Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia HUMAN RIGHTS AND

Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia

HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Serbia 2003

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HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Serbia 2003

PUBLISHER:

FOR PUBLISHER:

Sonja Biserko

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TRANSLATED BY:

Ivana Damjanovic Dragan Novakovic Spomenka Grujicic

LAYOUT BY:

Nebojsa Tasic

HUMAN RIGHTS
AND

COVER DESIGNE:

Ivan Hrasovec

PRINTED BY:

"Zagorac", Belgrade 2004

ACCOUNTABILITY

NUMBER OF COPIES: 500

- Serbia 2003 -

ISBN - 86-7208-090-4

This book was published thanks to the support of the Swedish Helsinki Committee for Human Rights

Belgrade, 2004

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I am here to work for you and in behalf of you. But I cannot work instead of you.

Zoran Djindjic

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Introduction

The Premier Zoran Djindjic assassination not only marked the year 2003

but will also – judging by ongoing developments – face Serbia with a historical crossroads: with one road leading towards Europe and another away from it. The murder of a reformist premier stalled reforms and put an end to the cooperation with The Hague Tribunal. And, moreover, it opened the door to Serbia’s radicalization. The DOS coalition's incapability and unwillingness to make a break with Milosevic’s policy, particularly the warring one, gave scope to restoration of the ancien regime that triumphed in the early parliamentary election.
A creeping putsch almost achieved its goals in the period between
Djindjic’s assassination and early parliamentary election. And it practically succeeded in spite of the international community’s endeavor to maintain the reformist course primarily by admitting the union of Serbia and Montenegro to the Council of Europe while the state of emergency in Serbia was still on. The entire opposition and most non-governmental organizations and media went for compromising and overthrowing the cabinet. The forces that have been delaying transition and democratization under the pretext that "national issue" should be solved first won the election. Refusing to admit that the national program has been defeated, the Serbian conservative elite turned to a new pillar of its populist policy: production of scandals and affairs. The pillar as such prevents the emergence of the alternative Serbia has been lacking ever since the downfall of the Berlin Wall. For, the same elite was not intent to pursue economic reforms but to disqualify its opponents. And that fully devaluated not only a genuine anti-corruption campaign, but also the very reforms. Electoral victory of the Serbian Radical Party and the Democratic Party of Serbia guarantees continuity to such policy that is already evident in ongoing debates on a new constitution, cooperation with The Hague Tribunal and perception of the state union, as well as in denial to face the past. Belgrade’s radicalized policy further destabilizes not only the country itself, but also the entire region.
Djindjic’s assassination, at the same time, fully discloses the violence characteristic of the past decade – in battlefields and in Serbia’s political life alike. The trial of his murderers is most indicative in this context. From the very

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Human Rights and Accountability

beginning this trial was turned into a farce aimed at presenting a political murder as a mafia showdown. Murders of Ivan Stambolic and Slavko Curuvija, as well as the assassination attempt at Vuk Draskovic burden the entire society and symbolize its inability to put an end to the vicious circle of political violence. The fact that a victim (Vuk Draskovic) makes a coalition with the same people he accuses of assassination attempt is most oppressive indeed.
Premier Djindjic was the torchbearer of reformist policy that was, in a way, his personal mission and challenge. Taking into account what it had to cope with after Zoran Djindjic was gunned down, the government he had formed was far from being inefficient. Over the past two years that same government's actions were aimed at overall reforms. It managed to pull the country out of isolation and secure its international comeback. By using the October 5 change to launch reforms – for which he actually captured no popular vote – Djindjic begun to chart the alternative. Now that he is gone, the in-house dynamism of his Democratic Party reflects this alternative. The state of emergency declared under the circumstances accompanying his murder was aimed at stabilizing the country and combating organized crime involved in the assassination itself through the so-called Zemun Clan. In spite of the cases of overt violation of human rights, the international community backed the state of emergency and, moreover, took an unprecedented step: it admitted Serbia and Montenegro to the Council of Europe while the state of emergency was still on. Amply supported by the media and most non-governmental organizations, the G17 Plus was a pillar of the anti-government campaign. Exposed to scandals produced on daily basis, defamation of cabinet members and permanent pressure, the government was ultimately forced to call an early parliamentary election.

