THE MILITARY COUP IN , 22 MARCH 2012. REFLECTIONS ON THE DEMISE OF DEMOCRACY AND THE IMPORTANCE OF CIVIL – MILITARY RELATIONS

Thomas C. BRUNEAU, Distinguished Professor Emeritus of National Security Affairs Florina Cristiana (Cris) MATEI, Lecturer Center for Civil – Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, USA

The coup in Bamako, on 22 March 2012 both gave lie to the apparent stability of Mali as a democratic country and resulted in the taking of power of an assortment of armed combatants in the North of the country, which resulted in armed intervention by France. This article is about the coup itself that created the power vacuum allowing the insurrection to grow and ultimately take power in the North. The authors have developed a framework for analyzing civil – military relations they believe is more useful than other available frameworks in understanding the role of the military in politics.

Key words: Coup in Mali, Civil - Military Relations, Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). 1. INTRODUCTION the case of Mali may be particularly dramatic given the long history of In this article we build on the insurgents in the North of the country conceptual framework of Samuel E. and the fact that the demands on the Finer in The Man on Horseback: The armed forces for fighting insurgents Role of the Military in Politics, and seriously increased after the collapse use the case study of the North West of the Muammar el-Qaddafi regime African country of Mali. We believe in Libya in August 2011 [2]. Even so, that any analysis of democratic civil we believe that sooner or later most – military relations must be attuned, armed forces will be required to do as Finer’s book so convincingly something concrete by the civilian demonstrates, to the potential for leaders and, if the requirements we a military coup to overthrow a posit for control and effectiveness are democratic regime [1]. While there not fulfilled, the democratic regime may be some areas of social science may well be overthrown [3]. in which conceptualization has minor implications, civil – military relations 2. THE MILITARY COUP IN MALI is not one of them since, at least in our 2.1. Background on the Coup formulation, how civilian decision- makers deal with the armed forces, Mali gained independence from and other security institutions, can, France in 1960, and became a one- as in the case of Mali, result in very party socialist style dictatorship serious consequences. We realize that under President Modibo Kéïta until

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1968, when a military coup led by the fall of the dictatorship in Libya Moussa Traoré removed Kéïta from (the groups will be discussed later power. Traoré remained President in this paper). Dioncounda Traoré, until 1991, when Amadou Toumani then 70 years old, was appointed Touré (dubbed ATT) – an army officer interim head of government until - staged a coup that overthrew Traoré July 31, 2012, when new elections [4]. Since then, according to all were to be held. The interim surveys or sources we have consulted, government has been challenged by Mali was one of the few democracies the existence of conflicting internal in Africa, which everybody in the divisions, continuous military international arena praised [5]. In meddling in politics, corruption this regard, in 2011 (and even in 2012), and mismanagement within state the widely respected Freedom House institutions, as well as harsh economic listed Mali as one of five democracies constraints due to a national recession in Africa [6]. Not only did Freedom and revenue crisis [10]. The transition House list Mali as “free” in terms of was delayed due to Traore’s health freedom of political rights and civil problems after he was beaten by liberties but it also listed it as “free” in loyalists of Captain Sanogo. On August terms of freedom of the press, a status 20, 2012, a new government was many older as well as Second and Third announced, within which many ministers Wave democracies in Europe and Latin were considered close to the coup leader America still lack [7]. (with some reports emphasizing they All of this came to a quick and were actually selected by the military) violent end with the military coup on while none of the ministers had ties March 22, 2012, a few weeks before to ATT [11]. On December 11, 2012, the democratic elections scheduled for under arrest, Mali Prime Minister Cheick April, when Touré would follow his Modibo Diarra announced his resignation predecessor’s example and step down and the resignation of his government. A at the end of his two constitutionally new Prime Minister Django Sissoko was permitted terms [8]. On March 22, a appointed [12]. In May 2013, the interim group of junior officers and enlisted government announced that general soldiers, led by Army Captain Amadou elections would be held on July 28, 2013. Haya Sanogo, overthrew the elected government of Touré, looted the 2.2. The Rebels presidential palace, seized members The main groups competing, or of the government, suspended the at times cooperating, for power in the Constitution, imposed a curfew, and disrupted context of “pre-“ and “post”coup closed the country’s borders [9]. Mali are the following [13]: The coup was followed by 1) The National instability and violence in the capital Liberation Movement (MNLA), of Bamako, and quickly in the loss which was created in 2011 from the of Malian government control in the merger of existing Tuareg groups Northern half of the country (including (including those who went to Libya the well-known tourist destination of during the Qaddafi rule and came back ) to an array of four major after the collapse of his dictatorship), insurgent groups, which had long been is a secular revolutionary movement operating in the North of Mali but fighting for establishing a pan-ethnic which consolidated their power after independent state in Azawad. While

