A Short History of the Iranian Drone Program

Home , Alireza Sabahifard, Ali Fadavi, Amir (Iranian Army), Azad News Agency, Basir, Fars News Agency

MICHAEL RUBIN AUGUST 2020

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE Executive Summary

he 1980–88 Iran-Iraq War was a formative The third is the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) Tevent for the Islamic Republic of Iran. The sur- fleet, the focus of this report. While Iranian UAVs prise Iraqi invasion caught Iran’s revolutionary have been, until recently at least, among the least pub- regime unprepared. In the last decade of his rule, the licized Iranian asymmetric tools, they are among the ousted shah centered the Iranian military around Islamic Republic’s oldest, in service now for 35 years. big ticket items such as F-14 Tomcats, M60 tanks, The Iranian military utilizes its UAV fleet for two and AH-1 SuperCobra helicopters. At the time of the main purposes: surveillance and attack. Over the revolution, however, not only did many Iranian pilots last decade, Iranian UAV platforms for both pur- choose not to return to their homeland from training poses have expanded tremendously with not only ranges abroad but some of the equipment purchased the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps but also the by Iran also got stuck overseas. The Islamic Republic’s regular Iranian military and civil authorities gaining inability to purchase spare parts from Western sup- access to Iranian-made drones tailored for their spe- pliers further undercut its ability to defend itself over cific needs and mission sets. Whereas once, Iran did subsequent years. little more than attach cameras or grenades to rudi- As a result, both during and after the Iran-Iraq mentary drones that were limited both by weather War, Iranian authorities doubled down on indige- and line of sight to their controllers, today Iranian nous military industry so as not to become reliant on controllers can pilot drones for hours at a time over any overseas power and asymmetric technologies to hundreds of miles utilizing GPS coordinates. That bypass the fact that they no longer had access to the said, Iranian claims to have reverse engineered cap- most modern, expensive platforms on which many of tured US drones appear exaggerated, as do some their adversaries relied. In practice, there have been Iranian claims about the utility of their drones in the three main pillars to the Islamic Republic asymmetric fight against the Islamic State. military response. That said, whether for surveillance or attack, The first is naval. After what for Iran was a disas- the United States and its regional partners cannot trous confrontation with the US Navy in April 1988, afford to dismiss the threats posed by Iran’s drone Iranian authorities recognized that neither the Iranian fleet. Iranian forces have successfully demonstrated Navy nor the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps their ability to utilize drones to infiltrate Saudi air Navy could defeat the US Navy head-on. Instead defenses, stay aloft to find and hit targets of oppor- Iranian authorities began to rely on speedboats to tunity in Syria, and undermine adversary defenses by harass and swarm the larger, more expensive ships. using drone swarms in Yemen. The second is the ballistic missile program. Iran’s A broader concern, however, is not only Iran’s increasing investment in longer-range and more pre- provision of UAVs to proxy groups in Iraq and cise ballistic missiles compensates for the regime’s Lebanon but also its transfer of the capability airpower deficiencies and enables Iran in theory to manufacture drones to them. This buys both to strike far beyond its borders without the need Iran and its proxies plausible deniability as, when to invest in a top-tier air force. Any nuclear war- drones are utilized against US interests or those of head capability would only enhance this asymmetric US allies, there will be a question mark about who ability further. ordered their attack. Proliferation of Iranian drones

1 also raises the possibility that they might endanger Simply put, Iranian drones are here to stay. The civilian air and ship traffic across the Middle East, threat they pose cannot be underestimated, and but they could also become tools for terrorists they will remain part of the operational environment further abroad. across the Middle East for decades to come.

