2013 no 2 DIALOGUE A JOURNAL FROM THE PETROLEUM SAFETY AUTHORITY NORWAY
CAN WE PLAN FOR THE UNTHINKABLE?
22 JULY IN AMENAS NOKAS SECTION 9-3 CAN WE PLAN FOR THE UNTHINKABLE? DIALOG UE THE UNTHINKABLE
Emergency preparedness is a key term for everyone involved with both security and safety in the petroleum sector. Players must have effective systems in place to prevent and respond to hazards and accidents which could result from their everyday activities. But they must also be prepared to deal with possible conscious attacks – 4 10 terrorism and deliberate assaults. No pat definitions exists for either security or safety. Incidents occasionally occur which nobody imagined possible and which no scenario had taken into account. Such events can overturn established truths and pose deep challenges for society.
SECURITY The PSA has been given responsibility in 2013 for “security section” 9-3 of the Petroleum Activities Act, covering emergency preparedness 26 against deliberate attacks. That requires the industry to adopt and maintain measures to secure its facilities. This issue accordingly takes a look at three watershed events of recent years – the Nokas robbery in Stavanger during 2004, CONTENTS the terrorist attacks in Oslo and Utøya on 22 July 2011, and the BEING BETTER PREPARED 4-7 hostage drama at Algeria’s In Amenas facility in 2013. We introduce some of those who have sought to establish what CHANGING THREATS 8-9 failed, and present their analyses of what went wrong. They make 12 PREPAREDNESS A PRIORITY 10-11 it clear that work on risk and preparedness cannot be confined to particular industries. Everyone has something to learn. LIGHT ON A DARK DAY 12-15 RESPONDING TO THE UNFORESEEN 16-19 DISCUSSION Dialogue is intended to contribute to openness and discussion GETTING TO GRIPS WITH RISK 20-21 on important issues and safety challenges in Norway’s petroleum BLACK SWANS AND SAFETY 22-25 industry. Some of the challenges which urgently need to be overcome are to found far to the north on the NCS, in the Barents NOW OR NEVER 26-29 Sea. This issue asks whether operations can be sufficiently safe 16 31 NEW PAGE BUT THE SAME CHAPTER 30-33 when they are extended ever further from land and into areas with big geographical and climate challenges. STRAIGHT FROM THE TOP 34-35 BARENTS SEA BRIDGEHEAD 36-39 Enjoy! ANSWERING BACK 40-41 ØYVIND MIDTTUN Editor 34 36
FRONT COVER: ALEXANDRA BECH GJØRV (PHOTO: EMILE ASHLEY)
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DIALOGUE PSA 2013 CAN WE PLAN FOR THE UNTHINKABLE? BEING BETTER PREPARED
Security has become an issue for Statoil’s top management after a terrorist strike on an Algerian gas field, with full attention being paid to improving preparedness against deliberate attacks.
BY ØYVIND MIDTTUN
ut greater focus on this area will not be at the expense of work on health, safety and the en- vironment, stresses Jannicke Hilland, head of corporate security at the Norwegian oil company. Forty people died in the assault on the In Amenas facility in the Sahara desert during January 2013, including five Statoil employees. “We owe it to everyone who lost their life in this incident to learn its lessons and strengthen ourselves as a company,” says Hilland, who started her present job in September. The In Amenas attack exposed serious weaknesses in defences against such aggression. æ
“WORK ON SAFETY AND SECURITY will become clearer and more visible,” says Jannicke Hilland, head of corporate security at Statoil. (Photo: Helge Hansen/Statoil)
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Areas where the general level of security need- new type of risk the company had not been developing a good management system, WORKED. “It’s important to note the things ed to be enhanced were documented both by sufficiently aware of before. defining requirements, and ensuring that it which functioned well during the In Amenas Statoil’s own audit and by an external inquiry. “It may have existed, but we hadn’t quite has the necessary expertise and capacity in incident,” she adds. “I was personally present at taken the threat properly on board – as a the security field. the centre for relatives we opened in Bergen. IMPROVEMENT. Hilland’s new job makes her nation, as a company and as individuals.” “It made me proud to see how the organi- responsible for the major improvement drive Asked whether Statoil employees have EXPENSE. A key question is whether the all- sation functioned in such demanding circum- now being implemented by Statoil, and which more reason to be worried now than before, out effort to strengthen security will be pur- stances. It was professional and efficient. In is already well under way. she denies that it has become more dangerous sued at the expense of the company’s work Amenas was a terrorist attack, but we used One step has been to elevate security into to work in the petroleum industry. on operational safety. the same resources which would have been a separate staff entity at corporate level, in “But it’s important to be conscious of this Asked whether a balance can be struck, mobilised for a safety incident.” charge of both traditional safety and security/ risk. The threat isn’t static, so we must have a Hilland promises that there is no cause for emergency preparedness. dynamic approach to our work on security. concern. “Safety work will be maintained at TRANSFERRED. Hilland is also concerned “Work on safety and security will become “We don’t want people to be frightened, its previous level. to ensure that the experience acquired by clearer and more visible,” Hilland explains. but we want all of us to be more aware, and “It’s important that we as an organisation Statoil can be transferred to other companies, “The organisational change has been made to that doesn’t apply only to terrorist actions like achieve this even when making such exten- including players in the Norwegian oil and gas increase attention from top management. the one we saw at In Amenas. sive efforts to strengthen security. We must industry. “Improvement efforts aimed at security and “Security risk is just as much about com- and will manage that. “This problem isn’t confined to In Amenas preparedness have already been under way for puters and telecommunications, document “We’re pumping in resources and strength- or Algeria, and it’s not specific to us,” she some time, and have been reinforced by the management, how we behave while travelling, ening security, but this won’t, can’t and points out. “Increased preparedness is neces- findings of the In Amenas investigation.” communication and so on.” mustn’t be at the expense of our other safety sary for the whole industry. She reports that security staffing has been work.” “We’ve accordingly initiated a collaboration increased, with additional expertise recruited. BENEFIT. Statoil will seek to benefit from She emphasises that both security and with other companies, government agencies That applies not only to the company’s foreign solutions and results achieved in the tradi- safety form part of Statoil’s overall safety and organisations such as the Norwegian Oil operations but also to other business areas. tional safety field in its efforts to strengthen concept. and Gas Association.” “We’re appointing dedicated personnel to security, Hilland says. be responsible for security in all parts of the “An important job for us now is to carry our STRENGTHEN. The In Amenas report business, in addition to our central corporate safety-related expertise, systems and culture identified five areas where improvements resources.” over into the work we’re doing to become could strengthen the company’s overall But the improvement work But the improvement work is not only more secure. ability to handle security risks. is not only about providing about providing additional resources: “It’s also “At one level, safety and security are two While the first focuses specifically on In additional resources: a matter of raising awareness in the organisa- different things – the first involves risks found Amenas and other facilities in Algeria, the “It’s also a matter of raising tion – the attitude each of us has to security. within, while the other is about external others deal with general concerns – organisa- All our employees have a responsibility for threats or attacks. tion and resources, risk management systems, awareness in the organisation safety and security.” “Nevertheless, the way we as an organisa- crisis preparedness/response and collabora- – the attitude each of us has tion work with these two aspects has certain tion/networks. to security. EYE-OPENER. The terrorist attack in Algeria features in common – the framework and the “These recommendations are relevant for proved an eye-opener, both for Statoil and systems. We can benefit from much of this.” all parts of our business, including here in for many others. Hilland says it presented a Statoil’s improvement efforts include Norway,” Hilland emphasises. æ
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DIALOGUE PSA 2013 CAN WE PLAN FOR THE UNTHINKABLE?
