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General Introduction 1. Hall Gardner, Surviving the Millennium: American Global Strategy, the Collapse of the Soviet Empire, and the Question of Peacee (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 225. In fact, after the Russian annexation of Crimea, Putin may have wanted Poland to commit troops to Ukraine. Ben Judah, “Putin’s Coup,” Politico Maga- zine (October 19, 2014), available at http://wwww.politico.com/magazine/story/ 2014/10/vladimir-putins-coup-112025_Page3.html#ixzz3Nms2WcFp. 2. Francis Fukuyama, “Book Review: Surviving the Millennium,” Foreign Affairs (April 1995), available at http://wwww.foreignaffairs.com/articles/50626/francis -fukuyama/surviving-the-millennium-american-global-strategyy-the-collapse-o. 3. Andrei Grachev, Gorbachev’s Gamblee (Cambridge: Polity, 2008). 4. See my earlier articles, Hall Gardner, “The Military Integration of Eastern Europe: Toward an Eastern Locarno?” in Defense: Next Step in European Inte- gration?? Cicero Paper 1, 1996; “Toward a Euro-Atlantic Compromise,” Focus, Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Washington, D.C., November 1997; “NATO Enlargement: Toward a Separate Euro-Atlantic Command” (Janu- ary 30, 1999), available at http://fas.org/man/nato/ceern/hallga2.htm. Two states that could have assisted NATO build a separate system of collective defense and security in eastern Europe in coordination with Russia would have been Austria and, particularly, Sweden in the Baltic region. Yet this was not the path taken. 5. Hall Gardner, Dangerous Crossroads: Europe, Russia and the Future of NATO (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997). 6. Gardner, Surviving the Millennium. It should be pointed out that Soviet disag- gregation was nott an explicit goal of US containment policy as initiallyy defined by NSC-68 in 1950. 7. Fukuyama recognized this concern with expanded NATO membership, arguing for either weighted voting (as if that were feasible in wartime conditions!) or del- egation to a smaller committee. See Fukuyama, America at the Crossroadss (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2006), 174. But doesn’t a smaller committee imply a select hierarchy against the principle of consensus? 8. Richard C. Holbrooke, assistant secretary of state for European and Canadian affairs, US Department of State, “Letter to Ambassador Davies” (July 25, 1995). My copy. 9. Richard C. Holbrooke, To End a Warr (New York: Random House, 1998), 21. 200 Notes

10. Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperityy (New York: Free Press, 1995); and Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon, 1993). 11.Gardner, Surviving the Millennium, chapter 2; Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man. 12. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs, Special Issue, 1990. 13. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, 336. 14. Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Declinee (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014). On the one hand, the failure of the US executive branch to develop a coherent and cost-effective post–Cold War global strategy, coupled with Republican and Democratic squabbling over which states should obtain huge defense contracts cannot be considered a consequence of “vetocracy.” On the other hand, given the rising governmental debts, bureaucratic attempts to cut US defense spending through an arbitrary and dangerous process of “seques- terization” can be considered a result of “vetocracy.” In his book, Fukuyama ironically redefines the “end of history” as the implementation of governmental reforms and development of an efficient state apparatus that does not necessarily have anything to do with “democratic liberalism.” And it was these reforms, he only tacitly admits, that assisted Prussian militarism and expansionism from the 1806 Battle of Jena onto World War I! But does this mean that his celebration of the “end of history” in 1989 now applies to Russian “liberal” reforms in the 1990s followed by Russian militarism and territorial expansionism at the turn of the millennium? 15. Hall Gardner, American Global Strategy and the “War on Terrorism”” (Farnham: Ashgate, 2007). 16. In a letter to Senator Moynihan, Nitze forewarned, “NATO expansion distracts both us and the Russians from (the goal of lending political and economic support to the development of a democratic, market-oriented society in Russia.) . . . Indeed, the open-ended expansion being proposed for the alliance points toward increasing friction with post-Communist Russia for years to come. Driving Rus- sia into a corner plays into the arguments of those most hostile to forging a pro- ductive relationship with the US and its allies. It is not a sound basis for future stability in Europe, particularly when no current or projected threats warrant extending that alliance” Congressional Recordd, vol. 144, Pt 5 (April 21–30, 1998), 6785. 17. When asked why US-European-Russian relations were growing colder, Solzhenit- syn replied, “[I]n 1994, the Western world and its states were practically being worshipped . . . This mood started changing with the cruel NATO bombings of Serbia ... The situation then became worse when NATO started to spread its influence and draw the ex-Soviet republics into its structure. This was especially painful in the case of Ukraine, a country whose closeness to Russia is defined by literally millions of family ties among our peoples, relatives living on different sides of the national border. At one fell stroke, these families could be torn apart by a new dividing line, the border of a military bloc. So, the perception of the West as mostly a ‘knight of democracy’ has been replaced with the disappointed Notes 201

belief that pragmatism, often cynical and selfish, lies at the core of Western policies. For many Russians it was a grave disillusion, a crushing of ideals.” Spiegel interview with Alexander Solzhenitsyn, “I Am Not Afraid of Death” (July 27, 2007), available at http://wwww.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-interview -with-alexander-solzhenitsyn-i-am-not-afraid-off-death-a-496211.html. 18. I argue that the League of Democracies concept is a misreading of Kant. Hall Gardner, Surviving the Millennium, chapter 2, 40–43; Gardner, American Global Strategy and the “War on Terrorism,”” chapters 2 and 7. 19. Fukuyama linked NATO with Kant’s League of Democracies in his neoconserva- tive phase (End of History and the Last Man, 283). But he does not entirely dis- miss that claim in his “admittedly awkward” (his locution) “realistic Wilsonian” phase (America at the Crossroads, preface and chapters 6 and 7). In that book, Fukuyama discusses the pros and cons of a global League of Democracies, as well as multilateral security accords that could include China, for example, plus the concept of “shared sovereignty.” Fukuyama then ends his mea culpaa with praise for Bismarck as a model for a so-called new Wilsonian realism. But Bismarck was not a proponent of collective security or shared sovereignty over Alsace-Lorraine! On Bismarck and Alsace Lorraine, see Hall Gardner, The Failure to Prevent World War I (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015). 20. The NGO NATOWatch.orgg, founded by Ian Davis, offers a fair and balanced critique of NATO “transparency.” 21. Dmitri Medvedev, “Speech at Meeting with German Political, Parliamentary and Civic Leaders” (Berlin: June 5, 2008). This speech took place before the April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, where President Putin appeared to question Ukrainian sovereignty. By November 29, after the Georgia-Russia War, Med- vedev presented his draft European security treaty to the EU, NATO, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The proposal’s goal was to create a single, indivisible space in the sphere of military-political security in the Euro-Atlantic region. 22.Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decline. The intense conflict between centralized democratic liberalism and more decentralized modes of governance in Ukraine points to the reality that there are a multiplicity of “ideas” of democracy, which may not at all prove compatible. Moreover, the fact that the struggle in eastern Ukraine has involved the pressures of external actors on both sides works to undermine the prospects for “pure” democracy within one state that is not affected by outside forces. Both these points question the “idea” (in the singular) that liberal democracy represents the “end of history.” Other forms of “democracy” are possible! 23. On the German/European need to support federalism in Ukraine, see Anatol Lieven, “Ukraine: The Way Out,” New York Review of Bookss (June 5, 1014), available at http://wwww.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2014/may/05/ukraine-only -way-to-peace/. 24. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” The National Interestt (Summer, 1989), 3–18. 25.Fukuyama, Book Review: “Surviving the Millennium,” Foreign Affairss (April 1995). In asserting that I had presented a “familiar” history of the Cold War (as if 202 Notes

it were common knowledge that the basis of the 1973 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty could be found in Soviet proposals as early as 1947 or that the roots of Gorbachev’s unilateral nuclear and conventional arms reductions could be found in the demilitarized nuclear and conventional weapons zone as proposed in the series of Rapacki/Bulganin plans in 1958, 1962, and 1964), Fukuyama missed the key point: just because certain policies may have failed in one epoch does not mean that similar policies will necessarily fail in differing circumstances in a future epoch. 26. Hall Gardner, Surviving the Millennium, chapters 1–2 and p. 231, note 1. My defi- nition of double containment significantly differed from that of Wolfram H. Hanre- ider, Germany, America, Europee (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989). 27. See Hall Gardner, Dangerous Crossroads: Europe, Russia and the Future of NATO. 28. Hall Gardner, “NATO Enlargement and Geohistory,” in Carl C. Hodge, ed., NATO for a New Centuryy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002). 29. Edmund Burke, “Remarks on the Policies of the Allies with Respect to France (1793)” The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, vol. 4, available at http://wwww.gutenberg.org/files/15700/15700-h/15700-h.htm. 30. Ibid. 31. On the 30-year Russia-China gas deal, see “The New Non-Aggression Pact,” Wall Street Journall, available at http://wwww.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424 052702303480304579576052453731102. Russia and China could also be planning to create an international payment system linking the ruble and remimbi to replace the SWIFT system so as to reduce the ability of the United States and Europe to impose financial sanctions against them. In addition, both states have been attempting to restrict Internet access and create their own nationally controlled data networks, plus reduce trade, financial, and communication links with the West. Whether this is successful remains to be seen. Fyodor Lukyanov, “Global Aikido: Russia’s Asymmetrical Response to the Ukraine Crisis,” Russia in Global Affairs (December 13, 2014), available at http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/redcol/Global -Aikido-Russias-Asymmetrical-Response-to-the-Ukraine-Crisis-17177. 32. Hall Gardner, NATO Expansion and US Strategy in Asiaa (New York: Palgrave, 2013). 33. On the insecurity-security dialectic, see Hall Gardner, “Alienation and the Ori- gins and Prevention of War,” in Hall Gardner and Oleg Kobtzeff, eds., The Ash- gate Research Companion to Warr (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012).

Chapter 1 1. Zbigniew Brzezinski, “What Is to Be Done? Putin’s Aggression in Ukraine Needs a Response,” Washington Postt (March 3, 2014). 2. Philip Rucker, “Hillary Clinton’s Putin-Hitler Comments Draw Rebukes as She Wades into Ukraine Conflict,” Washington Postt (March 5, 2014), available at http://wwww.washingtonpost.com/politics/hillary-clintons-putin-hitler-comments -draw-rebukes-as-she-wades-into-ukraine-conflict/2014/03/05/31a748d8 -a486–11e3–84d4-e59b1709222cc_storyy.html. Notes 203

3. “McCain, Rubio, and Graham Appreciate Hillary Clinton’s Putin-as-Hitler Analogy,” Slatee (March 5, 2014) available at http://wwww.slate.com/blogs/weigel/ 2014/03/05/mccain_rubio_and_graham_appreciate_hillary_clinton_s_putin _as_hitler_analogyy.html. 4. Garry Kasparov, “Vladimir Putin and the Lessons of 1938” (March 16, 2014), available at http://wwww.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/03/vladmir-putin -crimea-hitler-1938–104711.html#.U99la2OUlqg. Kasparov questions what is the right analogy: “Is it Budapest 1956? Prague 1968? Austria 1938?” 5. US Senator Lindsay Graham put it this way: “[Clinton’s] right in this regard: The excuse given by Hitler, when going into the Sudetenland, was that he had to protect the German people. But I don’t think either of us are saying Putin is Hitler,” Slatee (March 5, 2014). 6. On the analogy of Putin to Mussolini, see Marcel van Herpen, Putin’s Wars: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014). 7. Henry Kissinger pointed out that the “demonization of Vladimir Putin is not a policy; it is an alibi for the absence of one.” Henry Kissinger, “How the Ukraine Crisis Ends,” Washington Postt (March 5, 2014). Dmitri Simes argues that Obama’s demonization of Putin is pushing Russia and China closer (“How Obama Is Driving Russia and China Together,” The National Interestt [June 24, 2014]). Simes ironically compares Obama to Russia’s last tsar, Nicholas II, who professed to be a man of peace: much as Russia drove Japan into war in 1904, the United States is driving Russia into war by believing it can respond as it pleases to Moscow’s conduct in Ukraine without taking any real risks. 8.The Estonian cyberattacks can be considered a popular pro-Russian “cyber-riot” intended “to get back at Estonia” for moving the Soviet World War II memo- rial of the unknown soldier, in which some militants used more advanced cyber techniques than others. Gadi Evron, “Authoritatively, Who Was behind the Estonian Attacks?” Dark Readingg (March 17, 2009), available at http://www .darkreading.com/risk/authoritatively-who-was-behind-the-estonian-attacks/d/ d-id/1130584. 9. Groups like Svoboda and Right Sector, who consider themselves “national democratic” and not pro-Western, see themselves as playing a fundamental role in helping overthrow Yanukovych and in preventing Russia from “subjugating” the country, while more moderate members of the interim government believe they can “co-opt” such militant parties. Critics argue these parties hold more power behind the scenes than their numbers reveal. On the significance of the far right from a pro-Maidan Ukrainian perspective, see Anton Shekhovtsov, “A Response to Cas Mudde’s ‘A New (Order) Ukraine,’” Open Democracyy (March 3, 2014), available at http://opendemocracyy.net/anton-shekhovtsov/response-to -cas-mudde%E2%80%99s-Ukraine-Far-RIght-How-Real-Russia. 10. Putin’s advisor on Eurasian integration, Sergei Glazyev, argued in early February 2014 for the “federalization” of Ukraine. This would help bring the southeastern part of Ukraine closer to the Russia-led Eurasian Customs Union. See more at: Stefan Meister, “Crimea: what does Putin want?” European Council on Foreign Relationss (March 6, 2014), available at http://ecfr.eu/blog/entry/crimeaa_what _does_putin_want#sthash.0vt9fYP6.dpuf. 204 Notes

11. Rajan Menon and Devin T. Stewart, “Ukraine: The New Cuban Missile Crisis?,” Carnegie Councill (February 22, 2015), available at http://wwww.carnegiecouncil .org/publications/articles_papers_reports/724. 12. European Parliament, “Texts Adopted” (February 25, 2010), available at http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubReff=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA -2010-0035+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 13. Maxine David, Marlene Laurelle, and Andrei Tsygankov, “No. 158: Russian For- eign Policy and the Ukraine Crisis,” Russian Analytical Digest (RAD). Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich; Research Centre for East European Studies, University of Bremen; Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, George Washington University (2014), available at http://wwww.css.ethz .ch/publications/pdfs/Russian_Analytical_Digest_158.pdf. 14. Margaret MacMillan, Dangerous Gamess (New York: Modern Library, 2010), pp. 160–61. 15. “Godwin’s Law” https://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/ Godwin_s_laww.html. 16. Philip Rucker, “Hillary Clinton’s Putin-Hitler Comments Draw Rebukes as She Wades into Ukraine Conflict,” Washington Postt (March 5, 2014), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/zbigniew-brzezinski-after-putins -aggression-in-ukraine-the-west-must-be-ready-to-respond/2014/03/03/25b3f928 -a2f5–11e3–84d4-e59b1709222cc_storyy.html. Hillary Clinton has been hawkish in support of the wars in Iraq and Libya, in addition to backing NATO’s “open enlargement” to Ukraine and Georgia once they meet NATO standards. 17. Gardner, NATO Expansion and US Strategy in Asia. See also Hall Gardner “The Reset Was Never Reset,” NATO Watch, 49 (April 3, 2014), available at http:// wwww.natowatch.org/sites/default/files/briefing_paper_no_49_-_ukraine_russia _crimea.pdf. 18. David Birnbaum, “In Kremlin Speech, Putin Rails at West, Tries to Bolster Economy as Recession Looms,” Washington Postt (December 4, 2014), available at http://wwww.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/in-kremlin-economy -speech-putin-rails-at-west-tries-to-avert-russia-recession/2014/12/04/ f940afe8–79b4–11e4–8241–8cc0a3670239_storyy.html. 19. Vladimir Putin, interview with Radio Europe 1 and TF1 TV, available at http:// eng.kremlin.ru/news/22441#sel=. 20. Ibid. 21. Henry Kissinger, “Do We Achieve World Order through Chaos or Insight?,” Spiegell interview, available at http://wwww.spiegel.de/international/world/ interview-with-henry-kissinger-on-state-off-global-politics-a-1002073.html. Mikhail Gorbachev stated, “The world is on the brink of a new Cold War. Some say that it has already begun” (Bettina Borgfeld, “Gorbachev Says World Is on Brink of New Cold War,” Reuters [November 8, 2014], available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/08/us-ukraine-crisis-gorbachev -idUSKBN0IS0QC20141108). Some have argued that the Cold War never really ended and that it was the United States that failed to end it. John Feffer, “The Cold War Never Ended,” Institute for Policy Studiess (September 10, 2014), available at http://wwww.ips-dc.org/cold-war-never-ended/. For a comparison Notes 205

with the Cuban Missile Crisis, see William R. Polk, “The Cuban Missile Cri- sis in Reverse” (February 24, 2015), available at http://wwww.williampolk.com/ assets/the-cuban-missile-crisis-in-reverse.pdf. 22. Roger Cohen, “Yes, It Could Happen Again,” The Atlanticc (July 29, 2014), available at http://wwww.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/08/yes-it-could -happen-again/373465/?single_page=true. See also, Major General Giorgio Spagnol, “The Ukrainian Crisis: Prodrome to the Third World War?” Work- ing Paper 15––20144 (June 11, 2014), Brussels: Institut Européen des Relations Internationales. 23. See Edward Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939 (New York: Perennial, 2001). 24. Norman Podhoretz, World War IV: The Long Struggle against Islamofascism (New York: Doubleday, 2007). 25. Chester A. Crocker, “The Place of Grand Strategy, Statecraft and Power in Conflict Management,” in Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided Worldd, edited by Crocker, Aalls, and Hampson (Washington, DC: USIP, 2007). 26. On the pre––World War I analogy, see George Liska, Quest for Equilibrium (Balti- more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977); George Liska, Russia and the Road to Appeasementt (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politicss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). For a list of anecdotall references to the pre––World War I analogy, see Hall Gardner, Alternatives to Global Warr (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), pp. 223–27. 27. Hall Gardner, American Global Strategy and the “War on Terrorism.” 28. “An Interview with Henry A. Kissinger: ‘We Were Never Close to Nuclear War,’” Washington Postt (August 11, 1985), L8. 29. William Russell Mead, “In the Footsteps of the Kaiser: China Boosts US Power in Asia,” The American Interestt (September 26, 2010), available at http://wwww.the -american-interest.com/wrm/2010/09/26/in-the-footsteps-off-the-kaiser-china -boosts-us-power-in-asia/; Edward N. Luttwak, “China’s Military Adventurism Is Ill-Timed,” Wall Street Journall (December 29, 2013) available at http://online.wsj .com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303345104579286480552285954; Joseph Nye, “1914 Revisited?” Project Syndicatee (January 13, 2014) available at http://wwww.project-syndicate.org/commentary/joseph-s—nye-asks-whether -war-between-china-and-the-us-is-as-inevitable-as-many-believe-world-war-i-to -have-been#qBCGT7X665PBrOz4.99. 30. Aaron Friedberg, “Will Europe’s Past Be Asia’s Future?” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 42 (3), 2000, 147–59. 31.Nialls Ferguson, “‘Chimerica’ Is Headed for Divorce,” Niall Ferguson website (August 31, 2009), available at http://wwww.niallferguson.com/site/FERG/ Templates/ArticleItem.aspx?pageid=210. For a list of differing theories, see Wash- ington’s Blog, “Top Financial Experts Say World War 3 Is Coming . . . Unless We Stop It” (August 1, 2014), available at http://wwww.washingtonsblog.com/2014/ 07/war-2.html. 206 Notes

