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General Introduction 1 Notes General Introduction 1. Hall Gardner, Surviving the Millennium: American Global Strategy, the Collapse of the Soviet Empire, and the Question of Peacee (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 225. In fact, after the Russian annexation of Crimea, Putin may have wanted Poland to commit troops to Ukraine. Ben Judah, “Putin’s Coup,” Politico Maga- zine (October 19, 2014), available at http://wwww.politico.com/magazine/story/ 2014/10/vladimir-putins-coup-112025_Page3.html#ixzz3Nms2WcFp. 2. Francis Fukuyama, “Book Review: Surviving the Millennium,” Foreign Affairs (April 1995), available at http://wwww.foreignaffairs.com/articles/50626/francis -fukuyama/surviving-the-millennium-american-global-strategyy-the-collapse-o. 3. Andrei Grachev, Gorbachev’s Gamblee (Cambridge: Polity, 2008). 4. See my earlier articles, Hall Gardner, “The Military Integration of Eastern Europe: Toward an Eastern Locarno?” in Defense: Next Step in European Inte- gration?? Cicero Paper 1, 1996; “Toward a Euro-Atlantic Compromise,” Focus, Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Washington, D.C., November 1997; “NATO Enlargement: Toward a Separate Euro-Atlantic Command” (Janu- ary 30, 1999), available at http://fas.org/man/nato/ceern/hallga2.htm. Two states that could have assisted NATO build a separate system of collective defense and security in eastern Europe in coordination with Russia would have been Austria and, particularly, Sweden in the Baltic region. Yet this was not the path taken. 5. Hall Gardner, Dangerous Crossroads: Europe, Russia and the Future of NATO (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997). 6. Gardner, Surviving the Millennium. It should be pointed out that Soviet disag- gregation was nott an explicit goal of US containment policy as initiallyy defined by NSC-68 in 1950. 7. Fukuyama recognized this concern with expanded NATO membership, arguing for either weighted voting (as if that were feasible in wartime conditions!) or del- egation to a smaller committee. See Fukuyama, America at the Crossroadss (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2006), 174. But doesn’t a smaller committee imply a select hierarchy against the principle of consensus? 8. Richard C. Holbrooke, assistant secretary of state for European and Canadian affairs, US Department of State, “Letter to Ambassador Davies” (July 25, 1995). My copy. 9. Richard C. Holbrooke, To End a Warr (New York: Random House, 1998), 21. 200 Notes 10. Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperityy (New York: Free Press, 1995); and Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon, 1993). 11.Gardner, Surviving the Millennium, chapter 2; Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man. 12. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs, Special Issue, 1990. 13. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, 336. 14. Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Declinee (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014). On the one hand, the failure of the US executive branch to develop a coherent and cost-effective post–Cold War global strategy, coupled with Republican and Democratic squabbling over which states should obtain huge defense contracts cannot be considered a consequence of “vetocracy.” On the other hand, given the rising governmental debts, bureaucratic attempts to cut US defense spending through an arbitrary and dangerous process of “seques- terization” can be considered a result of “vetocracy.” In his book, Fukuyama ironically redefines the “end of history” as the implementation of governmental reforms and development of an efficient state apparatus that does not necessarily have anything to do with “democratic liberalism.” And it was these reforms, he only tacitly admits, that assisted Prussian militarism and expansionism from the 1806 Battle of Jena onto World War I! But does this mean that his celebration of the “end of history” in 1989 now applies to Russian “liberal” reforms in the 1990s followed by Russian militarism and territorial expansionism at the turn of the millennium? 15. Hall Gardner, American Global Strategy and the “War on Terrorism”” (Farnham: Ashgate, 2007). 16. In a letter to Senator Moynihan, Nitze forewarned, “NATO expansion distracts both us and the Russians from (the goal of lending political and economic sup- port to the development of a democratic, market-oriented society in Russia.) . Indeed, the open-ended expansion being proposed for the alliance points toward increasing friction with post-Communist Russia for years to come. Driving Rus- sia into a corner plays into the arguments of those most hostile to forging a pro- ductive relationship with the US and its allies. It is not a sound basis for future stability in Europe, particularly when no current or projected threats warrant extending that alliance” Congressional Recordd, vol. 144, Pt 5 (April 21–30, 1998), 6785. 