An acknowledgement that security efforts throughout Statoil needed strengthening came from chief executive Helge Lund when the In Amenas investigation report was published in September.
The company’s ability to iden- facing a changing array of threats. tify and respond to the risk of “The sign of a strong safety culture is the deliberate attacks was heavily ability to understand and handle changes. criticised in the findings, which We must therefore constantly update our risk identified a number of areas assessments and adopt new measures when where improvements were needed. necessary.” Running to almost 80 pages, the report He emphasised that attention has primar- was produced by a team led by Torgeir ily been concentrated on operational safety. Hagen, former head of the Norwegian “As a company, we’ve been more accus- Intelligence Service. tomed to and have much experience with “Safety is a precondition for our entire developing safety systems. business,” said Lund. “We’ve developed “We have more expertise with what I’d systems, knowledge and expertise on oper- call operational safety. Given our history and ational safety over 40 years, and much good background, this is where our attention has work is done here. primarily been concentrated. “Protection against forces which deliber- “Then we’ve gradually got a better grip on ately want to harm our company is another and management of this [security] type of aspect of safety. And the investigation report safety. But the report concludes very clearly notes that this area needs reinforcing.” that we’re not good enough at this.” Statoil does have systems, Lund added. Lund said that Statoil must give the issue “But these must be improved. We make risk a higher priority and more resources, and assessments, but these must be better and must get a more coherent handle on it. more broadly based. We have expertise, but “We have systems and expertise, but too this must strengthened and developed in little of them. Our job is now to ensure that CHANGING new areas.” security receives sufficient management attention, greater expertise and more ACCEPTABLE. “We consider that safety is systematic treatment.” acceptable for our employees in Norway THREATS and internationally,” said Lund. “But we’re “We have systems and expertise, but too little of them. Our job is now to ensure that security receives sufficient management attention, greater expertise and more systematic treatment.”
FORTY PEOPLE WERE KILLED during the assault on the In Amenas facility in Algeria during January. Five of them worked for Statoil. (Photo: Kjetil Alsvik/Statoil)
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he petroleum industry has how important it is that the companies are always had to prepare for and aware of the threats, have the necessary protect against deliberate systems in place and are well prepared.” assaults. But incidents such as the outrages in Norway on 22 July RESPONSIBLE. The companies themselves 2011 and the In Amenas hostage are responsible for complying with the Tdrama this year have greatly increased regulations, both in preventing accidents Norwegian concern with the issue. and undesirable incidents and in protecting Responsibility was delegated to the PSA against deliberate attacks. in early 2013 for enforcing section 9-3 of the “Our job as the regulator is to supervise Petroleum Activities Act on emergency prepar- that the companies fulfil this responsibility,” edness against deliberate attacks. observes Carlsen. “We also check that cooper- Pursuant to this provision, licensees must ation in the industry and between the players “initiate and maintain security measures to and government resources is effective. contribute to avoiding deliberate attacks “We monitor that the companies have against facilities and shall at all times have adequate management systems, have plans contingency plans to deal with such attacks”. and procedures in place, are prepared to “Delegating enforcement of this section to respond appropriately and have adequate us represents a clarification of our authority,” barriers.” explains Finn Carlsen, one of the PSA’s direc- The PSA conducts specific audits focused tors of supervision. on the industry’s preparedness to deal with “It covers following up work by the players deliberate attacks, Carlsen adds. on health, safety, environmental protection “Our impression so far is that the companies and emergency preparedness – including their have good systems and barriers. But it’s impor- readiness to deal with deliberate assaults.” tant that they ensure continuous improvement and actively learn from relevant incidents.” PRIORITY. Prevention and improvement of both safety and security levels are the top NECESSARY. It is up to the companies to BY ØYVIND MIDTTUN priority. This involves avoiding harm to people, decide which specific security measures are the environment and material assets, man- necessary, and how their emergency prepar- aging risk and having systems and barriers in edness plans are to be configured. place to ensure acceptable operation. “Detailed knowledge of the facilities rests In addition, prevention deals with protec- with the operators,” Carlsen points out. “They tion against conscious, deliberate threats must analyse the threats, and know what must and actions. be protected and against what. “Norway is still a secure society to both live “We supervise that the overall level of secu- PREPAREDNESS and conduct business in,” emphasises Carlsen. rity meets the requirements, but responsibility “But we have no reason to be blue-eyed. rests clearly with the companies. And that “The threats we face are constantly requires them to have sufficient knowledge, changing. Recent incidents both at home expertise and resources to exercise it.” and abroad provide terrible reminders of A PRIORITY DEFINITION THE LAW maintain security measures Operators and licensees on the NCS must have Security can be defined as Section 9-3 of the Petroleum to contribute to avoiding protection against Activities Act on emergency deliberate attacks against systems and security measures in place to protect undesirable but deliberate preparedness against deliber- facilities and shall at all times against terrorist attacks. Although Norway remains actions and incidents. ate attacks reads: “The licensee have contingency plans to deal shall initiate and with such attacks.” a secure country, there is no reason to be naive. THE PSA HAS BEEN GIVEN REGULATORY RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECTION 9-3 of the Petroleum Activities Act, and supervision director Finn Carlsen is strengthening follow-up of the industry’s preparedness against deliberate attacks. (Photo: Morten Berentsen)
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DIALOGUE PSA 2013 CAN WE PLAN FOR THE UNTHINKABLE? LIGHT ON A DARK DAY
More than two years have passed since Norway ALEXANDRA BECH GJØRV experienced the unthinkable – the terrorist outrages chaired the commission of inquiry into the terrorist of 22 July 2011. The inquiry report which followed outrages in Oslo and Utøya prompted many government measures. But what has on 22 July 2011. (Photo: Emile Ashley) been the effect in the petroleum sector?
BY EILEEN BRUNDTLAND
æ
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DIALOGUE PSA 2013 CAN WE PLAN FOR THE UNTHINKABLE?
