october 2013 . Vol 6 . Issue 10

Contents The Nairobi Attack and

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 The Nairobi Attack and Al-Shabab’s Al-Shabab’s Media Strategy Media Strategy By Christopher Anzalone By Christopher Anzalone

Reports 6 The Dutch Foreign Fighter Contingent in Syria By Samar Batrawi 10 Jordanian Jihadists Active in Syria By Suha Philip Ma’ayeh 13 The Islamic Movement and Iranian Intelligence Activities in Nigeria By Jacob Zenn 19 Kirkuk’s Multidimensional Security Crisis By Derek Henry Flood 22 The Battle for Syria’s Al-Hasakah Province By Nicholas A. Heras

25 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 28 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts

Kenyan soldiers take positions outside the Westgate Mall in Nairobi on September 21, 2013. - Photo by Jeff Angote/Getty Images fter carrying out a bold Godane. The attack also followed a attack inside the upscale year in which al-Shabab lost control Westgate Mall in Nairobi in of significant amounts of territory in September 2013, the Somali Somalia, most importantly major urban Amilitant group al-Shabab succeeded in and economic centers such as the cities recapturing the media spotlight. This of Baidoa and Kismayo. was in large part due to the nature of the attack, its duration, the difficulty This article examines al-Shabab’s About the CTC Sentinel in resecuring the mall, the number of media strategy during and immediately The Combating Terrorism Center is an casualties, and al-Shabab’s aggressive after the Westgate Mall attack, both independent educational and research media campaign during and immediately via micro-blogging on Twitter through institution based in the Department of Social after the attack.1 its various accounts as well as more Sciences at the United States Military Academy, traditional media formats such as West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses From al-Shabab’s perspective, the attack audio statements from the group’s the Center’s global network of scholars and on Westgate Mall was a media triumph, leadership. The article also puts the practitioners to understand and confront particularly coming in the midst of a group’s media operations for the contemporary threats posed by terrorism and growing rift among jihadists both inside Westgate attack in historical context other forms of political violence. and outside Somalia regarding the by comparing and contrasting them consolidation of power by the group’s to al-Shabab’s past media campaigns. amir, Ahmed “Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr” Finally, the article concludes with The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, an assessment of al-Shabab’s current the Department of the Army, or any other agency state of health and the potential for of the U.S. Government. 1 Roopa Gogineni, “Nairobi Mall Death Toll Expected to more spectacular acts of violence, Rise,” Voice of America, September 25, 2013.

1 october 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 10 in large part as political and media Kenyan security forces was, at best, September 24, and President Kenyatta spectacles designed to capture public disorganized, which likely was one of only declared a formal end to the siege attention.2 It finds that al-Shabab, the reasons that the militants were late in the evening on the same day.12 despite facing increased political and able to prolong the attack over several The following day, shopkeepers and military setbacks, remains adept at days.6 After the initial failed attempts restaurateurs were able to return to their executing audacious attacks designed to to stop them, the attackers proceeded businesses inside the mall, where some attract the maximum amount of media to pick out targets from among those discovered evidence of theft and looting attention. Its media operatives are still trapped inside the mall, in some by some Kenyan soldiers.13 The number able to skillfully exploit its enemies’ places separating Muslims from non- mistakes on the battlefield and in the Muslims.7 Kenyan authorities remained information operations war, as well as unsure as to developments inside the “It is suspected that al- manipulating the news cycle by inserting mall nearly an hour into the attack, and Shabab succeeded multiple sensationalist claims.3 It also finds that the first army units arrived in the late al-Shabab has maintained a great deal afternoon, although confusion continued times in circumventing of continuity with its messaging toward due to the lack of clear command-and- attempts to prevent them foreign state actors active in Somalia, control between the Kenyan military despite the insurgents’ shifting fortunes and police.8 The Kenyan military and from micro-blogging by on the ground.4 police—reportedly aided by foreign creating a new account each advisers from the United States, United The Westgate Attack Kingdom, and Israel—helped hundreds time a Twitter suspension Al-Shabab’s complex assault on the of trapped shoppers escape the mall went into effect.” Westgate Mall began just after noon throughout the siege.9 on Saturday, September 21, 2013, when an undetermined number of The standoff between the al-Shabab gunmen entered the facility and began fighters and Kenyan security forces of casualties currently stands at 72, throwing grenades and shooting continued through the weekend. At including five of the attackers and six indiscriminately.5 Eyewitness accounts 1:28 p.m. Kenyan time on September 22, Kenyan soldiers.14 As of October 15, the from the early stages of the attack however, the Kenyan military’s official Red Cross reported that 23 people were suggested that the first response from Twitter account said that most of those still missing after the attack, although trapped inside had been rescued and the Kenyan government claims all those 15 2 For more on the “spectacle” aspect of terrorism/anti- “most parts” of the mall complex were missing have been accounted for. 10 civilian violence, see Gerard Chaliand, Terrorism: From under control. The claim that the Popular Struggle to Media Spectacle (London: Saqi Books, attack was nearly over was disproved in Kenyan authorities initially believed 2001); Steven Livingston, The Terrorism Spectacle (Boul- the early morning of September 23 when that there were 10 to 15 attackers, der, CO: Westview Press, 1994). The media spectacle of an explosion rocked the Westlands but have since revised their estimate 16 violence is discussed in Douglas Kellner, “Media Propa- district of Nairobi where the Westgate to as low as four to six. They have ganda and Spectacle in the War on Iraq: A Critique of Mall is located. More large explosions named four individuals they believe U.S. Broadcasting Networks,” Cultural Studies: Critical followed in the early afternoon. participated in the attack: Abu Bara’ Methodologies 4:3 (2004): pp. 329-338; Cynthia Carter, Vi- Confusion reportedly continued with al-Sudani (“the Sudanese”), Omar al- olence and the Media (New York: Open University Press, regards to the exact chain-of-command Nabhan, Khattab al-Kini (“the Kenyan”), 17 2003); Matthew Robert Kerbel, If It Bleeds, It Leads: An among the Kenyan military and police, and an individual named Umayr. All Anatomy of Television News (Boulder, CO: Westview with differences emerging between Press, 2001). For a theoretical discussion of the “political commanders and the office of Kenyan 12 Ibid. Stefan Smith and Peter Martell, “Kenyan Presi- 11 spectacle,” see Murray Edelman, Constructing the Political President Uhuru Kenyatta. Fighting dent Announces End to Mall Bloodbath,” Agence Spectacle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); continued into the evening of Tuesday, France-Presse, September 25, 2013. Arie S. Soesilo and Philo S. Wasburn, “Constructing a 13 Howden; Geoffrey York, “Kenyan Military Seeks Sol- Political Spectacle: American and Indonesian Media Ac- 6 Daniel Howden, “Terror in Nairobi: The Full Story diers Who Looted Stores During Mall Attack,” Globe and counts of the ‘Crisis in the Gulf,’” Sociological Quarterly Behind al-Shabaab’s Mall Attack,” Guardian, October 4, Mail, October 3, 2013; Margaret Wahito, “Lenku Admits 35:2 (1994): pp. 367-381. 2013. Looting at Westgate, Probe Continues,” Capital FM Ra- 3 These include making allegations that Kenyan forces 7 Ibid. dio [Nairobi], September 29, 2013; John Campbell, “Nai- used chemical weapons during the siege and later blew 8 Ibid. robi’s Westgate Mall Attack: Unanswered Questions,” up sections of the mall, burying scores of people, to hide 9 Peter Walker, “Kenyan Forces Begin ‘Major Assault’ Council on Foreign Relations, October 8, 2013. their act. to End Nairobi Mall Siege – as it Happened,” Guardian, 14 Gogineni; “Kenyan Mall Attack: 39 Still Missing, Says 4 Looking at al-Shabab’s media operations from a his- September 23, 2013; Richard Norton-Taylor and Vikram Red Cross,” Associated Press, September 30, 2013. torical perspective allows for a more detailed and con- Dodd, “Nairobi Attack: Israel Takes Lead Role in Advis- 15 Ramadhan Rajab, “23 People Still Missing Almost a textualized analysis of continuities, shifts, and trends in ing Kenyan Forces,” Guardian, September 23, 2013; Geof- Month after Westgate Attack,” The Star [Nairobi], Octo- its messaging, which is not possible if the group’s state- frey Mosoku, “Kenya Denies Involvement of Foreign ber 15, 2013. ments are examined in a vacuum. Military,” The Standard [Nairobi], September 23, 2013. 16 “Kenya Military Names Westgate Mall Attack Sus- 5 The Kenyan government has said that there were be- 10 Kenya Defense Forces, tweet, September 22, pects,” BBC, October 5, 2013. tween 10 and 15 attackers, but the exact number remains 2013, available at www.twitter.com/kdfinfo/status- 17 Ibid. Omar al-Nabhan was the nephew of the late unclear. See “Nairobi Attack: Kenya Forces Comb West- es/381877655227731968. Saleh al-Nabhan, an al-Qa`ida operative in East Africa gate Site,” BBC, September 24, 2013. 11 Howden. who served as a military trainer for al-Shabab and was

2 october 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 10 four were reportedly members of al- (AMISOM) force inside Somalia, the experience at the hands of Kenyan Hijra, al-Shabab’s chief Kenyan ally, Somali federal government, and the invaders. #Wetsgate [sic]”; “What which was formerly known as the United States.22 Kenyans are witnessing at #Westgate is Muslim Youth Center.18 If the attack was retributive justice for crimes committed indeed carried out largely by fighters The insurgent group’s media by their military, albeit largely from al-Hijra, it would be yet another department provided a continuous miniscule in nature”; and “The attacks sign of the increasing importance to al- stream of “updates” and commentary are just retribution for the lives of Shabab of its Kenyan allies and support throughout the assault on Westgate innocent Muslims shelled by Kenyan networks, which have steadily increased Mall.23 This reveals that the group jets in Lower Jubba [in Somalia] and in since 2010.19 recognizes the value of tweeting, refugee camps #Westgate.”26 particularly in English, in attracting Al-Shabab’s Media Operations During the the attention of the world’s news Second, al-Shabab directed renewed Siege media. Prior to launching their warnings to the Kenyan government and The start of al-Shabab’s use of assault, the attackers may have set public, linking the latter’s security to Twitter as a propaganda tool began up a “command-and-control center” the removal of the thousands of Kenyan on December 7, 2011, following the in an unidentified vehicle positioned military personnel from Somalia. entrance of the Kenyan military into earlier in the day on September 21.24 Some example tweets included: “HSM southern Somalia in October 2011.20 Intelligence intercepts suggested that has on numerous occasions warned Since then, it has attracted significant some of the Twitter updates posted by the #Kenyan government that failure to attention from journalists.21 Since al-Shabab’s HSM Press (Harakat al- remove its forces from Somalia would its debut on Twitter, al-Shabab has Shabab al-Mujahidin) account were have severe consequences”; and “The made great use of the micro-blogging sent from there.25 Kenyan government, however, turned format to deliver its counternarrative a deaf ear to our repeated warnings to events occurring inside Somalia, The tweets posted to the account and continued to massacre innocent running commentary on a host of during the assault attempted to Muslims in Somalia #Westgate.”27 political, social, and religious issues, deliver al-Shabab’s message in a They also made a direct demand for the and taunting its enemies, such as the number of different areas. First, removal of Kenyan forces from Somalia: African Union Mission in Somalia there was the promotion of the “The message we are sending to the insurgents’ counternarrative, which Kenyan govt & Public is and has always killed in a U.S. military raid in September 2009. For painted the attack on Westgate Mall been just one: remove all your forces 28 background information on Saleh al-Nabhan, see “Pro- as a response to the greater suffering from our country #Westgate.” file: Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan,” BBC, September 15, 2009. endured by those inside Somalia. Some 18 “Abu Baara al-Sudani, Omar Nabhan, Khattab al- example tweets included: “The attack Third, and most importantly for the Kene, and Umayr Identified as Kenya Mall Attackers,” at #WestgateMall is just a very tiny use of its Twitter messaging as a news.com.au, October 6, 2013. The Muslim Youth Cen- fraction of what Muslims in Somalia propaganda tool designed to attract ter’s (MYC) reported name change appeared in the latest media attention, the HSM Press report from the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and 22 The al-Shabab media operatives who run the “HSM account purportedly posted “updates” Eritrea, although the entire section on the MYC is re- Press” account spend a great deal of time and energy, on the ongoing siege at a time when dacted and listed as “strictly confidential.” Twitter and measurable to some degree in a comparative analysis of conflicting reports abounded. These Tumblr accounts believed to be linked to the MYC, and the numbers of tweets on the subject, pushing forward included tweets announcing the attack which release statements in its name, still use the old their counternarrative to that of the Somali government, on the “Kenyan Kuffar [unbelievers] name, not al-Hijra. African Union, the United States, and other international inside their own turf,” denying the 19 Christopher Anzalone, “Kenya’s Muslim Youth Cen- actors. See the analytical data in Alexander Meleagrou- cessation of fighting between “the ter and Al-Shabab’s East African Recruitment,” CTC Sen- Hitchens, Shiraz Maher, and James Sheehan, Lights, mujahidin” and the Kenyan military tinel 5:10 (2012). Camera, Jihad: Al-Shabaab’s Western Media Strategy (Lon- and police, alleging that the Kenyan 20 Christopher Anzalone, “Harakat al-Shabab al-Muja- don: The International Centre for the Study of Radicali- government was “pleading” with the hideen’s Press Office Opens Twitter Account,” al-Wasat sation, 2012), pp. 31-35. attackers inside the mall to negotiate, blog, December 8, 2011. Al-Shabab’s original English 23 Propaganda messaging in English, a language more and reports of the calmness of the language Twitter account has since been closed, but the readily accessible to many in the Western news media, attackers despite being under siege by 29 group’s media department appeared to open new ac- has in the past led to the inflation of the importance of Kenyan security forces. Al-Shabab counts as previous ones were suspended by Twitter for some jihadist publications, such as Inspire magazine, also claimed via Twitter that it had “violations of service.” See, for example, Feisal Omar, “Al and, some argue, personalities, such as the late radical “singled out” only “unbelievers” in the Shabaab’s Twitter Account Down after Hostage Threat,” Yemeni-American preacher Anwar al-`Awlaqi. See J.M. attack and had “escorted out” Muslims Reuters, January 25, 2013. Berger, “Inspiration Inflation,” Foreign Policy, April 23, before the attack began, announcing 21 See, for example, Michelle Shepherd, “Tweeting War: 2013; Erik Stier, “Is Anwar al-Awlaki’s Importance to that the defense of Muslim lands “is one Somalia’s Al Shabab Joins Twitter,” Toronto Star, Decem- Al Qaeda Overstated?” Christian Science Monitor, May 10, ber 8, 2011; Spencer Ackerman, “Somali Terrorists Join 2011; Gregory D. Johnsen, “A False Target in Yemen,” 26 These tweets were posted by the now-defunct @HSM_ Twitter #Propaganda,” Wired, December 7, 2011; Da- New York Times, November 19, 2010; Thomas Heggham- Press Twitter account, September 21-24, 2013. The text of vid Smith, “Al-Shabaab in War of Words with Kenyan mer, “The Case for Chasing al-Awlaki,” Foreign Policy, the tweets has been saved by the author. Army on Twitter,” Guardian, December 13, 2011; Geof- November 24, 2010. 27 Ibid. frey York, “Al-Shabab Goes to War with Kenyan Army 24 Howden. 28 Ibid. on Twitter,” Globe and Mail, January 11, 2012. 25 Ibid. 29 Ibid.

3 october 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 10 of the foremost obligations after faith & battlefield.”37 Through this rebranding After Westgate: Continuity in Media defending against the aggressive enemy effort, al-Shabab promoted its Operations is our right as Muslims.”30 propaganda videos as “documentaries” On the last day of the attack, al- and a form of “insurgent journalism” Shabab’s HSM Press Twitter account Al-Shabab’s discourse via more that revealed the “truth” in the midst was still busy disseminating the group’s traditional channels—such as press of the falsehoods supposedly being messages and attempting to influence statements broadcast on the radio and spread by the Western media about the the news cycle. In the early hours of distributed online via pro-Shabab news group.38 September 24, the group continued to websites—delivered similar messages. deny reports that the siege had ended, In an audio statement on September Advancing its counternarrative is a callously noting that “countless dead 21, al-Shabab’s senior spokesman, Ali key part of al-Shabab’s media strategy, bodies” were scattered throughout Mohamed Rage (also known as Ali as is evident by the group’s handling the mall as the attackers continued to Dheere), said that the Westgate Mall of the Westgate Mall story. By claiming hold out.42 A still image from closed attack was in response to the attack by to be in close contact with the militants circuit television from inside the “Christian Kenya” on Somalia via the inside the mall, its media operatives mall showing two of the attackers southern region of Jubba.31 The Kenyans, garnered a great deal of attention from was also released.43 In a tweet clearly he alleged, committed massacres of news media outlets around the world. It demonstrating that the group’s media Somali civilians, including women and is suspected that al-Shabab succeeded operatives were well aware of events children, with fighter aircraft and heavy multiple times in circumventing impacting Muslims outside of Somalia, weapons.32 The Kenyan government, attempts to prevent them from micro- HSM Press quoted and heralded Rage said, continues to ignore the blogging by creating a new account “mujahid” Michael Adebolajo, one of insurgents’ warnings to withdraw each time a Twitter suspension went two young British men charged with from its “illegal” occupation of parts into effect.39 Al-Shabab also tailored its murdering off-duty soldier Private of Somalia or face the consequences at different Twitter feeds to their different Lee Rigby on May 22, 2013, in London. home.33 Rage painted the attack as an audiences, focusing on more domestic Shortly after Rigby’s murder, Adebolajo “eye for an eye,” citing the second half issues via its Somali language Twitter said that it was an “eye for an eye” of a Qur’anic verse, which reads, “And account.40 The confused handling of response to British aggression against the one who attacks you, attack him in a the crisis by the Kenyan government Muslims.44 In the tweet, al-Shabab manner similar to that which he attacked benefited al-Shabab’s efforts to said, “His [attack] was #Woolwich [in you.”34 Rage said that the attack was manipulate the reporting of the attack, London], #Westgate ours!”45 carried out by a specially trained squad on which it was quick to capitalize. Al- of fighters who were “defending” their Shabab has undermined its enemies’ The insurgents, via Twitter, also religion and avenging the innocents claims previously as well, releasing alleged that the Kenyan government killed by the Kenyan military.35 photographs showing dead AMISOM had used “chemical agents” in Westgate soldiers, including close-ups of their Mall in a desperate attempt to end the Insurgent Media as an Alternative News identification cards and captured siege.46 To cover “their crime,” the Source weapons and equipment, following HSM Press feed continued, the Kenyan Since it emerged in 2007-2008 as AMISOM denials of suffering casualties government destroyed the building, the premier insurgent movement in attacks in Somalia.41 fighting the then-Transitional Federal 42 HSM Press tweet, September 24, 2013. This account Government (TFG) in Somalia, al-Shabab has since been suspended by Twitter. The text of the has expressed an interest in “correcting tweets referenced has been saved by the author. 36 false news” about itself. The latest 37 “Al-Kata’ib News Channel,” al-Shabab, July 27, 2010. 43 Ibid. stage in the evolution of the group’s 38 The Burundian Bloodbath: Battle of Dayniile, al-Shabab, 44 Tom Whitehead, David Barrett, and Steven Swinford, media operations was the rebranding of November 12, 2011; Under the Shade of Shari’ah, al-Shabab, “Woolwich Attack: Suspect Michael ‘Mujahid’ Adebola- a part of its media department as the “al- July 1, 2012; Christopher Anzalone, “The Rapid Evolu- jo Led Away in Handcuffs at Fanatic’s Trial,” Telegraph, Kataib News Channel,” a source of news tion of Al-Shabab’s Media and Insurgent ‘Journalism,’” May 23, 2013. about “the mujahidin” that was unbiased Open Democracy, November 16, 2011. 45 HSM Press tweet, September 24, 2013. This account and brought “the truth directly from the 39 “Al-Shabab Showed Gruesome Social Media Savvy has since been suspended by Twitter. The text of the During Attack,” CBS News, September 24, 2013. tweets referenced has been saved by the author. On Oc- 30 Ibid. 40 Ibid. Cedric Barnes, a Somalia expert working for tober 17, al-Shabab’s media department released a new 31 Ali Mohamed Rage, “Mujaahidiintu Duulaan Aar- the International Crisis Group, noted this difference be- propaganda film, Woolwich Attack: It’s an Eye for an Eye, goosi ah Ayay Ku qaadeen Kenya,” al-Shabab, Septem- tween al-Shabab’s English and Somali language media in Arabic and English versions, heralding Adebolajo and ber 21, 2013. messaging regarding its assault on the Westgate Mall, other “lone wolf mujahidin” who, when unable to become 32 Ibid. but the story does not provide any specific examples of foreign fighters in places such as Somalia, have “fulfilled 33 Ibid. these differences. their duty of jihad” in their home countries. 34 See Qur’an 2:194. 41 The Burundian Bloodbath: Battle of Dayniile; Mogadishu: 46 HSM Press tweets, September 25, 2013. This account 35 Rage, “Mujaahidiintu Duulaan Aargoosi ah Ayay Ku Crusaders’ Graveyard, al-Shabab, July 30, 2010; Chris- has since been suspended by Twitter. The text of the qaadeen Kenya.” topher Anzalone, “Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen tweets referenced has been saved by the author. Also see 36 “An Important Clarification regarding the Promotion Releases Statement & Information on Burundian AMI- Umberto Bacchi, “Nairobi Westgate Mall Siege: Al-Sha- by Al-Jazeera of False News about the Movement [al- SOM Soldiers Slain at Battle of Dayniile,” al-Wasat blog, baab Accuses Kenyan Troops of Chemical Weapon Use,” Shabab],” al-Shabab, November 24, 2008. December 12, 2011. International Business Times, September 25, 2013.