32. James Holmes, “Three Reasons Why China Isn’t Imperial Germany (It’s Tougher),” available at http://thediplomat.com/2013/03/three-reasons-why -china-isnt-imperial-germany-its-tougher/4/. In this view, China has less immediate major military threats than imperial Germany, such as France and Russia; the United States is a distant rival unlike Great Britain in relationship to Ger- many; and unlike imperial Germany, China can now support its sea power with airpower and antiship missiles. 33. Victor Davis Hanson, “China Believes It’s Now Time for Its Military to Reflect Its Economic Power,” National Revieww (January 9, 2014) available at http:// www.nationalrevieww.com/article/367886/changes-pacific-return-1930s-victor-davis -hanson. 34. On December 23, 1989, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States vetoed a draft United Nations Security Council resolution, backed by Moscow and Beijing as well as by the seven nonpermanent council members who had introduced the resolution, that demanded the immediate withdrawal of US forces from Panama. Washington cited the right to protect 35,000 Americans. The United States additionally failed to win any international support outside its traditional European allies for the newly installed Panamanian regime. Paul Lewis, “Fighting in Panama: United Nations; Security Council Condemnation of Invasion Vetoed,” New York Times (December 24, 1989), available at http://www.nytimes .com/1989/12/24/world/fighting-panama-united-nations-security-council -condemnation-invasion-vetoed.html. 35. Greg Grandin, “How the US Created a ‘Little Hiroshima’ in Central America,” The Nation (December 22, 2014), available at http://wwww.thenation.com/ article/193505/how-us-created-little-hiroshima-central-america. 36. David Klion, “The Best Historical Analogy for Crimea Doesn’t Involve Nazis: For precedent, look to Cyprus instead of Poland,” New Republicc (March 7, 2014) available at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/116931/putin-invades-crimea -nazi-analogy-isnt-best-europe. 37. Other annexations include the Jordanian annexation of the West Bank (1950); Ethiopian annexation of Eritrea (1962); Indonesian annexation of East Timor (1975–76), and the Moroccan (and initially Mauritanian) annexation of the Western Sahara (1975). This is not to overlook the Soviet annexation of eastern Poland (Galicia and Volhynia) in 1939–40, ostensibly to protect Ukrainian and Belarusian (White Ruthenian) minorities. Moscow also annexed parts of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina in June 1940 from Romania, in addition to annexing Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in June, plus eastern Karelia and Pet- samo from Finland in 1941. After the collapse of the secret Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union and occupied the three Baltic states from 1941 to 1944, until the Soviet Union returned, occupying the Baltic states from 1994 to 1991. The United States and Europe refused to recognize the three Baltic states until after their de facto independence from Soviet con- trols in 1991. Soviet annexation of two northern Kurile Islands/northern territories and South Sakhalin in 1945 remains an issue of contention between Russia and Japan. Notes 207

Chapter 2 1. The threat to turn the Euromaidan protests into an armed struggle may have forced Yanukovich to flee. If so, the affair had elements of a staged coup d’etat. See International New York Timess (January 5, 2014), 1; 4. 2. Nearly all members of the new Ukrainian Euromaidan government, most promi- nently the new Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, had been on the record as wanting to renegotiate, if not scrap, the Kharkiv Accords. Interview of Nicolai Petro Nicolai N. Petro and David C. Speedie, “Crisis in Ukraine: Crimean Stand- Off,” Carnegie Councill (March 4, 2014), available at http://www.carnegiecouncil .org/studio/multimedia/20140304/index.html. 3. Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A Historyy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); and Alexander J. Motyl, Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1993), pp. 101–2. 4. The 1829 Treaty of Adrianople forced Turkey to recognize Russian control over the mouth of Danube with its islands, the whole Caucasian Black Sea coast from the mouth of Kuban river to the north border of Adjara (an autonomous part of Georgia today). Turkey also acknowledged the annexation of Georgia, Imere- tia, Mingrelia, and Guria, as well as the Khanates of Erivan and Nakhicheva (Azerbaijan) to Russia that were taken by St. Petersburg from Iran according to the 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchay. “Adrianople treaty signed,” Presidential Library (September 14, 1829), available at http://wwww.prlib.ru/en-us/History/Pages/ Item.aspx?itemid=1152. 5. Mara Kozelsky, “The Crimean War, 1853–56,” Kritika, 13, No. 4 (Fall 2012), 903–17. 6. The Declaration of Paris opened the door for the distribution of Austrian, Brit- ish, and French merchandise and was, in turn, seen by Russia as causing consid- erable damage to Russia’s exports. “Laws of War: Declaration of Paris, April 16, 1856,” Avalon Projectt, Yale Law School, available at http://avalon.laww.yale.edu/ 19th_century/decparis.asp; “Russia Initiated the Repeal of the Black Sea Neu- tralization,” Yeltsin Presidential Library, available at http://wwww.prlib.ru/en-us/ History/Pages/Item.aspx?itemid=301. 7. Serbian nationalists and Russian and French elites all had reasons to oppose Archduke Franz Ferdinand, who hoped to incorporate Serbia into the Austro- Hungarian Empire, revive the Dreikaiserbundd, and to break the Franco-Russian alliance. See Hall Gardner, The Failure to Prevent World War I (Farnham: Ash- gate, 2015). 8. Vinichenko, “Ukrainian Proclamation on Independence,” Firstworldwar.com (November 20, 1917), available at http://wwww.firstworldwar.com/source/ ukraine_vinichenko1.htm. 9. Ibid. 10. Lenin: “Ultimatum Against Ukrainian Independence,” Firstworldwarr.com (December 17, 1917), available at http://wwww.firstworldwar.com/source/ukraine _lenin1.htm. 11. Ivan L. Rudnytsky, “The Fourth Universal and Its Ideological Antecedents,” in Taras Hunchak, ed., The Ukraine, 1917–1921: A Study in Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 201, cited in Kataryna Wolczuk, The 208 Notes

Moulding of Ukraine: The Constitutional Politics of State Formation (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001), available at http://books.openedition .org/ceup/1739. 12. “Peace Treaty between Ukraine and Central Powers,” Firstworldwar. com (February 9, 1918), available http://wwww.firstworldwar.com/source/ ukrainianpeacetreatyy.htm. 13. In the “Act of Unity” (Akt Sobornostii), “the concept of Sobornistt’, which until then referred to the ecclesiastical unity of the Orthodox Church, came to denote the unification of all historical Ukrainian territories into one state. The enlarged Ukrainian state was to be quasi-federal as Galicia was to maintain its autonomy as a Western Ukrainian Oblast of the UNR (ZOUNR).” Kataryna Wolczuk, The Moulding of Ukraine; and Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, p. 362. 14. Orlando Figes, A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891–1914 (New York: Penguin, 1996), pp. 706–8. 15. Kataryna Wolczuk, The Moulding of Ukraine; and Orest Subtelny Ukraine: A History. 16. “Hitler’s Reply To the President’s Message on the Threat of War,” The American Presidency Projectt (September 27, 1938), available at http://wwww.presidencyy.ucsb .edu/ws/?pid=15543. 17. Richard Pipes, Survival Is Not Enoughh (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983). 18. In Kievan Rusʹ, the vechee () was a town assembly of free men, but it was severely restricted by the Mongols. Dustin Hosseini, “The Effects of the Mon- gol Empire on Russia,” The School of Russian and Asian Studiess (December 12, 2005), available at http://wwww.sras.org/the_effects_off_the_mongol_empire_on _russia. See also Fukuyama, “Political Order and Decay,” 394. One can debate whether the vechee was truly “democratic” or was controlled by the boyars. 19. Hall Gardner, The Failure to Prevent World War I. 20. Western Ukraine practiced parliamentarianism since 1867, despite its significant imperfections. By contrast, parliamentary forms of governance were not fully developed in eastern Ukraine. Yet sociopolitical rivalries and military conflict tended to lead to the acceptance of authoritarian leaderships in both eastern and western Ukraine prior to the Soviet era. Kataryna Wolczuk, The Moulding of Ukraine: The Constitutional Politics of State Formation (Budapest: Central Euro- pean University Press, 2001).

Chapter 3 1. During the Holodomor, Stalin attempted to Russify millions in the North Caucasus and Eastern Slobozhanshchyna, an essentially ethnic Ukrainian territory that is currently in the Kursk, Belgorod, and Voronezh Oblasts of the Russian Federation, as well as in part of the Sumy, Kharkiv, and Luhansk Oblasts in Ukraine. Oleksandr Kramar, “Unknown Eastern Ukraine,” Ukrai- nian Weekk (March 14, 2012), available at http://ukrainianweek.com/History/ 43727. 2. Mark Kramer, “The Transfer of Crimea from Soviet Russia to Soviet Ukraine, 1954,” Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars CWIHP e-Dossier No. 47, available at Notes 209

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/why-did-russia-give-away-crimea -sixty-years-ago. 3. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Interview, Forbess (August 5, 2008), available at http:// www.forbes.com/2008/08/05/solzhenitsyn-forbes-interview-oped-cx_pm _0804russia.html. 4. President George Bush (August 1, 1991) stated that “Americans will not support those who seek independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism. They will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred. We will support those who want to build democracy.” Available at http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Chicken_Kiev_speech. See also Bush’s views in 2004, available at http://wwww.washingtontimes.com/news/2004/may/ 23/20040523–101623–2724r/. 5. Andrei Gratchev, Gorbachev’s Gamblee (Cambridge: Polity, 2008). 6. Marilyn Berger, “Boris Yeltsin, Russia’s First Post-Soviet Leader, Is Dead,” New York Timess (April 23, 2007), available at http://wwww.nytimes.com/2007/04/23/ world/europe/23cnd-yeltsin.html?pagewanted=print&_r=0. 7. Dick Cheney wanted the United States to establish closer relations with the ex- Soviet Republics, while James Baker supported a stronger central government. See http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/09/world/noting-soviet-eclipse-baker-sees -arms-risks.html and http://oralhistoryy.org.ua/en/interview-en/287/. 8. “Aggressive US posture might strengthen the resolve of Japan to resist the Soviets and then cooperate with US forces, and even encourage the Chinese to cooperate with the West.” See Martin L. Lasater, “US Maritime Strategy in the West Pacific in the 1990s,” Strategic Revieww (Summer 1990), 21. 9. Paul Goble, “Ten Issues in Search of a Policy,” Current Historyy (October 1993), 305–8. 10. Le Mondee (January 25, 1992); “Minsk Agreement on Strategic Forces” (Decem- ber 30, 1991), available at http://wwww.bits.de/NRANEU/START/documents/ strategicforces91.htm. 11. Stepan Kisseliov, “Ou va la Russie,” Les Nouvelles de Moscou, No. 42 (Octo- ber 22, 1991), 1–3. 12. Financial Timess (November 21, 1991), 3. 13. Wall Street Journall (November 15–16, 1991); Minsk Agreement on Strate- gic Forces (December 30, 1991), available at http://wwww.bits.de/NRANEU/ START/documents/strategicforces91.htm. 14. Paul Kolstoe, Russians in the Former Soviet Republicss (Bloomington: Indiana Uni- versity Press, 1995), 190–99. Here, one can raise the pitfalls and legitimacy of plebiscites in general. See Peter Emerson, “Majority Rule: A Cause of War?” in Hall Gardner and Oleg Kobtzeff, eds., The Ashgate Research Companion to War. 15.“Ukraine Finds ‘Active Independence’ despite Military and Other Obstacles,” New York Timess (September 6, 1992), available at http://wwww.nytimes.com/ 1992/09/06/world/ukraine-finds-active-independence-despite-military-and -other-obstacles.html?src=pm&pagewanted=2. Motyl, Dilemmas of Indepen- dence, 108. Motyl lists Russian and Ukrainian policy decisions that exacerbated tensions. Some Ukrainian legislators opposed ratifying the Strategic Arms Reduc- tion Treaty and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty because Moscow threatened 210 Notes

Kiev over Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet. Moscow was also accused of stirring up nationalism around Donetsk and Donbass. 16. NATO, Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, available at http://www .nato.int/docu/comm/49–95/c911108a.htm. 17. Norman Kempster, “Just Kidding, Russian Says after Cold War Blast Stuns Euro- peans,” LA Timess (December 15, 1992), available at http://articles.latimes.com/ 1992–12–15/news/mn-2214_1_foreign-ministers. 18. “Yeltsin: Help Is Urgent,” Seattle Timess (March 3, 1993), available at http:// community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19930317&slug= 1690960. 19. Cited in Victor Zaborsky, “Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet in Russian-Ukrainian Relations,” Discussion Paper 95-11, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University (September 1995), available at http://belfercenter .ksg.harvard.edu/files/disc_paper_95_11.pdf. 20. National Security Archives, The George Washington University, available at http://wwww.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb245/index.htm. 21. Cited by Paul H. Nitze and Robert W. Chandler in “At What Price an Enlarged NATO” (May 16, 1995). Draft editorial, not published. 22. Marshall Lee and Wolfgang Michalka, Germany Foreign Policy, 1917––33 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1987). 23. Motyl, Dilemmas, 122–23. 24. Roman Popadiuk continued, “That statement was huge! I had the defense ministry, the foreign ministry calling me. ‘Are you sure Mr. Ambassador? Is this what you said, is this what the United States has said?’ I said ‘Yes. This is what the United States has said.’ Not the Embassy, I said the United States of America. It went like wildfire, and the Ukrainians were really pleased. I think that helped a lot,” The Collapse of the Soviet Union: Oral History of Independent Ukraine, available at http://oralhistoryy.org.ua/en/interview-en/287/. In the long term, the significance was even larger than Mr. Popadiuk could have imagined. 25.Solzhenitsyn may have supported a pan-Russian empire, but it was not to be achieved by force: “. . . never, under any circumstances, will either I or my sons join in a Russian-Ukrainian clash, no matter how some hotheads may be pushing us towards one,” in “A Prophecy of Pain,” Daily Telegraphh (May 28, 2014), available at http://wwww.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/rbth/opinion/10860269/solzhenitsyn -predicted-future-ukraine.html. 26. Andrei Kozyrev, “The Lagging Partnership,” Foreign Affairss (May/June 1994). 27. NATO, “Finale Communique” (December 10, 1996), available at http://www .nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-165e.htm. 28. Richard C. Holbrooke, US Department of State, “Letter to Ambassador Davies” (July 25, 1995). My copy. 29. Richard C. Holbrooke, To End a Warr (New York: Random House, 1998), 21. 30.Holbrooke to Davis (July 25, 1995). 31.Holbrooke to Davis (July 25, 1995). 32. Noam Chomsky, “A Review of NATO’s War over Kosovo,” Z Magazine (April–May, 2001), available at http://wwww.chomskyy.info/articles/200005— .htm. The refugee crisis resulted primarily from ex-Yugoslav assaults, but this is Notes 211

precisely what Milošević had threatened if NATO did begin its bombing cam- paign. Milošević probably believed that US/NATO threats to attack were a bluff. But NATO had to prove its credibility and justify its right to exist (and expand) after Soviet collapse, while Moscow was in no position to back Milošević, nor was it totally supportive of his actions. 33. Rambouillet Interim Accords, available at http://wwww.alb-net.com/kcc/interim .htm. Henry Kissinger, “The New World Disorder,” Newsweekk (May 31, 1999). One could even argue the Rambouillet Summit resulted in an ultimatum that was even stronger than that which Austria put on Serbia during the July 1914 crisis that led to World War I! On the problem of false historical analogies and Kosovo, see Henry Kissinger, “Finding a Solution to the Kosovo Crisis Must Begin by Rejecting False Analogies to the Traumas of the Past,” News- weekk (April 5, 1999). See also, Noam Chomsky, “A Review of NATO’s War over Kosovo,” Z Magazinee (April–May, 2001), available at http://wwww.chomsky .info/articles/200005—.htm. Ironically, Chomsky, the nonviolent anarchist, and Kissinger, the traditional realist, took similar positions on the NATO war “over” Kosovo. 34. See Hall Gardner, NATO Expansion and US Strategy in Asia, 45–47. The Chinese embassy may have been serving as a relay system for Serbian army radio signals and for monitoring US cruise missile attacks. “NATO Bombed Chinese Delib- erately,” The Guardian (October 17, 1999), available at http://wwww.guardian.co .uk/Kosovo/Story/0,2763,203214,00.html. 35.Charles Krauthammer, “The Path to Putin,” cited in Congressional Record Sen- ate S2555 (April 12, 2000), available at http://wwww.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC -2000–04–12/pdf/CREC-2000–04–12-pt1-PgS2553–9.pdff#page=4. 36. Senator Pat Roberts (R-KS), cited in Congressional Record Senate S2555 (April 12, 2000), available at http://wwww.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2000–04–12/ pdf/CREC-2000–04–12-pt1-PgS2553–9.pdff#page=4. 37. Michel Dobbs, “US Advice Guided Milosevic Opposition,” Washington Post (December 11, 2000). Fukuyama admits that US democracy engineering in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine represented a violation of traditional concepts of sovereignty. Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads, 178. 38. For a critique of the war “over” Kosovo, see William D. Hartung, “The Costs of NATO Expansion Revisited,” A World Policy Institute Issue Brieff (April 21, 1999), available at http://wwww.bu.edu/globalbeat/nato/Hartung0499.html. 39. Interview, Richard Holbrooke, Frontline Interviews PBS (no date), available at http://wwww.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/holbrooke .html. 40. Thomas W. Lippman “Russian Leader Cancels Trip in Protest,” Washington Post (March 24, 1999), A22, available at http://wwww.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/ inatl/daily/march99/russia032499.htm.

