DOCSLIB.ORG

Offshore Terror Preparedness in the Barents Sea

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Offshore Terror Preparedness in the Barents Sea Offshore terror preparedness in the Barents Sea “Preparing for the unexpected” EN310E: Master of Sciences in Energy Management Karin Dahl & Marte Haugan Master thesis – Master of Sciences in Energy Management Bodø, 2014 Preface This master thesis represents the final semester of a two-year Master of Science degree within the Energy Management program at Bodø Graduate School of Business and MGIMO University in Moscow. We have faced many challenges along the way in this study. This is mainly due to the limited information shared about terrorism, both from public and private actors. We have gathered highly important, interesting and informative material from our interviews with representatives from the petroleum industry and already published data. Throughout the study we have been confirmed by several participants the importance of this study for the petroleum industry’s security. First of all we want to give a sincere thanks to our supervisor, Odd Jarl Borch, for constructive criticism and guidelines along the way. He has been an incredibly important resource for us in terms of relevant literature, areas to focus on, interesting discussions and topics and especially to obtain interview candidates. Finally we will gratitude all the interview participants for their willingness to participate in this study sharing their knowledge and experience within the topic studied. Their input and information has been essential and highly necessary for the ability to conduct this research. Bodø, 20th May 2014 Karin Dahl & Marte Haugan Keywords: Preparedness team, Preparedness system, Terrorism, Barents Sea, Managerial roles, Security Bodø Graduate School of Business i Master thesis – Master of Sciences in Energy Management Bodø, 2014 Summary The petroleum industry is constantly moving further north on the NCS, where oil and gas operators are facing new challenges in more complex environments. The ability to respond quickly in crisis situations is important both economically and socially. Oil platforms are a central and important part of the Norwegian infrastructure, where activities both onshore and offshore represent a large part of the Norwegian economy and are sensitive targets and legitimate goals for terrorist and violent extremists. New terror attacks and regulations in the past years have created national and regional discussions, which calls for oil companies to strengthen their preparedness system dealing with terrorist threats. This has created new demands of upgrading and improving the preparedness system and security strategies. This paper examines what measures to be done by the national preparedness system and the oil companies and their 2nd line preparedness teams to strengthen their preparedness and security against terror threats in the Barents Sea. Our research question is as following: “How should the managerial roles within the 2nd line preparedness team be strengthened to handle terror threats in the Barents Sea?” Companies in the petroleum industry faces challenges related to security and preparedness of offshore installations in the Barents Sea such as: lack of resources, long respond time, long distances, harsh weather conditions, communication and cooperation difficulties between a highly number of participants, lack of full-scale practices and lack of knowledge and experience handling terror threat situations. One way of meeting these challenges is to strengthen the 2nd line preparedness team within the oil companies. The preparedness team consists of several managerial roles that are responsible of assisting the 1st line preparedness team located on the platform. The managerial roles within the 2nd line are responsible of the following areas during a crisis situation: handling the media, contacting the authority, protecting the environment, contact with the rig team, logistic and resources assistant and allocation, ensuring personnel care and an action manager managing the whole preparedness team. It is limited what changes that can be done within the 2nd line preparedness team to strengthen the preparedness against terror attacks in the Barents Sea without strengthening the oil companies preparedness system and the national preparedness system. It is therefore needed to examine what changes that can be done within these two preparedness systems to Bodø Graduate School of Business ii Master thesis – Master of Sciences in Energy Management Bodø, 2014 strengthen the performance of the 2nd line preparedness during a terror threat situation in the Barents Sea. The main findings in study show that the 2nd preparedness team should establish two new managerial roles: 1) Expertise of handling terror threat situation and 2) Local and regional expertise handling crisis situations in the Barents Sea. Due to the complex environment and the high number of preparedness participants full-scale exercises should be held in the Barents Sea region more frequently practicing on different terror attack scenarios. A clear and common terror threat picture between the oil companies and the authorities needs to be in place to implement necessary measures such as: physical security of installations, increased regional resources and improved infrastructure to prevent and prepare for terror attacks in the Barents Sea. Bodø Graduate School of Business iii Master thesis – Master of Sciences in Energy Management Bodø, 2014 Sammendrag Petroleumsnæringen beveger seg stadig lengre nord på den norske sokkelen, noe som fører til at olje og gass selskapene står ovenfor stadig nye utfordringer i mer komplekse omgivelser. Evnen til å reagere raskt under krisesituasjoner er nødvendig både på grunn av økonomiske og sosiale grunner. Oljeindustrien i