Unreadiness to face the recent past, wars and war crimes figures as a

major moral problem of the Serbian society. Facing the past is a premise of political freedom and thus of democratization, given that only awareness of guilt leads to the awareness of solidarity and accountability. Apart from hindering a breakthrough in terms of European civilization’s values, this is a stumbling block in the way of stabilizing neighborly relations and regaining regional trust. To be efficient a project as such must be turned into a national policy backed by a nationwide consensus. For the time being, Serbia is incapable of carrying out such project. For, the Serbian society and its elite in the first place, are unwilling to accept their own responsibility for the developments that took place over the last decade of the 20^thcentury. This is best illustrated by Serbia’s attitude towards The Hague Tribunal and, moreover, towards the trial of Slobodan Milosevic. developments that ensued the October 5 overthrow, but also Serbia throughout the 20^thcentury – its attitude towards "both" Yugoslavias and, especially, its perception of fundamental values of the Western democracy such as free market, the rule of law and minority policy. With this in mind, it is obvious that, the same as throughout the 20^thcentury, today’s Serbia is deeply antagonistic to the West. This is all about Serbia's resistance to reforms that have been turned down twice in 15 years only. Firstly, when the so-called antibureaucratic revolution led to deposal of Prime Minister Ante Markovic. Secondly, when Premier Zoran Djindjic was assassinated. Today’s Serbia moves about without a definite destination, without a vision, without a policy to The Hague Tribunal, without perception of its recent past and without the idea about how to build its social system.
Ongoing trials before The Hague Tribunal – the Milosevic trial in particular – dramatically lay bare Milosevic's death machinery. Through plea bargains the Prosecution managed to have enough insiders take the stand and testify about the Serbian Ministry of the Interior, the Yugoslav People's Army and Milosevic's connections with armies and police forces of the so-called Republika Srpska Krajina and Republika Srpska. When Milan Babic confessed that he had taken part in "prosecution of non-Serbs on religious and political grounds," that was almost a prima facie evidence of Belgrade's aggression against Croatia, ethnic cleansing, massive prosecution and crimes against humanity. Babic's repentance exceeds a personal act, given its significance for overall relations between Serbs and Croats in Croatia. However, in Serbia it was qualified as a remorse "for personal gain" and, therefore, labeled as "a bigger sin that the one he repents." From a psychological angle, the truth emerging from The Hague increasingly homogenizes masterminds of the war and warlords, who now resume the same arguments they once used as a pretext for the war. On the other hand, the emerging truth unlocks the door to all those that, faced with reality, pave the way to facing the past. The Serbian public – and elites in the first place – increasingly perceive The Hague Tribunal in a negative light. Nevertheless, the new government will have to accept the Tribunal as a top priority of its foreign policy agenda. According to foreign policy experts close to Vojislav Kostunica, his government will be focused on "deposing Carla del Ponte." "If Rwanda's Tutsi managed to do that, why shouldn’t Serbs?" said one of those experts, Aleksandar Fatic."¹

The outcome of early parliamentary election, the same as electoral

results of the presidential one that preceded, fully identified the actual state of affairs at the political scene that used to be rather blurred. Such outcome denied the thesis about Serbia’s democratic potential or its democratic tradition. Today’s Serbia is somewhere in between a general wish to join Europe and a militant conservativeness, which renounces responsibilities and obligations implied in the European option. The very fact that Slobodan Milosevic and
Military defeat and the past decade that never resulted in a bottom line, persistence in the Greater Serbia program, identity crisis and overall frustration revived traditional conservativeness. The December early parliamentary election contributed, in a way, to an insight into the state of affairs in Serbia. To better understand such electoral outcome, one should analyze not only the

¹Vecernje Novosti, February 23, 2004.