Chapter 4 1. Niall Ferguson and Brigitte Granville, “Weimar on the Volga,” The Journal of Economic Historyy Vol. 60, No. 4 (December 2000). See also Stephen E. Hanson 212 Notes

and Jeffrey S. Kopstein, “The Weimar/Russia Comparison,” Post-Soviet Affairs Vol. 13, No. 3 (1997), 252–83. 2. Francis Fukuyama and Michael McFaul, “Should Democracy Be Promoted or Demoted?,” The Washington Quarterlyy Vol. 31, No. 1, 23–45. One can question why McFaul, a known critic of Putin, was chosen as ambassador to Russia in 2012, instead of a more traditional diplomat, if the goal was truly to reset US-Russian relations. There is a difference between “leading by example” and US efforts to actively promote democracy in Russia, as advocated by Fukuyama and McFaul. The latter has helped cause a backlash, particularly given the fact that US actions are not always perceived by Moscow or other states as actually practicing what one preaches. 3. Sarah E. Mendelson and Theodore P. Gerber, “Us and Them: Anti--American Views of the Putin Generation,” The Washington Quarterlyy Vol. 31, No. 2, 131–50, available at http://wwww.twq.com/08spring/docs/08springg_mendelson.pdf. 4. Hall Gardner, “Breaking the Cycle of Mutual Imprecations,” Russian Interna- tional Affairs Councill (April 8, 2013), available at http://russiancouncil.ru/en/ inner/?id_4=1671#top. 5. See Lilia Shevtsova, Russia: Lost in Transition; The Yeltsin and Putin Legacies (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007). 6. See Hall Gardner, NATO Enlargement and US Strategy in Asiaa (Palgrave, 2013), chapter 4. 7. Putin, cited in Kurt Volker, Cable 08USNATO290, Ukraine, MAP and the Russia- Georgia Conflictt, available at https://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/08/08USNATO290 .html. Georgian president Saakashvili also predicted that Russia would incite ten- sion in Crimea and then make a generous offer to Yanukovych (presumed to be the next president) to help solve the problem. https://wwww.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/ 09TBILISI1965_a.html. 8. Putin, cited in Kurt Volker, Cable 08USNATO290. 9. See Ukrainian protest in parliament against the decision to extend the lease of the Russian fleet. http://wwww.youtube.com/watch?v=7qsRaBFw—AA http://en.rian .ru/infographics/20100423/158718722.html. 10. The threat to turn the Euromaidan protests into an armed struggle may have forced Yanukovych to flee. If so, the affair had elements of a staged coup d’etat. See International New York Timess (January 5, 2014), 1, 4. For evidence of Yanokovych’s corruption, see “Ukraine: The Ex-President’s Caretaker,” Yano- kovychleakss (July 22, 2014), available at http://yanukovychleaks.org/en/stories/ ukraine-the-ex-presidents-caretaker.html. 11. Putin’s advisor on Eurasian integration Sergei Glazyev argued in early February 2014 for the “federalization” of Ukraine. This could help to bring the southeastern part of Ukraine closer to the Russia-led Customs Union. See more at http:// ecfr.eu/blog/entry/crimea_what_does_putin_want#sthash.0vt9fYP6.dpuf. 12.“Ukraine PM Tells Russia to Accept ‘Reality’ of EU Trade Deal,” Reuters (August 28 2013), available at http://wwww.reuters.com/article/2013/08/28/us -ukraine-russia-azarov-idUSBRE97R0JM20130828. 13. Even her former ally, former President Yushchenko, had testified against Tymosh- enko for ostensibly selling out Ukrainian interests to Russia; yet her jailing Notes 213

nevertheless held up the European Association Accord with Ukraine, which she herself opposed. 14. Scott Belinski, “Ukraine’s Two New Energy Deals,” Oil Pricee (December 10, 2013), available at http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Ukraines-Two -New-Energy-Deals.html. 15. “Deadly Clashes in Ukraine,” Streaming WSJJ, available at, http://stream.wsj .com/story/deadly-clashes-in-ukraine/SS-2–457850/SS-2–469908/?mod=wsj _streamingg_deadly-clashes-in-ukraine. 16. UNIAN, “Yury Lutsenko Calls for Eastern Maidan, Sets Priorities for Protest- ers,” Zikk (February 9, 2014), available at http://zik.ua/en/news/2014/02/09/yury _lutsenko_calls_for_eastern_maidan_sets_priorities_for_protesters_459368. 17. Dmitry Trenin, “Russia Needs to Stay Clear of Ukraine,” Carnegie Moscow Cen- ter (October 9, 2013), available at http://carnegie.ru/eurasiaoutlook/?fa=53848; The Guardian (January 28, 2013), available at http://wwww.theguardian.com/ world/2014/jan/28/vladimir-putin-ukraine-crisis-eu. 18. “Ukraine’s dependence on the Russian market means that it will have to adapt simultaneously to two competitive integration regimes, the EU and the ECU. At the same time, there are emerging opportunities for economic cooperation. Russia has been rapidly adopting EU and international standards in the context of creating the ECU and of accession to the WTO.” See Rilka Drag- neva and Kataryna Wolczuk, Russia, the Eurasian Customs Union and the EU: Cooperation, Stagnation or Rivalry?? (London: Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House, August 2012), available at http://wwww.chathamhouse.org/ sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/0812bp _dragnevawolczuk.pdf. 19. See Samuel Charap and Mikhail Troitskiy, “Russia, the West and the Integration Dilemma,” Survivall (December 2013––January 2014), 49–62. 20.Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczuk, Russia, the Eurasian Customs Union and the EUU. 21. Jean-Pierre Chevènement, “Sans la Russie il manque quelque chose à l’Europe,” Le Figaro (March 8, 2014), 22. 22. Hubertus Hoffmann, Russia, NATO and the EU: A Plea for a True Partnership (Berlin: World Security Network, March 26, 2014). 23. See Walter Schwimmer, Secretary General of the Council of Europe from 1999- 2004, as to how the EU criticism of the Russia-Ukraine deal over the Black Sea Fleet in 2010 made the Russian military concerned that they could lose the naval base in Sevastopol and that NATO should have somehow given Moscow a guar- antee that it could retain the base: “Now Russia and the EU are trapped. Russia will not retreat from Crimea and the EU cannot acknowledge its annexation, since it was against international law. And now Russia and the EU are trapped in this escalation of sanctions that are leading to nothing.” Alexey Khlebniko, “There Is No Europe without Russia and No Russia without Europe,” Russia Direct (March 19, 2015), available at http://wwww.russia-direct.org/qa/there-no -europe-without-russia-and-no-russia-without-europe. 24. On US support for the Maidan demands and opposition to any Ukrainian or EU-Ukrainian deal with Moscow, see “Ukraine Crisis: Transcript of Leaked 214 Notes

Nuland-Pyatt Call,” BBC (February 7, 2015), available at http://wwww.bbc.com/ news/world-europe-26079957. The alleged conservation between Assistant Sec- retary of State Victoria Nuland and the US ambassador to Ukraine, Geoffrey Pyatt, which revealed US efforts to intervene in Ukrainian affairs, probably took place in late January 2014 after Yanukovych offered Arseniy Yatsenyuk the position of prime minister, which he refused. 25. Kyiv, “Agreement on the Settlement of Crisis in Ukraine” (February 21, 2014), available at http://wwww.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/671350/ publicationFile/190051/140221-UKR_Erklaerung.pdf. 26. Robert Wade, “Rethinking the Ukraine Crisis,” London School of Economics and Political Sciencee (February 11, 2015), available at http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ internationaldevelopment/2015/02/19/robert-wade-rethinking-the-ukraine -crisis/. 27. Nicolai N. Petro and David C. Speedie, “Crisis in Ukraine: Crimean Stand-Off,” Carnegie Councill (March 4, 2014), available at http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/ studio/multimedia/20140304/index.html. 28. Mark Thompson, “Ukraine to Get $18 Billion Rescue from IMF,” CNN Money (March 27, 2014). 29. Scott Morris, “Will Mr. Putin Drive Congress into the Arms of the IMF?,” The Hilll (March 7, 2014), available at http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign -policy/200227-will-mr-putin-drive-congress-into-the-arms-off-the-imf. 30. Robin Wigglesworth, “Ukraine’s Bonds Sink as Debts Spiral,” Financial Times (January 6, 2015), available at http://wwww.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2b00232e-95b7 -11e4-b3a6-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3Y2NV8FPa. 31. Iana Dreyer and Nicu Popescu, “Do Sanctions against Russia Work?,” EU Insti- tute for Security Studiess (December 2014), 1–4. 32. Larry Hanauer, “Crimean Adventure Will Cost Russia Dearly,” Moscow Times (September 7, 2014), available at http://wwww.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/ article/crimean-adventure-will-cost-russia-dearly/506550.html http://www.osw .waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2014–08–01/a-bottomless-pit-costs -crimeas-annexation-russia. 33. Iana Dreyer and Nicu Popescu, “Do Sanctions against Russia Work?” 34. Larry Elliott and Angela Monaghan, “Five Issues That Will Make—or Break— the World Economy In 2015,” The Observerr (December 28, 2014), available at http://wwww.theguardian.com/business/2014/dec/28/five-issues-world-economy -2015. 35. Aasim M. Husain, Anna Ilyina and Li Zeng “Europe’s Russia Connections,” IMFdirectt (August 1, 2014), available at http://blog-imfdirect.imff.org/2014/ 08/01/europes-russian-connections/. See also Sputnik Report (July 29, 2014), available at, http://en.ria.ru/business/20140729/191450645/Sanctions-Against -Russia-May-Have-Severe-Impact-on-Global.html. 36. Germany’s strong business ties with Russia are more than double the value of Russian trade with the United States. For details, see Jack Ewing and Alison Smale, “In Reversal, Germany Cools to Russian Investment,” New York Times (December 28, 2014), available at http://wwww.nytimes.com/2014/12/29/business/ international/in-reversal-germany-cools-to-russian-investment.html?_r=0. Russia’s Notes 215

largest trading partners (in terms of total trade, in billions, January through August 2014) were China ($43.4), Netherlands ($38.2), Germany ($34.3), Italy ($25.2), Ukraine($16.1), Belarus($15.7), Turkey ($15.5), Japan ($15.3), United States ($15.0), and Poland ($12.1) according to the German-Russian Chamber of Commerce. The German industry’s Committee on Eastern European Eco- nomic Relations believes that the crisis could endanger up to 25,000 jobs in Germany. Were a broad recession to befall Russia, German growth could sink by 0.5 percent. Matthias Schepp and Cornelia Schmergal, “The Boomerang Effect: Sanctions on Russia Hit German Economy Hard,” Der Spiegell (July 21, 2014), available at http://wwww.spiegel.de/international/business/german-economy-hit -by-us-eu-sanctions-on-russia-a-982075.html. 37. Neil MacFarquhar and Andrew Roth, “Putin Urges Economic Retaliation for Sanctions over Ukraine Conflict,” New York Timess (August 5, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/world/europe/putin-urges-economic -retaliation-for-sanctions-over-ukraine-conflict.html. 38. On state of TTIP negotiation, see European Commission, “State of Play TTIP Negotiations after the 6th Round” (July 29, 2014), available at http://trade.ec .europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/july/tradoc_152699.pdf. 39. One-third of Europe’s gas supply comes from Russia, and almost half of that is transported through Ukraine. Germany obtains about one-third and Sweden almost one-half of their imported energy from Russia. Poland, Slovakia, Bul- garia, and Lithuania depend on Russia for 90 percent or more of their imported energy, excluding intra-EU trade. Tensions with Russia have led some European countries to sign contracts with the United States for future natural gas delivery. The United States is also exporting its excess supply of coal to Europe, as the domestic shale gas and oil boom reduce US coal consumption. Henry Meyer and Evgenia Pismennaya, “China Embraces a Russia Cut off from Western Capital,” Bloomberg Business Weekk (October 16, 2014). 40. “Turkey Does Not Recognize Russia’s Crimea Annexation,” Anadolu Agencyy (Jan- uary 14, 2015), available at http://wwww.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/449841—turkey -does-not-recognize-russias-crimea-annexation. 41. In March 2014, Kiev and China’s CITIC Construction signed an agreement that Ukraine will receive $15 billion from China at a minimal interest rate for 15 years to build housing and infrastructure (Gazeta.ru, March 26), cited in “Ukraine Conflict Benefits China,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 12, No. 62 (April 3, 2015), available at http://wwww.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?txx_ttnews %5Btt_news%5D=43740&cHash=e6cb2fd34b5fe5b45207046561df1ce2# .VTVV_hCGqpBc. 42. John C. K. Daly, “Hot Issue: After Crimea: The Future of the Black Sea Fleet,” Jamestown Foundation (May 22, 2014), available at http://www.jamestown.org/ programs/hotissues/single-hot-issues/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42411&tx _ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=61&cHash=18fb1cd8a0f31ab19fc65b39ef83d021. 43. Frederic Mousseau, “What Do the World Bank and IMF Have to Do with the Ukraine Conflict?” IPS (August 12, 2014), available at http://wwww.ipsnews .net/2014/08/what-do-the-world-bank-and-imff-have-to-do-with-the-ukraine -conflict/. 216 Notes

44. Eugene Rumer and Alexandra McLees, “Saving Ukraine’s Defense Industry,” ISNN (August 12, 2014), available at http://wwww.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/ Articles/Detail/?ots591=4888caa0-b3db-1461–98b9-e20e7b9c13d4&lng=en& id=182641. 45. Ibid. 46. Ibid. 47. NATO, “NATO’s Relations with Ukraine” (March 31, 2015), available at http:// wwww.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37750.htm. 48. In addition to Article 2(4) and Article 51 of the UN Charter, Moscow has been charged with violating the Minsk Declaration of December 1991, the Alma Ata Declaration of December 1991, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, and the 1997 Treaty of Friendship and Coopera- tion between Russia and Ukraine, as well as the 1997 legal framework surround- ing the Russian Black Sea Fleet, plus the 2002 Rome Accords that established the NATO-Russia Council. The March 16 referendum on the future of Crimea appeared to violate Article 73 of the Ukrainian constitution, which states that questions of Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty can only be decided by referendums put to the whole of the population. Russian actions also appear to have violated the basic principles of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (which opposes secessionist movements) plus the European Security Treaty that was proposed by Moscow itself in June 2008. 49. Although allusions have been made to the 1923 Rapallo Pact (between Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia), in contemporary circumstances, it is the burgeon- ing Russian-Chinese relationship that best parallels the 1923 German-Soviet Rapallo Pact. As I pointed out in 1998, “As long as the newly unified Germany remains within the EU and NATO, Bonn will not seek out a Rapallo Pact or a neo-Molotov Ribbentrop Pact with Russia. On the other hand, EU expansion, coupled with the possibility of NATO membership for selected states in central Europe, could lead to a de facto partition between those states that enter NATO and those that do not—if Russia does take the countermeasures as it has threatened.” I also argued that Russia could soon distrust all promises of cooperation with NATO and the EU. Hall Gardner, “NATO, Russia and Eastern European Security beyond the Interwar Analogy,” in Piotr Dutkiewicz and Robert J. Jackson, eds., NATO Looks Eastt (Westport, CT, Praeger, 1998). 50. John C. K. Daly, “Hot Issue: After Crimea: The Future of the Black Sea Fleet,” Jamestown Foundation (May 22, 2014), available at http://wwww.jamestown.org/ programs/hotissues/single-hot-issues/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42411&tx _ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=61&cHash=18fb1cd8a0f31ab19fc65b39ef83d021. 51. Statement by NATO Foreign Ministers, NATO-Russia Council (April 1, 2014), available at http://wwww.nato-russia-council.info/en/articles/20140327 -announcement. 52. Agnia Grigas, “Russia-Baltic Relations after Crimea’s Annexation: Reasons for Concern?,” Cicero Paper, No 14/05 (June 2014), available at http://www .cicerofoundation.org/lectures/Agniaa_Grigas_Russia-Baltic_Relations.pdf. 53. Bill Gertz, “Russian Strategic Bombers near Canada Practice Cruise Mis- sile Strikes on US,” Washington Times (September 8, 2014), available at Notes 217

http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russian-strategic-bombers-near-canada -practice-cruise-missile-strikes-on-us/.For a Russian perspective, Alexander Yer- makov, “Cold Peace in European Skies,” RIAC (December 15, 2014), available at http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=4963#top. This dispute would suggest the need for joint NATO-Russian air patrols. 54. Embassy of the United States, Ukraine: Office of Defense Cooperation, available at http://ukraine.usembassyy.gov/odc.html. 55. US Department of Defense, “DoD Announces European Infrastructure Consolida- tion Actions and F-35 Basing in Europe,” Defense-aerospace.com (January 8, 2015), available at http://wwww.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/160104/us -cuts-more-bases%2C-forces-in-europe.html. 56. In October 2014, Polish F-16s, which could carry US B61 tactical nuclear weapons if modified, participated in nuclear strike exercises, known as Steadfast Noon 2014, in northern Italy, which had been planned before the Russian annexation of Crimea, raising questions about NATO nuclear policy. Hans M. Kristensen, “Polish F-16s in NATO Nuclear Exercise in Italy,” FASS (October 27, 2014), available at http://fas.org/blogs/security/2014/10/steadfastnoon/. On Polish con- siderations to upgrade Polish F-16s to carry B61 tactical nuclear weapons (replac- ing German Tornadoes), see National Centre for Strategic Studies, “America Needs a Poland That Is More Self Sufficient,” Stratforr (June 6, 2014), available at http://wwww.stratfor.com/the-hub/america-needs-poland-more-selff-sufficient #axzz3NktGukOO. Another option would be for Poland to buy dual-capable Tomahawk cruise missiles with a range exceeding a thousand kilometers and equip the Polish navy with a new class of submarines. The Polish hardline position argues that submarine-launched cruise missiles would augment uncertainty for Russian nuclear planners but at the cost of a dangerous arms race. East European NATO-member demands for a permanent stationing of forces have been met by a rotating system of force deployments, which is seen by hardliners as inadequate. 57. The SA-11 BUK missile system, which was allegedly supplied by Moscow and which allegedly shot down the Malaysian airliner, has a sophisticated high-tech radar-led system, which can only be handled by a team of trained military spe- cialists, who would allegedly also be supplied by Moscow. Mark Kramer, “It’s Happened Before: MH17 Tragedy Was Part of a Bigger Air War,” CNNN (July 24, 2014), available at http://edition.cnn.com/2014/07/23/opinion/kramer-russia -ukraine-shoot-down/index.html?iid=article_sidebar. 58. Russian “separatists” consist of four groups: (1) Russian special forces (Spetsnaz), belonging to the GRU, the intelligence service of the Russian army; (2) Rus- sian militias, consisting of former (contract) soldiers; (3) Cossack and Chechen militias (these were also active in South Ossetia during the war with Georgia in 2008); and (4) local mercenaries who sympathize with the Kremlin’s annexation- ist drive. Marcel van Herpen, “Ukraine: Who is Responsible is Responsible for the Death of the Passengers of the MH17?,” Cicero Paperr No. 14/02 (July 2014), available at http://wwww.cicerofoundation.org/lectures/Marcel_H_Van_Herpen _The_Ukraine_Plane_Crash.pdf. 59. In August, Kiev and Moscow reached an, at least temporary, arrangement to permit humanitarian aid into the embattled region, in an accord mediated 218 Notes

by Finland, France, and Germany. Daryna Krasnolutska and Anton Doro- shev, “Ukraine-Russia Talks Seek to Ease Crisis Amid Aid Accord,” Bloom- berg Newss (August 17, 2014), available at http://wwww.bloomberg.com/news/ 2014–08–16/ukraine-russia-talks-seek-to-ease-crisis-amid-aid-accord.html. Jeffrey Sparshott, “Obama Warns Russia Against Further Intervention in Ukraine” Wall Street Journall (August 11, 2014), available at http://online.wsj .com/articles/obama-warns-russia-against-further-intervention-in-ukraine -1407786233. 60. Sergei Lavrov “‘We Will Survive Sanctions,’ Says Russian Foreign Minister,” France 24: The Intervieww (December 16, 2014), retrieved from wwww.france24 .com. 61. Ukrainian sources state that Russian operatives began to plan operations in Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2012, if not as early as 2010, at least two years after Putin’s speech at the 2008 Bucharest NATO summit. Polish intelligence became alarmed by the summer of 2013. Ben Judah, “Putin’s Coup,” Politico Magazinee (October 19, 2014), available at http://wwww.politico.com/magazine/ story/2014/10/vladimir-putins-coup-112025.html#.VTV1pCGqpBd. 62. Nicolai Petro, “Six Mistakes the West Has Made (and Continues to Make) in Ukraine,” The National Interestt (May 8, 2014), available at http://nationalinterest .org/feature/six-mistakes-the-west-has-made-continues-make-ukraine-10397. See Petro’s website at http://wwww.npetro.net/8.html. 63. “NATO needs to make concrete commitments to help Ukraine modernize and strengthen its security forces. And . . . we have to do more to help other NATO Partners, including Georgia and Moldova, strengthen their defenses as well. . . . And we must reaffirm the principle that has always guided our Alliance—for countries that meet our standards and that can make meaningful contributions to allied security, the door to NATO membership will remain open.” Remarks by President Obama to the People of Estonia (September 3, 2014), available at http://wwww.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/03/remarks-president -obama-people-estonia.

