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IRAQI , PERSECUTION AND STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE

Pasar Abdulkareem Fendi1, Salawati Mat Basir2, Span Jameel Mustafa3 and Sarsam Khaleel Shwani4

1 Faculty of Law, The National University of Malaysia. And Scientific Research and Development Center- Nawroz University- Regional, 2 Faculty of Law, The National University of Malaysia 3 Department of Law, College of Law and political science, Nawroz University, Iraq 4 Department of Media Techniques, Erbil Technical Administrative College, Erbil Polytechnic University, Kurdistan region of Iraq

Received: 10 April 2020 Revised and Accepted: 26 June 2020

Abstract: The present paper contextualises the discussion by examining the case of the Iraqi Kurds. The discussion begins with an overview of the origin of the Kurds and Kurdistan on the other hand Other major developments torch-lighted in this paper include the Kurdish elections of 1992, the establishment of a Kurdistan regional government and the adoption of a new Iraqi constitution in 2005, which recognises the Kurdistan Region as a federal entity within the Republic of Iraq. Key constitutional disputes between the Kurdistan region and the Iraqi federal government are also discussed. On the other hand, a highpoint of the paper is the 2017 referendum for independence held in the Kurdistan region in which the Kurds voted overwhelmingly to separate from Iraq. The rest of the paper examines after the referendum. The paper ends with a summary of the situation in the Kurdistan region after the 2017 independence referendum. Keywords: Kurdish, Uprising, Parliament Election, establishment government, federalism, independence referendum, referendum Sanctions.

I. INTRODUCTION Following the Kurdish elections of 1992, an autonomous government was established for the region, which is recognised by the new Iraqi constitution of 2005 as a federal unit of Iraq. The end of the Saddam regime in 2003 was expected to improve the region’s condition. Unfortunately, the Kurds have continued to suffer marginalisation and neglect of their constitutional rights by the Iraqi government, despite their contributions to national building, even in the face of extreme repression. The continuing oppression compelled the Kurdistan region to hold a referendum in September of 2017. The Kurds voted overwhelmingly to secede from Iraq, with mixed international reaction. In response, the Iraqi government dispatched military troops to the region, banned all international flights and withheld oil revenues, as well as workers’ salaries, weakening the region’s economy. Today, with persistent tension between the KRG and their Iraqi federal counterpart over the status of disputed territories, allocation of federal budget, as well as ownership and commercialisation of the country’s oil resources, among other issues, prospects for a political solution to the present crisis look dim.

II. KURDS AND KURDISTAN: AN OVERVIEW The Kurds and the Kurdistan territory have historically been dominated by different imperial powers. An example is the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman sultans ruled over what was previously known as Mesopotamia, and in recent times called Iraq and Kurdistan. Some scholars, indeed, trace the modern history of the Kurds to the rise of the Ottoman Empire. Geopolitically, it is believed that the Kurdish territory was once under the control of both the Ottoman and the Persian Empires.

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According to some historical accounts, the Kurds are an ancient people, who, at different eras, suffered invasion and domination from numerous foreign groups, such as the Armenians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Greeks, Hittites, Mongols, Parthians and Persians, forcing them into constant migration. This broad area is referred to as Kurdistan, which is believed to have first emerged in the 12th century. The word, “Kurdistan,” itself, is the subject of controversy. For some, it means the land of the Kurds, with “Kurd” representing the ethnic inhabitants and “istan” standing for “the land of” (McDowall, 2004).