Norge representerer en sentral del av den norske verdiskapningen hvor offshore oljeinstallasjoner vil være potensielle terror mål for terrorister og voldelige ekstremister. Tidligere terror angrep har skapt nasjonale og regionale diskusjoner, og det er et behov fra oljeselskapene sin side å styrke sitt beredskapssystem for å håndtere terror trusler. Dette har ført til nye krav om oppgradering og forbedring av beredskapssystemet og sikkerhetsstrategier. Denne oppgaven undersøker hvilke tiltak som må gjøres innen det nasjonale beredskapssystemet og av oljeselskapene for å styrke beredskapen og sikkerhet av olje installasjoner mot terrortrusler i Barentshavet. Vår problemstilling er som følgende: ”Hvordan skal lederrollene i andrelinje beredskapen styrkes for å kunne håndtere terror trusler i Barentshavet?” Petroleumsindustrien står ovenfor utfordringer knyttet til sikring og beredskap på oljeinstallasjoner offshore hvor det er en mangel på ressurser, lang respons tid, store avstander, vanskelige vær forhold, samarbeid og kommunikasjonsvanskeligheter mellom mange beredskapsaktører, mangel på fullskala øvelser og kunnskap og erfaring med å håndtere terror situasjoner. En måte å møte disse utfordringene på er å styrke oljeselskapenes andrelinje beredskapsteam. Andrelinje beredskapsteamet består av flere lederroller som er ansvarlig med å bistå førstelinje beredskapsteam på olje plattformene. Lederrollene innen andrelinje teamet er ansvarlige for følgende områder under en krisesituasjon: media håndtering, kontakt med myndighetene, beskytte miljøet, kontaktpunkt med ulykkesstedet, fordele og skaffe nødvendige ressurser, sikre personell og i tillegg hvor det er en overordnede som har ansvar for å lede beredskapsteamet. Det er begrenset hvilke endringer som kan gjøres i andrelinje for å styrke beredskapen rettet mot terrorangrep i Barentshavet uten å se på hvordan oljeselskapenes beredskapssystem og det nasjonale beredskapssystemet kan styrkes. Bodø Graduate School of Business iv Master thesis – Master of Sciences in Energy Management Bodø, 2014 Det er derfor nødvendig å undersøke hvilke endringer som kan gjøres innen disse områdene for å styrke kapasiteten til andrelinje beredskap under en terrorsituasjon i Barentshavet. De viktigste funnene i denne oppgaven er at andrelinje beredskap bør etablere to nye lederroller. Den først med kompetanse til å håndtere terrortrussel og den andre med lokal og regional kompetanse for å håndtere krisesituasjoner i Barentshavet. Barentshavet befinner seg i et kompleks miljø hvor terror beredskapssituasjoner krever deltakelse fra et høyt antall aktører. Det bør derfor holdes flere ”fullskala øvelser” i Barentshavet der alle aktørene som deltar under en terror krisesituasjon er med. Det er også behov for å etablere en sterkere felles forståelse av terrortrussel bildet i Barentshavet mellom oljeselskapene og myndighetene. Et samlet trusselbildet vil gjøre forbedringsprosessen av beredskapssystemet lettere hvor man ser de samme behovene for fysisk sikring av installasjoner, økt ressurs behov og forbedring av infrastrukturen i Barentshavet for å håndtere terror angrep. Bodø Graduate School of Business v Master thesis – Master of Sciences in Energy Management Bodø, 2014 Terms and definitions Adverse events can be used as a generic term for all types of accidents, crisis disasters etc. These are events that derivate from the normal, and there are actions to prevent and limit the damage of an adverse event (Sommer, 2013). Crisis is an event that has the potential to threat important values and weaken an organizations ability to perform their essential functions (NOU, 2000:24). A crisis could develop into a disaster, which is an event with serious injuries and losses (NOU, 2000:24). Intentional adverse event is a type of adverse event that people do intentionally, examples here are terrorism,
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Actors Against Trafficking for Labour Exploitation
    Actors against Trafficking for Labour Exploitation Report on Cooperation between Stakeholders at the National Level in the countries of the Baltic Sea region to Address Trafficking for Labour Exploitation Written by: Stella Rössborn Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) Secretariat Bjarney Friðriksdóttir, Anna Ekstedt, Anthony Jay, Vineta Polatside This study was produced with funding from the Task Force against Trafficking in Human Beings. This publication has not been formally edited © The Council of the Baltic Sea States, January 2013 2 The aim of the study is to obtain an overview national level in each member state. The of the different actors who are currently report has been designed to present an involved in the work of combating and overview of relevant actors and mandates; preventing trafficking for labour exploitation. governmental as well as non-governmental. It Actors have occasionally also been included further analyses the current forms of who have a significant potential to be involved cooperation, in terms of mechanisms in place in this work. In addition, the study has as well as relevant policies and legislation. analysed existing resources and structures, primarily for cooperation at the national level. The findings are based mainly on the expertise and experience of national actors currently This work was a necessary starting point working on the issue of trafficking for labour in identifying existing resources as well as exploitation and forced labour. As such, the challenges encountered by different actors report is meant to capture resources as well as at the national level. The results have been challenges as they are perceived and identified compiled into the report which will serve as a by the relevant national actors, according to starting point and as a basis for dialogue at the the individual context in that specific country.