eflections on the significance of Published just over a year after the to act, collaboration, information and commu- was precisely the crucial reason why things the inquiry to an industry well incident, the inquiry report made brutal nications technology, and a result-oriented went wrong in some areas on 22 July and right known for safety thinking, emer- reading. The attack on the government leadership are decidedly present in the petro- elsewhere. gency response and accident buildings could have been prevented, and leum industry’s safety work.” “Drawing up good plans forces you to think investigations were provided the authorities failed to protect the victims Gjørv again stressed the importance of through risk and potential outcomes,” Gjørv Ron 12 June this year. on Utøya. being conscious of the responsibility which noted. “When you train in implementing these Alexandra Bech Gjørv, who headed the rests on the individual. plans, you exercise in mastering the whole independent investigation into the terrorist FAILURE. While the police as an institution “It’s not enough to play your own role keyboard. attacks by Anders Behring Breivik in Oslo and came in for tough criticism, with both exten- adequately. If you simultaneously fail to see “And it’s knowing where the keys are Utøya, was addressing the Safety Forum’s sive system errors and weak leadership that problems are being solved, it becomes a located and how the notes can be combined annual conference. slated, the report also identified failures responsibility for everyone - and particularly harmoniously which makes it much easier to She spoke powerfully and matter-of-factly by individuals. for managers – to take the initiatives required improvise.” about that dark summer’s day, reminding her Gjørv noted that great personal respon- to find solutions.” The health service was one of the agencies audience about the glass which rained over sibility rests on everyone with safety and which mastered the art of improvisation on 22 central Oslo from the bombed government emergency response duties. But she also FUNDAMENTAL. “The fundamental distinc- July, according to the investigation report. buildings. emphasised that a balance must exist tion between what went well and badly on 22 “It has a far more complex organisation Her review spanned from the Post-It note between system and person. July related primarily to attitudes, culture and than the police,” observed Gjørv. “More training with the number of Breivik’s escape vehicle, The 22 July incident revealed precisely leadership, and to the way people and organ- across organisational boundaries nevertheless which lay untouched for 20 minutes in the that the system was so weak that the people isations exercised the authority entrusted to allowed it to master this structure better. police operations centre, to the shots fired directly involved in it were placed in a wholly them,” the report stated. “The planning framework in the health at Utøya. unreasonable position. “What we emphasised was the individual’s service is also more detailed and, in addition, Other incidents included the understaffed “Those who had these difficult jobs deserve responsibility not only to ensure that the reg- it’s good at improving these plans in the wake operations centre at North Buskerud police praise for the responsibility they accept on a ulations were observed but also to remember of exercises.” district, which was overwhelmed by calls from daily basis,” said Gjørv, a lawyer who has also what they were for,” said Gjørv. Gjørv reported that the commission visited terrified young people at the island camp. served as an industry executive. She mentioned the Grubbegata street London to meet the UK Home Office. The Brit- Gjørv also mentioned the rapid response “At the same time, we can’t have a culture alongside the government buildings in Oslo ish officials explained that the biggest lesson team which drove at breakneck speed from where nobody ever dares to talk about the as an example. The decision had been taken they had learnt from their many crises was the Oslo while desperately trying to get through mistakes made. The system is wholly depend- to close this off, but cumbersome bureaucracy importance of a well-thought-out interface on the communications network. ent on individuals accepting their share of and misunderstandings meant it was never between the various bodies involved. She recalled the wrong rendezvous, an responsibility. done. “Good plans mean that you understand the overloaded rubber dinghy, heroes in small “Nobody’s infallible. But if we fail to say that So a white van filled with explosives could human and material resources available and boats from surrounding campsites, Breivik’s individuals must do their job better, for fear drive up and park right alongside the high-rise how these can interact,” she said. “That’s the arrest and the loss of 77 lives. of upsetting somebody, we do society a grave block which forms part of the government important consideration.” disservice.” complex. DATA. The investigation into the outrages “Everyone involved felt that they were involved systematising huge amounts of THINK. Gjørv emphasised that she does not doing what was expected of them, but they “Nobody’s infallible. data, Gjørv explained. These included the want to translate the inquiry report, but to all saw that the problem wasn’t resolved,” whole operational log from every police talk about it in a way which gets people and observed Gjørv. “That didn’t represent good But if we fail to say that district throughout 2011. industries to think for themselves. preventive action.” individuals must do their More than 800 people were interviewed But do its findings contain lessons relevant job better, for fear of up- directly by the commission, while almost for the petroleum industry? The latter has PLANNING. Addressing the question of how setting somebody, we do 4 000 more responded to a questionnaire. done many sensible things in its approach to one can actually prepare for the unthinkable, The next step was to put together the safety and preparedness, Gjørv said. Gjørv saw this as a matter of good planning society a grave disservice.” pieces of the jigsaw puzzle in an attempt to “Good plans and regular exercises are followed by applying the plans and improving establish what had happened, why, and what crucial for emergency response. Our principal them through exercises. lessons were to be learnt. recommendations on risk recognition, ability The extent to which plans were followed
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DIALOGUE PSA 2013 CAN WE PLAN FOR THE UNTHINKABLE?
Risk management and preparedness are central and relevant issues for many social sectors beyond the RESPONDING TO petroleum industry. Assessing risk and managing crises are everyday activities for the police.
THE UNFORESEEN BY SINDRE BØ
e must be ready to respond This dramatic incident in the heart of to something happening in Norway’s “oil capital” proved a watershed for 10 minutes which nobody the Rogaland police – call it their own 22 July. had expected and which you What have they learnt, and what effect has the can’t expect anyone to have lessons had? Wthought of,” says Hans Vik, head “People often ask us that,” says Vik. “But it’s of the Rogaland police district. difficult to give an exact answer, because I’m “All the same, it’s our job to deal with the continuously implementing measures and consequences. How can you handle the un- changes which I believe to be right. foreseen? That’s the key question.” “They could be motivated by 22 July or Crimes are being committed all the time – Nokas, but might also be adopted because great and small, usual and unusual – and must of other incidents. And they could be the be dealt with continuously. Things occasional- outcome of thoughts and ideas developing ly get really serious. over a long time.” That was the case when almost a dozen robbers went on the rampage in central POSSIBLE. Faced with the issue of whether Stavanger on a spring day in 2004. Nobody it is impossible to plan for the unthinkable, had expected the force of the attack or the Vik counters by posing a question of his own gang’s brutality. – what do we mean by “unthinkable”? The Nokas robbery is history now. A police- “Was the attack on Pearl Harbor unthink- man was killed, more than NOK 55 million was able? The 9/11 outrage in the USA? If some- stolen, all the thieves were caught and have thing’s unthinkable, then that’s precisely been punished. what it is. æ
“THE ABILITY TO IMPROVISE IS IMPORTANT,” says Hans Vik, head of the Rogaland police district. “It’s impossible to lay detailed plans for every eventuality.” (Photo: Morten Berentsen)
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DIALOGUE PSA 2013 CAN WE PLAN FOR THE UNTHINKABLE?
