Terrorist Threat Assessments in the Netherlands

Communicating Terrorism: terrorist threat assessments in the Netherlands

Thesis by

Kay van der Ven 1579010

MSc Crisis and Security Management

Leiden University, Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Edwin Bakker Second reader: Dr. Alastair Reed

January 2016

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.

This thesis, the research conducted and all related effort could not have been completed without the support of numerous persons, for whom I would like to express my utmost gratitude.

First and foremost I would like to thank my family for their support, particularly to them a simple acknowledgement does not do justice to their part in this process. Valerie, I truly admire the way in which you managed to cope with me for so many years and especially your support during the final phase.

Also, I like to take this opportunity to thank my friends and fellow students Brian, Lars and Roan for their valuable comments, remarks and engagement throughout this process. Most importantly, sharing the pressure made my life so much easier.

A special acknowledgement goes to Prof. Dr. Edwin Bakker, who besides being my supervisor provided me the opportunity to engage in the thesis topic not only theoretically, but also professionally. Working at the Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism has been the most desirable environment for finalizing my work and served as an inspiring atmosphere. Last but not least I thank MA Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn for our endless debates on the topic.

This thesis would not be the complete piece of work it is without the guidance of my supervisor, proof readers, critics and motivators.

I am sincerely grateful,

Kay van der Ven

ABBREVIATIONS.

AIVD – the General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands

CBRN - Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear

CTC – European Union Counter-terrorism Coordinator

DSI - Special Intervention Service

DTN – Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands

EU – European Union

IND – Immigration and Naturalisation Service

IS – Islamic State

ISAF –The International Security Assistance Force

ISIL – Islamic State in Iraq

ISIS - Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

KLPD – National Police of the Netherlands

MIVD – Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCTV – The National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism

NFI - The Netherlands Forensic Institute

S4H - Sharia for Holland

UN – United Nations

UNSC - UN Security Council

JaN – Jabat al Nusra

RIV - Council for the Intelligence and Security Services

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Acknowledgements...... 2 Abbreviations...... 3 Abstract...... 6 1. Introduction...... 7 2. Theoretical Framework...... 12 2.1 Concept of (national) Security...... 12 2.2 Baldwin & security problematique...... 13 3. Methodology ...... 16 3.1 mixed methods...... 17 3.2 Likert scale...... 17 3.3 Quantitative analysis...... 18 3.4 Limitations...... 19 3.5 Operationalization of Baldwin’s framework...... 19 3.6 Definitions...... 22 4. DTN ...... 26 4.1 Why a terrorist threat assessment Netherlands? ...... 26 4.2 Scope...... 28 4.3 Parties involved...... 30 4.4 For whom? ...... 31 4.5 Communicating threats...... 32 5. Analysis...... 33 Ten years DTN...... 33 2005 (DTN 1-2): Threat level; Substantial...... 33 2006 (DTN 3 – 7) Threat level; Substantial...... 37 2007 (DTN 8 – 11) Threat level; Limited...... 40 2008 (DTN 12 – 15) Threat level; Substantial...... 43 2009 (DTN 16 – 19) Threat level; Limited and Substantial...... 47 2010 (DTN 20 – 23) Threat level; Limited...... 49 2011 (DTN 24-27) Threat level; Limited...... 53 2012 (DTN 28-31): Threat level; Limited...... 55 2013 (DTN 32-34): Threat level; Substantial...... 58 2014 (DTN 35-37): Threat level; Substantial...... 60 2015 (DTN 38-40): Threat level; Substantial...... 63 4.5 Quantitative findings...... 66 6. Conclusion and reflection ...... 71

5. 1 General impression ...... 71 5.2 Specification of the security problematique ...... 74 5.3 How did this develop over time? ...... 76 5.4 Reflection ...... 77 6. Bibliography...... 79

ABSTRACT. This thesis explorers the content of ten years terrorist threat assessments Netherlands (DTN) of the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) through qualitative observations and by conducting a quantitative analysis. The DTNs increasingly have become the principal tool of communicating the state of affairs concerning terrorism to the public. The assessments provide developments on (inter)national events, assessed to be of relevance to the Netherlands, combined with an attached threat level, being: ‘minimal’, ‘limited’, ‘substantial ‘or ‘critical’. In order to research how the assessments evolved since their establishment in May 2005, how this developed over time and to what extent the security problematique is specified, the theoretical framework of Baldwin (1997) has been adopted and operationalized. The systematic analysis through the framework focussed on the seven aspects necessary to specification of the security problematique according to Baldwin (1997). First and foremost; for whom is the security intended? Secondly, what values does it aim to protect? Third, measuring security as a matter of degree, how much security is needed? Fourth, from what threats? Fifth, by what means is security pursued? Sixth, at what costs is security pursued? And finally, what is the time period of the security situation at hand? The results show that for most of these criteria, the level of specification in the DTNs is met. The findings determine an extensive international focus reaching far beyond just the Netherlands, combined with numerous (international) threats, dominated by jihadism. Furthermore, shifts in specification concerning costs, how much security and means are noticed. Societal values are mentioned consistently, but not specified extensively as the DTNs mention societal values mainly in terms of ‘threatened by’ radicalization and polarization. Overall, geographical shifts in threats are identified. However the main themes remain similar, consisting of returning foreign fighters and several forms of jihadism and salafism. In conclusion, the NCTV’s terrorist threat assessments maintain a high level of quality throughout the ten years and are a valuable asset in communicating terrorism to the public and its partners.

KEY WORDS: Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands (DTN), threat level, NCTV, Baldwin

1. INTRODUCTION.

“The threat level for the Netherlands is again determined to be ‘substantial’. This means that the chance of an attack within the Netherlands is realistic. The events of last Friday, June 26th [2015] in France and Tunisia confirm the current threat image. Also in the Netherlands and other Western countries comparable attacks are conceivable. The perpetrators and targets chosen increasingly become more diverse. This, combined with the calls of the Islamic State (IS) and al Qaeda leadership to carry out attacks, fits within the image of a realistic threat” (NCTV, 2015).

Terrorism.

The phenomenon of ‘terrorism’ has dominated politics and society on an international level for the past decades. Almost every day, reports in (news) papers, television and the Internet show headlines related to terrorism. It is a “highly complex, highly subjective and politically sensitive topic” that receives much attention from media and governments (Bakker, 2015: 19). In the modern field of international crisis and security management States are increasingly interrelated with the topic of globalisation, which to a large extent is demonstrated the phenomenon of terrorism (Clarke, 2009). Some academics argue that due to increasing globalisation the “permeability of borders and state interdependence the internationalisation of terrorism and other forms of political violence is a fact” (Schmid, 2004: 201). Moreover, Cronin (2003) states that “the current wave of international terrorism, characterized by unpredictable and unprecedented threats from non-state actors, not only is a reaction to globalization but is facilitated by it” (p. 30). The international character of terrorism was displayed after the terrorist acts on September 11, 2001 (9/11) in the United States (US), after which various significant ‘gaps’ and ‘shortcomings’ within the European Union’s (EU) counter-terrorism policy came to light. This revealed the substantial difference in scope, depth and perception of terrorism internationally and on a European Union (EU)-level. For example, in the pre- 9/11 era, only a few contemporary EU Member States 1 had perceived terrorism as a theme that could potentially pose a threat to national security and defined it as a serious crime (Bures, 2010: 52). Although terrorism is perceived to be of particular relevance after 9/11, in fact, there have been numerous eras in which what we now call ‘terrorism’ ranked high on political and security agendas (Bakker, 2015: 47) The phenomenon itself is not new,

1 United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain

7 but the way it has been labelled, due to changing size, scope, nature and impacts of these acts, is (Bakker, 2015: 47). Concerning Western democracies, terrorism has at all times formed a threat (Abels, 2008: 535). Political minor subgroups that, by means of targeting human lives violently, pursue to force their ideas and/or ideologies on to others do not only cause fear and unspeakable human suffering but also undermine the very roots of democracy, disregarding the rules and basic principles involved in the peaceful settling of political disputes (Abels, 2008: 535). According to Abels (2008) per definition, a democracy is at a disadvantage in finding a response to such actions on the democratic rule of law, as such system is primarily required and expected to comply and adhere to its own core principles (p. 535). In fact, weakening the constitutional state should be avoided at times, as this would advance terrorists’ goals, only causing its support to cultivate. For that reason, counterterrorism demands are often reluctant in the application of profound (counter) measures.

The Netherlands.

Terrorism is not new to the Netherlands. However, the contemporary shape of terrorism has since 9/11 been perceived as a “new phenomenon”, being ‘catastrophic terrorism’ (Donner & Remkes, 2004). In contrast to the prior character of terrorism, involving clearly defined objectives by terrorists, the driving force is no longer politically-, but religious based (Eikelenboom, 2007: 7). According to Abels (2008) the terrorism phenomenon is impossible to delimit within Dutch territory alone (p 535). Despite the fact that we can speak of ‘home- grown’ terrorism, international developments have an equally substantial influence on the Dutch terrorist threat assessment. For instance, Dutch military efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have direct consequences for the international profile the Netherlands has in circles of radical Islamists. In addition, the military developments in the most infamous global Islamic conflicts, such as Iraq, the Palestine territories, Chechnya, Kashmir and Somalia have their effect on the security situation in the Netherlands (Abels, 2008: 535).

The NCTV.

In 2004, the Dutch cabinet set out the necessity for a “special unit that, together with other initiatives taken, would ensure that the main impediments to a coordinated approach to counterterrorism would be properly addressed” (Vast Comité I, 2010: 151). Within the Netherlands approximately twenty institutions contribute in combatting terrorism, either in terms of policy or operational aspects (Vast Comité I, 2010: 151). Concerning the topic of terrorism and counterterrorism there was no coordination and monitoring component within

8 the Dutch government regarding the integrated approach in fighting terrorism, until the establishment of the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) in 2004. The NCTV was established with a mandate to guarantee the overall coordination of the fight against terrorism. Stating the nature of terrorism has changed over the recent years, currently the NCTV perceives terrorism as an “intended strategic tool to force a particular political or politico-religious direction upon a government and/or society” (NCTV, n.d.). The NCTV stresses the changed nature of the coercive tool of terrorism in recent years and defines terrorism as “threatening, making preparations for or perpetrating, for ideological reasons, acts of serious violence directed at people or other acts intended to cause property damage that could spark social disruption, for the purpose of bringing about social change, creating a climate of fear among the general public, or influencing political decision-making” (NCTV, n.d.).

Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands.

The quote presented above is published by the National Coordinator for Security and Counter Terrorism in June 2015 and is part of the organizations terrorist threat assessment (DTN 39). The DTN is a general valuation of the terrorist threat, primarily produced for Dutch administrative bodies, political leadership and policy makers. Every quarter, the NCTV assesses the national and international state of threat to the Netherlands and Dutch interests abroad and publishes such assessment committed to a threat level. The formation of the document and the determination of the perceived threat level is based on (confidential) information from various intelligence and security services occupied with combating terrorism and / or countering radicalization processes. In addition, the organization uses information obtained from publicly available sources, administrative sources and analyses of NCTV itself (NCTV, 2015). The NCTV produces an unclassified version of the DTN, which is available to the public. The public terrorism threat assessment is not designed and intended to deter terrorists, but mainly to inform the society and display the possible fluctuation of the threat situation in the Netherlands, attached with a threat level, being: ‘minimal’, ‘limited’, ‘substantial’ or ‘critic’ (Tielbeke, 2014). Communicating terrorist threats to the public can be very challenging, especially when this results in a shift in threat level. One could argue that publication of such documents potentially leaves room and opportunity for interpretation by the public if not clearly defined and specified. One cannot assume the public to evidently understand the contextual aspects, terminology and understand the frame of reference on such threats and related threat level, described in such document. Therefore, this could potentially

9 generate an ambiguous image of the terrorist threat in terms of public perception and could the social context within a society. It is conceivable that there are significant individual differences in the manner in which individuals deal with terror threats (Silke, 2003). Research conducted by Huddy, Feldman, Capleos,& Provost (2002) revealed that in presence of an increased terrorist threat, important adaptive social changes could occur within society. Individuals that feel personally threatened by terrorism, an aspect that could potentially occur in absent of clear, defined concepts and context in a terrorist assessment, are expected to undertake or support actions aimed at decreasing its exposure to terrorism personally; i.e. use more caution whilst handling email, limitations on travelling through air, restrictions on holiday destinations and/or places to visit (Baldwin, 1997; Huddy et al., p. 506).

Research.

As communicating terrorism is challenging, the content of the public versions of the DTNs, combined with a threat level, has to be analysed in order to understand how these evolved in the last ten years. This thesis focuses on what the DTNs contain information-wise, both qualitative and quantitative. What changed in the past ten years? How did the terrorist threat assessment Netherlands describe events and threats? And what quantitative findings can be identified? This thesis tries to reflect on the content of the public version of the DTNs between May 2005 and November 2015 (DTN1 – DTN 40), by identifying possible fluctuations in communication of (counter) terrorism related subjects to the public and to understand the representation of such assessment. In order to do so, a theoretical framework by Baldwin (1997) on specification of the security ‘problematique’ will serve as a guide. The debate on the representation of the terrorist threat assessment for the Netherlands is underexposed in the current scholarly debate. Since this is the first time a ten-year timeframe can be analysed, this thesis aims to answer the fundamental research question:

How did the Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands evolve in the last ten years, to what extent is the security problematique specified and how did this develop over time?

In order to answer this question, a clear understanding of the background, scope, realization and development of the ‘all-source threat assessment’ will be presented. Furthermore, a theoretical framework on the definitions and concepts related to national security should be established. Chapter two will clarify the theoretical framework and presents various academic notions in relation to security and threat assessments Netherlands. I will use the theoretical positions on the concept of security as basic frame of reference and hold these to the public

10 versions DTNs as published by the NCTV. Further to this, I will describe the root causes for the establishment of a terrorist threat assessment, focusing on the necessity and significance of an ‘All-Source Threat Assessment’ in Dutch Counterterrorism and the structure and criteria in which the NCTV states to construct its terrorist threat assessment, attached to a threat level. Also, in this chapter particular indicators will be presented, which serve as tool in analysing the documents. The methodology of this research will be assessed in chapter three, in which the operationalization of the theoretical framework will be clarified. Thereafter, chapter five will show the findings of the analysis of the ten years of communicating terrorism via the DTN. Finally, I will describe the findings of the research. The conclusion will be presented by general findings, specification, the developments over time and suggestions for improvement in communicating terrorism through the DTN.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK. Answering the abovementioned research question demands a structured approach as the material to be analysed consists of lengthy assessments. The public versions of the DTNs consist of at least five pages and contain sometimes over twenty pages. In order to analyse the material systematically and consistently, the forty DTNs will be examined through a theoretical framework. This chapter highlights several academic positions towards (national) security and specification, stating that certain minimum criteria has to be met to avoid ambiguity and explicate concepts for meaningful scientific communication (Baldwin, 1997: 17). This academic position serves as basis for this research, as it helps to analyse to what extent the security problematique is specified in the DTNs.

2.1 CONCEPT OF (NATIONAL) SECURITY. From a Western perspective, the term ‘security’ nowadays is related to “individual or societal value systems”, according to Brauch (2011: 61). In this thinking, security as concept has no independent meaning and in social science is ambiguous and elastic (Brauch, 2011: 61). The indistinct meaning of the concept is challenging as the term can have a different sense for people in a society. Some authors claim that it is widely accepted that security depends on attitudes and behaviour of individuals and groups and state that one needs to understand the social, cultural and psychological factors underlying human understanding of security (Biswas, 2011; Burgess, 2014; Egelman & Peer, 2015). Baldwin’s perspective in his publication “The concept of security” in 1997 provides an interesting dimension regarding the extent to which ‘security’ should be specified. In his article, Baldwin (1997) does not just accept that a concept of security is a contested concept and therefore should not be defined, but instead argues that a definition is needed. This stance is based on the work of Buzan from 1991, who argues that a concept of security that fails to specify a 'referent object' makes little sense (p. 13). Baldwin (1997) refers to this process as ‘defining the security problematique’. The security problematique refers to the complex of issues associated with the topic of security, considered collectively. In the Netherlands, attention to security forms the foundation of a free and secure society. In this perspective, specifically the ‘Counterterrorism Strategy’ is mentioned to, “in cooperation with public and private partners crisis, guarantee security” (Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, 2015: 1). One of the topics connecting national and international security is terrorism; a theme of fundamental interest in the DTNs.