III. KURDISH UPRINSING, ESTABLISHMENT OF SAFE HAVENS AND FORMATION OF A REGIONAL GOVERNMENT FOR THE KURDS 2.1 Kurdistan Region from 1990 to 2003 Kurdish uprising began in Raniyah, a town close to Sulaymaniyah on 5 March of 1991. The Kurds mounted assaults on the establishments of the much dreaded state security police and dislodged the Iraqi government in Kurdish areas such as Dohok, Erbil, Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah. Attacks then spread to other key Kurdish cities. Through the coalition provided by the IKF, the Kurdish military force, , meaning those who face death, effectively managed the uprising. As a result of their brave efforts, the Kurds eventually gained control over Kurdistan on 19 March of 1991(John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, 1993). In the course of the uprising and even before it started, a good number of mustashars, as well as Jash forces, who were Kurdish militias fighting for the Iraqi government, switched allegiance and joined the IKF-controlled Peshmerga. They became sure that the Saddam regime had been incapacitated, even though some of them still remained with the Iraqi forces (Graham Brown, 1999). From 28 March of 1990 onwards, after Saddam deployed Iraqi troops into Kurdish areas, the Kurds were forcefully removed from key cities and sent to mountain areas on Iranian and Turkish borders. Reminded of the rein of terror suffered from the Iraqi regime during the 1988 Anfal campaign and concerned about their personal survival, about 2 million civilian Kurds escaped to mountains covered in snow (M. Malone, 2006). As the international community began to receive news of Kurdish refugees battling with cold and hunger in the mountains, there was global outcry. Foreign governments came under pressure to take military and humanitarian measures to alleviate their plight and possibly set up a “safe haven” for refugees in the northern part of Iraq (Thomashausen, 2002). On 28 April of 1991, aid started to arrive, catering for about a million Kurds left in extreme conditions at the border with (Nicholas J. Wheeler, 1992). Foreign aid agencies embarked on a large-scale assistance programme to improve the plight of Kurdish refugees. In view of the intolerable state of affairs described above, Western powers, led by the U.S., the UK and France, set up a safe area under their control, the so-called “Operation Provide Comfort” (David M. Malone). The allied powers eventually forced Iraqi forces to pull out of Kurdish areas, which they declared a safe haven in April of 1991. It can be said that the international intervention was successful as it ensured access to food, clothing and shelter for Kurdish refugees, as well as safe passage to their abodes in the north of Iraq. (W. Rudd, 2004) Surely, it was in a bid to end the brutal treatment of the Iraqi Kurds and their deplorable conditions that the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 688 on 5 April of 1991 (M. Malone, 2006). The resolution decried the violent repression of Iraqi civilians, particularly in Kurdish areas, which posed a unique humanitarian dilemma to the international community. The cross-border military operations of the Iraqi government and massive outflow of Kurdish refugees, were viewed as endangering international security. Thus, the resolution also called on the Iraqi regime to end its threat to global peace and security by putting a stop to its repressive activities in the Kurdish region and permitting the entry of international humanitarian agencies to areas in need of aid throughout Iraq (S/RES/0688, 1991). Nonetheless, even though that resolution facilitated access to aid for the Kurds, the overall situation continued to be of concern as the number of refugees continued to increase. That compelled the U.S. and the UK to create “no- fly- zones” close to Duhok to shield the Kurds against air attacks from Iraqi military planes in the north (Gareth R. V. Stansfield, 2003). In other words, with the continuing suppression and large scale departure of Kurds from the north of Iraq, the coalition forces deemed it necessary to protect them (McDowall, 2004). The safe haven was, therefore, an international humanitarian response to the threat of starvation and death to which the Kurds, particularly those in the mountains, were exposed by the Iraqi government. It gave the Kurds the rare opportunity of establishing a de facto administration for self-rule and the determination of how they were to continue their relations with the Iraqi government.

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As it turned out, Resolution 688 marked one of the turning points in the lives of people in the Kurdistan region. McDowall adds that it made some historic highlights in the field of international law. For the first time since the League of Nation’s arbitration on the Mosul province in 1925, an international instrument made express reference to the Kurds, thereby enhancing their international status. The resolution is also unprecedented in authorising foreign intervention in the domestic affairs of a UN member state. Moreover, in defining international peace and security, the resolution referred to the Iraqi government’s acts of internal repression provoking “an outflow of refugees towards and across international borders” (Kerim Yildiz, 2004). Even after the pull out of coalition forces, the no-fly zones in northern Iraq were to be maintained under the surveillance of coalition forces, who would be prepared to launch appropriate reprisals, whenever the Kurds were attacked by the Iraqi government (J. Wheeler, 2000). Alongside these developments, the Kurdish leadership went into dialogue with the Iraqi government for autonomy. In the course of discussions, however, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah fell under the control of Kurdish forces, the Peshmerga, in July of 1991 (Graham Brown, 1999).

2.2 The Kurdish Elections of 1992 and the Establishment of Kurdistan Regional Government On 19 May of 1992, the Kurds, for the first time in their history, formed their own parliament and local authorities for complete self-rule, marking the final end of Iraqi government control over the northern part of the country. Free elections were successfully held in Kurdish-controlled areas in which a great number of visibly excited Kurds turned out to select members of the KNA (Ewan Anderson, 2003). They also participated in the presidential elections. Almost all the major political groups took part in the elections, Thus, has “been in control of their own region, and they have been able to institutionalise self-rule in northern Iraq through the Kurdistan Regional Government” (Denise Natali, 2004). In effect, it can be said that Iraqi Kurdistan became a de facto Kurdish state, at least, from 1991 to 2003 (Ali Naji, 2018). During those elections, the lack of census figures for the Kurdistan region, but also for the wider Iraq, presented a major difficulty, given distortions in the population caused by the Arabisation policy and violent treatment of the Kurds by the former Iraqi regime (Gareth Stansfield, 2003). Notwithstanding, through Law No. 1, the Kurdish legislative assembly clearly showed that their relationship with the Iraqi government would best be based on federalism. Even though the Kurds were practising self-rule for the first time, they did so successfully, achieved reasonable progress and tried to secure the political and cultural rights of the various inhabitants of the Kurdish region. Perhaps, they could also have attempted to assuage the anxiety of surrounding states, convince them of their ability to maintain unity and peace in the region, and further that they had no intention to undermine their territory integrity or that of Iraq by seceding. Later on 4 July of 1992, the first regional cabinet was formed based on Law No. 3 of 1992. It comprised the Prime Minister, deputy prime minister, fifteen ministers and five ministers of state. Rivalry among the KDP, KNA and the PUK was addressed through a “power sharing” arrangement under which the 105 seats in the KNA were shared equally among them (Gareth R. V. Stansfield, 2003), apart from the five seats allocated to minority Christians. Regrettably, in 1994, conflict broke out between the two major Kurdish parties, the KDP and the PUK; a situation that was worsened both by UN sanctions on Iraq and the latter’s economic siege on the region (Yildiz, 2004). As the conflict approached a halting stalemate, threatening a virtual meltdown of the region, both parties agreed on a ceasefire in 1998 (Charles Tripp, 2007).

