1 Human Rights in Transition – Serbia 2001 Introduction The situation of human rights in Serbia was largely influenced by the foregoing circumstances. Although the severe repression characteristic especially of the last two years of Milosevic’s rule was gone, there were no conditions in place for dealing with the problems accumulated during the previous decade. All the mechanisms necessary to ensure the exercise of human rights - from the judiciary to the police, remained unchanged. However, the major concern of citizens is the mere existential survival and personal security. Furthermore, the general atmosphere in the society was just as xenophobic and intolerant as before. The identity crisis of the Serb people and of all minorities living in Serbia continued. If anything, it deepened and the relationship between the state and its citizens became seriously jeopardized by the problem of Serbia’s undefined borders. The crisis was manifest with regard to certain minorities such as Vlachs who were believed to have been successfully assimilated. This false belief was partly due to the fact that neighbouring Romania had been in a far worse situation than Yugoslavia during the past fifty years. In considerably changed situation in Romania and Serbia Vlachs are now undergoing the process of self identification though still unclear whether they would choose to call themselves Vlachs or Romanians-Vlachs. Considering that the international factor has become the main generator of change in Serbia, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia believes that an accurate picture of the situation in Serbia is absolutely necessary. It is essential to establish the differences between Belgrade and the rest of Serbia, taking into account its internal diversities. Serbia’s distinct regional character resulting from her historical heritage must be built into a strategy of Serbia’s development. At this moment it is essential to define the crux of the problem in order to lay the fundamentals for change. After 11 September human rights have gained on importance in the sphere of defence of freedoms and values that the human right concept advocates. Terrorism has only revealed vulnerability of modern world and its values and, at the same time, has emphasised the reasons for intensifying support to democratisation in the states and regions, which through repressive measures deny human rights and very often constitute the breeding ground for all kinds of radicalisms. 11 September has also laid bare the mind set in Serbia. On the one hand, the authorities have condemned terrorism and tried to “market” its “war campaigns in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina” as the fight against Islamic terrorism, while, on the other hand, an obvious support to Bin Laden was rather an expression of anti-Americanism and anti-globalisation. Emergence of clandestine organisation “Gavrilo Princip” which has sent threatening letters to all prominent Serbs in Sarajevo, as well as to individuals in Serbia, is indicative of potential radicalisation in Serbia proper. The removal of Slobodan Milosevic had created the conditions for constructing a framework for much-needed transition, as well as laid bare the gravity of the problems in hand and the extent to which the society and its institutions had been devastated. Although the absence of any substantial headway in the past year can be attributed to the ruinous legacy, no serious effort was made to take stock of the policy of the Milosevic regime in order to break away from it. Co- operation with the Hague Tribunal was the best indicator of how much progress the ruling Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) made in that direction: Milosevic was handed over to the Hague Tribunal as a result of pressure from the international community, especially the US Congress, and of activities of Carla del Ponte herself. The expectations that pressure on the new government to co-operate with the Tribunal would abate once Milosevic had been transferred to The Hague proved yet another illusion, based more on wishful thinking than on an appraisal of the new circumstances, especially those after September 11. The indictment of Slobodan Milosevic for crimes committed in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, including genocide, defines the character of the war in the past decade. As well as implicating Milosevic personally, the indictment spells out the war policy and names all its bearers, thus ending a phase of relativizing and equating the culpability of all the protagonists in the former Yugoslavia. As a result, the various Serb elites, who had hitherto looked upon Milosevic as a scapegoat, modified their attitude and now regard his trial as »the writing of the ongoing political history of the region«. As Dragoljub Micunovic, Speaker of the Federal Parliament, said, »we cannot watch disinterestedly as Slobodan Milosevic wages a private war at The Hague... After all, we as a state are part of that indictment«. 1 2 The dragging of feet on passing a law on co-operation with the Hague Tribunal was largely due to a disinclination to co-operate with it and indicated the correlation of forces as regards the matter. The growing pressure of individual Western governments and international organizations alike, as well as of the Tribunal itself, brought about a crisis within the DOS in which only individuals exhibited a clear attitude towards the Tribunal. This is partly understandable considering that the majority of the parties forming the ruling coalition supported and helped to implement the Greater Serbia policy, and that their criticism of Milosevic centred mostly on his failures and capitulation. Vojislav Kostunica, the president of the FRY, set up a State Truth and Reconciliation Commission in March, at the height of US Congress pressure aiming to make assistance to Serbia conditional on her co-operation with the Tribunal. Rather than striving after genuine confrontation with the recent past, the Commission in the past year sought - judging by statements by some of its members as well as of the president himself - to interpret the events from a Serb point of view. It is interesting to note that Milan Milutinovic, the president of Serbia himself indicted for war crimes and sought by the Hague Tribunal, pardoned a number of prisoners on Republic Day, a paradox that failed to provoke any public reaction. The past continued to be ignored as a matter of course and it was mostly under outside provocation that any action was taken. As a result of the absence of political will on the part of state authorities to sanction war crimes legally, the question of culpability and responsibility was narrowed and sidelined. With the internal potentials of the state at their lowest ebb ever, no radical reform was possible without international credibility. The attitude towards war crimes was essentially a measure of a genuine break with past policy. Given the manipulations and scheming of the state authorities and the prevailing attitudes in Serbia, it is hard to imagine that the question of culpability and responsibility can be addressed outside the Hague Tribunal. The DOS had come to power on the strength of only one demand, namely the removal of Milosevic. The take-over was helped by the international situation and the internal consensus that Milosevic must go. The election of Vojislav Kostunica as president was not accidental, for it was calculated at perpetuating the very policy whose aim was the creation of a Greater Serbia. From this point of view, the survival of the FRY could be viewed merely as a stepping stone towards the realization of that project, with Vojislav Kostunica, once a most fervent opponent of the Yugoslav state, himself regarding the FRY as a means to an end. No sooner was he in office than he nailed his colours firmly to the mast on the question of Republika Srpska, Montenegro, and Kosovo, there being no difference whatever between his position and that of the previous regime. What is more, the rhetoric of Kostunica’s messages was far less ambiguous, a fact especially appreciated in Republika Srpska and resulting in a far more cordial relationship then under the former regime. With regard to Montenegro, Kostunica chose not to employ the Army directly, finding it more advantageous for the time being to subject the republic to pressure through the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC), the most dogmatic segment of the Montenegrin political scene staunchly loyal to Slobodan Milosevic throughout the past ten years, and certain pro-Serb Montenegrins such as the academicians Matija Beckovic and Ljubomir Tadic. All of them were actively engaged in exacerbating divisions in Montenegro along tribal lines. However, in spite of enormous international pressure, the independent bloc won the election thanks to support from the Montenegrin elite and the younger generations. In the long term, the process of emancipation of Montenegro is an irreversible process and it only remains to be seen what form of disintegration Yugoslavia will undergo. The “normalization” of Serb nationalism and its democratic legitimation enjoyed Western public support during the first months of the DOS’s rule. However, during the first years of its rule, the DOS failed to establish itself as a political grouping of much relevance because it proved unwilling to confront the past, i.e. not only the war crimes but also corruption and the re- organization of Serbia as a whole. Every single step it did was forced from abroad and made conditional on financial aid. The biggest changes took place at the international level, the international community having decided to readmit the FRY to the United Nations, the OSCE and a number of other organizations as a matter of urgency. The rationale behind this policy should be attributed to a desire to prevent the collapse of Serbia and to accelerate her consolidation, though this was achieved only partially.