Briefing Paper No.49 NATO, the EU, Ukraine, Russia and Crimea
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Briefing Paper No.49 3 April 2014 Contact: Dr. Ian Davis | +44 (0)7887 782389 Email: [email protected] www.natowatch.org NATO, the EU, Ukraine, Russia and Crimea: The “Reset” that was Never “Reset” By Hall Gardner Key Points: NATO needs to modify its open The Crimea crisis reveals the complete enlargement policy with respect to Ukraine failure of NATO, the EU and Russia to find a and the Caucasus in return for the path toward defense and security implementation of a regional “peace and cooperation in the post-Cold War era. development community” for the entire Black Sea and southern Caucasus region. Allied support for the “open enlargement” of NATO has continued to send the wrong It is crucial that Ukraine formally sustain its signals to both Kiev and Moscow. neutral, non-aligned status. Transatlantic reaction to the Russian The key challenge now is to find ways for annexation of the Crimea raises the the US, EU, Ukraine and Russia to prospects of continual, if not escalating, cooperate in a Contact Group, while NATO-European-Russian tensions. working with the NATO-Russia Council and NATO-Ukrainian Commission. There is a crucial need for a concerted US- EU-Russian policy to prevent Ukrainian A more decentralized Ukrainian federation state collapse, bankruptcy and socio- could be achieved through the political instability. establishment of at least two International Centers of Peace and Development in Lviv Two root causes of the current crisis were: and Kharkiv to serve as a bridge to help NATO's failure to address the regional develop the eastern and western regions of security needs of the Black Sea and Ukraine, while also linking Russia and Caucasus, including legitimate Russian Ukraine to Europe. A third center in security concerns (as opposed to failing Sevastopol could also help establish new to expand its membership and its forms of cooperation between Ukraine, mission to Georgia and Ukraine, which Europe, the United States and Russia. some have argued as a root cause); and A “grand compromise” between the US, The failure to sign an EU-Russia-Ukraine Europeans and Russia (by means of a agreement for economic cooperation in regional system of peace and development parallel with the EU-Ukraine association for the entire Black Sea and Caucasus) will agreement. require truly engaged diplomacy in which In order to keep open communication US, EU and Ukrainian 'vital' interests and channels with Moscow, the EU should those of Moscow are eventually redefined postpone aspects of the Association and reconciled. The alternative is a period Accords with Kiev that do not directly or of intense geopolitical and arms rivalry that indirectly include pro-Russian Ukrainian could soon prove even more dangerous interests in those discussions. than that of the Cold War. 1 Introduction particular, US and NATO refusal to incorporate Russian concerns during NATO’s “exceptional” The furtive Russian military intervention into the intervention against Russia’s ally Serbia in the Crimea today is a direct reaction to the war “over” Kosovo in 1999 helped lead to the uncoordinated “triple expansion”1 of NATO, the Russian backlash against NATO under Vladimir European Union plus American/European Putin. Although President Barack Obama and US defense and political economic interests and Vice President, Joe Biden, attempted to achieve military infrastructure into the so-called Russian a “reset” of US-Russian relations in the aftermath ‘near abroad’. This uncoordinated triple of the 2008 Georgia-Russia war, the fact of the expansion has been countered by Russian efforts matter is that the “re-set” was never “re-set”—in to check both NATO and EU enlargement, at the that Allied support for the “open enlargement” of same time that Moscow has been seeking to NATO has continued to send the wrong signals to build step-by-step a new Eurasian geostrategic both Kiev and Moscow. and political economic alliance in the aftermath of Soviet collapse. This rebuilding of Russia has In effect, Moscow’s rapid preemptive involved the formation of the Collective Security intervention in Crimea was intended to prevent Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Eurasian Customs the new EuroMaidan government in Kiev from Union (ECU), and Shanghai Cooperation evicting the Russian Black Sea fleet from Organization (SCO) (leading to closer Russian- Sevastopol, while concurrently hoping to check Chinese security and defense cooperation since closer Ukrainian ties with the European Union 2005). plus eventual Ukrainian membership in NATO. Nearly all members of the new Ukrainian President Putin’s actions in the Crimea have government, most prominently the new Prime revealed the complete failure of NATO, the EU Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, had been on the and Russia to find a path toward defense and record as wanting to re-negotiate, if not scrap, security cooperation in the post-Cold War era, the