    [Show full text]
  • Annual Report
    2011 annual report 2011 Contents Foreword 3 Organization and Staffing 4-5 Deprivation of Position by Court Judgment 6-7 Documenting Decisions in Criminal Cases 8-9 Police Corruption in Norway 10-11 The Conduct of Police Employees 12-13 The Use of Police Signature in Private Contexts 14-15 Incidents during Detention 16-17 Statistics 18-21 Decisions to Prosecute in 2011 22-25 Emergency Turn-Outs in 2011 26-27 Administrative Assessments in 2011 28-31 Court cases in 2011 32-35 Meetings and Lectures in 2011 36-37 The Norwegian Bureau for the Investigation of Police Affairs 38 Articles from Previous Annual Reports 39 annual report Copy Print Photo / Norwegian Bureau for the / PJ-trykk, Oslo / Frank Holm, Alelier Klingwall Investigation of Police Affairs / Cornelius Poppe, Berit Roald, ScanpiX Illustrations / Politiforum Design / layout / Harald Nygård / Getty Images / Newmarketing AS / Geir Hansen Foreword The purpose of the Annual Reports from the Bureau is, in addition to presenting statistical data, to point to opportunities for learning through experience. This year’s report focuses, among other things, on police detention. he Bureau has forwarded 220 cases that decisions regarding measures taken dur- the Bureau was maintained by the Director of to administrative assessment since its ing detention are not sufficiently documented. Public Prosecution. Testablishment on 1 January 2005. Typi- cally these cases have not resulted in punitive Despite the fact that the number of cases is One of the objectives of creating of the Bureau reactions, but the investigation has revealed a relatively small compared to the number of was to strengthen the public’s confidence in need for an improvement of routines.
    [Show full text]
  • Dialogue a Journal from the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway
    2013 no 2 DIALOGUE A JOURNAL FROM THE PETROLEUM SAFETY AUTHORITY NORWAY CAN WE PLAN FOR THE UNTHINKABLE? 22 JULY IN AMENAS NOKAS SECTION 9-3 CAN WE PLAN FOR THE UNTHINKABLE? DIALOG UE THE UNTHINKABLE Emergency preparedness is a key term for everyone involved with both security and safety in the petroleum sector. Players must have effective systems in place to prevent and respond to hazards and accidents which could result from their everyday activities. But they must also be prepared to deal with possible conscious attacks – 4 10 terrorism and deliberate assaults. No pat definitions exists for either security or safety. Incidents occasionally occur which nobody imagined possible and which no scenario had taken into account. Such events can overturn established truths and pose deep challenges for society. SECURITY The PSA has been given responsibility in 2013 for “security section” 9-3 of the Petroleum Activities Act, covering emergency preparedness 26 against deliberate attacks. That requires the industry to adopt and maintain measures to secure its facilities. This issue accordingly takes a look at three watershed events of recent years – the Nokas robbery in Stavanger during 2004, CONTENTS the terrorist attacks in Oslo and Utøya on 22 July 2011, and the BEING BETTER PREPARED 4-7 hostage drama at Algeria’s In Amenas facility in 2013. We introduce some of those who have sought to establish what CHANGING THREATS 8-9 failed, and present their analyses of what went wrong. They make 12 PREPAREDNESS A PRIORITY 10-11 it clear that work on risk and preparedness cannot be confined to particular industries.