4 october 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 10 burying scores beneath the rubble.47 There is a precedent for al-Shabab’s Aware of the media frenzy surrounding Al-Shabab also commented on Western use of this type of media strategy. The the Westgate Mall attack, the HSM media speculation that the so-called group employed a similar strategy Press feed began advertising in advance “White Widow” (British militant with Uganda and Burundi in 2010 a forthcoming audio statement from Samantha Lewthwaite) was involved before and after al-Shabab carried out Godane on the afternoon of September in the attack.48 The group denied that two “martyrdom operations” in Kampala 24.57 Godane’s statement was released “any woman” was involved, stating, in June of that year.52 Before carrying the next day and distributed on pro- “We have an adequate number of young out those attacks, al-Shabab’s al-Kataib Shabab Somali news websites, jihadist men who are fully committed & we do Media Foundation released a video forums, and on Twitter, first with a in which the unidentified narrator, Somali language tweet and, soon after, “The attack on Westgate who spoke impeccable English with a two English language tweets with links Mall provided the group British accent and whose face was not to official English written and audio shown, warned the Ugandan and, to a translations of the statement.58 The with a media triumph that lesser extent, the Burundian people to audio translation was read by what catapulted it back onto the pressure their governments to withdraw sounded like the same individual, their forces from Somalia, where both speaking with a British accent, who public stage.” militaries formed the backbone of the debuted in al-Shabab’s English language AMISOM force propping up the weak Somali TFG.53 “As al-Shabab’s battlefield not employ our sisters in such military Following the Kampala attacks, the capabilities continue to operations.”49 The insurgents, perhaps insurgents released a follow-up video deteriorate, the strategic aware of potentially damaging public prominently featuring scenes from relations, also denied targeting women those attacks. What sounded like the benefits of low-cost acts of and children in the attack, saying that same English-speaking narrator warned terrorism and asymmetric they provided them “safe passage,” a the Ugandan public that if the “lessons claim belied by the evidence.50 being taught” against their military warfare increase, and the forces inside Mogadishu were not clear group is likely to turn to Al-Shabab repeated its earlier demands enough, then perhaps only “lessons a to the Kenyan public to pressure their little closer to home” would be the “only such actions in a bid to government to withdraw its military solution...You [the Ugandan public] remain a relevant force forces from Somalia. In exchange, al- will then pay a hefty price.”54 An audio Shabab would allow Kenyans to live message from al-Shabab leader Godane both inside and outside in peace: “Kenyans, look how fear has in the same video portrayed the Kampala Somalia.” gripped your nation…You can put on attacks as revenge for innocent Somali a brave face but you’re shaken. Your women, children, and elderly killed spirit is on the wane &your leaders lack by AMISOM in Somalia.55 In October the moral fibre to do the right thing… 2011, Rage warned the Kenyan public video productions during the summer You could have avoided all this and to “consider carefully” the path their of 2010. The release of written and lived your lives with relative safety. government was taking them down by audio English translations of Godane’s Remove your forces from our country intervening militarily in Somalia, a statement within hours of the release of and peace will come.”51 point he has since reiterated in audio the original demonstrated the group’s statements regarding the Westgate Mall media savvy in capitalizing on and even 56 47 HSM Press tweet, September 25, 2013. This account attack. feeding the worldwide media attention 59 has since been suspended by Twitter. The text of the surrounding the attack. tweets referenced has been saved by the author. Also see Afua Hirsch, “Kenya Mall Attack: Dozens More Bodies has since been suspended by Twitter. The text of the Dubbing the attack the “Badr Nairobi” Believed Buried Under Rubble,” Guardian, September tweets referenced has been saved by the author. in reference to the Prophet Muhammad’s 26, 2013. 52 Anzalone, “The Rapid Evolution of Al-Shabab’s Me- first major battle in 624 AD, Godane 48 Mike Pflanz, “Britain’s Shadowy ‘White Widow’ dia and Insurgent ‘Journalism.’” eulogized the “martyrdom-seekers” who Linked to SEAL Team Target in Somalia,” Christian Sci- 53 The African Crusaders: Fighting the West’s War, al-Sha- carried out the attack and stated that the ence Monitor, October 8, 2013. bab, June 27, 2010. 49 HSM Press tweets, September 24, 2013. This account 54 Mogadishu: Crusaders’ Graveyard. 57 HSM Press tweet, September 24, 2013. This account has since been suspended by Twitter. The text of the 55 Ibid. has since been suspended by Twitter. The text of the tweets referenced has been saved by the author. 56 Rage, “Mujaahidiintu Duulaan Aargoosi ah Ayay Ku tweets referenced has been saved by the author. 50 HSM Press tweets, September 24, 2013. This account qaadeen Kenya,” al-Shabab, October 2011; Ali Mohamed 58 HSM Press tweets, September 25, 2013. This account has since been suspended by Twitter. The text of the Rage, “Statement of Shaykh Ali Dheere [Rage],” al-Sha- has since been suspended by Twitter. The text of the tweets referenced has been saved by the author. Stating bab, September 24, 2013; Ali Mohamed Rage, “Mujaa- tweets referenced has been saved by the author. that they have “no interest” in harming women and chil- hidiintu Way Ufasaxanyihiin,” al-Shabab, September 59 It is possible that al-Shabab decided to produce an dren, the group claimed that it did everything “practically 22, 2013. The second statement, which is in Arabic, was English audio translation of Godane’s statement to make possible” to remove women and children from the mall. advertised on the HSM Press Twitter account, first with it easier for television and radio outlets to play excerpts 51 HSM Press tweets, September 24, 2013. This account an Arabic and then an English tweet. in their broadcasts.

5 october 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 10 operation was in response to Kenya’s the African Union, the United States, military intervention inside Somalia.60 and the United Kingdom to target The Dutch Foreign Fighter The “success” of the attack, he said, once al-Shabab’s leadership in the hopes Contingent in Syria again showed the “power of faith, which of eliminating it as an international “nothing can stand against,” revealing threat. By Samar Batrawi weaknesses in the Kenyan government, military, and police.61 As he did to the The attack may not lead to a Kenyan since the start of the Syrian civil war Ugandan public following the Kampala military withdrawal from Somalia, but in 2011, foreign fighters have bombings in 2010, Godane addressed it could be a harbinger of a continuing increasingly traveled to Syria to fight the Kenyan public by telling them to shift by al-Shabab back to asymmetric against the Bashar al-Assad regime. leave Somalia. “You have entered into a warfare. The group might carry out Many of these foreign fighters have war that is not yours and is against your more attacks on soft targets, such as joined the more extremist Salafi-jihadi national interests…you have voluntarily civilian centers and non-military sites, rebel groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra given up your security and economy and to bleed the fledgling Somali federal or Jaysh al-Muhajirin wa-al-Ansar. have lost many of your sons,” he said, government and its African Union They have come from several different arguing that because they elected their backers. Indeed, the insurgents began countries, including Western states such politicians, they bear the responsibility shifting back to their guerrilla roots in as the United Kingdom and Sweden. of “the massacres that are being August 2011 when they withdrew from perpetrated by your military in Kismayo Mogadishu in the face of a mounting This article examines the presence of and the neighboring regions.”62 offensive by AMISOM, the TFG, and Dutch fighters in the Syrian civil war. allied Somali militias. This followed al- It also identifies the Netherlands- Conclusion Shabab’s failure to drive out AMISOM based networks and individuals to The Westgate Mall attack has returned and the TFG from Mogadishu. which these foreign fighters have links the beleaguered al-Shabab militant and describes what is known about group into worldwide headlines. As al-Shabab’s battlefield capabilities their activities in Syria. It finds that at Wracked by internal divisions—most continue to deteriorate, the strategic least 20 people from the Netherlands notably the public spat between al- benefits of low-cost acts of terrorism have joined the war in Syria, and at Shabab’s senior leadership under and asymmetric warfare increase, and least six of them have died there.1 Godane and dissidents such as Omar the group is likely to turn to such actions Although the General Intelligence Hammami as well as former senior in a bid to remain a relevant force both and Security Service (AIVD) of the leaders within the group itself—al- inside and outside Somalia. Netherlands has not found evidence Shabab was in need of relief. The attack that Netherlands-based networks have on Westgate Mall provided the group Christopher Anzalone is a Ph.D. student actively recruited Dutch Muslims to with a media triumph that catapulted it in the Institute of Islamic Studies at fight in Syria, the AIVD does believe back onto the public stage. McGill University where he studies that groups such as Sharia4Holland, modern Muslim sociopolitical movements, Behind Bars, Hizb al-Tahrir and The long-term military significance contemporary jihadist movements, Shi`a of the attack is unknown at this time. Islam, and Islamist visual cultures. He is 1 In February 2013, the head of the AIVD, Rob Berthol- While it is unlikely that it will result also an adjunct research fellow at the Ali ee, said in a Dutch news broadcast that “tens” of young in significant military gains for al- Vural Ak Center for Global Islamic Studies Dutch Muslims were fighting in Syria. The estimate of 20 Shabab on the ground in Somalia, it may at George Mason University. people from the Netherlands fighting in Syria is based on lead to strategic gains for the group in the author’s research. After identifying Dutch fighters in the short-term, particularly if there is a Syria through social media and other open sources, the heavy-handed response from the Kenyan author attempted to corroborate those names with AIVD government that targets the hundreds of and Dutch government publications and statements, 63 thousands of Somalis living in Kenya. available police records, and sources such as community The increased media attention may blogs and websites. By cross-checking all available open also prove to be a mixed blessing for source information, the author tried to paint a rough al-Shabab. On the one hand, it renews sketch that is as accurate as possible. One limitation is its relevance in the eyes of potential that unless the AIVD or Dutch government confirms that supporters at home and abroad. On the a Dutch citizen has traveled to or died in Syria, it is not other hand, it will intensify the drive by possible to determine whether a Dutch fighter is a Dutch powerful international actors such as citizen or a former resident. They might have a Dutch passport but they could also hold a permit. What was 60 Ahmed Godane, “Badr Nairobi,” al-Shabab, Septem- more important to the author, however, was that all 20 ber 25, 2013. of the fighters had a clear history of living in the Nether- 61 Ibid. lands, whether as citizens or residents, which made them 62 Ibid. part of a certain network and community and part of the 63 “Westgate Attack: MPs to Call for Refugee Camps to Dutch socioeconomic and political context. For some of Close,” BBC, September 30, 2013; “Number of Somali the details on the deaths of the fighters, see “Opnieuw Refugees in Horn of Africa Passes 1 Million Mark,” Unit- Nederlandse Syriëganger gedood,” Trouw, October 17, ed Nations Refugee Agency, July 17, 2012. 2013.

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Millatu Ibrahim are increasingly parents of foreign fighters have They largely came from the Dutch utilizing the developments in Syria to approached the media claiming the cities of Zeist, Delft, Rotterdam and promote their cause, which in turn has a contrary.5 The Hague (specifically the notorious potential radicalizing influence on their Schilderswijk9 neighborhood).10 supporters.2 This author has identified at least 20 individuals from the Netherlands who There are several organizations that are Background on the Fighters have fought or are fighting in Syria, at least affiliated with some of the 20 The AIVD considers Dutch nationals although there could be more than individuals in question. This affiliation fighting in Syria as a significant 100.6 At this point, it is not possible ranges from featuring obituaries and threat to the national security of the to access specific details about the supportive statements on the website Netherlands due to their radicalizing fighters’ backgrounds—such as their De Ware Religie11 (The True Religion) influence on Dutch society.3 This socioeconomic positions—but in some to alleged recruitment through has resulted in several attempts to of the cases there is enough information individuals active in the groups address the issue on a judicial level by to paint a rough sketch of these foreign Behind Bars and Sharia4Holland, criminalizing so-called “jihad travel.”4 fighters. several of which have been on “jihad The AIVD maintains that there are no trips” before and enjoy respect and recruiting networks or individuals in The majority of the 20 identified Dutch authority within their communities.1 2 the Netherlands, yet several concerned foreign fighters came from Moroccan,

Somali and Turkish communities in proximately 390,000 (of the 20 Dutch people fighting in 2 According to the AIVD, “Several members of radical the Netherlands, although one Dutch Syria, at least three are of Turkish descent). These details 7 Islamist organisations such as Sharia4Holland and Be- man was originally from Bosnia. are drawn from “Bevolking; kerncijfers,” Central Bureau hind Bars are among those that left to Syria to join the Most commonly, the individuals in for Statistics of the Netherlands, April 5, 2013. A 2010 8 jihad. This is indicative of how blurred the line between question are of Moroccan descent. research study examined these groups, and it found that radicalism and jihadism has become. These movements differences between Moroccans and Turks are at times have created an environment in which people with simi- 5 “AIVD: geen aanwijzing ronselen jihadstrijders,” De significant: Moroccans scored much higher on all- indi lar ideas meet and develop radical ideas into jihadist ide- Volkskrant, April 16, 2013; Janny Groen, “Ouders woe- cators of religiousness than Turks. For details on that ologies. This group dynamic has led to a rapid radicaliza- dend op AIVD: wel ronselaars voor Syrië,” De Volkskrant, study, see Paul M. de Graaf et al., “Sociaal-culturele ver- tion of many individuals as well as concrete attempts to April 18, 2013. schillen tussen Turken, Marokkanen en autochtonen: join the jihad in Syria.” See “Jaarverslag 2012: technologi- 6 Although this author has identified 20 people from the eerste resultaten van de Nederlandse LevensLoop Studie sering bepaalt dreigingsbeeld,” General Intelligence and Netherlands who have traveled to Syria to fight, other es- (NELLS),” Central Bureau for Statistics of the Nether- Security Service of the Netherlands, 2012, p. 24. timates and claims of the leader of the Dutch jihadists in lands, 2011. 3 As the AIVD states on their website, “The number of Syria, known as Abu Fidaa, place the number at about 9 The Schilderswijk neighborhood of The Hague was jihadist travelers is growing every year. Dutch jihadists 100. recently the focus of a report in Trouw because of the ac- are becoming more and more successful in connecting 7 Various newspapers have identified several Dutch tions of some of its Salafist residents. Salafists in Schil- themselves to key international figures in these net- nationals fighting in Syria. They include: Saddek Sbaa derswijk have tried to enforce Shari`a-like social laws works. If these people return to the Netherlands they will (Moroccan-Dutch, died in Sahil, at age 20), Sofian M. on residents, such as dress codes for women or norms take with them all the contacts and skills that they ac- (21-years-old from Zeist), Jordi de Jong (20-years-old about alcohol and smoking. Dozens of residents told the quired during their period abroad. This makes it possible from Delft), Soufianne Elfassi (20-years-old from Delft/ Trouw newspaper that the neighborhood is known as the for them to commit attacks or to support other jihadists Rotterdam, died in Syria), Choukri Masali ‘Abu Wa- “Shari`a Triangle”—a reference to the part of the neigh- in planning attacks in the West. Returning jihadists en- lae’ (Moroccan-Dutch man who died in Syria and was borhood called the “forgotten triangle” after it was left joy a significant degree of prestige, they are militant and possibly fighting for Jabhat al-Nusra), Mourad Masali out of an urban renewal plan. The area is also home to they are capable of influencing others. They are therefore (20-year-old Moroccan-Dutch man from Delft who the Salafist As-Soennah Mosque. For details, see Perdiep a radicalizing force.” See the AIVD statement on move- died in Syria and was possibly fighting for Jabhat al- Ramesar, “Haagse buurt domein orthodoxe moslims,” ments of terrorism: “Reisbewegingen jihadistisch terror- Nusra), Abu Fidaa (leader and spokesperson of the Trouw, May 18, 2013. isme,” General Intelligence and Security Service of the Dutch fighters) and Victor Droste (also known- asZa 10 These trends became clear as the author continued Netherlands, September 2013. karia al-Holandi, a 26-year-old Dutch convert to Islam). to document all information available about the Dutch 4 The legal aspects of this issue are complex and seem More recently, obituaries have been posted on the new fighters. It is also confirmed by Edwin Bakker, professor to be developing rapidly as the Netherlands attempts to Facebook page for Dutch jihadists in Syria, available at of Terrorism and Counterterrorism at Leiden University cope with this phenomenon on a judicial level. A new www.facebook.com/pages/Nederlandse-Mujahideen- in the Netherlands, who stated that many of the young Dutch law, Article 134a, states that any acts that serve in-Syri%C3%AB/142765595912474. An archive of past Dutch fighters in Syria are from The Hague. See “Veel as preparation for terrorist acts are punishable by law. statements from that Facebook page is located at www. Nederlandse strijders Syrië komen uit Den Haag,” Om- It is a broad article that can encompass a wide range of ahlussunnahpublicaties.wordpress.com/2013/06/19/ roep West, April 18, 2013. “terrorist” activities as well as “preparatory acts.” In Oc- archief-nederlandse-mujahideen-in-syrie. For videos 11 De Ware Religie (The True Religion) is a Dutch-lan- tober 2013, for the first time Dutch “Syria fighters” were showing the Dutch-Bosnian man, see www.youtube.com/ guage website that expresses radical Islamist views, pub- convicted in the Netherlands for planning to undertake a watch?feature=player_embedded&v=ceNsOnDon90 and lishing relevant news articles, opinion pieces and some- “jihad trip.” It remains to be seen what the effect of this www.youtube.com/watch?v=h6u5whMS0us. times even obituaries for Dutch jihadists in Syria. sentence will be in terms of preventing more Dutch citi- 8 At least nine out of the 20 are of Moroccan descent. 12 These groups all operate openly in the Netherlands, zens from attempting to undertake such travel, but the There are about 360,000 Moroccans in the Nether- although they are controversial and their activities are sentence will probably prove to be an important legal lands, most of whom are second-generation immigrants, monitored by the AIVD. See “Sharia4Holland speelt rol precedent for the criminalization of traveling abroad to making them the second largest non-Western group of bij jihad-reizen,” De Volkskrant, April 24, 2013; “Neder- join jihadist causes. See “First Conviction of Syria Trav- immigrants in the country. Turks are the largest minor- lander vast in Marokko om ronselen voor Syrië,” De Volk- ellers,” NOS News, October 23, 2013. ity group in the Netherlands, with a population of ap- skrant, May 25, 2013.

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Most of the men in Syria are estimated The first known Dutch national to die in An April 2013 article in De Volkskrant to be between the ages of 23 and 26, Syria was 21-year-old Mourad Massali, voiced the frustration of parents of with the exception of a couple of Dutch a Dutch-Moroccan man from Delft, who Dutch fighters, who felt that their minors who managed to undertake the was killed in March 2013.19 According to concerns about the recruitment of young journey to Syria.13 his friends and family, who cooperated Muslims had not been taken seriously by with a Dutch news organization in a the AIVD.28 Murat Ofkeli (also known Based on pieces of information drawn series of interviews, Massali became as “Ibrahim the Turk,” “Abu Jarrah” or from the 20 profiles, most of the fighters more radical after the death of his “Abu Zer”) from Schilderswijk in The reached Syria by flying from either the father.20 He was part of a Delft-based Hague was one of the names mentioned Netherlands or Belgium to Turkey, group of friends of about 20 young by these parents as a potential where they crossed into Syria from the people, many of whom have criminal recruiter.29 The AIVD had monitored Turkish border.14 records.21 According to friends, many him since 2001 after suspicions arose of these young people viewed engaging that he might be recruiting young Profiles and Recruiters in the conflict in Syria as a form of Muslims for jihadist conflicts abroad.30 In September 2013, the Dutch website penance for their sins.22 Massali’s Two years later, Ofkeli was cleared De Ware Religie posted an obituary friend, 20-year-old Soufian Elfassi from of charges accusing him of recruiting for a 19-year-old Dutch man, known Delft, was the second Dutch national individuals for jihad.31 In 2005, he as Abu Abdurrahman, who fought to die in Syria; he was killed in March came to the authorities’ attention once alongside “Islamic rebels” since June 2013.23 Elfassi played for the local again when three young men from The 2013.15 Abdurrahman, from The Hague, soccer team Delfia, whose president Hague, who he had allegedly recruited, left for the north of Syria with one was surprised to hear of Elfassi’s travel were arrested in Azerbaijan on their of his best friends, where he fought to Syria as he did not perceive him to be way to fight in Chechnya.32 He was with several other Dutch people.16 radical, nor did he ever hear him voice also suspected to be a member of the The website claimed that he died a clear opinion on Syria.24 When Elfassi Hofstad Group,33 but he was cleared of during a surprise attack on the enemy, left for Syria in December 2012, he told all charges due to a lack of evidence.34 launched from a recently captured area his colleagues that he was leaving to which Abdurrahman was in charge study at a university in Egypt. Massali’s The parents of the young Muslims of patrolling. His real first name was 26-year-old brother Choukri was killed who Ofkeli allegedly recruited told De Soufian, and he was killed along with one in July 2013, according to a statement Volkskrant that he remained active as a other Dutch national. Abdurrahman by the Dutch fighters. recruiter even after 2005.35 He would is the most recent Dutch casualty in wait for young people to finish praying the Syrian conflict. De Ware Religie Alleged recruiters have received in the Turkish Mimar Sinan mosque in appeared to acquire the details on significant attention from the media Schilderswijk in The Hague, the parents Abdurrahman’s alleged activities from and the government in the Netherlands. alleged.36 Several parents said they a statement17 published by the Dutch- A 19-year-old woman from Zoetermeer, overheard Ofkeli speaking about the language Facebook page “Nederlandse known as Oum Usama, was suspected jihadist struggle and about conducting Mujahideen in Syrië” (Dutch Mujahidin of recruiting people to join the war in Syria).18 in Syria.25 Her arrest in July 2013

triggered a campaign in which Behind nl, August 26, 2013. 13 This estimate was from Abu Fidaa, who was inter- Bars and Sharia4Holland demanded her 28 Groen, “Ouders woedend op AIVD: wel ronselaars 26 viewed in Janny Groen, “Lees hier de onverkorte versie release. In August 2013, her Facebook voor Syrië.” van het interview met de Nederlandse jihadstrijders,” De page claimed that she had left the 29 Ibid. 27 Volkskrant, June 15, 2013. Netherlands for Syria. 30 “Ambtsbericht,” General Intelligence and Security 14 For one case, see “Tegengehouden Syriëganger voor Service of the Netherlands, August 27, 2007. de rechter,” De Volkskrant, July 31, 2013. contacts with fighters in Syria. The page is located at 31 “Five Suspects in Jihad Case Cleared of Charges,” De 15 These details were reported on the controversial web- www.facebook.com/pages/Nederlandse-Mujahideen- Volkskrant, October 31, 2007. site De Ware Religie in September 2013. For details, see in-Syri%C3%AB/142765595912474. 32 Ibid. Dutch authorities did not have sufficient grounds “Actueel Opnieuw martelaarschap voor Nederlandse 19 Janny Groen, “Nederlandse jihadist gedood in Syrië,” to convict him. For details on this case, see Janny Groen man in Syrië,” dewarereligie.nl, September 19, 2013. De Volkskrant, March 20, 2013. and Annieke Kranenberg, “Vrijspraak vijf verdachten 16 Ibid. 20 “‘Mourad was een goede jongen,’” NOS Journaal, jihadzaak,” De Volkskrant, October 31, 2007. 17 A PDF of the statement is available at www.app.box. March 20, 2013. 33 The Hofstad Group was a network of radical Islamic com/s/6o9ppnwafisatkpkxlcj. 21 Ibid. youth, 14 of whom were suspected of participation in ter- 18 The Facebook page “Nederlandse Mujahideen in 22 Ibid. rorist activities. The individual who killed Dutch artist Syrië” started in May 2013. It publishes pictures and 23 “Tweede Nederlandse jihadist gedood in Syrië,” Alge- Theo can Gogh was a member of this group. The group obituaries for Dutch fighters in Syria. It has also posted meen Dagblad, March 21, 2013. was founded in 2003 and it is listed as a terrorist organi- several pictures of a Dutch- and Arabic-language Qur’an 24 “Na Mourad Massali ook Sofian Elfassi: van voetbal- zation by the Dutch National Coordinator for Counterter- being held up in front of a pile of weapons (a picture that speler met een baardje tot jihadist,” Media Werkgroep rorism (NCTb) and the Council of the European Union. was not spread through any other source). It is unclear Syrië, March 21, 2013. 34 “Recherche arresteert zes ‘jihad-ronselaars,’” Elsevier, who runs the website, although some original postings 25 “Demonstratie voor vrijlating Zoetermeerse Oum November 7, 2006. of pictures and statements (such as obituaries) indicate Usama,” Omroep West, July 29, 2013. 35 Groen, “Ouders woedend op AIVD: wel ronselaars that either individuals in Syria are updating the page or 26 Ibid. voor Syrië.” that the people who run the Facebook page have good 27 “Oum Usama vertrokken naar Syrië,” dewarereligie. 36 Ibid.