Kharkiv Accords that were implemented by given Russian opposition to NATO enlargement as Presidents Vladimir Putin and Viktor Yanokovich the primary means to achieve a new post-Cold in April 2010.3 The latter accord had agreed to War system of Euro-Atlantic security, and the US- extend the Ukrainian lease of the Russian Black European refusal or inability to develop Sea Feet until at least 2042. alternative Euro-Atlantic security options that could have been more inclusive of Moscow’s For his part, after the Russian takeover of Crimea, interests. Specifically, the US and Europeans had President Obama has stated that neither the US failed to find ways to bring the new Russian nor NATO wants to engage in conflict with Russia, Federation under Boris Yeltsin into a new Euro- and that the world has an interest “in a strong Atlantic security relationship prior to NATO’s and responsible Russia, not a weak one.” While decision to engage in an “open ended” arguing that Moscow needs to thoroughly engage enlargement— which was warned against by Cold itself in diplomacy in order to avoid deeper Warrior Paul Nitze in Congressional testimony.2 In isolation, Obama has likewise urged NATO allies to boost their defense expenditure.4 In short, 1 American and European reaction to the Russian On the “triple expansion” see Hall Gardner, NATO annexation of the Crimea raises the prospects of Expansion and US Strategy in Asia (New York: Palgrave, 2013) 2 In a letter to Senator Moynihan, Paul Nitze the US and its allies. It is not a sound basis for future forewarned: “NATO expansion distracts both us and stability in Europe, particularly when no current or the Russians from (the goal of lending political and projected threats warrant extending that alliance.” economic support to the development of a Congressional Record, vol. 144 Pt 5 (April 21-30, 1998), democratic, market-oriented society in Russia.) p. 6785. For Paul Nitze’s arguments, see Hall Gardner, Indeed, the open-ended expansion being proposed for Dangerous Crossroads (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997). the alliance points toward increasing friction with 3 post-Communist Russia for years to come. Driving Interview of Nicolai Petro Russia into a corner plays into the arguments of those 4 “Obama cites ‘moment of testing,’ urges Europeans most hostile to forging a productive relationship with to bolster NATO” 2 continual, if not escalating, NATO-European- threat to assert Russian interests in the Russian tensions. There is consequently a real Transnistria, if not in eastern Ukraine itself—if danger that a highly instable Ukraine could result these issues cannot soon be resolved in a much wider regional conflict at a time when diplomatically. It appears clear that Moscow there are already signs of a burgeoning NATO- seeks to assert Russian hegemony over Ukraine Russia arms race, involving intermediate range (in part by seeking to “federalize” the country)— missiles as well as tactical and strategic nuclear by using “diplomacy by other means” in weapons.5 Clausewitz’s terms. In response, President Obama has demanded that Russian troops presently In one sign that tensions could escalate, in late deployed on the frontier with eastern Ukraine be March 2014, American intelligence reported that pulled back; yet Moscow has not yet agreed, and Russian forces could soon attempt to establish a has thus far raised concerns about socio-political land link to Crimea through the ostensibly pro- instability, violence and the rise of anti-Russian Russian regions of eastern Ukraine.6 These and extreme rightwing movements.9 threats to Ukraine have taken place at the same time as the Russian military opted to engage in Nevertheless, even in a major crisis involving massive nuclear war drills, said to have been “diplomacy by other means,” there can planned months before.7 Yet these reports also sometimes arise an opportunity to negotiate came at the same time that Presidents Putin and appropriate policies to deal with that crisis. There Obama had just begun to discuss “ways in which is a crucial need for the implementation of a the international community can stabilize the concerted US-European-Russian policy that situation” in Putin’s words. 8 would be intended to prevent Ukrainian state collapse, bankruptcy and socio-political instability It is clear that President Putin is using power- from degenerating into a wider socio-political based strategic leveraging as a means to conflict. Such efforts must be taken to achieve legitimize the annexation of Crimea, with a tacit reconciliation at the national level within Ukraine itself and at the international level so that a neutral (and non-nuclear) Ukraine could truly 5 Ian Davis, “Tit-for-tat escalation in the Crimea crisis: serve as a bridge between the US, Europe and where will it end?” NATO Watch No 46 (19 March Russia, much as elder statesmen Mikhail 2014); NATO Watch News Brief: “Arms Control Gorbachev10 and Henry Kissinger,11 among Advocates Lose Hope on European Tactical Nukes” others, have proposed.