IV. Kurdistan Region Post-2003 In 2003, when the Second broke out between Iraq and the West, President Saddam lost power. During that war, the Kurds joined U.S. forces and supported them in gaining control over the key cities of Kirkuk and Mosul. That “paved the way for even greater Kurdish autonomy” (McDowall, 2004), completely enhancing the position of Iraqi Kurdistan. The KRG gained international recognition as a lawful political and legal establishment (Natali, 75). Recognition of the KRG increased with the advent of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). Although viewed as no more than an appendage of the Coalition Provisional Authority, a transitional government set up for Iraq by the U.S.-led coalition forces, the IGC strengthened the legitimacy of the KRG. This is because it was during the time of the IGC that the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), the precursor of the 2005 Iraqi constitution was drafted. For the Kurds, TAL was a somewhat sacrosanct instrument, since it laid the foundation for a federal system of government in Iraq (TAL, Article 53).

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On 8 March of 2004, TAL, formally known as the “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,” was signed. It served as an interim constitution, which outlined a process for political transition, while also preserving the autonomy of the KRG and its power to modify the implementation of specific national laws. Prominent among the provisions of TAL is Article 54 (A, B), which set out the powers of the KRG (TAL, Article 54). Also of relevance is Article 55, which gave increased support to Kurdistan region’s autonomy (TAL, Article 55).

V. The Kurdistan Region under the New Iraqi Constitution of 2005 On 15 October of 2005, a referendum was conducted during which Iraqis voted to adopt the new constitution. For the Kurds, four cardinal principles are germane to the constitution namely, federalism, equal rights for women, freedom of individual conscience and justice for the victims of Ba’athism (Qubad Talabani, 2005). The constitution provides for a federal government, as well as regional governments meant to facilitate autonomous rule. It also recognises the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional (IKR) and its regional, as well as federal authorities. In addition to Arabic, recognition is equally granted to Kurdish as an official language (Iraqi Constitution 2005, Article 4). Revenues derived from oil and gas shall be shared equitably among the regions, with all Iraqis as beneficiaries (Dewhurst, 2006). a Kurdistan Region Recognised as a Federal Entity within the Republic of Iraq Under the 2005 Iraqi constitution, the three governorates of Dohuk, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, as well as some parts of the governorates of Diyala, Kirkuk (al-Taamim) and Ninawa were accorded formal recognition as federal entities under the authority of the KRG. Article 115 of the constitution strengthened the powers of regional governments, the KRG having been the sole one in existence when it was signed (Iraqi Constitution 2005, Article 115). Legally speaking, the above article similarly permits regional governments to adopt their own laws on some matters. The Kurds insisted vehemently on this provision during deliberations over the structure of the constitution, because, according to Kelly, it significantly limited the authority of the federal government in the autonomous regions (Iraqi Constitution 2005, Article 115). An important feature of the 2005 constitution is the establishment of a federal system of government. Federal systems “incorporate elements of self-rule in the sense that their component units enjoy a certain degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the federal government even as they share in the control of that government” (John McGarry, Brendan O’Leary, 207). This system defines the relationship of the IKR with the Iraqi central government; one that is premised on freedom and independence. The constitution is shaped by the belief that the Arabs and the Kurds have willingly opted for a partnership and to live in unity with full sovereignty. According to its preamble, “we are the people of Iraq, who in all our forms and groupings undertake to establish our union, ‘freely and by choice’ and to adhere to this constitution, which shall preserve for Iraq its free union of people, land and sovereignty; adhering to this constitution will protect Iraq’s free union as people, land and sovereignty” (Iraqi Constitution 2005, Preamble). It has been argued that if, as affirmed above by the preamble of the 2005 constitution, Kurdish participation in the drafting of the constitution and nation building is based on free will, then the Kurds are also free to withdraw that participation, if in the future they choose to do so. The right to pursue separation from the Iraqi state can also be gleaned from several other unequivocal provisions in the constitution, which allow the Kurds to freely depart from the union, if they perceive unacceptable violation of their rights. Considering that the Kurds feel deeply connected with Kirkuk and other areas still under dispute, it would almost certainly cause violence if, in the future, they are not incorporated into Kurdistan (John McGarry, Brendan O’Leary, 2007). Despite the foregoing provisions, under Article 106 of the constitution, the federal is exclusively charged with the task of preserving the territorial integrity of Iraq. That article states that, “the federal authorities shall preserve the unity, integrity, independence, sovereignty of Iraq and its federal democratic system” (Iraqi Constitution 2005, Article 116.). At the same time, it seems open to the Iraqi federal government to challenge any such act of secession by claiming it is only discharging its obligation to preserve the country’s territorial integrity in accordance with this article. Any claim of the right of secession must also be reconciled with UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 on the principle of self-determination (A/RES/2625(XXV).

