Boko Haram, the Government and Peace Negotiation

By Prof. James B. Kantiok, Ph.D,; MDY

Introduction Both scholars and non-scholars alike define peace variously. Depending on one’s knowledge and understanding of the concept, one may define it in simple layman/woman’s language as the “absence of violence” or the “absence of the fear of violence.” It can be associated with a multitude of factors and phenomena that reinforce one another, including gender equality, justice, relevant education and employment opportunities, the sound management of natural resources, human rights protection, political inclusion, and low levels of corruption. However, most of these factors are culturally coded and hence are only definable contextually. Understanding the central role played by culture in identifying the roots of a given conflict and the related specific path towards reconciliation is thus an essential, if not determining, step in achieving lasting peace and security. Peace has been and remains a permanent ideal and aspiration, as well as a right and a duty. However, in our fast-paced, interconnected world, peace is at risk. Understanding the issues involved in the Boko Haram insurgency could help the government decide whether or not to negotiate with the group, thus ensuring the security of life and property in the country.

The resurgence of religious conflict on a global scale from the late 1970's onward has been one of the great surprises of the modern era. Some analysts portray the rise of religiously motivated violence as a barbaric "throwback" fated to disappear as capitalism and democracy become worldwide and therefore may not be resolved. While others, yielding to pessimism, portray it as a feature of an essentially irresolvable "clash of civilizations." In contrast to both views, I believe that violent religious conflicts are the linked to so many factors that reinforce each other and may be resolved, but the assumption that such resolution lies in western models is untenable. By reconstructing our relationships with those subjected to our power, the poor and downtrodden, ensuring justice and contextualizing our problems, we may find solutions to the incessant religious conflicts in our country as well as globally.

At one extreme, religious identification can function as a mere badge of ethnicity, class, or caste as in Northern Ireland. The war between the Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland was not the result of differing interpretations of the Eucharist or disagreements about Papal infallibility. Their struggle was rooted in bitter social inequalities and political insecurities afflicting their communities over the course of three centuries. The salient issues were jobs, dignity, and group identity, not religious beliefs. On the other hand religious extremism could be the result of a clash in civilization, a feeling that modernization is encroaching on the ultraconservative views being held by religious extremists who find themselves on the fringes of in a postmodern society.

The colossal loss of human lives, destruction of property suffered by people in the northern part of the country, and the crumbling effect that the Boko Haram insurgence has on Nigeria’s economy is peaking and all hands must be put on deck to arrest the situation. As challenging as life is in this country, it is more so, especially for those who live within the Boko Haram operational zone, who no longer live a normal life. That church services and other related activities, especially in the Northeast zone now hold at police and military guards and patrols for fear of being attacked by Boko Haram can no longer be accepted as normal life or even be

1 tolerated. A responsible government cannot fold its arms and watch helplessly when a very important resource, human life, is being cut short and destroyed on a daily basis. The President Goodluck Jonathan Government has its hands full and is almost at a loss as to how to handle this menace. The Government, in its attempt to find a lasting solution to the problem is using a two- prong approach; one is its attempt to pursue the terrorists where they are and the other is through persuasion, negotiations or what has been deemed dialogue, which the latter is a more recent approach.

This symposium is an attempt to explore the way out of this quagmire in the best possible way. There have been opinions and counter opinions on why government should or should not negotiate with Boko Haram. The goal this paper is to relay the facts so that Nigerians and others in the international community can come to terms with a real problem, and, thus pursue the best way to resolving the problem. The objective is to create awareness on the way forward with the menace of the Boko Haram insurgency among Nigerians, the Government and the international community. It is also to help us understand the gravity of this problem and propose reasons why the Nigerian governments must avoid the purely hardline approach, which had earlier been dominant, but rather seek an alternative engagement. This paper examines the importance of engagement as a process of peace negotiation and conflict management. It sets out first with an examination of the philosophy of peace negotiation as a panacea to peace engagement or dialogue with the Boko Haram insurgency and proposes the way forward in Nigeria to resolve the conflict.

Developing a philosophy for expedient/a generic peace negotiations

The Preamble to the UNESCO Constitution states that, "Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed" (UNESCO). Peace is the most expensive commodity in the global market today and has been described as the Summum Bonum or supreme ideal for human progress and enjoyment of life on this part of the divide. To understand the exact meaning and real nature of peace, as well as the means to realizing it, we must first of all rectify the prevailing tendency that thinks of peace in terms negative peace, which is the absence of conflict or war. This line of thinking only encourages a pacifist understanding of the term, but denounces conflict or war owing to the shallow understanding of what actually causes those wars. Global overviews now confirm the presence of ethnic, religious, sectarian, economic as well as cultural strives that lead to civil and international wars. Therefore, our definition of peace should include the elimination wars and strives.

While it is true that peace would be achieved by removing all kinds of violence, such as war, environmental destruction, violation of human rights, cruelty against women and children, exploitation and oppression of the weak, poor and illiterate and the powerless, it will amount to grandstanding to believe that peace is merely a state of non-violence or absence of wars. We must understand peace in all its dimensions. First, we must understand it theoretically at the personal or mental level, that is, the inner state of calm or tranquility. Second, we must also understand it as social in terms of the state of social justice and development. Third, peace should be understood at the national level in terms of nation-state stability, progress and freedom from civil disorder. Fourth, at the international level, peace or peaceful relation is needed among all nations for global security and prosperity. Global peace, that is, peaceful co-existence is therefore necessary for the continued existence of the human race. Therefore, peace has a global phenomena and no nation can survive without others. Relationships must be global, because it is the foundation of the survival of humankind.