    [Show full text]
  • Politiet Politidirektoratet
    POLITIET POLITIDIREKTORATET Arbeids- og sosialdepartementet NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTORATE Postboks 8019 Dep 0030 OSLO Deres referanse: Vår referanse: Sted, Dato 15/6209 201503828-19 008 Oslo, 09.12.2015 HØRING - ENDRINGER I FORSKRIFT OM HMS-KORT FOR BYGGE- OG ANLEGGSPLASSER, FORSKRIFT OM OFFENTLIG GODK-1ENNING AV RENHOLDSVIRKSOMHETER OG FORSKRIFT OM SIKKERHET, HELSE OG ARBEIDSMIUØ PÅ BYGGE- OG ANLEGGSPLASSER (BYGGHERREFORSKRIFTEN) Politidirektoratet viser tll Arbeids- og soslaldepartementets høringsbrev av 11. september 2015 om endringer I forskrift om HMS-kort for bygge- og anleggsplasser, forskrift om offentlig godkjenning av renholdsvirksomheter og forskrift om sikkerhet, helse og arbeidsmIljø på bygge- og anleggsplasser (byggherreforskriften). Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet oversendte høringen tIl Politidirektoratet den 13. oktober 2015. FrIst for merknader tiI Arbeids- og soslaldepartementet er satt til 11. desember 2015. Politidirektoratet har forelagt høringen for underliggende instanser. Vi har mottatt høringsuttalelser fra Kripos, Nasjonalt ID-senter, Oslo pollUdistrIkt og Rogaland politidistrikt, som er delvis innarbeidet i direktoratets høringssvar. Uttalelsene følger vedlagt I kopi. Innledning Forslagene som fremmes i høringen er et ledd I gjennomføringen av regjeringens strategl mot arbeidslivskriminalitet. Det fremgår av høringsnotatet at ArbeidstIlsynet i økende grad erfarer at kortene blir mIsbrukt. Typiske eksempler er angitt å være utstedelse av kort på bakgrunn av falske legitimasjonsdokumenter kort blIr brukt av
    [Show full text]
  • Annual Report 2010 Contents
    Norwegian Bureau for the Investigation of Police Affairs annual2010 report annual report 2010 Contents Foreword 3 Organisation and staffing 4-5 The Police Operations Centre 6-7 The police’s duty of activity when a person is deprived of their liberty 8 Misuse of register data 9 The use of blunt physical force by the police 10-11 Sexual involvement between police officers and parties in criminal cases 12-13 The duty to register crime reports 14 International cooperation 15 Statistics 16-19 Decisions to prosecute in 2010 20-21 Emergency turn-outs in 2010 22-23 Administrative assessments 24-25 Court cases in 2010 26-28 Meetings and lectures in 2010 29 The Norwegian Bureau for the Investigation of Police Affairs 30 Copy Design / layout Print Photo / Norwegian Bureau for the / Newmarketing AS / PJ-trykk, Oslo / Frank Holm, Atelier Klingwall / Helge Mikalsen, SCANPIX Investigation of Police Affairs / Politiforum / Harry Bakken, Oppland Arbeiderblad / Stig Kolstad, Politiforum / Bård Pedersen , Brønnøysunds Avis / Espen Braata, SCANPIX Foreword In this annual report, the Bureau presents sta- deadline for an arraignment in court is not upheld, considers, for its part, the opportunity to contribute tistical data. The report will also try to provide in the opinion of the Bureau, this is a very serious to improvements in the police and prosecuting au- further insight into our activities and some issue. We also believe that there may be reason thorities’ practices to be an extremely motivating of the cases that have been investigated in to question whether the police, when a suspect aspect of its work.