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b Constitutional Articles related to Natural Resources There are also serious disagreements over provisions in the 2005 Iraqi constitution concerning natural resources. Which organ has control over those resources: the federal government, the regional governments or both? The federal government’s control over natural resources in the country is viewed as the hallmark of centralization (John McGarry, Brendan O’Leary, 2007). However, as O’Leary maintains, “the constitution makes clear that natural resources are not an exclusive competence of the federal government” (Bouillon, 2007). As provided in Article 111, “oil and gas are owned by all the people of Iraq.” McGarry stresses that this provision is clearly separate and independent of Article 110, which outlines the powers exclusively reserved for the federal government (John McGarry, 2007). Article 111 is viewed as an exemption clause, which ought to be construed in pari passu with Article 115, according to which, “all powers not stipulated in the exclusive powers of the federal government belong to the authorities of the regions and governorates that are not organised in a region.” (A. Dewhurst, 2006) In respect of other powers exercisable by both the federal and the regional governments, laws made by the regions and governorates not organised in a region shall prevail, in the event of any conflict (Iraqi Constitution 2005, Article 115.). As Article 116(2) provides, “the regional authority has the right to amend the implementation of the federal law in the region in the case of a contradiction between the federal and regional laws in matters that do not pertain to the exclusive powers of the federal authorities.”(Iraqi Constitution 2005, Article 116) Another key constitutional provision relating to oil and gas, is Article 112, which avers that, “the federal government, with the producing governorates and regional governments, shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from present fields, and that the federal government, with the producing regional and governorate governments, shall together formulate the necessary strategic policies to develop the oil and gas wealth in a way that achieves the highest benefit to the Iraqi people”( Iraqi Constitution 2005, Article 112). The above article, together with Article 114, can be viewed as defining additional areas in which both the regional and the federal governments may exercise concurrent powers. Nevertheless, Article 112 should be construed in tandem with Articles 115 and 121, which proclaim the supremacy of the regions (John McGarry, 2007). Significantly, according to Horowitz, Article 112 “restricts the federal government's role to present fields [and this] “seems to tie the distribution of future oil revenue to the location of the resource in one region or another”. Since Iraq’s oil resources are concentrated in the Shiite south and the Kurdish north (D L Horowitz, 2005), however, this would cause grave concern to the Sunni Arabs, who would become landlocked and bereft of oil (International Crisis Group, 2006). c Kirkuk and Disputed Areas The Kurds “want to maintain as much autonomy as possible in a federal Iraq” and have consequently stuck frantically to their long-held claim to the oil-endowed, “ethnically mixed city of Kirkuk as their regional capital” (BBC, 2018). Kirkuk, being one of the biggest oilfields worldwide, understandably ranks among the most disputed parts of Iraq (Brendan O'Leary, John McGarry and Khaled Salih, 2005). Control over its oil resources has been the subject of heated controversy between the Iraqi Kurdistan region and the Iraqi federal government. It is yet unclear which of the disputants will eventually gain control over the area. Evidently, however, “the outcome of the Kirkuk issue, which has been an area of major focus in the Post-War conflict, will have a significant effect on both the long and short term stability of Iraq”(Kerim Yildiz, 2004). The status of Kirkuk city, as well as the Kirkuk governorate was not addressed under TAL, thus creating a need to have it resolved during negotiations over the 2005 constitution (O’Leary, 2009) This city, which is richly endowed with oil resources has stood out as one of the main stumbling blocks to a permanent resolution of the Kurdish dilemma in the northern part of Iraq. Kirkuk is of great significance to the Kurds, both strategically and economically, and control over this area will be critical to any future secessionist bid by the Kurds. (TAL, Article 58). In 2005, when the Iraqi Council of Representatives adopted the present constitution, an important provision was made in Article 140 The constitution stressed the need to fully implement Article 58 of TAL and provided under Article 140 for the status of Kirkuk to be determined in three stages. First, is for the demographic condition of that area to be returned back to its original position prior to the Saddam regime and its Arabisation policy. Next, is for the conduct of a census to determine the composition of Kirkuk’s population. Finally, is the holding of a referendum to decide whether or not Kirkuk should join the region of Kurdistan (Mark A. Dewhurst, 2006).