8 october 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 10 attacks.37 Ofkeli was already banned together in the Netherlands.46 Anything Abu Fidaa. The non-secular rebels do from the As-Soennah Mosque in The more combat-specific than that is not not look at Syria in a vacuum; after Hague for his controversial behavior.38 possible, but at least this allows them to freeing Syria from Bashar al-Assad, In June 2013, Dutch media reported that be in adequate shape before arriving in he explained, they will help their Murat Ofkeli had died in Syria.39 Syria for more serious training.47 Palestinian brothers. According to Abu Fidaa, Azedine C. (also known as “Aboe Abu Fidaa explained that when a new Moussa”) is another name mentioned “brother” arrives in Syria, he receives We are not planning to return [to in three separate accounts of concerned training that lasts six weeks.48 After a the Netherlands]. Freeing Syria will parents.40 He is an active member of minimum of six weeks of training, one take a while. A true mujahid will the group Behind Bars.41 Azedine is a has the right to seek martyrdom.49 never be able to leave Syria…If we frequent commentator on the website According to Abu Fidaa, there are give up at any point, all our efforts De Ware Religie, where he has also daily meetings during which Dutch and the efforts of people before us published a statement regarding his “brothers” talk to each other and will have been for nothing. That is alleged recruitment of young Dutch receive news updates from fellow why it is so important to be honest Muslims to join the struggle in Syria. fighters who are able to speak and to cleanse your intentions He denied any form of brainwashing Arabic.50 Dutch fighters mix with during the jihad. Brothers from the and did not take or deny responsibility other nationalities to improve their Netherlands and Belgium feel good for facilitating their travel, but insisted integration into a strong jihadist here and they do not want to return. that these individuals were voluntarily community.51 Abu Fidaa, however, did The Armageddon will happen in committed to a just cause.42 not identify which rebel groups the this area and we do not want to miss Dutch fighters have primarily joined. this. The mujahidin who risked Activities in Syria their lives for this cause will not The leader and spokesperson of Dutch Although Abu Fidaa and the fighters accept anything else than Shari`a fighters in Syria, Abu Fidaa, gave a that surround him are reportedly for Syria. They will not make the critical interview to De Volkskrant in June located in Aleppo, this is not the mistake of replacing an unjust 2013.43 The interview is the single most only place where Dutch fighters are tyrant for another unjust tyrant.54 useful source for uncovering details based. According to Abu Fidaa, they about the activities of Dutch fighters are spread across the entire country. Abu Fidaa also addressed the biggest in Syria, even though it is difficult to The fighters attend classes by scholars concern for Dutch authorities: what verify the extent to which his account and “knowledgeable brothers.”52 They will these fighters do if they return to is true. Abu Fidaa stated that Dutch also take time to relax and swim, Europe or the Netherlands? “The media fighters do not leave for Syria without exercise or visit Dutch fighters in claims that Muslims who go to Syria preparation, although it is difficult other areas. The locals often invite the can be a danger to the Netherlands,” to adequately prepare for jihad in fighters over for dinner, during which Abu Fidaa acknowledged. “There is fear the Netherlands without drawing the the fighters tell Syrians about the for possible attacks in the Netherlands attention of the AIVD.44 He mentioned manner in which Muslims are treated when these people return. The opposite that in his case he would read American in the Netherlands—how they live is true, however.” He then said, “If and Chinese books about power and as a minority that is regarded with the West keeps stopping Muslims and warfare such as 48 Laws of Power and The contempt, as slaves under a capitalist making it difficult for them to go to Thirty-Six Stratagems of War, books which system.53 There are at least three Dutch Syria and other Islamic countries… were recommended to him by likeminded women in Syria, according to Abu Fidaa. then certain diligent Muslims—whose friends.45 For physical training, he These women joined their husbands conscience will bother them—will plan said, some “brothers” go out and jog when they decided to fight in Syria. attacks on Western soil. We advise the Dutch and other Western governments 37 Ibid. Abu Fidaa was confident that the to stop forming an obstacle for Muslims 38 “Recherche arresteert zes ‘jihad-ronselaars.’” jihadists in Syria have an excellent that wish to leave for those places in 55 39 “Derde Nederlandse Syriëganger gesneuveld,” Om- strategy. He claimed that they can easily need of help.” roep West, June 29, 2013. uncover a spy, and that their long- 40 Groen, “Ouders woedend op AIVD: wel ronselaars term vision gives them ideological and Conclusion voor Syrië.” strategic strength. This is the advantage Unfortunately, there is not enough 41 See the YouTube video of Azedine C., posted they have over secular groups, said data on fighters from the Netherlands by Behind Bars, available at www.youtube.com/ to draw meaningful conclusions watch?v=5N6gEsPvz2s&feature=c4-overview&list=UUj about what has driven them to make Jd66kwqfHotkOqKB3Rd0g. 46 Ibid. certain decisions, the extent to which 42 “‘Iedereen is schuldig, behalve wij!’” dewarereligie.nl, 47 Ibid. recruiters influenced their decisions May 7, 2013. 48 Ibid. and whether or not they will return 43 Janny Groen, “Interview met Nederlandse strijders 49 Ibid. to the Netherlands. For now, their in Syrië: ‘De jihad werkt therapeutisch,’” De Volkskrant, 50 Ibid. focus remains on Syria, although June 15, 2013. 51 Ibid. 44 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 55 Ibid.

9 october 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 10 the networks linked to them in Amman hotel bombings, a terrorist the Netherlands might prove to be Jordanian Jihadists Active attack that killed 60 people in Jordan in a more immediate threat in terms of in Syria 2005.5 Moreover, al-Zarqawi’s spiritual radicalization. mentor, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a By Suha Philip Ma’ayeh Jordanian citizen of Palestinian origin, Much of this is linked to broader is a prominent proponent of Salafi- political and societal developments in since the start of the rebellion against jihadism in Jordan.6 the Netherlands, such as the problems Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in that second and third generation 2011, Jordanian foreign fighters have The Jordanian government views immigrants face and the continuing traveled to Syria to fight with the Salafi-jihadis as extremists, and polarization of Dutch society. At the opposition. What began as a small tensions between the banned same time, the obstacles that these trickle of Jordanian militants has movement and the government are individuals confronted in Dutch society swelled as the conflict evolved from longstanding.7 In April 2011, for are memories they carry with them a popular uprising into a civil war example, 400 Salafi-jihadi protesters and share with their fellow jihadists of regional proportions. At the start demanded the release of prisoners and abroad.56 While Dutch territory is not of the uprising, Jordanian jihadists clashed with police—a demonstration the main battlefield for these fighters at viewed participation in the Syrian war that resulted in the stabbings of four this point in time, they carry grievances as a religious duty to fight against an policemen.8 Various reports suggest about the treatment of Muslims in the autocratic, Alawite regime. Their hope that support for Salafi-jihadis is gaining Netherlands. These grievances might is that the fall of al-Assad will result in ground in the Jordanian cities of Maan fuel frustration, and in time may prove the establishment of a Sunni Islamic and Zarqa, the latter of which was al- to be a threat to the Netherlands. This state. This conviction intensified as Zarqawi’s hometown.9 Tensions became is where the existing networks in the the war became increasingly sectarian. more pronounced as the war in Syria Netherlands and their radicalizing Galvanized by the involvement of Iran escalated. In January 2013, Jordanian potential must be understood, as their and Hizb Allah, and the subsequent King Abdullah warned that “the new actual connections to transnational calls for jihad against al-Assad by Sunni Taliban we are going to have to deal jihadist networks are unclear. clerics, Jordanian jihadists considered with are in Syria,” adding that it might it their obligation to defend Sunnis in take two years to clean up the “bad Samar Batrawi is an intern at the Syria.1 elements,” in reference to jihadists in Clingendael Institute for International Syria.10 Relations in The Hague. She has previously This article provides background on worked with the Women’s Centre for Legal Jordanian jihadists who have traveled to In October 2012, authorities foiled Aid and Counselling in Ramallah and fight in Syria. It finds that many of these a plot targeting Jordan. Jordanian the International Centre for the Study of militants have joined the al-Qa`ida- authorities arrested 11 Jordanians Radicalisation and Political Violence in linked rebel group Jabhat al-Nusra, a who were accused of plotting to London. She is the co-author of an analysis development that could threaten the bomb shopping malls and Western of online jihadist reactions to the Boston security of the Jordanian state.2 diplomatic missions in Amman, bombings, which appeared in Foreign using weapons and explosives Affairs. She has recently completed an MA at Jihadist Activity in Jordan smuggled into Jordan from Syria.11 King’s College London. All views expressed General estimates place the number The militants reportedly planned in this article are the author’s and do not of Salafi-jihadis3 in Jordan at a few to execute their attacks in stages.12 represent the Clingendael Institute. thousand, some of whom are veterans They first planned to target shopping of the recent wars in Afghanistan centers and foreigners in Jordanian and Iraq.4 Al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI), for example, was led by the prominent

Jordanian jihadist Abu Mus`ab al- 5 Hassan M. Fattah and Michael Slackman, “3 Hotels 56 These obstacles include socioeconomic marginaliza- Zarqawi. Al-Zarqawi, who was killed in Bombed in Jordan; At Least 57 Die,” New York Times, No- tion, discrimination against non-Western immigrants June 2006, was responsible for the triple vember 10, 2005. and the lack of a comprehensive integration plan for 6 Osama al-Sharif, “Rise of Local Salafist Jihadists Wor- non-Western minorities in Dutch society. Apart from 1 Omar Fahmy, “Sunni Clerics Call for Jihad Against ries Jordan’s Government,” al-Monitor, July 3, 2013. affecting the prospects of non-Western immigrants on Syria’s Assad, Allies,” Reuters, June 13, 2013; personal 7 Suha Philip Ma’ayeh, “Salafists Clash with Jordan Po- a socioeconomic level, these obstacles contribute to the interview, Mohammed al-Shalabi, a Jordanian Salafi- lice,” The National, April 16, 2011. more general climate of polarization and segregation in jihadi leader, August 9, 2013. 8 Ibid. the Netherlands, in which radical Islamism, and also the 2 Personal interview, Marwan Shehadeh, expert on Is- 9 Al-Sharif. far right, experiences a surge in popularity and activism. lamic groups, August 12, 2013; Tamer al-Samadi, “Jor- 10 Alistair Lyon and Suleiman al-Khalidi, “Jordan Stag- See the annual integration report of the Dutch Central dan’s Salafists Provide Lifeline to Syrian Opposition,” gers Under Fallout of Syria Conflict,” Reuters, February Bureau of Statistics for more information on the obstacles al-Monitor, April 23, 2013. 1, 2013. that non-Western immigrants face, available at www. 3 For the purposes of this article, Salafi-jihadis are de- 11 Ranya Kadri, “Jordan Says 11 Plotted a Series of At- cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/dossiers/allochtonen/pub- fined as Salafists who support the use of violence to tacks,” New York Times, October 21, 2012; Jamal Halaby, licaties/publicaties/archief/2012/2012-b61-pub.htm, as achieve their goals. “Jordan Says it Foils Al-Qaida-Linked Terror Plot,” Huff- well as the 2008 trend analysis by the Dutch government 4 Personal interview, Hasan Abu Hanieh, expert on Is- ington Post, October 21, 2012. called “Polarisation and Radicalisation.” lamic groups, August 13, 2013; Al-Samadi. 12 Ibid.

10 october 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 10 hotels.13 After those initial attacks, least 100 Jordanian jihadists have been bodied Muslim to support his brothers they wanted to execute more deadly killed in Syria.23 there.”30 attacks using powerful explosives on Western diplomatic missions and “vital It is not possible to identify the exact Al-Tahawi’s call to action is not an national sites.”14 Jordanian authorities number of Jordanian fighters in isolated occurrence. In the wake of identified some of the men as belonging Syria. Yet Mohammed al-Shalabi, a reports about Iran and Hizb Allah’s to the banned Salafi-jihadi movement Salafi-jihadi leader in Jordan, said role in defending the al-Assad regime, in Jordan.15 Abed Shehadeh al-Tahawi, between 700-800 Jordanians have other Sunni clerics called on Muslims who leads Jordan’s Salafi-jihadi joined the jihad in Syria.24 Al-Shalabi, to join the rebels in Syria.31 The Salafi- movement, told the Associated Press also known as “Abu Sayyaf,” told jihadi leader al-Shalabi said, “This that he “recognized at least half of the reporters, “As the battle to defend jihad is to defend Ahl al-Sunna [Sunni people shown on television…They are the Muslim nation from the Godless Islam]. It is obligatory. When the war members of my group, but they have regime of Assad continues, more are turned sectarian, it became a motive nothing to do with what is said to be willing to join the fight.” Other reports not only for members of the movement a ‘terror plot.’”16 Although some have place the number at 500.25 but also for the public at large to join expressed skepticism about the plot, the the mujahidin, especially after Hizb conflict in Syria has clearly stirred up Among those killed include Mahmoud Allah and Iran interfered.”32 Al-Qa`ida Jordan’s jihadist community.17 Abdul Al, the son-in-law of prominent chief Ayman al-Zawahiri also called on Salafi-jihadi shaykh Abu Muhammad Sunni Muslims to unite and join the war In September 2013, for example, al-Tahawi. Abdul Al blew himself up in Syria.33 Jordanian authorities acted again, in Deraa in October 2012.26 In a video jailing five Jordanian Salafi-jihadis commemorating his son-in-law’s death In the early months of the war, for trying to join Jabhat al-Nusra.18 produced by the jihadist website Jordanian jihadists crossed the border In total, Jordanian authorities have Ma’asada, al-Tahawi called for the in the southern Syrian provinces of arrested approximately 68 individuals reestablishment of the caliphate, and Deraa and Reef Damascus.34 They in connection with the war in Syria, 47 of urged Salafi-jihadis to rise and defend also had a presence in the eastern and whom are facing trial in a state security themselves against the enemies of western areas of Syria, including Deir court.19 Islam.27 He was also blunt in his al-Zour, Aleppo and Homs.35 Hasan support for Jabhat al-Nusra.28 Al- Abu Hanieh, an expert on Islamic Jordanian Jihadists in Syria Tahawi spoke about a fatwa he issued groups, argued that the Jordanian Security is tight on the Jordan-Syria stipulating that it is the responsibility government at first turned a blind eye border, but it is believed that authorities of any good Muslim to stop the bloodshed to the flow of Jordanian jihadists in turned a blind eye in the early months perpetrated by the Alawite regime in Syria, hoping that jihadists in Jordan of the revolution, which made it Syria.29 In an interview, al-Tahawi would enter Syria and die there.36 Yet as easier for jihadists to enter Syria.20 In said that “Muslims in Syria have been the civil war continued, the Jordanian February 2013, for example, the Jordan oppressed by Assad’s brutal and government began to harden its 230- Times reported the death of a 17-year- barbaric regime; therefore, according mile border with Syria, arresting dozens old Jordanian who was fighting with to Islam, it is obligatory for any able- of jihadists trying to enter the war-torn Jabhat al-Nusra in Deraa.21 In August country, and foiled attempts to smuggle 2013, al-Ghad reported the death of a arms from Syria into Jordan.37 These 29-year-old Jordanian jihadist in Deraa Killed in Syria,” al-Ghad, August 4, 2013. border restrictions prompted Jordanian who was also fighting with Jabhat al- 23 Al-Shalabi made statements to the local media on jihadists to travel to Turkey before Nusra.22 Thus far, it is estimated that at Salafi-jihadis who were killed, their names and from entering Syria from the north.38 The which city they came. Also see Muwaffaq Kamal, “10 Turkish-Syria border has been used 13 Ibid. Salafists Enter Aleppo Through Turkey,” al-Ghad, Octo- by hundreds of other jihadists who 14 Ibid. ber 7, 2013; Muwaffaq Kamal, “The Salafi Jihadi Denies flocked from Libya, Tunisia, Lebanon, 15 Ibid. Mohammad al-Najjar, “Jordan Dismantles a Cell Establishing a Murabitoon Brigade,” al-Ghad, September That Planned Quality Operations,” al-Jazira, October 21, 23, 2013. 2012. 24 Personal interview, Mohammed al-Shalabi, a Jorda- 30 Murad Batal al-Shishani, “Syria Emerges as a New 16 Ibid. nian Salafi-jihadi leader, August 9, 2013; “Teenage Jor- Battlefield for Jordan’s Jihadists,” Terrorism Monitor 11:1 17 Suleiman al-Khalidi, “Syrian Jihadist Spillover Haunts danian ‘Jihadist’ Killed in Syria.” (2013). Jordan,” Reuters, October 28, 2013. 25 “Teenage Jordanian ‘Jihadist’ Killed in Syria.” 31 Fahmy. 18 “Jordan Fights Wave of Syria Jihad With Heavy Jail 26 Murad Batal al-Shishani, “Jordan’s Jihadists Drawn to 32 Personal interview, Mohammed al-Shalabi, a Jorda- Sentences,” Middle East Online, September 23, 2013. Syria Conflict,” BBC, October 29, 2012. nian Salafi-jihadi leader, August 9, 2013. 19 Personal interview, Musa Abdullat, legal representa- 27 This video is available at www.youtube.com/ 33 “Qaeda Leader Urges Muslims to Fight in Syria,” al- tive and defense attorney for Salafi-jihadis, August 18, watch?v=Mu5GD1eaRTA. Arabiya, June 6, 2013. 2013. 28 “Jordanian Salafi-Jihadi Leader Abu Muhammad Al- 34 Personal interview, Hasan Abu Hanieh, expert on Is- 20 Personal interview, Hasan Abu Hanieh, expert on Tahawi: ‘America, You Are The Main Target On The lamic groups, August 13, 2013. Islamic groups, August 13, 2013. Mujahideen’s Agenda,’” Middle East Media Research 35 Ibid. 21 “Teenage Jordanian ‘Jihadist’ Killed in Syria,” Jordan Institute, December 30, 2012. 36 Ibid. Times, February 28, 2013. 29 Mona Alami, “Calls for Jihad Split Salafist Move- 37 Ibid. 22 Hassan Tammimi, “Jordanian Salafi from Rusaifa ment,” Inter Press Service, June 3, 2013. 38 Kamal, “10 Salafists Enter Aleppo Through Turkey.”