Over sixty years ago Wolfers (1952) already focussed on the symbol that national security presents in his article ‘National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol’, stating that “it would be an exaggeration to claim that the symbol of national security is nothing but a stimulus to semantic confusion, though closer analysis will show that if used without specifications it leaves room for more confusion than sound political counsel or scientific usage can afford” (Wolfers, 1952: 483.) In this perspective, it is suggested that specification is an essential instrument in diminishing confusion regarding national security; an interpretation highly applicable to the terrorist threat assessments Netherlands. Further to this, it is suggested that the concept of national security potentially is a dangerously ambiguous concept if used without such specification by Wolfers (1952), who defines national security as "absence of threats to acquired values", highlighting the significant role values have (p. 489). This thinking is valuable to the idea that publicly available terrorist threat assessments should therefore be explicit and contains clearly described concepts and themes. Regarding the Netherlands, the NCTV (2007) describes that national security is at stake when vital interests of our state and / or society are threatened to such extent that this could result in- potential – social disruption (p. 9). National security includes both the affecting of security by deliberate human action (security) and infestation by disasters, system or process errors, human error or natural anomalies such as extreme weather (safety). The organizations’ strategy for national security focuses on the protection of the Dutch society and people on their own territory against internal and external threats, stating that “obviously” there are direct links between national security and international security (NCTV, 2007: 9). As the condition of the Netherlands’ national security in relation to terrorism are described in the assessments, one could argue these demand specification regarding the state of affairs as indicated by the aforementioned authors.

2.2 BALDWIN & SECURITY PROBLEMATIQUE. On this notion, Baldwin (1997) provides guidance in the form of several specification criteria. Using these as framework helps to examine how the security problematique is described and specified in the public version of the terrorist threat assessments Netherlands. This theoretical approach will be used to identify how the DTN evolved during the past ten years. Also, this framework contributes to determine to what extent the DTNs specify the terrorist threats within the Netherlands from various perspectives. In order to do so, Baldwin defined a set of two principles, and five additional standards required that serve as minimum requirement to specify such concepts. The operationalization of this theoretical framework will be explained

13 in chapter 3.4Baldwin (1997) suggests that security in the “most general sense can be defined in terms of two specifications. The first question, “security for whom?” can be answered by an empirical observable specification such as ‘the state’, or ‘individuals’. The second leading specification is “security for which values?” Baldwin (1997) points out that such individuals, states and other (social) actors have different values (p. 14). The study of values has re- emerged as a major topic for social psychological investigation in the past decade, with value systems seen as important superordinate cognitive structures with considerable implications for individual behaviour (Rohan, 2000; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990). Essential to this framework is Baldwin’s statement: “failure to specify which values are included in a concept of national security often generates confusion”. In this perspective, values are essential as referent object for specification. According to Baldwin (1997) some of these values include physical safety, economic welfare, autonomy and psychological well-being. However, in this research the framework will not be limited to these pre-defined values, as is described in the operationalization. The aforementioned primary specifications, however, suffice to define the concept of security but offer minimal guidance in the pursuit of what the terrorist threat assessment Netherlands stands for. In order to analyse the DTNs and use these for comparative means, the following specifications presented by Baldwin (1997) are also desirable, concerning answers to the questions; ‘how much security?’, ‘from what threats?’, ‘by what means?’, ‘at what cost?’ and finally, ‘in what time period?’ According to the theory described by Baldwin (1997) the latter specifications, being means, costs and time period, must be specified for means of systematic comparison of policy alternatives. This thesis aims not to compare and find policy alternatives but intends to understand the representation of the DTNs, of which the theoretical framework provides guidance. It is of importance to understand to what extent the DTN is intended to communicate such concepts. The root causes for the necessity of such all-source threat assessments perform a fundamental role in this and will be discussed in the following chapters. Furthermore, chapter 3.4 demonstrates the operationalization for these specifications.

Interestingly, Baldwin (1997) addresses that exertions in redefining security for the sake of redefining policy agendas of nation-states is often supported by (normative) arguments about “which values of which people of groups of people should be protected, and empirical arguments as to the nature and magnitude of threats to those values”, demonstrating the evident role of values in security-related matters (p. 5). The role of values will therefore be of extensive importance while analysing the documents. The aforementioned assumptions in the

14 specifications form the framework in which I will proceed to analyse the DTNs published in the past ten years. The theoretical perspective as presented above contributes as guide in order analyse the content of the DTNs with respect to the actors in focus, its societal values concerned, the degree of security, the types of threats, the means for countering such threats, and the relevant timeframe (Baldwin, 1997: 17).

3. METHODOLOGY This chapter presents the methods that are used to conduct this thesis, demonstrating both the qualitative and quantitative approaches taken to analyse and validate the results. First, the independence of the DTNs are explained, observing them as separate documents rather than as a whole. Thereafter, the various approached taken are presented. To illustrate findings, a so-called ‘Likert scale’ will be presented per year; finally resulting in an all-encompassing figure in which possible developments will be visualized. Most importantly, the operationalization of the theoretical position of Baldwin (1997) together with the interpretation for this research will be presented in this chapter.

The terrorist threat assessment Netherlands presents a current and periodically revised threat assessment with updates on relevant developments concerning the topic of terrorism within the Netherlands and Dutch interests abroad. Based on contributions provided by prominent governmental bodies associated with counterterrorism in the Netherlands, the NCTV’s analysts develop a terrorist threat assessment for the Netherlands. The first public all-source terrorist threat assessment Netherlands was published in May 2005 and has since been reproduced every three months, serving as substantive base and guideline for Dutch (Abels, 2007: 540). On November tenth, 2015 the NCTV published its fortieth terrorist threat assessment Netherlands in a ten year timeframe. An advantage of the introduction of such terrorist threat assessment Netherlands is that both the political and civilian level receives a periodically updated assessment, representing the latest developments concerning terrorism. Figure 1 shows that such assessment could differ in terms of the attached threat level. For example, in March 2013 the terrorism threat level shifted from ‘limited’ to ‘substantial’; representing the changing nature of threat perception. Therefore, such terrorist threat assessment should be viewed separately from the formerly produced versions, as these are independent assessed documents. However, it should be noted that perceptions presented are not entirely unconnected as previously perceived threats to the Netherlands might change in magnitude, diminish or shift. Thus, in this thesis the publicly published versions of the DTNs will be treated as single case studies, multiplied by the quantity of published versions (1 to 40).

3.1 MIXED METHODS. Qualitative research methods are often used to examine social processes at work, in particular contexts in considerable depth (Griffin, 2004: 9).Qualitative methods, especially within longitudinal studies often involve a series of systematic observations which can reflect inconsistencies and contradictions (Griffin, 2004: 6). As indicated, the systematic observations will be conducted through a theoretical frame work consisting of seven aspects. In order to answer the research question of this thesis a predominantly qualitative approach will be engaged for analysing the data within a ten-year timeframe, presenting a longitudinal research approach starting from May 2005 to November 2015. Correspondingly, qualitative data collection methods will be applied including data analysis procedures such as categorising data. The data analysed, consisting of non-numerical data presented in the DTNs provide the fundamental source for this research. The DTNs will be treated as detached documents, representing a three-month period prior to its publication and serve as case studies. Although terrorism is a global phenomenon, there are regional differences in terms of the nature of both terrorism itself and counterterrorism strategies (Bakker, 2015: 27). Using this method captures this complexity in the cases, within each unique period of time. Gerring (2007) states that “a case study may be understood as the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that study is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases. Case study research may incorporate several cases, that is, multiple case studies” (p. 20). This method contributes to understanding a specific case or, in this particular research, multiple cases in large detail. However, it is important to mention that although forty cases might potentially indicate a large-N study, the external validity remains limited strictly to the Netherlands due to impossibility of random case selection. This would abstain the research from covering the complete ten years in terms of public threat assessments by the NCTV. On the other hand, small-N approaches have better internal validity and measurement validity. The nature of the collected qualitative data affects the analysis, as in this particular research the documents consist of governmental assembled and complied (classified) documents. Very important in this context is the operationalization and determination of Baldwin’s criteria and how this will be interpreted regarding this specific research. Further limitations will be discussed in chapter 3.4.

3.2 LIKERT SCALE. A research method that helps to illustrate observations on topic or theme is a rating scale, which requires the researcher to indicate the level of agreement or disagreement with a specific statement at hand. In social research, and mainly social psychological research, various types of

17 rating scales have been developed. One of the methods often used is the Likert scale, which is a principle of measuring attitudes as this approach, which in addition, specifically provides measurements in terms of the extent to which the subject agrees or disagrees; displaying the cognitive and affective components of attitudes (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009: 378). First and foremost, response categories for different types of rating questions should be established. As our theoretical framework, based on Baldwin’s criteria towards specification, serves to explorer to what extent the security problematique is specified I will use the seven criteria enquiries as rating questions. Furthermore, I will assess whether or not the answers on Baldwin’s criteria are present or not, and to what extent they are presented in terms of frequency and specificity. For that reason, Saunders et al. (2009) determined types of rating for assessment purposes, consisting of the following scales:

Always Frequency Sometimes Rarely Practically never

This approach will be applied for every year assessed, eventually providing a yearly overview that contributes to establishing conclusions. In addition, an overall figure will be presented. In the final part of this chapter indicators and relevant use of language serving as indicator will be clarified in relation to this study’s interpretation of Baldwin’s criteria.

3.3 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS. In order to explore the use of language in the DTNs throughout the years, conducting quantitative research in addition helps to generate findings. The quantitative data obtained may be used to qualify it, meaning “to convert it into narratives that can be analysed qualitatively” (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009: 153). For analysing the documents quantitatively the software of ATLAS.ti, and more specifically, its ‘word cruncher’ tool will be used. ATLAS.ti provides the possibility to illustrate the frequencies of the words within the data primary documents (DTNs) by creating an Excel spreadsheet of every word used in those documents and totals the frequencies. The outcomes of this quantitative research method merely serves as instrument to confirm or reject assumptions made based on the qualitative research conducted, for example shifts in topics of interests, or predominantly topics of interest.

Mixed methods research implies the use of more than one data collection method and refers to those combinations in which more than one data collection technique is applied with associated analysis techniques (Saunders et al., 2009: 152). The qualitative and quantitative data collection

18 techniques and analysis procedures will be used sequential, starting with qualitative, to prevent a biased stance while analysing the documents in terms of the quantity in which certain topics and themes are covered. Further to this, it should be understood that the qualitative data procedure is dominant. In order to manage the complex nature of the data collected the content will be condensed, grouped, categorised and narratively restructured in a chronological to support meaningful analysis. In addition, the theoretical framework discussed will be used as guide. Lacking this approach could result in an impressionistic view of what the result means (Saunders et al., 2009: 482).

3.4 LIMITATIONS. In qualitative research events can only be understood adequately if they are perceived in context. The context in which the DTNs have been published is not predefined for any period. Qualitative research perceives the information not as separate variables but rather determines the ‘experience’ as a whole. Providing specific context for the particular research at hand contributes to understanding the specific case, but is for that same reason limited in its external validity. Producing adequate validity and reliability are major points of criticism while using this approach, as with the subjective nature of qualitative data it is challenging to apply conventional standards of reliability and validity. The specific contexts, circumstances, events, interactions and conditions entwined to this research result in a minimal opportunity for replication or establishing generalisations.

3.5 OPERATIONALIZATION OF BALDWIN’S FRAMEWORK. Most important is the operationalization and establishment of how Baldwin’s criteria and approach will be interpreted regarding this specific research. The aforementioned presented elements connected to the questions, represent Baldwin’s assumptions of what is relevant and seems suitable as answer. However, some of the descriptions stated a lack of completion and delineation. Therefore, these will be defined, keeping in mind the NCTV’s frame of reference regarding the intention of the terrorist threat assessment; a document that provides a global analysis of national and international threat against the Netherlands and Dutch interests abroad (NCTV, n.d.).

First in Baldwin’s (1997) definition criteria is the question ‘security for whom?’ In this regard, he states that “a wide range of answers to the question [..] are acceptable” (p. 13). Furthermore, he specifically mentions “the individual (some, most, or all individuals), the state (some, most, or all states), the international system (some, most or all international systems) etc.” (p. 13). These fit

19 within the scope of the research and fit in the research question at hand. Indicators for this topic consist therefore of (international) actors that fit in the aforementioned categories. Most importantly is his final remark, stating that the choice of answers is dependent on the particular research conducted. In this specific research, it seems that the answer to the question should reflect upon to the Dutch society, or Dutch nationals abroad. The above mentioned options by Baldwin are suitable for the objective of applying this criteria-question to the terrorist threat assessment Netherlands.

Secondly, the interpretation concerning ‘Security for which values?’ for this specific research should be clarified. Baldwin (1997) rightly indicates that (social) actors, such as stated above have many, potentially dissimilar values, which “may include physical safety, economic welfare, autonomy, psychological well-being, and so on” (p. 13). However, these are intended for the concept of national security rather than values that contribute to defining a terrorist threat assessment. Baldwin’s stance, on including societal core values in this dimensions of security differs from the approach taken for this research, as Baldwin excludes these to prevent prejudices on the value of security as policy objective. As we interpret the set criteria for purposes of determining specification rather than policy objectives, core values serve as highly relevant aspects within our study. For that reason, I will focus on societal factors and more specifically values of the Dutch society that potentially could be threatened by terrorism. These specific values for the Netherlands are defined in a report of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (2014) on core values that form the basis of Dutch society. Such core values as defined by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment comprise democracy, rule of law, social rights, freedom; religious, in way of life, self-determination, freedom of speech, equivalence (equal treatment) and solidarity. These values will be taken into account while analysing the terrorist threat assessments and will serve as possible indicators for the second question of our theoretical framework. Accordingly, I will examine whether the DTN points out what values are or could be at stake regarding terrorist threats.

The next point set-out by Baldwin, being ‘How much security?’ is based on the assumption that security can be measured as a matter of degree. Obtaining security is related to measures taken to achieve such objective. In return, security as objective indicates that it has to compete with other objectives on state-level. For that reason, Baldwin (1997) points out that one should not avoid to question how much security is enough (p. 15). For our research this approach comprises analysing the provision of information regarding governmental measures as presented in the terrorist threat assessment for the Netherlands, as this potentially provides certain indication of to

20 what extent the government has acted in response to the terrorist threat (level) and thus aimed to increase security. In order to do so, certain means will have to be deployed. Therefore, related to the quantification of security is the follow-up question Baldwin determined concerning ‘By what means?’ The difference in interpretation between both questions is that means will be directly related to the measures actually taken as described in the DTN, in the form of action plans, programmes, initiatives and any other security-related measure whilst matters of how much security will be defined based upon what the NCTV presents in terms of how much is required, and not been put in place per se. However, one could argue that ‘how much’ is very much dependant on the means presented and in the context of the DTN are enclosed in the specification of means, as the DTN intends to associate threats to (counter) measures. In case such distinction is made, this will be defined. Regarding the question of means the intention lies in the importance of such aspects within international politics (Baldwin, 1997: 16). As the DTN is intended to be a politically independent document, this interpretation’s relevance ceases. However, interpreting this question in its most generic sense, separated from its original context, contributes to the analysis as means adopted in the pursuit of (increased) security will become apparent. The question ‘At what cost?’ is expected to be underrepresented in term of answers and specifications, simply due to the fact that such information is not distributed through the DTN, which signifies a different platform. Baldwin (1997) argues that the pursuit of security always comprises costs, or more specifically in this case, could encompass sacrificing other goals instead (p. 16). It is highly unlikely for the DTN to present such information on a constant bases, merely touching upon shifts in allocating resources could potentially be presented. However, any financial indicators will fit within this specification and serves as a matter of degree.