Chapter 5 1. The absurd term “multipolarity” implies three or more equal “poles” (the earth only has 2 poles!) that necessarily repel one another and hence cannot come to terms; the term “polycentricism” implies differing centers of power that may or may not conflict with one another. 2. For US list of antistate “terrorist” organizations, see Bureau of Counterterror- ism, “Foreign Terrorist Organisations,” US Department of State, available at http://wwww.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. Not all states agree with US definitions of terrorism, and governments themselves can also be considered as engaging in totalitarian and state-supported terrorism. See Hall Gardner, American Global Strategy and the “War on Terrorism.” 3. “Strategic leveraging” provides an alternative to “rational-actor” models and “cost/benefit” models to interstate behavior, as it shows the willingness of states and antistate groups to engage in “nonrational” behavior to press their interests, Notes 219

even if their actions do not necessarily enhance the overall economic well-being of a society or sociopolitical group or class. 4. Robert M. Hayden, “Intersecting Religioscapes and Antagonistic Tolerance: Tra- jectories of Competition and Sharing of Religious Spaces in the Balkans,” Space and Polityy Vol. 17, No. 3 (September 2013), 320–34. 5. Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2014). See discussion of Piketty by Paul Krugman, “Paul Krugman: Why We’re in a New Gilded Age,” Moyers and Companyy (April 16, 2014), available at http:// billmoyers.com/2014/04/16/paul-krugman-why-we%E2%80%99re-in-a-new -gilded-age/. Unfortunately, Piketty does not examine how wars tend to level incomes. 6. Balázs Jarábik and Anaïs Marin, “Belarus,” available at http://wwww.lse.ac.uk/ IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR019/SR019-Jarabik-Marin.pdf. 7. “Estonian-Russian Border Treaty in Proceedings in Moscow,” The Baltic Course (April 4, 2015), available at http://wwww.baltic-course.com/eng/transport/?doc= 104700. 8. Helena Smith, “Syriza’s Tsipras Sworn in after Greek Government Formed with Rightwingers,” The Guardian (January 26, 2015), available at http:// wwww.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/26/syriza-forms-government-rightwing -independent-greeks-party. 9. Leonid Bershidsky, “America’s Losing the Currency War,” Bloomberg Vieww (January 23, 2015), available at http://wwww.bloombergvieww.com/articles/2015–01–23/europe -just-started-waging-currency-war-on-the-u-s-, See “Global Risks 2015 Report,” World Economic Forum, 10th ed. (2015), available at http://www3.weforum.org/ docs/WEF_Global_Risks_2015_Report.pdf. 10.Paul Taylor, “Russia in Crimea? It’s Europe’s Fault, Say Eurosceptics,” Reuters (March 21, 2014), available at http://wwww.reuters.com/article/2014/03/21/us -ukraine-crisis-eurosceptics-idUSBREA2K0ZB20140321. In December 2013, a member of Putin’s United Russia party attended the summit of Eurosceptic groups in Turin. TNO Staff, “Italy’s Northern League Elects New Party Secre- tary at Turin Congress,” The New Observerr (December 16, 2013), available at http://newobserveronline.com/italys-northern-league-elects-new-party-secretary -at-turin-congress/. 11. Jason Karaian, “Putin Has Friends of Europe’s Far Right and Left (but Mostly Right),” Quartz (January 15, 2015), available at http://qz.com/326487/putin -has-friends-on-europes-far-right-and-left-but-mostly-right/. Patrik Oksanen, “Russia-Index: 11 New Eu-Sceptic Parties Added,” EUbloggen (January 10, 2015), available at https://eublogg.wordpress.com/2015/01/10/russia-index-11 -new-eu-sceptic-parties-added/. 12. The Russian arms deal is to be financed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. FRANCE 24, “Egypt, France to Conclude €5.2 Billion Deal for Rafale Jets,” France 24 (February 16, 2015), available at http://wwww.ipsnews.net/2014/03/russian-arms -egypt-threaten-undermine-u-s-mideast/. Egypt has also purchased the French Rafale so as to better balance its armed forces (France 24 [February 16, 2015], available at http://wwww.france24.com/en/20150216-france-egypt-sign-deal-sale -rafale-fighter-jets/). 220 Notes

13. See Micah Zenko, “The Slippery Slope of US Intervention,” Foreign Policy (August 11, 2014), available at http://wwww.foreignpolicyy.com/articles/2014/08/ 11/the_slippery_slope_off_us_intervention_iraq_islamic_state_humanitarian _intervention. 14. “Obama Calls for anti--Jihadist Front as France, UK Weigh Strikes,” France 244 (September 3, 2014), available at http://wwww.france24.com/en/20140903 -obama-calls-anti-jihadist-front-france-uk-weigh-strikes/. 15. Kautilya, The Arthashastraa (New Delhi: Penguin Classics, 1992), 551–70. 16. Hall Gardner, “War and the New Media Paradox: A Critique of Marshall McLu- han,” in Athina Karatzogianni, ed., Cyber-Conflict and Global Politicss (New York: Routledge, 2008). 17. S. C. Gwynne, Empire of the Summer Moon (New York: Scribner, 2011). 18. Permanent Delegate of Turkey, “Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits Signed at Montreux, July 20th, 1963” (December 11, 1936), available at http:// sam.baskent.edu.tr/belge/Montreuxx_ENG.pdf. For a primer, see “A Primer on the Montreux Convention,” Bosphorus Naval Newss (March 5, 2014), available at http://turkishnavyy.net/2014/03/05/a-primer-on-the-montreux-convention/. 19. Gus Lubin, “A Brief Tour of the 7 Oil Chokepoints That Are Crucial to the World Economy,” Business Insiderr (February 5, 2011), available at http://www.businessinsider.com/oil-chokepoints-suez-canal-2011–1?op=1 #ixzz3QR4Tju1v. For a list of strategically vital cable landings, mines, energy producers, and weapons and medical manufacturers that could be attacked by terrorists or states, see Gus Lubin, “Wikileaks Unveils over 300 Foreign Sites That Are Critical to U.S. National Interests,” Business Insiderr (December 6, 2010), available at http://wwww.businessinsider.com/wikileaks-critical-foreign -dependencies-2010–12?op=1#ixzz3QR5nEBdZ. 20. “National Debts Shall Not Be Contracted with a View to the External Fric- tion of States.” Immanuel Kant (1795). Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. Retrieved from https://wwww.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant1.htm. 21. Saul Bernard Cohen, Geopolitics of the World System (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003). 22. Hall Gardner, “Toward Regional Security Communities: NATO, the UN and the 1948 Vandenberg Resolution,” Civitatis Internationall, available at http://dl .dropboxusercontent.com/u/36509234/Vandenberg.pdf.

Chapter 6 1. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian Warr (New York: Penguin Classics, 1985), I.22, 48. 2. “Of Vicissitudes of Things,” Sir Francis Bacon, Essays of Francis Bacon or Coun- sels, Civil and Morall (1627), available at http://wwww.literaturepage.com/read/ francis-bacon-essays-115.html. 3.Ibid. 4. J. M. Keynes, A Treatise on Probabilityy (London: Macmillan, 1921), 309. 5. Ibid., 309. 6. Ibid., 313. Notes 221

7. Eve Tavor Bannet, “Analogy as Translation: Wittgenstein, Derrida, and the Law of Language” New Literary History, Vol. 28, No. 4, Philosophical Thoughts (Autumn, 1997). 8. Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, 2nd edition (London: Routledge, 1961); Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makerss (New York: Freedom Press, 1986); and Margaret Macmillan, Dangerous Games: The Uses and Abuses of Historyy (New York: Random House: 2009). 9. Jean-François Lyotard, The Post-Modern Condition: A Report on Knowledgee (Min- neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984, reprint 1997). 10. In biology, homology refers to common structural and ancestral characteristics. 11. In effect, appeals to nationalism and religion represent a means to assert unity and overcome nihilism through what Nietzsche poetically called Geisterkreig (ghost or ideological war). See Frederick Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evill, translated by Helen Zimmern, available at http://wwww.gutenberg.org/files/ 4363/4363-h/4363-h.htm; Frederick Nietzsche, The Will to Power, edited by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1968). For Nietzsche, Europe needed to become “One Will” against the “threatening attitude of Russia,” yet Europe still seems far from establishing a common foreign, security, or defense policy toward Moscow. 12. Edward Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939 (New York: Perennial, 2001). 13. Marcel van Herpen, Putin’s Wars: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014). 14. I have derived many of these concepts from the following works: George Liska, Quest for Equilibrium (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economyy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Politics of the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1984); Saul Bernard Cohen, Geo- politics of the World System (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003); Halford Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” The Geographical Journall Vol. 23, No 4 (April 1904), 436–37; Halford Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reall- ityy (London: Constable, 1919); and Nicholas J. Spykman, The Geography of the Peace (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944). 15. George Liska, Ways of Powerr (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990). 16. I am not following either Mackinder, Spykman, or Wallerstein. These definitions are more geo-political-economic than political-geographic and can change in diff- fering historical contexts. 17. Saul Cohen, Geopolitics. 18. A. J. P. Ta y lor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–19188 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 90. Historian Niall Ferguson made the same point in 2003 that I made in September 1990. See Niall Ferguson, “Lessons from the British Empire: True Lies,” The New Republic, 27 (May 2003); Niall Ferguson, Colossuss (New York: Penguin, 2004), 220. See Hall Gardner, “From Egypt in 1882 to Iraq in 1990–91” Scripta Politica, American University of Paris, Vol. 7, No. 4 (March 1991). Hall Gardner, “From the Egyptian Crisis of 1882 to Iraq of 2003: Alliance Ramifications of British and American Bids for ‘World 222 Notes

Hegemony,’” Sens Public, available at http://wwww.sens-public.org/IMG/pdf/ SensPublic_HGardner_From_the_Egyptian_Crisis.pdf. 19. The Russian reaction to the EU Eastern Partnership can also be compared and contrasted with the Soviet reaction to Marshall Aid, given the Soviet decision to crack down in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the rest of eastern Europe in 1947–48. 20. “The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 1939.” In Article III of the secret protocol, Ber- lin stated it was disinterested in Bessarabia. This corresponds to the question of Transnistria today, in which Moscow has asserted its hegemony. 21. A Kuwaiti told me that Ninja Turtle comic book characters were painted on wall murals following the 1990 Persian Gulf War. Considering that Japan (and Ger- many) paid the costs for much of the American-led UN rollback of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the symbolism did not seem entirely inappropriate. 22. Should the United States fail to sustain the US--Japanese alliance in contemporary circumstances, that failure could parallel the failure of the British to sustain the Anglo--Japanese alliance following the Washington Naval Conference in 1921–22. On historical parallels between the Anglo--Japanese and US--Japanese alliances, see Hisahiko Okazaki, A Grand Strategy for Japanese Defensee (Lanham: University Press of America, 1986), 135. 23. Robert D. Kaplan, “The South China Sea Is the Future of Conflict,” Foreign Policyy (August 15, 2011), available at http://wwww.foreignpolicyy.com/articles/ 2011/08/15/the_south_chinaa_seaa_is_the_future_off_conflict. 24. Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Struggle for the Mastery of Asia,” Commentaryy Vol. 110, No. 4 (November 2000); and Aaron L. Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,” International Securityy Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993–94), 5–33. See also John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politicss (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), chapter 10; and Glenn H. Sny- der, “Mearsheimer’s World: Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security; A Review Essay,” International Securityy Vol. 27, No. 1 (Summer 2002), 149–73. 25. Kimberly Field and Stephan Pikner, “The Role of U.S. Land Forces in the Asia Pacific,” National Defense University Presss (August 11, 2014), available at http://wwww.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?ots591=4888caa0-b3db -1461–98b9-e20e7b9c13d4&lng=en&id=182633. 26. Niall Ferguson, Colossuss (New York: Penguin, 2004), 220. 27. Nawaf Obaid, “Saudi Arabia Shifts to More Assertive Defense Doctrine,” Al- Monitor, available at http://wwww.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/06/saudi -arabia-regional-defense-doctrine-counterterrorism-plan.html.

Chapter 7 1. John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsdayy (New York: Basic, 1996), available at http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller//doom.pdf. 2. John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). 3. John Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International Securityy Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), 5–56. Mearsheimer Notes 223

continues to assert that if Kiev possessed nuclear weapons, then Moscow would have been less likely to have ventured into Crimea. John Mearsheimer, “Getting Ukraine Wrong” (March 14, 2014), available at http://wwww.nytimes.com/2014/ 03/14/opinion/getting-ukraine-wrong.html. 4. J. Robert Oppenheimer, “International Control of Energy,” in Morton Grodzins and Eugene Pabinowitch, eds., The Atomic Agee (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1963), 54. 5. Dan Lindley and Kevin Clemency, “Low-Cost Nuclear Arms Races,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Vol. 65, No. 2 (April 2009), 44–45, available at http://www3 .nd.edu/~dlindley/handouts/Costs%20off%20Arms%20Races.pdf. The countries studied include Argentina, Brazil, China, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan, Turkey, and Britain. 6. See NTI, Iraq Nuclear Chronologyy (February 2009), available at http://wwww.nti .org/media/pdfs/iraq_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791. 7. Barak Ravid, “Obama and Netanyahu: Stop Pushing Congress toward New Sanctions on Iran,” Haaretz (January 23, 2015), available at http://wwww.haaretz .com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.638604. 8. Eben Harrell and David E. Hoffman, “Plutonium Mountain: Inside the 17- Year Mission to Secure a Legacy of Soviet Nuclear Testing,” Cambridge, MA: Report for Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and Inter- national Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School (August 15, 2013), available at http:// belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/23327/plutonium_mountain.html. 9. “Budapest Memorandums on Security Assurances, 1994,” Council on Foreign Relations: Primary Sources (December 5, 1994), available at http://wwww.cfr .org/arms-control-disarmament-and-nonproliferation/budapest-memorandums -security-assurances-1994/p32484. 10. Eric Schlosser, Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safetyy (New York: Penguin Press HC, 2013). See also Nate Jones, “The Department of Defense List of 32 ‘Accidents Involving Nuclear Weap- ons,’” Unredactedd (October 9, 2013), available at http://nuclearweaponarchive .org/Safrica/SADisarming.html. 11. “Al-Qaeda Close to Acquiring ‘Dirty Bomb’, Cables Say,” Global Security News- wire, NTII (February 2, 2011), available at http://wwww.nti.org/gsn/article/al -qaeda-close-to-acquiring-dirty-bomb-cables-say/. In 2014, it was reported that roughly 88 pounds of uranium compounds were seized by Islamic State (IS) in Mosul, but the substances were purportedly judged not useful for a dirty bomb. Rachel Oswald, “U.S. Downplays Extremist Seizure of Low-Grade Uranium in Iraq,” Global Security Newswire, NTII (July 11, 2014), available at http://www .nti.org/gsn/article/us-downplays-extremist-seizure-low-grade-uranium-iraq/ ?mgs1=ee4dgy7ZaE. See also Graham Allison, “Nuclear Terrorism Fact Sheet,” Policy Memo, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School (April 2010), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/ publication/20057/nuclear_terrorism_fact_sheet.html. 12. Nuclear Threat Initiative: South Africaa (November 2014) available at http:// wwww.nti.org/country-profiles/south-africa/nuclear/.“South Africa’s Nuclear 224 Notes