“Perhaps we have to distinguish between principal jobs, and we’re constantly pursuing it file simply to document how two pipes are Vik emphasises that plans and procedures unthinkable and unlikely? And perhaps we with volunteers, the public and media as well to be screwed together. That’s prevention. cannot cover every eventuality when you are must also distinguish between deliberate as directly with criminals. “If we’re going out to arrest ‘John Doe’, we in the middle of an incident. actions like robbery or terrorism and accidents “Investigation is also a form of prevention. can’t give the patrol a file corresponding to “Some people regard that as a case of ‘this or natural events. The whole point of investigating and pros- those two pipes. But we can call up all the is unmanageable, I can’t cope with it’, but it’s “I believe the key issue is mental prepara- ecuting is its preventive effect both on the data we have on him – his address, his precisely where the expertise of front-line tion. You need to be ready for something that perpetrator and the public. It gives us informa- criminal record, who he hangs out with. police officers lies. you haven’t prepared for.” tion about communities which can stop new “We try to form the best possible picture “A rigid procedure could be useless In addition to heading Norway’s third crimes occurring.” of the position, which can often be diffuse because conditions vary from one occasion largest police district after Oslo and Bergen, and hazy. We can’t see everything as clearly in to another. Competent officers in the front Vik participates in a change programme at OFFSHORE. The Rogaland police district advance as the oil industry perhaps is able to. line must be able to deal with lack of clarity, the National Police Directorate. differs from all the others in Norway because it “That’s where the petroleum sector could uncertainty and vague conditions, sufficiently He has been put in charge of one of the is responsible for the NCS, including investiga- have something to learn from us – how to deal freed from the underlying routines. five priority areas, covering management, tion, support and contingency planning in the with hazards and accidents which can’t be “We’re often asked why we don’t have rou- leadership and culture. That is no small task, North Sea. precisely determined.” tines for this and that. The answer is that we given that the inquiries into the Nokas robbery That involves interaction with the oil and can’t lay detailed plans for every eventuality. and the 22 July outrages identified more than gas sector at a number of points, and Vik says DIFFICULT. Terrorist scenarios can be difficult That’s impossible.” 200 lessons for the police. the police have picked up a number of ideas to define, and police participation in an oil Vik defines the essence of learning as from the industry since the mid-1990s. company exercise earlier this year clearly made FREEDOM. Faced with the original question “experience in order to get better next time”, “These cover such areas as health, safety a big difference. of whether planning for the unthinkable is and notes that people learn from both exercis- and the environment, internal control, and re- An officer with special expertise in ne- possible, Vik says he is concerned to give his es and incidents. porting on undesirable incidents. We also learn gotiating with terrorists and hostage-takers officers freedom to decide the right response “A good many specific measures have from participating in oil industry exercises. provided advice which cannot be found in any to circumstances. been implemented in the wake of the Nokas “In a given incident, too, we depend on the oil company’s plans. “In that way, I also create an acceptance affair – some public, others not. A national expertise of the operator. We don’t basically In this case, the lessons were obviously that errors can be made. When we judge our intelligence system to share information have any detailed knowledge about the instal- passed from the police to the petroleum sector responses, a broad area is known as accept- across police districts is one. Others are a new lations and operations out there.” – and were highly relevant in the light of the In able and positive performance of duty. operational alarm system and improved media But Vik emphasises that the petroleum Amenas attack. “Then comes a narrower range where the management.” industry has a completely different level of The oil industry’s security regime has won action taken could be more debatable and Incidents happen, plans are laid, exercises control over incidents than the police does. praise in many quarters, and former prime less positive, followed by one where the things are staged and new emergency preparedness “An operator can plan in detail where a minister Jens Stoltenberg has hailed it as a done are more criticisable and ultimately is constructed – all in order to improve the pipeline is to be laid and predict the risk of source of preparedness lessons for the whole punishable. ability to respond to crises. such an operation to a great extent. It has a community. “The last of these categories is normally This is an eternal cycle, an everlasting good overview of conditions. Vik has also understood that the industry is very clear. The point is that we can often learn balancing act between prevention and crisis “For us in the police, the position is often saturated with security routines and proce- more from the dubious cases – those which management, intelligence-gathering and unclear, time is short, uncertainty prevails dures. For better or worse, he notes, the police aren’t so obvious and are more borderline.” investigation. Vik sees no contradictions in this. – all the characteristics of a crisis. are more flexible. A better overview of the circumstances is “Preventive work extends far more widely “An oil company is familiar with its defined “Examples of parodic safety rules can always useful, Vik emphasises. “To achieve that, than most people imagine. It’s one of our hazards and accidents, and can create a thick perhaps be found in oil companies, but you we really need a ‘360-degree’ picture of social can certainly find cases in the police which the conditions which give me as police chief the petroleum sector would have called pliability. best possible management information. “An operator can plan in detail where a pipeline is to be “We’re good at responding to immediate “We can always use better equipment and events, and are trained to handle crises where training, too. But the best lessons are learnt by laid and predict the risk of such an operation to a great you’ve got to be bound by regulations in a way working in the front line, out in the field, and extent. It has a good overview of conditions. For us in yet must also use pretty broad discretion. The we do that every day. Such learning the police, the position is often unclear, time is short, latter can be erroneously interpreted as ‘no never ends.” uncertainty prevails – all the characteristics of a crisis. guidelines or procedures’.”
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RARE. Avoiding major accidents in the MECHANISMS. “A number of accident theo- petroleum sector has a high priority at the ries, including the black-swan thesis, point to PSA. Precisely because such incidents are for- mechanisms which derive from the context for GETTING TO tunately rare, decisions cannot be based solely barrier management,” Årstad explains. on experience from earlier incidents. “The petroleum industry and its global set- Major accidents are unique. They may have ting have changed a great deal, and increasing features in common, but could nevertheless complexity means increased vulnerability and be very different from each other in terms of uncertainty. both causes and effects. “A number of accident mechanisms aren’t GRIPS WITH RISK Industry participants need to accept that – and can’t be – picked up by traditional risk the petroleum sector, and the whole global analyses. In other words, we need something Some of the biggest disasters in the petroleum industry were picture it forms part of, is complex and unpre- more rather than replacements for these events most people had refused to believe possible. It would be dictable. studies.” Something more includes getting better at unrealistic to think that similar incidents will not occur again. PREDICTING. “Traditional risk analysis understanding what risks could be created by builds on predicting accidents with the aid decisions which almost nobody considers of experience, factual knowledge and simple relevant for safety, and what creates robust BY THOR GUNNAR DAHLE models,” says Ingrid Årstad, a PSA veteran on and safe organisations in complex systems. risk management. “Those who work with these theories ncidents with very substantial conse- which could be ignored in an assessment “But studies of black-swan incidents show point to many important priority areas, such quences, which most people thought This made clear for the first time that it was that such methods don’t pick up important as a commitment to technical expertise,” says to be highly improbable but which can necessary to accept that all human activity – aspects of extreme events.” Årstad. typically be explained with hindsight, including the petroleum industry – involves Currently studying for a PhD at the Uni- “Others include strengthening ownership are known as “black swans”. risk. versity of Stavanger, she nevertheless says of safety among more people, in ways better This term has roots which stretch as that black-swan thinking does not mean that suited to the individual’s responsibility and Ifar back as the 16th century, but has acquired ANALYSES. The guidelines were replaced in classic risk analyses are useless or unnecessary. authority, and using more models and tools. increasing relevance as the world has shrunk 1991 by regulations on the conduct of risk “There’s always room for improvement in “These are voices we should listen to in and societies have become more complex. analysis, partly because giving acceptance these studies, and not least in the way they’re order to avoid major accidents in the future.” The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 criteria for probability in numerical form led to used. But traditional approaches are absolutely in the USA and 22 July 2011 in Norway are a lot of “number juggling”. fine when they’re used correctly and at the dramatic examples of such events. But a black Companies wanted to use such calcula- right time. See also the opinion piece on page 22 about swan can also be regarded as positive. tions to escape the need to assess certain “These analyses are particularly useful in black swans and safety. Examples of the latter include the introduc- types of accidents, even where they were connection with barrier management and in tion of the internet or the collapse of the Sovi- clearly relevant for the risk picture. the early phases of development projects.” et Union – disastrous for some in the business The new regulations established the prin- world and beneficial for others. ciple that risk analyses are meant to identify which incidents might occur, not provide GUIDELINES. The PSA – then part of the evidence that a chosen solution meets official Norwegian Petroleum Directorate – issued rules on acceptable hazards. The black swanwas originally a metaphor for the impossible or completely improbable. guidelines on safety evaluation of platform It was made clear that such analyses must But explorers then found such birds living in Western Australia. concepts as far back as 1981. form the decision basis for choosing relevant So it was adopted as the doubly appropriate symbol for the fourth international Representing initial requirements for and efficient solutions - and that their assump- conference organised by the International Regulators Forum (IRF). managing major accident risk, these defined a tions must be followed up systematically in the In addition to being staged in Perth, capital of Western Australia, during October, lower limit for the probability of incident types operations phase. its programme concentrated on major accident risk.