2 Peace negotiation a duty for all

Issues relating to peaceful co-existence are not solely the property of politicians, moralists, religionists, national leaders and social scientists, but of everyone. Every citizen must be aware of his/her responsibility by adopting an essentially new and intrinsic way of thinking for peace. The duty of philosophers and ethical thinkers is to make men and women free from their deep-rooted superstitions, dogmas and also from illogical, irrational and outdated way of thinking. We need to evaluate and reevaluate the relevance of traditional politico-national goals such as patriotism, nationalism, as well as the spiritual ideals of personal salvation and self-realization. This has become necessary because the recent global situations that require a review and reassessment of traditional ideas and values from the global perspective to the decision-maker, the voters, the executives, parents, national leaders, national bodies and international organizations. The greatest responsibility of thinkers and philosophers alike is to see that humanity is upheld as supreme. Hence it is necessary to awake the human conscience at personal, national and even at international level. This is needed because "the seeds of peace do not lie in lofty ideas, but in human understanding and empathy of ordinary people" (Rai, nd).

That the futility of philosophies and ideologies, which declare "conflict" or "strife" as a necessary condition for progress, has been proved is no longer debatable. What is needed therefore is to replace such philosophies, which accept peace as a factor contributory to progress. The interpretation of progress in terms of conflict and competition, advanced by Malts, Darwin, Marx and industrial civilization, must be replaced by interpretations that promote cooperation or peaceful relation, because peace within and without is not only a preferable condition for progress, but an essential one. The road to a peaceful future can only be traversed through cooperation based on the recognition of equality among nations and peoples respect for the sovereignty of humanity.

For peace to reign in this country, we must educate each other and ourselves in ideals of human conduct. It is unquestionable and ultimately true that humankind itself is the insurmountable barrier in the accomplishment of peace, since alternatives of war and peace, of progress and regress, of construction and destruction are matters of human choice and not historical processes. We are our own worst controversial enemies. If we want peace in Nigeria and in the world generally, we must imbibe creative qualities or virtues such as love, friendliness, self-control, sacrifice, modesty, non-violence, forgiveness, tolerance, compassion, gentleness and self- contentment. This should not be a matter of the head only, but a matter of the heart. Having knowledge of virtues alone is not sufficient; to be virtuous is more important. Virtues must be reflected in our thought, speech and conduct. Seemingly destructive qualities or vices such as anger, greed, arrogance, pride, excessive self-esteem, treachery and willful committal of injury to others should be denounced. To cultivate noble qualities as well as the elimination of demoniac qualities require extensive moral training. This is something that is currently lacking in our society. In spite of the proliferation of churches and mosques, the emergence of reverend gentlemen and sheikhs, the moral fabric of our society remains tattered. Corruption is at its highest levels in our national life and it cuts across all facets of the society that includes, the church, the mosque, traditional institutions and shrines. This leads t us to specifically focus on whether or not there can be negotiations between the government of Nigeria and the Boko Haram insurgency.

Should Government Negotiate With Boko Haram?

3 Many of us are now used to the rhetoric by governments all over the world that they will never negotiate with terrorists. Whether such outbursts can be sustained in the present realities that we face with global terrorism is yet to be seen. Former US President George W. Bush declared in 2003, “You’ve got to be strong, not weak. The only way to deal with these people is to bring them to justice. You can’t talk to them. You can’t negotiate with them.” Similarly, UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, at the height of IRA violence, vowed never to negotiate with terrorists. In the same vein, the governments of Colombia, Turkey and other Spanish leaders also pledged not to negotiate with terrorist organizations. Such outburst and bickering by governments are backed by some prominent scholars of terrorism. Paul Wilkinson (2001, p.80), a leading scholar in the field for decades, wrote that it would be ‘totally unacceptable’ for talks to be opened with the assailants who killed 58 tourists in Luxor, Egypt in 1997. Other scholars like Ward- law, (1989); Alexander, (2002); Narveson (1991); Weinberg & Davis(1989); and Neumann(2007) believe that negotiations on the underlying political demands of terrorists are unlikely to resolve the conflict and may simply incite more terrorism. In this case, (Zartman, 1990, p.165) holds the view that “the standard doctrine holds that one should not negotiate with terrorists” and the subject overall remains a taboo.