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Vojislav Seselj topped two candidates' lists for the election, while another two indicted generals, Lazarevic and Lukic, figured on another two election tickets revealed that the policy in which all means are taken as legitimate, wars and war crimes included, has not been relinquished so far. And this is what mostly blocks democracy in the post-war Serbia.
The post-election Serbia – marked by prevalent ultranationalism and strong anti-Hague pressure from the so called patriotic bloc leaning on extreme clericalism and the comeback of patriarchal traditionalism and isolationism in all social strata – crystallized its resistance to the reformist course of the late Premier Djindjic’s cabinet. Elaborating his program, Kostunica said nothing that would touch on Serbia’s joining the Partnership for Peace, let alone presented a clear-cut program of reforms.
The newly formed government deposed all top people of the former administration. Premier Kostunica opted for having the judiciary, the state police and intelligence service under his control, while the Vice-premier picked up the economic domain. All ministries were "purged" according to the criteria of partisan suitability. National minorities are not represented in the parliament where the extreme Right, led by the Radicals, has the final say. Threats that Vojvodina will be deprived of its anyway reduced autonomy become more and more overt. The issue of Sandzak cannot but aggravate against the background of denials to have Serbia decentralized and regionalized. gained more and more strength ever since Djindjic's assassination, this symbiosis has been marginalizing the anyway weak and permanently targeted alternative. All failures made in October 2000 within the DOS coalition itself and mostly under the pretext of legalism have been blamed on it. Reluctance to come to grips with the main problem of the Serbian society – continuity or discontinuity with centralized socialism and nationalism – opened the door to consolidation of Serbian conservativeness.
Establishment of a Serbian ethnic state that is underway fuels intolerance and xenophobia. Insistence on Serbian ethnicity and centralism cannot but jeopardize a Serbia nationalists aspire to. Negation of the fact that Serbia is a complex state just provokes its further fragmentation.
The triumph of the Right deepened Serbia's anyway latent conflict with
Europe. Serbia's unpreparedness to face itself leads to apathy, but to rationalization as well. So, according to some voices, particularly coming from the circles in the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, Yugoslavia should not have been destroyed at all. Historian Veselin Djuretic takes, for instance, that "the Yugoslav option is the only solution for all nations of the former Yugoslavia."²The Serbian political elite permanently creates crises to make up for its reformist inaptness – and that was most evident in late 2003 in its attitude towards the minority issue. In addition, the Serbian Orthodox Church was ever more adamant when it came to auto-cephaly of the Macedonian Orthodox Church – basically, it displayed territorial aspiration for Macedonia. By permanently creating chaos, the political elite attempts to reach modus vivendi with the international community that would suit it. For, counting on Serbia’s "geostrategic significance," it looks forward to the international community’s continued financial aid.
Social radicalism threatens to fully devaluate the reformist endeavor of the former cabinet. Though strongly criticized and renounced by the opposition that now came to power, privatization was the ex-government’s most successful undertaking in 2003. Toning egalitarianism, major criticism of the privatization carried out up to now implies that the tender model will be replaced by the voucher one or distribution of bonds to employees. New owners of some industries were questioned already in the course of the election campaign. Such occurrences might easily put off potential investors that can hardly be expected to sink money in a legal chaos. Two leading parties see eye to eye when it comes to privatization. The Democratic Party of Serbia advocates privatization of the remaining state and public industries through free distribution of shares, while the Serbian Radical Party announces "revision and annulment of all illegally privatized industries." It is the issue of privatization that best illustrates resistance to private ownership and free market, and, moreover, today's prevalent attitude towards reforms.
Now that Serbia faces another run for presidency with Tomislav Nikolic, the Radicals’ leader, as a favorite, it can be expected that the new regime, with no exceptions, would get an ultra-rightist profile. The "democratic bloc" coinage

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supposed to define Kostunica’s government

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will just screen this

government’s anti-European and anti-Atlantic policy. Such policy may easily lead to destabilization of the entire region and slow down the process of regional reconstruction.
No matter whether propagated by Vojislav Kostunica or Tomislav

Nikolic, "normalization" of Serbian nationalism blurred the sum and

substance of the latest radicalization that is mostly blamed on The Hague Tribunal and Carla del Ponte. Nationalism that was, in 1980s, induced and funneled by the elite, nowadays is generated from "the bottom," primarily in the form of social radicalism. Most politicians, inadequate and fundamentally antagonistic to any change, deliberately stir radicalization. Mostly detriment to reforms, such attitude simultaneously discloses the political elite's demagogy, confusion and controversy. And, above all, irresponsibility. Radicalization of Serbia is nothing but a logical outcome of its warring policy and denial to face the past. The Serbian society is thus in the process of turning the clock back – the process in which attainments such as a secular state are questioned, and the role of the Church and the army built up.
With their stands about two crucial issues – modernization of the state and society, and war crimes – majority political elites practically opted to retain Serbia in a criminal symbiosis of centralized socialism and nationalism. Having

²NIN, December 2003.