In this research the question ‘From what threats?’ refers to the aspects that are described as perceived threats within the terrorist threat assessments and is a question of great relevance to this study. Such aspects can consist of individuals, groups, states or other aspects that might be threatening the aforementioned values for example. As guidance, Baldwin (1997) points out that during the Cold War references concerning threat such as ‘Communist threat’ failed in their specification. Based on this notion, broad references to potential threats will be also included in the analyses together with clearly defined aspects within the scope of the DTN, as this highlights differences in the assessed threat specification.

Finally, description of ‘In what time period’ contributes to elucidating the scope in which the DTN operates and if there is a timeframe allocated to the perceived threats and potential measures. For our research this is relevant as the DTN is a quarterly produced document, but in

21 terms of specification might have a short or long-term vision. In order to define whether or not this is represented in the DTNs, I will identify indications of a defined timeframe, or time-related language. Also, Baldwin (1997) uses this question to focus whether short and long-term policies regarding security are conflicting (p. 17). In terms of analysis, I will not limit ourselves to looking at a DTN as a document only ‘valid’ for the past three months, but will in addition seek to identify to what extent formerly integrated assessments and measures are referred to in a later period.

3.6 DEFINITIONS. In the documents analysed, certain definitions are often used. It is highly relevant to understand what these definitions mean in the perspective of the NCTV. Therefore, most descriptions presented below are derived from publications by the NCTV or from the website. However, for some definitions the NCTV applies the definition published by the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service. Moreover, the information on the theme of ‘salafism’ is derived from a joint publication of the NCTV and the AIVD; “Salafism in the Netherlands: diversity and dynamics” of 2015. Both organizations share the interpretations in this publication, which therefore serves as main source. The following definitions are alphabetically arranged.

Extremism “Extremism is the phenomenon whereby individuals or groups aware of the limits of the law go and commit illegal actions in order to achieve their goal. The Netherlands has various extremist groups, each with its own grounds, such as right-wing extremism, animal rights extremism and left-wing extremism and Islamic extremism” (NCTV, n.d.). Jihadism

In the NCTV’s publication ‘Ideologie en strategie van het jihadisme’ of 2009, the concept of jihadism “considers the armed struggle, which is defined as jihad, as the means for realizing the ideals. "Jihadism," and "jihadist" are therefore derived from the concept of "jihad", the concept of jihad in Islam, however, is a complex and comprehensive concept which explicitly also has a spiritual and "peaceful" meaning. When speaking about Jihadism or jihadist it is always about jihad in the sense of an armed struggle, also referred to as "minor jihad," or by some as 'holy war'. This refers to jihad by individuals, groups and freedom fighters and not by countries” (NCTV, 2009: 18).

Jihadist movement

“Jihadism is a movement within political Islam that, based on a specific interpretation of the Salafist doctrine and based on the ideas of Sayyid Qutb pursues to establish a worldwide rule of Islam and the re-establishment the Islamic State (Caliphate) through an armed struggle (jihad)” (NCTV, 2009: 19).

Jihadist terrorism

“Terrorism is defined as threatening, making preparations for or perpetrating, for ideological reasons, acts of serious violence directed at people or other acts intended to cause property damage that could spark social disruption, for the purpose of bringing about social change, creating a climate of fear among the general public, or influencing political decision-making” (NCTV, 2009: 20).

This, in combination with the definition of jihadism results in the following definition of ‘jihadist terrorism’: “Jihadist terrorism is terrorism from a Jihadist intention. Features for this category of terrorism involve:

- The label as jihad of threats, preparing or committing serious violence directed at people, or acts aimed at causing damage aimed at disrupting a society;

- Committing activities that fit in the pursuit of global domination of Islam and the re- establishment of the Islamic State”. (NCTV, 2009: 20).

Polarization “The sharpening of differences between groups in society that can lead to tensions between groups and an increase in segregation along ethnic and religious lines” (NCTV, n.d.).

Radicalization Concerning the topic of radicalization, the NCTV uses a definition established by the General Intelligence and Security Service (2004) in their report “From Dawa to Jihad”: “The active pursuit of and/or support for fundamental changes in society that may endanger the continued existence of the democratic order (aim), which may involve the use of undemocratic methods (means) that may harm the functioning of the democratic order (effect)” (p. 13).

De-radicalization “Renunciation of extremist ideas (cognitive change)” (NCTV, n.d.). Resilience, resistance, and adaptability Due to the interconnectedness and independence of systems and infrastructures society become considerably more complex. This has led to an intrinsically increased vulnerability to disruptions and greater uncertainty regarding the nature and effects. Due to these developments, the Ministry of Security and Justice, and more specifically the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTV), requires a better understanding of the ways in which the state is capable to measure the resilience of the Dutch society periodically. Therefore, TNO conducted such research for the NCTV and produced a document on the resilience of the Dutch society. According to them: “a resilient society is a society in which individuals, groups and communities are able to cope with threats and disturbances caused by social, economic and physical changes. The literature shows that for the operationalization and measurability of the concept of 'resilience' three aspects are relevant: resistance, resilience and adaptability. Resistance involves the system's ability to be able to continue with its function, if a disturbance occurs, without significant changes taking place within in the system. If functions will be affected more than resilience makes sure that the functioning is restored. Adaptivity is the ability of a system to respond to changes in their environment, to adapt and to learn from experience” (TNO, 2014: 5). I will therefore apply this stance as the representation of the topic of resilience in the DTNs.

Salafism

Salafism is interpreted by the Dutch intelligence- and security service and the NCTV as a ‘catch-all’-term for a variety of fundamentalist movements within Sunni Islam, seeking to ‘the pure Islam’, in their perspective. These movements invoke a similar method and have clear agreements on key points of religious doctrine and Practising. However, aspects within the broad spectrum of Salafism also encompass distinct differences in interpretation and the translation of the teachings into concrete political and social preferences and behavior (AIVD & NCTV, 2015: 4) Within the Salafist spectrum there are three broadly divided directions, which according to the AIVD & NCTV (2015) “can be traced back on the ratio of these currents in respect of the regimes in Islamic countries” (p. 5).

Apolitical Salafism: “the apolitical Salafism is characterized by an aversion to chaos, discord and revolution and focuses on the personal religious life and the isolation of non-Muslim society. This subgenre seeks the "pure Islamic society" to achieve primarily through dawa (preaching) and giving the right example” (AIVD & NCTV, 2015: 5).

Political Salafism: “the political Salafism promotes greater social engagement and a stronger political commitment. This subgenre is actively trying to reach her religiously inspired sociopolitical goals, also through dawa” (AIVD & NCTV, 2015: 5).

Jihadi Salafism: “the most extreme form of Salafism is the jihadi Salafism. Characteristic of this subgenre, which is one of the main components is the current violent jihadism is demonizing other faiths (takfir) and the approval of the use of force (with the exact interpretation of these two themes within the jihadi Salafism much debate exists). It should be noted that jihadi salafists undertake regular dawa activities” (AIVD & NCTV, 2015: 5).

Terrorism

4. DTN

Before analysing the content of the terrorist threat assessment for the Netherlands, it is important to understand its objectives, method and the context in which the Netherlands produces and communicates its terrorist threat assessment. First, the root-causes for creating a terrorist threat assessment for the Netherlands will be discussed. Secondly, the scope of the assessment is presented, providing information on what can be expected of a DTN. Thereafter, the parties involved in establishing a DTN are presented together with background information on the establishment itself. Furthermore, the target groups for who the assessments are created are discussed, showing the complexity in communicating the terrorist threat(s). Finally, it seems appropriate to mention that in the light of the tenth anniversary of the terrorist threat assessment Netherlands in November 2015, I had the opportunity to participate in conducting research for an essay on this topic for the Centre for Terrorism and Counter terrorism. The results of this research are published in the essay ‘Barometer van de dreiging’ by Prof. dr. Bakker and de Roy van Zuijdewijn (2015) and adds to understanding the background, role and necessity of the DTN and therefore serves as main source for this chapter.

4.1 WHY A TERRORIST THREAT ASSESSMENT NETHERLANDS? After the attacks of 9/11, 2011 the public in the Netherlands increasingly demanded more insight in the nature and extent of the threat posed by terrorism (Bakker & de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2015: 11). The government responded to this urge with several letters to the parliament and progress reports concerning the Counterterrorism and Security Action Plan, which was drawn up a few weeks after the attacks. In 2004 Europe was confronted with attacks on trains in Madrid (Spain), often referred to as the ‘Madrid Bombings’. This event in particular caused the Netherlands to be aware of the exogenous aspects within the phenomenon of terrorism, which could also emerge from within society itself (Abels, 2008: 536). After this attack the public need for insight and information about the threat posed by terrorism increased again (Bakker & de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2015: 11). In response, the Dutch government created a Counterterrorism Alert System (ATb), which became operational in June, 2005 (NCTV, n.d.). The system is primarily intended to warn vital economic sectors rather than members of the public, and therefore does not serve as threat assessment but as

26 instrument for governmental bodies and certain economic sectors2 to take security measures. Such a system for the general public was created after the establishment of the NCTV in 2004, when its first coordinator Tjibbe Joustra argued that the coordination of counterterrorism policy would be impossible if lacking access to an up-to-date and periodically revised threat assessment Netherlands. Therefore, the most prominent governmental bodies within the Netherlands related to counterterrorism were requested to provide, “analysed information about the trends relevant for the outlining of a current threat assessment of terrorism” regarding the Netherlands (Abels, 2008: 537). Ten years ago, in May 2005, the first DTN was published and presented to the public. One of the central tasks assigned to the NCTV is communicating and informing politicians and policymakers, the public and the business community on terrorism-related topics. The DTN is an important tool in doing so, not only to the general public but also to inform the Parliament about the severity, extent and direction of the terrorist threat (Bakker & de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2015: 5). This document, of which a new version is produced every three months, has since served as a substantive base, as well as a guideline for Dutch counterterrorism policy.

TABLE 1, DTN & ATB

2 Airports, the chemical industry and telecom sector.

4.2 SCOPE. The DTN is a global analysis of the national and international terrorist threat against the Netherlands and Dutch interests approach (NCTV, n.d.). In essence, the terrorist threat assessment Netherlands is a general qualitative analyses. It presents a trend analysis that provides in general terms insight in the development direction of the threat posed by terrorism. According to Abels (2008), the DTN “explicitly is not a risk analysis that compares nature, severity and probability of a threat (threat analysis) to an estimation of the resistance present against such a threat in the form of security and / or the level of security awareness among potential victims, targets, or specific population groups and communities (the resistance analysis)” (p. 542). One aspect that perhaps does fit within the context of a risk analysis is the attached threat level that comes with every DTN. Since its establishment in 2005, the NCTV applies four levels of threat in which the terrorist threat situation can be categorised, depending on the nature and seriousness of the terrorist threat, consisting of ‘minimal’, ‘limited’, ‘substantial’ and ‘critical’ (NCTV, 2015). These terms indicate the general chance that the Netherlands will be a victim of a terrorist attack. Several factors of relevance are pre-defined by the organization, as presented in Table 2 and serve as criteria for the perceived level of national security, but the threat level is determined based on an unlimited list of factors (Bakker & de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2015: 13). Concerning the scope of the terrorist threat assessment, Dutch counterterrorism policy contains the so-called ‘comprehensive approach3’ since 1999, signifying that the policy is not limited at the timely recognition and counteracting of terrorist acts, but in addition focuses on the identification and prevention of radicalisation processes. This approach is the result of the idea that individuals are subjected to a radicalisation process towards an increasing preparedness to the use of violence rather than being born as such (terrorist) (van der Woude, 2009: 3). The Netherlands has invested a lot in the improvement of coordinative efforts between the relevant actors in the field of counterterrorism (Bakker, 2015: 187). As Abels (2008) explains, this theme is therefore to a large extent included in the assessments.

3 Brede benadering

TABLE 2, THREAT LEVEL CRITERIA (NCTV, N.D.)

TABLE 3, THREAT LEVELS OVERVIEW (NCTV, N.D.)

4.3 PARTIES INVOLVED. Unsurprisingly, the General Intelligence- and Security Service (AIVD) provides its contribution on significant developments regarding threats in the form of a rough draft. In addition, the Dutch Military Intelligence- and Security Service (MIVD), the military equivalent of the AIVD and the National Police Service Agency (KLPD) deliver a considerable share. A vital contribution regarding international components in this perspective is provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Other governmental bodies can, if necessary and available, supply intelligence. This could involve Customs, Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND), the Fiscal Information and Investigation Service (FIOD) or local authorities. According to Bakker (2015), the authorities and experts within the Netherlands seem to agree on the necessity for such wide approach, of which the NCTV is “the most noticeable product” (p. 187). Being aware of such radicalisation processes and developing intervention strategies, could possible prevent or terminate these processes. Radicalism and terrorism are considered as coherent. As a result of this stance, the ‘broad approach’ ensures that the DTN does not only take terrorists, their networks, intentions and actions into account, but also radicalisation processes within a variety of groups. The aforementioned international character of terrorism due to the high profile of The Netherlands is of severe importance for the outline of the DTN. Mainly the fact that such conflicts could potentially have a political or religious impact cause these international events to constitute a motivation to support jihadism within the Netherlands or abroad. An example for this stance towards the international character is presented in terms of the interaction between international and national events concerning the Danish cartoons controversy, with which the security of a Western nation was – because of a seemingly innocent national cause – challenged by an internationally stimulated outrage.

The DTN is written by the analysts of the NCTV and is based on the information delivered by the aforementioned organisations in counterterrorism every three months. All the obtained contributions to the DTN are studied and compared by NCTV’s analysts, who enhance the views and information acquired whilst studying the (classified) intelligence other government bodies have shared, as well as open sources and scientific literature on the diverse topics. Based on this, the analysts construct an integral concept version. Counterterrorism in the Netherlands often includes probability reasoning, rather than mathematically planned outcomes. Collaboration with several parties brings with it the challenge of sharing dissimilar

30 insights, which can be of a conflicting nature due to the potentially different frame of reference as diverse governmental organization have various priorities and scope. In such conflicting case certain parties adhere to their perception, the difference in viewpoints is not obscured, as the intention is not to find a conclusive agreement, but instead is explicitly mentioned (Abels, 2008: 539). Further to this, the realization process of the DTN entails a firm demand on the quality of strategic analysis regarding all relevant departments, agencies and employees. Fundamentally, the exchange and testing of analytical insights on the phenomena of terrorism and radicalization are one of the chief benefits of the development and realization process of the DTN in practise (p. 539). Within counterterrorism inadequate analytical qualities, fixation or lacking self-criticism might lead to undesirable situations on an operational and potentially political level. In this perspective, the DTN is an essential point of interest as it provides a solid base for testing and referencing amongst actors within the Dutch counterterrorism field. Also, for purposes of safeguarding the final product from potentially being influenced towards politically aspiring directions and maintain the independent qualitative analysis the final formation of the DTN is only signed by the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security, who therefore is one person integrally and ultimately responsible for its contents (Abels, 2008: 540).

4.4 FOR WHOM? First and foremost, the DTN is intended and designed to serve as a substantive basis for Dutch counterterrorism policy, aimed at protection of the Netherlands and Dutch interests abroad (Abels, 2008: 540). The administrative and political leadership of the Netherlands, including policymakers are the primary recipients of the assessments (NCTV, n.d.). Hence these quarterly analysis are primarily written for the highest governmental body in the Netherlands concerned with decision-making in counterterrorism policy, which are the Joint Counterterrorism Committee (GCT), the Netherlands Joint Intelligence Committee (CVIN), Council for the Intelligence and Security Services (RIV) - a sub council of Ministers - and the members of the Committee for Intelligence and Security of the House of Representatives (CIVD). They receive the most extensive version; a State Secret Confidential (or higher) classified version (Bakker & De Roy van Zuijderwijn, 2015: 9). This version could also be distributed to the European Coordinator for Counterterrorism and to organization abroad similar to the NCTV - after consultation with the AIVD and, if relevant, with the MIVD.