But why are governments all over the world so averse to talking with terrorist and terrorist organizations? The answer lies in the fundamental belief by governments that negotiating with terrorist will legitimize terrorist and terrorism in general. Legitimizing terrorist groups and their actions would weaken the democratic quality of states and likely only serve to incite more violence. Terrorist groups often lack organizational structures that would ensure a path to negotiations. Apparently, Boko Haram, which is said to be an upshoot of Al Qaeda and Al-Shabab lacks such an organizational structure with which government can engage it in a meaningful dialogue. The advent of Al-Qaeda and its non-traditional structure seemingly based on a loose network of cells and like-minded groups as well as the complexity of the modus operandi gives more reasons for governments to become averse to the whole notion of negotiations or even dialogue. The lack of such engagement structures has added another major hurdle to applying conflict resolution methods to terrorism. Therefore, two important questions must be addressed while attempting to engage Boko Haram insurgents, namely: Who does one talk to? Who speaks for the ‘terrorists’? These questions relate to legitimacy and complexity andform the bedrock for any meaningful negotiations with terrorists

The author posits that there are alternative perspectives to the two questions of legitimacy and complexity in engaging with Boko Haram. He author draws from research in peace and conflict studies, and attempts to analyze how, contrary to conventional wisdom and what is generally argued, that these two nagging questions may well provide the path conducive to peaceful resolution of conflicts involving terrorist violence such as Boko Haram. The author uses two examples from history toback his argument and to illustrate the fact that the engaging the Boko Haram insurgency might well offer a sigh of relieve for the government, the people and the terrorists themselves. On the question of legitimacy, the author examines talks with the Irish Republican Army and its leader, Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland. The complexity question is examined through the lenses of the relationship between Al-Qaeda and its locally linked groups and in, particular the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) of the Southern Philippines region of Mindanao and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Terrorist organizations have no territory

4 We must understand that terrorism cannot be deterred because terrorists do not have territories on which to attack; neither do they have populations or infrastructure that could be killed or destroyed. They are invisible and therefore, this makes it more difficult to track them down. For example, Al-Qaeda is invisible, and, even though the American war machine has hit its training camps and headquarters in Afghanistan many times, the network remains unaffected. Al Qaeda is an ideology and followers join it, believe in it and fight for it, but they do not settle within it, unlike a state. Al Qaeda therefore, can be anyone and everywhere. This gives the organization an advantage over a conventional military power. Al Qaeda is never ultimately threatened because its invisibility makes the threat of retaliation and preemption less credible. The same thing can be said of Boko Haram, whose training camps are not even indefinable by the Nigerian forces, let alone being attacked or destroyed.

Similarly, organizations like Hezbollah and Al Shabab, although may have operational bases, but no territories or population to attack. In fact, members of such organizations can easily blend with the general population, thus making it even more difficult to be targeted. This is the problem Nigeria is facing in its fight against the Boko Haram insurgency. Although one may argue, as Israel does, that Hezbollah has a territory, such as the West Bank or South Lebanon from where it launches its attacks and could be targeted and hit in such territories, but such a claim has only attracted international condemnation when Israel does hit them. The US, in its global war on terror maintains that nations that harbor terrorist or terrorist organizations are legitimate targets of the global war on terror. The increased drone attacks under the Obama administration supports this view.One may argue that attacking the West Bank, Lebanon, Waziristan in Pakistan or even Somalia to dislodge Al Qaeda and its related groups may not necessarily affect such groups. Similarly, Israel attacking Hezbollah camps and rocket launchers in Lebanon would only and unavoidably hit the Lebanese people. Thus, holding innocent men, women and children collectively liable for violent acts for which they are not responsible will surely foster the belief that Hezbollah is fighting a necessary and justified war. It only bolters the resolve of the people in those territories to support the actions of the terrorist organizations as the world witnessed Lebanon’s support for the Hezbollah war against Israel in 2006. This means, generally speaking, that attacking countries, which are under suspicion of supporting or harboring terrorists will only strengthen the ideology these organizations stand for. In other words, these attacks give terrorists a pretext for their attacks on civilian populations, thus making it easier for people to believe in their ideology and justifications. This is why it is justified to parley or negotiate with terrorist organizations rather than adopt the hawkish approach to fighting terrorism. Many in Nigeria are in support of negotiations with Boko Haram not necessarily because they support their activities, but are simply tired of the senseless murders of innocent victims andthe general insecurity in the country.

Secondly, the threat of death and destruction of group members serves no useful purpose for those willing to sacrifice their lives in a suicide bombing. A rhetorical question that is important at this point is, “Has the world become more secure because of the Global War on Terrorism embarked upon by America and her allies?” It is very doubtful, because it seems it has only intensified terrorism worldwide. The problem with humankind is that history does not seem to teach us anything at all. If it did, the Cold War could have taught us that deterrence leads to more insecurity. Deterrence is based on a negative approach that if we threaten terrorist with

5 punishment if they continued their activities, then they will stop. According to (Frey, 2004, p.34), “coercive action is answered by coercive action and such interaction tends to degenerate into a negative sum game between the parties involved, making each of them worse off.” There is no winner between countries engaging in the coercive response and the terrorists since both lose (italics in original).

The author is of the opinion that deterrence or use of force is neither the right nor an adequate answer to the threat of terrorism. It only toughens the terrorist and makes them more isolated and more likely to wreck more destruction. To reduce the threat of terrorism, we must reduce people’s willingness to engage in terrorism. Governments must address the issues terrorists are raising. For example, in the case of Nigeria, corruption, injustice, religious persecution, unemployment and poverty must be addressed. Once this is done, it makes recruitment more difficult for Boko Haram. The state’s line of defense is to identify areas where it knows and fears that new terrorists will be recruited. The less support the likes of Shakau receives, the less likely that there will be more attacks. Once we can strangle their ability to recruit, then we will be able to focus on those who are already in and contain them, thereby defeating the organization. America got it right when it identified and targeted Al Qaeda’s financial support base; it strangled their financial support by freezing the accounts of their supporters. This means, that the Nigerian government, while pursuing the Boko Haram insurgents must also identify their support based, including their financiers and targeting them. Addressing the issues so identified by Boko Haram such as checking corruption, ensuring religious freedom, reducing ethnicity in our body politics, ensuring credible and acceptable election results and justice and fairness to all would go a long away to reduce the attacks by Boko Haram. Nigeria has enough resources to address the problem of poverty and unemployment if our resources are well managed. There is enough money in this country to go round if we can check the astronomical levels of corruption in the country.