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MNLA allied with Ansar Dine and (also known as the Signatories for Blood) MUJAO (to be discussed below) is an AQIM breakaway faction supporting initially, it now opposes Islamic global jihad, created in 2012 [17]. jihadist groups. On April 6, 2012, 6) Islamic Movement forAzawad the MNLA declared independence (IMA): is a movement is an Ansar from Mali with the creation of the Dine breakaway faction created in Republic of “Azawad” in three January 2013, after France commenced Northern counties. Despite attempts military intervention in Mali [18]. IMA to seek legitimacy for Azawad’s expressed its willingness to negotiate independence by invoking United for a peaceful settlement of the crisis in Nations charter and separatist Mali, as well as their readiness to fight aspirations going back to 1958, two “extremism” and “terrorism” [19]. years before Mali’s independence from The Tuareg groups had been France, no foreign government has so operating in the North and rebelling far recognized Azawad [14]. against the Malian State since the 2) Ansar Dine, also known as early 1950s (more frequently since Ansar al Deen, Ansar Eddin or Ansar the 1990s). Such rebellions led to the al Dine, (“Defenders of the religion” adoption of several peace accords in Arabic), which was established in including the National Pact of 1992, 2011with the goal to impose the Shari’a and the Algiers Accord of 2006 [20]. across the whole country (yet without Nevertheless, lack of implementation disputing Mali’s territorial integrity). of said accords only increased the 3) Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Tuareg grievances. As David J. Maghreb (AQIM) is the former Francis notes, “Between 1985 and Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching 2009 the government signed several and Combat (GSPC), renamed in peace deals and ceasefire agreements 2007, after the group officially joined after every violent Tuareg rebellion, Al-Qa’ida central in 2006. AQIM without addressing on a long-term was established in the North of Mali basis the fundamental problems of without encountering any opposition the marginalisation and exclusion of from the Malian government, and the Tuareg minority. The promises includes combatants of Algerian, by successive governments of Mauritanian, Senegalese and Malian greater political autonomy and nationalities, loyal to Osama Bin devolved rule for the Tuaregs in Laden’s legacy [15]. AQIM uses the north never materialised.” [21] ransom money from kidnapping of What distinguished the January 2012 Western citizens as well as drug- context from previous rebellions, trafficking to fund itself. however, was the strong Islamist vibe 4) The Movement for Unity and in the traditionally nationalist Tuareg Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), which groups, which, coupled with the fall emerged in 2011 from combatants of the Qaddafi regime in Libya in who defected from AQIM, due to 2011, helped the rebels consolidate “the marginalization of black African their power in North Mali. As members” within AQIM [16]. Mireille Affa’a-Mindzie argues, In 2012-2013, two more groups “Groups like Ansar Dine (Defenders emerged from the previously of Faith) had ties to ideologically discussed four. motivated external groups such as 5) Signed-in-Blood Battalion -based al-Qaida in the Islamic