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In line with the above constitutional provision, a referendum was scheduled to determine the status of Kirkuk. However, voting was never conducted because the prerequisites for a referendum, particularly, the conduct of a census, could not be fulfilled. In any case, many groups in Kirkuk have now come to perceive Article 140 as promoting only Kurdish interests in the area and will expectedly do everything possible to hinder its implementation (David Romano, 2007). Turcomans notes that, although the Kurds have always been the majority in Kirkuk, particularly prior to Saddam’s Arabisation campaign, Arab leaders insist that they too have the right of stay since they were settled there legally. As things stand, the Kurds are likely to obstruct the conduct of any provincial elections in Kirkuk, unless its status is resolved. Cogan remarks that “Kurdish control of Kirkuk would provide the economic foundations for the long- term perspective of Kurdish nationalists a separate Kurdish State” (James Cogan, 2007). Surely, growing unease between the Kurds and the Iraqi federal government will cause anxiety among minorities in the northern part of the country about their own status. Timely resolution of this political issue is imperative to prevent further conflict in Kirkuk and the wider region. Kirkuk is viewed as a microcosmic representation of Iraq, given its multi ethnic composition. According to Salih, it “waits an uncertain future as disagreements about the future of the city increase; a victim of its oil wealth, Kirkuk has for long been a divisive issue in Iraq's politics” (M A Salih, 2018). Over time, however, different Iraqi governments made varying levels of attempts to alter the ethnic composition of the Kirkuk region. It is reported that from the 1970s until 2003, Saddam forcefully relocated over 100,000 Kurds with the aim of “Arabising” Kirkuk city (L Beehner, 2018). Through a policy of bringing in Arab settlers to replace Kurds expelled or killed as part of the Arabisation campaign, Arab population in Kirkuk city rose from under 30 per cent reported in the 1957 census to about 44 per cent, according to a 1977 census (L Beehner, 2018). According to the U.S. Department of State, between 1991 and 1999, “in north Iraq, the government continued its campaign of forcibly deporting Kurdish and Turcoman families to southern governorates, as a result of these forced deportations, approximately 900,000 citizens were internally displaced throughout Iraq”( Nouri Talabany, 2011). d Key Constitutional Disputes between the Iraqi Federal Government and the Kurdistan Region A number of dilemmas are posed by the 2005 Iraqi constitution. For example, Article 13 is in conflict with Article 116. Based on Article 13, the constitution is the supreme law of the country. Yet, Article 116 permits regional governments to amend federal laws. Regional laws and constitutions ought to conform with rather than contradict the federal constitution. (Rebwar Fatah, 2018) The role played by the Kurdish parliament is akin to that of a '”council” for the Kurdish region; it lacks the power of a regional parliament under a federal system of government. Articles 1 and 107, as well as the preamble of the constitution potentially endanger the unity and continued existence of Iraq. By providing that Iraq is a “voluntary union” between the Arabs and the Kurds, it seems to grant the latter the freedom to withdraw from the union. Moreover, while Articles 113-122 provide for balance of power between the regional governments and the federal government of Iraq, determining the details of this arrangement is left to the council of representatives. In terms of power distribution, those articles allocate broad authority to the regional governments, while restricting that of the federal government. As a whole, the Iraqi federal system is largely ambiguous, leaving room for different interpretations. The arrangement is a rather loose one that grants the regions, particularly the Kurds, the highest possible level of independence in running their affairs. With regard to the Iraqi security and armed forces, Article 9 provides that the need for “balance and representation” should be taken into consideration. However, under sec Article 9 B thereof, the formation of militias outside the conventional armed forces is prohibited, although the Kurdish Peshmerga is permitted to operate in the Kurdistan region. It means that the Shiite and the Sunni militias presently in existence, would have to be absolved into the armed forces of Iraq. The implication is that the Iraqi federal government needs to strike a compromise between its armed forces and the militias. The militias are established by the different ethnic groups to provide security for their respective regions, while the Iraqi armed forces are constituted by all the ethnic groups to defend the whole country against domestic and foreign dangers. Articles 110 and 112 of the constitution strive to apply a quota system to oil and gas resources by calling for their equitable distribution in line with the demographic composition of Iraq. Despite that, no clarity is provided on oil and gas exploration rights. Another problematic provision is Article 140, which concerns between thirty and forty disputed areas in Iraq (Ramzy Mardini, 2009). It has generated the greatest rift between the Kurdistan region and the federal government. Articles 110 and 112 extend the quota system to oil and gas resources, and demands their equitable distribution

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based on the demographic composition of Iraq. The constitution, however, leaves a gap in respect of oil and gas exploration rights. This issue was not addressed in TAL and was supposed to have been resolved during deliberations over the present constitution in line with Article 140. The federal government was supposed to have implemented Article 140 by December 2007, but failed to do so, causing distraught among the Kurds (B Katulis and P Juul, 2008). When on 12 June of 2014 the Kurdish Peshmerga eventually took over Kirkuk, ( Tanya Goudsouzian and Lara Fatah, 2015) the then Kurdish President, Masoud Barzani, declared that Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution on disputed areas, had been enforced in the province of Kirkuk; a step he claimed was irreversible Iraqi (Constitution 2005, Article 140). It seems to be, therefore, that it was a positive turning point for the Kurds when they voted to support the Iraqi constitution in 2005. For some though, this constitution has only ushered in a new phase in the repression of the Kurds. For example, the federalism professed by the constitution is weak and hardly beneficial to them (Kenneth Katzman, 2010) it fails to acknowledge the “ethnic, historic and geographical reality of a Kurdish homeland” (Rebwar Fatah, 2006).