2 A SHORT HISTORY OF THE IRANIAN DRONE PROGRAM MICHAEL RUBIN A Short History of the Iranian Drone Program

Michael Rubin

he 21st century is shaping up to be the century to leapfrog centuries of military stagnation and bypass Tof the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Military an investment in military man power that it could not strategists have understood the UAV’s potential for realistically afford to embrace the latest military tech- decades, but their use has become increasingly public nology. Later, Mohammad Reza Shah, who ruled Iran against the backdrop of conflict in Afghanistan, Iraq, from 1941 until his 1979 ouster, embraced the same Libya, Syria, Yemen, and even Saudi Arabia.1 While spirit. He established a nuclear program in 1957 and, many drone technologies remain classified, their capa- despite US entreaties, began to experiment with laser bilities have been featured in popular culture, mak- enrichment and plutonium reprocessing in the next ing appearances in Hollywood blockbusters such as decade. Such efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon The Bourne Identity, Syriana, and Thirteen Days. Allies came to naught, but in his last decade, he pushed and adversaries across the globe have quickly grasped forward to construct what was then a state-of-the- their potential. Whereas just over 20 countries used art air force. When the shah fell, Iran may still drones at the turn of the century, today that number have been a third-world country, but it possessed a has quintupled.2 More than a dozen have used them first-world military. in combat.3 That changed quickly with the Islamic Revolu- That the Islamic Republic of Iran saw the drone’s tion, the officer purges it heralded, and the 1980–88 potential and moved early to fold it into its arsenal Iran-Iraq War. A host of international sanctions fur- should not be a surprise. While historically Iran has ther devastated the Iranian military. No longer able not been an incubator for new technology, it has to purchase big-ticket platforms to keep up with rival always been quick to adopt it. Whereas Sunni reli- Gulf Cooperation Council militaries, Iranian officials gious clergy regularly condemned new technologies, sought to capitalize on cheap, indigenous alternatives Shi’ite leaders in Iran (or Persia as it was called before and asymmetric strategies. For example, unable to 1935) often embraced it. Iran was among the first compete against the US Navy with big surface ships, countries outside the United States and Europe to the Iranian military developed a naval doctrine depen- embrace telegraphy, laying its first lines just a decade dent on swarming small boats.5 after its invention and well before many European It was against this backdrop that Iran first countries did. began experimenting with UAVs. Iran launched the Nasir al-Din Shah, Iran’s ruler through the latter Mohajer-1 in 1985 and began experimenting with the half of the 19th century, quickly understood that the Ababil-1 the following year.6 It used both to spy on communications benefits mitigated the military gap Iraqi movements and positions behind the World that Iran was experiencing at the time in the face of War I–style trenches that marked the front line. growing British and Russian challenges. Iran adopted Then, in 1988, the US Navy devastated Iran’s air force quickly both to radio and television even while other and navy in a skirmish that quickly morphed into the regional countries lagged behind.4 The shah sought largest surface naval engagement since World War II.7