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Iraq, Turkey, Europe, Chechnya and Gelebeb was the amir of Jabhat al-Nusra Jordanian Salafi-jihadi sympathizers elsewhere.39 in Damascus and Derra, although he appear to be growing, or at least was thought to have died in December becoming more vocal, and the The Militant Group of Choice: Jabhat al-Nusra 2012.48 Yet subsequent reports suggest movement seems to be gaining The vast majority of Jordanian he was only injured, and returned to ground in Maan and Zarqa.55 Jihadist jihadists in Syria appear to be fighting the fighting after receiving medical black flags have been spotted in for Jabhat al-Nusra, according treatment in Turkey.49 Maan where citizens increasingly to al-Shalabi.40 Reports of their complain of being marginalized by the participation were also revealed in After Abu Gelebeb’s injury, Mustafa Jordanian government.56 There are also an article by al-Monitor, translated Abdul Latif, another Jordanian, frustrations with the lack of genuine from al-Hayat, stating that the Salafist reportedly took charge of the southern political reforms, soaring poverty and community in Jordan serves as a lifeline front in Jabhat al-Nusra.50 Latif, also unemployment.57 for Jabhat al-Nusra in southern Syria.41 known as Abu Anas al-Sahaba, was The report said that jihadists in Syria close to al-Zarqawi and fought in the Contrary to some claims that al- “rely on gangs that smuggle weapons Islamic State of Iraq; he was in charge Qa`ida’s influence has been weakened and people into hot fighting zones in of a services office for jihadists arriving by the Arab Spring, Hanieh, the exchange for amounts ranging from in Syria to fight in Iraq.51 Al-Sahaba expert on Islamic groups in Jordan, $600 to $900 per person, in addition has been operating in Syria since the argued that there is evidence that to the fees imposed on weapons, which beginning of the revolution, and he has al-Qa`ida has benefited from the exceed $400 per gun.”42 played a significant role in recruiting lack of successful transition toward and attracting fighters to Jabhat al- democracy in some countries.58 The The report also said that Jordanian Nusra.52 military coup that overthrew the jihadists—who have experience in Muslim Brotherhood-led government conflicts such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Conclusion in Egypt has only helped to bolster Chechnya and Yemen—lead prominent The war in Syria has drawn jihadists al-Qa`ida’s narrative. As a recent military brigades in Jabhat al-Nusra. from all over the world, including from report from al-Monitor warned, “As the Two Jordanians of Palestinian origin Jordan. The rise of Jabhat al-Nusra and influence of the Brotherhood recedes, who hail from the city of Zarqa, the its appeal among Jordanian jihadists especially after recent events in Egypt, hometown of Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi, will likely present a challenge for the role of Salafist jihadists will increase helped establish the Nusra Shura Jordanian authorities, especially if al- in the region. Jordan will soon find council with Abu Muhammad al-Julani, Qa`ida and its allies continue to expand itself in the epicenter of this emerging the head of Jabhat al-Nusra.43 These two their presence in Syria. phenomenon.”59 militants—Iyad Toubasi and Mustafa Abdul Latif—were among the senior The Jordanian jihadist al-Shalabi Suha Philip Ma’ayeh is a freelance leadership of al-Qa`ida in Iraq.44 They assured that Jordan is not a target journalist based in Amman, Jordan. She were active in Syria since the beginning for militants. Jihadists, he said, will writes news, analysis and features mainly of the war and immediately started only target a regime if it attacks its about Jordanian politics, the Syrian operating without publicizing their own people.53 Nevertheless, there is a crisis and refugees. Her work has been presence.45 heightened sense of anxiety in Jordan published in the Wall Street Journal over jihadist groups, and the Jordanian and Foreign Policy. She is a frequent Iyad Toubasi, also known as Abu authorities have arrested dozens of contributor to The National, an English- Gelebeb, is married to Abu Mus`ab al- suspected militants, including key language daily based in Abu Dhabi. Zarqawi’s sister.46 He fought with al- figures in the Salafist movement.54 Zarqawi in Afghanistan and Iraq.47 Abu

39 Personal interview, Hasan Abu Hanieh, expert on Is- lamic groups, August 13, 2013. 40 Personal interview, Mohammed al-Shalabi, a Jor- danian Salafi-jihadi leader, August 9, 2013; Lyon and 48 Al-Samadi. al-Khalidi. 49 Ibid. Personal interview, Hasan Abu Hanieh, expert 41 Al-Samadi. on Islamic groups, August 13, 2013; personal interview, 42 Ibid. Marwan Shehadeh, expert on Islamic groups, August 12, 55 Al-Sharif; Suha Philip Ma’ayeh, “Resentment Rises 43 Ibid. Personal interview, Hasan Abu Hanieh, expert 2013. Towards Jordan’s Leaders in Poverty-hit South,” The Na- on Islamic groups, August 13, 2013; personal interview, 50 Al-Samadi. tional, January 21, 2013. Marwan Shehadeh, expert on Islamic groups, August 12, 51 Personal interview, Marwan Shehadeh, expert on Is- 56 Personal observations, Maan, December 2012; 2013. lamic groups, August 12, 2013. Ma’ayeh, “Resentment Rises Towards Jordan’s Leaders 44 Personal interview, Hasan Abu Hanieh, expert on 52 Ibid. in Poverty-hit South.” Islamic groups, August 13, 2013. 53 Personal interview, Mohammed al-Shalabi, a Jorda- 57 Sean L. Yom, “Jordan in the Balance: Evaluating Re- 45 Ibid. nian Salafi-jihadi leader, August 9, 2013. gime Stability,” CTC Sentinel 6:1 (2013). 46 Al-Samadi. 54 Personal interview, Musa Abdullat, legal representa- 58 Personal interview, Hasan Abu Hanieh, expert on Is- 47 Ibid. Personal interview, Marwan Shehadeh, expert tive and defense attorney for Salafi-jihadis, August 18, lamic groups, August 13, 2013. on Islamic groups, August 12, 2013. 2013. 59 Al-Sharif.

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The Islamic Movement In recent years, Iran’s Quds Force3 and The IMN exploits this extremist-prone Lebanese Hizb Allah have coordinated environment to extend its message to and Iranian Intelligence intelligence gathering on U.S. and Shi`a and Sunnis, including members Activities in Nigeria Israeli targets in Nigeria and engaged in who joined movements such as Boko weapons and drug trafficking in West Haram.6 By Jacob Zenn Africa with operatives drawn from Nigeria’s Shi`a community. The Iranian Radicalization in Northern Nigeria: Iran and since the islamic revolution in 1979, government also maintains ties with an the IMN Iran has promoted “Khomeinism”1 influential religious group called the Iran’s main advocate in Nigeria is the as one of its foreign policy tools in Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN). The IMN’s leader, Ibrahim al-Zakzaky. the Muslim world. Despite Nigeria’s rhetoric and actions of the IMN’s leading Al-Zakzaky graduated from Ahmadu geographic and cultural distance from imams and former members add fuel to Bello University in Zaria, Kaduna in Iran, there is no region outside of the the hot mix of Islamic fundamentalist the 1970s, where he led the Muslim Middle East where Iran’s ideology movements that emerged in northern Students’ Society and then Nigeria’s has a greater impact than in northern Nigeria after the 1970s. Muslim Brotherhood in the early Nigeria. Nigeria’s pro-Iranian Shi`a 1980s.7 During the Cold War period, al- Muslim community was virtually non- This article analyzes the activities of existent 30 years ago but now comprises the IMN, the Quds Force, and Hizb question whether Nigeria is a “democracy” or a “selec- about five percent of Nigeria’s 80 Allah in Nigeria and West Africa. tocracy,” “petrocracy,” or “kleptocracy.” The ineffective- 2 million Muslims. It finds that the Zaria, Kaduna- ness and corruption of Nigerian democracy are reasons based IMN’s charismatic leadership why the IMN and other Islamist movements, such as 1 According to one scholar’s definition, Khomeinism is and northern Nigeria’s attraction to Boko Haram, have opposed democracy. In a September “a form of Third World political populism—a radical but revivalist Islam enables Iran to spread 25, 2013, video statement, for example, Boko Haram pragmatic middle-class movement that strives to enter, “Khomeinism” in Nigeria, including its leader Abubakar Shekau said, “The concept of govern- rather than reject, the modern age…a militant, some- antagonism towards the United States ment of the people, by the people, for the people cannot 4 times contradictory, political ideology that focuses not and the West. Kaduna, which is the continue to exist. It shall soon, very soon, be replaced by on issues of scripture and theology but on the immedi- political center of northern Nigeria, Government of Allah, by Allah, for Allah.” See Godwin ate political, social, and economic grievances of workers has experienced increased Muslim- Etakibuebu, “This Nigerian Democracy is Really Going and the middle class…[Khomeini] has systematically Christian violence, unemployment, and Crazy,” Vanguard, September 24, 2013; Prince Osuagwu manipulated history to bolster the clergy’s reputation as anti-Western sentiment since Nigeria and Vincent Ujummadu, “What We Practice in Nigeria champions of the downtrodden and as defenders against restored democracy in 1999 and 12 is Selectocracy – Prof Mojekwu,” Vanguard, March 29, foreign powers.” Although Khomeinism is often associ- northern states adopted modified 2011; Tina Rosenberg, “The Perils of Petrocracy,” New 5 ated with Shi’ism and support for Iran, it has also been versions of Shari`a (Islamic law). York Times, November 4, 2007; Ekanem Ekop, “Klep- accepted without a Shi`a or Iranian connotation. For tocracy as Nigeria’s Albatross,” Nigerian Tribune, July example, Sunni Syrians in the Muslim Brotherhood in four million or more. Nigerian Shi`a who are not mem- 3, 2013; “Boko Haram’s Shekau Appears in Video Af- the early 1980s looked up to Khomeini until he made the bers of the IMN may be unaffiliated with any movement ter Death Claims,” Vanguard, September 25, 2013; Tom “irreparable mistake” of supporting Syrian leader Hafiz or members of the Rasulul A’azam Foundation (RAAF). Ashby, “Christians Say Islamic Extremism on Rise in al-Assad even after al-Assad’s crackdown on the Syr- RAAF is led by Shaykh Muhammad Nura Dass and is Nigeria,” Reuters, April 17, 2004. ian rebellion in 1982. Similarly, those who embrace the strongest in Gombe and Bauchi. RAAF, which split from 6 The Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab is, for Islamic Movement in Nigeria’s brand of Khomeinism the IMN in 1992, rejects IMN’s confrontational attitude example, a likely byproduct of this extremism-prone need not be Shi`a or Iranian, since the doctrine is in- toward the government, argues that the Nigerian secu- environment. He attended anti-American sermons in tended to transcend sect and nationality. Khomeini said lar state is legitimate and must be obeyed, and focuses on mosques in Kaduna years before he trained with al- in 1980, “We do not worship Iran, we worship Allah; for Shi`a doctrine and ritual. In contrast to the IMN, whose Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to detonate patriotism is another name for paganism. I say let this inspiration comes from Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini, explosives on a Detroit-bound plane on Christmas Day land [Iran] burn. I say let this land go up in smoke, pro- RAAF is similar to Iraq’s leading Shi`a cleric, Ayatollah 2009. His neighbor in Kaduna said, “For 30 years, there vided Islam emerges triumphant in the rest of the world.” Ali al-Sistani, who believes politicians should run eco- has been violence here. People like Farouk grew up in Since Khomeini’s death in 1989, however, his successors nomic affairs, day-to-day politics and foreign relations, this atmosphere. I don’t think all his radical ideas came have tried to “rebrand Khomeini as an iconic patriot” to while the clerics should limit themselves to spiritual and from Yemen.” The Boko Haram breakaway faction, “strengthen the image of the Islamic Republic.” See Ras- religious matters in which the politicians cannot pass Ansaru, which was closely connected to affiliates of al- mus Christian Elling, Minorities in Iran: Nationalism and sound judgment. See Farouk Umar and Estelle Shirbon, Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), also formed its Ethnicity After Khomeini (London: Palgrave Macmillan, “Tensions Between Muslims Simmer in Nigerian City,” firstshura council in Zaria, Kaduna, in 2011. See “Arrests 2013); Umar Abdallah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria Reuters, March 19, 2008. Follow Kaduna Clashes,” BBC, November 5, 2001; Adam (Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press, 1983); Ervand Abrahamian, 3 The Quds Force is a special unit of Iran’s Islamic Revo- Nossiter, “Lonely Trek to Radicalism for Terror Suspect,” Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (Berkeley, CA: lutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) that is tasked with “extra- New York Times, January 16, 2010. University of California Press, 1993). territorial operations.” 7 Nigeria’s Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood) 2 Reuters reported in 2008 that “Shi`a Islam was almost 4 Muhammad Sani Umar, “Education and Islamic was an offshoot of the Muslim Students’ Society and a Ni- unknown in Nigeria until the early 1980s when Muslim Trends in Northern Nigeria: 1970s to 1990s,” Africa To- gerian version of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. Accord- radical Ibrahim Zakzaky, fired by the Iranian revolution, day 48:2 (2001); Ahmad Dallal, “The Origins and Objec- ing to its website, “The Muslim Students’ Society of Nige- campaigned for an Islamic government and stricter ad- tives of Islamic Revivalist Thought, 1750-1850,” Journal ria (MSSN) was founded in Lagos, Nigeria on 18th April, herence to Sharia, or Islamic law.” The IMN estimates its of the American Oriental Society 113:3 (1993). 1954, in response to the yearnings of Muslim students for followers (it does not have formal “membership”) at three 5 Although Nigeria has been under civilian rule and a platform to discuss and find solutions to their common million, while other estimates range from one million to held democratic elections since 1999, many scholars problems and challenges, especially in the face of hostile

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Zakzaky was known for preaching Islam downplayed the IMN’s “Shi`a” image, station called Shuhada (the martyrs), as an alternative model to socialism choosing instead to portray it as an an al-Zakzaky Facebook page, and an and capitalism and leading rallies “Islamic movement.”13 IMN website with faces of Khomeini, where followers burned Nigeria’s Khamenei and al-Zakzaky on every constitution to protest secularism and Today, the IMN, which is commonly page.19 As in previous years, al-Zakzaky supported Iran’s Islamic revolution in known in Nigeria as “the Shi`a” (despite visited Iranian centers of Shi`a 1979.8 After traveling to Iran in 1980, al-Zakzaky’s attempts to portray it as scholarship in Qom and Mashhad in al-Zakzaky adopted the symbolism non-sectarian), is Africa’s largest Shi`a 2012 and met dozens of IMN members and rhetoric of Shi`a Iranian leader movement.14 It has reportedly mobilized studying in Iran.20 He also visited Ayatollah Khomeini on top of the more than one million people for Shi`a Lebanon, where he received a red flag ideology of the late Sunni Egyptian religious events and 50,000 people from Karbala, Iraq’s Shi`a shrine of Muslim Brotherhood founder, Hasan for political rallies where Khomeini Imam Husayn, as a gift from Nasrallah, al-Banna, and Muslim Brotherhood and his successor, Ali Khamenei, and and Iraq, where he prayed at Najaf’s thought leader, Sayyid Qutb.9 Al- Hizb Allah leader Hassan Nasrallah are Shi`a shrine of Imam Ali.21 Zakzaky then founded the IMN and went revered, while flags of the “Great Satan on “recruitment tours” to northern [the United States]”15 and Israel are Although a former Iranian diplomat Nigerian universities to showcase burned.16 The IMN also has hundreds described the IMN as an “Iranian the Iranian revolution.10 In between of paramilitary guards called hurras,17 proxy,”22 the IMN claims it only receives periods of imprisonment in the mid- a Hausa language18 newspaper that “simple handouts” from its members.23 1980s, al-Zakzaky converted to Shi`a honors IMN “martyrs,” a Hausa radio Nonetheless, evidence shows the IMN Islam and transformed the IMN from largely serves as an extension of Iranian student activism to a mass movement 13 Ayatollah Khomeini also “downplayed” the Iranian foreign policy in Nigeria, especially in that called for “a second jihad” to Revolution’s “Shi`a” image. According to Vali Nasr, spreading “Khomeinism” among the 11 implement Shari`a in Nigeria. He also “[Khomeini] posed as a champion of Islamic revival, and country’s Muslims. declared Nigeria’s secular government presented the Iranian revolution as the Islamic revolu- unfit to rule and the traditional Sunni tion that the Sunni thinkers of the Muslim Brotherhood Gateway to Radicalism leadership of Nigeria, including the and Jamaat-e Islami had been claiming was necessary if Although the IMN does not promote sultan of Sokoto and Sufi brotherhoods, Islam’s fortunes were to be restored… His anti-American- violence, its imams preach that the guilty of siding with the government ism had roots in Iranian history but was in many regards West conspires to “dominate minds and to “protect their offices and worldly a byproduct of his ambition to be recognized as the leader resources” of Muslims by converting 12 possessions.” Al-Zakzaky, however, of all Muslims, to find a cause that would unite Shias and them to Christianity and secularizing Sunnis under his cloak.” See Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: them, Jews are the “lowest creatures colonial and evangelical environment then prevalent in How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future (New on earth” and the “children of monkeys 24 the country.” York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006), pp. 136-138. and pigs,” the West fabricated the 8 Ibrahim Usman, “Zakzaky - Ahmadu Bello Univer- 14 The term for “Shi`a” in Hausa is “Yan Shi`a.” 9/11 attacks on the United States, and sity’s Last Alumnus Standing,” Daily Trust, December 5, 15 The term “Great Satan” is a derogatory epithet for the the Nigerian government created Boko 2012; Muhammad Dahiru Sulaiman, “Shiaism and the United States that was first used by Ayatollah Khomeini Haram to justify Western-Christian Islamic Movement in Nigeria 1979-1991,” in Ousmane in a speech on November 5, 1979. Al-Zakzaky also uses “occupation” of the Muslim world 25 Kane and Jean-Louis Triaud eds., Islam et Islamismes au the term to refer to the United States. and northern Nigeria. This rhetoric sud du Sahara (Paris: Karthala, 1998). 16 The IMN leader in Yobe, Mustapha Lawan Nasidi, appeals to broad sectors of Nigeria’s 9 Al-Zakzaky said, “The Islamic Awakening started estimated that the February 20, 2011, Mawlid celebra- Muslim population, including Sunnis. when Allah blessed this Ummah with people like Shaykh tion in Zaria had two million youths in attendance, while For example, at more than 10 IMN- Hasan al-Bana, Maududi, Sayyid Qutb and Imam other witnesses observed that Nasidi may have exagger- led protests over the U.S.-made film Khomeini…But above all, the last two made the greatest ated the number, but there was still a continuous line impact. Sayyid Qutb made his impact ideologically, for of youths for two kilometers along roads leading to the 19 For al-Zakzaky’s Facebook page, see www.facebook. he was executed by the tyrants before he could realize his main square. See Samuel Aruwan, “Anti-Islam Film: com/sayyidzakzaky. For the IMN’s website, see www. theory. As for Imam Khomeini, he is a unique personal- 50,000 Shiites Protest in Zaria,” Blueprinting, Septem- islamicmovement.org. ity in the history of mankind…This is partly because the ber 21, 2012. 20 For al-Zakzaky’s visit to Iran, see www.islamicmove- Islamic revolution in Iran came at a time when all hopes 17 According to the IMN’s website, “The Guards or hur- ment.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl were almost lost.” See “The Islamic Awakening: Islamic ras is a wing in the movement responsible for ensuring e&id=298:pictures-of-sheikh-zakzakys-visit-to-some- Struggle, Correct Path to Lasting Success,” Islamicmove- proper arrangement, providing security to the members places-inside-iran&catid=41:frontpage. ment.org, undated. of the movement during normal activities and events 21 Photos of al-Zakzaky’s visits to Lebanon and Iraq are 10 Alexander Thurston, “Interactions Between Northern that are being carried out at different times.” One analyst available at www.islamicmovement.org. Nigeria and the Arab World in the Twentieth Century,” who has researched the IMN extensively told this author 22 Dan Brett, “Profile of an African Hezbollah,” Middle Georgetown University Masters Thesis, 2009. that “the hurras are not officially armed yet. They do not East Strategic Information, January 25, 2009. 11 Roman Loimeier, Islamic Reform and Political Change in display arms because this would certainly compel secu- 23 “Re-Insecurity: The Middle East Factor,” Islamic- Northern Nigeria (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University rity forces to confront them, but they are a uniformed, movement.org, June 20, 2013. Press, 1997), p. 299. regimented organization modeled on the Revolutionary 24 “Highlight of Sheikh Zakzaky’s Speech,” July 1, 12 Dauda Nalado, “Islamic Authority Would be Estab- Guard that carries Hizb Allah’s flag as their emblem.” 2008, available at www.sharqeyah.us/vb/showthread. lished in Nigeria,” Islamicmovement.org, September 22, 18 Hausa is the lingua franca in northern Nigeria and php?p=238378&langid=1. 2010; Karl Maier, This House Has Fallen (London: Pen- seen as a language of the masses, as opposed to English, 25 Agaju Madbuga, “Boko Haram Creation of the West – guin Books, 2000). which is the language of the elite. Zakzaky,” Daily Champion, September 6, 2011.