VI. KURDISH DURING ISALAMIC SATATE (IS) PERIOD Unfortunately, in July of 2014, the general atmosphere in Iraq deteriorated as Islamic extremists overran cities in northern Iraq and declared as an Islamic caliphate (Chelsea J. Carter, 2014) all territories under their control (Frank Gardner, 2014). This seriously impacted regional and international stability. Sectarian violence spiralled out of control, the country faced a civil war and security broke down completely, posing a threat to regional and global security. Within the country, large numbers of the population were internally displaced and essential services left in short supply. In fact, Iraq became a quasi-failed state in which the government was shown to be incapable of preserving the federal system. The Iraqi army lost control of the city of Mosul and most of the Sunni areas in northern Iraq to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS-ISIL). As a result, the KRG was saddled with the responsibility of securing the lives and properties of the Kurdish people since the Iraqi army was no longer in the position to ensure the security of its citizens and borders (International Organization for Migration, 2018). With the rapid capitulation of the Iraqi army before ISIS forces in northern Iraq, the Kurds moved quickly to seize control of disputed territories, especially Kirkuk city(BBC News, 2014) to prevent its oil resources from falling into the hands of the jihadists (Jim Muir, 2014). Between 2014 and 2018, over 2,000 members of the Kurdish peshmerga died, while not less than 10,000 were injured as they fought to defend the KRI and disputed areas against ISIS advances. During this period, the KRI enjoyed the highest level of security in the whole of Iraq and remained the fountain of stability (Kurdistan Regional Government Representation in the United States, 2018).

VII. The 2017 Referendum for Independence in the Kurdistan Region Amidst their liberation struggle, the Kurds during an independence survey in 2017 (Al Jazeera, 2017), received several assurances in the course of negotiations with the Iraqi government. In the end, the government did not fulfil its promises. Instead, the Kurds were marginalised and their agitation for the fulfilment of those promises was met with a tough response from the federal government. As this paper has already shown, the Kurds have suffered extreme repression, including house arrest, forced displacement, genocide and chemical attacks, such as those in Anfal and Halabja, in addition to the destruction of Kurdish villages, cities, as well as their economic infrastructure. It has also been seen in this paper, that the liberation of the Iraqi people from the Saddam regime in 2003, marked the birth of a new country founded on democratic principles, voluntary federalism and multiparty politics. With a policy of inclusiveness that allowed participation from all ethnic and religious groups, the Kurds were deeply involved in the restoration of the country. Even though they suffered intolerable repression and paid a supreme price throughout successive Iraqi regimes, the Kurds frantically helped in erecting the pillars of a new Iraq and the drafting of a new constitution that recognises the rights of citizens from all parts of the country. Regrettably, ever since then, the Iraqi government has continued to abuse the rights of the Kurds, including their marginalisation, which manifestly violates the constitution and threatens the basis of federalism in the country. Constitutional provisions regarding the equitable distribution of revenues and the redrawing of the Kurdish region’s borders, are yet to be enforced. The Kurdish regions have even had their share of the federal budget sliced. Moreover, the government has failed to create federal councils as required by the constitution. It must be remembered that the 2005 constitution, including its preamble, calls for the observance of its provisions,

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commitment to the voluntary union of the Iraqi people and the protection of their rights, including those of the Kurds (Iraqi Constitution, Preamble, 2005). On 7 June of 2017, Iraqi Kurdistan Regional President Masoud Barzani held a meeting with political party leaders and representatives in the Kurdish parliament and the KRG (Maher Chmaytelli , 2017), as well as the president of the KRG and the president of the Supreme Commission for Elections and Referendum in the Kurdistan Region. They deliberated over the general situation in the Kurdistan region, as well as areas of differences among the Kurds. The main point of the discussion was the non-enforcement of the rights of the Kurdistan people and potential solutions. They finally arrived at several decisions by an absolute majority (Kurdistan Region Presidency statement, 2017). Importantly, it was also decided that 25 September of 2017 should be set for the holding of referendum in the Kurdistan region, as well as in regions outside the regional government for the people to determine their political future. In this respect, it was decided that a higher committee for the referendum should be created by the presidency of Masoud Barzani, head of the region (Kurdistan Region Presidency statement, 2017). Later on, 10 July of 2017, political party heads and representatives that were not members of the Kurdistan parliament had a meeting with Barzani, expressing their support for the conduct of the proposed referendum. The Supreme Commission for Elections and Referendum in the Kurdistan Region included representatives of all the political parties, religious and national groups in the Kurdistan region (Kurdistan Parliament a statement, 2017).