Weapons Program: Putting Down the Sword,” Nuclear Weapon Archive (September 7, 2001), available at http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Safrica/ SADisarming.html. 13.Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issuess (Washington, DC: CRS, May 10, 2012), available at http:// www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb388/docs/EBB035.pdf. 14. International Strategic Analysis, “The Kashmir Flashpoint” (2014), available at http://wwww.isa-world.com/news/?tx_ttnews[backPid]=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]= 34&cHash=f801016a25ed5aa74c4f53dc826562ad. 15. Ankit Panda, “Will China’s ‘Reset’ With India Work?” (June 25, 2014), available at http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/will-chinas-reset-with-india-work/. 16. David W. Pike, ed., The Closing of the Second World Warr (New York: Peter Lang, 2001). 17. General Sir Mike Jackson, “My clash with NATO Chief,” The Telegraphh (Sep- tember 4, 2007), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ 1562161/Gen-Sir-Mike-Jackson-My-clash-with-Nato-chieff.html. Clark was pressured to step down from his post at SACEUR two months later. 18. Hall Gardner, Surviving the Millennium. 19.Charles Arthur, “Symantec Discovers 2005 US Computer Virus Attack on Iran Nuclear Plants,” The Guardian (February 26, 2013), available at http://www .theguardian.com/technology/2013/feb/26/symantec-us-computer-virus-iran -nuclear. 20. Jon Davis, “Why Won’t Anonymous Target ISIS?,” Forbess (January 19, 2015), available at http://wwww.forbes.com/sites/quora/2015/01/19/why-wont -anonymous-target-isis/. 21. Lithuania has not only ostensibly done a better job in integrating ethnic Rus- sians than either Latvia or Estonia but is also concerned with pro-Russian elements of its Polish minority. See Marina Best, “The Ethnic Russian Minority: A Problematic Issue in the Baltic States,” Verges: Germanic & Slavic Studies in Review (GSSR) Vol 2, No. 1, 33–41; and Agnia Grigas, “Russia-Baltic Relations after Crimea’s Annexation: Reasons for Concern?,” Cicero Paper, No 14/05 (June 2014), available at http://wwww.cicerofoundation.org/lectures/Agniaa_Grigas _Russia-Baltic_Relations.pdf. Seventy-seven percent of ethnic Latvians were opposed to Moscow’s annexation of Crimea; but among non-Latvians, mainly ethnic Russians, 34 percent fully supported Russia’s annexation and 32 percent said they partly supported it. John D. Stoll, Charles Duxbury, and Juris Kaža, “Latvia Casts Wary Eye on Russia,” Wall Street Journall (May 5, 2014). Latvians fear pro-Russian provocateurs: some 15 percent of the Latvian population is a noncitizen. Latvia, which is 100 percent dependent on Russian gas exported 11 percent of its goods to Russia in 2013, more than to any country except its two Baltic neighbors. Western sanctions and countermeasures by Russia could cost Latvia “hundreds of millions of euros.” John D. Stoll, Charles Duxbury, and Juris Kaža, “Latvia Casts Wary Eye on Russia,” Wall Street Journall (May 5, 2014). 22. Peter Beaumont, “Norway Attacks,” The Guardian (July 23, 2011), available at http://wwww.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/23/norway-attacks. Notes 225

23. Hall Gardner, “From Balance to Imbalance of Terror,” in Hall Gardner, ed. NATO and the European Union: New World New Europe New Threatss (Farnham: Ashgate, 2004). 24.Hall Gardner, NATO Expansion and the US Strategy in Asia. 25. “Le Journal,” Les Echoss (27 April 2015), available at http://wwww.lesechos.fr/ journal/index.php. See also https://russiandefpolicyy.wordpress.com/category/ strategic-forces-modernization/. 26. The concept of “de-escalation” stems from the Cold War arguments of Thomas Schelling that the “tailored” use of nuclear weapons could cause unacceptable damage so that the costs of an opponent’s aggression would exceed the presumed benefits. Nikolai N. Sokov, “Why Russia Calls a Limited Nuclear Strike ‘De- Escalation,’” The Bulletin of Atomic Scientistss (March 13, 2014), available at http://thebulletin.org/why-russia-calls-limited-nuclear-strike-de-escalation. 27. “In the event of the outbreak of a military conflict involving the utilization of conventional means of attack (a large-scale war or regional war) and imperiling the very existence of the state, the possession of nuclear weapons may lead to such a military conflict developing into a nuclear military conflict.” The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved by Russian Federation presidential edict on February 5, 2010, and available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/ 2010russiaa_militaryy_doctrine.pdf. The 2000 document allowed for the use of nuclear weapons “in situations critical to (Russian) national security”; the 2010 edition, however, limited the use of such weaponry to situations in which “the very existence of the state is under threat.” Nikolai N. Sokov, “Why Russia Calls a Limited Nuclear Strike ‘De-Escalation,’” The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (March 13, 2014). 28.“The (Life Extension Program) for the B61 gravity bomb will add a guided tail kit to one of the existing B61 types to increase its accuracy. The new type, known as the B61–12, will be able to strike targets more accurately with a smaller explo- sive yield and reduce the radioactive fallout from a nuclear attack.” Hans Kris- tensen, “Nuclear Weapons Modernization: A Threat to the NPT?,” Arms Control Todayy (May 1, 2014), available at http://wwww.armscontrol.org/act/2014_05/ Nuclear-Weapons-Modernization-A-Threat-to-the-NPT; see also Hans M. Kris- tensen, Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons, Federation of American Scientists (May 2012), available at http://fas.org/_docs/Non_Strategic_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf. “Under current plans, approximately 480 B61-12s are set to be produced by the mid-2020s, and they would serve all U.S. gravity-bomb missions contemplated for five different aircraft. In addition to deployment in Europe, the U.S. Air Force also intends to use the B61-12 to arm heavy B-2 and B-52 bombers based in America” (John Mecklin, “Disarm and Modernize,” Foreign Policyy [March 2015]). The US is also planning to modernize its nuclear strategic triad of land, sea and air forces. 29. David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “U.S.-Russia Nuclear Deal Stalls as Ten- sions over Ukraine Rise,” New York Timess (August 2, 2014), available at http:// wwww.nytimes.com/2014/08/03/world/europe/us-nuclear-deal-with-russia-fails -as-tensions-rise.html?emc=edit_th_20140803&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid= 32636370&_r=0. 226 Notes

30. Interfax, “Russian General Sees Growing Threat of Nuclear War,” Global Secu- rity Newswire, NTII (November 18, 2011), available at http://wwww.nti.org/gsn/ article/russian-general-sees-growing-threat-nuclear-war/. 31. Valery Gerasimov put it in January 2013, “The emphasis in methods of struggle is shifting toward widespread use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other non-military measures, implemented through the involvement of the population. All this is supplemented by covert military means, including implementation of measures of informational struggle, and the actions of special forces. Overt use of force, often under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis management, occurs only at a certain stage, primarily to achieve definitive success in the conflict” (cited in Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy, Mr. Putin [Washington, D.C.: Brookings: 2013], 337). 32. Zachary Keck, “Russia Threatens Nuclear Strikes over Crimea,” The Diplomat (July 11, 2014), available at http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/russia-threatens -nuclear-strikes-over-crimea/. Ukrainian Defense Minister Valeriy Heletey pledged to retake Crimea before the Ukrainian parliament, “Ukraine’s New Defence Minister Promises Crimea Victory,” Kiev Ukraine News Blogg (July 4, 2014), available at http://news.kievukraine.info/2014/07/ukraines-new-defence -minister-promises.html. 33. Kennette Benedict, “How Did We Get from Trade Disputes in Ukraine to Nuclear Threats in Severodvinsk?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientistss (July 8, 2014), available at http://thebulletin.org/how-did-we-get-trade-disputes-ukraine-nuclear -threats-severodvinsk7363. 34. “Over 350,000 Killed by Violence, $4.4 Trillion Spent and Obligated,” Costs of War Project, Watson Institute, Brown University (June 2014), http://costsofwar .org/. 35. See the argument that North Korea was provoked into attacking South Korea. Bruce Cummings, The Origins of the Korean War, 2 volumes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990) 36. Stephen Cohen, cited in George Washington—Zero Hedge, “Ukraine Joining NATO Would Provoke Nuclear War,” Other News. September 7, 2014, Stephen Cohen interview, “Ukraine Ceasefire Takes Hold, but an Expanding NATO on Russia’s Borders Raises Threat of Nuclear War,” Democracy Now, available at http://wwww.democracynoww.org/2014/9/5/ukraine_ceasefire_takes_hold_but _an. See also Solzhenitsyn, previously cited, Spiegell interview with Alexander Solzhenitsyn, “I Am Not Afraid of Death.” 37. Nicolai Petro, “The Real War in Ukraine” (December 2014), available at http:// nationalinterest.org/feature/the-real-war-ukraine-the-battle-over-ukrainian -identity-11782?page=2. 38. Norman Angel, The Great Illusion (New York: Putnam and Sons, 1913), available at https://archive.org/details/cu31924007365467. 39. Patrick J. McDonald and Kevin Sweeney, “The Achilles’ Heel of Liberal IR The- ory? Globalization and Conflict in the Pre––World War I Era,” World Politicss Vol. 59, No. 3 (April, 2007), 403. 40. See, for example, Robert J. Gordon, “Does the New Economy Measure up to Innovations in the Past?,” Journal of Economic Perspectivess Vol 14, No. 4–5 (Fall Notes 227

2000); Hall Gardner, “War and the Media Paradox,” in Athina Karatzogianni, ed., Cyberconflict and Global Politicss (New York: Routledge, 2009). 41. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracyy (New York: Harper, 1975) 42. In his chapter “Preventing Global War,” George Modelski seeks to break out of the deterministic aspects of long-cycle theory. See Hall Gardner and Oleg Kobtzeff, eds., The Ashgate Research Companion to War: Origins and Prevention. 43. Joseph Nye, “1914 Revisited?,” Project Syndicatee (January 13, 2014), available at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/joseph-s—nye-asks-whether-war -between-china-and-the-us-is-as-inevitable-as-many-believe-world-war-i-to-have -been#qBCGT7X665PBrOz4.99. See also the critique of historical analogy by Var- tan Oskanian, “Ukraine: Ominous World War II Parallels?,” Aljazeeraa (March 14, 2014), available at http://m.aljazeera.com/story/201431372034569427. Nye’s critical remark tends to reconfirm Hume’s skepticism with regard to the predic- tive relevance of historical analogy. 44. Geoffrey Blainey, Causes of War, 3rd edition (New York: Free Press, 1988). 45. Sean McMeekin, July 1914: Countdown to Warr (London: Basic, 2013), 390fn. 46. “U.S. Imperialism Is a Paper Tiger,” Selected Works of Mao Tse-tungg (July 14, 1956), available at https://wwww.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected -works/volume-5/mswv5_52.htm. 47. Vladimir Isachenkov, “Putin’s ‘2 Weeks to Kiev’ Out of Context: Aide,” Yahoo! News (September 2, 2014), available at http://news.yahoo.com/putins-aide-confirms-2 -weeks-kiev-remarkk-081030630.html.

Chapter 8 1. This image was symbolically ridiculed by the rock band Pussy Riot in criticizing Putin, yet the group likewise offended those reminded of the Communist des- ecration of the Orthodox Church, even if they were not pro-Putin. 2. “Ukraine Defuses Pro-Russia Instigations in Odesa Province,” Eurasia Daily Monitorr Vol. 12, No. 66 (April 9, 2015). 3. Luke Coffey, “Will Putin Bite off More than He Can Chew?” Aljazeeraa (Janu- ary 9, 2015), available at http://wwww.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/ 01/will-putin-bite-offf-more-than-he-20151745338179641.html. Ben Judah, “Putin’s Coup: How the Russian Leader Used the Ukraine Crisis to Consolidate His Dictatorship,” Politico (October 19, 2014), available at http://www.politico .com/magazine/story/2014/10/vladimir-putins-coup-112025_Page3.html #ixzz3NmzsgOLr. 4. “Le Journal,” Les Echos, available at http://wwww.lesechos.fr/journal/index.php. See also “Russian Defense Policy,” World Press, available at https://russiandefpolicy .wordpress.com/category/strategic-forces-modernization/. 5. Interfax, “Wikileaks Prompted Russia to Suspend Joint Consultative Group on CFE Participation-Russian Foreign Ministry,” Russia Beyond the Headliness (March 11, 2015), available at http://rbth.co.uk/news/2015/03/11/wikileaks_prompted _russia_to_suspend_joint_consultative_group_on_cfe_par_44387.html. 228 Notes

“A Treaty That Ended the Cold War in Europe Is Denounced in Moscow,” Eur- asia Daily Monitorr Vol. 12, No. 46 (March 12, 2015). 6. Pavel Felgenhauer, “Russia’s Coming War with Georgia,” Eurasia Daily Moni- tor Vol. 6, No. 29 (February 12, 2009), available at http://wwww.jamestown .org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34493&tx_ttnews %5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=36bb337090#.VMU3LGTF_pA. 7. Andrei Retinger, “Russia-Iran Deal Is about More than Nuclear Power,” Rus- sia Beyond the Headliness (November 26, 2014), available at http://rbth.co.uk/ opinion/2014/11/26/russia-iran_deal_is_about_more_than_nuclear_power _41727.html. 8. Based on reports by Pravda.com and Interfax, “Ukraine Launches Probes of Zyuganov, Zhirinovsky,” Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, available at “Ukraine Launches Probes of Zyuganov, Zhirinovsky” (July 25, 2014), available at http:// www.rferl.org/content/zyuganov-zhirinovsky-avakov-kolomoyskiy-probe/ 25469971.html. 9. John C. K. Daly, “Hot Issue: After Crimea; The Future of the Black Sea Fleet,” Jamestown Foundation (March 22, 2014), available at http://wwww.jamestown.org/ programs/hotissues/single-hot-issues/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42411&tx _ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=61&cHash=18fb1cd8a0f31ab19fc65b39ef83d021. 10. Lyle J. Goldstein, “What Does China Really Think about the Ukraine,” The National Interestt (September 4, 2014), available at http://nationalinterest.org/ feature/what-does-china-really-think-about-the-ukraine-crisis-11196. The Chi- nese military is also interested in how Moscow carried out large exercises in parallel to the takeover of the Crimea. 11. Fyodor Lukyanov, “Global Aikido: Russia’s Asymmetrical Response to the Ukraine Crisis,” Russia in Global Affairss (December 13, 1014), available at http:// eng.globalaffairs.ru/redcol/Global-Aikido-Russias-Asymmetrical-Response-to -the-Ukraine-Crisis-17177. 12. Shirley A. Kan, “Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990,” Congressional Research Service Reportt (June 13, 2010). 13. Henry Meyer and Evgenia Pismennaya, “China Embraces a Russia Cut off from Western Capital,” Bloomberg Business Weekk (October 16, 2014). 14. For details on the buildup, see Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, Shangri-la Dialogue, IISS (Singapore: May 30–June 1, 2014), available at http://wwww.iiss .org/en/Topics/shangri-la-dialogue/sld14–05-plenary-1–36fb. 15. John C. K. Daly, “Hot Issue: After Crimea; The Future of the Black Sea Fleet,” Jamestown Foundation (March 22, 2014), available at http://wwww.jamestown.org/ programs/hotissues/single-hot-issues/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42411&tx _ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=61&cHash=18fb1cd8a0f31ab19fc65b39ef83d021. 16. Karl Marx, New York Tribune, February 2, 1854, available at https://wwww.marxists .org/archive/marx/works/subject/russia/crimean-war.htm. 17. Marx, New York Tribune. 18. Siemon T. Wezeman and Pieter D. Wezeman, “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2013,” SIPRI Fact Sheett (March 2014), available at http://books.sipri .org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1403.pdf; François Godement, “France’s Pivot to Asia,” European Council On Foreign Relations Policy Brieff (May 2014); Nicola Casarini, Notes 229

“The European ‘Pivot,’” Issue Alertt Vol. 3 (March 2013), 1–2, available at http://wwww.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert_Asia.pdf; and Nanae Kurashige, “Japan, France to Establish Committee to Control Arms Exports,” The Asahi Shimbun (June 5, 2013), available at http://ajww.asahi.com/article/behind_news/ politics/AJ201306050091, http://news.yahoo.com/japan-france-tighten-nuclear -defense-060425544.html, http://wwww.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert_Asia .pdf. 19. Halford. J. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” The Geographical Journall, Vol. 23, No. 4 (April 1904), 436–37. Mackinder differentiates between the “pivot region,” then controlled by Russia, and a “pivot policy” pursued by shifting alliances among major states but with control over the key “pivot region” in mind. 20. Michael G. Roskin, “The New Cold War,” Parameterss Vol. 44, No. 1 (Spring 2014), available at http://wwww.strategicstudiesinstitute.armyy.mil/pubs/parameters/ issues/Springg_2014/1_Roskin.pdf.

Chapter 9 1. US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Blenheim Palace, September 19, 2008. 2. Vladimir Putin, Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Clubb (October 24, 2014). 3. Kurt Volker, cited in Cable 08USNATO290, Ukraine, MAP, and the Georgia- Russian Conflict. 4. Kurt Volker, cited in Cable 08USNATO290. 5. Contrary to the US position, based on my conservations in Tbilisi, it can also be argued that the Russian intervention was provoked by Tbilisi to gain stronger US supports. 6. For a proposal to place the “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform” in discussion of Medvedev’s European Security Treaty, see Eleni Fotiou, “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform: What Is at Stake for Regional Coopera- tion?,” International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS), ICBSS Policy Brief No. 16 (June 2009). 7. Hall Gardner, “The Reset Was Never Reset,” NATO Watch, No. 49 (April 3, 2014), available at http://wwww.natowatch.org/sites/default/files/briefingg_paper _no_49_-_ukraine_russiaa_crimea.pdf. Such an approach in engaging Russia and its Eurasian Union (in which Belarus and Kazakhstan have some veto power) might have prevented Armenia from joining the Russian-led Eurasian Union as a full member on January 1, 2015, despite four years of negotiation with the European Union given Armenian’s previous efforts to maintain a multidirec- tional policy that sought to balance its Russian and European interests. By contrast, despite Russian pressures, both Moldova and Georgia have sought out EU Association Accords, while a relatively wealthy Azerbaijan has hoped to sustain its independence between the European Union and Eurasian Union. Yet should Azerbaijan enter the Eurasian Union, this could give Moscow a monopoly over gas transport in the Caucasus. See Amanda Paul, “The Eastern Partnership, the 230 Notes