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Maghreb (AQIM). Added to that was the insurgents on January 11 (under the proliferation of heavy weapons after the name of Operation “Serval”) as the downfall of Libyan leader Qaddafi, they were moving South and were making for a volatile situation.” [22] feared to capture the capital, Bamako, if outside military assistance was not 2.3. Foreign Intervention quickly provided [25]. French troops Clearly, since the coup to early were joined by an ECOWAS-led January 2013 the unstable political led force in late January, while the situation in Bamako coupled with European Union started in March the alliances between the Tuareg and to provide training to the Malian Islamist groups paved the way for the armed forces to help them boost their rebels to advance and seize the main effectiveness [26]. The operation was Northern Mali cities - Timbuktu, Gao approved unanimously by the UN and Kidal, then central Mali city of Security Council, which underscores Konna – threatening to advance all the shared international concern the way to Bamako [23]. Originally about the mounting extremism and a UN – sponsored military force was armed conflict in Mali. Since the planned to fight the various insurgents launch of the operation, ECOWAS- in order to retake the North of Mali. led African-led International Support ECOWAS, African Union, as well Mission to Mali (AFISMA) troops as other partners, agreed in the fall (e.g. French, Mali, Chad, etc.) have of 2012 to an intervention plan for recaptured important territories in the retaking the North. The plan involved North of Mali, including Timbuktu, 3000 troops provided by Mali, 3000 Gao, and Kidal, took prisoners, and by ECOWAS, intelligence and killed several hundred, including logistics support, as well as aerial important Al Qaeda leaders such as cover and surveillance by France and Abdelhamid Abou Zeid, one of the UN, and training of Malian troops top ranking Sahara commanders by the EU [24]. However, while the of Al Qaeda in North Africa [27]. international military intervention to Despite these accomplishments, combat militants and retake the North Islamists “melted back into desert was planned to take place in the Fall and mountain hideaways and of 2013, the advancement to central have begun a small campaign of Mali and possible capture of Bamako, harassment and terror, dispatching which would have had a deleterious suicide bombers, attacking guard impact on not only Mali, but also posts, infiltrating liberated cities or on the whole region, prompted the ordering attacks by militants hidden Malian president to seek military among civilians.”[28] In addition, assistance from France in January the rebels conducted terrorist attacks. 2013. France, also concerned with In sum, while one could argue that the impact that a rebel-dominated the intervention has been successful Mali have on the region and beyond, in pushing the rebels away from the but which has its particular interests main Mali cities, one still cannot in Mali (given the high number of assess its further impact on Mali’s French citizens living or traveling to future and / or return to democracy. and from Mali, as well as of various The international community business and economic ties with Mali acknowledges that a solution to and the region) began air attacks on the situation in Mali requires a

14 Journal of Defense Resources Management Vol. 5, Issue 1 (8) /2014 multipronged approach by Mali, [32] Equally important, and as well as its regional and global currently receiving increasing partners and allies: diplomatic, attention in serious scholarly work, political, humanitarian, economic, are the reverberations from the coup and security (including the problem in three major areas. First, the need of counterinsurgency)[29]. for a legitimate government to take All of these developments made control over the armed forces, which France consider an incremental of course made the coup and are still withdrawal of its troops and to some degree involved in power, AFISMA’s replacement with a UN in order for them to become more Force. In March 2013, the U.N. professionally competent to be able Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon to work with the French and other stated: “Our worry is that [the African armed forces, to include jihadists] could reappear, and that Chad, Nigeria, among others, could affect the countries of the and to do so in a way that respects region.”[30] On April 25, 2013, the human rights. Free and fair elections, United Nations Security Council in particular elections that the North unanimously adopted Resolution will perceive as credible, are the 2100 of 2013, which established first step to ensure this. Second, to the Peacekeeping Force for Mali establish a government that is able to (United Nations Multidimensional reengage with the United States, and Integrated Stabilization Mission thereby receive military and other (MINUSMA), to replace AFISMA, aid beyond solely humanitarian effective July1, 2013. Extremely assistance, which was cut off after significant, MINUSMA will the coup [33]. And, third, the need operate under Chapter VII of the to establish a government that can UN Charter, and will be comprised in fact negotiate with the various of some 11,200 troops, 1,440 groups in the North, and especially police, to replace AFISMA [31]. the Tuaregs with the goal to establish The initial vacuum in power a workable and long term “solution” created by the coup, which is to the problems of decentralization highlighted above, was extremely or recognition of different ethnic important in allowing the situation groups [34]. In short, the coup has described above to happen. As the had very serious and continuing very highly – regarded North Africa negative repercussions. expert, Roland Marchal stated: Currently, as Wolfram Lacher “As expected, [by him in an earlier and Denis M. Tull argue, “it is still publication] the coup in Bamako unclear what impact the French on March 22nd 2012 was more intervention will have on the balance a symptom of the crisis in Mali of power in Bamako. France, than the first step to its recovery. AFISMA and EUTM Mali will seek The crisis actually deepened and to curb the coup leaders’ influence. was reshaped by new dynamics, However, even if they are successful, including the growing role of jihadi the army leadership will attempt to groups such as al-Qaeda in the capitalise on the fact that external Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the actors depend on cooperation with the Movement for Unicity (Tawhid) and Malian army for their intervention in Justice in West Africa (MUJWA).” the north.” [35]