If the rumors are true (and I dare say there that there is just too much rumors being spread round the country), that a senator takes home about N35, 000,000.00 ($218,750.00) a year while the ordinary Nigerian lives on less than $1 or N160 a day, then such injustices need to be addressed by the those who lead us. Such gross injustices and disparities could be one of the reasons responsible for people taking arms, which they see as the last resort and attacking and killing innocent people. Addressing these problems would increase the chances of successful negotiations with terrorist organizations, albeit Boko Haram. If we are willing to negotiate with terrorists we open up a window of opportunity for them to attain some of their objectives in a peaceful way. This was what the Yar’Adua Administrations did when it granted amnesty to the Niger Delta Militants. Although it is difficult to compare the case of the Niger Delta Militants and that of Boko Haram, but government must find creative ways of engaging them. Let me make it unambiguously clear that setting up a committee to dialogue with Boko Haram would be like building a bridge to no where. Peace negotiations with terrorist organizations are not the work of a committee, but that of a peace negotiator, a person whom both the government and terrorist organization trust.

We can reward them if they are cooperative by accepting them as a negotiating partner. Doing this should not necessarily mean that the state is acknowledging or accepting all their objectives or actions. It simply means the state is merely offering them an olive branch, much the same way

6 it is doing with other rogue and pariah states. Offering terrorists and their supporters a real and credible chance of achieving some of their objectives without violence will challenge the terrorists’ claim that they have no other choice than to use deadly force. Of course, we must understand that there will always be those supporting violence for the sake of violence. However, offering the olive branch will make it more difficult for an organization to find support and to recruit new followers for its violent actions if there is a credible peaceful alternative. Bock (2007) believes that by offering negotiations to terrorists, even when it seems taboo, we start to fight terrorism at its source, in a setting where violence is perceived, for whatever reasons, as the only option.

Does negotiation give legitimacy to terrorist and terrorism?

The first question we must address is: Should a government negotiate with a terrorist group? Those who argue against negotiating with terrorists believe in this simple fact: that democracies must never give in to violence, and terrorists must never be rewarded for using it. Negotiating with terrorist groups therefore gives legitimacy to terrorists and their methods and undermines actors who have pursued political change through peaceful means. Talking with terrorists can destabilize the negotiating governments' political systems, undercut international efforts to outlaw terrorism, and set a dangerous precedent. So for hardliners and the hawks within a democratic system, we must never talk with them, recognize them or legitimize their activities, as doing so will be a sign of weakness on the part of the government in power.

This tough talk stance by government often contradicts the dirty deals that take place behind the scenes. In practice, democratic governments often negotiate with terrorists behind the door. For example, during the intractable conflict between Great Britain and the Irish Republican Army, there were dirty deals and behind the scene negotiations going on, even though the IRA was branded a terrorist group. The British government maintained a secret back channel to the Irish Republican Army even after the IRA had launched a mortar attack on 10 Downing Street that nearly eliminated the entire British cabinet in 1991. Similarly, in 1988, the Spanish government sat down with the separatist group Basque Homeland and Freedom (known by its Basque acronym ETA) only six months after the group had killed 21 shoppers in a supermarket bombing. The often celebrated Israeli tough stand on terrorist has been contradicted by the fact that the government strayed from the supposed banned negotiation with terrorists and in in 1993, secretly negotiated the Oslo Accords even though the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) continued its terrorist campaign and refused to recognize Israel’s right to exist. Very recently, the US government, which maintains the toughest stance on terrorism, went against itself and the government of Afghanistan to open communications channels leading to negotiations with the Taliban. In her desperate move to end the Afghan War, which has been known as the dungeon for all known imperialist governments, the US hurriedly, recognized the Taliban’s office in Dubai and a conference that was convened in spite of protests from the Afghan government.

Arguments against engaging terrorists in peace negotiations

One of the main arguments put forward by scholars against engaging with terrorists is that such a course of action would legitimize the terrorists, their goals and, most of all, their means. In fact,

7 Wilkinson rejected the idea of even the possibility of talks with the Luxor assailants because he believed it would mean accepting “such criminals as legitimate interlocutors” (Wilkinson, 2001, p.80. Others like Laqueur (1987, p.308) posit that compromising with terrorists will give full recognition to terrorist groups and would likely lead to increased attacks.Negotiations give legitimacy to terrorists and their methods and thus undermine actors who pursue political change through peaceful means. According to Neumann (2007, p.128), talking to terrorist has the potential for destabilizing the negotiating government’s political systems, undercutting international effects to outlaw terrorism, and setting dangerous precedents.