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Innocence of Muslims in August 2012, allegedly by the IMN in revenge for the for the Revival of Islam, JTI).37 JTI most participants were neither IMN cleric’s support of the crackdown on the was a Kano-based IMN breakaway members nor Shi`a and never saw the IMN in 2005.31 Al-Zakzaky, however, group founded in 1994 that continued film, but were persuaded by the IMN’s claimed the IMN was framed to justify al-Zakzaky’s confrontational stance message.26 Boko Haram also capitalized ousting the IMN from Sokoto.32 In 2012, toward the government but through on the upsurge in anti-American al-Zakzaky again accused Nigerian Salafist doctrine and whose members sentiment by issuing a widely viewed security forces of a plot to assassinate reportedly carried out the beheading YouTube video in which its leader, the IMN’s imam in Yobe, Mustapha of the Christian trader in Kano.38 In Abubakar Shekau, promised retaliation Lawan Nasidi, while Nasidi was 2002, Yusuf founded Ahl al-Sunna against “evil plotters of the blasphemous leading prayers, but the attack failed wa al-Jama`a (Companions of the film.”27 insofar as it killed Nasidi’s brother, Prophet), which was known locally as driver, and two people seated near the “Nigerian Taliban” or “Yusufiya” The IMN’s rhetoric has in some cases him.33 When Israeli Foreign Affairs (Followers of Yusuf), and became the translated into violence. In 1991, an Minister Avigdor Lieberman visited Borno representative on the Supreme IMN imam in Katsina (who also spoke at Abuja in 2009, al-Zakzaky said that Council for Shari`a in Nigeria.39 In film protests in 2012), Yakubu Yahaya, Nigerian security forces targeted the July 2009, the Nigerian security forces whose hero was Khomeini, led hundreds IMN for Israel because “Iran is waxing killed Yusuf and 1,000 of his followers, of IMN members in an attack on the stronger in Nigeria through me, and this office of the Daily Times newspaper after is why they want to attack us, to finally 37 It is certain that Yusuf, who was a native of Yobe it portrayed the Prophet Muhammad in slay the growing Iranian influence and State and acquired religious prominence in Yobe and 28 34 a cartoon marrying a prostitute. In the our movement.” Borno, would have come into contact with IMN leaders 2000s, the IMN clashed most frequently in Yobe. IMN has a well-established presence in Potis- with Sunnis in Sokoto, which is the In several cases, IMN members have kum, Yobe’s capital, where Mustapha Lawan Nasidi is seat of the sultan of Sokoto and where been radicalized in the movement but the leading IMN imam. In one of Yusuf’s sermons from Nigerian intelligence reported that IMN then formed or joined more violent 2009, he also said, “Muslims are very divided, some 35 established training camps for recruits groups. One example was when a fight as Shi`a, others as Sufi and others as a mixture of 29 from across northern Nigeria. In 2005, mob of former IMN members turned everything…We had Sunni groups that started as Mus- IMN imams sought leadership positions Salafi-jihadists publicly beheaded a lim Brothers, but ended up turning into a Shi`a sect. in mosques in Sokoto, which led to Christian Igbo trader in Kano in 1994 Another group also emerged called Jama’atu Izalatul 30 36 violence between Sunni and Shi`a. In for allegedly desecrating the Qur’an. Bid’a wa Ikamatu Sunna, but they all ended up work- 2007, Nigerian security forces destroyed According to a prominent Zaria-based ing with the government. In fact some of their members the IMN’s headquarters in Sokoto and Salafist imam and Nigerian scholars, embraced democracy and even became chairmen and arrested an IMN imam after a Sunni Boko Haram founder Muhammad Yusuf councilors of local government areas. This indeed is no cleric was assassinated at a mosque also met and followed al-Zakzaky religion at all.” Terje Østebø also wrote that Yusuf was before Yusuf became Borno State amir of “a self-educated activist, inspired by the Islamist Mus- 26 These reports come from eyewitnesses to the protests. Jama`at al-Tajdid al-Islami (Movement lim Students’ Society of Nigeria (MSSN), formed in 1954, See Muhammad Nur Alkali, Abubakar Kawu Monguno, and in particular Ibrahim al-Zakzaki.” See Terje Østebø, and Ballama Shettima Mustafa, “Overview Of Islamic “Islamic Militancy in Africa,” Africa Center for Strategic Actors in Northeastern Nigeria,” University of Oxford, 31 “Nigerian Clash Over Cleric Death,” BBC, July 19, Studies, November 2012; Abimbola Adesoji, “The Boko January 2012. 2007. Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria,” Af- 27 Aminu Abubakar, “Boko Haram Chief Issues Video 32 Ibid. rica Spectrum, 2010; “Who Are the Boko Harams, Part Threat Over Anti-Islam Film,” Agence France-Presse, 33 Nasidi gained popularity in 2006 when he led the I,” naijainfoman.wordpress.com, June 24, 2012; “Shekh October 1, 2012. protests against the Danish cartoons depicting the Albani Speaks On Boko Haram,” Sunday Trust, January 28 Twenty-one years later, in 2012, This Day media hous- Prophet Muhammad in a satirical way. See “Yan Uwa 1, 2012; Ousmane Kane, Muslim Modernity in Postcolonial es in Abuja and Kano were attacked by suicide bombers Uku Ne Suka Yi Shahada Sakamakon Harin Da Sojoji Nigeria (Leiden: Brill, 2003). connected to Boko Haram in revenge for portraying the Suka Kai Markaz a Potiskum,” Harkar Musulunci, May 38 Tahir Haliru Gwoza, “Activities of Islamic Civic As- Prophet Muhammad satirically in a cartoon that it pub- 29, 2012, available at www.harkarmusulunci.org/data. sociations in the Northwest of Nigeria: With Particular lished in 2001. See Loimeier, Islamic Reform and Political asp?id=102535&lang=1. Reference to Kano State,” Africa Spectrum, 2003; Mark Change in Northern Nigeria, p. 300; Toyin Falola, Violence 34 Ibraheem Musa and Isa Liman, “Police Set to Sack Bray, Universal Primary Education in Nigeria: A Study of in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics & Secular Ide- Shiites,” Daily Trust, September 11, 2009. Kano State (London, Boston and Henley: Routledge & ologies (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 35 Umar and Shirbon. Kegan Paul, 1981). 1998). 36 Etanibi Alemika and Festus Okoye, “Ethno-Religious 39 Yusuf also reportedly belonged to the Izala movement 29 Segun Olatunji, “Arms Stockpiling: Kaduna Police Conflicts and Democracy in Nigeria: Challenges. Kaduna, for a period of time in the 2000s until he broke away Boss, Islamic Sect on War Path,” Punch, March 19, 2009. Nigeria,” Human Rights Monitor, 2002; Adamolekun from Izala because he believed the movement became 30 Sunnis alleged that Shi`a were disrespecting the sul- Taiye, “Religious Fanaticism and Fundamentalism in too close to the Nigerian government and “tolerant of tan of Sokoto and that al-Zakzaky was fueling the crisis Nigeria Since 1980: A Historical Perspective,” British other Islamic tendencies.” See Nosa James-Igbinadolor, for personal gain, while Shi`a alleged the sultan was Journal of Arts and Social Sciences 9:2 (2012); Karl Maier, “Why We Must Fight And Win This War Against The behind the attacks on Shi`a and that Sunnis started the “Beheading Stirs Nigerian Tension,” Independent, August Zealots,” Sahara Reporters, October 8, 2013; Bestman conflict by violently breaking up a Shi`a Ashura proces- 16, 1995; Jamalah, “Did Gideon Akaluka Really Desecrate Wellington, “Nigeria and the Threat of al-Qaeda Terror- sion. See Musa Umar Kauzare and Aminu Mohammed, The Holy Qur’an? A Contrarian Muslim Review,” Naira- ism,” Terrorism Monitor 6:12 (2008); Bayo Oladeji et al., “Sokoto Sectarian Clash: Matters Arising,” Daily Trust, land, April 26, 2011; Tajudeen Suleiman, “The Plot to Is- “Boko Haram Picks Datti Ahmed as Mediator,” Leader- June 17, 2005. lamise Nigeria,” Tell, November 30, 1990. ship, March 14, 2012.

15 october 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 10 who were by then known as “Boko United States and its allies; comparing believable that a former Boko Haram Haram” because of the radical teachings their conflict against the Nigerian member interviewed in August 2013 of Yusuf and his deputy, Abubakar government to conflicts between the claimed he was a member of an “Islamic Shekau (“Boko Haram” means “Western United States and Muslims in Iraq, movement” called “the Shi`a” that sent education is sinful” in Hausa). In July Afghanistan and Pakistan; viewing the members to Iran for training before he 2010, Shekau announced that he secular state as “illegitimate”; blaming joined a Boko Haram faction in Kaduna succeeded Yusuf, and he formed the the “corrupt” government for poverty of that attacked Christians and security Salafi-jihadi group Jama`at Ahl al- the masses while proposing an Islamic forces.45 Sunna li al-Da`wa wa al-Jihad (Sunni system as the solution; claiming Usman Group for Preaching and Jihad), which dan Fodio’s legacy (while condemning The Quds Force and Hizb Allah: has continued to be known as “Boko Dan Fodio’s heirs, such as the sultan Recent Operations Haram” since it began waging an armed of Sokoto)43; exploiting sensitive issues Iran’s Quds Force and Hizb Allah’s insurgency in September 2010. to Muslims; and targeting northern global operations have involved Nigeria’s unemployed youths for Nigeria for more than a decade, Yusuf and Sunni leaders of JTI and membership. but their activities were exposed the more popular Izala movement40 in October 2010. Nigerian customs that subsumed JTI in 1999 likely split Unlike the IMN and virtually all officials in Lagos seized 13 containers from the IMN because of three main Nigerian Salafist movements, of weapons from a ship operated reasons: first, they started to believe however, only Boko Haram prohibits by the same French-Lebanese al-Zakzaky was “smuggling a Shi`a Western education, service in the businessman’s company that in March agenda” into the purported “Islamic government, female membership, and 2011 saw a ship bound for Sinai, Movement”; second, the war between looks to the Taliban and al-Qa`ida Egypt, via Syria to supply weapons Shi`a Iran and Saudi Arabia-backed (particularly al-Qa`ida in the Islamic to Hamas in Gaza intercepted by and Sunni-led Iraq from 1980 to 1988 Maghreb and al-Qa`ida in Iraq) for Israeli naval commandos.46 The polarized Shi`a and Sunnis throughout inspiration in carrying out violent containers in Lagos, which included the Muslim world41; and, third, Nigerian jihad, including assassinating Salafist 107mm Katyusha artillery rockets used Sunni leaders, including Yusuf, began imams who preach non-violence and by Hizb Allah against Israel in 2006, receiving funds from Arab countries, Christians—although Boko Haram has were shipped on behalf of a Tehran- such as Saudi Arabia and Sudan, to never targeted Shi`a.44 It is therefore based Islamic Revolutionary Guard promote Sunni Islam and Salafism to Corps (IRGC) “front company” and 42 counter Iran’s influence. Nonetheless, 43 Usman dan Fodio was a pre-colonial West African were picked up at Bandar Abbas in Boko Haram and IMN still share similar Islamic leader. For more details, see Philip D. Curtin, “Ji- Iran, where the IRGC has a naval 47 doctrines, including: demonizing the had in West Africa: Early Phases and Inter-Relations in base. According to Nigeria’s foreign Mauritania and Senegal,” Journal of African History 12:1 minister, the weapons were destined 40 Jama`at Izalat al-Bid`a wa Iqamat al-Sunna (Society (1971). for a warehouse in Abuja, but of Removal of Innovation and Reestablishment of the 44 As an example of al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb shippers altered documents to send Sunna), known as Izala, was founded in 1978 by Shaykh and Algerian jihadists’ influence on Yusuf, in an undated them to Gambia (presumably for anti- Ismaila Idris in Jos, Plateau State. The movement is anti- Hausa sermon called “Tahirin Musilminai” (History of Sufi and fights bid`a, or innovation, that it believes is Muslims), Yusuf said, “We are yet to establish a pure of Algerian scholars, the fatwa was rooted in the specific practiced by Sufi Brotherhoods, including the ritual of Sunni Islamic sect that will be ready to take on ignorance experience of the Algerian civil war of the 1990s between visiting the tombs of Islamic saints. Izala is now one of and secularism. The few we have and are functioning are the military government and armed Islamist cells operat- the largest Islamic movements not only in Nigeria, but al-Qa`ida and the Taliban whose ideology and theologi- ing from the mountains. Yusuf blindly absorbed it and also in West African countries such as Niger and Chad. cal foundations are purely Sunni in nature. Finally, we applied it to a different context like Nigeria.” Boko Haram Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are known to fund the building have other groups emerging in Algeria, all of them have members also trained in Algeria during the mid-2000s, of Izala mosques in the region, although Izala is gener- missions committed to the spread of Islam and I hope you including those who later planned the suicide attack on ally more progressive than those countries in terms of understand all these.” This video is available at www. the UN Headquarters in Abuja on August 26, 2011, and women’s education and other social issues. youtube.com/watch?v=eUQYNucjqUE. In an April those who broke from Boko Haram to form Ansaru. 41 Saudi Arabia reportedly provided Iraq with $1 billion 2009 sermon called “Guzurin Mujaahidai” (Foundations Abubakar Shekau has frequently referred to al-Qa`ida per month starting in 1982. See John Bulloch and Harvey of Jihad), Yusuf also said, “In Algeria, they tried to intro- in Iraq leaders Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi and Umar al- Morris, The Gulf War: Its Origins, History and Consequences duce democracy but when they realized democracy was Baghdadi, and he has employed takfiri (accusing other (London: Heinemann Ltd., 1991). anti-Islam and anti-Allah, they came back to the way of Muslims of apostasy) ideology to justify Boko Haram’s 42 John Paden, Faith and Politics in Nigeria: Nigeria as a Shari`a. They formed the Islamic Jihad group that was attacks. See Andrea Brigaglia, “Ja‘far Mahmoud Adam, Pivotal State in the Muslim World (Washington, D.C.: U.S. initially made up of more than 50,000 people. But since Mohammed Yusuf and Al-Muntada Islamic Trust: Re- Institute of Peace Press, 2008); “Nigeria: Investigating the group refused to follow the way of Shari`a, the way flections on the Genesis of the Boko Haram Phenomenon Wahhabi Insurrection and Saudi Funds,” IRIN, Janu- of Allah, their numbers declined drastically.” This video in Nigeria,” Annual Review of Islam in Africa 11 (2012). ary 25, 2004; “Sudanese Arrested, Accused of Funding is available at www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_ 45 “Confessions of Boko Haram Fugitive,” Sun News On- December Islamic Uprising,” IRIN, February 20, 2004; embedded&v=VWCNdqwGU-M#t=2690. According to line, August 10, 2013. Roman Loimeier, “Playing with Affiliations: Muslims prominent imam Muhammad Auwal al-Bani of Zaria, 46 Nick Tattersall, “Weapons Seized in Nigeria Came in Northern Nigeria in the 20th Century,” in Laurent “Yusuf had listened to some leaders of the Algerian Is- from Iran: Shipping Company,” Reuters, October 30, Fourchard, Andre Mary and Rene Otayek eds., Entre- lamist insurgency pronounce a fatwa that prohibited the 2010. prises religieuses transnationales en Afrique de l’Ouest (Paris: militants to attend schools and to work for the govern- 47 Yemi Adebowale, “Illegal Weapons Loaded in Iran,” Karthala, 2005). ment. Besides having been rejected by the vast majority This Day, October 29, 2010.

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Senegalese rebels in Casamance).48 The security forces arrested three Shi`a imam in Ilorin, attended a course Nigerian security officials arrested individuals, all of whom admitted to at Imam Khomeini University in Qom in four individuals: a senior Quds Force receiving training from Hizb Allah, 2006.59 In 2011, he trained in the use of officer; a Nigerian who formerly including: a Lebanese citizen, who AK-47 rifles and improvised explosive studied in Iran and worked at Radio owned a supermarket and amusement devices in Iran, and in 2012 he traveled Tehran’s Hausa language service; park in Abuja; a second Lebanese to Dubai to receive funding to form the and two Nigerian customs officials.49 citizen, who was arrested at the airport cell.60 A fifth Iranian suspect, Sayyed Akbar in Kano before boarding a flight to Tabatabaei, who was the Quds Force Lebanon; and a dual Lebanese-Nigerian Regional Comparison citizen.53 Although the weapons Iran’s activities in Nigeria are “Iran’s Quds Force and were rusted, Nigeria’s director of the consistent with Iran’s actions State Security Service said they were throughout Africa. For example, in Hizb Allah’s global “serviceable,” and a Nigerian brigadier Kenya, two members of the Quds operations have involved general said they were intended for Force were found guilty in May 2013 attacks on U.S. and Israeli targets in of storing explosives and carrying Nigeria for more than a Nigeria.54 Nevertheless, some of the out surveillance of Israeli, British, decade, but their activities munitions, such as anti-tank mines, U.S. and Saudi targets in Kenya.61 are more compatible with rebel groups The Nigeria and Kenya plots fit the were exposed in October than a terrorist group and may have pattern of Quds Force and Hizb Allah 2010.” been linked to the weapons and heroin operations involving Iranians and dual shipments in Lagos in 2010.55 Lebanese-European or Lebanese- Canadian nationals that targeted In February 2013, three months before Israelis in India, Georgia and Thailand Africa Corps commander, took refuge uncovering the “armory,” Nigeria in February 2012; Azerbaijan in in the Iranian Embassy, flew back to announced it also uncovered an Iranian- March 2012; and Cyprus and Bulgaria Tehran with Iran’s foreign minister and funded cell whose leader admitted in July 2012.62 The failures of all but was reportedly reassigned to Venezuela to plotting attacks on “prominent the Bulgaria cell, as well as the ability to run Quds Force operations in Latin Nigerians” to “unsettle the West.”56 of Israeli intelligence to help national America.50 One month after these Such leaders included Nigeria’s former governments track these cells, may arrests, $10 million worth of heroin military leader, Ibrahim Babangida, have prompted Iran to search for new hidden in auto engine parts suspected and former sultan of Sokoto, Ibrahim targets in Africa in 2013, such as Kenya of being linked to the weapons shipment Dasuki, as well as Saudi Arabia’s and Nigeria, where Israelis often travel in October was seized in Lagos from a ambassador to Nigeria.57 The cell also and conduct business. ship originating in Iran.51 conducted surveillance on USAID, the Peace Corps, an Israeli shipping While Iran has increased economic Iran’s role in weapons trafficking company, a Jewish cultural center, and activities and aid to Africa in recent resurfaced in May 2013 when Nigerian hotels frequented by Americans and years, much of Iran’s influence is security forces uncovered a weapons Israelis in Lagos.58 The cell’s leader, a won through ideology promotion, as “armory” in a Kano home owned by seen with the IMN in Nigeria. Iran 52 the Lebanese consul to Sierra Leone. Kano City,” Digital Journal, June 2, 2013; Abdulsalam has, for example, opened up Iranian Muhammed, “Hezbollah Weapons Warehouse Belongs Cultural Centers (similar to Confucius 48 “Arms Seizure: Nigeria Reports Iran to the UN,” to Sierra Leonean – Lebanese Consul,” Vanguard, June Elombah.com, November 16, 2010. 4, 2013. 59 Success Nwogu, “Court Orders SSS to Release Ber- 49 “Arms Shipment: Nigeria Trial Will Expose Iran 53 “Hezbollah Members Arrested In Kano, Illegal Ar- ende, Terror Suspect,” Punch, May 27, 2013. Gun-running,” Vanguard, January 19, 2011. moury Discovered,” Point Blank News, May 30, 2013. 60 Soni Daniel, “How We Saved Dasuki IBB, From As- 50 Ibid. Tabatabaei and the other suspects were pro- 54 Ibid. According to one Nigerian security analyst, sassins – DSS,” Vanguard, February 21, 2013. scribed by the U.S. Treasury Department for overseeing the weapons “were immersed in sawdust for conceal- 61 Kenyan officials reportedly said, “The advanced ex- the shipment to Gambia. See “Treasury Targets Iranian ment. Humidity probably caused the sawdust to be- plosives the Iranians had and their links to the Quds Arms Shipments,” U.S. Treasury Department, March 27, come ‘caked’ and stick to the weapons.” Another analyst Force would indicate the mission in Kenya was cleared 2012. suggested, “considering how poorly the weapons were by the highest levels inside Iran’s government.” See Sne- 51 “Nigeria Seizes $9.9 mln Heroin Shipment from Iran,” stored one could argue that [the suspects] were either not jana Farberov, “Two Iranians from Elite Revolutionary Reuters, November 19, 2013. See also Charles E. Grass- particularly well trained agents or else they have such a Guard Unit Arrested in Kenya While ‘Plotting to Attack ley, “Drug Trafficking in West Africa,” Senate Caucus on vast number of arms caches that these were leftovers.” U.S., Israeli and British Targets,’” Guardian, July 2, 2012; International Narcotics Control, May 16, 2012, that stat- 55 “Nigerian Army Links Boko Haram To Hezbollah,” Tom Odula, “Kenyan Court Sentences 2 Iranians to Life ed, “Treasury found complex links between the bank and Sahara Reporters, May 30, 2012. in Jail,” Associated Press, May 6, 2013. drug traffickers to the Middle Eastern terrorist organiza- 56 Austine Odo, “SSS Busts Alleged Iran-Linked ‘Spy 62 Matthew Levitt, “Hizballah and the Qods Force in tion Hezbollah. Treasury and DEA were able to also link Network,’” Daily Trust, February 21, 2013. Iran’s Shadow War with the West,” The Washington individuals in Iran to this criminal money laundering 57 “Suspect Alleges Plot to Kill Saudi Ambassador to Ni- Institute of Near East Policy, January 2013; “Iranian and drug smuggling network [that moved illegal drugs geria,” Vanguard, August 3, 2013. and Hezbollah Terrorist Attacks against Israeli Targets from South America to Europe and the Middle East via 58 Bashir Adigun, “Nigeria Secret Police Say Terror Abroad The Situation on the Ground and Background West Africa].” Group Broken Up,” Associated Press, February 20, Information,” The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism 52 “Suspected ‘Hezbollah Cell’ Armory Uncovered in 2013. Information Center, February 15, 2012.