    [Show full text]
  • Investigation Report
    Investigation report Report Report title Activity number Updated report of the investigation into personal injuries on 001036022 Heimdal on 28 November 2019 Security grading ☒ Public ☐ Restricted ☐ Strictly confidential ☐ Not publicly available ☐ Confidential Involved Team Approved by/date T-1 Kjell M Auflem, by authority, head of supervision/26 May 2020 Members of the investigation team Investigation leader Sissel Bukkholm, Jorun Bjørvik, Anita Sissel Bukkholm/Kristi Wiger Oplenskedal and Kristi Wiger 2 Contents 1 Summary ........................................................................................................................................... 4 2 Background information ............................................................................................................. 4 2.1 Description of the facility ................................................................................................. 4 2.2 Local conditions ................................................................................................................... 5 2.3 Position before the incident ............................................................................................ 5 2.4 Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................ 6 3 PSA investigation ........................................................................................................................... 6 3.1 Investigation team’s mandate .......................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • ANNUAL REPORT 2013 COPY the Norwegian Bureau for the Investigation of Police Affairs
    ANNUAL REPORT 2013 COPY The Norwegian Bureau for the Investigation of Police Affairs LAYOUT Newmarketing AS PRINT PJ-trykk, Oslo PHOTOS Marte Garmann Lars A. Lien John Andre Aasen (Phokus photography) Karin Jegtvik/ NRK Politiforum iStock Contents Foreword 3 Analysis of Cases Concerning Use of Force 4 Information Leaks from the Police to the Media 8 Discipline in communications – the Internal Dialogue in the Police Service 10 Status in Interviews with the Bureau 12 Custody – an Invasive Measure 13 Complaints against Police Lawyers 16 The Requirements of the Criminal Procedure Act regarding Report of Search 18 Photographing/Videoing Police Performing their Duties 20 International Cooperation 2013 22 Police Management 24 Case Processing at Two Levels 26 Statistics for 2013 28 Decisions to Prosecute in 2013 32 Emergency Turn-outs in 2013 36 Court Cases in 2013 38 Administrative Assessments in 2013 40 The Bureau’s Organisation and Staffing 44 The Bureau’s Management Group 45 Persons on Assignment 45 Brief Notes on some Bureau Employees 46 About the Bureau 47 241 651 Articles from Previous Annual Reports 48 Trykksak 3 Jan-Egil Presthus, Director of the Norwegian Bureau for the Investigation of Police Affairs Foreword “There is no doubt sed in the article are intended to provide exceptionally are there grounds for penal- a basis for reflection and discussion by the ties when we see that the case could and that there would have police on what constitutes sound manage- should have been dealt with otherwise. been fewer criminal ment. Cases dealt
    [Show full text]
  • Brief Executive Summary
    SkagEx11 Evaluation Report The SkagEx11 project is co-funded by the Civil Protection Financial Instrument of the European Union SkagEx11 Evaluation Report This page is intentionally left empty 16.04.2012 Page 2 of 91 SkagEx11 Evaluation Report Forword The report you are holding in your hands, describes exercise SkagEx11 and the lessons identified during this exercise, which took place in Skagerrak in September 2011. The Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (DSB) was responsible for planning and conducting the exercise and is in charge of management throughout the project. The Swedish Civil Contingencies agency (MSB) has had a leading role in the evaluation process, and in the production of this evaluation report. The Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) is responsible for the process of disseminating this report with recommendations for changes that will address some of the findings in this report. Exercise SkagEx11 is one of the largest civilian exercises ever conducted in Norway. In all, more than 3000 people were involved in this exercise in one way or another. The scenario consisted of a fire on board the passenger ferry MS Bohus, enroute from Strömstad to Sandefjord. An ensuing collision with another ship created a scenario where two distressed ships had to be dealt with simultaneously. The situation required firefighting, evacuation and medical treatment of passengers, and search and rescue (SAR) at the accident site. Firefighting teams and rescue services from Norway as well as neighboring Sweden, Denmark and Finland were involved in this operation. The Skagerrak basin is among the busiest waters in Northern Europe, with significant shipping traffic consisting of fishing vessels, cargo ships, large passenger ships and a substantial leisure fleet.
    [Show full text]
  • Rosita-2 Project
    Rosita-2 project Final Report Editors: Alain G. Verstraete Elke Raes Grant agreement n°SUB-B27020B-E3-S07.18222-2002 Final Report March 2006 Ghent University Department of Clinical Biology, Microbiology and Immunology De Pintelaan 185 9000 Gent Belgium E-mail: [email protected] 1 Contents Chapter 1 Executive Summary 4 Chapter 2 Introduction 7 Chapter 3 Survey of existing POCT tests 11 Chapter 4 Results from Belgium 32 Chapter 5 Results from Finland 46 Chapter 6 Results from Germany 81 Chapter 7 Results from Norway 95 Chapter 8 Results from Spain 111 Overview of Rosita-2 US operations 129 Chapter 9 Results from the USA: Florida 132 Chapter 10 Results from the USA: Utah 144 Chapter 11 Results from the USA: Washington 156 Chapter 12 Results from the USA: Wisconsin 170 Chapter 13 Global results 189 Chapter 1 Executive summary. • The Rosita-2 project was carried out in 2003-2005 in order to evaluate the usability and analytical reliability of the onsite oral fluid (saliva) drug testing devices. • The study was carried out by National Institute for Criminalistics and Criminology in Brussels, Belgium, the National Public Health Institute in Helsinki, Finland, the Institute for Legal Medicine in Strasbourg, France, the Institute for Legal Medicine in Homburg/Saar, Germany, the Division of Forensic Toxicology and Drug Abuse, Norwegian Institute of Public Health, Oslo, Norway and Institute of Legal Medicine, University of Santiago de Compostela, Spain. It was coordinated by Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium. • The study was performed in cooperation with the Unites States, where it is funded by The National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), National Institutes of Health, US Department of Health and Human Services, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), US Department of Transportation and the Office of National Drug Control Policy Executive Office of the President.