Russia-Ukraine War, and the Impact on the South Caucasus,” IAI Working Paper (February 2015), available at http://wwww.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiwp1506.pdf. 8. Michael McFaul, Stephen Sestanovich, and John J. Mearsheimer, “Faulty Pow- ers: Who Started the Ukraine Crisis?,” Foreign Affairss (November–December 2014), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142260/michael-mcfaul -stephen-sestanovich-john-j-mearsheimer/faulty-powers. 9. “NATO allies such as Poland and the Baltic states will likely support Ukraine’s NATO aspirations, while seeking greater reassurances of the US commitment to their own security. These new demands on US extended deterrence will further strain US-Russian relations.” Mariana Budjeryn, “The Breach: Ukraine’s Territorial Integrity and the Budapest Memorandum,” Nuclear Prolifera- tion International History Projectt, Issue Brief No. 3 (2014) available at http:// www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Issue%20Brieff%20No%203—The %20Breach—Final3.pdf. 10. NATO Press Release, “Joint Statement of NATO-Ukrainian Commission” (Septem- ber 4, 2014), available at http://wwww.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_112695.htm. 11. Ibid. 12. Harold C. Deutsch, “Dress Rehearsal Crisis 1938,” in Dennis E. Showalter and Harold C. Deutsch, eds., If the Allies Had Fallen: Sixty Alternative Scenarios of World War III (New York: MJF, 1997). 13. See Garry Kasparov, “Vladimir Putin and the Lessons of 1938,” Politico (March 16, 2014), available at http://wwww.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/ 03/vladmir-putin-crimea-hitler-1938–104711.html#.U99la2OUlqg. 14. NATO Press Release, “Joint Statement of NATO-Ukrainian Commission” (Sep- tember 4, 2014). 15. September 2014 opinion polls in Kharkiv and Odessa (which were not possible in Donetsk and Luhansk) represent areas that are supposedly pro-Russian. But few respondents had any understanding of what Novorossiya even was (43 percent didn’t know or refused to comment, only 4 percent correctly recognized it as a historical term), a huge majority (87 percent) wanted their regions to remain part of Ukraine, a smaller majority (56 percent) had a negative impression of Vladimir Putin, and a slightly smaller majority (52 percent) said that Russian troops were directly engaged in the recent fighting. But a mere 26 percent of the respondents think that Ukraine should join NATO versus 48 percent who think that it should not. http://wwww.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2014/09/ 23/ukrainians-still-dont-want-to-join-nato/. 16. Rajan Menon and Devin T. Stewart, “Ukraine: The New Cuban Missile Crisis?,” Carnegie Councill (February 22, 2015), available at http://wwww.carnegiecouncil .org/publications/articles_papers_reports/724. 17. “Ex-NSA Director, US Intelligence Veterans Write Open Letter to Merkel to Avoid All-Out War,” Zero Hedgee (September 1, 2014), available at http://www .zerohedge.com/news/2014–09–01/ex-nsa-director-us-intelligence-veterans -write-open-letter-merkel-avoid-all-out-ukra. 18. Kremlin, “The Putin Plan for Settling the Conflict in Ukraine” (September 3, 2014), available at http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/22899. Notes 231

19. Neil MacFarquar, “Ukraine Deal Imposes Truce Putin Devised,” New York Times (September 5, 2014). Putin may have wanted Poland to commit troops to Ukraine, arguing to Polish prime minister Donald Tu sk (soon to be president of the European Council) that “Ukraine is an artificial country and that Lvov is a Polish city and why don’t we just sort it out together.” Tusk did not answer. Ben Judah, “Putin’s Coup,” Politico Magazinee (October 19, 2014), available at http://wwww.politico.com/ magazine/story/2014/10/vladimir-putins-coup-112025.html#.VTV1pCGqpBd. 20.The September 19 accord Minsk Memorandum signed by the rebel leaders of the Donbass and Luhansk People’s Republics and other participants of the Trilateral Contact Group includes the following points (Nicolai N. Petro, “Timeline for Donbas since the Signing of the Minsk Accords”): Point 1: Mutual cessation of use of weapons. Point 2: Withdrawal to demarcation of forces line as of 19 September. Point 3: Prohibition on offensive operations. Point 4: Withdrawal of heavy artillery (above caliber of 100mm) at least 15 km. within 24 hours. Point 5: Prohibition on heavy weapons placement in four settlements. Point 6: Removal of landmines and prohibition on placement of new landmines. Point 7: Prohibition on combat and surveillance flights, with exception of OSCE monitoring. Point 8: Deployment of OSCE monitoring missions within 24 hours. Point 9: Removal of all “foreign military formations, military equipment, militants and mercenaries from Ukrainian territory, to be monitored by the OSCE.” 21. Nicolai N. Petro, “Timeline for Donbas since the Signing of the Minsk Accords” Sept 5—Twelve point Minsk Protocol signed. The conflict has continued because of failure to reach all points: Point 1: Immediate bilateral ceasefire [never fully implementedd] Point 2: Monitoring and verification of ceasefire by OSCE [implementedd] Point 3: Decentralisation of power through the adoption of a “law on special status” of some areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. [passed by Rada but never signed into law and later revokedd] Point 4: Monitoring of border and security zone on Russian-Ukrainian border by OSCE. [implementedd] Point 5: Immediate release of hostages and detained persons. [partially implementedd] Point 6: An amnesty law. [passed Rada but never signed into law and later revokedd] Point 7: “Continued inclusive national dialogue” [never implementedd] Point 8: Measures to improve the humanitarian situation in Donbass [partial blockade introduced by Kiev] Point 9: Local elections to be held in accor- dance with “law on special status.” [implemented by Donbass, but not recognized by Kiev] Point 10: Withdrawal of all military and mercenaries from Ukraine. [never implementedd] Point 11: Program of economic recovery and reconstruction for Donbass [legislation initiatedd] Point 12: Security for participants in negotiations. [implementedd] The two sides have differed on the date set for elections due to the following: 1) “Kiev withdrew its signature from the demarcation line designated on 10/29, as a result electoral districts could not be drawn up; and 2) the act on special status was never actually signed into law by the president and speaker of parliamentt” (Nicolai N. Petro, “Timeline for Donbas Since the 232 Notes

Signing of the Minsk Accords,” available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/ 0BxHXhkTO_ICnYmtKMGxLeFhURFk/view?pli=1). 22. Rajan Menon and Alexander J. Motyl, “Ukraine Should Put Russia to Donbas Test,” LA Times, cited in Gulf Newss (December 26, 2014). 23. “Lavrov: Moscow Is Ready to Discuss Peacekeepers in Donbas,” ZNN, UA Mirror Weeklyy (March 16, 2014), available at http://mww.ua/WORLD/lavrov-moscow-is -ready-to-discuss-peacekeepers-in-donbas-1455_.html. 24. Andrei Kortunov, “Russia between Two Maidans” RIACC (December 3, 2014), available at http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=4890#top. 25. Poroshenko’s sacking of the Ukrainian banking, media, and energy oligarch, Ihor Kolomoisky, could be seen as a concession to the EU’s Association Accord, western creditors, and the IMF in an effort to clean up the corrupt state energy sector, while checking the political independence of Ukrainian oligarchs. It could also be seen as a concession to Russia by checking his financing of antiseparatist militants to prevent eastern separatists from seizing the industrial region of Dni- propetrovsk. “Anti-Corruption Tide Sweeping across Ukraine,” Eurasia Daily Monitorr Vol. 12, No. 60 (April 1, 2015). Concurrently, a number of Ukrainian separatist leaders have either been assassinated or said to have committed suicide. See “Ukraine Ally of Ex-President Yanukovych Found Dead,” BBC, available at http://wwww.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32329512. It is possible that Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov may have been assassinated because he opposed Russian involvement in Ukraine. Lucian Kim, “How War in Ukraine Led to Russian Opposition Leader Boris Nemtsov’s Death,” Reuters, available at http:// blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/03/02/how-war-in-ukraine-led-to-russian -opposition-leader-boris-nemtsovs-death/. 26.Paul J. Saunders, “5 Reasons Why Arming Ukraine Won’t Work,” The National Interest (February 12, 2015), available at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/5 -reasons-arming-ukraine-won’t-work-12234. James Carden, “Reckless: Obama’s Advisers Go Rogue,” The National Interestt (March 20, 2015). Paul McLeary, “US Trainers to Deploy to Ukraine,” Defense Newss (January 22, 2015), available at http://wwww.defensenews.com/story/defense/land/army/2015/01/21/ukraine-us -army-russia/22119315/. 27. Interview with Damon Wilson, “Permanent Neutrality and ‘Finland Status’ Are Bad Ideas for Ukraine’s Own Interests,” Ukrainian Weekk (July 10, 2014), available at http://ukrainianweek.com/World/115456. 28. Hall Gardner, The Failure to Prevent World War I: The Unexpected Armageddon (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015). 29. This would mean allocating greater financial and development resources to the regions (which now obtain only 15 percent of the Ukrainian budget) and not primarily to the central government (which now obtains roughly 85 percent), so as to better counterbalance Moscow’s political influence. See interview of “pro- Russian” Ukrainian oligarch, Dmytro Firtash, “Dmitry Firtash: Europe, Ukraine and Russia Should Sit Down and Talk,” Euronews (March 2, 2015), available at http://dmitryfirtash.com/stance. 30.Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Realityy (1919), 158. 31. Ibid., 170–71. Notes 233

32. Lloyd George, House of Commons (July 27, 1936), available at http://www .theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=1936–07–27a.1115.14#g1207.1. 33. Jan Karski, The Great Powers and Polandd (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985), 316. 34. Sergei Karaganov, cited in Roger Cohen, “Russia’s Weimar Syndrome,” NY Times (May 1, 2014), available at http://wwww.nytimes.com/2014/05/02/opinion/cohen -russias-weimar-syndrome.html?_r=0. 35. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1996). 36. See my critique of Kissinger, Hall Gardner, “Crimea: When and If, the Dust Set- tles,” RIAC (April 11, 2014), available at http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4 =3507#top. For a perspective on how Finland kept its relative independence from Moscow through the threat of resistance and links to Europe, see René Nyberg, “Finnish Lessons for Ukraine,” New York Timess (September 2, 2014), available at http://wwww.nytimes.com/2014/09/03/opinion/finlands-lesson-for-ukraine.html. 37. “A fundamental question too often forgotten in recent years by NATO is: Can the applicant country be defended and are the members of the alliance and the applicant country willing to build the capacity and spend the resources required to do so? By ‘defended’ I do not mean defended by the early use of nuclear weapons which could destroy much of Europe and probably also escalate to both the U.S. and Russia.” Sam Nunn, NTI Analysiss (September 4, 2014), available at http://wwww.nti.org/analysis/opinions/former-senator-sam-nunns-perspective -nato-summit-russia-ukraine/. 38. Hall Gardner, NATO Expansion and US Strategy in Asia. 39. See my more concrete proposals in Hall Gardner, Averting Global War and NATO Expansion and US Strategy in Asiaa (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013). 40. Purnomo Yusgiantoro, Minister of Defense, Indonesia has argued that the “US would remain a military superpower, China was a rising force, and ASEAN was destined to become a solid political-security community. Conflict is not inevitable because the region is large enough to accommodate all powers, and the regional security architecture should accommodate this ‘evolving dynamic equilibrium.’” Proceedings, Shangri-la Dialogue, IISS (Singapore, May 30–June 1, 2014), available at http://wwww.iiss.org/en/publications/conference%20proceedings/sections/ shangri-la-aa36/the-shangri-la-dialogue-2014-f844/sld14–07-plenary-3-bbe0. 41. Hall Gardner, NATO Expansion. See also, Hall Gardner, “The Impact of the US ‘Re-Balancing’ to Asia on French Strategic Thinking,” in Greg Kennedy, ed., Assessing the US Re-Balance Strategy: Effects on the Maritime Balance of Power (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015), forthcoming. 42. Republic of Taiwan, East China Sea Initiativee (August 2012), available at http:// wwww.mofa.govv.tw/en/cp.aspx?n=A3C75D6CF8A0D021. 43. Hall Gardner, “From Berlin to Ukraine/Russia: Definitely There Are Things That Do Not Love Walls . . . ,” Other News (November 6, 2014), available at http:// www.other-news.info/2014/11/from-berlin-to-ukrainerussia-definitely-there -are-things-that-do-not-love-walls/. 44. Hall Gardner, Surviving the Millennium (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 230. Selected Bibliography

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Abe, Shinzo, 9, 120 historical analogy, 21–27, 38, 99, 101–3, Abkhazia, 11, 18, 61–62, 86–87, 90, 127, 145, 174, 195, 206, 227 155, 188 homology, 102–3, 221 Afghanistan, 12, 21, 45, 59, 60, 89, Angel, Norman, 127, 226, 235 90–91, 110–11, 124, 132–38, 140, The Great Illusion (1910), 127, 235 150, 160, 170, 182, 192–94 Anglo-French entente, 113–14, 181–82 intervention in (2001), 137–38 Anglo--Japanese alliance (1902), 120, 222 Africa, 13, 55, 70–78, 82, 111–13, 121–24, Annan, Kofi, 26 132, 153, 223–24 Annexations (as causes of war), 23–28 Central, 112 Anonymous, 134, 224 North, 111–12, 123 Arab Gulf/Arab-Persian Gulf, 9, 26, 56, 60, African National Congress, 82, 132 82, 90–95, 111–14, 130, 150–55, Akkerman Convention (1826), 32 192–94 Alaska, 153 Arab-Israeli war (1967), 150 Al-Assad, Bashar, 90–91, 123, 130–34, Arab Spring, 6, 90–97 154, 191 Arctic region, 116, 123 Alexander I (Tsar), 40 Argentina, 70–71, 133, 153, 160, 223 Algerian National Liberation Front, 132 Aristotle, 94 Allied Control Council (1945), 140 Armenia, 13, 32, 40–48, 64, 71, 87, Al-Maliki, Nuri, 90 117–18, 154, 171, 229 Al Qaeda, 45, 56, 82, 90–94, 114, 131–34, Arms Control, 46, 192, 223–25 223 Adopted Conventional Force in Alsace-Lorraine, 23, 34, 95, 104–9, Europe (ACFE) treaty, 135 114–15, 151, 160, 180–82, 201 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, Prussian annexation of (1871), 109, 151 62, 154 alternative globalization, 88 Budapest Memorandum (1994), 4, Amalrik, Andrei, 166 131, 172, 216, 223, 230 America, 11, 23, 82, 121, 202–6, 210 Conventional Force in Europe (CFE) Central, 112, 121 treaty (1990), 92, 135, 227 North, 23, 112 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces South, 112, 121 (INF) treaty, 49, 136, 154 See also United States (US) START I, 44–47, 154 analogy, 12–19, 20–27, 33–38, 52–53, START II, 47–49 60, 99, 101–5, 118, 121–29, 145, ASEAN, 190–93, 233 164, 174–75, 181–87, 195, 203–6, ASEAN 10 Declaration of Conduct, 216, 221–27 193 240 Index

Asia, 13, 22, 39, 45, 62, 85, 90, 100, Berezovsky, Boris, 59 111–13, 120–24, 154–57, 164–66, Beria, Lavrentii, 36, 44, 85, 164 190–95, 202–8, 211 Berlin-Baghdad-Basra rail system, 93 Central, 39, 45, 85, 90, 100, 110–13, Berlin Wall, 1, 195, 233 121–24, 155, 164, 195 Bermuda, 112 South, 82, 100 Bessarabia, 33, 88, 206, 222 Augustus II, 30 Biden, Joe, 170 Australia, 9, 70–71, 120, 157 bin Laden, Osama, 137–38, 150 Austria, 9, 13, 22–23, 31–37, 70, 104–6, Black Sea, 10–13, 29, 30–38, 44–47, 51, 118–19, 122, 161, 182–88, 199, 61–67, 72–75, 82–87, 100, 111–17, 203, 211 139, 154–55, 170–78, 180–89, War of Austrian succession (1740–48), 190–95, 207, 210–16, 228–29 23 Black Sea Economic Cooperation Forum, Austro-Hungarian empire, 31–34, 45, 190 116–18, 207 Boko Haram, 82 Axis Powers, 13 Bolsheviks, 35–37, 107 Azarov, Mykola, 64–66, 212 Anti-Bolshevik movements, 35–36 Azerbaijan, 32, 40–48, 64, 72, 87, 117, Pro-Bolshevik movements, 35–36 185, 207, 229 Bonaparte, Jérome, 31 Bonaparte, Louis-Napoléon, 32, 107 Bab-el-Mandeb strait, 94 Bonaparte, Napoleon, 31, 40, 93, 145–46, Bacon, Francis, 81, 100–101, 135, 220 151 Bahamas, 112 Berlin Decree (1806), 31 Bahrain, 85 Napoleonic wars, 39, 40, 106, 113, Baker, James, 3, 47, 209 165 Balaklava, 33 Borodino, 31 Balfour Declaration, 111 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 23, 33, 47, 108–9 Balkans, 45, 55–57, 90, 100, 111–18, Austro-Hungarian annexation of 122–24, 146, 154, 166, 189, 193–95, (1908), 23 219 Bosnian war (1990–95), 4–6, 52–57 Baltic-Black Sea alliance, 117, 180–85 Bourbon France, 109 Baltic Sea, 32, 93 Brazil, 13, 70–78, 112, 153, 161, 233 Russian Baltic Fleet, 75 BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Baltic states, 18, 21–25, 43–47, 70–76, Africa), 70–78 117–18, 124, 139, 153, 170, 180–87, Brissotin faction (French Revolution), 106 191, 206, 224, 230 Bruening, Heinrich, 185 Bandera, Stepan, 18 Brunei, 112, 193 Barthou, Jean Louis, 184 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 22, 187–88, 202–4 Barthou Plan, 183 Budapest Memorandum or Budapest Battle of Navarino (1827), 32 Accords (1994), 4, 51, 74, 131, Battle of Poltava (1709), 28 172, 216, 223, 230 Bay of Narva, 87 Bukovina, 88, 206 Belarus, 4, 13, 29, 30–36, 47, 51, 64, 71, Bulgaria, 18, 35, 55, 85, 153 85–87, 116–18, 130–31, 152–54, Burke, Edmund, 12–13, 202 176, 182, 191, 206, 215–19, 229 Bush (George W.) administration, 21, 62, Belgium, 77, 93, 147, 184 89, 128, 130–38 Index 241

Bush, George, Sr., 25, 209 Sino-Russian entente, 158 “Chicken Kiev” speech, 44, 209 Sino-Soviet alliance (1950), 120, 158 Byzantium, 39 Sino-Soviet rapprochement, 158 Tiananmen square, 14, 162–66 Caribbean, 112 Ciesyn, 36 Carter, Jimmy, 21–25, 112 Clark, Wes (General), 133, 224, 235 Caspian Sea, 32, 72 Clemenceau, Georges, 181 Catherine II (Catherine the Great), 30 Clinton, Hillary, 19, 20, 170, 202–4 Catholics, 32, 95 Clinton Administration, 5–6, 52–57, 128 Caucasus, 22––28, 30–38, 45, 61–62, 82–85, Cohen, Stephen, 139, 226 90–92, 100, 111–17, 123–24, 139, Cold War, 5–8, 10–19, 21–29, 40–49, 149, 151–55, 161, 171–73, 180–89, 50–56, 64, 76–79, 81–86, 90–95, 193–95, 208, 229, 230 104–9, 111–19, 123–29, 130–39, Cayman Islands, 112 140––41, 162––69, 172, 180–87, 194–96, Central Asia, 39, 45, 85, 90, 100, 110–13, 200–204, 210–17, 222–29, 235 121–24, 155, 164, 195 Collective Security Treaty Organization Central Powers, 35, 41, 208 (CSTO), 13, 48, 117, 131, 155, Peace Treaty with Ukraine (1918), 172, 201 35, 41 Colombia, 24 Charles V, 109 Commonwealth of Independent states, Chechnya, 59 46–47, 64 Chechen Islamist movements, 60 Communism, 6–7, 146 China (Imperial) Comparative or cross-historical method, Ming dynasty, 122 103–9, 113. See also underr analogy Opium Wars, 22, 149 Concert of Europe, 33, 88, 109, 194 Sino-Japanese war (1894–95), 22, Constantinople, 31 119, 158, 165, 196 Contact Groups, 15, 191–94 Qin dynasty, 122, 146 containment Qin Shi Huang, Emperor, 146 US-Soviet “double containment,” 11, Qing dynasty, 122 202 China (People’s Republic of), 8–9, cooperative-collective security, 2–8, 12–15, 11–15, 21–27, 39, 45–49, 56, 54, 131, 172, 186–88, 193 64–69, 70–79, 82–86, 91–96, 105, Crimea 110–19, 120–29, 131–35, 140–49, annexation of by Moscow (2014), 10–19, 152–59, 160–67, 186, 190–97, 21–28, 30, 61–69, 74–79, 86, 202–6, 215, 222–28, 233 90, 108, 136–37, 151–55, 161, air defense zone, 76, 157 170–76, 181–88, 195, 217, 224 Chinese Communist Party, 14, 149 Crimean Declaration of Independence Heilongjiang, 164 (1992), 46, 207 Nine Dash Map, 157 Crimean Khanate, 31–32, 207 Silk Road Economic Belt, 11, 86, 132, Crimean Tatars, 39, 43, 161, 176 156 Crimean War (1853–56), 22–28, 30–34, Sino-American entente, 121 40, 109, 114, 149, 151, 161–65, Sino-European alliance, 162 187, 207 Sino-Japanese rivalry, 120 Declaration of Pariss (1856), 33, 207 Sino-Russian alliance, 121, 156–59, 165 siege of Sevastopol (1854–55), 30–32 242 Index