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3. ANALYSIS OF THE COUP frustrated with the lack of effective UTILIZING SAMUEL FINER’S management of the defense sector FRAMEWORK by Mali’s government (especially when attempting to confront the In a country like Mali, where the rebellion in the North) [37]. Coup democratic system was problematic leaders lamented the unwillingness even before the coup, we strongly of the Ministry of Defense to identify with the following statement provide weapons and other supplies by Samuel E. Finer. “Instead of asking (including food) to soldiers fighting why the military engage in politics, the Tuaregs in the North, and the we ought surely ask why they ever Minister’s refusal to respond to the do otherwise. For at first sight the subsequent rank-and-file complaints political advantages of the military that they were not properly equipped vis-à-vis other and civilian groupings to fight the rebels [38]. Indeed, as are overwhelming. The military possess the CRS report notes, “rebel gains, vastly superior organization. And they combined with mismanagement and possess arms.” [36] If we employ Finer’s corruption within the senior command framework for analysis we find that the … demoralized many Malian troops military had, in Finer’s terms, both the and undermined support for President mood and disposition to intervene. For Touré…Military commanders’ failure Finer the mood can consist of self – to protect troops from the massacre, awareness, overwhelming power, and which some analysts saw as having grievance. The opportunity is most AQIM involvement, entrenched likely created when a civilian regime grievances within the ranks and among must increasingly rely on the military. military families.”[39] This analysis In our own work on civil – military is also supported by what we saw relations, which we developed for “on the ground”, through participant more consolidated democracies, we observation and interviews, during have elaborated on Finer’s framework two one week visits, in July 2010 by conceptualizing civil-military and September 2011. By the time of relations in terms of both democratic the second seminar, after the fall of civilian control and military Muammar el-Qaddafi and decrease effectiveness. Specifically in terms of foreign tourism to Mali by 90% of Mali, we believe there is sufficient due to the precarious security evidence to conclude that the catalyst situation in the North, the Malian for the coup on 22 March 2012, and officers in the seminar made it clear the support it quickly received from they were very concerned about broad sectors of the armed forces, their ability to respond to security can only be understood in terms of problems. In short, civilian control the perception of the armed forces, was jeopardized, or negated, by the which was largely accurate, that inability or unwillingness of the Mali the government was not providing government to provide the armed them with the necessary means to forces with the means they required be effective in military terms. This in order to be effective. While was the oft-repeated allegation of the we consider these observations coup leader, Captain Amadou Haya unexceptional, and drawing directly Sanogo, who, together with other coup from Finer’s work, we find we must leaders publicly stated that they were expand on why we use this broader

16 Journal of Defense Resources Management Vol. 5, Issue 1 (8) /2014 framework for analysis of civil – for developing institutions for both military relations. control and effectiveness; and, second, a focus on the necessary 3.1. A Myopic Approach to but not sufficient requirements for Democracy and to Civil – Military both. Here we encounter, at least Relations for civilian decision- makers, the challenges of adopting a more Our observation above on relevant framework. To create the cause of the coup should be institutions, requires attention and obvious, but it is not since civil – effort, and the payoff in terms of military relations has come to be votes generally appears problematic. conceptualized only in terms of Further, in our framework, to achieve democratic civilian control. That is, effectiveness requires not only a plan, if there is any consideration at all to or strategy, but also institutions to the security or military dimension, as cooperate with the armed forces and most studies of democratization do other security forces, and resources not even include the security forces. in the form of money and personnel. And, when academics do include the These are very demanding, and few military, it is exclusively in terms of political leaders are willing to make democratic civilian control. As Peter the types of commitment necessary. Feaver states in his 1999 review Our argument is: if scholars and article: “Although civil – military decision – makers would begin to relations is a very broad subject, think in terms of this framework, encompassing the entire range of they can better deal with the myriad relationships between the military of challenges and issues that arise and civilian society at every level, between civilian decision makers the field largely focuses on the and the security forces, to include control or direction of the military armed forces, national police, and by the highest civilian authorities in intelligence services [42]. nations states.” [40] This observation Democratic civilian control of is further buttressed by the scholarly the armed forces must indeed remain literature on new democracies, where a central part of the civil-military the exclusive focus is asserting relations framework, especially with democratic civilian control [41]. regard to new democracies, and most While there are understandable importantly those that emerge from historical reasons for the military dictatorships. Nevertheless, conceptualization of civil-military it is not sufficient to describe civil- relations as exclusively asserting, and military relations in the twenty first consolidating, democratic civilian century in terms of control alone, control, it cannot accommodate what and Mali is a case in point, and even is happening in the “real world” more so, judging from the country’s of the relationships of the civilian history, as civilian control was policy – makers with the armed precarious. From the perspective of forces. We thus propose a broader, making effective security decisions and we believe, more relevant and policies, which requires framework for the conceptualization. “functioning” security forces, civil- This conceptualization emphasizes military relations must involve more two main themes. First, the need than control. In a democracy, policy