After briefings in the RIV, a departmental classified confidential version of the DTN is produced, in which the most sensitive passages have been removed, for purposes of protection

31 of sources. This version is distributed to the Commissioners of the King and the mayors of the biggest cities, the Chief Commissioners of Police, the chief public prosecutors, and a number of other relevant national services. A public version of the threat assessment is provided by the ministers to the parliament. This public version is accessible via the NCTV’s website 4. Furthermore, in most cases, the release of a DTN is supported by a press conference and further explanation by the NCTV in the media, as this documents receives a lot of attention (Bakker & De Roy van Zuijderwijn, 2015: 9). Also, besides the media and citizens, the political attention the DTN receives results often in debates, such as the standing committees for the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Defence, Security and Justice, and Social Affairs and Employment (Bakker & de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2015: 9).

4.5 COMMUNICATING THREATS. Overall, communications relating to terrorism should contribute to calm and peacefulness while at the same time, in times of an increased threat level, the communication should indicate that there is potential danger (Bakker & de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2015: 7). Perhaps even more striking is the fact that communication on terrorist threat for the general public can warn for ‘something’, but lacks behavioural perspective. Ideally, governmental communication on the theme contributes to the level of trust and support for countermeasures and policy in general. However, if a government communicates to its citizens to be vigilant, specification lacks regarding what for, how and where? An important part in the communication is the earlier mentioned threat level. One could argue that it is almost impossible to capture the extensive variables involved in assessing a threat in one word. Further to this, a low level does not guarantee an attack will not take place, whilst during a high threat level the Netherlands is not expecting an attack per se. Similarly, communicating an increase or downscaling of a threat level to the public can be challenging and problematic regarding what this implies for the society. Should society be more alert during a higher threat level? It is difficult to communicate and understand what the role of society, or what is expected from them in case of shifting levels. The effects of such communication are unclear (Bakker & de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2015: 8). Although communicating terrorism is challenging, it is necessary to explain possible visible countermeasures to the public, to prevent wrongful interpretation.

4 www.nctv.nl

5. ANALYSIS.

TEN YEARS DTN. In this part the public version of the terrorist threat assessments Netherlands will be analysed since its first publication. As the documents are produced on a quarterly basis, the NCTV produced forty DTN documents covering a timeframe from May 2005 to November 2015. The observation will be conducted on a yearly base, closely looking at what has been determined and communicated per category, as priory defined: the threat level for the Netherlands, international cluster (context, developments, and threats), threats against the Netherlands, jihadism, radicalization and polarization and resistance. I will thoroughly analyse the content of the DTNs, and briefly described shifts defined in the aforementioned categories within and throughout the year(s). Furthermore, I will continuously balance the information provided regarding the terrorism threat against the Netherlands and Dutch interest abroad with the distinct terrorism threat level, which contributes to the understanding of what theme’s and topics influence such assessment.

2005 (DTN 1-2): THREAT LEVEL; SUBSTANTIAL. In 2005 the terrorist threat assessment for the Netherlands was publically produced for the first time. The NCTV communicated that in that period there has not been indication of an increased threat for attacks within the Netherlands, related to attacks or foiled terrorist actions in neighbouring or comparable countries. However the Dutch involvement in international developments, such as the deployment of Dutch units Afghanistan in 2005, in combination with the growing international interest in interethnic relations in the Netherlands, particularly since the assassination of Theo Van Gogh in 2004, are root causes for a high international profile, which contributes to the current threat. Concerning Baldwin’s first theoretical demand, ‘security for whom?’ this is clearly presented and comprises primarily the Netherlands (DTN1-2, 2005). Europe is also specifically mentioned in 2005 as defined actor regarding terrorist acts, as DTN 2 begins with stating that “the attacks this summer in London have once again shown that the threat of terrorist violence is also high in Europe” (DTN, 2005: 1). Furthermore, the assessments in 2005 refer to the pre-9/11 period to point out that classic ‘hard targets’, such as diplomatic and military objects or/and persons has shifted ever since, as the terrorists revealed its interest for so-called soft targets (soft targets) and targets with a symbolic value. In this perspective, the assessments state that both soft and hard-targets are perceived to be threatened. The West is several times mentioned as potential target and

33 actors challenged by the threats, presenting the West as actor for which the DTN intends its assessment.

The values that are threatened according to the NCTV in 2005 involve the disruption of society, or the vital, economic or political infrastructure. This is the chief specified reference reflecting upon the defined societal values regarding the Netherlands (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 2014).

In terms of ‘how much security’, we look at quantity of measures taken as indicated in the operationalization chapter. In 2005, the ‘Hague programme 5 ’ is mentioned as asset in preventing and combating terrorism (DTN 1, 2005: 4). An important starting point is that the Member States in protecting national security fully take the security of the Union as a whole into account. The importance of the exchange of information between law enforcement agencies and intelligence services, both within and between states, is highlighted also in the ‘Hague Programme’. In addition, the EU Action Plan on Terrorism is highlighted, stressing the essential role on improvement on information exchange. Concerning ‘means’, a central role is mentioned in measures including resilience and countering radicalization, extension capacity AIVD analysis, MIVD and RID, Border Control and identity checks. Moreover, administrative measures, law approaches, financing terrorism, and approach for using the Internet and satellite channels for radical and terrorist are specified in this perspective (DTN 1, 2005: 12). In the latter part of 2005, the NCTV developed five scenarios for terrorist attacks or incidents in the Netherlands in cooperation with executive and operational services. Further to this, is the information provided regarding investigation and prosecution. Means deployed to enhance this are presented in the expansion of capacity police (KLPD: National Crime Squad and National Service Criminal information) and OM (national parquet flooring and functional). Also, regarding means the topic is presented in DTN1 in terms of crisis response. To this end, a new over-arching service is organized and presented in the assessment, being the Special Interventions (DSI), which is organizationally under jurisdiction of the KLPD. Also, in preparation for possible attacks on "soft targets" on April 6, 2005 the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the municipality of Amsterdam organized Exercise Bonfire (DTN 1, 2005: 16). One of the most primary means implemented regarding threats in the implementation of the Counterterrorism Alert System under the direction of the NCTb. This system is principally intended to counsel vital economic sectors. Through this system, vital economic sectors will be informed if a particular sector is threatened by for terrorism or

5 Haags programma

34 a possible terrorist event. The Alert System is used as platform to provide adequate information to particular professionals in order to conduct suitable security measure according to the threat (NCTV, n.d.). These four business segments are connected to the Counterterrorism Alert System: Schiphol Airport (both landside and airside); Drinking water (water supply); Rail (passenger and stations) and Port of Rotterdam (petrochemicals) (DTN 1, 2005: 18). Also, as a result of terrorist attacks in London, the crisis management organization was activated (the ministerial policy team, interdepartmental policy team, scaling up National Coordination Centre) (DTN 2, 2005: 4). Moreover, the NCTV conducted means aiming to tightened up the following focus areas: information exchange, coordination and management, connections, operational services and civil-military cooperation

In 2005, a paragraph concerning financial information fulfils Baldwin’s demand for specification about ‘at what cost’ security is obtained. For the purpose of intensifying the investigation and prosecution of the OM, it is stated that the Dutch government made financial resources available which aimed at reinforcements at the national parquet flooring and functional, as well as for legal expenses (intensification of wiretaps, interpreters etc.,). The Public Prosecution Service has been awarded € 700,000 for 2005 and € 1,261,000 for 2006 and beyond. These funds are intended for the intensification of investigations into (preparation of) terrorist offenses and the prosecution of suspects in terrorism cases. In addition, the Functional Prosecution Service received € 100,000 in 2005, € 339,000 in 2006 and € 490,000 for 2006 and beyond. These funds are intended for the intensification of the fight against terrorism (financing), the civil law approach to terrorism and, related to it, the supervision of legal entities (DTN 1, 2005: 14).

Baldwin’s specification criteria concerning threats is largely represented and comprises the following answers: “The Islamic terrorist threat to the Netherlands still comes largely from Islamist networks” (DTN 1, 2005: 2). “The threat to the Netherlands is inextricably linked to international developments” (DTN 1, 2005: 2). This threat remains substantial in 2005 (DTN1, DTN2, DTN3). Just as the first periods in 2005, the threat is determined mainly by domestic terrorist networks include deriving inspiration from the jihadist ideology of Al Qaeda (DTN 2, 2005: 1). Also, the NCTV states that greatest threat in that time period for the Netherlands was based on the Al-Qaida networks and more specifically lies in the proliferation of its ideology (DTN, 2005: 2). However, an increased threat was determined in July, as a result of information by the intelligence services regarding “some persons” (DTN 2, 2005: 2). Furthermore, individuals are mentioned as threat, varying from Muslims born in the

Netherlands (p. 2), and ‘self-ignition6’ meaning that an individual, without involvement in networks or direct personal contacts with recruiters such independent radicalizes, for example under the influence the internet, that on its own initiative prepares and execute jihad or terrorist attacks (DTN, 2005: 2). Furthermore, the threat in 2005 consisted of persons that are part of local networks. Also, international networks such as veteran jihadists should have been be taken into account. Also, the possible return of Muslims who participated in armed actions in Iraq to Europe to was perceived as a threat (DTN 1, 2005: 3). This turns out to be an interesting finding, as will be clarified in the latter part of this chapter. In 2005, this concern has been partly based on experiences in several European countries including the Netherlands, with individuals who in the past played a role in other Muslim units of resistance (especially Afghanistan and to a lesser extent Algeria, Bosnia and Chechnya). After their (re) arrival in Europe precisely this category has played a prominent role in the establishment of Islamic terrorist networks and recruitment of youths for violent jihad. Also, Radicalization is mentioned as being one of the threats posed to the Netherlands in 2005 (DTN 2, 2005: 4). Regarding the topic of radicalisation it is stated that concerning domestic factors a few development became apparent which only could be rightly interpreted in the context of global radicalization processes: “this means that developments in the Netherlands are part of global social processes that exhibit similar patterns in many Western countries and cover only a very small proportion of immigrants and natives” (DTN 3, 2005). Finally, the NCTV states that “the Islamistic terrorist threat to the Netherlands is still largely posed by Islamistic networks”

(DTN 1, 2005: 2).

As mentioned before, the timeframe discussed in the terrorist threat assessments by the NCTV is at least intended to reflect the prior three months, as a quarterly product is produced consequently. In the assessments of 2005 there are several indicators present regarding a long- term specification for what period the measures suffice. Moreover, measures such as the implemented Counterterrorism Alert System are still present.

6 Zelfontbranding

Practically 2005 Always Frequently Sometimes Rarely never

For X Whom? For

which X values? How X Much? Means X Cost X

Threats X Period X

2006 (DTN 3 – 7) THREAT LEVEL; SUBSTANTIAL. In 2006, the terrorism threat level remained ‘substantial’. This is the result of an evaluation of the national and international dimension of the terrorist threat as indicated by the NCTV based on the received information by supporting services, versus the perceived resistance. It is defined that the threat is specified for the Netherlands. In addition, Europe is also mentioned in relation to returning foreign fighters from Iraq to Europe, for which were no indications found. ‘Security for whom?’ comprises furthermore “European countries, Transatlantic alliances and the West in general” (DTN 3, 2006: 2). Also, tensions between supports of Israel and Hezbollah/Lebanon sympathizers increased as inspiration for of radical Islam. In addition, failed attack against (railways) in Germany are mentioned in relation to the background of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah showing that the international situation far away from the conflict itself, can promote the manifestation of spontaneous networks and may result in terrorist activities (this is also an imminent threat). Further to this, is the determination of Europe’s security in relation to the apparent intention of jihadists in North Africa in 2006 to establish a new over-arching jihadist organization, which may convey a non-negligible threat to Europe itself (DTN 4, 2006: 4). Finally, the NCTV names the terrorism threat for many countries of the European Union and Allies in NATO regarding the

37 unlikeliness of a diminishing threat (DTN 4,6,7). Turkey is mentioned in relation to Kurdish separatists as is jihadist terrorism also in Iraq, Afghanistan and Indonesia (DTN 5, 2005: 4).

Values are somewhat represented in a separate paragraph concerning polarization, as this is stated to remain an “undiminished concern”. It is specified that the manifestation of interethnic violence is undermining the cohesion of Dutch society and remains of interest (DTN 3, 2005: 4). Also, in DTN 4 this remains a topic of interest (p. 3). In DTN 7, the topic of polarization is once more presented stating tHat with respect to the previous reporting period more violent interethnic incidents in the were reported (DTN 7, 2006: 4). A central role in the DTN produced in June 2006 (DTN 5) is the importance of detecting radicalization processes in an early stage. The DTN describes three tracks, being strengthening the bond with society, increasing the resilience of society and the active intervention, as tools in maintaining societal values in the Netherlands (DTN 5, 2006: 7).

‘From what threats’ describes that the unpredictable and dynamic nature of significant transnational dimension of the threat related to the Netherlands. Interestingly, the Netherlands as part of the West remains a potential target for terrorists (DTN, 3-7, 2005). Being part of the West is therefore defined as threat. Another threat is posed by small circles of radical Muslims. Furthermore, the escalation of conflicts such as the Middle East could ripple through on local networks, and is mentioned as potential threat, although direct indicators are named (DTN 3, 2005: 2). In the beginning of 2006, the threat for the Netherlands is largely determined by possible repercussions of international developments. Continuously mentioned is the presence of Dutch ISAF troops in Afghanistan, which involves Netherlands directly at the battle site and can radiate on the perceptions of those that follow the radical Islam (DTN

3-6, 2006). Interestingly, the following terrorist threat assessment Netherlands stated : “relevant for the threat assessment is the possible appearance of the developments in North Africa to Europe”, demonstrating the international context in which the NCTV perceives the threat related to the Netherlands (DTN 3, 2006: 3). Radicalisation is also mentioned as a threat and it is pointed out that attacks in the form of suicide terrorism should also be considered as threats. (DTN 4, 2005: 2). The Internet is also perceived as threat as on the Internet itself a lot of training material from jihadist character easily accessible (DTN 4, 2005: 2). Also in this period, radicalisation from within prisons is mentioned as threat (DTN 7, 2006: 10). Another factor which is of importance for the future threat assessment the Netherlands is formed by the increasing number radical Muslims detainees. Chances are that some of these prisoners at least will continue to make an ideological and strategic contribution to the development of

38 their sympathizers from within prison (DTN 4, 2006: 3). DTN 5 is an extensive publicly produced document and summarizes and confirms the aforementioned threats; the security situation in Afghanistan, the rising conflict around Iran, the early activities of transnational networks in North Africa, the virtual networks on the Internet and the rapid spread of the jihadist ideology contribute to this end (DTN 5, 2006: 2). Also, in the short term the risk of terrorist capabilities of operating non-conventional weapons (chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear, CBRN) against the Netherlands, is estimated as small but real (p. 3). More specifically for the Netherlands, is the threat security authorities assessed to come from several terrorist networks, who have been investigated. The Hofstad Network is a striking example of one of those networks (DTN 4, 2006).

Concerning ‘for what period?’ the continuing radicalization of a part of the Muslim youth in the Netherlands, is mentioned as a “worrying development that continues to have a significant impact on long-term threat” (DTN 3, 2005: 4). DTN 4 also contains information on this theme, stating that for the past years (pre-2006) recurrent for jihad purposes takes place within the Netherlands and on an international level. Moreover, this theme will continue to become apparent in the future. Also, an indication of time is presented in DTN 4 as the Netherlands will continues, in the coming time, to be a potential terrorist target (DTN 4, 2006: 3).

How much security is discussed in terms of a decrease in threat of certain elements contributing to the terrorism threat perceived (DTN 3, 2005: 2). An important observation in this context is that in the last period prior to 2006 no concrete threat posed by the known terrorist networks in the Netherlands were evident. The decrease of this specific threat for the Netherlands was also a result of the continuation of in the previous threat assessment identified a trend of internationalization of the agenda of local networks. Several means regarding the aforementioned approach towards radicalization are noted in the assessment of June 2006, stressing the importance and relevance of the local approach of municipalities. Furthermore, the establishment of ‘Meldpunt Cyber’ and KLPD expansion, expansion Functional Prosecutor's Office, under civil law powers OM, Tackling terrorism financing, Border surveillance and identity control, International cooperation on border protection, CBRN terrorism, criminal enforcement and additional safety measures are lengthily described (DTN 5, 2005: 17). Another mean described is the public campaign launched on February 27, 2006 ‘Netherlands against terrorism’, aimed to give wide publicity to the efforts who provide the government and many others to the risk of reducing attacks (DTN 5, 2006:

22). Further to this is the deployment of various streams aimed to strengthen the efforts on police, justice and intelligence services on the Internet (DTN 7, 2005: 9).

