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Mali Implications of the Approved United Nations Peacekeeping Force for Mali May 2013

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Mali Implications of the Approved United Nations Peacekeeping Force for Mali May 2013 Special Report: Mali Implications of the approved United Nations peacekeeping force for Mali May 2013 TABLE OF CONTENTS BACKGROUND AND CURRENT SITUATION ...................................................................... 3 UN FORCE TO BRING REDUCTION OF VIOLENCE .............................................................. 5 POTENTIAL FOR RESURGENCE ATTACKS FOLLOWING RELATIVE CALM .............................. 6 IMPORTANCE OF TUAREG POLITICAL INCLUSION ............................................................ 6 INCREASE THREAT TO REGIONAL SECURITY .................................................................... 7 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 9 APPENDIX .................................................................................................................. 11 WEAPON PROLIFERATION IN THE SAHEL ............................................................................. 11 WEAPONS FROM LIBYA ................................................................................................. 11 MALI REBEL GROUP BREAKDOWN .................................................................................... 12 CURRENT AREAS OF INFLUENCE FOR MALI REBEL GROUPS........................................................ 12 THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF AZAWAD (MNLA) ...................................... 13 ANSAR DINE .............................................................................................................. 14 ISLAMIC MOVEMENT FOR AZAWAD .................................................................................. 14 AL QAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB (AQIM) ..................................................................... 15 MOVEMENT FOR UNITY AND JIHAD IN WEST AFRICA (MUJAO / MOJWA) .................................... 16 SIGNED IN BLOOD BATTALION ......................................................................................... 17 MALIAN ARAB MOVEMENT (ARAB MOVEMENT OF AZAWAD (MAA) .......................................... 17 MOVEMENT OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES OF CASAMANCE (MFDC) ................................................ 18 2 Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +442035140378 www.max-security.com Background and Current Situation On April 25, the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) mandated the deployment of a peacekeeping force to Mali. Integrating and replacing the current African-led mission on July 1, the United Nations Integrated Mission for the Stabilization of Mali (MINUSMA) will consist of 11,200 U.N. peacekeepers and 1,440 policemen and will be supported by a permanent force of 1,000 French troops starting 2014 - down from the 2,000 soldiers which Paris expects to reduce its contingent to this July. The mandate’s progression from intervention to peacekeeping highlights the perception of an improved security situation in northern Mali, although this will likely lead to the dispersal of Islamist militants throughout the greater North Africa and Sub- Saharan regions. Captain Amadou Sanogo Citing the fact that Chad accomplished its mission on April 14, President Idriss Deby announced that the first of Chad’s 2000 deployed troops have begun to withdraw. President Deby also stated that he is certain Algerian Jihadist and former al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) kidnapping kingpin, Mokhtar Belmokhtar is dead. Still unconfirmed, Belmokhtar’s death was initially reported on March 2, a day after reports indicated Chadian forces had also killed AQIM’s second in command, Abdelhamid Abu Zeid. French and Algerian officials have since confirmed Abu Zeid’s death. But the need for international military assistance traces back to January 2012, when ethnic Tuaregs again attempted to reclaim their traditional homeland in the Azawad region of northern Mali. Led by the secessionist and secular National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the rebellion was only the latest in a series of Tuareg attempts for independence, which dates back to the 1914-1916 rebellion. Upset with the Government’s handling of the rebellion, soldiers under the command of Captain Amadou Sanogo embarked on a coup d'état on March 21 and overthrew the democratically elected government, what was at the time considered to be one of the most stable democracies in Africa. As a consequence to the security vacuum, Islamist rebel groups that were once allied with the secular Tuaregs overpowered the MNLA and took control of northern Mali and 3 Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +442035140378 www.max-security.com immediately began implementing Sharia Law. Power became shared between Ansar Dine, an Islamist group native to Azawad, and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), a West African but predominantly non-Malian offshoot of AQIM. Both groups were reinforced by experienced AQIM militants, many of who came to the region with weaponry from Libya after fighting in that revolution in 2011. In December 2012, the UNSC unanimously passed a resolution mandating an African-led mission assist the Malian government to reconquer its northern territory. With no time frame initially specified but a conditional demand for prior domestic political reform, October 2013 had been estimated as the mission’s start date. However, following an Islamist push south towards Bamako, Algerian Jihadist Mokhtar Belmokhtar France intervened on January 11, 2013. Shortly thereafter, the UNSC confirmed in an emergency session that French actions were in conformity with international law and the UN charter, which led the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), under the December authorization, to deploy troops immediately. Simultaneously, Paris increasingly sent troops, which grew to 4,000. No longer in control of their urban strongholds, the Jihadists have since fled to the deserts, particularly the Ifoghas Mountains in the north. In addition to engaging in firefights, since fleeing, militants have attacked convoys with land mines and checkpoints with suicide bombings, though the number of these incidents has been greatly reduced as the war persists. Following the French intervention, Belmokhtar’s AQIM splinter organization attacked an Algerian oil facility on January 19 at In Amenas, near the Libyan border, holding hostage 41 foreigners. Also justified by the intervention, the Islamist militant group Boko Haram, based in northern Nigeria, kidnapped a family of seven French nationals, including four children, from northern Cameroon on February 19. Given these two attacks, as well as remarks made by Jihadists since January, all of West Africa has had an elevated threat level, further revealed by a bomb threat in central Dakar on February 22. In response to the UNSC’s decision to approve the deployment of a peacekeeping mission on April 25, this report will analyze the implications for Mali and the surrounding states across the Sahel and in West and North Africa. 4 Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +442035140378 www.max-security.com UN Force to bring reduction of violence We assess northern Mali to likely see a period of increased calm relative to the volatility experienced since the start of 2013. In order for U.N. forces to deploy on July 1, the UNSC must decide when it next convenes if the conditions are safe enough for the mission. While shipping off military personnel can be accomplished relatively quickly, other parts of the mission such as political and humanitarian aspects require more planning, which is already underway. Given this, and the fact that the French proposed this start date, we assess that the French believe the improvements thus far can be maintained and improved, thereby making July 1 realistic. In addition, the mission is unlikely to be delayed for political reasons due to the widespread popularity of the intervention in Paris, as opposed to much of the rest of Hollande’s presidency, and the French people’s understanding that they will not be pulling out quick, but will rather be on the ground through 2014 at least. Moreover, the initiation of troop withdrawals by both France and Chad, the two strongest and most active militaries engaging Islamist militants, in conjunction with statements by President Hollande and President Deby, suggest that the remaining Jihadists who are hiding in even more remote areas of the Malian desert likely no longer pose the same level of risk as they previously had. The elimination of major Islamist leadership, including French President Hollande visits Mali Abu Zeid and likely Mokhtar Belmokhtar along with other commanders, combined with serious losses in regular manpower, will likely require these militants to take some time to regroup and reorganize so they can conduct future attacks. Despite these improvements, it should still be noted that Islamists continue to pose a serious threat to Malian national security. On April 28, security forces announced the discovery of a Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) cell in Bamako. The seven arrested suspects reportedly were trained in the northern desert, both militarily and ideologically. While other groups have penetrated the capital, this was the first recorded incident of a MOJWA cell in Bamako and was likely a strategic repositioning in response to the northern takeovers made by the French and African forces. 5 Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +442035140378 www.max-security.com Potential for resurgence attacks following relative calm While not immediately following the MINUSMA troop deployment,
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