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DIALOGUE PSA 2013 OPINION CAN WE PLAN FOR THE UNTHINKABLE?
swans safety BY EINAR ØVERENGET nowledge is power, English philosopher Francis Bacon asserted. That is because it can equip us to control and exploit nature for our own benefit. By understanding and explaining our surroundings, we can create a stable and predictable world – a place where what happens actually has a meaning. A sense of security is provided by knowing why something is the way it is, and why one thing happens and not another. Knowing in advance makes us feel secure – we can rely on life tomorrow not being radically different from today. The modern person is intoxicated by the power conferred by a knowledge of causes. At one stroke, we have control over what happens – and is to happen. However, one type of knowledge exists which does not equip us to predict the future, æ
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DIALOGUE PSA 2013 OPINION CAN WE PLAN FOR THE UNTHINKABLE?
and that is the awareness that the unexpected calls black-swan logic. had no reason to expect actually happen. We – precisely because we cannot imagine it. But can happen. He is not primarily concerned with the have not even reflected on what was so im- we have some power, in the sense that we can Quite independently of what we know or birds as such. Instead, he seeks to apply the probable that it had never occurred to us. conceive that we cannot conceive it – and that have reason to expect, life tomorrow could be logic to all the expectations we have of the way Think 20 years ahead – what things we represents a valuable insight. radically different. The completely improba- the world is. What we regard as probable, may cannot even imagine today will be a matter The ability of people to calculate what the ble can happen, an event we had absolutely appear to be so only because we have never of course then? future might bring in terms of possible events no reason to expect – because we have never experienced anything which could point to One way to meet the future is to think is admittedly governed by earlier experi- experienced it before. other probabilities. that nobody can predict what will happen ence, which limits our capacity to think the It had been established a long time ago Calculating probabilities is based to a with certainty, but that what will occur is one unthinkable. that all swans were white. That was something great extent on the expectation that what will of several likely possibilities we can imagine But humans also possess a faculty for everyone knew. Nobody had ever seen a swan happen tomorrow is something we can proba- today. But why should things actually be imagining that the world could be completely of any other colour. So it was assumed that no bly expect today. What seems less likely is also like that? It might be equally likely that the different. This is the ability which underlies non-white swans existed. less probable. completely improbable will happen, the things development and change. And even though But that turned out not to be true, because But what about all the things we had not nobody has any reason to expect today. people can make mistakes, we must never black swans were found in Australia. The even imagined would happen, which have nev- This naturally represents a challenge for throttle this ability through fears of human assumption that all swans are white was er happened before. Are they also completely all forms of safety work. Petroleum operations error. accordingly shown to be false. improbable? Naturally not. This is where the involve a risk, and we have many examples of Good safety work calls for robust systems But as long as nobody had ever seen a black-swan logic comes in. The completely major accidents. Regardless of how serious and organisations which pick up the errors black swan, there was no reason to assume improbable is also possible. What we cannot such incidents might be, however, eliminating and safety breaches which occur. But interac- that they could be found. It was quite simply even imagine can obviously happen. risk is impossible. tion between the system and people must not improbable. Not because it was impossible. It is not necessary to do more than cast We can naturally do our utmost to elimi- reduce the latter to pawns in the former – and After all, everyone can imagine that swans our minds back a couple of decades, and nate the probability of accidents. But what can we must not expect the system to take care of could be other colours than white. But there compare the expectations we had for world we do about the improbable incidents. Can safety. We must also give room for the indi- was no reason to expect it. developments with the things we take for we plan for these? Can we take control of the vidual’s silent, experience-based knowledge, On the basis of this discovery, Lebanese- granted today. inconceivable? which enables it to smell danger. American philosopher and mathematician We have all seen black-swan logic in In the nature of things, this is very diffi- Nassim Taleb has formulated a theory he action. All of us have found that things we cult. We have no power over the unimaginable
EINAR ØVERENGET (born 29 January 1964) is a Norwegian philosopher, author and lecturer. He has a DPhil from Boston College and heads the Activa Academy of Humanities, which he helped to found in 2000. Øverenget was one of the expert witnesses who testified at the trial of Norwegian terrorist Anders Behring Breivik.
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DIALOGUE PSA 2013 CAN WE PLAN FOR THE UNTHINKABLE? NOW OR NEVER Companies must agree on binding and specific collab- oration, the industry must accept responsibility, and it must be done urgently. These three points sum up the PSA’s expectations of players who want to partici- pate in the Barents Sea and the northernmost NCS.
BY INGER ANDA
“COLLABORATION Is the key to good safety in the far north,” æ says Sigurd Robert Jacobsen at the PSA.(Photo: Morten Berentsen)
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DIALOGUE PSA 2013 CAN WE PLAN FOR THE UNTHINKABLE?