Practically 2006 Always Frequently Sometimes Rarely never For X Whom? For which X values? How X Much? Means X Cost X Threats X Period X

2007 (DTN 8 – 11) THREAT LEVEL; LIMITED. In March 2007, the DTN opens with the most significant change in the terrorism threat perception in the Netherlands so far, namely a shift in level. Whilst since May 2005 this was assessed to fit within the bandwidth of ‘substantial’ (DTN1-2, 2005 – DTN 2-7, 2006) now this perception has been adjusted downwards to ‘limited’, meaning that that the chance is relatively low for a terrorist attack, but certainly not entirely be ruled out (DTN 8, 2005: 2). It should be noted that in this document the NCTV writes in terms of chance, indicating an assessment in in some way, which signifies a quantification of the threat, whilst in the work of Abels (2008) it is stated clearly that in the case of the DTN deliberately referred to as a threat ‘image’, since no systematic assessment of threats and resistance, which should eventually lead to specific security measures, occurs (543). Furthermore, this is clarified by the following passage:

“In the previous threat assessments, the mix of data was weighed again and again, with the balance getting through to hit the threat level «substantial». Within the bandwidth

«substantial» in the course of time, however, several changes occurred in the mutual weight allocated from these factors. Since threat assessments in October 2006 there seemed evidence of a decrease of the specific threat in the Netherlands, which continued. This allowed the centre of gravity that shifted the threat assessment of the potential threat, including from the present radicalization in the Netherlands and to the international context and the international profile of Netherlands. In addition to these decline in real domestic threat, presumably from longer duration would be potential threats appeared not to materialize. It adds that the resistance within the Muslim community increased. This trend has now led to the reduction of the threat level from "limited". The main risks in that process are now occurring in the atmosphere of the unpredictability of incidental violence, in the long term risks of the still ongoing radicalization and the possible worsening of the international Profile of Netherlands (DTN 8, 2007: 2)”.

With regards to actors, the Netherlands remains to have a central role. More specifically, the high international profile remains of primary clarification for who the threat is evident (DTN 8-11, 2007). Additional actors are mentioned as North Africa is portrayed to play an important role in the international threat image, with the potential to spread out to Europe and to some extent also to Netherlands (DTN 8, 2007: 3). In this perspective, the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla in Morocco are named as an important mobilization theme amongst jihadist movements (DTN 8, 2007: 3). ). In October 2007, the NCTV mentioned that reports containing signals on Europeans jihadist trained at camps in the Middle East to carry out attack in their homeland in the future are confirmed due to events Germany. Besides Germany, Denmark and the UK are mentioned in relation to terrorist incidents (DTN 10, 2007: 2).

Also, the Dutch presence in Iraq and Afghanistan are named in relation to this international profile and provide a solid basis as threat (DTN 8, 2007: 2; DTN 9). Further to this, is the understanding that the threat from people guilty of violence (or threatening with violence) implicitly or explicitly associate their actions with a radicalized vision of faith and society (DTN 8, 2007: 3). Another specified threat is the salafist ideology, which is scaled under the notion of radicalization by the NCTV (DTN 8, 2007: 3) and is determined as risk for some individuals, as this ideology could constitute a step towards radicalization and function as potential developmental-direction to establish willingness to use violence. It is stated that this salafist ideology has robustly won influence the Netherlands in 2005 and 2006 (DTN 8, 2007: 3; DTN 9). Another actors continuously related to threats is al Qaida, for example in

41 combination with the Algerian terrorist ‘Groupe Salafiste pour la predication et le Combat’ (GSPC), which decided to join the terrorist organization in 2007. Also, increasing number of foreign jihadists in Afghanistan willing to join combat groups are described as threat (DTN 10, 2007: 3). Finally, in the reports period the size of unorganized extreme-right wing increased (DTN 8, 2007: 4) Noteworthy is the text provided in DTN 10, stating “only a few hundred of them [gabber; right wing] are actually linked to a far-right party, or connected as Blood and Honour. However, the high degree of xenophobic, nationalist ideas and utterances against Muslims, and Jews among large groups of gabbers is worrying and can reinforce divisions between native and immigrant youth” (DTN 10, 2007: 4). In terms of specification and interpretation one could question the background of which the reader is supposed to interpret the amount of “only a few hundred”. Finally, the NCTV stated, regarding the threat related to terrorism, that the intelligence services indicate that the probability of an attack in the Netherlands involving biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN)-means is small, but realistic (DTN 11, 2007: 11).

The value of social values in relation to the threat are briefly, but evidently described in terms of that polarization, inter-ethnic violence and xenophobia remain of concern regarding the cohesion of society. This could strengthen in ‘we versus them thinking‘ between social groups. Means are noted, but mainly in terms of “various measures conducted” (in relation to salafistic mosques) (DTN 8, 2007: 5). In DTN 9 to 12, measures are highlighted in the form of the above-mentioned Counterterrorism Alert System, counterterrorism for businesses, surveillance and security, civil protection, crisis event of a terrorist threat, and practices in combatting terrorism (DTN 9-12, 2007). Also, the final product published in November 2007 comprises an extensive overview regarding measures to combat terrorism in its seventh counterterrorism progress report (attached to the DTN) including an update on the aforementioned topics (DTN 11, 2007: 12). In the latter part of DTN 9 several means are covered in a more generic sense, but providing valuable insights for a report on a public level, demonstrating specification; i.e. describing mobile CCTV and ‘extra’ secure homes, but also to other types of measures, such as infrastructure measures; “one example is the development of the International Zone in The Hague” (DTN 9, 2007: 15). Initiatives mentioned in the previous analyses are continues. By doing so, the focus in Internet is to tackle information accessibility for radical and terrorist purposes for example (DTN 11, 2007: 10). In order to do so, efforts focused on strengthen cooperation with other countries within the EU, in a project aimed at exchanging information on trends and developments by monitoring the Internet has

42 been generated (DTN 11, 2007: 11). Further to this, in the majority of the assessments published in 2007 means in terms of quantity and information is rather limited (DTN 8-11, 2007). Costs are underrepresented and not discussed in terms of language nor specification regarding the Netherlands for the period in focus. Only an indication is found in the EU’s willingness to financially support the African Union for terrorism studies, which in return is not described in detail (DTN 11, 2007: 7).

Practically 2007 Always Frequently Sometimes Rarely never For X Whom? For which X values? How X Much? Means X Cost X Threats X Period X

2008 (DTN 12 – 15) THREAT LEVEL; SUBSTANTIAL. In the first DTN of 2008, published in March the NCTV raised the overall threat level in the Netherlands from ‘limited’ back to ‘substantial’; the level that was applied since the first publically published terrorist threat assessment in May 2005 up to April 2007. According the NCTV this increase has been the consequence of an identified increasing conceivability of an attack in the Netherlands, which has already be anticipated on in the earlier published DTNs 10 and 11 (DTN 12, 2008: 3). For whom the security is considered in the DTNs in 2008 is clearly stated, with the Netherlands as central actors. However, other nation-states are mentioned as well regarding international (terrorism) threats, for example West-Europe is referenced regarding to jihadist threat. Also, the assessment names the United Kingdom, Denmark, Spain and Germany regarding arrests related to al Qaeda-allied groups in amongst other Pakistan and Afghanistan (DTN 12, 2008: 3). Also, “other European countries” than the

Netherlands are commented on with regards to “new persons identified through which a potentially an international threat could occur” (DTN 12, 2008 5).

Values are treated in the form of radicalization and polarisation, which is referred to as the potential result of the spread of a radical Islamic ideology (DTN 12, 2008: 6). However, additional values are not treated nor further specified. Regarding the theme of polarisation, the NCTV’s DTN states that despite the initiatives against polarization some Muslims feel less at home in the Netherlands in a general sense, and the youth speaks more often about a possible departure to "Muslim-friendly” Countries in Europe, or to move to their country of birth (DTN 13, 2008: 4). Costs are named various times. However, the information regarding costs are almost always related to means of counterterrorism, for example in discussing insight into the effectiveness of combating terrorism and enhancing expertise and priority partners (DTN 15, 2008: 16). Also, UN Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999) is discussed in terms of financial sanctions against the Taliban, Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda and their associated persons and organizations (DTN 15, 2008: 10). Algeria is also mentioned in combatting terrorism, including financial means. In this perspective, these do not fit within the adopted framework of Baldwin (1997) regarding costs.

Threats are discussed, evidently in relation to the increased threat level attached to the threat assessment and includes an increase of international influence on the jihadist threat. Furthermore, the target selection of the jihadists in the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan is commented as it was expected to be less focused on individuals, like in the local Dutch networks, but more traditional al Qaeda targets, demonstrating an international assessments on threats. Terrorist plots in the United Kingdom, Denmark and Germany are perceived not as incidents, but as attacks organized by people with a Pakistani background or carried out by persons who are trained there and now (2008) are now conceivable anywhere in Europe, and therefore also in the Netherlands (DTN 12, 2008: 4). Also, an increase of unprecedented threat is presented. Throughout the year 2008 the conceivable international terrorist threat against Europe, including the Netherlands remains unmistakably present according to the NCTV, mainly posed by Pakistan/Afghanistan (DTN 13, 2008: 1). Related to this remains the “high international profile” of Europe, and more specifically the Netherlands (DTN 12-15, 2008). Moreover, the threat from this international character is extensively focused upon in DTN 13-15, stating the Europe has received remarkably attention in the period before and within 2008 due to several events. The reprint of a Mohammed-cartoon, the

44 production of ‘Fitna 7 ’ and the baptism of a well-known Egyptian formerly Muslim are stressed as events that attract international attention amongst radical Muslims. Regarding means in this perspective, the Dutch government has established links with key figures in the Netherlands and abroad, including governments, partnerships Islamic of countries including the OIC and the Arab League and religious leaders in the Islamic world, as a result of the film Fitna. It has been stressed that the movie in no way is related to the Dutch politics, although the freedom of speech is a high value within the society (DTN 13, 2008: 5). Also, the ‘three- track policy’, referred to in the earlier chapters has a prominent role regarding means. The track include “increasing the resilience of open society, confront and delegitimize those who propagate the bigoted ideas and enforcement in case of criminal offenses such as the threat or use of violence and incitement to violence and hatred” (DTN 13, 2008: 5). Means are also discussed on a European level, stating the visible position in the international circuit of the EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator (CTC). Furthermore, in order to combat radical statements and information of terrorist on the Internet, several processes have been established involving monitoring, surveillance, the hotline cybercrime and the development of a Notice-and-Take- Down system (DTN 14, 2008: 5). Regarding the UN framework finalizing the Comprehensive Anti-Terrorism Convention remains the priority (DTN 15, 2008: 8). Regarding means, it is noteworthy to realize that 2008 is the third and final year of the mass media publicity campaign ‘Netherlands against Terrorism’ which the NCTV initiated in February 2006 at political request. Furthermore, the Alert system for counterterrorism, exercises, and developments for system of Special Units, CCTV, and a project targeting home-made explosives are discussed as means, on a rather basic level (DTN 12-15, 2008). However, this is only done in the latter published assessments of 2008 (DTN 15, 2008: 16).

7 Movie produced by the Dutch politian Geert Wilders (PVV)

The time period is only discussed in terms of in which period the DTN is produced and what period it accounts for. Long-term and short-term assessments are not clearly presented in the 2008 assessments.

Practically 2008 Always Frequently Sometimes Rarely never For X Whom? For which X values? How X Much? Means X Cost X Threats X

Period X

2009 (DTN 16 – 19) THREAT LEVEL; LIMITED AND SUBSTANTIAL. In March 2009, the terrorism threat level for the Netherlands was determined to remain substantial, meaning there is a realistic chance that an attack could occur, targeted at the Netherlands and Dutch interest abroad. This level remains applicable for the majority of the year (DTN 16-18, 2009). Also, international jihadist groups remain a large threat to Western Europe (DTN 16-18, 2009). In November 2009, the threat level was decreased to limited. “An evaluation of the national and international dimension of the terrorist threat compared with the resistance leads to this conclusion”, according to the NCTV (DTN 19, 2009: 3). Two main explanations are provided for lowering the assessed threat. First, there has been no specific indicators that links the Netherlands to be a ‘preferred target’, which the organization assessed the Netherlands to be regarding al Qaeda. The Netherlands was at the end of 2009, compared to the first quarter of 2008, less “in the picture of international jihadist organizations” (DTN 19, 2009: 3). Secondly, the NCTV assessed a decrease in the effectiveness of the core of al Qaeda in targeting Europa, and for that reason the Netherlands as well (DTN 19, 2009: 3).

In 2009 the Netherlands and Europa are numerous times presented at for whom the security is relevant in the DTN (DTN 16-19, 2009). Specifically, arrests in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Belgium and Italy are mentioned regarding effectiveness against networks in Europe (DTN 16, 2009: 2).

The threats in the reports of 2009 include the continuing jihadist ‘theatres’ in the Pakistan- Afghanistan region, North-Africa, Yemen, Iraq and Somalia.

The societal values are once more covered in the topic of polarization, stating that the war in Gaza between Israel and Hamas triggered a lot of emotions within Dutch Muslim communities. However, the NCTV assessed that the resistance within this community remains high. Also, this resistance against violent radicalisation within the Dutch salafistic movement is increasing (DTN 16, 2009: 4). Increasing military operations targeted at the Pakistani Taliban is reported to be a potential breeding ground for the recruitment of new members by various Islamist movements (DTN 17, 2009: 2). Jihadist foreign fighters regarding Western individuals that join the violent jihad in Somalia are mentioned as threat. In DTN 18, Somalia is discussed once more, in relation to Al Shabaab, the biggest jihadist group in Somalia, which seeks ideological connection with the objectives of international jihadism. More specifically, al Qaeda regards the group as “the southern front of the jihad” (DTN 18, 2009:

3). Regarding the Internet, several (international) jihadist website are established, despite previous numerous measures that took down such websites (in September 2008) (DTN 17, 2009: 2). This trend continues also in the latter part of the year (DTN 19, 2009: 6). Threats are also discussed in terms of threat against Europe and European interest and involve travel movements from Germany to the jihadist conflict areas in Pakistan, jihadists returning from conflict areas (DTN 17, 2009: 3). Regarding specifically the Netherlands, the ‘preferred target’ profile the Netherlands has according to the NCTV remains the core threat in this period (DTN 16-18, 2009). Furthermore, the radical Islamistic organization Hizub ut-Tahrir tries to increase its sphere of influence within Dutch territory (DTN 17, 2009: 4). Finally, the main source of threat is still posed by international jihadist networks). The threat posed by local autonomous networks compared to previous DTNs remains unchanged (DTN 18, 2009: 4).

Means are covered in a bilateral perspective, presenting several developments aimed at combatting terrorism on a European level (DTN 17-19, 2009). The EU anti-terrorism Strategy and Action Plan and the EU Strategy to counter radicalization and recruitment are the main frameworks of interest in this perspective, focussing amongst other priority-areas on the Western Sahel-region. Countering radicalization remains of great importance throughout the assessments and is discussed in relation to countering violent radicalization by means of a research conducted by the University of Amsterdam (DTN 19, 2009: 11). The reason for this study was that knowledge of the psychological backgrounds of radicalization and terrorism was fragmented across different scientific disciplines. Also the visit of the UN-Executive Director of the Counterterrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) to the Netherlands, intended to implement counterterrorism laws and regulations in accordance with UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 1373 (on Criminalizing the financing or terrorists') and 1624 (on incitement to commit acts of terrorism) is largely discussed in relations to means (DTN 17, 2009: 8). Furthermore, increasing security awareness, securing civil aviation by i.e. passenger name records and body scanners, CBRN-terrorism, self-made explosives, migration, cross- border protection of endangered persons in Europe, CCTV, NCTV’s Counterterrorism Alert System, exercises communication and education are discussed in terms of an update on the means implanted. To define ‘How much security’ in this perspective is problematic to judge, as a frame of reference is lacking in terms of to what extent these will increase or terms of measurability. The timeframe for which the DTNs are representative is continued to be specified, as every DTN serves for a period including the priory-mentioned three months.

