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31 October 2012 What Is the Probability of an Israeli Strike Against Iran in the Six Months Following the 2012 US Presidential Election?

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31 October 2012 What Is the Probability of an Israeli Strike Against Iran in the Six Months Following the 2012 US Presidential Election? Intelligence brief | 31 October 2012 What is the probability of an Israeli strike against Iran in the six months following the 2012 US presi ential election? Open Briefing currently assesses an Israeli strike against Iran to be highly unlikely between the US presi ential elections in November 2012 an the Israeli elections in January 2013, an unlikely between January an the Iranian presi ential elections in June 2013. This outlook is pre icate on five key areas of consi eration, summarise below an expan e upon in the following pages. 1. Persisting regional uncertainty will oblige Israel to calculate its moves with painstaking caution. A military strike on Iran, with the possible blowback this coul pro uce, is likely to occur only in extremis, that is, if Israel believe its existence coul be jeopar ise by containment, or in the face of incontrovertible ,smoking gun- evi ence. .owever, growing signs of Iranian cooperation with al- 0ae a an international jiha ist groups, as well as the Israeli lea ership1s fluctuating views regar ing Iranian Shiite rationality, represent wil car s. 2. Israelçs military ability to eradicate or significantly disrupt Irançs nuclear programme is far from clear. Israeli military authorities assess that a strike woul , even in the best case scenario, merely elay Iran1s nuclear progress by up to two years, thereby calling into 2uestion the longer-term wisdom of such a move. In a ition, Iran has been ramping up its covert operations an asymmetric assets, emonstrating an ability to respon in kin if provoke . 3. The impact of parallel measures, especially cyber warfare and far-reaching sanctions, may persuade Israel to postpone a strike. One in icator of their success has been Iran1s eman for upfront sanctions relief uring the 3551 talks. A further in icator woul be cuts in Iranian fun ing of Bashar al-Assa 1s regime in Syria. 4. Upcoming elections in ashington, Jerusalem and Tehran will set the stage for what transpires in 2013. The Obama-Romney US presi ential race remains tightly conteste . A Barack Obama re-election will most likely favour the ongoing mix of iplomacy an sanctions, but a 8itt Romney victory will not necessarily entail war uring the first half of 2013. That sai , mounting threats from Israel an the Unite States 9 notably if Benjamin Netanyahu an Romney are at the helm 9 will tip the balance in Tehran further in favour of regime har liners an the powerful Revolutionary :uar s. This coul increase the longer-term likelihoo of escalation, miscalculation an , ultimately, arme conflict. 5. Israelçs &special relationship' with the United States and its confidence in Obamaçs pledge to prevent a nuclear Iran is a central national security pillar. Although this confi ence is currently unclear, the longer-term ramifications on bilateral relations ren er a unilateral strike in the assesse six month perio unlikely. Conversely, if it continues to cry ,wolf- an overplays its han , Israel may yet corner itself into a strike in or er to maintain its eterrence cre ibility. 1. Israel1s regional threat calculus Israel faces the prospect of a highly hostile Iranian regime on the verge of becoming nuclear. That Tehran has repeate ly calle for the removal of that ,cancerous tumour [Israel]- an is believe to be the principal state sponsor of terrorist attacks against Israelis throughout the worl ren ers it an unacceptable threat for most within the Israeli government. Whether Iran woul initiate a nuclear attack epen s on the rationality of its lea ership. While the Islamic Republic has repeate ly invoke resistance rhetoric as a front for its regional lea ership aspirations, certain critical ecisions over the past three eca es were clearly governe by realpolitik an the pursuit of regime survival. 8oreover, Israel is thought to possess some 200-300 nuclear warhea s an a secon strike capability, which a rational Iran woul not ignore. On the other han , Iranian nuclear parity coul egra e Israel1s regional strategic manoeuvrability, embol en Tehran an spark a regional arms race. As things stan , the Iran-le ,resistance axisè (Lebanese .ezbollah, Assa 1s Syria, assorte Ira2i Shia groups an 3alestinian rejectionist factions inclu ing 3alestinian Islamic Jiha an , until recently, .amas) is situate in a verse circumstances. Iran is foun ering un er sanctions, yet it has alrea y injecte some USB12 billion in lethal an non-lethal support to keep Assa 1s regime afloat. .ezbollah1s arsenal, specifically its Iranian-manufacture rocket an missile stockpiles, epen s heavily on overlan transfers via Syria. The recent assassination in