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Institutes or Alliance Francaise) Conclusion in Syria becoming a regional war.71 in countries such as Sierra Leone Iran’s activities in Nigeria likely serve Al-Zakzaky said in a BBC interview and Tanzania, attempted to convert two purposes. First, Tehran wants to in 2012 that if Iran were attacked villages from Khartoum to Kordofan in win the support of African countries the impact would be felt “not only Sudan to Shi’ism, and invited Ivorian and its one billion people to oppose UN in Nigeria, but in the entire world.”72 and Sudanese Shi`a imams to the and U.S. policies targeting Iran. Iran Iranian-trained cells drawn from Basij base in Ramshir, southwestern has achieved some success, with polls Nigeria’s Shi`a community may be part Iran.63 Similarly, indigenous African showing in 2013 that many African of Iran’s networks, and the possibility of Shi`a (as opposed to Lebanese-West countries, from Senegal to Ghana to them striking U.S. and Israeli interests African citizens) in Sierra Leone, Kenya, have “favorable” ratings of in the case of an asymmetric war should Senegal and other countries receive Iran two times higher than the world not be ruled out. funding to study Shi’ism in Lebanon average.67 Even after breaking ties with or Iran and return home sympathizing Iran because of the illegal arms shipment Finally, an issue that remains beyond with “Khomeinism”64; the former in Lagos in 2010 and the Iranian foreign Iran’s control is how the IMN will president of Comoros from 2006 to minister’s subsequent admission that evolve if al-Zakzaky transfers 2010, for example, was even nicknamed Iran supplied “substantial amounts” of leadership to more radical and “Ayatollah” because he studied in Qom arms to anti-Senegalese rebels, Senegal violence-prone younger imams, under Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazidi, the restored relations with Iran at the such as 48-year-old Mustapha Lawan mentor of former Iranian President Organization of the Islamic Conference Nasidi or Yakubu Yahaya, or whether Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.65 As in Nigeria, (OIC) Summit in Cairo in 2013.68 the IMN will fragment. History some African Shi`a have become shows that when groups break from militants, such as the Ivorian who in Similarly, Iran’s promotion of the IMN, they tend to become more July 2013 became the “first African “Khomeinism” has likely influenced violent, possibly because they no martyr” in Syria defending President public attitudes of Nigerian Muslims longer have al-Zakzaky discouraging Bashar al-Assad’s forces and was later and contributed to the recruitment them from physical confrontation eulogized by Hizb Allah.66 base and ideological development of the with the government or with Sunnis IMN and other emerging Shi`a groups and Christians.73 If a successor to in Africa as well as non-Shi`a terrorist al-Zakzaky cannot maintain stable groups such as Boko Haram. Until 2011, relations with Nigeria’s Sunnis and 63 The Basij (Persian: Sazman-e Basij-e Mostaz’afin, Nigerian Muslims had higher levels of Christians, especially with escalating literally “The Organization for Mobilization of the Op- support for Hizb Allah and Hamas than sectarianism in Iraq and now Syria, pressed”) is a paramilitary volunteer militia established Muslims in any non-Middle Eastern then Nigeria may experience increased in 1979 by order of Ayatollah Khomeini and has a base country and the most favorable views of intra-religious conflict in addition to its in almost every Iranian city. See Ahmed Janabi, “Shia al-Qa`ida and Usama bin Ladin in the pre-existing inter-religious conflicts. 69 Books Spark Debate in Sudan,” al-Jazira, December 22, world. Boko Haram’s transition from 2006; Saidu Kamara, “Sierra Leone: Iranian Cultural a Salafist preaching group to a jihadist Jacob Zenn is a consultant on countering Centre to Reopen,” Standard Times, April 6, 2004. group in September 2010, however, violent extremism and policy adviser for the 64 Although Sudan is majority Sunni and has promoted has led to more than 4,000 deaths in Nigerian-American Leadership Council. Salafism abroad, the government is allied with Iran and northern Nigeria and a significant drop He speaks Arabic, French and Swahili Hizb Allah in opposing Israel and supplying weapons to in Nigerian Muslims’ support for Boko and has a degree in law from Georgetown Hamas in Gaza, so Sudan likely tolerates some of Iran’s Haram and foreign terrorist groups such University. His work has focused on 70 religious activities in the country. See “Le véritable poids as Hamas, Hizb Allah, and al-Qa`ida. international law and best practices de la communauté chiite au Sénégal,” Leral.net, Novem- related to the protection and promotion ber 11, 2011; Lloyd Ridgeon, Shi’i Islam and Identity: Reli- Second, there is the potential that Iran of civil society organizations, including gion, Politics and Change in the Global Muslim Community is preparing for a U.S. or Israeli attack a program he co-leads in South Sudan. (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012); “Sheikh Harun Bari: Over on Iranian nuclear facilities and other In 2012, he authored “Northern Nigeria’s 1 Million Shias Live in Sierra Leone,” Ahlul Bayt News contingencies, such as the civil war Boko Haram: The Prize in Al-Qaeda’s Agency, September 13, 2011. Africa Strategy,” which was published by 65 Comoran President Sambi was, however, Sunni, and 67 “Global Views of Iran Overwhelmingly Negative,” The Jamestown Foundation. also studied in Saudi Arabia and Sudan, but some Shi`a Pew Research Center, June 11, 2013. believe he is Shi`a and committed taqiyya (a method 68 “Iran, Senegal Resume Diplomatic Ties: Report,” 71 Guy Taylor, “Attack on Syria Likely to Trigger Terror- whereby a Muslim—often Shi`a—can legally deny his or Agence France-Presse, February 7, 2013. ists Acts Against U.S., Israel,” Washington Times, August her faith or commit blasphemous acts if facing persecu- 69 “Muslim Publics Divided on Hamas and Hezbollah,” 26, 2013; “Pro-Hezbollah Sheikh Warns U.S. Interests at tion or needing protection from the majority). Comoros is Pew Research Center, December 2, 2010. The BBC also Risk if Syria Hit,” Daily Star, August 27, 2013. mostly Sunni and therefore Sambi could have hypotheti- reported that in the months following the September 11, 72 Mark Lobel, “Sheikh Zakzaky: Why Nigeria Could cally hid his Shi`a beliefs to win the presidential election. 2001, attacks in the United States, there was a “massive Fear an Attack on Iran,” BBC, May 8, 2012. See “Profile: The ‘Ayatollah’ of Comoros,” BBC, May 16, rise” in newborn males named Usama (after Usama bin 73 See, for example, the cases of the JTI members who 2006; “Details of Spending Iran’s Wealth in Other Coun- Ladin) in Nigeria, including 70% of newborn males at split from al-Zakzaky and reportedly carried out the tries,” CNN, July 23, 2009. one hospital in Kano. See “Osama Baby Craze Hits Nige- beheading of a Christian Igbo trader in Kano in 1994, as 66 “The First African Martyr in Defense of the Shrine,” ria,” BBC, January 3, 2002. well as the interview of Nasir Isiaku, who left the “Shi`a” valieamr.com, July 26, 2013. Also see www.southleba- 70 “Muslim Publics Share Concerns about Extremist to join a Boko Haram cell in Kaduna that targeted Chris- non.org/?p=79659. Groups,” Pew Research Center, September 10, 2013. tians and security forces.

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This article argues that the still sought to redress the decades-long Kirkuk’s Multidimensional unresolved status of Kirkuk may be Ba`athist Arabization program. Under Security Crisis the most critical issue for the future the large-scale population shuffle in integrity of the Iraqi state. It first the 1970s, Kurdish villagers were By Derek Henry Flood discusses the growing hostility between forcibly displaced and northern areas Kurds in Kirkuk and in the KRG with were repopulated with Arab tribes since the u.s. military withdrew over al-Maliki’s central government in from western Iraq. The Ba`ath Party the Kuwaiti border on December 18, Baghdad, and then shows how rising incentivized sympathetic Sunni Arab 2011, the conflict in Iraq has morphed discontent among Sunni Arabs in tribesmen to resettle in the cooler, into a dangerous new phase where Kirkuk Province serves as a further irrigated lands of the traditionally oil interests and bitter ethnic politics destabilizing factor. The article finds Kurdish-majority north.7 Other non- have left vulnerable, ordinary Iraqis that while much of Iraq is suffering Arab minorities, including Turkmen caught in the middle. The unresolved under an upsurge in religio-political and Assyrians, were often expelled issues of Kurdish autonomy combined violence in 2013, Kirkuk is a realm unto en masse. Many were either killed or with re-escalating Sunni-Shi`a discord itself of insurgent aims due to the nature fled Iraq altogether. The peak of the are undergirded not solely by mere of its ethnic and sectarian complexity program culminated in the al-Anfal ideological drivers, but by an economic and the economic consequences of its campaign that took place from February power struggle over the present and future control. Kurdish state actors in to September 1988 in which chemical future wealth of the country’s oil and Kirkuk and Erbil often feel that they are weapons were ultimately used at the tail gas reserves. This contest is especially being challenged by both Sunni Arabs end of the Iran-Iraq war.8 evident in the oil-rich northern Iraqi from various insurgent movements and province of Kirkuk.1 Shi`a Arabs from either the al-Maliki Kirkuk city, located outside of the “no government or non-state Shi`a militias fly zone” beneath the so-called Green Kirkuk is the gateway to, although not a who they believe share a common Line9 and therefore still under the part of, northern Iraq’s relatively stable disdain for Kurdish ethno-nationalism. control of Baghdad, became the focus Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of ongoing Arabization well after 1991. area and is part of a territorial tug of Background Cognizant of Kirkuk’s intrinsic value, war framed through a prism of ethnic Following the 1990-1991 Gulf War and Ba`athist officials actively altered rivalry between the KRG’s leader, the late President Saddam Hussein’s the city’s contested demographics President Massoud Barzani, and Iraqi retribution against northern Kurds who primarily with Arab Shi`a from Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki.2 This had been fighting the post-colonial Iraqi southern Iraq throughout the 1990s.10 rivalry is supported by the importance state sporadically since 1961,4 a de facto The plebiscite on the territorial of who will control Kirkuk’s oil and gas autonomous Kurdish governance zone status of Kirkuk vaguely outlined in fields. Kirkuk holds some of the world’s was established in the north. A border Article 140—which could result in its most sought after petroleum reserves, formed that separated regular Iraqi army formal annexation by the KRG—has making the future of who administers it troops with Kurdish peshmerga (Kurdish failed to come to fruition since 2007 critical to both the KRG and Baghdad. fighters). The two principle Kurdish when it was originally scheduled to Kirkuk Province, with its flashpoint town parties, the Kurdistan Democratic occur. This left the future of Kirkuk of Hawija, has helped to reenergize al- Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of open to endless political infighting Qa`ida’s Islamic State of Iraq, which is Kurdistan (PUK), firmly gained control among Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen, now known as the Islamic State of Iraq and of the three northern Iraqi provinces of which enabled insurgent attacks in the Levant (ISIL).3 The uncompromising Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyya along the interim.11 Meanwhile, the KRG manner in which Baghdad dealt with with northeastern portions of Ninawa has been trying to use cash and land Sunni discontent in Hawija served as and Diyala provinces, and a small patch grants to encourage Kurds to re-inhabit a catalyst for a broadening protest of Salah al-Din Province.5 villages below the Green Line to create a movement as well as an enabling factor deeper Kurdish foothold in the disputed for the resurgence of the country’s al- When the post-Saddam constitution territories, which could be useful in Qa`ida branch that has transformed was adopted in October 2005, the case of a future census or referendum.12 from a local to a now regional outfit. stage was set for Kurdish and Shi`a empowerment, albeit of very different 7 Hania Mufti and Peter Bouckaert, “Iraq, Claims in 6 1 Kirkuk Province can alternately be referred to as strains. For Kurdish leaders, one of Conflict: Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in Northern Iraq,” Tamim Province. See Kenneth Katzman, Iraq: Politics, the key achievements, at least in theory, Human Rights Watch, 2004, p. 10. Elections and Benchmarks (Washington, D.C.: Congressio- was Article 140 of the constitution that 8 Michael J. Kelly, Ghosts of Halabja: Saddam Hussein and nal Research Service, 2009), pp. 2, 10. the Kurdish Genocide (Westport, CT: Praeger Security In- 2 Liz Sly, “U.S. Policy on Iraq Questioned as Influence 4 Michael M. Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds ternational, 2008), pp. 23-31. Wanes, Maliki Consolidates Power,” Washington Post, (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2011), p. 155. 9 The Green Line is the nominal 1991 demarcation line April 8, 2012; Yochi Dreazen, “Iraq’s New Strong Man,” 5 For a sample of the U.S. military’s interpretation of the that was between the Kurdish northern provinces of Iraq Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting, October 14, 2011. approximate Green Line from 1991-2003, see the map in and the remainder controlled by Saddam Hussein. 3 ISIL is commonly abbreviated as ISIS (Islamic State “Developments in Iraq,” Special Inspector General for 10 Mufti and Bouckaert, pp. 46-47. of Iraq and al-Sham). See Sami Aboudi, “Iraqi al Qaeda Iraq Reconstruction, July 2012, p. 75. 11 “Kirkuk in Limbo as Law Addressing Political Balance Wing Merges with Syrian Counterpart,” Reuters, April 6 “Draft Constitution Adopted by Iraqi Voters,” Associ- is Scrapped,” IRIN, October 14, 2013. 9, 2013. ated Press, October 25, 2005. 12 Personal observations, Kirkuk Province, August 2,

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A Tense Green Line: Renewed Hostility Following the U.S. withdrawal from between PUK-affiliated peshmerga and Between Kurds and the Central Government Iraq, tensions along the Green Line Iraqi forces on November 16 had some The key issue along the Green Line synchronously ramped up in two Iraqis fearing the two sides were on the is the so-called Disputed Territories ways. Peshmerga forces sought to further brink of war.20 Although a major armed or Disputed Internal Boundaries.13 consolidate their control of areas they conflict between the two sides on what These are districts within provinces ardently view as historic Kurdish is essentially a front line has thus far running along the axis from northern areas, and insurgent groups like the failed to materialize, keeping an eye on Ninawa through Kirkuk southeast to ISIL and Ba`athist fighters began to one another along the Green Line makes Diyala which many Kurds want to see target security forces and civilians in the prospect of robustly collaborating enveloped into the comparatively more Ninawa, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din, and on stemming their common foes in the secure KRG at some point. It is in these Diyala with increasing ferocity. In the ISIL and the Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al- districts where ethnic politics meet the autumn of 2012, al-Maliki created the Naqshabandi (JRTN) movement more struggle over oil rights between Erbil Dijla Operations Command to establish problematic. and Baghdad’s Oil Ministry. Pipelines a stronger federal security presence and oil installations here are therefore along the Baghdad-controlled side of Al-Maliki’s forces are facing opposition more prone to insurgent attacks than the Green Line—an act that the KRG’s from several sides in the provinces those inside the KRG itself. Peshmerga Ministry viewed as an with disputed districts. Although the unvarnished military provocation by ISIL is most associated with sectarian The lucrative yet vastly the federal government. While the Dijla violence, it is also involved in anti-state underperforming Kirkuk-Ceyhan Operations Command was welcomed violence and ethnic tension between pipeline has been constantly targeted by segments of the disenfranchised Arabs and Kurds. The ISIL and other by improvised explosive devices Arab community in Kirkuk and met Arab-dominated takfiri groups are (IED) throughout mid-2013.14 Foreign with mixed reactions by Turkmen locked in an ongoing battle with the oil companies are forced to choose whose local political leadership is Kurdish Democratic Union Party’s between federal and Kurdish sides divided about whether to side with (PYD) Popular Protection Units (YPG) in terms of who controls what piece security conscious Kurdish interests militia in northeastern Syria.21 The of territory, upon which there is no or those of Ankara,17 local Kurdish ISIL is attempting to stem the process commonly agreed final determination. politicians made their concerns known of rudimentary sub-state formation by In September 2013, for example, in no uncertain terms. the PYD akin to the 1990s-era KRG in BP signed a deal with the al-Maliki Iraq that could one day rupture Syria’s government to revamp Kirkuk’s Kirkuk’s Kurds view the creation of territorial integrity. The ISIL views dilapidated primary oil field, sparking the Dijla Operations Command as a the secular KRG’s maneuvers in Iraq’s a bellicose reaction from the KRG. A sign of al-Maliki further centralizing disputed territories as a threat to Islamism spokesman from the KRG’s Ministry Baghdad’s authority in what is ideally and Arab identity. For the ISIL in both the of Natural Resources stated: “No meant to be a federalized Iraqi state Syria and Iraq cases, hardline Salafism company will be permitted to work at least in constitutional terms. Some must trump divisive ethnic politics. in any part of the disputed territories Kurdish Kirkukis, both civilians and including Kirkuk without formal security forces alike, criticized al- Owing to the centrality of the oil approval and involvement of the KRG.”15 Maliki’s alleged allegiance to Tehran issue in the broader context of Caught in the middle are Kirkuk’s and his need to increase his own Iraq’s instability, protests over the provincial authorities, who are trapped personal power.18 They also cited the mismanagement of oil wealth by between an outdated Ba`ath period presence of ethnic-Arab Dijla troops as political elites have also erupted hydrocarbons law and an ambiguously reminiscent of the Ba`athist Arabization in the capital with demonstrators interpreted constitution that they feel program despite the fact that al-Maliki angrily chanting “oil is for the people, the al-Maliki government is exploiting is a practicing Shi`a who was an anti- not the thieves.”22 In the context of to hold on to Kirkuk’s wealth.16 Saddam activist as an exiled member of Iraq’s rather monolithic economy so the Da`wa Party in the 1980s. heavily dependent on oil production and exports, which account for 90% of By mid-November 2012, both Kurds its income, the future of the country’s and federal forces were reportedly oil industry is of utmost importance 19 2013. steadily increasing their armaments. to Baghdad, the KRG and the various 13 “Iraq and the Kurds: The High-Stakes Hydrocarbons A deadly incident in Tuz Khurmatu, insurgent movements that seek to harm 23 Gambit,” International Crisis Group, April 19, 2012. in northeastern Salah al-Din Province, both entities. 14 “Oil Flow from Northern Iraq to Turkey Halted,” Hur- riyet, August 23, 2013; Kamarran al-Najar, “New Pipeline 20 “Iraqi Forces Clash with Kurdish Troops, One Dead,” Bombing Adds to Kirkuk Field Woes,” Iraq Oil Report, 17 Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield,Crisis in Kirkuk: Reuters, November 16, 2012. September 18, 2013. The Ethnopolitics of Conflict and Compromise (Philadelphia: 21 Amberin Zaman, “Syrian Kurdish Leader Urges Tur- 15 Meeyoung Cho and Peg Mackey, “Iraq Signs Deal University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), p. 54. key To End Support for Salafists,” al-Monitor, October 9, With BP to Revive Northern Kirkuk Oilfield,” Reuters, 18 Personal interviews, Kirkuk Province, August 2, 2013. September 12, 2013. 2013. 22 “Hundreds of Iraqis Protest Against Lawmaker Privi- 16 Tamsin Carlisle, “Trying to Sell the Advantages of In- 19 Karim Abed Zayer, “Maliki Deploys ‘Tigris Force’ to leges,” Reuters, August 31, 2013. vesting in Kirkuk Oil,” Platts, October 14, 2013. Kirkuk,” Azzaman, November 13, 2012. 23 “IMF Says Iraq has Made Good Progress with its

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Sunni Arab Discontent in Kirkuk after Hawija sit-in protestors.29 In turn, protestors sympathy combined with years of ISI In addition to the renewed tensions claimed they were simply attacked when violence have led groups like the JRTN between Kurds and Baghdad, the al- unarmed.30 In the immediate aftermath and ISIL to find new common cause in Maliki government is also facing rising of the incident in Hawija, ordinary anti-Shi`a, anti-government, and anti- Sunni Arab discontent in Kirkuk Sunni tribesmen took up arms against Kurdish mass casualty attacks.36 Province. As al-Maliki began paving government targets.31 Meanwhile, the way for a third term in office insurgents belonging to the ISIL An Iraqi police commander in Dibis following a somewhat controversial ramped up a series of suicide attacks complained that the withdrawal of U.S. court decision in August 2013, across poorly secured northern cities troops not only removed the buffer disenchanted Iraqis of all stripes had like Mosul, Kirkuk and Tuz Khurmatu between Iraqi Army and peshmerga already begun to bristle at the rise of beneath the Green Line. The situation in tensions, but also allowed for relatively a new authoritarian leader.24 Of these Hawija also helped mobilize the JRTN. unimpeded ISIL movement. In 2007, segments, Sunni Arabs, who have been The JRTN—whose name indicates a major from the U.S. Army’s 10th transitioning into a minority status over it is a militant Sufi outfit unlike the Mountain Division was quoted as saying: the past decade, have been the most Salafi-jihadi al-Qa`ida—styles itself “The Hawija area will be an obstacle to vocal. This tension has been especially as a champion of Iraq’s disenchanted militants, rather than a pathway for evident in Kirkuk Province. Sunni Arabs, particularly in northern them.”37 Now that the American obstacle areas that abut districts disputed with has been removed, Hawija is flush with In post-Ba`athist Iraq, Sunni Arab Kurds.32 Sunni ire as well as insurgency. marginalization has become so acute in the era of rule by al-Maliki’s perceived Several security sources in Kirkuk Along the Green Line, there is a Shi`a chauvinism and with continuing Province described die-hard Ba`athist confluence between ISIL Salafi- Kurdish economic and territorial gains elements in the JRTN33 as seeking jihadism and anachronistic Ba`athist in the north that a serious spike in to reverse Kurdish territorial gains patriotism emphasized by the JRTN. violence is already well underway.25 and ambitions by employing methods Insurgents of both strains mutually Al-Maliki’s humiliation of several commonly associated with Sunni seek to harm agents of the al- prominent Sunni political elites coupled insurgent groups, such as IEDs and Maliki government or anyone they with militarization along the Sunni Arab ambushes. The JRTN—led at least see as traitors. Police in Dbis said the side of the Green Line helped set the nominally by Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, difference between the ISIL and JRTN stage for the resurgence of the ISIL.26 Iraq’s vice president under Saddam— was tactical (i.e., suicide VBIEDS vs. is quite active along the Green Line IEDs), but their goals were presently the The spark of much of the recent conflict according to local security force same in terms of restoring Sunni Arab took place in the restive town of Hawija leaders.34 supremacy in Iraq. In the view of many in Kirkuk Province. Hawija was once Kurds, as the ISIL has evolved from a referred to by the U.S. military as the In the wake of the U.S. troop largely Iraq-focused organization into a “Anbar of the North” due to the danger withdrawal, the JRTN has transformed regional one with its involvement in the the town posed to coalition troops.27 its message from a nationalist anti- Syrian civil war, it has become a multi- Today, government and Kurdish forces occupation resistance force to one front militant outfit simultaneously are contending with an area where Sunni bent on attacking the interests of the waging takfiri jihad while also attacking militancy never died but was merely Iran-friendly, Shi`a-dominated al- Kurds in the name of Arab identity tamped down for a period during the Maliki government in Baghdad as well politics. coalition’s concerted counterinsurgency as Kurds who it disdains for their ethnic troop surge. separatism.35 Hawija has again become Although violence in Iraq had been on a key node of Sunni militancy within a net decline at least in terms of hard On April 23, 2013, Iraqi security forces Iraq as an area where historic Ba`athist casualty figures since the U.S. troop led by the Army’s 12th Division attacked surge in 2007-2008, beginning in April a Sunni Arab protest camp in Hawija 29 Ibid. 2013 Iraq has seen the highest cluster 28 38 west of Kirkuk City. The central 30 Ibid. of death tolls since 2008. Alongside government claimed they were engaging 31 Ali Abel Sadah, “Sunni Tribes in Anbar, Kirkuk Pre- the civilian and security force death armed elements enmeshed within the pare for Battle,” Iraq Pulse, May 3, 2013. figures, a significant uptick against 32 Adam Schreck, “Group Tied to Old Guard Could Gain northern oil export infrastructure has Economy,” BBC, October 1, 2010. in Iraq Unrest,” Associated Press, April 27, 2013. occurred, particularly affecting Ninawa 24 “Path Cleared for Maliki’s Third Term as PM,” Agence 33 For details on the JRTN, see Michael Knights, “The and Kirkuk provinces. France-Presse, August 26, 2013. JRTN Movement and Iraq’s Next Insurgency,” CTC Sen- 25 “Make or Break: Iraq’s Sunnis and the State,” Interna- tinel 4:7 (2011). 36 “Iraqi Special Force Kills Prince of al-Qaeda in Hawi- tional Crisis Group, August 14, 2013. 34 Personal interviews, local security force leaders, Dbis, ja,” Shafaq News, October 19, 2013; “Key Qaeda Leader 26 “Sunni Grievances Drive Spike in Iraq Unrest,” Kirkuk Province, Iraq, August 2, 2013. Killed in Hawijah,” All Iraq News, October 19, 2013. Agence France-Presse, May 26, 2013. 35 Fayez Sarah, “Iraq and Iran Aligned on Syria,” as- 37 “Six Thousand Sunni Arabs Join Security Pact to Help 27 “Sons of Iraq Graduate Iraqi Police Training in Hawi- Safir, November 9, 2012; Adam Schreck and Qassim U.S. Forces Block Terrorist Escape Routes,” Associated ja,” U.S. Central Command, May 16, 2008. Abdul-Zahra, “Iraq PM Maliki Warns Syria War Could Press, November 28, 2007. 28 Adam Schreck, “Clashes Suggest Sunni Anger Boil- Spread if Opposition Wins,” Associated Press, February 38 “Iraq’s May Death of Over 1,000 is Worst Since 2008, ing Over in Iraq,” Associated Press, April 24, 2013. 27, 2013. UN Says,” Associated Press, June 1, 2013.

