Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY Serbia 2003 0 1 Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY Serbia 2003 Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia PUBLISHER: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia FOR PUBLISHER: Sonja Biserko * * * TRANSLATED BY: Ivana Damjanovic Dragan Novakovic Spomenka Grujicic LAYOUT BY: Nebojsa Tasic HUMAN RIGHTS COVER DESIGNE: Ivan Hrasovec AND PRINTED BY: "Zagorac", Belgrade 2004 ACCOUNTABILITY NUMBER OF COPIES: 500 - Serbia 2003 - ISBN - 86-7208-090-4 This book was published thanks to the support of the Swedish Helsinki Committee for Human Rights Belgrade, 2004 2 3 Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia I am here to work for you and in behalf of you. But I cannot work instead of you. Zoran Djindjic 4 5 Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia Introduction The Premier Zoran Djindjic assassination not only marked the year 2003 but will also – judging by ongoing developments – face Serbia with a historical crossroads: with one road leading towards Europe and another away from it. The murder of a reformist premier stalled reforms and put an end to the cooperation with The Hague Tribunal. And, moreover, it opened the door to Serbia’s radicalization. The DOS coalition's incapability and unwillingness to make a break with Milosevic’s policy, particularly the warring one, gave scope to restoration of the ancien regime that triumphed in the early parliamentary election. A creeping putsch almost achieved its goals in the period between Djindjic’s assassination and early parliamentary election. And it practically succeeded in spite of the international community’s endeavor to maintain the reformist course primarily by admitting the union of Serbia and Montenegro to the Council of Europe while the state of emergency in Serbia was still on. The entire opposition and most non-governmental organizations and media went for compromising and overthrowing the cabinet. The forces that have been delaying transition and democratization under the pretext that "national issue" should be solved first won the election. Refusing to admit that the national program has been defeated, the Serbian conservative elite turned to a new pillar of its populist policy: production of scandals and affairs. The pillar as such prevents the emergence of the alternative Serbia has been lacking ever since the downfall of the Berlin Wall. For, the same elite was not intent to pursue economic reforms but to disqualify its opponents. And that fully devaluated not only a genuine anti-corruption campaign, but also the very reforms. Electoral victory of the Serbian Radical Party and the Democratic Party of Serbia guarantees continuity to such policy that is already evident in ongoing debates on a new constitution, cooperation with The Hague Tribunal and perception of the state union, as well as in denial to face the past. Belgrade’s radicalized policy further destabilizes not only the country itself, but also the entire region. Djindjic’s assassination, at the same time, fully discloses the violence characteristic of the past decade – in battlefields and in Serbia’s political life alike. The trial of his murderers is most indicative in this context. From the very 6 7 Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia Human Rights and Accountability beginning this trial was turned into a farce aimed at presenting a political developments that ensued the October 5 overthrow, but also Serbia throughout murder as a mafia showdown. Murders of Ivan Stambolic and Slavko Curuvija, the 20th century – its attitude towards "both" Yugoslavias and, especially, its as well as the assassination attempt at Vuk Draskovic burden the entire society perception of fundamental values of the Western democracy such as free and symbolize its inability to put an end to the vicious circle of political market, the rule of law and minority policy. With this in mind, it is obvious violence. The fact that a victim (Vuk Draskovic) makes a coalition with the that, the same as throughout the 20th century, today’s Serbia is deeply same people he accuses of assassination attempt is most oppressive indeed. antagonistic to the West. This is all about Serbia's resistance to reforms that Premier Djindjic was the torchbearer of reformist policy that was, in a have been turned down twice in 15 years only. Firstly, when the so-called anti- way, his personal mission and challenge. Taking into account what it had to bureaucratic revolution led to deposal of Prime Minister Ante Markovic. cope with after Zoran Djindjic was gunned down, the government he had Secondly, when Premier Zoran Djindjic was assassinated. Today’s Serbia moves formed was far from being inefficient. Over the past two years that same about without a definite destination, without a vision, without a policy to The government's