Moreover, in 2009 many short and long-term initiatives, means and trends are discussed which clearly specifies and indicates the continuing elements intertwined with terrorism and counterterrorism. In addition, in this year the threat level was adjusted. The explanation for this decision is provided in reference to earlier periods and reports, which also provide an insight in the period at hand (DTN 16-19, 2009). At what cost such means are imposed is not specified. Merely financial matters in relation to the funding of such counterterrorism related means, stating that the Ministry of Interior and Kingdom relations partly finances scientific research in the field of polarization and radicalization (DTN 17, 2009: 4). Furthermore, the focus is mainly on countering efforts to fund terrorism and not specifically on the governmental part in financing such means to counter it (DTN 16-19, 2009).

The time period is only discussed in terms of in which period the DTN is produced and what period it accounts for. Long-term and short-term assessments are not noticeably presented in the 2009 assessments.

Practically 2009 Always Frequently Sometimes Rarely never For X Whom?

For which X

values? How X Much?

Means X Cost X Threats X

Period X

2010 (DTN 20 – 23) THREAT LEVEL; LIMITED. In 2010 the NCTV assessed the threat level for the Netherland to remain limited throughout the year, meaning the chance of an attack against the Netherlands is relatively small, but not

49 entirely to be ruled out. Relevant to notice is that the likelihood of an attack against Dutch interests is assessed to be greater in those countries and regions affiliated with operating al Qaeda groups (DTN 20-23, 2010). Moreover, according to the NCTV the profile of the Netherlands continues to fit in in the “international jihadist enemy image” (DTN 21, 2010: 1). For a longer period the risk of terrorist attacks is more prominently present for Dutch interest, as part of Western interest, close to jihadist struggles including Pakistan, Afghanistan, Indonesia, North Africa, Somalia and the Arabian Peninsula (DTN 22, 2010: 2).

For whom the security is defined is expressed in the central role of the Netherlands, as part of Western interests. Furthermore, the United Stated of America is mentioned in relation to an increase in home-grown networks and a foiled attack on board of a flight to Detroit (DTN 20- 21, 2010). Once more, Somalia is mentioned in relation to al Shabaab, stating that the terrorist organisation demonstrates international ambitions; the same applies to the jihadist attractiveness posed by the conflict in and around Afghanistan. New is that South-Africa is discussed. This is due to the identification of several postings on the Internet where jihadists expressed an interest to commit an attack on the 2010 World Cup (DTN 21, 2010: 4). Europe and European countries are also mentioned several times (DTN 20-23, 2010).

Regarding threats, it is assessed that the threat itself mainly comes from transnational networks and may manifest themselves primarily through training camps and areas of conflict, regarding returning Dutch or European jihadists (DTN 20-23, 2010). Interestingly, it is mentioned that after a decline in home-grown terrorism in the Netherlands, there has been an increase in home-grown terrorism on American soil, which is stated under the header of ‘general threat’ (DTN 20, 2010: 3). Furthermore, several aspects within the USA related to this theme are presented, expressing the new specific US-focused recruitment and planning from US attacks elsewhere in the world. Directly stated is that because of the limited threat from core Al Qaeda the threat from that quarter against the Netherlands is assessed to be limited at this time (DTN 20, 2010: 4). The threat coming from the Jihadist Internet is discussed. DTN 23 furthermore mentions many reports of high terrorist threat in Europe. Unsurprisingly, the international profile of the Netherlands remains high as the Netherlands is, in the eyes of jihadists, “a legitimate target in relation to the alleged discrimination of Muslims in the Netherlands and because of the many "defamation of the Prophet”, within the country (DTN 23, 2010: 4).

In 2010 means in combatting terrorism are largely presented, mainly in DTN 23. In the first quarter, these are underrepresented, but in the latter assessment published in June countermeasures against representatives and members of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) and the Revolutionary People's Liberation Army / Front (DHKP / C), active in Western Europe, were conducted in the form of “disruptive actions” (DTN 22, 2010: 7). Also, concerning countering violent radicalization means are discussed comprising the approach to the Internet and terrorism as shaped in a steering committee in which the AIVD, MIVD, KLPD, OM, Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom relations, the Ministry of Safety and Justice, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Govcert, DI & I and the NCTV participate (DTN 21, 2010: 8). Also, in order to increase the understanding of the relationship between the image of counterterrorism and the actual measures taken by the government in this NCTV requested dr. Beatrice de Graaf of the Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism (CTC),Leiden University, Campus The Hague to conduct a study regarding this connection (DNT 22, 2010: 9). Exploring the optimal use of travel information of passengers in terms of Advanced Passenger Information (API) and Passenger Name Records (PNR) are also discussed in 2010. A continuation of commission Suyver, in which a work plan is established within a relatively short duration (end of 2010) offering convenient evaluation of counterterrorism measures, is discussed. This plan is founded on five main streams, including a counter-terrorism infobox, system special units, sanctions lists, personal approached and the legislative proposal Administrative Measures National Security), which is subject to “further consideration” (DTN 21, 2010: 12). Security awareness, civil aviation security, exercises, CBRN terrorism and explosives are discussed extensively regarding means. In addition, means related to specific events are included, containing information on means during Queensday, the annual National Memorial Day, elections and World football championship (South Africa) (DTN 21, 2010: 16). Regarding legal countermeasures in the Netherlands a limited number of foreigners were declared undesirable in the first half of 2010. Finally, European cooperation, the UN Counterterrorism Strategy and establishing ‘terrorism lists’, are presented as countermeasures (DTN 23, 2010: 11).

Regarding polarization and radicalization, which could potentially threaten the societal values of the Dutch society, the NCTV states that the ‘Islam debate’ in the Netherlands remains polarized and would in the coming months, from the perspective of Jihadists, be enlarged due to national elections at hand (DTN 20, 2010: 4). Furthermore, in DTN 21 several activities are discussed regarding polarization, but the values at hand are not specified. In the next quarter,

51 a few incidents involving violent radicalization in the Netherlands are described, stating that this remains a breeding ground for radicalization for various groups (DTN 22, 2010: 6). In relation to societal values, a research conducted to ethnics Somalia groups exposed difficulties in all sorts of areas including socio-economic position, integration, relative isolation, criminality, drug use, family and generation problems and mental health given the experience of the war in the country of origin (DTN 22, 2010: 6). Finally, the NCTV states that the atmosphere of growing antagonism and polarization can lead to “increased militancy of jihadists to strike Western targets. In western countries, it can lead to growing tensions between populations” (DTN 23, 2010: 3). Polarization is perceived to be a growing phenomenon. However, the resistance within the Dutch society remains high, as does it for the Muslim society in the Netherlands. (DTN 23, 2010: 6).

Several means are discussed in terms of short and long-term goals in the reports of 2010. Also, threats are discussed in terms of a defined period; being both results from earlier noticed trends or of future concern.

Practically 2010 Always Frequently Sometimes Rarely never

For X Whom? For

which X values? How X Much? Means X Cost X Threats X

Period X

2011 (DTN 24-27)8 THREAT LEVEL; LIMITED. In general, trends and developments in the Netherlands and abroad are similar to those as mentioned in the previous assessments (DTN 24, 2011: 2). The Netherlands and European countries remain central regarding Baldwin’s (1997) framework concerning ‘security for whom?’ (DTN 24-27). Also, several other countries are mentioned; Egypt and Tunisia are mentioned related to the resignation of the incumbent presidents (DTN 24, 2011: 3). North Africa and the Middle East because of Osama Bin Laden’s death (DTN 25, 2011: 2).Also, in a more general sense “turmoil in the Arab world’’ is reported. More specifically, Afghanistan / Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and North Africa are mentioned as main jihadist struggles (DTN 25, 2011: 3). In addition, an assault in the Moroccan city of Marrakech, which resulted in 16 dead and 21 wounded, is reported. Disturbing reports about Afghanistan are mentioned together with a limited positive impact the US seems to produce in Pakistan (DTN 24, 2011: 3). Sweden, in relation to a double bombing in the centre of Stockholm, is mentioned as well. In addition, the security situation in Greece is reported (DTN 24, 2011: 4). The attacks in Norway on July 22nd, executed by Breivik, are described as dozens of people, for the first time in Europe, were slayed by a person who in his manifesto invokes mainly anti-Islamic, anti- multicultural, anti-leftist ideas (DTN 26, 2011: 2).

Values are reported in relation to polarization and radicalization, discussing the public and political debate on issues such as integration, immigration and Islam, which experienced in the beginning of the reporting period a ‘sharpness’ (DTN 24-27). On a small scale (mainly) peaceful demonstrations took place initiated by and for Tunisians, Egyptians, Libyans and Syrians (DTN 25, 2011: 4). The resistance in the Netherlands against violent radicalism, extremism and terrorism for this period is assessed to be unaffectedly high. Regarding the societal values of the Netherlands the NCTV mentions that the attacks of Breivik led in the Netherlands, but also abroad, to a debate on to what extent the social climate contributed to the actions (DTN 26, 2011:5). Furthermore is the financial-economic crisis named as driving force for influencing left-extremists (DTN 27, 2011: 5).

8 The formal reporting period of the DTN24 runs from September 15 2010 to and December 31, 2010.However, relevant recent developments up to March , 2011 have also been included in the analysis.

Means are amongst other aspects demonstrated in relation to countering violent radicalization, including measures on the Internet, in cooperation with European partners. Also, European ICT developments in Internal Security Strategy, liquids measures in civil aviation security and coordinated efforts at national level to minimize the chance of CBRN terrorism are demonstrated (DTN 25, 2011: 8). In addition, the NCTV and Interpol organized a global exercise “BIOSHIELD GLOBAL”, aimed at (preventing) biological terrorism. Concerning homemade explosives the NFI developed a CBRNE System (Bomb Data System) for all Dutch chain partners such as the Ministry of defence and police. This system provides a further professionalization of the Dutch knowledge based on (homemade) explosives (DTN 25, 2011: 8). Means are further presented regarding counter financing of terrorism, which is the only way of financial representation in the documents (DTN 24-27).

The international context of the jihadist threat and developments main jihadist areas are of principal focus (DTN 24-27). Threats in this timeframe are discussed in relation to a variety of topics, most of which are not new to earlier discussed assessments. Intelligence indicate that, since the summer of 2010, certain “transnational networks are determined to carry out attacks in Europe” (DTN 24, 2011: 3). In the subsection that describes ‘means’, arrests for preparatory acts for terrorist attacks in Europe will be focused upon. The Netherlands remains, from the perspective of jihadists a legitimate target due to the alleged discrimination against Muslims and the perceived “vilification of Islam and the Prophet Muhammad in our country” (DTN 24, 2011: 2). Furthermore, due to the (declining) (military) involvement in and the police mission in Afghanistan the international profile of Netherlands still causes threat (DTN 24-26). Also, at the end of December 2010 serious indicators for a possible attack in the Netherlands coming from Al Shabaab-affiliated suspects, were noticed (DTN 24, 2011: 5). The described role of the internet, Mohammed cartoons, the threat against Western countries and networks within the Netherlands, are all related to the threat posed by jihadism. In addition, the decision to conduct a Police Mission in the northern Afghan province of Kunduz could result in a shift of focus towards Dutch interests in Afghanistan, making this an “opportunity target” (DTN 25-26, 2011). Interestingly, DTN 25 (June 2011) states that the actual threat of jihadist networks in the Netherlands is perceived to be low (p. 3). The jihadi networks within the Netherlands are “limited in number, loosely organized, have no clear objectives and strong leaders. Nevertheless there are still people in the Netherlands who cherish the jihadist ideology. But the chance that they are preparing an attack in the

Netherlands in the short term is limited” (DTN 25, 2011: 3). The attacks in Norway once again emphasize the threat that may also arise from radicalized loners (DTN 25, 2011: 4).

The timeframe for which the assessments are accountable are noticeably stated. Moreover, occasionally a specific concept is discussed in terms of long and short-term periods, which specifies the security problematique in terms of period (DTN 24-27). For example, it is stated that in the long-term the Muslim brotherhood in the Netherlands could potentially threaten the democratic rule of law (DTN 25, 2011: 4).

Practically 2011 Always Frequently Sometimes Rarely never For X Whom?

For which X values?

How X Much? Means X

Cost X Threats X

Period X

2012 (DTN 28-31)9: THREAT LEVEL; LIMITED. As the reports of 2011 already indicated, this year also opens its assessment by reporting that in recent months (published in March 2012), no major changes occurred in the threat assessment (DTN 28, 2012: 2). Therefore, the assessed threat level remains limited throughout the year, which means that the chance of a terrorist attack at present is low, but cannot be ruled out completely (DTN 28-31, 2012). This situation is frequently confirmed in

9 The formal reporting period for DTN 28 runs from September 20, 2011 to on December 31 2011. However, relevant developments until March 6, 2012 have also been included in the analysis.

55 the published reports, which contain merely repeated information regarding previously situations. The actors for who the report assessed the threat involve, according DTN 28 the West and more specifically the Netherlands (p. 2). In addition, specified are Amsterdam and Dutch diplomatic representations (DTN 28, 2012: 2). Also, the Middle East and North Africa are named, in relation to al Qaeda leader al-Zawahiri which “calls jihadists to establish links with political developments” so as to achieve the Islamic state (DTN 28, 2012: 3). In this same threat perception, Europe is mentioned several times (DTN 28-31). The United Kingdom, the United States, Spain and Germany and mentioned regarding measures in the form of arrests. Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia in relation to Jihadist networks and groups in the traditional battle areas (DTN 29, 2012: 2). More specifically to Yemen, the country is mentioned as another jihadist area of battle, from which threats regarding the West emerged in the past. Moreover, the influence jihadist groups had, decreased since May 2012, but the security situation remains fragile. Further to this, threats did not shift, but are largely represented in the assessments covering the situation in 2012. First and foremost, the threat coming from core al Qaeda is linked to throughout 2012, stating the organization has been affected by the death of several leaders. Also, the threat decreased due to a shift in focus of the various regional, to core al Qaeda-affiliated organisations towards the armed and political battle in parts of Africa and Asia (DTN 28, 2012: 2). Prominently present in the DTNs is the statement that the Netherlands and its subjects are still legitimate targets for jihadists, because of the alleged discrimination against Muslims, the perceived insults of Islam and the Prophet Muhammad, and the participation in military missions in Islamic countries (DTN 28-31, 2012). Worrying is, according to the NCTV, that in 2012 the number of jihadists that travel to a jihadist battle area “in recent years has grown and that they more often able to achieve their goal” (DTN 28, 2012: 2). According to the NCTV, limited jihadists are involved concerning the armed conflict in Syria, but the country increasingly becomes of interest to European jihadists (DTN 29, 2012: 2). In the latter part of the year, the internal security situation of the Netherlands is stated to possible further be affected by the danger of radicalization to violence by individuals involved in groups like Sharia4Holland (S4H). Finally, “there is no indication of a terrorist threat from other ideological corners than from the Netherlands against jihadism. Experiences from abroad, however, to show that with this capability has to be reckoned with” (DTN 30, 2012: 2). DTN 31 states that the Syrian conflict can affect the threat against the West. Moreover, Syria seems in fact to develop a new jihad area with a suction effect on persons willing to fight the jihad abroad, from the Arab world but also from Europe (DTN 31, 2012: 3).

Concerning means, the NCTV reported that over the past six years in Netherlands, 50 people were declared unwanted and 31 persons expelled linked to terrorist activities, radicalisation or jihadism. Due to the limited threat assessed, law measures, like various other counterterrorism instruments, have been used to a limited extent (DTN 28-31, 2012). The time period for which the reports account is clearly stated, comprising one month of the previous year and covers 2012 up till November 11th. Measures are by no means presented regarding any indication of time, lacking to discuss short or long-term goals (DTN 28-31, 2012). DTN 31 mentioned regarding means that in terms of countermeasures with the detention of Samir A. in his cell because of the suspicion of preparing an attack after his release, a potential future threat is prevented (p. 5).