17 THE MILITARY COUP IN MALI, 22 MARCH 2012. REFLECTIONS ON THE DEMISE OF DEMOCRACY AND THE IMPORTANCE OF CIVIL – MILITARY RELATIONS makers craft and implement security NOTE ON SOURCES decisions and policies that are in service of safeguarding democratic The literature on civil – military values, national interests, and the relations in Africa is limited. In this citizens themselves; successful article on Mali there are three main policies, however, go hand in hand reasons why, we believe, we have with effective security forces. We adequate information to be able to must remember that even when describe and analyze reasonably civilian control is unquestioned, as accurately. First, the co-authors in the United States, this control by spent one week in July 2010 and itself is no guarantee that the policy- another week in September 2011 makers will make good decisions, or in Bamako, Mali, conducting implement policy in such a way as seminars on intelligence reform to result in military success. On the for intelligence professionals from other hand, the exclusive focus on several Francophone countries in the military versus the other security North Africa. We used the seminars forces is detrimental to understanding as a form of participant observations, the larger and more complex and beyond the seminars conducted relationships concerning democracy interviews with local Malian and security forces, particularly when we consider the very wide civilians and civilian and military spectrum of interchangeable roles officials at the U.S. embassy. Second, and missions. The concept should, due to the coup of 22 March 2012, then, include the effectiveness of all and the subsequent conflict in the security forces in doing their jobs, at North involving a wide ideological the optimum cost possible – that is, spectrum of combatants, with the efficiently. resultant armed combat involving at least France from 11 January 2013, 4. CONCLUSION there is a great deal of attention given to Mali. There is periodic and Beginning with the military coup extremely good reporting in the New in Mali that has huge implications York Times, originally by Adam for regional and, as evidenced by Nossiter, who was based in Bamako the French military intervention on and has been willing to communicate January 11, 2013 and the UN Security with the authors, as well as in The Council decision under Chapter Washington Post, The Economist, VII on 25 April 2013, international and British Broadcasting Corporation security, we argue that a, if not (BBC) News. A very wide variety of the, cause is a poorly understood think tanks and non-governmental approach to civil-military relations organizations throughout Europe that focuses exclusively on and North America have reported democratic civilian control. While extensively on the situation in Mali. understandable, we argue that this In particular we found the “Mali: focus is insufficient and must be Eviter L’Escalade. Rapport Afrique balanced and be combined with No 189-18 juillet 2012” very useful. equal attention to what is required We can also cite “Mali: Civilians for armed forces to be effective. Bear the Brunt of the Conflict” and

