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The Nairobi Attack and Al-Shabab's Media Strategy

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The Nairobi Attack and Al-Shabab's Media Strategy OCTOBER 2013 . VOL 6 . ISSUE 10 Contents The Nairobi Attack and FEATURE ARTICLE 1 The Nairobi Attack and Al-Shabab’s Al-Shabab’s Media Strategy Media Strategy By Christopher Anzalone By Christopher Anzalone REPORTS 6 The Dutch Foreign Fighter Contingent in Syria By Samar Batrawi 10 Jordanian Jihadists Active in Syria By Suha Philip Ma’ayeh 13 The Islamic Movement and Iranian Intelligence Activities in Nigeria By Jacob Zenn 19 Kirkuk’s Multidimensional Security Crisis By Derek Henry Flood 22 The Battle for Syria’s Al-Hasakah Province By Nicholas A. Heras 25 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 28 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts Kenyan soldiers take positions outside the Westgate Mall in Nairobi on September 21, 2013. - Photo by Jeff Angote/Getty Images fter carrying out a bold Godane. The attack also followed a attack inside the upscale year in which al-Shabab lost control Westgate Mall in Nairobi in of significant amounts of territory in September 2013, the Somali Somalia, most importantly major urban Amilitant group al-Shabab succeeded in and economic centers such as the cities recapturing the media spotlight. This of Baidoa and Kismayo. was in large part due to the nature of the attack, its duration, the difficulty This article examines al-Shabab’s About the CTC Sentinel in resecuring the mall, the number of media strategy during and immediately The Combating Terrorism Center is an casualties, and al-Shabab’s aggressive after the Westgate Mall attack, both independent educational and research media campaign during and immediately via micro-blogging on Twitter through institution based in the Department of Social after the attack.1 its various accounts as well as more Sciences at the United States Military Academy, traditional media formats such as West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses From al-Shabab’s perspective, the attack audio statements from the group’s the Center’s global network of scholars and on Westgate Mall was a media triumph, leadership. The article also puts the practitioners to understand and confront particularly coming in the midst of a group’s media operations for the contemporary threats posed by terrorism and growing rift among jihadists both inside Westgate attack in historical context other forms of political violence. and outside Somalia regarding the by comparing and contrasting them consolidation of power by the group’s to al-Shabab’s past media campaigns. amir, Ahmed “Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr” Finally, the article concludes with The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, an assessment of al-Shabab’s current the Department of the Army, or any other agency state of health and the potential for of the U.S. Government. 1 Roopa Gogineni, “Nairobi Mall Death Toll Expected to more spectacular acts of violence, Rise,” Voice of America, September 25, 2013. 1 OCTOBER 2013 . VOL 6. ISSUE 10 in large part as political and media Kenyan security forces was, at best, September 24, and President Kenyatta spectacles designed to capture public disorganized, which likely was one of only declared a formal end to the siege attention.2 It finds that al-Shabab, the reasons that the militants were late in the evening on the same day.12 despite facing increased political and able to prolong the attack over several The following day, shopkeepers and military setbacks, remains adept at days.6 After the initial failed attempts restaurateurs were able to return to their executing audacious attacks designed to to stop them, the attackers proceeded businesses inside the mall, where some attract the maximum amount of media to pick out targets from among those discovered evidence of theft and looting attention. Its media operatives are still trapped inside the mall, in some by some Kenyan soldiers.13 The number able to skillfully exploit its enemies’ places separating Muslims from non- mistakes on the battlefield and in the Muslims.7 Kenyan authorities remained information operations war, as well as unsure as to developments inside the “It is suspected that al- manipulating the news cycle by inserting mall nearly an hour into the attack, and Shabab succeeded multiple sensationalist claims.3 It also finds that the first army units arrived in the late al-Shabab has maintained a great deal afternoon, although confusion continued times in circumventing of continuity with its messaging toward due to the lack of clear command-and- attempts to prevent them foreign state actors active in Somalia, control between the Kenyan military despite the insurgents’ shifting fortunes and police.8 The Kenyan military and from micro-blogging by on the ground.4 police—reportedly aided by foreign creating a new account each advisers from the United States, United The Westgate Attack Kingdom, and Israel—helped hundreds time a Twitter suspension