he PSA has resolved to define the – critical issues for safe petroleum activity. This will be submitted to the programme the wrong approach. far north as one of its four main He believes that the key to good safety committee for HSE challenges in the far “The limits in the regulations are fixed,” priorities for 2014. That is timely across the range of operations on the northern north, which is being chaired by Norwegian Jacobsen points out. “On that basis, the and crucial, observes Sigurd NCS can be summed up in a single word – Oil and Gas. companies must come up with solutions and Robert Jacobsen. cooperation. present them to us. T As the agency’s leading expert on the “We’re now starting to move really far RISK. “The safety heading covers all parts of “They need to do that on their own initia- far north, the Arctic and the Barents Sea, he north and a very long way from land. That the industry’s operations – the risk of major tive, in good time before submitting consent notes that the PSA has been working on issues means the oil companies and rig contractors operations, working conditions for personal applications, and based on collaboration and related to Norway’s northernmost seas since must collaborate. and environmental protection,” says Jacobsen. a collective industry understanding. the 1980s. “These players must accept responsibility, “Darkness, cold, ice, changeable weather “Dialogue is the key. That’s got to happen “But this subject has now been raised with and should be using the Norwegian Oil and conditions and long distances from land are ahead of the application processes, and be full force in the Norwegian petroleum industry. Gas Association to work towards collective among the natural problems faced in the far conducted between the companies, the un- Big discoveries have been made in the Barents solutions. north. ions and government.” Sea and many companies want to explore “That organisation has the necessary “They present challenges related to tech- He emphasises that prevention of un- there. muscle and is sitting in one of the driving nological and operational solutions, emergen- desirable incidents occupies a central place “Attractive blocks have also been put on seats. It should be seizing the steering wheel.” cy preparedness, logistics and geography. in the industry, and the regime now being offer, and important decisions are soon due to Developing a positive level of safety in the “Others include access to rigs and equip- established in the far north must be robust. be taken on activities in the far north. We have far north is a common responsibility which ment, the quality of rigs, collaboration over “Very stringent standards and expectations an important role in this.” rests with the industry, Jacobsen emphasises. such units, winterisation, and transport are set for the companies who will operate in Jacobsen emphasises that what has long “Without collaboration and agreements solutions in general and helicopter transport these climatically and geographically challeng- been confined to future scenarios will be ma- between the players, we’re unlikely to succeed in particular.” ing and vulnerable areas.” terialising within one to three years as specific with the planned activities in the Barents Sea. A fixed point in the Barents Sea will be consent applications to the PSA. That applies to both exploration and develop- essential as a refuelling stop and secure haven ICE. Jacobsen also stresses the importance “That represents a big challenge. Once a ment. for helicopters unable to reach landing sites of remembering that climatic conditions in formal request has been submitted, it’s too “Specifically, the companies must work such as Bear Island, he observes. the Barents Sea are not static, and that the late in many respects – and very expensive together on conducting exploration drilling “Many people have pointed in that context marginal ice zone does not necessarily cover – to make big changes. simultaneously in the same areas in order to to Statoil and the licence due to develop Johan a stable area. “So it’s important that companies seeking comply with regulatory requirements. Castberg. We’ve noted that this discovery is “Big annual variations can occur, with the consents start talking to us well in advance. “This is a very topical issue. In practice, ideally placed between the mainland and ice moving further south than we’ve seen in We have a good dialogue today with Statoil, collaboration between several companies is Bear Island. recent years. Planning must take account of for example. the only way we can achieve safe operation.” “It could also play an important role in fur- such natural variation.” “It’s the biggest of the players, and we’re The far north ranks moreover as a key issue ther offshore development of the Barents Sea In technical terms, he adds, a safety success very familiar with its plans, requirements for in the Safety Forum, which is chaired by the region, and we’re very keen to see what the in the Barents Sea could help to clear the way clarification, challenges, measures and PSA and brings together companies, unions licence decides and what part Statoil will play for future activity in the Arctic. The probability discussions. and government. in integrated thinking for the area.” of ice is high north of the 74th parallel, and “But the picture’s very different with a Establishing good arenas for company- Both Johan Castberg and Goliat are favour- bearing that in mind will be important. number of the other companies. They must union-government collaboration over petro- ably placed for expansion north-westwards in “But extensive research lies ahead. We ensure that contact has been established leum operations in the far north is also being the Barents Sea, Jacobsen says. Further east, know a lot about conditions in the far north, with us in good time.” followed up by the PSA through this body. the challenges faced are different. and a great deal about what we need to know He emphasises that taking such an initi- Specifically, Safety Forum participants are “In connection with opening Barents Sea more on. ative is the responsibility of the companies drawing up a list of challenges related to tech- South-East, the Storting [parliament] has “We’re otherwise pursuing extensive themselves, and not up to the PSA. nology, operation, the working environment, specifically asked us to look at the challenges dialogue and collaboration with international “We’ll be keeping a firm grip on consents emergency response and so forth. concerned. agencies regulating activities in the Arctic for activity in far northern waters. We’ve no “These relate to such aspects as technol- region. desire to play the role of an agency which has ogy, operational conditions and emergency “In our view, the challenges in the far north to call a halt far along the road in a planning “He believes that the key to preparedness. We’re currently working on this.” and the Arctic can be overcome. But both the process – but if we have to, we will.” good safety across the range industry and government have an important Jacobsen secured an MSc from the Univer- of operations on the northern WRONG. In the PSA’s view, having to use the job to do. Right now.” sity of Stavanger in 2012 with a dissertation on NCS can be summed up in a regulations to force through the necessary evacuation and rescue in the Barents Sea single word – cooperation.” development in the far north would represent
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DIALOGUE PSA 2013 CAN WE PLAN FOR THE UNTHINKABLE? NEW PAGE BUT THE SAME CHAPTER A high level of safety is both necessary when moving into the Arctic and a commercial edge there, says Liv Monica Bargem Stubholt, head of strategy and communication at Norway’s Kværner company. æ
BY TORBJØRN GOA
LIV MONICA BARGEM STUBHOLT at Kværner believes the industry has what it needs to overcome the challenges in the far north. She regards operations there as a natural extension of what the Norwegian petroleum industry has already been doing for several decades. (Photo: Kværner)
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n Stubholt’s view, the oil industry itself challenges in the far north and those further strong structures – simplifying a bit, as storage should be considered. will opt for a step-by-step approach to south should not be exaggerated. tough as bedrock. A staffed facility could thereby be self- establishing operations in challenging “We often talk about ‘a new chapter’. “In areas with a lot of ice scour or wear sufficient for a long period, even in the event regions of the high north. But we could equally well say that we’re now from drift ice on the sea surface, concrete of a supply line being disrupted. Moreover, she believes, much of continuing to write a chapter we’ve already structures will offer very durable and resistant “This isn’t a question of ‘competition’ I the innovation needed to overcome the begun. facilities. between subsea solutions and concrete in- challenges involved will be generated by large “Major technological issues, difficult “We’ve experienced this, for example, in stallations. Both could be relevant choices specific projects. weather conditions and problems with tem- Russia’s Sakhalin project, where the ice cover for different applications in the far north.” “Innovation is often very project perature and pressure have been and are be- becomes more than four metres thick while dependent,” notes Stubholt, who has previous- ing overcome in many other parts of the NCS. moving at a pace of up to four knots. FRAMEWORK. Stubholt believes that ly served as a junior minister in the ministries “As I see it, operations in the far north are a “That puts heavy pressure on an installa- Norway’s collaboration model will continue of both foreign affairs and petroleum and natural extension of what Norway’s petroleum tion, so we applied a steel sheath to see if that to provide the best framework for safe and energy. industry has been doing for several decades. gave extra protection. The ice wore that cover acceptable development in the far north. “Many people say that we must pursue But a fully acceptable level of safety remains off within a year, but the concrete was unaf- “This unique model is characterised by research and development before launching an absolute requirement. fected. Its quality withstood the test.” close cooperation between government, a project. That’s fine, but it should be supple- “I believe the industry has what it needs Stubholt notes that players in the industry industry and unions, and has proved a big mented with the innovation which only to overcome the challenges in the far north. talk about most things in the future being success,” she points out. a project can create. But we must also admit that climate, winter done subsea, and admits that this could She calls particular attention to the Norsok “I think it’s wise of the government to darkness and political considerations present become a reality. collaboration over standards as an important maintain a fact-based approach to the man- particularly tough challenges in the northern- “Although subsea technology has made component in Norway’s regulation of the oil agement regime, so that we understand as most part of the NCS.” impressive progress, however, we still haven’t industry. much as possible about regions being opened reached the point where it can handle all “There’s a danger that we’ll take the to operations.” APPLIED. Stubholt maintains that Kværner’s requirements at every stage. benefits represented by this partnership for technology and industrial expertise can now “Seabed installations depend, for example, granted. Oil companies, suppliers and the DEBATE. She feels that the public debate in be applied in new ways in the far north. on a certain level of infrastructure in order government must accept their individual Norway on activities in the far north occasion- “At the moment, concrete support struc- to be able to operate, and that’s lacking in responsibility for the future of these standards, ally becomes simplistic. tures for fixed installations represent our most remote areas.” which will decay if they’re not maintained and “It gives the impression that people must important product for use in Arctic conditions. She believes that the challenges presented further developed. resist a sector which is eagerly piling on the “Many functions, such as cables, risers, drill by limited infrastructure mean the use of large “Norsok is very suited to its purpose pressure and seeking speedy full-scale devel- pipes and mechanical equipment are enclosed installations with room for equipment and and represents in reality a tool for HSE. It’s opment in the far north. and protected in this type of facility, which can important for ensuring first-class quality, and “What we actually see is that the industry be advantageous in areas with sea ice. deserves active support.” has a cautious attitude, taking one step at a “Floating concrete structures also “It gives the impression time. My impression is that developments in represent relevant and operationally secure that people must resist a the far north are taking place at a pace which solutions for regions with ice and deepwater sector which is eagerly piling allows consideration and reflection – and the currents.” authorities have room for detailed analysis of on the pressure and seeking Liv Monica Bargem Stubholt is due to leave requirements and challenges.” STRONG. She points out that developments speedy full-scale development Kværner in November to join the Hjort law In her view, the differences between the in concrete technology have resulted in very in the far north.” firm as a lawyer.