Values are again presented regarding mainly polarization, and radicalization. Values themselves are not specifically highlighted but instead indicators relevant to such values are mentioned. For example, the construction of new mosques is at the local level sensitive, as became apparent in the cities of Groningen, Veghel and Zoetermeer (DTN 31, 2012: 4). In 2012, various radical and extremist movements were in focus and several forms of extremism regarding the society are mentioned. In general, the risk remains that the combination of the right-extremist thoughts and ownership of weapons might lead to ideological violence (DTN 29, 2012: 5). Another incident mentioned is S4H, an activist radical Islamist group that disturbed a lecture in ‘De Balie’ in Amsterdam in November 2011 in an intimidating manner (DTN 28, 2012: 5).DTN 31, which is the final assessment published in 2012 states that after eleven years a significant decrease was noticeable regarding radicalisation and terrorism within the Dutch society (DTN 31, 2012: 5). However, the resilience of the Dutch population against extremism and violence from ideological considerations is considered to be unaffected high (DTN 28-31).

Practically 2012 Always Frequently Sometimes Rarely never For X Whom? For which X values? How X Much? Means X Cost X Threats X Period X

2013 (DTN 32-34)10: THREAT LEVEL; SUBSTANTIAL. In the previously analysed DTNs several (threatening) developments that affect the threat assessment in the Netherlands have been outlined. In the light of these developments, the NCTV’s conceivability of an attack against Netherlands or Dutch interests abroad increased in such that the threat level has been raised from limited to substantial, meaning that there is a real chance that an attack will take place in Netherlands (DTN 32, 2013: 2).

Concerning threats regarding the increased threat level, three main developments are presented (DTN 32-34, 2013). Firstly, the assessment presents the substantial increase posed by the increased number of jihad travellers to various countries in Africa and the Middle East, more specifically to Syria. In further detail, within the Netherlands a few dozen people are perceived to have left, whilst this on an European scale comprises hundreds of people (DTN 32-34). Whilst not every returnee poses a direct threat, the NCTV takes into account that these individuals are not only likely to be radical but can also be traumatized and potentially willing to apply violence upon return to the Netherlands (DTN 33, 2013: 4). Secondly, the NCTV states that signals have been determined which indicates an increase in Islamistic

10 The formal period of reporting of DTN 32 is from October 2012 up to 31 December 2012, and includes developments up to Match 1, 2013.

58 radicalization of a minor group youngsters within the Netherlands, of which the aforementioned individuals that travelled to Syria served as an indicator (DTN 32, 2013: 2). The overt propaganda from jihadist circles via channels on the internet and social media, stimulating to participate in the fight in Syria increased in the latter part of 2013 (DTN 34, 2014: 2) The third core developments of interest come from various North African and Middle East located countries, in which the Arab revolts erupted since late 2010. The downside of this situation, in which the countries are in a complex situation towards democracy, is that jihadist organizations also have the opportunity to manifest themselves in these areas (DTN, 32 2013: 2). In an international threat context, DTN 34 states that in certain Syrian parts ISIL and JaN increasingly become dominant as both groups have a demonstrable intention to commit attacks in and against the West.

Concerning means, the assessment describes that in the Middle East and North Africa dozens of embassies were shut down at the end of August 2013 following a threat identified by the US (DTN 34, 2013: 3). With regard to the counter-measures the in 2013 published DTNs provide information regarding the difficult practice with regards to criminal prosecution of Dutch residents/suspected recruiters and returnees who have potentially joined a terrorist organization and / or have been involved in (war) crimes in jihadist conflict areas, mainly facing problems regarding the collection of evidence (DTN 34, 2013: 6). In DTN 32 the preventive approach in combatting violent extremism is discussed, comparing approaches in different European countries, stating the approach is no longer focussed on entire groups within the population, but the focus is more on preventive measures/interventions at radicalized individuals (DTN 32, 2013: 6). Furthermore, the summaries of the assessments provide no further information or specification regarding means and/or countermeasures.

The security problematique involves first and foremost the Netherlands and also Dutch interests abroad. Furthermore, Europe remains a centre of focus in this regard as well. Besides the above stated areas, more specifically Egypt, Israel, Mali and therefore France interests are mentioned (DTN 32, 2013: 3). The situation in Mali might also affect Dutch interests, as the Netherlands amongst other European countries supports France (DTN 33, 2013: 2). The security situation in the northern Sinai, bordering Israel, is stated to endure concerns (DTN 33, 2013: 2). Regarding, the uprisings the security situation Tunisia is particularly mentioned in relation to formations of salafistic-jihadistic groups. Also, the West in general is mentioned due to the bombing at the Boston marathon. As is stated in the previous DTNs, the resilience of the Dutch population against extremism and violence from ideological motives is perceived

59 to be big, as there is hardly violence involving ideological motives and supporters of extremist groups remains small (DTN 34, 2013: 6).

Values are discussed in relation to worrisome open display of pro-jihadist elements in the Dutch society, both virtually and in public spheres. Also, animal rights, extremism right-wing extremism and asylum rights extremism are discussed, however none of these forms of extremism express indications developing towards terrorism. Tensions between Turks and Kurdish persons within the Netherlands are stated have increased in the start of 2013 (DTN 32, 2013: 4). Concerning the period reported in the assessments, there are various indications present that refer to a long-term assessment and developments.

Practically 2013 Always Frequently Sometimes Rarely never For X Whom? For which X values? How X Much? Means X Cost X Threats X Period X

2014 (DTN 35-37)11: THREAT LEVEL; SUBSTANTIAL. In 2014 the threat level is assessed to remain substantial throughout the years. Dominant factor in this perspective remains the jihadist threat. More specifically, the expressed concerns in this regard presented in the DTNs of the previous year, comprising particularly persons traveling abroad to Syria and return, did not decrease in this period (DTN 35-37). The number of those persons going the Syrian battlefield increases, as does the amount of those returning (DTN 35, 2014: 2). The threat coming from returnees includes recruiting roles through

11 The official reporting period DTN35 runs from August 1, 2013 to December 31, 2013. However, developments until February 10th, 2014 are also included in the analysis.

60 jihadist fora or social media also plans for an attack (DTN 35, 2014: 2). Within the Netherlands the persistent overt jihadist events, both on the Internet and in the physical world, are perceived to pose a threat (DTN 35, 2014: 2). Worrying are statements of support and showing loyalty to groups like ISIL and JaN, which are currently the two dominant internationally oriented jihadist groups in Syria (DTN 35, 2014: 2). The terrorist attack in Belgium, on the Jewish Museum, is mention as relevant development as the information at time of publication indicated that the attack was carried out by a jihadist returnee who had fought in Syria (DTN 35. 2014: 2). This particular event served as illustrative basis for the alleged threat coming from returnees, which was the root cause for raising the threat level in 2013 for the NCTV (DTN 35, 2014: 2). The attack in focus was carried out by a French resident, it seems that returnees can perpetrate attacks in a country other than their country of origin, demonstrating that the threat posed by returning Jihadists could affect all of Europe (DTN 36, 2014: 2). Furthermore, a large amount of the assessments are related to international development, all of which have a direct link to jihadism or with the Syrian conflict. Varying from beheadings of journalists by ISIS in response to US airstrikes in Iraq to several other regional conflicts, and many correspondingly emerging jihadist violence (DTN 35-37, 2014). However, there is no link made to what this means to the Netherlands in terms of threat other than the statement made above (DTN 35-37, 2014). What is specified, is the remaining threat related to the participation of the Netherlands in a military coalition, which in in this particular timeframe represents fighting in Iraq against ISIS (DTN 37, 2014: 1). This is, besides serving as indicator for threats, also interpretable as mean. Furthermore, only DTN 37 has a separate paragraph dedicated to countermeasures, which states that “the jihadist threat has already led to an intensification of national and international counter-terrorism and anti-jihadist policy in the West” (DTN 37, 2014: 7). Action by the police and judiciary have led to several arrests and foiled attempts of persons that wanted to leave the country. Further specification is not present. Interesting is, that in DTN 37 it is stated that the rising escalation of violence between the West and ISIS, is “perceived to contribute to the conceivable threat”. In the latter part of 2014, the NCTV determined that there is a realistic threat coming from individual jihadists in the West, who could resort to violence within their own country absent from having ever returned from a battle area in for example Syria or any other jihadist conflict area. This identified threat is directly related to what seems have been the case in Canada (October 2014) in which (on two instances) jihadists –radicalized in their own country- committed attacks targeted at a par of Canadian Armed Forces soldiers (DTN 37, 2014: 1). Noticeable is that (the summarized version of) DTN 37 opens with this international context.

Furthermore, the security problematique in 2014 is presented to involve, besides the Netherlands, Northwestern-European countries, Europe, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Middle-East, Yemen, African and Asian countries Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, Somalia, Mali and Nigeria. In addition, the West in general is mentioned several times (DTN 35-37). Specifically Belgium is named in relation to a terrorist attack in Brussels targeted at a Jewish Museum on May 24th (DTN 36, 2014: 2). Also, the UK is mentioned related to the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) that reported an increase in threat of right-wing extremism in the past years (DTN 36, 2014: 5). Australia is mention in relation to a prevented terrorist plot in September 2014 (DTN 37, 2014: 1).

The societal values are somewhat represented in terms of situations described regarding violent radicalization and polarization (DTN 35-37, 2014). Prior to, and during the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) on March 24 and 25, 2014 left extremists conducted some 'extremism light 'actions. Already for decade, extreme right extremists are not able to mobilize large groups for their activities. Also, the NCTV states that the usually most active group within the extreme left movements and the ‘right of asylum’ extremists, conducted relatively few (illegal) actions in recent months (DTN 36, 2014: 6). In the light of the societal values the NCTV states that until about three years ago, radical Islamistic groups barely had a podium in the Netherlands. However, “developments (mainly in) Syria have created a favourable environment for these groups” (DTN 36, 2014: 6). The scope is that in the Netherlands there is a great aversion to ideologically motivated violence, this is also applicable to the Muslim population in the Netherlands. However, it is stated that over the long term, there are concerns about the resilience among the Muslim population (DTN 36, 2014: 7). The period for which the specification seeks an answer is underrepresented, indicating only ‘the past period’ and sometimes a short or long-term specification (DTN 35-37, 2014).

Practically 2014 Always Frequently Sometimes Rarely never For X Whom? For which X values? How X Much? Means X Cost X Threats X Period X

2015 (DTN 38-40): THREAT LEVEL; SUBSTANTIAL. The first assessment produced in 2015, was published in March and started with presenting the threat level, which remains substantial, in relation to attacks in Paris, Copenhagen and the foiled plot in Verviers (Belgium) (DTN 37, 2015: 1). These attacks, according to the NCTV confirm the threat level indicated.

Applying Baldwin’s framework to the year 2015, shows that ‘security for whom’ comprises first and foremost, the Netherlands and Europe (DTN 37-40, 2015). Furthermore, the security problematique described include other counties, including Syria, Iraq, Yemen, the Middle East in general, France, Belgium, “other Western countries”, North America, Australia, North and East Africa, Libya, Mali, Russia, Turkey and Somalia (DTN 37-40, 2015). Naturally, some of these actors have been focussed on more extensively as result of lengthy conflicts, whilst others are mentioned in relation to incidents. However, this distinction is not relevant for Baldwin’s interpretation as it indicates for whom the security is in this perspective. Furthermore, in relation to the aforementioned actors threats are highly specified throughout 2015. First and foremost, the high threat level in the Netherlands is strongly related to Western and Dutch jihadist joining international jihadist groups in both Syria and Iraq. The conflict in Syria and Iraq remains the primary source of threat to the Netherlands (DTN 40,

2015: 1). This is related to the threat that sympathizers in Europe are “infected with propaganda of ISIS from within the jihadist areas” (DTN 38, 2015: 1). Also, the NCTV published that recent attacks in other Western countries have shown that a threat may originate from individuals that feel the tendency to use, independently or on behalf of a jihadist organization, violence in the West. According to the NCTV this perception demonstrated that it is conceivable – related to such comparable incidents in other countries - that jihadists, which have been prevented from travelling abroad by the government, convert their frustration to (violent) acts in the Netherlands. Further to this, the identified threat comes from individuals, potentially inspired by appeal from (jihadist) conflict areas. At the same time there is a threat posed by (transnational) controlled or facilitated networks of sleeper cells (DTN 39, 2015: 1). The most recent publication of November 2015 states that “the mainly jihadist threat remains complex, with a multitude of actors. The potential threat mainly consists of international and local networks as well as lone actors (DTN 40, 2015: 1). In addition, the ties that are established in Syria and Iraq due to cooperation between Dutch and other European jihadists, eventually, in the long term, could work towards an increased threat towards Europe - and possibly also the Netherlands (DTN 39, 2015: 1). Another component of the threat is that the Netherlands has a high profile which is focussed upon by Jihadists state. As the Netherlands is part of the anti-ISIS coalition, the country remains a legitimate target for jihadists. On a more international level, the threat is constructed by “several international developments”, according to the NCTV (DTN 39, 2015: 1). This is followed up to by describing security situations and developments in various countries in the Middle East, but does not specify how and why this is related to the threat for the Netherlands. However, the threat is not exclusively determined by those travelling to join the jihadist battle and returnees. Interestingly, the NCTV states that “the image of a complex and real threat is applicable to the entire West”, strongly illustrating the international dimension of the specific

Dutch threat (DTN 40, 2015: 1). Newly mentioned is the potential security threat posed by tens of thousands of refugees arriving (unchecked) in the European Schengen zone. Although the focus is primarily on the current refugee crisis for civilians in need in Syria and Eritrea, there are also security risks attached to this movement (DTN 40, 2015: 2). Despite measures such as screening all asylum seekers in the Netherlands, the NCTV states that it cannot rule out jihadists members of jihadist organizations potentially mingled with migratory flows and thus unnoticed and illegally entered the Netherlands (DTN 40, 2015: 2). Moreover, the NCTV states that question marks can be put after the correct possibilities of immigration and security services in the Netherlands to get a clear picture on the flow of refugees (DTN 40, 2015: 2).

Values are to some extent presented under the headers of polarization and radicalization. DTN 38 discussed the risk of a sharper polarization in the Netherlands due to attacks in Paris, leading to social divisions along ethnic and religious lines after these events. Also, in the Netherlands, reports of threats and graffiti on Mosques were made (DTN 38, 2015: 3). Within society, the NCTV states that visibility of various extreme right-wing groups increases, performing more action against the ‘Islamisation of the Netherlands’, and use the terrorist attacks in Paris and Copenhagen for further encouragement of the sentiments and intensification of actions (DTN 38, 2015: 4). Also in the Netherlands were reports of threats and graffiti.

Means are not particularly mentioned in a separate paragraph, but are sometimes touched upon regarding threats or long-term policies. For example, the Ministry of Defence of the Netherlands is still investigating the safety implications regarding their employee that joined the combat in Syria has and has taken measures to reduce risks (DTN 40, 2015: 1). In the first assessment in 2015, the NCTV stated that the threat “can also grow quickly under the influence of events: events in the conflict zones, measures (perceived) hardening of public debate or by incidents against Muslims”, demonstrating that actual measures are taken. Also, several times measures are mentioned in relation to preventing individuals from travelling to jihadist conflict areas. However, such references lack specification. Quantification in terms of measures or means concerning ‘how much security’ is not presented. Also, financial indications are not provided throughout 2015. Numerous times the assessments refer to long- terms and specific periods in relation to threats, developments or measures (DTN 38-40, 2015). However, since DTN 37 there is not more specification in the first published DTN of 2015 regarding the coverage of the first timeframe (DTN 38, 2015: 1).