actions were aimed at overall reforms. It managed to pull the Hague Tribunal, without perception of its recent past and without the idea country out of isolation and secure its international comeback. By using the about how to build its social system. October 5 change to launch reforms – for which he actually captured no Ongoing trials before The Hague Tribunal – the Milosevic trial in popular vote – Djindjic begun to chart the alternative. Now that he is gone, the particular – dramatically lay bare Milosevic's death machinery. Through plea in-house dynamism of his Democratic Party reflects this alternative. The state of bargains the Prosecution managed to have enough insiders take the stand and emergency declared under the circumstances accompanying his murder was testify about the Serbian Ministry of the Interior, the Yugoslav People's Army aimed at stabilizing the country and combating organized crime involved in the and Milosevic's connections with armies and police forces of the so-called assassination itself through the so-called Zemun Clan. In spite of the cases of Republika Srpska Krajina and Republika Srpska. When Milan Babic confessed overt violation of human rights, the international community backed the state that he had taken part in "prosecution of non-Serbs on religious and political of emergency and, moreover, took an unprecedented step: it admitted Serbia grounds," that was almost a prima facie evidence of Belgrade's aggression and Montenegro to the Council of Europe while the state of emergency was still against Croatia, ethnic cleansing, massive prosecution and crimes against on. Amply supported by the media and most non-governmental organizations, humanity. Babic's repentance exceeds a personal act, given its significance for the G17 Plus was a pillar of the anti-government campaign. Exposed to overall relations between Serbs and Croats in Croatia. However, in Serbia it scandals produced on daily basis, defamation of cabinet members and was qualified as a remorse "for personal gain" and, therefore, labeled as "a permanent pressure, the government was ultimately forced to call an early bigger sin that the one he repents." From a psychological angle, the truth parliamentary election. emerging from The Hague increasingly homogenizes masterminds of the war Unreadiness to face the recent past, wars and war crimes figures as a and warlords, who now resume the same arguments they once used as a major moral problem of the Serbian society. Facing the past is a premise of pretext for the war. On the other hand, the emerging truth unlocks the door to political freedom and thus of democratization, given that only awareness of all those that, faced with reality, pave the way to facing the past. The Serbian guilt leads to the awareness of solidarity and accountability. Apart from public – and elites in the first place – increasingly perceive The Hague Tribunal hindering a breakthrough in terms of European civilization’s values, this is a in a negative light. Nevertheless, the new government will have to accept the stumbling block in the way of stabilizing neighborly relations and regaining Tribunal as a top priority of its foreign policy agenda. According to foreign regional trust. To be efficient a project as such must be turned into a national policy experts close to Vojislav Kostunica, his government will be focused on policy backed by a nationwide consensus. For the time being, Serbia is "deposing Carla del Ponte." "If Rwanda's Tutsi managed to do that, why incapable of carrying out such project. For, the Serbian society and its elite in shouldn’t Serbs?" said one of those experts, Aleksandar Fatic."1 the first place, are unwilling to accept their own responsibility for the The outcome of early parliamentary election, the same as electoral developments that took place over the last decade of the 20th century. This is results of the presidential one that preceded, fully identified the actual state of best illustrated by Serbia’s attitude towards The Hague Tribunal and, affairs at the political scene that used to be rather blurred. Such outcome denied moreover, towards the trial of Slobodan Milosevic. the thesis about Serbia’s democratic potential or its democratic tradition. Military defeat and the past decade that never resulted in a bottom line, Today’s Serbia is somewhere in between a general wish to join Europe and a persistence in the Greater Serbia program, identity crisis and overall frustration militant conservativeness, which renounces responsibilities and obligations revived traditional conservativeness. The December early parliamentary implied in the European option. The very fact that Slobodan Milosevic and election contributed, in a way, to an insight into the state of affairs in Serbia. To better understand such electoral outcome, one should analyze not only the 1 Vecernje Novosti, February 23, 2004.