6.1 Ruling of Iraqi Federal Supreme Court The Iraqi government applied to the country’s Federal Supreme Court to declare moves by any province to secede from Iraq as unconstitutional and void. It also urged the Court to restrain the Kurdistan region from taking further action based on the referendum. The Court granted both prayers (Iraqi Prime Minister's Media Office, 2017). However, the leadership of the Kurdistan region denounced the Court’s verdict and promised to issue a common Kurdish stance on the matter. In its ruling, the Court had noted that Article 1 of the Iraqi constitution and other related constitutional provisions stress Iraq’s unity and further that, under Article 109 of the constitution, it was the responsibility of the federal government to defend that unity (Iraqi Federal Supreme Court decision No 122, 2017). Nonetheless, since the Court failed to say that Article 116 of the constitution did not permit any of constituent parts of Iraq to break away, the KRG saw this ruling as a victory, insisting that it should form the bedrock for broad discussions on the way out of the crisis. For the Kurds, the preservation of Iraq’s unity mentioned in Article 1 of the constitution could only be guaranteed by upholding the rights and powers provided in the said constitution (Iraqi Federal Supreme Court Statement, 2017).

6.2 Results of the Kurdistan Referendum for Independence The following were the results of the referendum on the independence of Kurdistan held in the Kurdistan region, as released by Electoral Commission on 27 September of 2017 (The Independent High Elections and Referendum Commission, 2017): - Number of eligible voters: 4,581,255 - Number of participants in the referendum: 3,305,925 (72.16%) - Number of Yes votes: 2,861,471 (92.73 per cent) - Number of No votes: 224,468 (7, 27 per cent) - Excluded votes: 170 - Cancelled votes: 40,011 - Number of blank ballots: 9,368.

VIII. Kurdistan Region after the 2017 Referendum on Independence The referendum on Kurdistan’s independence conducted on 25 September of 2017 resulted in a serious face-off between the KRG and the Iraqi federal authorities. The latter ignored all moves to begin negotiations on

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Kurdistan’s separation from Iraq. It rejected the outcome of the referendum, even though the Kurdish leadership suggested that the referendum was not determinative, but only served as a basis for discussions between both sides. It seems that the main factor behind the Iraqi federal government’s opposition to Kurdish independence was the fear that it would further disrupt an already fragile country, which was facing challenges from ISIS, as well as tribal and sectarian violence. Kurdistan’s secession would deepen the political crisis in Iraq with potential on regional stability (BBC, 2017). Shortly after the referendum, the Iraqi parliament rejected it as unconstitutional. The airports in Erbil and Sulaymaniah were later shut down. This cut Kurdistan off from foreign investments, blocked access to the region for international firms and expatriate workers, further hurting an already weakened economy (Al Jazeera, 2017). On 15 October of 2017, the crisis escalated as the Peshmerga refused demands by the federal authorities to peacefully surrender Kirkuk to the Iraqi military. The Peshmerga had insisted that they were bound only by instructions from the KRG and not the Iraqi government; an act that was viewed as a revolt against the Iraqi state (Ferdinand Hennerbichler, 2018). Prior to that showdown, the Iraqi government stopped all communications with the Kurdish leadership; an indication of the policy of isolation principally employed by the government against the Kurds. It seems that the Iraqi government had even been collaborating with neighbouring countries to isolate Kurdistan, as well as regain areas, which, in 2014, had fallen into the hands of the Peshmerga in governorate of Kirkuk. This suspicion was borne out, when on 20 October of 2017, militias led by were stationed in Kirkuk, purportedly for the protection of its oil wells (Iraqi Prime minister, 2017). There have been sporadic clashes between the Kurdish Peshmerga and the PMF. As well as Al-Qa’im, it diminished in importance. The PMF came under criticism for human rights abuses in the Kirkuk governorate, particularly in Tuz Khurmatu (Rudaw, 2017). The Iraq government deployed troops to Kirkuk, banned all international air travels to and out of the Kurdistan region and held back oil revenues, as well as workers’ salaries. These measures worsened political differences in the region, sparked off protests from workers for the nonpayment of salaries and encouraged a culture of corruption. The region’s economy came under severe strain. As things stand presently, the prospect for Kurdish independence is at a low. The conflict that followed the independence referendum has revealed several areas of serious and continuing tension between the KRG and the Iraqi federal government. These include the status of disputed territories, allocation of the federal budget, as well as the ownership and commercialisation of the country’s oil resources. With political leaders struggling to strengthen their positions in their respective constituencies, any meaningful political solution to the present crisis is hardly in sight. Pressed by the perceived injustices from the Iraqi government, Masoud Barzani, President of the Kurdistan region, embarked on what proved to be a highly controversial referendum on the regions’ independence in September of 2017. He defied overwhelming national, regional and international calls against such a move. Although the referendum was successful, with the Kurds voting in large numbers to separate from Iraq, serious adverse consequences later followed. In the face of military response from the Iraqi government, the Kurds lost the territories they had managed to seize during the war against ISIS. As a result, President Barzani was forced to resign from his position.