Scholars like (Wardlaw, 1989 and Clutterbuck, 1993) have tried to draw a distinction between ad hoc negotiations to release hostages or end a hijacking from political negotiations that involve concessions. Negotiations that involve the former, such as hostage release or aborting a hijacking incidence could be problematic, but necessarily unavoidable in order to save lives. On the other hand, conflated concessions by governments while negotiating with terrorists might be seen as counterproductive and dangerous.

While terrorism scholars and experts continue to raise such red alerts, they have not been able to tell us how negotiations lead to legitimation, neither have they nor policymakers elaborated on how dangerous or counterproductive such negotiations would impact the general population. Narveson, 1991; Gilbert, 1994; Crenshaw, 1983, based their objections to negotiations on ethical and moral issues surrounding terrorism. According to Paul Gilbert (1994, p.169), by targeting civilians, terrorist groups forfeit their legitimacy because they have breached the conventions of debate required for negotiations. Similarly, Jan Narveson (1991, p.161) posited that terrorists put themselves in “Hobbes’ state of nature with respect to us” (what life will be like without government). Therefore, engaging with terrorists would translate their violence into a legitimate means to be heard and thus lead other groups to engage in similar activities. Crenshaw (1983, p.25) argued, “The power of terrorism is through political legitimacy, winning acceptance in the eyes of a significant population and discrediting the government’s legitimacy.” To negotiate with them, therefore, means giving them the power and legitimacy they have always craved for. Arguing to the contrary, Gilbert believes that the state criminalizes terrorism or in some cases turns terrorists into “external adversaries” warranting a military as well as police response.” It is such policies that make it hard for the state to negotiate with terrorist groups. And because terrorist are often branded as bandits, the state therefore finds it difficult do deals with them, since doing so is inappropriate under the rule of law. Such prejudiced stance already makes it difficult for negotiations to take place because it is supposedly inappropriate to negotiate with terrorists (Gilbert, 1994, p.167).

It should be noted here that the very act of naming a group or action as terrorist already presupposes it is illegitimate and precludes any form of negotiations. By delegitimizing the group, it gives the state the power to go after them and/or their sources of finance. Such designation is not a desirable side effect that accompanies the legal and financial penalties, but rather one of the stated goals of governments in naming terrorist groups. For example, the US Department of State (2005), said its classification of a group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) “stigmatizes and isolates designated terrorist organizations internationally.” The constant use of the term FTO by the US government has prompted the UN Working Group on Terrorism to express concern that “labeling opponents

8 and adversaries as terrorists offers a time-tested technique to de-legitimize and demonize them” (United Nations, 2002, p.6). We should understand that by delegitimizing a group and giving it the terrorist label, it simply curtails attempts to resolve the conflict through nonviolent means (Nadarajah & Sriskandarajah, 2005; Hicks, 1991; Russell, 2005). It is such labeling that has hampered attempts at reaching a permanent solution between the government and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al Shabbab in Somalia. In the same vein, the US designation of terrorist groups under the Reagan and the first and second Bush administrations placed severe limitations on the range of U.S. response to such attacks, thus encouraging the use of military force while imposing strong disincentives on negotiation (Kenneth Hicks, 1991).

Lastly, when the state classifies a group or opposition movement as terrorist as we are now witnessing the events in Egypt where the interim government is calling the Freedom and Justice Party (Muslim Brotherhood) terrorists, it can also polarize such movements, forcing moderate voices to choose between accepting the ‘terrorist’ label and thus engage in illegal actions or abandon their activism altogether. In fact, terrorist and terrorism have simply become the buss word to silence opposition to bad governments. Legitimacy is thus seen as a key obstacle in engaging with terrorism through talks. Labeling a group ‘terrorist’ has the sole aim to delegitimize it and allow for public statements aimed at discrediting them. For example, former New York mayor Rudolph Giuliani said, “Those who practice terrorism lose any right to have their cause understood” (Philipson, 2005).

Negotiating with terrorist grants them legitimacy

If legitimation that accompanies negotiations brings an insurgent group to change its behavior would it be congruent with the norm barring political violence? In answer to this question, we may look at three scenarios. First, negotiations may eliminate the very reasons why the insurgents may have engaged in violence in the first place. Lack of a legal outlet to voice their grievances could have been responsible for their violent action. In this case, if the Nigerian government had carefully studied the reasons for the Boko Haram insurgency carrying arms, the problem might have been resolved or at least, it wouldn't have escalated to where it is today. Bulunkutu ward, the poorest area in the Maiduguri metropolis, is known to have been the site for the worst Maitatsine riots of the early 1980s. It is also the place where Boko Haram was born. Had government taken serious steps and implemented the recommendations of the various panels on Maitatsine in the 1980s and remained resolute to not allowing such religious riots to happen in the future, perhaps we would be singing a different tune today.

Second, had the government addressed some of the major issues raised by Boko Haram, which started first as the Nigerian Taliban, the problem would have not escalated to where it is today. The problem in Nigeria is that government tends to treat serious problems with kids globes, hoping they will fizzle away. One of the major problems related the Boko Haram insurgent is not necessarily a rejection of Western Education, but the philosophical understanding that western education is responsible for the institutionalization of corruption, thus perpetuating poverty among majority of Nigerians. In the case of Boko Haram, a ruling government promised to change their fortunes by providing basic amenities such as electricity, water, roads and schools in the area during its electioneering campaigns, but reneged on such promise after receiving their

9 unalloyed support leading to its victory at the polls. Boko Haram came about as the result of poor governance, deceit and arrant display of ill-gotten wealth by politicians in the area rather than the poutright rejection of western education.