Beirut of a lea ing Lebanese security figure is putting heat on Syria 9 an conceivably .ezbollah 9 for its perceive involvement. An .amas has taken pains to issociate itself from all three. Elsewhere, however, the region1s emerging strategic balance cannot yet be fully iscerne . An exception to this is the ascen ancy of Sunni Islamists, Salafists an the 8uslim Brotherhoo in omestic politics, prominently in Libya, Tunisia an Egypt. In parallel, jiha ist militant groups fre2uently linke to al-0ae a are believe not only to be gaining groun in 8uslim Africa, Demen, an Ira2 but closing in on Israel1s bor ers via the Syrian :olan an the increasingly lawless Sinai 3eninsula. Egypt an Turkey, two of Israel1s key erstwhile regional allies, have become ambivalent, the one following the presi ential election of a former 8uslim Brother, an the other owing to Ankara1s series of spats with Israel over the 200E-09 :aza War (Operation Cast Lea A an the 8ay 2010 boar ing by Israeli comman os of the :aza-boun 8G 8avi 8armara. Even Jor an1s mi -term stability has been cast in oubt as it attempts to intro uce across-the-boar reforms while resisting pressures to evolve into a constitutional monarchy. Since last year, three prime ministers have been fire . Furthermore, the Islamic Action Front, the political arm of the 8uslim Brotherhoo with significant support bases among the 3alestinian majority, is now the largest opposition group. Open Briefing | 2 Israel1s present bor ers are therefore more sensitive than usual. Iespite in ications of Sunni-Shia antagonisms worsening, evi ence inclu ing the ,Bin La en filesè (files remove by US Navy SEALs from the Abbottaba compoun A now suggests a growing strategic alliance, however awkwar , between Shiite Iran an Sunni jiha ists beginning with al-0ae a. Since it is impossible to confi ently ascertain the Iranian lea ershipJs true intentions, Israel must an will continue taking its threats at face value. But regional uncertainty will warrant painstaking caution. 2. The balance of forces The Israel Air Force is capable of a well-orchestrate strike on Iran1s nuclear facilities, even without US support (assuming unproblematic flight routes). It possesses some 500 aircraft, inclu ing F-16 variants, F- 16Is (SufaA an F-15Is (RaJamA 9 the primary platforms to be eploye in interceptor (top coverA an groun -attack missions 9 as well as early warning/comman an control aircraft. Their inventory of refuelling craft is, however, uncertain an either the use of airbases near Iran (such as in AzerbaijanA or highly innovative bu y refueling techni2ues may be necessary. Among the explosive or nance a apte for such a mission, Israel also possesses approximately 100 US- ma e laser-gui e :BU-2E Mbunker-busters" capable of penetrating seven metres of concrete or over 30 metres of earth, although this is still ina e2uate for eeper sites like For o that re2uire the :BU-5N 8assive Or nance 3enetrator. An alternative might be envisage in some kin of electromagnetic pulse attack. 8ore importantly, the Israeli Iefense Forces boasts some 150 Jericho-class ballistic missiles esigne to carry nuclear payloa s. This inclu es the multiple warhea Jericho-III ICB8, with an estimate range (5,000-12,000 kilometres) that encompasses much of Eurasia. Alternatively, the shorter-range Jericho-IIs coul also be fitte with bunker-buster munitions. Offshore, the Israeli navy maintains a secon strike capability via cruise missiles carrie by its han ful of Iolphin-class/Type-212 submarines. IranJs air force oes not match up to IsraelJs. Its flight complement currently comprises some 300 plus semi-reliable pre-19N9 US attack craft (F-14s, F-4I/Es 3hantoms an F-5s) an both Russian (8I:-29, SU-24 an SU-25A an Chinese mo els (F-N8/8I:-21A. Its air efence systems comprise a mixture of surface-to-air systems, the more notable of which are the SA-15 :auntlet (Tor-81A an the 3antsir-S1E. It has not yet been able to ac2uire the potent S-300 anti-ballistic missile system from Russia though an remains keenly aware of the nee to either purchase or evelop a similar platform, likely with Chinese support. .owever, the Iranian Revolutionary :uar Corps (IR:CA comman s potent offensive capabilities. These inclu e one or two missile briga es, each consisting of 12-1E Shahab-1 an /or Shahab-2 missile launchers, an up to 12 a itional launchers for the Shahab-3 me ium-range ballistic missile (8RB8A with a maximum reporte range of 1,930 kilometres. The latter are able to eliver multiple nuclear warhea s an hence are of primary concern to Israel. Shahab-3s loa e with biological an chemical agents woul also complicate an Israeli intercept, particularly in the terminal phase of escent, because of the obvious risks presente by owning such missiles over Israeli territory. Iran also maintains an arsenal of :ha r-110 8RB8s with a range of 1,E00-2,000 kilometres an an even faster set-up time than the Shahab-3.
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