Al-Shabab’s complex assault on the of trapped shoppers escape the mall went into effect.” Westgate Mall began just after noon throughout the siege.9 on Saturday, September 21, 2013, when an undetermined number of The standoff between the al-Shabab gunmen entered the facility and began fighters and Kenyan security forces of casualties currently stands at 72, throwing grenades and shooting continued through the weekend. At including five of the attackers and six indiscriminately.5 Eyewitness accounts 1:28 p.m. Kenyan time on September 22, Kenyan soldiers.14 As of October 15, the from the early stages of the attack however, the Kenyan military’s official Red Cross reported that 23 people were suggested that the first response from Twitter account said that most of those still missing after the attack, although trapped inside had been rescued and the Kenyan government claims all those 15 2 For more on the “spectacle” aspect of terrorism/anti- “most parts” of the mall complex were missing have been accounted for. 10 civilian violence, see Gerard Chaliand, Terrorism: From under control. The claim that the Popular Struggle to Media Spectacle (London: Saqi Books, attack was nearly over was disproved in Kenyan authorities initially believed 2001); Steven Livingston, The Terrorism Spectacle (Boul- the early morning of September 23 when that there were 10 to 15 attackers, der, CO: Westview Press, 1994). The media spectacle of an explosion rocked the Westlands but have since revised their estimate 16 violence is discussed in Douglas Kellner, “Media Propa- district of Nairobi where the Westgate to as low as four to six. They have ganda and Spectacle in the War on Iraq: A Critique of Mall is located. More large explosions named four individuals they believe U.S. Broadcasting Networks,” Cultural Studies: Critical followed in the early afternoon. participated in the attack: Abu Bara’ Methodologies 4:3 (2004): pp. 329-338; Cynthia Carter, Vi- Confusion reportedly continued with al-Sudani (“the Sudanese”), Omar al- olence and the Media (New York: Open University Press, regards to the exact chain-of-command Nabhan, Khattab al-Kini (“the Kenyan”), 17 2003); Matthew Robert Kerbel, If It Bleeds, It Leads: An among the Kenyan military and police, and an individual named Umayr. All Anatomy of Television News (Boulder, CO: Westview with differences emerging between Press, 2001). For a theoretical discussion of the “political commanders and the office of Kenyan 12 Ibid. Stefan Smith and Peter Martell, “Kenyan Presi- 11 spectacle,” see Murray Edelman, Constructing the Political President Uhuru Kenyatta. Fighting dent Announces End to Mall Bloodbath,” Agence Spectacle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); continued into the evening of Tuesday, France-Presse, September 25, 2013. Arie S. Soesilo and Philo S. Wasburn, “Constructing a 13 Howden; Geoffrey York, “Kenyan Military Seeks Sol- Political Spectacle: American and Indonesian Media Ac- 6 Daniel Howden, “Terror in Nairobi: The Full Story diers Who Looted Stores During Mall Attack,” Globe and counts of the ‘Crisis in the Gulf,’” Sociological Quarterly Behind al-Shabaab’s Mall Attack,” Guardian, October 4, Mail, October 3, 2013; Margaret Wahito, “Lenku Admits 35:2 (1994): pp. 367-381. 2013. Looting at Westgate, Probe Continues,” Capital FM Ra- 3 These include making allegations that Kenyan forces 7 Ibid. dio [Nairobi], September 29, 2013; John Campbell, “Nai- used chemical weapons during the siege and later blew 8 Ibid. robi’s Westgate Mall Attack: Unanswered Questions,” up sections of the mall, burying scores of people, to hide 9 Peter Walker, “Kenyan Forces Begin ‘Major Assault’ Council on Foreign Relations, October 8, 2013. their act. to End Nairobi Mall Siege – as it Happened,” Guardian, 14 Gogineni; “Kenyan Mall Attack: 39 Still Missing, Says 4 Looking at al-Shabab’s media operations from a his- September 23, 2013; Richard Norton-Taylor and Vikram Red Cross,” Associated Press, September 30, 2013. torical perspective allows for a more detailed and con- Dodd, “Nairobi Attack: Israel Takes Lead Role in Advis- 15 Ramadhan Rajab, “23 People Still Missing Almost a textualized analysis of continuities, shifts, and trends in ing Kenyan Forces,” Guardian, September 23, 2013; Geof- Month after Westgate Attack,” The Star [Nairobi], Octo- its messaging, which is not possible if the group’s state- frey Mosoku, “Kenya Denies Involvement of Foreign ber 15, 2013. ments are examined in a vacuum. Military,” The Standard [Nairobi], September 23, 2013. 16 “Kenya Military Names Westgate Mall Attack Sus- 5 The Kenyan government has said that there were be- 10 Kenya Defense Forces, tweet, September 22, pects,” BBC, October 5, 2013. tween 10 and 15 attackers, but the exact number remains 2013, available at www.twitter.com/kdfinfo/status- 17 Ibid. Omar al-Nabhan was the nephew of the late unclear. See “Nairobi Attack: Kenya Forces Comb West- es/381877655227731968. Saleh al-Nabhan, an al-Qa`ida operative in East Africa gate Site,” BBC, September 24, 2013. 11 Howden.
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