Differentiated Integration, Reconsidered
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Policy Paper Centre international Note de recherche de formation européenne CIFE Policy Paper n°50 Hartmut Marhold*, March 3rd , 2017 Differentiated Integration, Reconsidered A new U-turn to multi-speed Europe The dilemma – pros and cons "The history of recent years has shown that there The challenge is obvious and is openly addressed in will be a multi-speed EU, and not all members will all of the three reports on EU reform 5 voted by the participate in the same steps of integration," said European Parliament on the 22 nd February. One of Angela Merkel after the informal EU-Summit at these introduced by the Committee on Constitution- Valetta/Malta, 3 February 2017 – “ it was the first al Affairs, chaired by Mercedes Bresso and Elmar time that Merkel clearly claimed this old idea as her Brok, outlines the problem: “The European Union own.” 1 It amounts to a U-turn in Merkel’s EU-inte- and its Member States are facing unprecedented gration strategy; until now, she has, in fact, pinned challenges, such as the refugee crisis, the foreign all her hopes on advancing towards tighter and policy challenges in the immediate neighbourhood tougher integration with all the – 27! – Member and the fight against terrorism, as well as globalisa- States of the Union. She is not the only one to tion, climate change, demographic developments, switch from a one-fits-all approach to differentiat- unemployment, the causes and consequences of the ed integration: François Hollande agreed as much financial and debt crisis, the lack of competitiveness on the idea 2 at the same time as the Italian govern- and the social consequences in several Member ment, and the three Benelux-countries went as far States, and the need to reinforce the EU internal as to publish an official statement on the topic. market, all of which need to be more adequately “Different paths of integration and enhanced coop- addressed.“ The report underlines „that these eration could provide for effective responses to challenges cannot be adequately tackled individual- challenges that affect member states in different ly by the Member States but need a collective ways. These arrangements should be inclusive and response from the Union, based on respect for the transparent, with the greatest possible involve- principle of multi-tier governance.“ ment of the other member states and EU institu- tions.” 3 This means that all the six founding But this view is just not unanimously shared Member States agreed, almost at the same throughout Europe – not only did a relative majority moment, on a strategy of integration which is of the British electorate vote to “leave” the EU, but certainly not new, from a historical perspective, but populist parties all-over Europe promise a re-na- has not been part of the game plan since the Brexit tionalisation of competences. Somebody like Nigel vote and the so-called Bratislava road-map, agreed Farage, a most ardent proponent of the “Leave” upon in September 2016 and aiming at a reform campaign in the UK, at the time UKIP president and vision for the EU to be achieved at the 60th anniver- still Member of the European Parliament, took the sary of the Rome Treaties, in March 2017. Last but floor in the debate about the aforementioned three not least, the President of the Commission joined reports: “Mr. Verhofstadt this morning said the the chorus: “’I think the time has come for us to people want more Europe. They do not: the people answer this historic question: do we want to move want less Europe”, and qualified those who were in forward – as a group of 28 – in fact, we`ve already favour of deeper integration as a “religious sect”. lost the 28th – or should those who want to move forward faster do so without bothering the others, Not least, the Visegrad-countries – Poland, the by putting in place a better structure, open to all?’ Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary – took a Juncker asked, adding that he would ‘argue for this’ divergent stance, both before and after the Bratisla- in the coming days.” 4 What has led to Angela va meeting, pleading for re-nationalisation; their Merkel, on behalf of Germany, and the other found- primary concern being „to strengthen the role of ing member states changing their minds? And what national parliaments, underlining respect for the can a “multi-speed” Europe, what can “different principles of subsidiarity and proportionality“; and paths and enhanced cooperation” mean? already “We believe it's up to national parliaments to have the final word on the decisions of the Euro- 1 Policy Paper Centre international Note de recherche de formation européenne pean Commission," confirmed the Polish Prime examples; others refer to the economic governance Minister, Beata Szydlo. This is the reason why these of the €-Zone, growth or social policy, migration and countries are strictly opposed to differentiated security. Whatever the policy, the choice is crucial, integration – their fear is that others would take and must hold the promise of an increased problem steps towards a more integrated Europe which they solving capacity for those who go for more integra- do not agree with: “the Visegrad Countries insist tion in the chosen field. that European integration is a common project and all negotiations should therefore be inclusive and Third, there must be appropriate models for the open to all Member States.“ 6 further and deeper integration of fewer than 27 Member States. The choice is confusing, and not all And that is the dilemma: Either enable the European of the methods, instruments, and structures are Union to find effective solutions to the problems by equally promising. The choice of an appropriate increasing its areas of jurisdiction, budgets, power – form of differentiated integration is as crucial in and then accept that not all of the remaining 27 terms of its chances of being implemented as the Member States will go this way; or stick to the idea choice of Member States and policies. The next that the Union as a whole should be held together at argument sets out to specifically address this the same level of integration – and then accept that aspect, but one thing is already clear: An advance- the problems cannot be solved. The momentum is in ment towards differentiated integration needs all favour of the first option. That is why it is relevant to the aforementioned three factors simultaneously – rethink differentiated integration under the current Member States, that are willing to join; policies circumstances. The following reflection aims to which promise to be successfully led at the Europe- pave the way for such a reflection. an level; and forms of differentiation – appropriate The triangle of realism: Member States, policies and for those Member States and these policies. Only if methods these three criteria are met can differentiated integration stand a chance of succeeding. One may Deeper integration among several Member States imagine this set of conditions in the configuration of maybe a way to advance, in terms of European unifi- a triangle, as shown below. This triangle is exclu- cation – but it soon becomes a dream if the real sive, too: It does not make much sense to look for conditions under which this can happen, are not policies which might indeed be better conducted at met. There are three fundamental conditions which the European level, if there are in fact no Member must come together in order to allow for differenti- States willing to transfer the corresponding compe- ated integration: First, one must identify Member tence to the Union. And there may be forms and States which are ready to go for more European methods of differentiated integration which seem to political unity, which are committed to a strength- be ingenious, but they are irrelevant as long as there ened Union, convinced that an enhanced Union can are no policies to which they can be applied with the and will offer better solutions to problems and that consent of a set of Member States. The focus of any such a move will be welcomed by their electorate. In further reflection should therefore be given to those other terms, the task of finding a way to deeper issues which unite all three conditions – Member integration with less than the whole range of States, policies and appropriate forms of integra- Member States must be envisaged from the tion – under one project. perspective of the Member States, more than from the level of the Union. Second, there must be policies which are arguably more effectively driven forward at the European level than at the level of the Member States. Differ- entiated integration can probably not be achieved by renforcing and empowering the constitutional system and institutions of the EU, endowing them with greater competences, if there is not a set of policies to which this empowerment actually applies. There are candidates, among the policies, which until now have either been in the hands of the Member States, or in the hands of the Union, or shared between both: Juncker, in his speech in Louvain-la-Neuve, quoted defence or research as 2 Policy Paper Centre international Note de recherche de formation européenne Differentiated integration is beneficial for the EU “Enhanced Integration” (or, with regard to defence only if it does not initiate a definite divide, but if it issues, “permanent structured cooperation”) is an develops an attractive dynamic. option within the Treaty itself. 7 It is by nature open to all the Member States, and fulfils the criterion of No Member State aims at reducing the number of openness without any restraint. The Brok-Bressot participants for further and deeper integration; Report puts all its hopes on the use of the unexploit- those who plead for differentiated integration ed potential of the Lisbon Treaty, and much depends consider that leaving others behind is a high price to on whether or not the Member States will trigger pay, and would wish them to join.