Tom Woodhouse, Oliver Ramsbotham & Andrew Cottey (2003, p.44 ) argued that a common factor in most cases of terrorism is a sense of injustice, frustration and humiliation, and the idea that there are no nonviolent channels of redress. If meaningful negotiations must take place, then the government must overcome this sense of exclusion, humiliation and impotence through democratic engagement. It must make sure that members of the isolated groups are brought mainstream. Some may argue that Boko Haram’s objective is to Islamize the country. True, but everybody knows that this is a mere dream, something that is often used by those on the fringes to bargain for recognition. The Boko Haram members are aware that Nigeria, whose population is almost evenly divided between Christians and Muslims, can neither be Christianized nor Islamized. It is simply a wild goose chase used by their sponsors to gain political relevance. According to Michael Ignatieff (2004, p.88), to engage the terrorist organization, the state must acknowledge that the terrorist group represents a valid claim even though its means are unacceptable. This involves the state’s willingness to engage with insurgent goals, and therefore its recognition of these goals as legitimate. Doing this could thus contribute to the resolution of the conflict. While Inaitieff, makes a valid point, the author, however believes that this cannot be applied in the case of Boko Haram, whose main goal is to Islamize the country. Doing so would only lead to more sectarian violence. Government can however accept and address the secondary demands of the group, which are the eradication of poverty, justice, equity, inclusion and reduction of corruption in the country. This is within the government’s power to address.

Zartman & Alfredson (2006), argued that when the state accepts insurgent groups as legitimate interlocutors, it potentially strengthens the factions within the group that are pushing for a political solution. Government’s offer to negotiate could contribute to creating and strengthening moderate factions within the movement. Negotiations may strengthen factions within the insurgent group that are in favor of nonviolent engagement to breakaway and commence negotiations. When this happens, it weakens the overall strength of the group, thus forcing the organization to want to negotiate. This appears to be evident in some members of Boko Haram’s willingness to negotiate with the government. Once the government can engage them as well as ensure safe passage, we could be on our way to finding some resolution to the problem. The opposite could be the case in a situation where the government refuses to accept a group as legitimate as this could lead to further radicalization (Ricigliano, 2005; Zartman &Alfredson, 2006; and Russell, 2005

Third, negotiations may draw insurgent groups down a path of change or transformation towards nonviolence. The state’s legitimation of groups involved in terrorist violence could facilitate the bringing of such violence to an end. According to Leary (2004), legitimacy through engagement can lead not only to the strengthening of the accommodating factions, but also the slow transformation of the entire group into one adhering to the norms of nonviolent political debate. Once we lay down the conditions for negotiation, which include compromise, persuasion, positive-sum outcomes and democracy,it could lead to resolution of the conflict. Legitimacy of all parties, need to appeal widely, and acceptance of popular judgment impose limitations on terrorists that can mark the beginning of the socialization process toward inclusion. In this case, Boko Haram insurgents must

10 recognize the Constitution and the Flag of Nigeria as supreme and not subject to negotiation. The unity of Nigeria as a nation cannot be compromise as this was settled at independence. Boko Haram insurgents must lay down their arms, embrace dialogue and recognize the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria for any negotiations to take place. Nigeria is a democracy, a multicultural and multireligious society and no single ethnic group, religious sect or religion must claim superiority over another, thus imposing its sectarian and religious ideology on others. The current composition of Nigeria and Nigeria is not negotiable.

Taking this argument one step further, the state can, in a constitutive act, give the possibility to an armed group of becoming a legitimate group by offering it precisely what it lacks vis-à-vis the state, legitimacy. This was what the Yar’Aduwa government did in the Niger Delta Region by granting amnesty to the insurgents and bringing them mainstream. The training programs offered to the Niger Delta Militants have greatly decreased the spate of kidnapping and vandalization of oil facilities in the area. This has also greatly reduced youth restiveness leading to more meaningful development in the area. A state’s recognition of a violent group’s legitimacy claim would not weaken the democratic qualities of the said state, but rather strengthen them by drawing groups away from violent opposition and toward compliance with the state’s norms. This is clearly evidenced in the reduction of the kidnapping rate in the Niger Delta region. Engaging with a group based on the legitimacy of its grievances and goals may create a lot of problems for governments, but is desirable. It forces the state into making the difficult call of judging which goals and grievances are legitimate and which are not. Beyond this, it leaves two important questions unanswered, namely: what should be done when there is consensus that a group’s goals are illegitimate? What are the consequences of such an action? By accepting violent actors as legitimate interlocutors, governments risk marginalizing the forces that have struggled for the same goals without engaging in violence. Because of the above, legitimacy remains a key problem surrounding engagement, to which not many solutions are insight. This begs the question, Should Government recognize Boko Haram as a legitimate entity and thus negotiate with it? The answer is yes, if Boko Haram can come out of the closet and accept the olive branch being offered to government. They should identify a credible leader with whom the government can negotiate.