Practically 2015 Always Frequently Sometimes Rarely never For X Whom? For which X values? How X Much? Means X Cost X Threats X Period X

4.5 QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS. Table 4 presented below demonstrates the most frequent words used within the first ever publically produced summary of the terrorist threat assessment Netherlands (DTN 1) and the most recent one (DTN 40). What can be observed is that in both the first and last DTN the term ‘the Netherlands’ has been used frequently. Furthermore, ISIS was not present in the first assessment in 2005, whilst in DTN 40 ‘ISIS’ is often mentioned in the assessment. The same is applicable to ‘Syria’, and ‘jihadism’. ‘Means’ are fifteen times mentioned in DTN 1, whilst this is not present in DTN 40. As with the comparison between the DTN 1 and DTN 40, the word usage of ten years DTNs is analysed. Table 5 displays the cumulative vocabulary of forty DTNs. The words "Netherlands" and "threat" are the two frequent used words in the document12, an observation in support of the scope of the assessment. Noticeable is the high presence of terms related to ‘jihadism’. Also ‘international’, ‘countries’ and ‘European’ are present in the list, indicating the international dimension in the threat assessments is well represented. Further to this, with regards to the terminology around "Muslim," "Islam," "Muslim" and "jihadist" I find that the use of "Islamic" is fairly constant, that using "Muslims" has declined in the last five years compared to the first five years and that the use of the word "jihadist" since DTN 16 has risen sharply, although sometimes there are big

12 Exclusive articles and irrelevant words and verbs in lowercase, using the software ATLAS.ti

66 differences between the DTNs. The word "Islamist", which was common in the first DTN seems in most cases replaced by "jihadist" as illustrated in table 4.

One of the themes of influence to the increased threat level of in March 2013 (DTN 32) has been "foreign fighters”, which in recent years is extensively reported on (Bakker & de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2015). The amount of Dutch citizens who are fighting in Syria and Iraq is regularly updated. As the aforementioned analyses indicates, the potential threat of returnees is essential in this perspective. However, as it seems valuable to this research to what extent this theme was of interest earlier than 2013, table 5 below illustrates the use of words related to this theme. There have been numerous terms in which a foreign fighter is expressed due to the variety of conflicts in which it has been applicable, including ‘Iraq Jihadists’, ‘Foreign rebel fighters in the Syrian Civil War" to simply "foreign fighters” (Bakker & de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2015). This shows that the phenomenon has been of interest since the first threat assessment and that over the years continued to be of interest, but that a large increase erupted since March 2013.

TABLE 4, COMPARISON BETWEEN WORD USAGE DTN 1 AND DTN 40

words13 Quantity DTN 1 Quantity in DTN Total quantity 40 nederland 26 36 62 Isis 0 50 50 dreiging 16 19 35 kamer 32 1 33 Nctb 32 0 32 aanslagen 11 20 31 terrorisme 27 2 29 terroristische 25 4 29 terrorismebestrijding 28 0 28 aanslag 15 11 26 maatregelen 23 1 24 minister 24 0 24 syrië 0 24 24 aanpak 20 1 21 informatie 20 0 20 jihadistische 0 19 19 westen 3 14 17 eu 16 0 16 europese 12 4 16 mogelijk 8 8 16 personen 9 7 16 middelen 15 0 15 jihadisten 0 14 14 nederlandse 7 7 14 politie 13 1 14

13 Exclusive articles and irrelevant words and verbs in lowercase, using the software ATLAS.ti

TABLE 5, OVERALL QUANTITY WORD USE (DTN 1- DTN 40)

words14 Total quantity nederland 1201 dreiging 588 jihadistische 581 nederlandse 476 terrorisme 470 kamer 448 terroristische 418 internationale 361 jihadisten 354 radicalisering 338 aanslagen 330 landen 314 terrorismebestrijding 297 nctb 282 aanslag 266 netwerken 251 qa’ida 236 maatregelen 235 europese 230 personen 227 aanpak 217

europa 207 internet 206

14 Exclusive articles and irrelevant words and verbs in lowercase, using the software ATLAS.ti

TABLE 6, ANALYSIS PARTICULAR USE OF WORDS

20 islamitische

15 islamistische moslims 10 jihadistische 5

DTN 1 DTN 7 DTN 9 DTN 3 DTN 5

DTN 11 DTN 17 DTN 19 DTN 21 DTN 27 DTN 29 DTN 31 DTN 37 DTN 39 DTN 15 DTN 23 DTN 25 DTN 33 DTN 35 DTN 13

TABLE 7, ANALYSIS TERMS RELATED TO FOREIGN FIGHTERS

10 9 8 irakjihadisten 7 jihadgangers* 6 jihadreizigers 5 jihadstrijders 4 buitenlandse strijders 3 syriëgangers* 2 terugkeerders* 1 uitreizigers*

DTN 3 DTN 7 DTN 9 DTN 1 DTN 5

DTN 13 DTN 17 DTN 21 DTN 23 DTN 27 DTN 31 DTN 35 DTN 15 DTN 19 DTN 25 DTN 29 DTN 33 DTN 37 DTN 39 DTN 11

6. CONCLUSION AND REFLECTION In this chapter findings based on the systematic analysis in the previous chapter will be presented. First, I discuss overall findings regarding the content in the forty assessments. This includes general impressions on shape and size of ten years terrorist threat to the Netherlands. Secondly, based on the theoretical framework of Baldwin (1997) I will present extent to which the security problematique is specified. This concerns the earlier mentioned seven questions, being; ‘security for whom?’, “security for which values?”, ‘‘how much security?’ ‘from what threats?’, ‘by what means?’, ‘at what cost?’ and finally, ‘in what time period? Moreover, the way in which the specifications developed over time will be described. Finally, I reflect on the analysed material as a whole and will formulate suggestions how to further develop the DTN as a communication tool. This is followed by suggestions for further research.

5. 1 GENERAL IMPRESSION

Nature of the DTN.

Using the framework of Baldwin (1997) to observe how the terrorist threat assessment Netherlands has evolved since its establishment in May 2005, and what has been communicated to the public, this thesis has shown a comprehensive variety of elements that fit in the theoretical specifications applied. A first finding that should be mentioned prominently is that the DTNs are the product of very complex documents. The complex nature of the assessments is noticeable in Abels’ (2008) statement that DTNs are not risk assessments, but, however, in Dutch the translation of terrorist threat assessment is literarily ‘threat image’. Are the documents in its current form just qualitatively descriptive documents or do they assess a threat? This question seems hard to answer, especially when the attached threat levels indicate some sort of risk-assessing. This complexity might also influence the public perception of what the DTN actually is.

Focus.

Both the qualitative research and the quantitative findings indicate a strong focus on ‘jihadism’. The term is amongst the top three most frequently used words. Increasingly, the term is used in relation to ‘foreign fighters’, of which various similar terms including ‘jihadism’ are used (table 6 & 7). Also, a strong international focus is noticeable. This will be further described in 5.2.

Communication.

In essence, the DTN functions as communicative tool. The assessments are well-read by the public and often published in combination with a press-release (Bakker, 2015). For that reason it seems important to make sure that there is no misunderstanding on the material that is discussed and the way in which the NCTV interprets certain terms. Therefore, it is striking that there is no list with definitions attached to a DTN to explain interpretations of complex concepts such as ‘salafistic jihadism’, ‘polarization’ and ‘international terrorism’.

TABLE 8, OVERVIEW

2005 - 2015 Always Frequently Sometimes Rarely Practically never 2005 - 2015 For Whom?

2007 - 2005 - 2006 2008 For which values? 2010 2009 - 2011 2013 - 2012- 2015 2014 2007 - 2008 2005 - 2010 - 2011 How Much? 2006 2012 - 2013 2009 2014 - 2015 2007 - 2008 2012 - Means? 2005 - 2006 2009 - 2010 2015 2014 2013 2011 2006 – 2009 2010 - 2011 Cost? 2005 2008 2012 - 2013 2014 - 2015

Threats? 2005 - 2015

2005 - 2006 2007 - 2010 2008 Period? 2013 2012 - 2015 2011 - 2014 2009

5.2 SPECIFICATION OF THE SECURITY PROBLEMATIQUE In this part, the research results in relation to Baldwin’s seven questions will be discussed. Two of them are clearly answered in each and every DTN. These two are highly specified throughout ten years DTNs and will be mentioned first.

5.2.1 For whom?

First and foremost, the DTNs demonstrate an extensive quantity in amount and specification regarding the specification ‘security for whom?’ In the assessments the Netherlands is of central interest. In addition, numerous other countries are mentioned, of which a majority were within Europe. This is not the only illustration of the international scope of the DTNs. The assessments have a very strong international character due to the ‘high international profile’ of the Netherlands. This observation is supported by the quantitative findings, which demonstrate that ‘international’, ‘countries’ and ‘European’ are amongst the most frequent words used in the assessments 15. Interesting in this perspective is a statement made by the NCTV in 2005, in which it states that concerning domestic factors, developments could only be rightly interpreted in the context of global radicalization processes, which is based on the assumption that similar global social processes take place in all Western countries. Also, the broad spectrum of actors reach far beyond a direct connection with Dutch interests abroad. Almost any international event presented is linked to ‘the West’, ‘Western countries’ or ‘Europe’, which leaves room for interpretation regarding to what extent this directly can affect the Netherlands in particular. Furthermore, actors often came in the form of individuals, non-state actors, terrorist organizations or extremists.

5.2.2 From what threats?

The second question that was answered for every year, was ‘from what threats?’ The threats were often mentioned and specified, covering lengthy descriptions of the threats in almost all assessments. Often, the majority of those threats were directly applicable to the security of ‘the Netherlands’, ‘Europe’ and/or ‘the West’. Various forms of unprecedented and persistent threats have been mentioned including the ‘known’ threat versus the ‘unprecedented threat’, the ‘conceivable threat’, ‘potential threats’ and ‘concrete threats’, ‘internal’ and ‘external threats’. Regarding the specification of threats, similar (conflict) situations throughout multiple years were reflected upon and specific updates were provided. Furthermore, the

15 Exclusive articles and irrelevant words and verbs in lowercase, using the software ATLAS.ti

74 threats were in terms of the theoretical framework well represented and often included detailed specification throughout the years. The threats described in an international development were dominant.

5.2.3 For which values?

Values were often described in the assessments. However, as indicated in the analysis these were predominantly limited to the effects of radicalization and polarization. The societal values presented in the aforementioned publication of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (2014) that served as indicators were not mentioned specifically. Baldwin (1997) emphasized the important role of values in his article and therefore this needs improvement in this regard. However, in the interpretation of Baldwin (1997) indicators for values “may include physical safety, economic welfare, autonomy, psychological well-being”, and thus would be better represented than within the operationalization of this particular thesis (p. 13). The NCTV provides no guidance concerning values at all.

5.2.4 Means?

Furthermore, the content of the DTNs concerning ‘means’, came for example in the form of (counter) measures, projects, initiatives and programs directly related to (counter) terrorism and beyond. The description of such means was often detailed, and is valuable to the reader to understand what is possible and conducted against terrorist threats. Presenting these means directly in the same document contributes to the context.

5.2.5 At what costs?

The specification ‘At what costs?’ concerns financial indicators or indicators that involve sacrificing other goals in the pursuit of security. In several cases there were indicators present which demonstrates the cost involved in programmes and measures regarding (counter) terrorism. This positively contributes to specification from Baldwin’s perspective. A decrease of representation of such cost has been noticed, which can be explained with the separation between measures and implications from the public version summaries of the DTNs. The period for which the assessment applies for continues to be neatly presented, sometimes with added indications for short and long-term goals, threats or developments.

5.2.6 How much?

The quantification of security in terms of ‘how much security?’ is not continuously answered, and often absent. According Baldwin (1997) for most purposes meaningful scientific communication would seem to require at least some indication of how much security is being sought for which values of which actors with respect to which threats (p. 17). In this regard it should be noted that sometimes ‘some indication’ is provided, but indicators quantifying the level of security were absent. One would expect that when a threat level raises or lowers, a shift in terms of how much security, perhaps through means, would be noticeable. However, this seems not to be the case.

5.3 HOW DID THIS DEVELOP OVER TIME?

The final table presented above illustrates the overall development concerning the specifications. Various observation in relation to these developments can be made.

5.3.1 Actors

First of all, I notice a strong consistency in the description of actors, concerning ‘security for whom?’ This continues to be specified over time. As the overall table illustrates the question is answered and specified in all DTNs.

5.3.2 Threats

The same is applicable to the content related to threats, which is mentioned extensively in many forms throughout the ten years. Actors and threats remain to be a central theme in all DTNs.

5.3.3 Values

Descriptions related to ‘security for what values?’ shift between ‘sometimes’ and ‘rarely’. There is no increase or decrease throughout the years regarding this specification. As mentioned above, this is mainly the result of approaching societal values thro ugh the topic of radicalization, and leaves opportunity for improvement.

5.3.4 How much?

Quantification in terms of ‘how much security’ is necessary in the p ursuit of fighting terrorism remains to be underexposed over time. Up until 2009 there sometimes was an undetailed indicator present, but these lacked ever since.

5.3.5 Means

Interestingly, the means described in ten years DTNs were rather clearly specified and often came with detailed updates regarding initiatives in the form of national or international countermeasures, especially since 2005 up to 2012. However, after 2011 the NCTV decided to separate these from the DTNs and publish these in an external document that covers the policy aspects in counter terrorism. In terms of the DTN, this means for this particular research that a decrease is noticeable. However, one could argue that publishing these separately might be beneficial to the level of detail with regards to Baldwin’s (1997) framework.

5.3.6. Costs

In the first year of the publically available DTN (2005) indicators concerning specification ‘at what costs?’ were present. This negatively advanced throughout the years, frequently without any reference to this specification.

5.3.7 Period

In contrast, the period for which the DTNs, initiatives and measures were accountable, were continuously described. However, the level of detail and specification did shift; in the first few years from ‘frequently’ to ‘rarely’ back to ‘sometimes’ and in 2015 back to ‘frequently’. There seems to be a positive trend with regards to this specification over the years.

5.4 REFLECTION

Consistency.

Finally, regarding Baldwin’s specification of the security problematique, I observe the seven questions are to a large extent answered in the DTNs. Although sometimes not in detail this overall shows a decent level of specification, particularly when one realizes the purpose of the assessments is not per se intended to describe an all-encompassing security situation of the Netherlands, but merely serves as an informative tool in communicating (counter) terrorism.

Threat levels.

Furthermore, although various national and international changes in terms of political and administrative alterations has taken place in the past 10 years, it is perhaps most interesting and striking at the same time to state that ever since May 2005, the differences in assessments

77 are limited. Furthermore, it seems appropriate to mention the attached threat levels while reflecting on ten years threat assessments. The threat levels, containing four choices, serve to represent the threat(s) described in the DTNs in one word. As the threats are often measured against the bandwidth of the assessed threat level, one can be very critical to what this level actually means regarding the information and context provided in the assessments. Some indicators of what such level comprises is provided by the NCTV (table 1). However, one could question whether four of these levels for the NCTV compromises sufficient bandwidth to categorize the complex and constantly changing threat, especially since in practise, although theoretical possible, only two levels principally could be applied (limited/substantial). The threat level ‘critical’ shall in practice most likely only be applied after an attack or subsequent to an attack after which one or more (known) suspects or accomplices are still wanted, providing (prior to such circumstance) only two options in terms of levels. I highly question whether such categories are sufficient to display significant changes in the terrorist threat against the Netherlands. One of the former heads of the NCTV, Tjibbe Joustra, already mentioned the term ‘substantial plus’ in 2008, to indicate a more serious degree of the assessed substantial threat. Ultimately, one could question to what extent the threat levels are of added value to the DTNs since the document aims to provide an image of the threat rather than asses the actual threat. This offers an interesting theme for further research. Furthermore, I think that a pre-determined publication date, quarterly, of an assessment does not per se adds to the quality of the product. When one realizes the limited changes over a ten year timeframe, it might be beneficial to the relevancy of the product to publish a DTN when necessary in terms of changes in threat. It might be interesting to research why Denmark only publishes an assessment at regular intervals or in the event of sudden and significant changes in the nature and scope of the threat, in level, or if required in the light of events to inform its citizens. Finally, the DTN proved to be a valuable , well- specified communication tool for both the public and its partners. Nonetheless, it would not be a bad idea to put more effort in specifying what values are at stake.

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