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Fundamental resistance to any change practically determined the very character of the reforms pursued by the former government. Each reformist move met disapprobation and harsh criticism mostly deriving from nationalistic, egalitarian and collectivistic stands. The former government, for sure, did make some mistakes. However, as its basic endeavor was called on the carpet all the time, it was impossible to establish rules of the game that would bind all with no exception. Reforms are opposed from two strongholds: the population in general that is unaccustomed to market discipline and work, and top brass with an eye to controlling economic flows, and influencing political matters and the media for their sole benefit. Actually, there are by far more producers that want to be protected than true entrepreneurs. Such businesses "firstly manufacture goods and only then look for a market to sell it; so, they can supply domestic market only, and only if the government protects them from any competition."³Advocating liberalization, many businessmen and economists pinpoint that "foreign investors become unmotivated when faced with high regional barriers." According to them, only a free trade agreement involving the entire region opens the door to the European Union. It was obvious in the election campaign that the concept of self-isolation and economic patriotism gains the upper hand. Some aspirants gave priority to economic, while others to legal and institutional reforms. Some called for more dynamism, while others took the existing one was anyway much too abrupt. Serbia – the only country in transition faced with recession and foreign trade imbalance – has still not reached a general consensus on its strategic goals.
For, unless radical reforms take place – which is hardly probable – Serbs will once again try to compensate themselves by going for the territories they have allegedly lost. In a recent interview Academician Veselin Djuretic said, "Is it really possible that Albanians and Croats believe that Serbs would ever, just like that, give up what belongs to them?"⁴only reformist move that proved successful in 2003. Minister Aleksandar Vlahovic’s ambitious plan to sell 1,000 enterprises – thrice more than in 2003 – was implemented in full. Total profit amounted to one billion and 240 million EURO, while new owners committed themselves to invest over 700 million EURO in their newly acquired companies, and set aside more than 275 million EURO for social programs. However, overall results in this were questioned when the former cabinet’s mandate drew to a close. Trade union leaders demanded a new government to call a moratorium on privatization. Criticism coming from the Anti-corruption Council, established by the former cabinet itself, was by far harsher. However, once the Council submitted its report it was obvious that it had dealt with issues that were beyond its competence, as the criticism was more imbued with ideology and demagogy than supported by argumentation.

In 2003 too, and backed by top authorities the Serbian Orthodox Church

was overtly forcing itself on the society as an undisputable moral and ideological arbiter in all matters – ranging from education of children and the young to the society’s cultural mainstream. The values it promotes are marked by archaism, collectivism, anti-Western stands and xenophobia. Moreover, the Church’s advocacy of such values is highly intolerant and even aggressive.
Extreme intolerance to everything belonging to the Western culture is what the Serbian Orthodox Church messages its believers. The Church thus follows in the footsteps of its newly revived idol, Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic, whose interpretation of the modern history of Serbia boiled down to a complot the purpose of which was to "turn the liberated Serbian paupers into the paupers of the rotten West."
Political developments – defamation of the former government, its removal and the outcome of the December election in the first place – play into the Church's hands. Over the election campaign the winning coalition has anyway promoted the Church as its ally in Milosevic’s ouster and fueled its ambition to play the oracle in the society. Apparently, what we have now is overall clericalism. This is quite manifest in the Church's activity in Republika Srpska, Montenegro and Macedonia. Moreover, its intentions are fully bared when it comes to Macedonia and the ongoing dispute over auto-cephaly of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. Bearing in mind that Eastern Orthodoxy is identified with nation, the dispute with the Macedonian church implies nonrecognition of the Macedonian nation. Therefore, in tandem with the Army, the Serbian Orthodox Church keeps deluding the public that Serbia will smoothly restitute and unite all its "ethnic territories" once the international circumstances change.