The alternative approach to conflict resolution that is based on legitimacy could be viewed through the lens Northern Ireland, which offers a rare example of an overall successful peace process involving a group using terrorist violence in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Sinn Fein leader, Gerry Adams (2001, p.320) states in his autobiography that nationalists took part in armed struggle due to the feeling the alternative means for achieving progress was closed off. Recognizing the grievances of the republicans through opening a channel of nonviolent engagement, as was done in the late 1980s with direct and indirect contacts with mainstream parties as well as the British, Irish and US governments created the condition by the republican camp for the peace process to move forward.

Legalization might be the path to resolving armed conflicts.

We must understand that armed groups’ main argument for engaging in violence is that they have no choice. In spite of this, we must also accept the fact that the recognition or acceptance of the republican grievances as legitimate may have been one of the factors that brought the republican side to move toward contemplating a negotiated solution to the conflict. We can also argue that

11 legitimacy could strengthen the dissenting voices within the group as in the case of Northern Ireland. In fact, the recognition by governments of Gerry Adams as the legitimate leader of the republican movement, especially when he was granted a visa to visit the US in 1994 helped strengthened the hand of the Sinn Fein leader vis-à-vis the hardliners (Coogan, 2000; Mitchell, 1999). According to Dominic Adams, brother of the Sinn Fein leader, who spent seven years in jail for IRA activity, when you see Bill Clinton meeting Gerry Adams on the Falls Road, when you see Nelson Mandela taking Martin McGuinness and Gerry Adams around Pretoria, when you see Tony Blair and people like that greeting Gerry, Martin and the leadership, it legitimizes the struggle, propagandizes it too and it allowed Sinn Fein to take on that role of the spokespeople for the republican struggle.

Legitimation is said to have played an important role in allowing the leaders in Northern Ireland to repeatedly take into account the trade-offs between militancy and respectability (Weinberg & Pedahzur, 2003, p.25). It is noteworthy toargue that the IRA/Sinn Fein underwent a strategic shift because the British government offered it legitimacy as an interlocutor and as a potentially influential political party operating in an open democratic context (Leonard Weinberg & Ami Pedahzur, 2003 p.117). The British government understood the risks involved in legitimizing the IRA/Sinn Fein and the wrath of hardliners that it incurred in so acting, but, as stated in former Prime Minister John Major’s autobiography, it was worth a try. Major States, “We were well aware of the unlikelihood of success, but we felt we had a responsibility . . . to see if the leadership of the Provisionals, if offered fair and equal treatment, had the will and ability to move away from terrorism” (Major, 1999, p.433). This move by John Major was based in the belief in the possibility that granting the republicans ‘fair and equal treatment,’ accepting them as a legitimate group would give them the occasion to become a legitimate group and renounce violence.

Although we may not attribute the peace process in Northern Ireland solely to the start of talks with and the legitimation of Sinn Fein, it cannot be said that it didn’t play an important role. One may say here that such steps may have contributed to the end of IRA terrorist violence in at least three ways. First, by opening an alternative way to change for the republicans; second, by strengthening the factions favoring talks; and third, by offering the republicans the possibility to transform themselves into a legitimate entity. Engaging the IRA/Sinn Fein, the UK, Irish and US governments, as well as mainstream parties, accepted the republicans as legitimate interlocutors and paved the way for them to be accepted as a legitimate political force by the broader national and international publics. Although one cannot say categorically whether majority Protestant or non- republican Catholic communities in Northern Ireland or abroad wholeheartedly accepted that legitimization, it however helped in cessation of violence. In fact, many have blamed the slow process of the transition on the republicans’ behavior, and, in particular to their decommissioning and conforming to the norm of nonviolence.

Negotiating with groups with a religious ideology

Our second example of engagement is seen in the peace process entered into between the Philippines government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Although, some have linked Muslim insurgency in the Southern Philippines with Al Qaeda, it long predates the emergence of Al-Qaeda, with fighting marring the region ever since the Christian Spanish conquest in the 16th century. According to scholars of terrorism, the MILF founder and leader Salamat Hashim, however, had strong international Islamist

12 ties, including with Osama bin Laden himself (ICG, 2004, p.4; Abuza, 2003). Through training as well as financing, the MILF is widely believed to have maintained links with Al-Qaeda and its close Southeast Asian-based ally Jemaah Islamiyah after receiving training for its operatives in Pakistan and Afghanistan (ICG, 2004, 2005; Rogers, 2004; Abuza, 2006, 2003; Swanstrom &Bjornehed, 2004). During the post-World War II era, clashes flared in the early 1970s in reaction to the central government’s sponsored migration of Christians to Muslim regions (Rogers, 2004). The MILF reportedly returned favor by allowing foreign militants to use its numerous camps for training purposes to counter the government’s efforts at integration. Although MILF continues to maintain links with Al Qaeda, this has not subjugated its local goals to the transnational jihadist agenda of Al-Qaeda.