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DIALOGUE PSA 2013 CAN WE PLAN FOR THE UNTHINKABLE?
MANAGEMENT AND What particular safety challenges do you MAJOR ACCIDENT RISK. 2 see in a market with a high level of activity? Over many years, the PSA has Expertise, understanding of risk and management are always crucial for good safety work. In a very active been following up the way STRAIGHT market, it’s particularly important to maintain expertise company managements work requirements and ensure that our managers have to reduce the risk of major operating parameters which make it possible to plan accidents. This issue is one of and improve their work in an acceptable manner its main priorities for 2013. FROM Petter Osmundsen, professor of petroleum economics 3 at the University of Stavanger, said at the Safety Forum’s You recently attracted atten- 2013 annual conference that “the industry is cyclical” and 1 tion with the comment that that “the players see the boom coming, but none of them THE TOP you “hate booms” and that want to brake”. Is he right to claim that the industry fails many companies are pushing to learn from earlier mistakes? the safety envelope dan- I’m not sure that I agree with the professor on everything. gerously far. What can the Odfjell Drilling and other companies I’ve worked in have regulator and the industry solid experience from both good times and bad. jointly do to prevent this Odfjell Drilling has been going for 40 years, and our trend continuing? principal shareholder can look back on more than century as This is a case of raising an industrial owner. The ability to think of and protect the awareness. An organisation, company’s long-term interests is crucial in our strategy work. a company or an industry are no stronger than the weakest What special responsibility and challenges does the supplies link. We must highlight the industry face as petroleum operations move towards the Arctic? challenges faced by individual 4 We aim to run our business in a secure and acceptable manner, companies and the industry regardless of where we conduct it. We’re one of the few companies as a whole when demand rises to have drilled in Arctic waters, with Deepsea Delta working on towards a capacity ceiling. Shtokman in 2005. We know what’s required. We have the rigs During such phases, the and the expertise to operate safely in the high north. market can easily take off, which could lead to weak- What are you doing as a chief executive nesses in HSE. Everyone has to reduce major accident risk? a responsibility here, but the 5 I am conscious of the need to provide a good role model customer must perform de- through my behaviour and decisions. This means I want tailed qualifications to estab- to set a positive example by taking the right decisions, lish who has both ability and and in relation to risk and the level of activity. capacity in such periods. I demonstrate in practice that I support my managers when they cut back or halt an activity. SIMEN LIEUNGH CEO, Odfjell Drilling Photo: Odfjell Drilling.
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People have lived on and from the sea for thousands of years in Finnmark, Norway’s northernmost country. But nobody had built BARENTS SEA and operated a gas processing and liquefaction plant there before.
e’ve pushed back bounda- processing plant on land,” Nilsen explains. ries here, both technologi- “ We have a large gas-fired power station, a cally and geographically,” says huge liquefaction unit and a separate plant for BRIDGEHEAD Øivind Nilsen, production head injecting carbon dioxide – all concentrated in a at the Hammerfest LNG plant. relatively small area.” On a late summer’s day, Europe’s most advanced and complex gas pro- PREFABRICATED. Much of the land-based cessing facility and the world’s northernmost plant was prefabricated abroad and shipped to export plant for liquefied natural gas is bathed Melkøya for assembly. The processing facility in sunshine. was built by a Spanish yard, for example, put But Nilsen hurries away from the gleaming on a barge and towed to the site. stainless steel piping to climb one shadowed This development solution means that the flight of stairs after another before emerging various components have been stacked one at the highest point of the facility. atop the other, creating a much more compact This offers a magnificent view when the structure than elsewhere. weather is fine. But he has not brought me up “Although we’re on land, we’ve got to think here to show off the landscape, but to see how safety in the same way as on an offshore in- compact and complex the plant is. stallation,” says Nilsen. “We have many stories, “Here we combine something of what you a lot of equipment in a small space and work BY ØYVIND MIDTTUN find on an offshore installation with at many levels – boosting the risk of dropped part of what you get in a conventional gas objects, for instance.” æ
HAMMERFEST LNG is the world’s northernmost export facility for liquefied natural gas, and the northernmost of the eight land-based plants regulated by the PSA. (Photo: Gunlaug Leirvik, PSA)
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DIALOGUE PSA 2013 CAN WE PLAN FOR THE UNTHINKABLE? UNITY IN DIVERSITY Insight and knowledge are important requirements in the supervision exercised by the PSA over eight petroleum plants on land in Norway.