IX. LEGAL AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS On the domestic level, findings from this study unveil a series of legal dilemmas in relations between the Iraqi Kurdistan region and the Iraqi state. One of them relates to Article 140 of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution. This provision applies to not less than thirty disputed areas in the country, the status of which continues to be perhaps the biggest obstacle in relations between both parties. Further, Articles 110 and 112 of the constitution require the use of quota system in the distribution of the country’s oil and gas resources. Despite calling for these resources to be allocated in an equitable manner based on the country’s demographic composition, the constitution is silent on oil and gas exploration rights. Moreover, some of the constitutional provisions seem to conflict with each other. Article 13, for example, professes the supremacy of the constitution. Despite that, Article 116 grants regional governments the power to override laws made by the federal government. Articles 1 and 107 of the constitution, as well as its preamble pose additional legal quagmires. They provide that Iraq is a “voluntary union” between the Arabs and the Kurds. Thus, they have the potential to orchestrate the country’s disintegration since they impliedly permit the Kurds to separate from the union.

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Relatedly, Articles 113-122 of the constitution provide for balance of power between the regional governments and the Iraqi federal government. They, however, confer far greater powers on the regional governments than on the federal government. This renders the Iraqi federal system anomalous, with the Kurds enjoying the greatest benefit. In the area of security, Article 9 calls for “balance and representation.” At the same time, this article forbids the establishment of militias outside the regular Iraqi armed forces, with the exception of the Kurdish Peshmerga, which is allowed to function in the Kurdistan region. Since there are several other Shiite and Sunni militias in the country, they could undermine the effectiveness of the federal government, unless a compromise is reached between them and the government. Also, Articles 1 and 2 of the constitution describes Iraq as a “democratic” and “Islamic” state, but fails to define these apparently incompatible terms. This vagueness could end up stifling the democratic rights of the general population. Further ambiguity can be found in Article 23(2), which states that, “ownership with the purpose of demographic change is forbidden.” The meaning of this provision is unclear and has the potential to deprive Iraqis of equal representation. This is because some may interpret it as meaning that citizens from one ethnic group cannot own property in another ethnic region.

X. Recommendation On the national level, the 2005 Iraqi Constitution is a focus area. Although it is groundbreaking, there is still scope for improvement. The constitution does not explicitly recognise the Kurds as one of the two main peoples making up the country. Further, it does not address crimes against humanity committed against the Kurds, including the Arabisation campaigns, Operation Anfal, the Halabja genocide, and the destruction of many Kurdish villages. It is crucial to address those and related attempts at the marginalisation of the Kurds and the obliteration of their identity. For the federalism professed by the 2005 constitution to be meaningful and beneficial to the Kurds, their ethnic, historical, and geographical identity should be acknowledged. As well, provisions on the equitable distribution of the country’s revenues, redrawing of the Kurdish region’s borders and the creation of federal councils, should be enforced. In the above regard, areas deserving particular attention include Article 140, which relates to the disputed parts of Iraq, as well as Articles 110 and 112, which require equitable distribution of revenues from oil and gas but ignores issues concerning exploration rights. Moreover, since Article 9 prohibits the formation of other armed forces and militias, except the Kurdish Peshmerga, the fate of other irregular militias should be clarified to ensure that the federal government is not undermined. Moreover, even though Articles 1 and 2 of the constitution provide that Iraq is a “democratic” and “Islamic” state, these terms are not defined. Laws that are not Shariah-compliant could, therefore, be rejected on the basis of this provision, thus posing a threat to the democratic and human rights of the country’s non-Moslems or vice versa. Importantly, the 2005 constitution does not quite facilitate the pursuit of the Kurdish right to self-determination. For example, in the case of Sudan, the constitution permitted the southern part of the country to separate after four years, if its people felt dissatisfied with the central government. This is not exactly so in the case of the Kurdistan region and the Iraqi federal government. To attain a lasting resolution of the conflict between both parties, it is suggested that legislative or some other methods be adopted at the domestic or federal level permitting secession and specifying a timeframe for this to happen.

XI. Conclusion Although the Kurds have enjoyed self-autonomy since 1992, the Iraqi federal government remains unrepresentative, abusive, and more concerned to wipe out Kurdish identity and continue its dominion over the Kurds. Tension continues between the Kurdish regional government and the federal government, leaving the present power-sharing arrangement fragile and unpredictable. Also, the federal government has generally been weak in securing the country’s borders and citizens. In addition, the Kurdish region has demonstrated a capacity for independent statehood. It has also conducted itself responsibly in its pursuit of self-determination, with a clear commitment to democratic and human rights. In these circumstances, the region has earned remedial sovereignty and the majority of the Kurds have expressed a preference for secession from Iraq through a referendum. However, for Kurdish independence to be legitimate and accorded international recognition, the region must continue to abide by the core principles of international

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law and work with the federal government in a democratic manner. To successfully complete the process of earned sovereignty, strong international support is also required. As a whole, this study has attained its objectives. It examined the experiences of the Kurds under successive Iraqi regimes till date and whether their claim to independence is justified. It also considered what steps need to be followed to give legitimacy to such a claim, as well as the likely roles that international law, domestic law, and the international community as a whole could play in this regard.

XII. References

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