The conflict in the southern Philippines does not fit into the external conspiracy theory of clash of civilizations as proposed by Huntington, but simply an internal problem. This is reminiscent of the Boko Haram insurgency, which though has maintained some links with Al Qaeda in Yemen and Al Shabbab of Somalia tries to maintain its local identity and operational goals of Islamizing the whole of Nigeria. This point is further validated by the fact that the MILF continues to maintain off and on peace talks with the government over the creation of an autonomous region. This clearly demonstrates that its local agenda remains more important than any Al-Qaeda-imported transnational one. Although there may be a remote connection between Boko Haram and other transnational terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and Al Shabbab, Boko Haram remains committed to pursuing an Islamist agenda aimed at the complete Islamization of Nigeria despite the fact that mainstream Muslims argue it is impossible to achieve such an agenda. Thus, despite the links between the MILF and Al-Qaeda’s hardcore leadership, peace talks with the government remained possible precisely due to the fact that local grievances remain the prime focus of the group. It might interest us to note that despite accusing the MILF of using indiscriminate attacks against civilians and of having links with Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah, the President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo led administration, chose not to classify it as a terrorist organization. The Nigerian government might have taken a cue from thid and it is noteworthy that Nigerian government has not technically declared Boko Haram a terrorist group. This is despite the call from many Nigerians to approach the US government to declare Boko Haram Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). This provides prospects for negotiations.

It is the position of the author that if the government can’t talk directly to Boko Haram because such talks legitimizes them and their terrorist activities, and because like with Al-Qaeda we don’t know who to talk to, then the kinds of dirty deals that went on between the British government and IRA, the kind of backdoor deals currently going on between the US government and the Taliban might need to be explored. These dirty deals and behind the scene negotiations between British-IRA/Sinn Fein and the US-Taliban peace negotiations provide us with good examples and precedents that could help the Nigerian government engage Boko Haram. While it is true that negotiating with ‘terrorists’ can indeed lead to their legitimation, however, the author believes that through such legitimation government may offer them an alternative path and the chance to transform into nonviolent actors. The transformation of the republican movement in Northern Ireland can be seen as an example of such a process. In the case of Al-Qaeda, its complex structure can certainly be seen as a hurdle to understanding and engaging with the network. And so is the Boko Haram insurgency. However, such complexity could be the expansion of opportunities, to study the structure of not only Boko Haram, but also Al-Qaeda to determine multiple points of entry for negotiations. The case of the MILF and its loose transnational links with Al-Qaeda’s hard core provides us with an advantage

13 allowing for negotiations at the local level to continue despite Al Qaeda’s leadership’s opposition to talks. This may be true for Boko Haram and other local groups with ties to Al-Qaeda, allowing for the possibility for separate peace negotiations beyond the reach of the network’s global reach.

In spite of all the successes recorded and the problems in the UK and Philippines, it must be stated that neither legitimacy nor complexity appears to rule out negotiations entirely. It may not necessary be said that negotiations are always possible or will necessarily be fruitful, but it is worth the try and should not be ruled out as a priori in conflicts marked by terrorist violence. Negotiations offer the possibility of an alternative route to the policy of violent counter-terrorism currently advocated and enforced the worldwide and in which tens of thousands have been killed post-9/11. This leads us to the reasons why terrorism persists.

The position of the author is that naming groups as terrorist simply drives a wedge between them and the government since the main goal of designating groups terrorist is often precisely an attempt to delegitimize them, isolating them, potentially radicalizing them, and crucially closing off nonviolent paths to negotiations. Hicks (1991) believes that reducing a group or movement to its terrorist acts, which often does not even represent the main activity of the group, limits the group’s possibilities of being anything but a terrorist group. It also limits how the state can engage with such groups, putting decision-makers in a policy straightjacket. While it is true that some groups do carry out terrorist acts, but by defining them only by their actions of extreme violence, states stand the risk of limiting their responses to ones of extreme violence.

Conclusion

The author has argued that by engaging with “terrorist” groups through negotiations states can potentially reverse this naming, isolating, radicalizing game and it its place, create an all inclusive and legitimization regime that brings all parties on board. It is his position that rather than disempowering the norm of nonviolence, negotiations can lead to its strengthening. Negotiations between states and terrorist groups are not only possible; they also have the potential for reducing or even resolving the conflict. They are also potentially less destructive than most other responses to terrorism envisioned by academics and policy-makers today. Finally, such negotiations may offer a path of empowerment for the norm of nonviolent political contestations.We may object that it is impossible to negotiate with Boko Haram, because they make unrealizable claims. True, but that is what negotiations are all about. In negotiations demands are never completely realized. Which objectives will be realized and to what extent we can do this is a matter of negotiation. And even Boko Haram has demands that could be partially realized. For example, their demand for a just society, a reduction in crime rates resulting from corruption cannot be impeached. They may not get their demands for and Islamic Republic but they can justify their attacks with reference, among others that the country is corrupt due to the influence of western education. In a nutshell, the author believes that engagement through negotiations is the way out of the current quagmire between the government and Boko Haram. We’ve shed enough blood in the country and the blood of the innocent cry from the ground. Unless something quick is done to arrest this situation, we may wake up some day to find that the Nigeria that our forefathers and compatriots dreamt of is no longer there. May I conclude by making this one call and with a loud voice that, the Nigerian government needs to find creative ways of engaging Boko Haram rather than using

14 solely military approach to conflict resolution. At the end of the day, there might be no winner between Boko Haram and the government, only the people of Nigeria deserves the victory.

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