These facilities run like pearls on a string from its unique technology, the very from the Slagentangen oil refinery in Vestfold compact design presents challenges. county south of Oslo to Hammerfest LNG in “Moreover, the far northern location of Finnmark. this plant creates problems – including with “We take a unified approach to supervising weather and temperature, which affect both the petroleum sector,” explains PSA supervi- equipment and employees.” sion coordinator Kjell Arild Anfinsen, who is The PSA has consciously chosen to give responsible for all the land-based plants. priority to following up major accident risk and “The framework and management regula- the working environment at the land-based tions are the same, and we work in accordance plants, and the results have been good. with the same set of priorities whether the However, several serious incidents have facility is on land or offshore.” occurred because corrosion under insulating But the land-based plants have distinctive materials has not been discovered in time. features compared with installations at sea. The most recent of these was at the Mong- Nor are any of the eight the same. They differ stad refinery north of Bergen in November in processes, technologies, owners and man- 2012, when a steam pipe tore off and released TORLEIF HUSEBØ, the PSA discipline manager for process integrity, (left) and PSA director general Anne agement systems. large volumes of superheated steam and Myhrvold with Øivind Nilsen, Statoil’s production head for Hammerfest LNG.(Photo: Gunlaug Leirvik, PSA) Specialists with good insight into plant- water at high speed. specific challenges and solid knowledge of Nobody was injured, but up to four people STORMS. People in Finnmark are used to Seven years later, he no longer regards the individual plants are crucial for the PSA could have suffered life-threatening injuries or storms, but the Narve extreme weather event weather conditions as a particular challenge as a regulator, says Anfinsen. – in the worst case – been killed if the leak had which occurred in January 2006 takes some for Hammerfest LNG and says that no major “Hammerfest LNG at Melkøya, for instance, occurred only a few hours later. beating. And Melkøya was among the places operational problems have been caused by is Norway’s only gas liquefaction plant. Apart hardest hit. the climate. Very low temperatures, high winds and “It’s not that cold here, and the plant is well driving snow quickly combined to cover winterised – including extensive use of heat- components and equipment at the plant ing cables. But the combination of strong wind LEARNING THE LESSONS with a thick layer of ice. and sea spray can present icing difficulties. Construction was temporarily halted, “Falling ice is a problem during the winter, The L8 industry forum was established in is not a formal member of the network, but and personnel were evacuated from the exacerbated once again by the compact 2005 as a network for all Norway’s land-based attends its gatherings by invitation. work camp to safer surroundings in central design of the facility.” petroleum plants, discussing common issues Myhrvold emphasises that learning in- Hammerfest. and exchanging experience. volves more than simply exchanging experi- It was only 18 months before production Øivind Nilsen was production head for the “This is a key arena for experience trans- ence. Sharing information is easy, but only the was due to start, and the question was Snøhvit gas field and Hammerfest LNG from fer and learning between the eight facilities, first step. whether the new liquefaction plant could January 2011 to August 2013, and is now which have many shared challenges in the “If we’re really going to learn from incidents look forward to such conditions again. head of safety and sustainability for Statoil’s safety area,” says PSA director general Anne and achieve the desired improvements, we “Narve was a freak event,” Nilsen says. development and production international Myhrvold. need good and systematic follow up by the in- But the facility also faced difficulties with business area. She attended the L8 meeting at Hammer- dividual players. Learning doesn’t just happen.” the tough coastal climate during its fest LNG on Melkøya this August. The PSA running-in phase.
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DIALOGUE PSA 2013 CAN WE PLAN FOR THE UNTHINKABLE? ANSWERING BACK
The PSA is often the one asking the that unions are involved in developments in this area. safety on the NCS. The PSA Photo: Industry Energy. questions in its dialogue with the and have genuine influence We believe that no has no corresponding arena. over safety work in the far tripartite collaboration has Will you take the initiative to industry. Now Leif Sande, leader of north? occurred here since the Pe- establish a tripartite forum the Industry Energy union, has been troleum Industry Centre for for helicopter safety under PSA: It is crucial that those ex- Quality Assurance of Compe- your auspices? given the chance to quiz the regulator. posed to risk can participate tence (PSK) was shut down. in decision processes which After Norwegian Oil and Gas PSA: Maintaining a high are significant for HSE. has proposed a halving of re- level of helicopter safety Worker participation is fresher courses, we fear that in Norway is very impor- a cornerstone of efforts to the level of offshore safety tant. Efforts being made to establish and continue devel- will be weakened. establish common European BY MORTEN GJERSTAD oping a high level of safety in What will you do to en- regulations for such aircraft the petroleum industry. Em- sure that this does not hap- play a key role in that respect, SANDE: We’re constantly panies use English as their PSA: The government will ployees have both the right pen, and how will you ensure and it is important that we seeing infringements of the working language. This is go through the committee’s and the duty to participate. that tripartite collaboration pursue a common Norwegian regulations because union acceptable as long as safety report and the comments We are responsible for is revitalised? approach to these issues. running the Safety Forum as a officials and safety delegates is maintained. received once the consulta- In our view, this can best aren’t allowed to report and The language barrier can tion period is over. We are tripartite arena. Its members PSA: We participate as an be achieved through the write in Norwegian. be a challenge, but the com- not unaware of the desire have been asked to submit observer in the NSOB, and are We also find that the panies have a responsibility for more detailed regulatory the challenges they envisage aware of the work you men- existing collaboration forum, companies say failing to to ensure compliance with requirements, particularly on for activities in the far north tion. This is about Norwegian where the parties in the write in English will mean no the regulations and make the working environment. to the working party on Oil and Gas’s own guidelines, petroleum and helicopter reply or a delayed response. sure safety is maintained. We This has been the subject of a this region being led by the and collaboration on devel- sectors are represented along English is often defined as follow this up as part of our broad review, not least in the Norwegian Oil and Gas Asso- oping and possibly amending with the provider of air safety the working language in the supervision. Regulatory Forum. ciation. Companies, unions the requirements is accord- services. So we do not want companies. On a general basis, we can and government will jointly ingly a matter for the industry to establish a competing How will you enforce SANDE: The report from say that incorporating the identify where measures are and the unions themselves. arena. section 14 in the framework the committee of experts on guidelines in the regulations needed. We would refer to guide- regulations on the use of the future regulation of the is not on the cards. The basic We are following up line 002 to the activities regu- Norwegian? industry is now out to con- principles underlying the reg- worker participation in our lations. When making such a sultation. We constantly find ulations mean that this would audits and status meetings, reference, we are considering PSA: The regulations say that that your guidelines aren’t not be appropriate. In certain and also cooperate with the whether new versions of the Norwegian must be used as being followed because areas, however, we would Norwegian Labour Inspec- guidelines would provide the far as possible in the activity, they’re not legally binding. be able to consider whether tion Authority – not least to desired level of safety. but this is not an absolute We accordingly want the more specific requirements discuss audit findings. requirement. Other languag- guidelines incorporated in are needed. SANDE: Offshore helicopter es can be used if necessary or the regulations. SANDE: We and the other transport is an activity with appropriate for conducting Will you give weight SANDE: We see the petro- unions represented in the a major accident potential in the activity, providing this to union proposals to the leum industry is mov- Norwegian Oil and Gas terms of the possible loss of does not undermine safety. committee on a more ing north and into Arctic Association’s network for life. A tripartite arena exists Since the petroleum specific set of regulations regions. That could present safety and emergency re- today in the form of the industry is an international for safety and the working challenges which differ from sponse training (NSOB) Norwegian Civil Aviation Au- business, a number of com- environment? today’s. How will you ensure are very concerned about thority’s forum for helicopter
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DIALOGUE PSA 2013 CAN WE PLAN FOR THE UNTHINKABLE?
“The PSA has consciously chosen to give priority to following up major accident risk and the working DIALOGUE DIALOGUE A JOURNAL FROM THE PETROLEUM SAFETY AUTHORITY NORWAY environment at the land- based plants, and the results have been good.”
DIALOGUE Is published by the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) www.ptil.no
EDITORIAL STAFF Inger Anda (editor-in-chief/journalist) Øyvind Midttun (editor/journalist) Eileen Brundtland (journalist) Thor Gunnar Dahle (journalist) Morten Gjerstad (journalist) Janne N’Jai (graphic designer) Rolf E Gooderham (English editor/translator)
Printer: Kai Hansen Trykkeri Paper: 190/120g Highland Offset
Print run: 4 000 Norwegian, 1 500 English
This edition went to press on 22 October 2013.
Abbreviations used in this issue HSE – Health, safety and the environment NCS – Norwegian continental shelf PSA – Petroleum Safety Authority Norway
External views expressed in Dialogue Photo: Gunlaug Leirvik, PSA. do not necessarily represent the official position of the PSA.
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ISSN 1893-7292
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