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The frequency of IED attacks on the As the KRG has continued to attract crude export pipeline connecting foreign direct investment while The Battle for Syria’s Al- Kirkuk’s supergiant oil field to the port strengthening its own security Hasakah Province city of Ceyhan in southern Turkey’s apparatus and deftly annexing Adana Province has conservatively disputed territories on the Arab- By Nicholas A. Heras become a weekly occurrence. An majority side of the Green Line, the official from the state-owned North Oil societal fissures within Iraq have only syria’s resource-rich, northeastern Company cited some 37 attacks on the deepened. Recently, Atheel Nujaifi, province of al-Hasakah presents a Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline between late the governor of Ninawa—home to the complex human terrain where conflict June and late August 2013 alone.39 The turbulent Mosul—announced that is driven by the patchwork authority constant disruptions in output on the his province would be inking its own of the Syrian military and local and already well-aged pipes may accelerate deals with foreign energy firms despite long-standing communal antagonism. the fragmentation of Iraq’s tenuous fierce objections by the Oil Ministry in Control over al-Hasakah Province, federal governance arrangement. The Baghdad.42 which has an ethnic Kurdish plurality, KRG, based in the northern city of is important to the Kurds who are Erbil, seeks to create new routes to The al-Maliki government, while seeking greater autonomy and self-rule Turkey entirely within territory under irked by the KRG and now Ninawa’s from the Syrian state. Al-Hasakah’s its control, thereby creating potentially possible outside oil contract moves, oil resources are also important and lucrative energy sector independence has done little to stop the destruction a source of frequent conflict between from Baghdad.40 The persistent attacks of northern oil infrastructure key to Arab and Kurdish armed groups. on federally controlled pipelines its own economic survival. Militants both hurt Baghdad economically and can now travel freely from eastern This article provides background on exacerbate Arab-Kurdish tensions. Syria to northern Iraq as the Syrian the human geography of al-Hasakah They also help to justify the Kurds’ war grinds on.43 This will have the Province, highlights the sites of most arguments for managing their own likely effect of the KRG hardening frequent conflict, and examines the natural resource exports. its militarized territorial absorption major actors in the fight for control of program to securitize Kurdish villages the province. It finds that while the The KRG is simultaneously entertaining or historic Kurdish areas and stave Kurdish community of al-Hasakah is foreign investors to economically off jihadist infiltration well beyond well positioned to assert its political solidify its control over the three the recognized three provinces of the and military power over its areas of the northern provinces of Dohuk, Erbil KRG. Despite the ethnic and sectarian province, it will still face competition and Sulaymaniyya, while bolstering prism through which the bloodshed from the remnants of the Syrian military peshmerga positions along the Green in northern Iraq is viewed, it must be in the region and Arab armed groups. Line that separates KRG-controlled noted that bitter economic competition The Kurds also will have to convince Kurdistan from Arab-majority Iraq. over oil and gas resources importantly the region’s other ethnic and sectarian underpins all of the aforementioned minorities that they are genuine and Conclusion conflicts in the locally-held long view. equal partners in governance. In the decade since the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, fears remain that Iraq might Derek Henry Flood is an independent Human Geography of Al-Hasakah Province fracture along ethnic, sectarian and analyst working in MENA, Central Al-Hasakah is one of Syria’s most economic lines. Although the ISI/ISIL and South Asia. Mr. Flood has written diverse provinces, with an estimated has escalated attacks since late 2012, for Asia Times Online, CNN, Christian population of approximately 1.5 million the Hawija incident and the war in Syria Science Monitor and Jane’s Islamic people, a plurality of whom are ethnic seem to have emboldened it much more Affairs Analyst among other publications. Kurds that are present in both rural in recent months.41 The KRG’s peshmerga Previously, he served as editor of The villages and the province’s major urban and Asayish forces have also become Jamestown Foundation’s Militant areas.1 The three largest cities of the more assertive after Hawija to counter Leadership Monitor. region, al-Hasakah, Qamishli, and Ras the twin threats of reinvigorated Sunni al-Ayn, all have diverse populations that militancy and the presence of al-Maliki’s include ethnic Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians2 Dijla Operations Command. 1 Syria Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011, available at www.citypopulation.de/Syria.html#Land. Also see Basheer al-Baker, “Uncovering Syria (III): Counting on Kurds,” al-Akhbar, September 13, 2011. 39 “Iraq Oil Exports to Turkey Halted by Pipeline At- 2 The Assyrians are a distinct Semitic ethnic group whose tack,” Agence France-Presse, August 21, 2013. mother tongue is “Syriac,” a language that evolved from 40 “Turkey-KRG Pipeline ‘Close to Completion,’” Reu- Aramaic. A majority of ethnic Assyrians are adherents ters, August 22, 2013; Ben van Heuvelen, “New Gas 42 Ziad al-Sanjary, “Iraq Province Empowers Governor of Christianity, and ethnic Assyrians who are members Pipeline Reinforces Turkey-KRG Ties,” Iraq Oil Report, to Sign Oil Deals Without Baghdad,” Reuters, September of the Chaldean Catholic Church are sometimes referred October 6, 2013. 19, 2013. to as “Chaldeans.” Ethnic Assyrian communities are tra- 41 Jim Muir, “Iraq: Prospects of Partition as Violence 43 Personal interviews, Iraqi police and military, Dibis ditionally located in northeastern Syria, northwestern Takes its Toll,” BBC, May 2, 2013. district, Kirkuk Province, Iraq, August 2, 2013. Iraq, southeastern Turkey, Lebanon, and in the global

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(with Orthodox, Chaldean Catholic, and although present in other areas of In the northern, Kurdish-majority Church of the East sects represented), the province including the cities of areas of al-Hasakah Province, many of Armenians, Turkmen,3 and members of al-Malikiyya, Qamishli, Ras al-Ayn, these Sunni Arab tribal groups were the Yazidi4 faith in and around the city and al-Hasakah, have been greatly settled in the area from 1965-1976 as of Ras al-Ayn. Al-Hasakah Province is concentrated in a series of 35 villages part of the “Arab Belt” policy of the primarily an agricultural area whose that follow the path of the river from Ba`ath government, which established population is centered along the north- Ras al-Ayn to al-Hasakah.7 Throughout government-built Arab communities on south flowing Khabur River between the northern regions of the province, land taken from resident Kurds that were the city of Ras al-Ayn on the Turkish ethnic and sectarian groups live in close situated amidst Kurdish villages.12 It is border and the province’s capital of proximity to each other in neighboring estimated that approximately 60,000 al-Hasakah city, or northeast of the or mixed villages. Kurds were displaced from their land Khabur in a particularly fertile region by this policy.13 Ougaidat, Shammar that is located in the administrative The predominate form of social identity and Baggara, who predominate in the districts of Qamishli and the city of al- and mobilization among Sunni Arabs province’s southern sub-districts of al- Malikiyya.5 in al-Hasakah Province is through Arisha, al-Shaddadeh, and Markadah, Sunni Arab tribalism.8 Sunni Arab also maintain close ties to their kinsmen The Khabur River serves as the semi- tribes in the region include branches in neighboring Deir al-Zour Province.14 official western boundary of al-Hasakah of multinational tribal confederations Some Sunni Arab tribesmen participate in Province. Several ethnic and sectarian such as the Shammar, the Ougaidat, armed opposition groups that fight against groups—including Kurds, Arabs, the Baggara, the Taie, and the Jabbour, both the al-Assad government and the Assyrians, Armenians, Chechens/ and smaller tribal groups such as the al- Kurdish militias in the region, including Circassians, and Yazidis—are present Sharabiyya and the Zubayd.9 Ougaidat, the al-Qa`ida-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra.15 along the course of the river between Shammar, and the Albu Hassan branch One particular tribally organized armed Ras al-Ayn and al-Hasakah.6 Assyrians, of the Baggara that predominate in the group that has cooperated with Jabhat province’s southern sub-districts of al- al-Nusra in the region is the “Free Jazira diaspora in Europe, the United States, and Australia. Arisha, al-Shaddadeh, and Markadah Brigade,” which is organized by Shammar Also see Alberto M. Fernandez, “Dawn at Tell Tamir: maintain close ties to their kinsmen in tribesmen and is an affiliate of the Free 10 The Assyrian Christian Survival and the Khabur River,” neighboring Deir al-Zour Province. Syrian Army that has a presence near the Assyrian International News Agency, undated. Several of the region’s Sunni Arab Syrian-Iraqi border in the northeastern 16 3 The Turkmen are descendants of Oghuz tribal, ethnic tribes, including the Shammar, Jabbour, Yarubiyya sub-district. Turkic migrants who moved into the area of Syria in the and the Baggara, also have cross-border 10th century. See Nicholas A. Heras, “Syrian Turkmen ties with fellow tribesmen in Iraq which 12 For some details, see J. Michael Kennedy, “Kurds Join Opposition Forces in Pursuit of a New Syrian Iden- they have drawn upon for social and Remain on the Sideline of Syria’s Uprising,” New York tity,” Terrorism Monitor 11:11 (2013). armed support during the course of the Times, April 17, 2012. 11 4 The Yazidis are ethnic Kurds who are adherents of Syrian civil war. 13 It is estimated that more than 120,000 Syrian Kurds an esoteric religion that synthesizes belief from Zo- were denied Syrian citizenship, the majority in al-Ha- roastrian, Manichean, Jewish, Christian, and Islamic sakah Province, and were thus rendered stateless, on the sources. It is estimated that there are 50,000 Yazidis menians, Kurds, and Arabs, see Fernandez; al-Baker. basis of a controversial 1962 census. Their children were in Syria, 20,000-25,000 of whom live in rural areas of 7 “Assyrian Villages in Khabur Syria,” Assyrian Inter- born stateless and thus increased the population of state- al-Hasakah Province and in the city of Qamishli. Some national News Agency, 2013. less Kurds to 300,000 out of an estimated population of estimates, however, place the number of Yazidis in Syria 8 The Ba`ath Party in Syria has attempted to weaken 1.7 million Kurds in Syria. In April 2011, Syrian President much lower. See “Yazidis in Syria: Between Acceptance Sunni Arab tribalism as a primary form of social mobi- Bashar al-Assad passed a decree that formally granted and Marginalization,” KurdWatch, December 2010. lization in al-Hasakah Province since it assumed power most of these stateless Kurds citizenship. For more infor- 5 These details are based on the author’s field research in the country in 1963. These details are based on the au- mation on Kurdish statelessness and modern repression conducted in al-Hasakah Province in March 2010, as thor’s field research conducted in al-Hasakah Province in in Syria, see “Syria-Group Denial: Repression of Kurdish well as personal interviews, Arab tribal youth eco- March 2010, as well as personal interviews, Arab tribal Political and Cultural Rights in Syria,” Human Rights nomic migrants, Beirut, Lebanon, June-August 2009. youth economic migrants, Beirut, Lebanon, June-August Watch, 2009, p. 8; Kennedy; “Syria: State Policies and For details on Qamishli, see “Al-Qamishli: Demograph- 2009. Also see also Carole A. O’Leary and Nicholas A. Military Action Continue to Threaten Further Displace- ics,” SyriaToday.ca, undated; Hasan Biro, “In Qamishli, Heras, “Syrian Tribal Networks and their Implications ment,” Norwegian Refugee Council Internal Displace- Tensions Rise Between PKK and Syrian Army,” Syria for the Syrian Uprising,” Terrorism Monitor 10:11 (2012). ment Monitoring Centre, November 11, 2011. Deeply, April 22, 2013; “Al-Qamishli,” Encyclopaedia 9 These details are based on the author’s field research 14 These details are based on the author’s field research Britannica, undated. For details on al-Hasakah, see “Al- conducted in al-Hasakah Province in March 2010, as conducted in Deir al-Zour Province in July 2009, al- Hasakah Joins the Fight with Assad Forces,” Zaman well as personal interviews, Arab tribal youth economic Hasakah Province in March 2010, as well as personal al-Wsl, July 10, 2013; “Al-Hasakah City,” Homs Online, migrants, Beirut, Lebanon, June-August 2009. interviews, Arab tribal youth economic migrants, Beirut, undated. For details on al-Malikiyya, see “Cities: Al-Ma- 10 Ibid. Also see O’Leary and Heras, “Syrian Tribal Net- Lebanon, June-August 2009. likiyah,” KurdWatch, undated. works and their Implications for the Syrian Uprising.” 15 For more information on tribal armed groups in the 6 For Assyrians, see “Assyrian Villages in Khabur Syria,” 11 Ibid. Lauren Williams, “Tribes of Syria and Iraq Syrian conflict, see Carole A. O’Leary and Nicholas A. Assyrian International News Agency, 2013. For Chech- Drawn Into the Uprising,” Daily Star [Beirut], November Heras, “The Tribal Factor in Syria’s Rebellion: A Survey ens/Circassians, see Dawn Chatty, “Circassian, Chech- 15, 2012; Tim Arango and Duraid Adnan, “For Iraqis, of Armed Tribal Groups in Syria,” Terrorism Monitor 11:13 nyan, and Other Muslim Communities,” in Displacement Aid to Rebels in Syria Repays a Debt,” New York Times, (2013). and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East (New York: February 12, 2012; Phil Sands, “Oil, Food, and Protest in 16 Mariam Ballout, “The Battle for the North, an Offshoot Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 108-110. For Ar- Syria’s East,” The National, January 17, 2012. of the Syrian War: The Fight for Oil Between Kurds, Ji-

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The Kurds Developing an Incipient Authority YPG for armed support.21 In addition, Ras al-Ayn, contiguous as it is with in Al-Hasakah? the al-Sharabiyya and Zubayd Arab the Turkish city of Ceylanpinar, is a Currently, the strongest political tribal communities in the area also convenient logistical route for the armed and military position in the region reportedly feel sufficiently threatened opposition. Ras al-Ayn is also a fault belongs to the Kurds and their armed by the ongoing conflict in Ras al-Ayn line area that Sunni Arab Salafi-jihadi organizations, particularly the Popular and have accepted arms and affiliation organizations would seek to incorporate Protection Units (YPG). While in the with the YPG.22 into an Islamic state and Syrian Kurds past the YPG has been charged with would like to be part of a potentially being an organization with close ties to Major Sites of Conflict in Al-Hasakah autonomous Western Kurdistan.27 Low the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the The fighting in al-Hasakah Province intensity conflict has been ongoing in YPG’s leadership is trying to position demonstrates the complexity of the Ras al-Ayn since the end of 2012, with itself as a pan-ethnic organization that region and the nature of the al-Assad the latest bouts in July and August is the defender of all of the region’s government’s patchwork authority in the most intense and destructive since communities—both from the al- it. Fighting in the region, combined Kurds and Arabs began to clash for Assad government and Salafi-jihadi with a poor economy and increasingly control over the city.28 organizations that are trying to impose difficult access to food resources and an Islamic state on Syria.17 YPG leaders basic medicine, has led to internal The second major site of conflict in also insist that the organization is displacement from conflict areas al-Hasakah Province is in the far apolitical and subsumes itself under such as Ras al-Ayn.23 In late August northeast districts of al-Qahtaniyya the Supreme Kurdish Committee, which and early September 2013, more than and al-Malikiyya, particularly in includes the PYD and the umbrella 30,000 refugees fled to Iraqi Kurdistan, the sub-district of Tal Hamis in al- organization the Kurdish National overcrowding existing refugee camps Qahtaniyya and the sub-district of Council (KNC) that is close to KRG in that region, such as in the province Yarubiyya in al-Malikiyya.29 Tal Hamis President Massoud Barzani.18 YPG of Dohuk, which has been forced and Yarubiyya abut the Syrian-Iraqi forces are estimated to total more than to accommodate more than 55,000 border area of Rabia in the Tal Afar 30,000 fighters from all ethnic and refugees in a camp that was meant for region of Ninawa Province. This area sectarian communities.19 15,000.24 has been the focus of frequent clashes between the Syrian military—which Conflict in the vicinity of the Khabur While the Syrian military retains its has conducted airstrikes against Sunni River is leading to the militarization of strongest outposts in the cities of al- Arab armed opposition groups, the YPG some of the area’s ethnic and sectarian Hasakah and Qamishli, it has ceded a and its local allies—and a reportedly communities or leading them to turn great deal of territory in al-Hasakah tenuous alliance of Sunni Arab armed to the YPG for armed support and Province to local armed groups.25 The opposition groups that seeks to control organization. Assyrian communities in southern countryside of the city of al- the oil fields in and around the towns the area have begun to form militias that Hasakah, in the sub-districts of al- of Mabadi (Girke Lege in Kurdish), Gar man checkpoints to guard access points Arisha, ash-Shaddada, and Markada, Zero, and Suweidia, and the Syrian- to their villages. They are reportedly is the site of clashes. The town of ash- Iraqi border crossing of Yarubiyya/ being organized and trained by an Shaddada in particular has seen fierce Rabia which have been used to smuggle ethnic Assyrian, former Swiss Army fighting, with Salafi-jihadi forces led armed opposition fighters and materiel soldier and are seeking the assistance by Jabhat al-Nusra presently retaining into Syria.30 Armed opposition fighters of the YPG.20 Yazidi villagers are stated control over it and reportedly exploiting 26 to have been threatened by Salafi-jihadi its local oil resources for profit. 27 Wladimir van Wilgenburg, “Clashes Re-Erupt in fighters and as a result have either Syria Between Al-Qaeda, Kurds,” al-Monitor, July 16, fled their villages or are turning to the 2013; “Ras al-Ayn and the Specter of the Buffer Zone,” 21 “Kurdish Yazidi Minority in Syria Targeted By Isla- al-Akhbar, November 16, 2012. hadists, and the Clans,” as-Safir, July 30, 2013; “Deaths mist Armed Group,” ARA News, April 9, 2013. 28 Roy Gutman, “Kurdish-Nusra Battle Becoming a War in Clashes on the Syrian-Iraqi Border,” al-Jazira, March 22 Amed Dicle, “A Kurd-Arab War in Rojava,” Firat Within a War in Northern Syria,” McClatchy Newspa- 3, 2013. News Agency, September 2, 2013; Juwan Sha’doon, “Al- pers, July 23, 2013. 17 Mutlu Civiroglu, “YPG Commander: Kurds are Bul- Sharabiya Arab Tribe in Western Kurdistan,” Rihab 29 “YPG Launches Offensive Against al Nusra Front wark Against Islamic Extremism in Syria,” Rudaw [Iraqi News, August 15, 2013. Fighters,” PUK Media, September 29, 2013; “Fresh Kurdistan], July 22, 2013. 23 Bassem Mroue, “Kurds Carve Out Autonomy in Cha- Clashes Between YPG Fighters and the ISIS,” Firat 18 “YPG: We are Committed to Supreme Kurdish Coun- os of Syrian Civil War,” Associated Press, July 19, 2013. News Agency, September 23, 2013; Youssef Sheikho, cil,” Firat News Agency, September 1, 2013. 24 “Some 30,000 Syrians Flee to Iraq’s Kurdistan Re- “Syria: Al-Qaeda Looking for Local Mujahideen,” al- 19 Ibrahim Hameid, “Kurdish National Council Joins the gion, More Expected,” UN High Commissioner for Refu- Akhbar, September 13, 2013; Ece Goksedef, “War in Syria Coalition and Muslim Rejects the Agreement,” al-Hayat, gees, September 5, 2013. Inspires Kurdish Unity,” al-Jazira, July 27, 2013; “Al- August 28, 2013. 25 Biro. Hasaka Province: 19 YPG Fighters and 35 Fighters from 20 Andrea Giloti, “Syriac Christians, Kurds Boost 26 Loveday Morris, Joby Warrick and Souad Mekhen- the al-Nusra Front, ISIS and Some Rebel Factions Have Cooperation in Syria,” al-Monitor, June 20, 2013; net, “Rival al-Qaeda-Linked Groups Fortifying in Syria Been Killed,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, “One of the Checkpoints that Protects the Entrance with a Mix of Pragmatism and Militancy,” Washington July 20, 2013; Abbas Deiri, Nuha Shabaan, and Bassam to Tal Tamar,” March 4, 2013, available at www. Post, October 13, 2013; “Jabhat al-Nusra Conquers the Hamidi, “Kurds, Iraqis Drawn into Battle for Syria’s youtube.com/watch?v=m3_Dq10yiSo&desktop_ City of ash-Shadaada, al-Hasakah,” June 27, 2013, avail- Eastern Provinces,” Syria Direct, March 6, 2013. uri=%252Fwatch%253Fv%253Dm3_Dq10yiSo. able at www.youtube.com/watch?v=a9q9YVxr6OU. 30 For airstrike and oil field coalition, see Ballout. For