    [Show full text]
  • 09Annual Report
    09annual report Norwegian Bureau for the Investigation of Police Affairs 09annual report Contents Foreword 3 Organisation and staffing 4-5 Detaining in custody – incidents involving persons in police custody 6-7 Corporate penalties 8-9 Processing time 10-11 The Swedish National Police-Related Crimes Unit 12-13 Can criminal offences in the police be prevented? 14 International cooperation 15 Statistics 16-19 Decisions to prosecute in 2009 20-21 Emergency turn-outs in 2009 22-23 Administrative assessments 24-25 Court cases in 2009 26-28 Meetings and lectures in 2009 29 The Norwegian Bureau for the Investigation of Police Affairs 30 Copy Design / layout Print Photos / The Norwegian Bureau / Newmarketing AS / PJ-trykk, Oslo / Jens Haugen / Pål Leknes Hanssen for the Investigation of Police Affairs / Scanpix / Getty Images / Stakeholder / Lena Follingmo, Politiforum / Morten Knudsen, Rim Foreword Due to the nature of their tasks, the police The cases on which the Bureau works are often In 2009 the Bureau has also received significant have a wide range of powers. Without ad- serious and are clearly likely to weaken the public’s feedback from the Director General of Public equate control over the use of these pow- confidence in the Norwegian police. It is impor- Prosecutions concerning the Bureau’s routines ers, this right could become a threat to law tant that those in leading positions in the force are regarding dropping cases. The Director General and order and to democracy. The main task fully aware of the possibility of crime among their reviewed cases from the second quarter of 2008 of the Bureau for the Investigation of Police own ranks and are able to react to such situations that were dropped because there were no reason- Affairs is to investigate cases where members when necessary.
    [Show full text]
  • Assessment of the Viking Sky Incident
    REPORT Assessment of the Viking Sky Incident 1 September 2021 Utgitt av: The Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (DSB) 2020 ISBN: ISBN 978-82-7768-511-3 (PDF) Grafisk produksjon: ETN Grafisk, Skien Assessment of the Viking Sky Incident Summary ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................5 1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 13 1.1 Background............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 14 1.2 Mandate ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 14 1.3 Interpretation of the mandate ............................................................................................................................................................... 15 1.4 Structure of the assessment report .................................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Reply from Norway to the Questionnaire for the Evaluation Of
    Strasbourg, 16 February 2016 GRETA(2016)4 Reply from Norway to the Questionnaire for the evaluation of the implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings by the Parties Second evaluation round (Reply submitted on 1 February 2016) 2 GRETA(2016)4 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Introduction In accordance with Article 38, paragraph 1, of the Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, GRETA evaluates the implementation of the Convention following a procedure divided into rounds. At the beginning of each round, GRETA selects the specific provisions on which the evaluation procedure is based. GRETA has decided that the second evaluation round of the Convention will start on 15 May 2014. For the second evaluation round, GRETA has adopted a questionnaire to be sent to all states parties which have undergone the first round of evaluation, following a timetable approved by GRETA. States parties are requested to transmit to GRETA a reply to this questionnaire within five months from the date it was sent. Following a first round of monitoring, which provided an overview of the implementation of the Convention by each state party, GRETA has decided to examine during the second evaluation round the impact of legislative, policy and practical measures on the prevention of trafficking, the protection of the rights of victims of trafficking, and the prosecution of traffickers. The adoption of a human rights-based approach to action against trafficking in human beings remains at the centre of this new evaluation round. In addition, particular attention is paid to measures taken to address new trends in human trafficking and the vulnerability of children to trafficking.
    [Show full text]