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Mali: Five Months of Crisis. Armed groups in the region written by Rebellion and Military Coup by CCMR colleague Lawrence E. Cline, Amnesty International, London, former intelligence officer and expert 2012; “ECOWAS in Face of the in Islamically-based insurgencies, Crises in Mali and Guinea-Bissau: and José Olmeda, Dean of the A Double-Standard Dilemma?” Faculty of Political and Sociological from IPRIS in Lisbon, August 2012; Sciences at the Universidad Nacional Anouar Boukhars, “The Paranoid de Educación a Distancia of Madrid. Neighbor: Algeria and the Conflict in Mali” Carnegie Endowment. The NOTES AND REFERENCES Carnegie Papers, October 2012; and, as can be seen in the endnotes, various [1] Samuel E. Finer, The Man on articles from FRIDE, Norwegian Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics With a new introduction by Peacebuilding Resource Centre, Jay Stanley (New Brunswick: Transaction London Review of Books, European Publishers, 2006. Originally published 1962). Union Institute for Security Studies, [2] For an excellent analysis of some and the U.S. Institute of Peace. There of the implications see Roland Marchal, are at least two governments interested “The reshaping of West Africa after in the situation as evidenced by the Muammar Qaddafi’s fall”, NOREF, following two publications: Alexis Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Arieff and Kelly Johnson, “Crisis Centre, October 2012. in Mali” Congressional Research [3] Since January 2012, a Tuareg Service Report for Congress uprising, capitalizing on the weak (R42664) of 2012 and 2013, and Malian military and civilian presence, and bolstered by fighters and weapons Andrei Belik, Nela Grebovic and arriving from Libya after the fall Jeff Willows, A Policy Briefing for of Muammar el-Qaddafi, launched Wayne G. Wouters, “Friction Along successful attacks against the Malian the Sahelian Fault Line: Azawad military barracks in the North of Mali. and Ethnic Conflict in Northern See Mali: Five Months of Crisis. Armed Mali” Ottawa: Privy Council Office, Rebellion and Military Coup, London: 2012. Third, we capitalized on Amnesty International Publications, the information contained within 2012, pp. 1-31; Adam Nossiter, “Soldiers the Defense Institution Reform Overthrow Mali Government in Setback Initiative papers, which are prepared for Democracy in Africa”, The New and periodically updated by a team York Times, March 22, 2012.fighters and weapons arriving from Libya at the Center for Civil-Military after the fall of Muammar el-Qaddafi, Relations (CCMR) (including one launched successful attacks against the of the authors of this article) for Malian military barracks in the North the Office of Secretary of Defense, of Mali. See Mali: Five Months of and which are based on a review Crisis. Armed Rebellion and Military of secondary source documents, Coup, London: Amnesty International as well as on discussions between Publications, 2012, pp. 1-31; Adam CCMR experts and AFRICOM. We Nossiter, “Soldiers Overthrow Mali used unpublished in depth research Government in Setback for Democracy analyses on the Tuareg and Al Qaeda in Africa”, The New York Times, March

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22, 2012; Alexis Arieff, “Crisis in Mali”, Mali —Background and Foreground”, Congressional Research Service (CRS) E-Notes, April 2012, at fpri.org, pp. 1-2; Report, R42664, January 14, 2013, pp. Fabien Offner and Lydia Polgreen, “As 1-18; “US Intelligence Community Mali Prepares for Vote, Interim Leader Worldwide Threat Assessment Statement Is Sworn In”, The New York Times, for the Record,”, Office of the Director of April 12, 2012. National Intelligence, March 12, 2013. [9] Adam Nossiter, “Soldiers [4] Touré actually returned power Overthrow Mali Government in Setback to civilians shortly and organized for Democracy in Africa”, The New democratic elections, which resulted in York Times, March 22, 2012. the election of opposition leader Alpha [10] See Alexis Arieff, “Crisis in Oumar Konaré as President. See Alexis Mali”, Congressional Research Service Arieff and Kelly Johnson, “Crisis in (CRS) Report, R42664, January 14, 2013, Mali”, Congressional Research Service pp. 1-18; David J. Francis, “The Norwegian (CRS) Report, R42664, August 16, Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) 2012, pp. 1-16. Report, April 2013, pp. 1-16. [5] Especially since 2002 when [11] Source: Defense Institution Konaré stepped down at the end of two Reform Initiative (DIRI) Mali Country Paper, constitutionally permitted terms, and prepared by CCMR on January 18, 2013. Touré was elected president. Alexis [12] Adam Nossiter, “Mali’s Prime Arieff and Kelly Johnson, “Crisis in Minister Resigns After Arrest, Muddling Mali”, Congressional Research Service Plans to Retake North”, The New York (CRS) Report, R42664, August 16, Times, December 11, 2012. 2012, pp. 1-16. [13] Despite different goals these [6]http://media.crikey.com.au/wp- groups seem to coexist well in the content/uploads/2011/01/14-01-2011- North of Mali. For more information mapoffreedom2011.png; http://www. on the groups see: Mali: Five Months freedomhouse.org/reports. of Crisis. Armed Rebellion and Military [7] For example, Italy, Romania, Coup. London: Amnesty International Bulgaria, and Hungary in Europe, and Publications, 2012, pp. 1-31; “Mali crisis: Argentina, Peru, and Brazil in Latin Key players”, BBC, January 16, 2013; America to name a few are partially and, David J. Francis, “ The Norwegian free in terms of freedom of the press. Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) See http://www.knightfoundation.org/ Report, April 2013, pp. 1-16. In addition, media/uploads/article_images/map-of- for a more in-depth depiction of the press-freedom-w-icon.jpg; http://www. rebels, see Lawrence E. Cline, “Nomads, freedomhouse.org/reports. It should Islamists, and Soldiers: The Struggles for be noted, however, that scholars of Northern Mali”, unpublished manuscript, democratic transition and consolidation 2012 (author’s consent for citation granted such as Larry Diamond, Mark Plattner, in January 2013). and Zeric Kay Smith point out some [14] Harvey Glickman, “ The Coup flaws in ’ democracy. See Larry in Mali —Background and Foreground”, Jay Diamond and Mark M. Plattner, E-Notes, April 2012, at fpri.org, pp. 1-2; “Francophone Africa in Flux”, Journal of Mali: Five Months of Crisis. Armed Democracy Volume 12, Number 3 July Rebellion and Military Coup. London: 2001, pp. 35-36 and Zeric Kay Smith Amnesty International Publications, “Mali’s Decade of Democracy”, Journal 2012, pp. 1-31; Lydia Polgreen and of Democracy Volume 12, Number 3 Alan Cowell, “Mali Rebels Proclaim July 2001, pp. 73-79. Independent State in North”, The New [8] Harvey Glickman, “ The Coup in York Times, April 06, 2012.