24 october 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 10 seized the Yarubiyya crossing on the militias, tentatively organized under Syrian side of the border in March 2013, the over-arching Supreme Kurdish Recent Highlights in reportedly out of a motivation to prevent Committee, are trying to establish an Terrorist Activity the flow of military assistance from the incipient form of civil governance in the Iraqi government of Nuri al-Maliki to region, even if it stops short of seeking September 2, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): the government of Bashar al-Assad.31 complete autonomy or independence Taliban militants torched a number of from the Syrian state. The success of NATO supply trucks and then attacked Several Sunni Arab armed groups are this effort will depend upon the ability part of a U.S. military outpost in present in the sub-districts of Tal Hamis of the Supreme Kurdish Committee Nangarhar Province. Three insurgents and Yarubiyya, including Jabhat al- to convince al-Hasakah’s ethnic and were killed. Officials said that no Afghan Nusra, al-Qa`ida’s Islamic State of Iraq sectarian minorities—Assyrians, or U.S. soldiers died in the attack. and the Levant (ISIL), and the Shammar Armenians, Yazidis and Turkmen—and – Reuters, September 2; BBC, September 2 tribe-affiliated Free Jazira Brigade.32 Arabs that it can work with them to Other armed opposition organizations constitute an unbiased, pan-communal September 2, 2013 (SOMALIA): U.S. that report their participation in authority. citizen Omar Hammami told Voice of the battle for the area include local America that while he still considers affiliates of the Salafi-jihadi group Currently, the YPG is publicly himself a terrorist, he is no longer a Ahrar al-Sham and the Islamist group positioning itself to contribute to this member of the Somali militant group Tajammu` Kata’ib al-Haqq.33 Salih process by seeking to become the al-Shabab or al-Qa`ida. Hammami, who Muslim, the leader of the PYD, has region’s core defensive force charged has been indicted by a federal grand stated that Kurds control 60% of the with the protection of all of al- jury in the United States, said that al- country’s oil wells, although this figure Hasakah’s constituent communities. Shabab’s leader, Ahmed Godane, is has yet to be independently verified.34 As it distances itself from earlier trying to kill him. Hammami, a 29-year- Fighting for control of the oil fields charges of its close affiliation with the old from Alabama, is wanted by the around Rmeilan is likely to continue PYD, the YPG leadership will also need U.S. government for providing material well into the future, as they offer a to continue to demonstrate battlefield support to al-Shabab, an al-Qa`ida potentially lucrative source of income successes against its antagonists, affiliate. – Voice of America, September 5 for whoever controls them. primarily Sunni armed groups such as the Salafi-jihadi organizations and tribal September 3, 2013 (IRAQ): Gunmen Conclusion militias. It will also need to develop entered the house of a Sunni, pro- The pattern of conflict in al-Hasakah into a genuinely pan-ethnic fighting government militia member in southern Province is a war of positioning in the force to buttress the Supreme Kurdish Baghdad and beheaded him, as well as context of the Syrian military’s receding Committee’s claims of representing all his wife and three children. – Reuters, power in the region. The al-Assad people in the province. September 3 government is forced to rely upon an outpost strategy where the cities of al- Nicholas A. Heras is an Analyst with The September 3, 2013 (IRAQ): A series Hasakah and Qamishli represent its Jamestown Foundation and a Contributing of car bombs killed nearly 60 people most secure means of implementing a Editor and Analyst with the international in predominately Shi`a districts of patchwork influence upon the various affairs journal Fair Observer. A former Baghdad. The Islamic State of Iraq and constituent ethnic and sectarian David L. Boren Fellow, he has extensive the Levant later claimed responsibility. communities in the province. Into field experience throughout Lebanon and – Reuters, September 3; AFP, September 8 this vacuum, the Kurdish parties and Syria researching the politics of identity, cultural conflict, and socioeconomic September 5, 2013 (EGYPT): A suspected border crossing, see Aaron Y. Zelin, “Al-Qaeda in Iraq tension. Mr. Heras holds a B.A. in suicide bomber in a vehicle attacked the Enters the Syria Conflict,” al-Wasat blog, March 11, International Relations and an M.A. convoy of Egyptian Interior Minister 2013; “Syrian Army, Rebel Clashes Bring Conflict to Iraq in International Communication from Mohammed Ibrahim in Cairo, wounding Doorstep,” Reuters, March 2, 2013; “Iraqi Official Says American University in Washington, D.C. seven people. Ibrahim was not injured Jihadists, Weapons On the Move in Syria,” al-Arabiya, in the attack. The Egyptian terrorist February 11, 2012. group Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, which is 31 Deiri et al. based in the Sinai Peninsula, claimed 32 Ballout. responsibility. – AP, September 6; CBS, 33 “Liberating the Village of Jneedea of the Border Dis- September 9 trict Ya’rubiyah,” Ahrar al-Sham, July 25, 2013; “Ugarit, al-Hasakah: Gathering of the Divine Truth Brigades September 7, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): Rebel Convoy Heading to Free the Qamishli Al-Bajaria The Taliban said that they released an Checkpoint,” July 12, 2013, available at www.youtube. Afghan female member of parliament com/watch?v=Gt0wtS2GT78&desktop_uri=%252Fwatc held hostage since August 10 in h%253Fv%253DGt0wtS2GT78&app=desktop. exchange for the release of six 34 Ballout; “Muslim: 60% of Syrian Oil Controlled By prisoners. The released prisoners— Kurds,” Firat News Agency, May 9, 2013; Josh Wood, four women and two children—were “Syria’s Oil Resources are a Source of Contention for family members of Taliban fighters. – Competing Groups,” New York Times, March 20, 2013. AFP, September 7

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September 7, 2013 (SOMALIA): Al- Another man wearing a suicide vest, The ISIL said that the two rebel groups Shabab militants targeted the busy who apparently planned to attack police attacked its forces and suggested that Village restaurant in Mogadishu, when they arrived in response to the they may have collaborated with the killing 15 people. The attack involved a first blast, was arrested nearby. – CNN, Syrian regime. – Reuters, September 13 suicide bomber and a car bomb. – Reuters, September 11 September 7 September 12, 2013 (PHILIPPINES): September 11, 2013 (LIBYA): A car The Abu Sayyaf Group and the newly- September 8, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): bomb exploded near Libya’s Foreign formed Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Taliban suicide bombers attacked Ministry building in Benghazi, exactly Fighters combined forces to attack offices of the provincial intelligence one year after an attack in the same city government troops in Lamitan in the department in Wardak Province, killing that killed the U.S. ambassador and southern Philippines. Three soldiers at least four Afghan intelligence staff. three other Americans. In the latest were wounded in the attack. According – BBC, September 8 attack, there were no serious casualties. to the New York Times, “The violence raised – Washington Post, September 11 fears of a widening of the insurgent September 9, 2013 (JORDAN): Four men threat in the area, where the government appeared in a military court in Jordan September 11, 2013 (EGYPT): Two has for decades been struggling to to face charges of fighting with Jabhat suicide bombers drove their explosives- contain attacks by Muslim-led groups.” al-Nusra in Syria. Jabhat al-Nusra is laden vehicles into military targets – New York Times, September 12 linked to al-Qa`ida. – AP, September 9 in the town of Rafah in the Sinai Peninsula, killing at least six soldiers. September 13, 2013 (GLOBAL): Al- September 10, 2013 (NORTH AFRICA): – CBS, September 11 Qa`ida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri A new video of Mokhtar Belmokhtar released a new audio message marking emerged, ending speculation over September 11, 2013 (SYRIA): According the 12th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks whether he was killed in March 2013. to reports, an Australian jihadist, on the United States. Al-Zawahiri Belmokhtar, the leader of the terrorist known as Abu Asma al-Australi, drove called for more acts of “lone wolf” group behind the attack on the Ain an explosives-laden truck into a Syrian terrorism against the United States. Amenas gas plant in Algeria in January military checkpoint close to the Deir He said, “We must bleed America 2013 that left 37 foreign workers dead, al-Zour military airport. It is not clear economically by provoking it, so that it retains links with al-Qa`ida even how many people died in the explosion, continues its massive expenditures on though he is no longer a member of the although jihadist websites claimed security…Keeping America in a state of group’s Africa affiliate, al-Qa`ida in that 35 Syrian soldiers were killed. Al- tension and anticipation does not cost the Islamic Maghreb. According to CBS Australi fought for the al-Qa`ida-linked us anything but [organizing] dispersed News, “The new video shows the one- Jabhat al-Nusra. – Australian Broadcasting strikes here and there.” Al-Zawahiri eyed leader of the ‘Signatories with their Corporation, September 14; Sydney Morning further specified, “These dispersed Blood’ group, Belmokhtar, chatting Herald, September 14 strikes can be carried out by one with another prominent jihadist, brother, or a small number of brothers.” Abdel Hamid Abou Zaid, who was also September 11, 2013 (THAILAND): Separately, al-Zawahiri urged restraint said by the French to have been killed Suspected separatist gunmen ambushed in attacking other Muslim sects and during confrontations with their forces a Thai police patrol in Yala Province in non-Muslims, and in starting wars in in northern Mali earlier in the year.” southern Thailand, killing five officers. countries where jihadists have a safe – CBS, September 10 – UPI, September 12 base to organize. “As far as targeting the proxies of America is concerned, September 10, 2013 (IRAQ): A series September 12, 2013 (SOMALIA): Omar it differs from place to place,” he said. of bombings targeting both Shi`a and Hammami, a U.S.-born former member “The basic principle is to avoid entering Sunni Muslims in Iraq killed at least 20 of al-Shabab, was killed in a firefight into any conflict with them, except in people. – Reuters, September 10 with al-Shabab militants in Somalia. the countries where confronting them Hammami, who referred to himself as becomes inevitable.” – BBC, September 13; September 11, 2013 (GLOBAL): Somalia’s a “former poster boy” of al-Shabab, Reuters, September 16 al-Shabab militant group, which is an accused its leader, Ahmed Godane, al-Qa`ida affiliate, released a series of betraying al-Qa`ida’s East Africa September 13, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): of posts on Twitter celebrating the operative Fazul Abdullah Muhammad, Two suicide bombers in vehicles anniversary of the 9/11 attacks on the who was killed in 2011. In recent attacked the U.S. Consulate in Herat United States. The militants vowed that months, Hammami wrote on his Twitter Province. After the explosions, Taliban the mujahidin will “continue with their account that al-Shabab was trying to militants on foot engaged in a firefight jihad against the West until the world is kill him. – AFP, September 12 with Afghan security forces around ruled by one sovereign state, an Islamic the compound. At least seven militants state.” – AFP, September 11 September 12, 2013 (SYRIA): The died, while at least two Afghans were Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant killed. – AP, September 13 September 11, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide (ISIL) declared an offensive against the bomber detonated explosives in a crowd Faruq and Nasr battalions, two fellow September 14, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): of Shi`a worshippers at a mosque in rebel factions fighting against the A suicide bomber in a vehicle killed Baghdad, killing at least 30 people. Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad. at least three civilians near Kandahar

26 october 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 10 in southern Afghanistan. – RFE/RL, September 17, 2013 (LIBYA): A car Phoenix, was arrested in March 2013, September 14 bomb killed the head of a criminal and he apparently admitted he worked investigations unit in Benghazi. – AP, alongside Jabhat al-Nusra, an al- September 14, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide September 17 Qa`ida-linked rebel group. – Washington bomber attacked a funeral near Mosul, Post, September 19; CNN, September 20 Ninawa Province, killing at least 20 September 17, 2013 (NIGERIA): Boko people. The attack targeted the Shabak Haram militants disguised in military September 20, 2013 (YEMEN): minority sect. The Shabak are ethnic uniforms killed at least 142 people Suspected al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Turkmen and Shi`a Muslims. – AP, in the Benisheik area in Borno State. Peninsula (AQAP) militants killed at September 14 According to a “security source” quoted least 31 Yemeni soldiers and policemen in Agence France-Presse, the militants in multiple attacks in Shabwa Province September 14, 2013 (YEMEN): Al-Qa`ida “came in droves, driving about 20 in southern Yemen. – Reuters, September 20 in the Arabian Peninsula confirmed pickup trucks.” – AFP, September 20; AFP, that a U.S. drone strike killed one of September 22 September 20, 2013 (SYRIA): Hundreds its leaders, Qaid al-Dahab, at the end of rebels pledged allegiance to the al- of August 2013. He was killed in Bayda September 18, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): Qa`ida-affiliated groups Jabhat al- Province. – AP, September 15 Taliban gunmen on motorbikes killed Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq a senior election official in Kunduz and the Levant in northern and eastern September 15, 2013 (PAKISTAN): Province. After the attack, the Taliban Syria. – Reuters, September 20 A roadside bomb killed a Pakistani took responsibility on Twitter, general and another officer in Upper apparently the first time the group used September 21, 2013 (PAKISTAN/ Dir District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Twitter to officially claim responsibility AFGHANISTAN): Pakistan’s Foreign Province. The officers were visiting a for an assassination. – Dawn, September 18; Ministry confirmed that Mullah Baradar, military outpost near the border with New York Times, September 18 a founder of the Afghan Taliban and its Afghanistan. The Pakistani Taliban former military commander, has been claimed responsibility. – Reuters, September September 18, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): released by authorities in Pakistan to 15 Taliban fighters attacked a police improve the chances for peace talks. – convoy in Badakhshan Province, killing Telegraph, September 21 September 16, 2013 (SPAIN): Spanish 10 policemen. – Reuters, September 19 authorities arrested the alleged leader September 21, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide of a terrorist recruitment network in the September 18, 2013 (SYRIA): The bomber detonated an explosives-laden Spanish North African enclave of Ceuta. Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant vehicle near a tent filled with Shi`a The suspect, Spanish citizen Yassin (ISIL) overran the Syrian town of Azaz, mourners in Baghdad’s Sadr City, Ahmed Laarbi, is accused of sending two miles from the Turkish border. killing 25 people. – Reuters, September 21 50 militants to carry out attacks for al- According to one activist, fighting broke Qa`ida-linked groups in Syria. – Fox out among rebel groups after a Free September 21, 2013 (KENYA): Al- News, September 17 Syrian Army unit refused to allow the Shabab militants conducted a major ISIL to abduct a German doctor working terrorist attack against the upscale September 16, 2013 (RUSSIA): A suicide as a volunteer at a private hospital in Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, bomber in a vehicle killed three police Azaz. – Reuters, September 18 killing at least 67 people in a multi-day outside a police station in Russia’s siege. - AP, September 21 Chechnya region. – Reuters, September 16 September 18, 2013 (JORDAN): A Jordanian military tribunal jailed six September 22, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide September 16, 2013 (NORTH AFRICA): men for trying to join the al-Qa`ida- bomber detonated his explosives inside a Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb linked Jabhat al-Nusra rebel group in tent full of mourners in a predominately released a new video showing seven Syria. According to a Jordanian official, Sunni district of Baghdad, killing at kidnapped Westerners, including four “The convicts, arrested in December least 16 people. – Reuters, September 22 Frenchmen. The four French nationals as they tried to cross the border, were were kidnapped in northern Niger charged with carrying out acts that September 22, 2013 (PAKISTAN): in September 2010. The other three would expose Jordan and its citizens Two suicide bombers detonated their hostages—a Dutchman, a Swede and to the risk of acts of aggression and explosives outside an Anglican church a South African—were abducted in revenge.” – AFP, September 18 after the Sunday service in Peshawar, northern Mali in November 2011. – killing at least 78 people. It marked Business Standard, September 17; AFP, September September 19, 2013 (UNITED STATES): the deadliest attack in recent history 16 According to the Washington Post, “A on Christians in Pakistan. – Australian U.S. Army veteran accused of fighting Broadcasting Corporation, September 23 September 17, 2013 (IRAQ): A series of alongside a Syrian rebel group linked to car bombs in Baghdad killed at least 31 al-Qa`ida and charged with conspiracies September 22, 2013 (SYRIA): Clashes people. – AP, September 17 that could have landed him in prison for among rebel groups in Syria resulted in life pleaded guilty Thursday to a less the death of a local leader of the Islamic onerous count and was given a sentence State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The of ‘time served.’” Eric Harroun, of leader, Abu Abdullah al-Libi, was the

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amir of the ISIL in Idlib Province. – AFP, September 29, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide CTC Sentinel Staff September 22 bomber killed at least 40 people at a Shi`a Muslim funeral in Mussayab, Editor-in-Chief September 24, 2013 (SYRIA): A car 40 miles south of Baghdad. – Reuters, Erich Marquardt bomb exploded in Damascus, killing at September 29 Senior Editor, CTC least seven civilians. – Reuters, September 24 September 29, 2013 (IRAQ): Militants Editorial Board launched a coordinated suicide and car COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. September 25, 2013 (SYRIA): The bomb attack at the entrance to a Kurdish Department Head Democratic Union Party (PYD), a security service headquarters in Erbil, Department of Social Sciences (West Point) Kurdish militia based in Syria, killed killing six people. It was the first major seven rebels from al-Qa`ida’s Islamic assault in the Kurdistan region since COL Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. State of Iraq and the Levant in Atma, a 2007. – AFP, September 29; Reuters, September Deputy Department Head town on the Turkish border. – Reuters, 29 Department of Social Sciences (West Point) September 26 September 29, 2013 (PAKISTAN): A MAJ Bryan Price, Ph.D. September 25, 2013 (NIGERIA): Boko car bomb killed 33 people on a crowded Director, CTC Haram leader Abubakar Shekau street in Peshawar’s oldest bazaar. – AP, appeared in a new video, boasting of his September 28; AP, September 30 invincibility and promised that there would be “no democracy in Nigeria.” September 29, 2013 (NIGERIA): Boko Shekau, who was supposedly killed in a Haram group gunmen attacked a college gun battle in June, said, “It was said that dormitory and fired on students as they I was killed, but here I am; I deliberately slept, killing 40 people. – AFP, September refused to respond on time; but here I 30 Contact am talking and laughing at Nigerian Combating Terrorism Center authority who misled the world that I September 30, 2013 (UNITED STATES): U.S. Military Academy am dead.” He further said, “The concept A U.S. court sentenced Sabirhan 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall of government of the people by the Hasanoff to 18 years in prison for aiding West Point, NY 10996 people, for the people cannot continue al-Qa`ida. Hasanoff, an accountant Phone: (845) 667-6383 to exist. It shall soon, very soon, be living in New York, scoped out the New Email: [email protected] replaced by ‘Government of Allah, by York Stock Exchange as a potential Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ Allah for Allah.’” – Daily Post, September 25; target for al-Qa`ida in 2008. – Reuters, UPI, September 25 September 30 * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 September 26, 2013 (SYRIA): Kurdish September 30, 2013 (IRAQ): militiamen killed the Islamic State of Approximately 14 car bombs rocked Iraq and the Levant’s local commander predominately Shi`a areas of Baghdad, in Aleppo. – AP, September 26 killing at least 54 people. – Reuters, September 30 support September 27, 2013 (PAKISTAN): A The Combating Terrorism Center would bomb tore through a bus carrying junior September 30, 2013 (YEMEN): like to express its gratitude to its financial government officials in Peshawar, Suspected al-Qa`ida in the Arabian supporters, for without their support and killing at least 18 people. – CBS, September Peninsula militants seized a military shared vision of the Center products like the 27 base in Hadramawt Province. The CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you fighters were dressed in fatigues and are interested in learning more about how September 27, 2013 (MALI): Al-Qa`ida riding in military trucks. The fighters to support the Combating Terrorism Center, in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) named a reportedly held hostage a number of please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call replacement for Abdelhamid Abu Zeid, high-ranking officers and soldiers Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association who was killed in fighting with French- inside the base. – AP, September 30; AP, of Graduates at 845-446-1561. led forces. Said Abou Moughatil, an September 30 Algerian, will now command AQIM’s Tarik ibn Ziyad battalion in northern Mali. – AFP, September 27

September 28, 2013 (MALI): A suicide bomber in a vehicle killed at least The views expressed in this report are those of two people near a military camp in the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, Timbuktu. Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic the Department of the Army, or any other agency Maghreb claimed responsibility. – Voice of the U.S. Government. of America, September 30

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