Croatia, 47, 84, 164, 184 British intervention (1882), 113 Ustashi, 184 Eisenhower, Dwight (President), 8 Cuba, 24, 78, 123, 153–55 Elbe river, 31 Cuban Missile Crisis, 19, 21–28, 139, encirclement, 92, 107–9, 140, 159, 160–61, 188, 196, 204–5, 230 180 Lourdes radar station, 153 Estonia, 18, 36, 46, 50, 61, 87, 139, 153, cyberwar, 18, 61, 92, 134 203–6, 218–19, 224 Russian-Estonian, 18, 61 Estonian “cyber war” (April–Sept. Cyprus, 9, 26, 56, 154, 190–93, 206 2007), 18, 61 Turkish seizure of eastern Cyprus Eurasia, 13–15, 38–39, 64–68, 71–72, (1974), 26 82–86, 104–5, 110–18, 132, Czechoslovakia, 38, 115, 184–85, 222 153–59, 163–67, 176, 182, 193, 1968 Czechoslovak protest, 21 203–4, 212–15, 227–29, 232 Czech Republic, 36–39, 55, 62, 77, 115, Euro crisis, 68, 70–71 139 EuroMaidan movement/protests, 65, 87, 95, 172–74 Danilevsky, Nikolay, 39 European Atomic Energy Community, Danube, 32–33, 207 65 Danubian Principalities, 32 European Bank for Reconstruction and European Danube Commission, 32 Development, 69 Dardanelles, 31–32, 94 European Central Bank, 89 Davies, Joseph E. (Ambassador), 53, 199, European Coal and Steel Community, 210 190 Dawes Plan, 116 European Parliament, 19, 204 Dayton Accords (1995), 54 European States, 2, 53–54, 64, 75–76, de Klerk, Frederik Willem, 132 141, 171, 186–89 democracy, 2–8, 10–15, 25, 45, 56, 60–64, 85, 96–97, 133, 141, 156, 173, central, 54 200–209, 211–12, 226–27, 237 eastern, 2–3, 53–54, 64, 75–76, 111–16, Denikin, Anton (General), 36 171, 186 Denmark, 30, 118 western, 2, 52, 141 de Tocqueville, Alexis, 107–9 European Union (EU), 2–7, 10–12, 20–29, diaspora, 1, 17–18, 45–46, 50, 134, 152, 33–39, 48–49, 51–54, 61–69, 172–77 71–76, 85–89, 96, 108, 110–19, Russian, 18, 46, 50, 134, 152 123, 140–41, 152–59, 160–69, Dostoievsky, Fyodor, 39 170–79, 180–89, 190–96, 203–6, Dreadnought, 92–93 213, 225–29, 235 Duchy of Warsaw, 31 EU arms embargo on China (since Dugin, Alexander, 50 1989), 69, 162 Dutch East Indies, 94 EU association accords, 10, 232 EU-Chinese “Red Eiffel Tower East China Sea Peace Initiative (ECSPI), entente,” 162 193 EU Eastern Partnership (2008–9), 87, Eden, Anthony, 19, 184 117, 222 Egypt, 12, 25–26, 85, 90–97, 111–14, EU-Russian relations, 12, 137 124, 182, 193, 219, 221–23 ‘Eurosceptic’ movements, 89, 219 Index 243

Fabius, Laurent, 67 Eastern, 2–3, 12 Falklands/Malvinas islands, 24, 133 Imperial Germany, 22, 34–37, 40, 50, Fascism, 7–8, 12–17, 205, 237 86, 93–95, 105–9, 113–23, 141, Fatah, 97 145–47, 153, 155, 158, 161–62, Fattah el-Sisi, Abdel, 90 164, 181–82, 185, 196 Ferdinand, Franz (Archduke), 34, 104–9, Kriegsspiell, 145 149, 207 Schlieffen Plan, 124 Finland, 9, 28, 31, 53, 70–79, 87, 111–17, Nazi Germany, 13, 23–24, 38–39, 161, 185–87, 206, 218, 232–33 41–49, 53, 63, 93, 105–9, Four Power Agreement (over Germany, 115–19, 146, 153–58, 161–62, 1972), 140 184–86, 206 France, 4, 22–23, 31–38, 40, 52–56, Anschluss, 21, 118 60–66, 70–75, 82–89, 90–97, 104–9, Blitzkriegg, 146 111–19, 123, 131–34, 145, 158, Holocaust, 150 161–63, 172–76, 180–86, 190–96, Luftwaffe, 93 202–6, 218–19, 220–29 Weimar Germany, 12, 21–28, 37–38, ancien regime, 106, 122 50–59, 60, 105–8, 111–18, Franco, Franciso (General), 18 155–58, 184–85, 211–16, 233 Franco-Prussian War (1870–71), 32, 145 Global War on Terror (GWOT), 21, 60, Franco-Soviet alliance or pact (1935), 89, 124, 137–38, 201 158, 185 Goa, 25 French Revolution, 22–23, 30–31, 106, Indian annexation of (1961), 25 162, 207 Godwin’s Law, 19, 204 Fukuyama, Francis, 2–8, 10–14, 32, 56, Gorbachev, Mikhail, 3–7, 11–13, 44–46, 127, 199, 200–208, 211–12, 235 50, 78, 106–8, 120, 141, 166–69, isothymia, 7, 185 172–75, 185, 196–99, 202–9, 236 megalothymia, 7, 12–15 vetocracy, 8, 200 New Union Treaty, 45, 108 Gordon, ‘Chinese’ (General), 124, 226 Galvin, Jack (General), 4–5, 169 Great Britain, 22–27, 31–39, 40, 93, Gates, Robert, 144, 161–69, 175, 229 100–109, 110–19, 145–46, 151–`58, Gaza, 25–26 174, 181–86, 196, 206 Gazprom, 64–65 Anglo-Russian rapprochement, 34 George, Lloyd, 184, 233 Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere Georgia, 10, 28, 46–68, 50–55, 61–64, (Japanese), 120, 200 70–79, 83–87, 90, 117, 123, Great Northern War (1700–21), 30 151–55, 161–69, 170–73, 180–89, Greece, 8, 26, 56, 70–72, 89, 94, 116, 201–7, 211–18, 228–29 146, 153, 191 Georgia-Russia war, 10, 61–62, 73, Greek Cypriots, 26 151, 170–72 Greek Independence party (ANEL), Germany, 2–6, 11–13, 22–27, 34–49, 89 40–49, 50–56, 60–66, 70–77, Syriza party, 89 84–86, 92–95, 104–9, 110–19, Group of 7 (G–7), 55–59, 60–69, 116 120–23, 130–39, 140–47, 153–58, Group of 20 (G–20), 69 161–64, 176, 180–88, 190–95, Guam, 24 206, 210–18, 223, 236 Guantanamo Bay, 24 244 Index

Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC), sea lines of communication, 93–94, 85, 96 110–13, 158, 187 Gulf of Finland, 87 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 60, Gulf of Yemen, 94 190 Gusinsky, Vladimir, 59 Iran, 9, 25–26, 40, 70–73, 85–88, 90–96, 111–14, 123–29, 130–35, Habsburg Empire, 109 150–57, 160, 182, 192–95, 207, Hainan Island, 25, 192 223–28 Chinese annexation of (1950), 25 Iranian revolution (1979), 26, 150 Hamas, 82, 91–97, 112, 150, 191 Iran-Iraq war, 130 Hamilton, Alexander, 8 Iraq, 12, 26, 60, 81–89, 90–97, 111–14, Hanover, 30 123–24, 130–37, 150, 160–66, Hawaii, 24 191–95, 204, 220–23 US annexation of (1898), 24 Ireland, 89 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm, 9, 13, 31 Irish Republican Army (IRA), 82 Hitler, Adolf, 7, 11–19, 20–28, 38–39, Islamabad, 132 41, 59, 61, 93–95, 108, 115–18, Islamic State (or ISIS, ISIL, or Daesh), 26, 122, 142–46, 151–59, 174, 183–86, 82–83, 90–91, 114, 129, 132–35, 202–8, 230 150, 160, 191–95, 222–23 Hizb’allah, 25 Israel, 25–26, 33, 83–88, 111, 124–29, 130–34, 150, 191–92, 223 Holbrooke, Richard, 6, 52–57, 199, annexation of East Jerusalem, 25 210–11, 236 Eretz, 150 Holy Lands, 32–33 occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Holy Roman Empire, 100–109 (1967), 25 Hong Kong, 113, 122 Italy, 8, 13, 70–77, 89, 93, 108, 111–13, Hume, David, 101–2, 227 122, 184, 215–19 Hungary, 9, 13, 35, 40–49, 55, 70–72, 88, 111–16, 139, 151–53 Jackson, Mike (General), 133, 216, 224, 1956 Hungarian insurrection, 21 235 ethnic Hungarians, 88 Japan, 9, 11–15, 22–27, 34–39, 45–49, Hussein, Saddam, 26, 130, 150 71–79, 82–85, 93–99, 110–19, 120–23, 133–38, 140–46, 150–59, imperialism, 7, 10, 28–29, 72, 113, 133, 160–66, 180, 191–96, 203–9, 215, 146, 153, 172, 185, 203, 221, 227, 222–29, 237 236 American-Japanese “Ninja Turtle” Imperial Japan, 22 alliance, 120, 222 India, 9, 12–13, 23–27, 49, 56, 70–78, Jaurès, Jean, 28, 180–88 82–82, 99, 110–13, 120–23, 132, Jefferson, Thomas, 8 150–59, 161–63, 180, 193–96, Johnson, Lyndon, 19 209, 223–24, 236 Indian-Pakistani rivalry, 195 Kai-chek, Chiang, 165 Operation Vijay (1961), 25 Kant, Immanuel, 6, 94, 201, 220 Indian Ocean, 113, 122, 150–58, 193 “League of Democracies,” 8–9, 201 Indo-Pacific, 12–15, 76, 82, 113–19, Karelia, 116–17, 206 120–21, 156–58, 160–63, 192–96 Kargil war (1999), 132 Index 245

Kars, 33, 185, 233–36 Kuwait, 3, 26, 49, 222 Karski, Jan, 185, 233–36 attempted Iraqi annexation of (1990), Kashmir, 123, 132, 224 26 Kasparov, Garry, 17, 174, 203, 230 Kyrgyzstan, 48, 71, 118 Kautilya, 92, 220, 236 Kazakhstan, 4, 13–18, 29, 47–48, 51, 64, Lake Baikal, 36, 85 85, 118, 130–31, 152–59, 229 Latvia, 36, 46, 50, 139, 206, 224 Kennan, George, 5, 169 Lavrov, Serge, 24, 77, 178, 218, 232 Kennedy, John F., 19, 188, 223, 233 League of Nations, 38, 183–85, 194 Kerensky, Alexander, 34, 164 Lebanon, 25–26 Keynes, John Maynard, 100–101, 220, Lebed, Alexandre (General), 52 236 Lebensraum, 22, 95, 142, 145 Khanates of Erivan, 32, 207 Lenin, Vladimir, 115 Khanates of Nakhichevan, 32 Leninist Russia, 27–28, 112–15, 151 Kharkiv Agreement (Ukraine-Russia, Libya, 9, 81–85, 90–95, 123, 131–38, 2010), 154 204 Khodorkovsky, Mikhail, 59 French intervention (2013), 90 Khrushchev, Nikita, 43–46, 63, 151 Italian-Turkish war over (1911), 93 Kiel Canal, 93 Lithuania, 30–38, 46, 70, 89, 117, 139, Kiev, 1–4, 10–19, 25–29, 30–39, 184, 206, 215, 224 40–48, 51, 62–68, 70–79, 87, Republic of Central Lithuania, 38 119, 136–39, 146, 151–59, 161, Vilnius, 184 170–79, 180–187, 208–9, 210–17, Little Entente, 115–16, 184–85 223–27, 231. See also Ukraine Locarno Pact of 1924–25, 184 Kievan Rus, 39, 208 Eastern Locarno, 28, 116, 183–88, Kingdom of Westphalia, 31 199 Kissinger, Henry, 6, 22, 55, 187–88, Lugar, Richard, 6 203–5, 211, 233 Lukin, Vladimir, 67 kleptocrat, 29, 63–67, 95–97, 174 Lutsenko, Yuri, 64–66, 213 Korean peninsula, 120–21, 158 Luxembourg, 147 Korean War, 138, 146, 235 Lvov, Georgy (Prince), 34, 231 Kornilov Putsch, 50 Kosovo, 6–9, 10, 54–59, 62, 85, 123–28, Macao, 122 133–38, 153, 170, 185, 210–11 Macedonia, 47, 54, 153 Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), 55, Machiavelli, Niccolò, 21 138 Mackinder, Halford, 4, 164, 182–86, war “over” Kosovo (1998–99), 6–8, 221–29, 232–36 10, 55–59, 123–28, 170 Madison, James, 8 Kozyrev, Andrei, 48, 210 Magnitsky Act (2013), 61 Krauthammer, Charles, 7, 56, 200, 211 major-power war, 11–15, 20, 39, 79, Kravchuk, Leonid, 47 97, 108, 124–27, 135–39, 143–47, Kuchma, Leonid, 48 183, 194 Kurdish PKK, 82, 91 Makarov, Nikolai, 137 Kurdistan, 91 Malenkov, Georgii, 44 Peshmerga, 91 Manchuria, 22, 119, 120, 196 Kuril islands, 120, 156, 206 Japanese invasion of, 196 246 Index

Mandela, Nelson, 132 Mueller, John, 127, 222, 236 Maritime Provinces, 36 Muscovy, 30–39 Marshall Plan, 64, 116, 222 Muslims/Moslems, 39, 56, 95, 134, 164 Marx, Karl, 22, 41, 84, 94, 127, 161–63, Muslim Brotherhood, 90–97 227–28 Mussolini, Benito, 17, 122, 146, 203 Ma Ying-jeou, 193 mutually assured destruction (MAD), McCain, John, 17–19, 203 128, 135 McFaul, Michael, 61, 171–72, 212, 230 mutually assured security, 135 Mearsheimer, John, 1, 171–72, 222–23, 230–36 Nagorno-Karabakh, 90, 188 Mecklenberg, 30 Najibullah, Mohammed, 45 Mediterranean, 26, 73, 90, 113, 122–23, Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 19, 97 154, 160, 191–94 NATO, 1–9, 10–15, 20–29, 41––49, 50–59, Medvedev, Dmitri, 10, 61–62, 171, 201, 60–66, 72–79, 85–89, 90–94, 229 100–108, 112–19, 123–28, 131–39, Middle East, 11–15, 27, 38–39, 57, 62, 140, 151–59, 161–69, 170–79, 83–89, 90–91, 111, 124, 154, 166, 180–89, 190–99, 200–204, 210–18, 190–95 224–29, 230–36 Mill, John Stuart, 101 Baltic Air Police, 72 Milosevic, Slobodan, 55–57, 128, 133, Bucharest summit (2008), 62–63, 211 172, 201, 218 Minsk Summit (2014), 177 “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Minsk Agreement (1991), 46, 178, 209 Platform,” 171, 229 Minsk Statement on Strategic Forces Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, 48 (1991), 46 NATO-EU “double enlargement,” 117 missile defense system (MD systems), NATO Membership Action Plan 14, 62 (MAP), 48 Mittelafrika, 142 NATO-Russia Council (NRC), 54–59, Mitteleuropa, 142 74–75, 179, 191, 216 Moldavia, 23, 33 NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Moldova, 32–33, 46–49, 64, 76, 87, 108, Council, 54 117, 180–89, 218, 229 NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Molotov-Ribbentrop “non-aggression” Distinctive Partnership (1997), pact (1939), 24, 53, 88, 116–18, 74 156–59, 206, 216, 222 NATO-Ukraine Commission, 54, 74, Molotov-Tōgō accord, 24 173, 230 Mongolia, 86, 110, 122, 156–57, 164 Partnership for Peace (PfP), 2, 48, 53, Inner Mongolia, 86, 122, 156 186–88, 190–91 Monroe Doctrine, 13–14, 61, 94, 187, US-NATO-Ukrainian--Japanese 193 alliance (tacit), 193 Morgenthau, Hans, 12 Nazarbayev, Nursultan, 152 Montreux Convention (1936), 94, 160, Near East, 123 187, 220 neoconservatives, 6, 19, 49, 161–63 Morocco, 123, 160 neoisolationist, 20, 162, 172 Morsi, Mohamed, 94 Neo--Jaurès strategy, 28, 180–88 Mubarak, Hosni, 97 Neo-liberals, 174 Index 247