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[15] For a thorough depiction of Al Government Is Left Reeling After Qaeda in Africa see: Jose A Olmeda, Islamists Take Village Long Held by Army”, “THREAT ASSESMENT OF TWO The New York Times, January 11, 2013; MAGHREBI AND ONE IRAQI Jonathan Marcus, “Can France achieve its SALAFIST GROUPS IN EUROPE”, goals in Mali?”, BBC, January 17, 2013. unpublished document, 2008, pp. 1-22 [26] “Mali Conflict: West African (author’s consent for citation granted Troops to Arrive ‘in Days’”, BBC, in January 2013); Profile: Al-Qaeda in January 15, 2013; “EU agrees 'concrete North Africa, BBC, January 17, 2013. steps' on Mali”, BBC, January 17, 2013. [16] See: William Lloyd George, [27] Media reports however indicate ‘Mali’s Irrevocable Crisis’, Al Jazeera, it is unclear how the French came up 16 April 2012 at http://www.aljazeera. with the numbers of deceased Islamists. com/indepth/opinion/2012/04/2012415 Source: Defense Institution Reform 72956363410.html; Lawrence E. Cline, Initiative (DIRI) Mali Country Paper, “Nomads, Islamists, and Soldiers: The prepared by CCMR on March, 01, 2013 Struggles for Northern Mali”, unpublished [28] Eric Schmitt and Scott Sayare, manuscript, 2012 (author’s consent for “New Drone Base in Niger Builds U.S. citation granted in January 2013). Presence in Africa”, The New York [17] Michael Burleigh, “Deadly Times, February 22, 2013. message from one-eyed master of terror [29] Source: Defense Institution Reform behind the heavily-armed 'Signed-In- Initiative (DIRI) Mali Country Paper, prepared Blood-Battalion', Mail Online, January by CCMR on March, 15, 2013. 17, 2013; STEVEN ERLANGER and [30] Tim Lister, “Mali: The long, ADAM NOSSITER, “Jihad ‘Prince,’ a troubled desert road ahead”, CNN, February Kidnapper, Is Tied to Raid, “the New 08, 2013, at http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/08/ York Times”, January 17, 2013. world/africa/mali-analysis. [18] http://worldwideconflicts. [31] Text of the Resolution, at www. wordpress.com/2013/01/29/mia/ un.org . Being approved under Chapter [19] http://worldwideconflicts. VII of the UN Charter indicates that wordpress.com/2013/01/29/mia/ Mali is considered in the international [20] Susanna D. Wing, “Mali’s arena as a “failed” state. Precarious Democracy and the Causes [32] Roland Marchal, “Is a military of Conflict”, United States Institute for intervention in Mali unavoidable?” Peace (USIP) Special Report 331, May NOREF Norwegian Peacebuilding 2013, pp. 1-16. Resource Centre, October 2012, p.2. [21] David J. Francis, “The Norwegian [33] The United States provides the Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) highest humanitarian assistance in Mali Report, April 2013, pp. 1-16. and the Sahel region (more than $445.9 [22] Mireille Affa’a-Mindzie, mil in FY2012 and FY2013). Besides, “Mali and the Sahel-Sahara: From Crisis according to a January 2013 released Management to Sustainable Strategy”, CRS Report on Mali an additional $70.4 International Peace Institute (IPI) mil in bilateral foreign assistance “has Report, February 2013, pp. 1-15. either continued under existing legal [23] David J. Francis, “The Norwegian authorities, or has been approved to Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) resume”. See Alexis Arieff, “Crisis in Report, April 2013, pp. 1-16 Mali”, Congressional Research Service [24] Source: Defense Institution Reform (CRS) Report, R42664, January 14, Initiative (DIRI) Mali Country Paper, prepared 2013, pp. 1-18. Because of the 2012 coup by CCMR on January 18, 2013. however, which ended a democratically [25] Adam Nossiter, “Mali elected government, the law does not