17. When asked why US-European-Russian relations were growing colder, Solzhenit- syn replied, “[I]n 1994, the Western world and its states were practically being worshipped . This mood started changing with the cruel NATO bombings of Serbia ... The situation then became worse when NATO started to spread its influence and draw the ex-Soviet republics into its structure. This was especially painful in the case of Ukraine, a country whose closeness to Russia is defined by literally millions of family ties among our peoples, relatives living on different sides of the national border. At one fell stroke, these families could be torn apart by a new dividing line, the border of a military bloc. So, the perception of the West as mostly a ‘knight of democracy’ has been replaced with the disappointed Notes 201 belief that pragmatism, often cynical and selfish, lies at the core of Western poli- cies. For many Russians it was a grave disillusion, a crushing of ideals.” Spiegel interview with Alexander Solzhenitsyn, “I Am Not Afraid of Death” (July 27, 2007), available at http://wwww.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-interview -with-alexander-solzhenitsyn-i-am-not-afraid-off-death-a-496211.html. 18. I argue that the League of Democracies concept is a misreading of Kant. Hall Gardner, Surviving the Millennium, chapter 2, 40–43; Gardner, American Global Strategy and the “War on Terrorism,”” chapters 2 and 7. 19. Fukuyama linked NATO with Kant’s League of Democracies in his neoconserva- tive phase (End of History and the Last Man, 283). But he does not entirely dis- miss that claim in his “admittedly awkward” (his locution) “realistic Wilsonian” phase (America at the Crossroads, preface and chapters 6 and 7). In that book, Fukuyama discusses the pros and cons of a global League of Democracies, as well as multilateral security accords that could include China, for example, plus the concept of “shared sovereignty.” Fukuyama then ends his mea culpaa with praise for Bismarck as a model for a so-called new Wilsonian realism. But Bismarck was not a proponent of collective security or shared sovereignty over Alsace-Lorraine! On Bismarck and Alsace Lorraine, see Hall Gardner, The Failure to Prevent World War I (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015). 20. The NGO NATOWatch.orgg, founded by Ian Davis, offers a fair and balanced critique of NATO “transparency.” 21. Dmitri Medvedev, “Speech at Meeting with German Political, Parliamentary and Civic Leaders” (Berlin: June 5, 2008). This speech took place before the April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, where President Putin appeared to question Ukrainian sovereignty. By November 29, after the Georgia-Russia War, Med- vedev presented his draft European security treaty to the EU, NATO, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The proposal’s goal was to create a single, indivisible space in the sphere of military-political security in the Euro-Atlantic region. 22.Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decline. The intense conflict between centralized democratic liberalism and more decentralized modes of governance in Ukraine points to the reality that there are a multiplicity of “ideas” of democ- racy, which may not at all prove compatible. Moreover, the fact that the struggle in eastern Ukraine has involved the pressures of external actors on both sides works to undermine the prospects for “pure” democracy within one state that is not affected by outside forces. Both these points question the “idea” (in the singular) that liberal democracy represents the “end of history.” Other forms of “democracy” are possible! 23. On the German/European need to support federalism in Ukraine, see Anatol Lieven, “Ukraine: The Way Out,” New York Review of Bookss (June 5, 1014), available at http://wwww.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2014/may/05/ukraine-only -way-to-peace/. 24. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” The National Interestt (Summer, 1989), 3–18. 25.Fukuyama, Book Review: “Surviving the Millennium,” Foreign Affairss (April 1995). In asserting that I had presented a “familiar” history of the Cold War (as if 202 Notes it were common knowledge that the basis of the 1973 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty could be found in Soviet proposals as early as 1947 or that the roots of Gorbachev’s unilateral nuclear and conventional arms reductions could be found in the demilitarized nuclear and conventional weapons zone as proposed in the series of Rapacki/Bulganin plans in 1958, 1962, and 1964), Fukuyama missed the key point: just because certain policies may have failed in one epoch does not mean that similar policies will necessarily fail in differing circumstances in a future epoch. 26. Hall Gardner, Surviving the Millennium, chapters 1–2 and p. 231, note 1. My defi- nition of double containment significantly differed from that of Wolfram H. Hanre- ider, Germany, America, Europee (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989). 27. See Hall Gardner, Dangerous Crossroads: Europe, Russia and the Future of NATO. 28. Hall Gardner, “NATO Enlargement and Geohistory,” in Carl C. Hodge, ed., NATO for a New Centuryy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002). 29. Edmund Burke, “Remarks on the Policies of the Allies with Respect to France (1793)” The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, vol.
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