Netanyahu, Benjamin, 130, 223 Organization of American States (OAS), Netherlands (Holland), 77, 112, 215 25 Antilles, 112 Orthodox, 10, 32, 60, 78, 106, 174, 208, Newton, Isaac, 101 227 New Zealand, 9 Ottoman Empire, 13, 22, 30–39, 40, 88, Nicolas I (Tsar), 22–28, 32, 40, 108, 111, 124, 150–55, 161 149, 151, 161 Nicolas II (Tsar), 145 Pacific Ocean, 32 Niger, 130, 150 Pakistan, 12, 73, 83–89, 110–11, 122–24, Nigeria, 70, 150 132–38, 150–56, 191–95, 223–24 Nitze, Paul, 5–8, 169, 200, 210 Palestine, 33 Nogai Horde, 31 Green line, 33 Noninterventionist policy, 88 Panama, 24–25, 93, 112–13, 133, 193, Noriega, Manuel, 25 206 North Atlantic Partnership Council, 48 Panama Canal, 24–25, 93, 113, 193 North Korea, 9, 11–19, 73, 114–19, Torrijos-Carter Treaties (1979), 25 120–29, 131–38, 149, 157–58, pan-nationalism, 10, 36, 44, 51–52, 86, 160, 192–95, 223–26 95, 150–52, 166, 174, 209, 210 Arab, 150 North Sea, 93 German, 152 Norway, 116–18, 135, 224 Islamist, 12, 45, 57, 82–85, 90–91, nuclear power, 47, 129, 133, 143, 151–57, 123–24, 138, 150–55, 164, 192 228 Russian, 10, 52, 152, 166, 174 nuclear weapons, 1, 12, 51–55, 74–77, Shi’a, 150–55 122–29, 130–39, 155, 171–72, Slav, 39, 50, 85, 95 189, 217, 223–25, 233–37 Sunni, 90–91, 150–55 Nunn, Samuel, 189, 233 Paul, Ron, 88 Nuremburg War Crimes trials, 19 peacekeepers, 2–4, 50–57, 178, 190–91, Nye, Joseph, 143–44, 205, 227 232 IFOR, 54–55 Obama, Barack, 19, 76–79, 90, 130–38, Pearl Harbor, 120 153–57, 170–79, 192, 203, 218, Peloponnesian war, 12, 99, 220, 237 220–23, 232 Pentagon, 49, 59, 77, 89, 124, 134–37, “reset” policy with Russia, 19 160 oil, 26, 33, 46–49, 66–69, 70–72, 87, Perestroika, 46, 108 93–94, 142, 152–55, 163–64, Pereyaslav Agreement (1654), 30 170–74, 213–15, 220 Persia, 22, 32, 40, 93, 113–14, 123, 161, oil prices, 46, 69, 70–72, 174 222 shale oil, 69, 70, 215 Peter the Great, 40, 149, 163 Operation Barbarossa, 30, 41, 145 Philip II, 109 Operation Sea Lion, 146 Philippines, 12, 24, 83, 113, 157, Organisation de l’Armée Secrètee (OAS), 165–66 132 Marcos kleptocracy, 97 Organization for Security and Co- US annexation of (1898–1902), 24 operation in Europe (OSCE), 2, 50, Piatakov, Georgi, 36 178, 201 Piłsudski, Józef, 38 248 Index

Poincaré, Raymond, 181 Republic of Novgorad, 39 Poland, 2, 23, 30–39, 41–49, 53–55, Resurgent Emergent Global Threat 60–66, 70–77, 87, 116–19, 139, (REGT), 49 159, 180–87, 199, 206, 215–17, Revanchism, 12, 48, 104, 141 222, 230–36 Rhineland, 23, 115, 174, 184 Austrian-Prussian-Russian partitions Confederation of the Rhine, 31 of (1772), 31 Rimland, 11, 83, 96, 110–13, 120 German-Soviet September 1939 Rogozin, Dmitry, 137 attack, 23 Romania, 30–33, 55–56, 76–77, 88, Polish-Ukrainian conflict, 30 115, 180–85, 206 Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Romney, Mitt, 19 30–38 ruble, 14, 66–69, 72–74, 152–54, 202 Popadiuk, Roman, 51, 210 Rugova, Ibrahim, 55 Poroshenko, Petro, 68–69, 87, 177–79, Russia, Tsarist, 28, 39, 43, 50, 88, 95, 180, 232 105–7, 111–16, 121, 149, 153–58, Portugal, 8, 25, 77, 109 165, 181–82, 196 Primakov, Yevgeny, 57 Dual Alliance (France and Russia), 33, Primorsky Krai, 164–65 162, 181 Princip, Gavrilo, 145 Russo-Japanese war (1904–5), 24, province of Petsamo, 116 119, 164–65, 196 Prussia, 22–23, 31–39, 104–9, 115–17, Russian Revolution (1905), 28, 34, 145, 151–58, 161, 200 86, 208, 235 East Prussia, 39, 117 Russian revolution/civil war (1917–21), Puerto Rico, 24 12, 30–35, 40–43, 66, 159 Punic wars, 12 Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Putin, Vladimir, 10–19, 20–29, 41, 55–59, Republic (RSFSR), 37 60–67, 70–78, 85–86, 91–95, 105–8, Russian-Turk war of 1828–29, 32 115–17, 123––28, 133–39, 141––49, Russo-Turkish War of 1768–74, 30 151–56, 161–69, 170––79, 182–86, See also Russian Federation (Russia); 199, 201–6, 211–19, 221–29, Soviet Union 230–37 Russian Federation (Russia), 13–18, 20–27, Vladikavkahz speech (2008), 62 31–32, 82–85, 92–95, 106–8, 110–17, 123–24, 151–56, 161–69, Qaddafy, Muamar, 131 182–85, 195, 208, 225 Qaddafy regime, 90 Black Sea fleet, 10, 29, 44–47, 51, Qatar, 9, 85, 91, 112, 191–92 62–67, 75, 155, 210–16 Eurasian Union or Eurasian Customs radioactive leakage, 129 Union (ECU), 13, 38, 64–68, Rambouillet summit, 55, 211 71, 86, 117–18, 132, 152–59, Rapallo Pact (1922–23), 37, 155–58, 212–13, 229 216 Kaliningrad, 46, 75–77, 110–17, rapprochement, 33–36, 40, 132, 140, 190–91 150–51, 158, 160 Russia-China Eurasian alliance, 193 Austro-German-Russian, 40 Russian backlash, 2–7, 10–14, 46–48, Reagan, Ronald, 45, 133, 141 55–59, 63–69, 71–79, 108, 119, Reinsurance Treaty, 107, 158 170–75, 185 Index 249

Russian “diaspora,” 1, 18, 46, 50, 134, Sinn Féin, 82 152, 172–77 Slovakia, 18, 38, 56, 70, 115, 153, 184–85, “shock therapy,” 46–49 215, 22 Siloviki, 50, 61 Slovenia, 47 Ultranationalists, 50 Smolensk, 30 Weimar Russia, 12, 21 soft power, 14 youth groups, 61 Solzhenitsyn, Alexander, 8, 44, 51, 139, Nashi (Ours), 18, 61 201–9, 210, 226 Walking Together, 61 South Africa, 13, 55, 70–78, 82, 111–13, Russophones, 4, 17–18, 28, 41, 50, 132, 153, 223 63–67, 78, 86, 105, 119, 137–39, Southern Gas Corridor, 72 152–53, 166, 172–78, 180, 195 South Korea, 9, 14–19, 71, 120, 138, 149, 156–57, 193, 223–26 Saakashvili, Mikheil, 170, 212 South Ossetia, 10–18, 61–62, 86–87, 90, Saarland, 115 155, 188, 217 Sahel, 111, 194 South Stream, 69, 72 Saudi Arabia, 3, 49, 85, 91–94, 111–12, Soviet Union, 3–7, 11–12, 20–29, 34–39, 124, 130, 192, 219, 222–23 44–49, 50–53, 61–64, 82–88, Saudi Defense Doctrine, 124 95–96, 100–108, 110–19, 120–28, Sea of Azov, 32, 44 132–39, 140–45, 153–58, 163–69, Sea of Japan, 164 174, 183–96, 206, 210–12, 235 Senkaku/Diaotu islands, 121, 150–58, August 1991 coup, 44, 50, 216 165, 193 Glasnostt, 45, 108, 166 Serbia, 10–18, 40––47, 55–57, 72, 85–88, Holodomor, 19, 37, 43, 208 123––28, 133, 153, 164, 170, 200––207, Menshevik faction, 108 211 New Union Treaty, 44–45, 108 NATO intervention against (1999), Soviet Constitution (1936), 44 128 Supreme Soviet, 44 Sevastopol, 24–49, 30–33, 44, 51, 62–67, White Army, 36 71–75, 87, 154, 181–89, 190, 213 Spain, 24, 38, 56, 70–77, 89, 100–109, siege of (1854–55), 30–32 111, 150–53 Seven Years War (1756–63), 23, 106 Spanish-American war (1898), 24, 113 Shandong province, 119 Spanish civil war, 18, 93 Shanghai Cooperation Organization Spanish Reconquistaa (1492), 39 (SCO), 14, 86, 131, 155, 216 Spratly islands, 193 Shi’a, 26, 91–94, 150–55 Stalin, Joseph, 27, 36–38, 40–43, 53, Shikai, Yuan (General), 164 60–61, 72, 116–18, 120, 138, 145, Shining Path, 82 151, 208 Siberia, 36, 85, 164 state typology Sikorski, Radoslaw, 41, 67 continental, 110, 142 Silesia, 23 core, 82, 110 Prussian annexation of Silesia, 23 insular, 82, 99, 110 Silk Road Economic Belt, 13, 86, 132, oasis, 83–84, 110–12 156 periphery/peripheral, 110–11 Simes, Dimitri, 56, 201 rimland, 110–12 Singapore, 112, 193, 228 semi-peripheral, 82, 110–19 250 Index

shatterbelt, 11, 83–84, 96, 110–16, treaties 124, 191 Treaty of Adrianople (1829), 22, 32, quasi-insular, 82, 110–12 40, 207 Steinmeier, Frank-Walter, 67 Treaty of Berlin (1878), 33 Straits of Gibraltar, 93 Treaty of Brest-Litvosk (1918), 30–36 Straits of Malacca, 93 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation strategic leveraging, 83, 92–96, 109, 117, between Russia and Ukraine 218 (1997), 51, 216 Stuxnet computer virus, 134, 224 Treaty of Good Neighborliness, Sudan, 113, 124, 150 Partnership and Cooperation Sudetenland, 11–19, 23–28, 38, 109, (1990), 47 151, 186, 203 Treaty of Paris (1856), 24, 33, 180 annexation of (1936), 11–18, 21–28, Treaty of Riga (1921), 37 38, 109, 151, 186 Treaty of San Stefano, 33 Suez Canal, 93, 113–14, 193, 220 Treaty of Schoenbrunn (1809), 31 Suez crisis (1956), 19, 93 Treaty of Tartu (1920), 87, 116 Sweden, 9, 28, 30–31, 53, 63, 74–76, Treaty of Tilsit (1807), 31, 40 89, 117, 161, 185–87, 199, 215 Treaty of Trianon (1920), 88 Sykes-Picot accords, 111 Treaty of Tu rkmenchay (1828), 32, Syria, 12, 25–26, 73, 81, 90–95, 111–12, 40, 207 123, 130–38, 150–54, 160–66, Treaty of Utrecht (1713), 109 191–95, 223 Treaty of Versailles, 186 Treaty of Westphalia, 109 Taiwan, 12–15, 25, 71, 86, 119, 120–22, Triple Entente (Anglo-French-Russian, 149, 156–59, 160–65, 192–93, 223–28, 233 1907), 107, 182 Tajikistan, 48, 85, 118 Trotsky, Leon, 28, 37 Taliban, 45, 59 Truce of Andrusovo (1667), 30 Tamil Tigers, 82 Truman, Harry S., 19 Tartus, 90, 154 Tuchman, Barbara, 19 Tatars, 39, 43, 154, 161, 176 The Guns of Augustt, 19 Texas Rangers, 93 Tunisia, 85, 95–97, 191 Thirteen Years War (1654–67), 30 Turkey, 8, 26, 32–35, 56, 62, 70–77, 88, Thirty Years War (1618–48), 30, 109 91–94, 100–108, 110–16, 150–54, Thucydides, 12, 99, 128, 147, 220, 237 160–62, 171, 187–88, 191–93, The Peloponnesian Wars, 99, 237 207, 215, 220–23 Tibet, 22–25, 86, 122, 150–56, 182 Tu rkish-EU tensions, 26 Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Turkmenistan, 48, 150 Pipeline (TANAP), 72 “Two plus Four” accords, 44 Transatlantic Trade and Investment Tymoshenko, Yulia, 64–65 Partnership (TTIP), 13, 71, 86 Transnistra (Transnistrian Republic), 18, Uighur, 91 33, 50, 87, 90, 150, 152, 188, 222 Ukraine, 1–9, 10–19, 21–29, 30–38, Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 13, 41–49, 51–57, 60–69, 70–79, 83–88, 85–86 95–99, 100–105, 111–19, 128, Transylvania, 88 130–39, 142–46, 152–59, 161–69, Index 251

170–79, 180–89, 190–99, 200–209, Ukrainian Directory, 36 210–19, 223–28, 231–37 Pro-Bolshevik forces, 28 Act of Unity (1919), 35, 208 provinces/regions cities Don Dnipropetrovsk, 152, 179 Crimea (seee Crimea) Don Army Oblast, 37, 165, 208, Kiev, 1–4, 10–19, 25–29, 30–39, 231 40–48, 51, 62–68, 70–79, 87, Donbass, 10–18, 37, 63, 76–78, 119, 136–39, 146, 151–59, 176–79, 180, 195, 210, 161, 170–79, 180–87, 208–9, 231–32 210–17, 223–27, 231 Donetsk, 151–52, 176, 210, Mariupol, 151–52 230–31 Odessa, 30, 151–52, 161, 178, 230 Galacia, 31–37, 44, 206–8 Sevastopol, 24–29, 213 Kharkiv, 34–37, 40, 60, 139, 151–54, Constitution (1992), 46–49, 51 190, 207–8, 230 Cossack Hetmanate, 30 Kuban, 35–37, 207 Council of Pereyaslav, 30 Kursk, 37, 208 Eastern separatists, 50, 77–78, 151, Luhansk, 151–52, 176–77, 208, 177–79, 217, 232 230–31 governments (in Ukraine) Lviv, 36, 190 Central Council, 34 Novorossiya, 149, 152, 178, 230 Directory (Dnieper), 34 Stavropol, 37 Eastern Ukrainian People’s Volhynia, 36–37, 44, 206 Republic of Soviets/Congress Voronezh, 37, 208 of Soviets, 35 Rada (Supreme Court), 34–35, 62–67, Hetmanate, 30–34 231 Kyiv People’s Congress, 35 Sevastopol naval base, 24–29, 213 Makhno Anarchist movement Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), 18 (1918–21), 34–35 western Ukrainians, 30–37, 44 People’s Republic (Kharkiv), 34–35, uneven polycentrism, 81–89, 93–97 96, 120, 231 United Arab Emirates (UAE), 9, 91 Ukrainian military-industrial United Kingdom (UK), 4, 24, 74–77, complex, 72–77 100, 110–15, 131, 172, 206 Ukrainian National Republic United Nations (UN), 8, 10, 56, 192–97, (UNR)/Ukrainian People’s 213 Republic (UPR), 34–35 UN Security Council, 25, 48–49, Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, 133–38, 194 36 United States (US), 4–9, 10–18, 20–28, Western Ukrainian People’s 36, 40–49, 50–59, 60–68, 71–79, Republic (Galacia) (ZUNR), 82–88, 90–99, 104–8, 110–19, 34–35 120–29, 130–39, 140–45, 150–59, Orange Revolution (2005–10), 10, 60 160–69, 170–79, 180–89, 190–96, Polish-Soviet partition of, 28, 37 202–9, 210–17, 222 Political parties American military industrial complex, Borothists, 36 6–8, 163 Constitutional Democrats, 35 American Revolution (1775–83), 23, Ukrainian Bolshevik party, 36 106 252 Index

Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), 49 Warsaw Pact, 3–4, 11–12, 45, 116, 136, Department of Defense, 76, 217, 223 140 Global War on Terror, 21–17, 59, 60, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 89, 124, 137–38, 200–205 129 Homeland Security, 134 West Bank, 25–26, 150, 206 Joint Contact Team Program–Ukraine West Indies, 24 (JCTP), 76 White Sea, 32 Manifest Destiny, 39 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 101–2, 221 National Security Agency (NSA), 134 World Bank, 71, 190, 215 National Security Directive NSC-68 World Tr ade Organization (WTO), 65 (1950), 5 World War I, 8, 12–19, 21–28, 31–39, Operation Just Cause, 25 40–45, 92–94, 104–5, 111–19, “pivot to Asia,” 85, 155–57, 228 122–29, 130, 145, 150–58, 160–69, political parties 180–87, 194–96, 200–208, 211, Democrats, 19, 35, 50–51, 89 226, 236 Republicans, 19 Austro-German alliance, 23 September 11, 2001 attacks, 21, 59, Franco-Russian alliance, 23, 158, 162, 89, 101, 124, 134–38 180–85, 207 World War II, 12–18, 20–28, 40, 63, Ukraine Freedom Support Act, 76 92–94, 105, 111–16, 120–23, 138, US--Japanese alliance, 120, 222 140, 169, 175, 183–88, 190–94, US Office of Defense Cooperation, 76 203, 227, 230–37 US-Russian relations, 17, 170, 195, 212 Uzbekistan, 48 Xi Jinping, 14 Xinjiang province, 86, 91, 122, 156 Venezuela, 70, 123, 153 Versailles Treaty, 93, 108, 118–19, 153 Yalta conference (1945), 53 Vershbow, Alexander, 57 Yanukovych, Viktor, 10–19, 29, 60–67, Vienna Note (1853), 32 73, 95, 166, 174, 203, 212, 232 Vietnam, 12–19, 78, 93, 140, 153–58, Yat-sen, Sun, 164 165–66 Yatsenyuk, Arseniy, 177, 207 North, 19 Yeltsin, Boris, 3–5, 45–49, 50–59, 61, Vietnam war, 93 78, 115–17, 123, 141, 165–69, Vilna region, 38 172, 185, 207–9, 210–12, 237 Vinichenko, Volodimir, 34, 45, 207 Yemen, 85–89, 94, 130 Voivodine, 88 Yugoslavia, 1, 12, 38, 47, 54, 84, 90, Volker, Kurt, 170–71, 212, 229 111–16, 164, 184–85 von Beust, Friedrich Ferdinand, 104 Alexander I, 40 von Bismarck, Otto, 104–7 Yugoslav war (1990–95), 111 von Caprivi, Leo, 107 Yushchenko, Viktor, 10–18, 62, 212 von Leibniz, Gottfried, 101 Vukovar, 47 Zedong, Mao, 120, 138, 146, 164–65, 227 Żeligowski, Lucjan (General), 38 Wahhabi, 91 Zhirinovsky, Vladimir, 50, 155, 228 Wallachia, 23, 32–33, 108 Zionist movement, 150 War Powers Act (1973), 8 Zyuganov, Gennady, 50–52, 155, 228