21 THE MILITARY COUP IN MALI, 22 MARCH 2012. REFLECTIONS ON THE DEMISE OF DEMOCRACY AND THE IMPORTANCE OF CIVIL – MILITARY RELATIONS allow U.S. government to provide direct Alexis Arieff and Kelly Johnson, “Crisis military aid to Mali. Nevertheless, as in Mali”, Congressional Research Johnnie Carson, the State Department’s Service (CRS) Report, R42664, August top diplomat for Africa, stated in late February 16, 2012, pp. 1-16. 2013, security assistance and other assistance [40] Peter D. Feaver, “Civil-Military could “immediately” resume to Mali “if Relations,” Annual Review of Political there is a restoration of democracy.” Craig Science 2 (1999), p.211. Whitlock, “U.S. troops arrive in Niger to [41] The excellent work of Felipe set up drone base”, The Washington Post, Aguero on Southern Europe and South February 22, 2013. Keeping the elections America maintains this same focus. on schedule for July 2013 therefore He uses the term “civilian supremacy”. remains cardinal. Of his many works see, for example, [34] These fundamental points his “Democratic Consolidation and are highlighted in the following very the Military in Southern Europe and insightful and credible reports. Anouar South America” in Richard Gunther, Boukhars, “The Mali conflict: avoiding P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans- past mistakes,” FRIDE Policy Brief No. Jurgen Puhle, eds, The Politics of 148, February 2013, pp. 4-5. And, Wolfram Democratic Consolidation: Southern Lacher and Denis M. tull, “Mali: Beyond Europe in Comparative Perspective Counterterrorism,” Stiftung Wissenschaft und (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Politik, SWP Comments 7, February 2013, University Press, 1995), pp. 124-165. pp. 1, 3, and 6. [42] These requirements are [35] Wolfram Lacher and Denis M. Tull, discussed and illustrated in Anon, “Mali: Beyond Counterterrorism,” Stiftung 2008 quoted in Thomas C. Bruneau Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP Comments 7, and Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, February 2013, pp. 1, 3, and 6. “Towards a New Conceptualization [36] Finer, 2006, p. 5. of Democratization and Civil-Military [37] Adam Nossiter, “Soldiers Relations”, Democratization. Vol 15, Overthrow Mali Government in Setback no. 5, December 2008, pp. 909 – 929 for Democracy in Africa”, The New York and Chapter 3, Conclusion, in Anon, Times, March 22, 2012; Harvey Glickman, 2012 in Florina Cristiana Matei, Chapter “ The Coup in Mali —Background and 3, “A new conceptualization of civil- Foreground”, E-Notes, April 2012, at fpri. military relations”, in Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, org, pp. 1-2. Eds. The Routledge Handbook of Civil- [38] Adam Nossiter, “Soldiers Overthrow Military Relations (London: Routledge Mali Government in Setback for Democracy Publishers, 2013), pp. 26 - 38. in Africa”, The New York Times, March 22, 2012; Harvey Glickman, “ The Coup in Mali —Background and Foreground”, E-Notes, DISCLAIMER April 2012, at fpri.org, pp. 1-2. [39] Alexis Arieff and Kelly Johnson, The views expressed in this “Crisis in Mali”, Congressional Research document are those of the authors Service (CRS) Report, R42664, August and do not reflect the official policy or 16, 2012, pp. 1-16. Reports indicate position of the Department of Defense that Tuareg soldiers that were part of or the U.S. Navy. the national armed forces deserted and joined the MNLA and/or Ansar al Deen.

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