3 A SHORT HISTORY OF THE IRANIAN DRONE PROGRAM MICHAEL RUBIN

In its aftermath, Iranian strategists understood they Emirates and Turkey. It was a lot easier to smuggle could not hope to confront the United States directly smaller electronic components for a drone than larger by sea. Drones, however, were relatively inexpensive computers or nuclear or ballistic missile parts. and had broad utility. The Iranian investment took off. The Iranian government has made little secret of its turn toward UAVs. While the war was a stalemate Iran’s Ballooning Drone Program and the cease-fire ending it was akin to drinking “a chalice of poison” in the words of Iranian revolution- Much of the manufacturing of Iranian UAVs remains ary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Iranian indigenous. While Iranian officials spoke openly government found its drones a silver lining around about upgrading the Ababil in 1990, Iran’s UAV pro- which to rally its beleaguered and war-weary popu- gram remained relatively uniform, relying on just a lation.8 Indeed, in 1990, Mohammad Khatami, then couple models. This began to change in 2009, when the Islamic Republic’s minister of culture and Islamic Iran developed the Karrar prototype and then quickly guidance, promoted a mass-market movie Mohajer, unveiled several new UAV platforms. which depicted a drone division taking out Iraqi Qods Aeronautics Industries makes the Mohajer targets during the Iran-Iraq War. and Saeqeh drones, while Iran Aircraft Manufac- In subsequent years, as the Islamic Republic turing Industrial Company produces the Ababil.11 sought to regroup and rebuild, it continued to However, while companies affiliated with the labor under sanctions. On January 19, 1984, the economic wing of the Islamic Revolutionary US Department of State formally designated Iran Guards Corps (IRGC) might assemble UAVs, Iran a state sponsor of terrorism, leading to a ban on still appears dependent on technology produced defense exports and controls over exports of abroad. Israeli officials, for example, said the dual-use items. The United Kingdom and many Ayoub drone, which sought to penetrate the air- European Union member states suspended diplo- space above Israel’s nuclear complex at Dimona, matic relations with Iran after Khomeini issued a was actually manufactured by the German company 1989 fatwa demanding the death of British author Siemens and Bockstiegel and purchased by an IRGC Salman Rushdie after he published The Satanic front company.12 Hezbollah’s Star Holding Group Verses, a book Khomeini considered blasphemous. also appears involved in drone development and Beginning in 1995, US President Bill Clinton used acquisition of parts.13 executive orders to augment sanctions on Iran, pro- Iran has also sought to bypass sanctions to acquire hibiting trade and transshipment of key goods to materials to build lightweight motors. In 2008, the Iran.9 The 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act further US State Department warned that Qods Aviation was empowered the US government to take action trying to use French intermediaries to purchase light- against private companies doing business in Iran.10 weight German engines for use in the Iranian UAV More recently, the United Nations imposed an arms program.14 The US Embassy in Berlin quickly deliv- embargo on Iran as part of Resolution 2231 (2015), ered a démarche to German authorities warning them which incorporated agreements included in the Joint about the Iranian efforts.15 Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Iranian In 2013, German prosecutors charged a German- nuclear deal. Iranian dual citizen and an Iranian man with the As Iran found external markets closed or expensive, alleged illegal export of 61 aircraft engines to use in drones became a comparatively cheap technology Iran’s drone program.16 Likewise, the US District that Iranian engineers could develop indigenously. Court for the District of Columbia indicted Australian What the Iranian program could not develop, it could national David Levick and his company ICM Compo- seek to acquire by leveraging businessmen in the nents for scheming to export drones and other tech- diaspora or third countries such as the United Arab nology to Iran.17

4 A SHORT HISTORY OF THE IRANIAN DRONE PROGRAM MICHAEL RUBIN

Regardless of how the Iranian military has man- • Kaman. The Iranian Army’s Air Force unveiled aged to manufacture and acquire UAVs, one thing the Kaman-12 in April 2019. The drone has a is certain: The military has an impressive arsenal. speed of about 125 miles per hour, can fly for While there is a divergence between the capabilities about 10 hours, and has a 620-mile operating announced and reality, the Iranian military has begun radius, carrying payloads of approximately using UAVs regularly for reconnaissance and attack, 220 pounds. The Iranian military claims the both within Iranian borders and abroad. drone can conduct combat operations with Today, various elements of the Iranian military fly point-and-shoot missiles or be fitted for elec- perhaps a dozen different UAV models, many of which tronic warfare and reconnaissance.22 include three or four variants, and Iranian authorities claim to have developed even more models, although • Karrar. In 2010, the Iranian Defense Ministry some appear more aspirational than real. Here are unveiled the Karrar “striker,” which it claimed just a few of the most prominent UAV models that had a 600-mile range.23 The Karrar, according Iranian authorities have unveiled in their media or to press accounts, was capable of launching two allowed to be photographed during exercises. C-705 cruise missiles or carrying 500-pound guided bombs. Not long after, Hezbollah • Ababil. The first Ababil prototype was devel- deployed a suicide drone, likely a Karrar, which oped in the 1980s, and the IRGC began mass pro- could be directed to crash into a target. 24 ducing it in 1986. In 1990, it underwent a major redesign. Today, the prototype is manufactured • Kian. In September 2019, Army Commander by the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Alireza Sabahifard, commander of the army’s Company, an IRGC-run company. Initially, how- air defense force, announced two Kian-type ever, the Ababil was constrained by a need to drones, one designed for speed as an intercep- operate within line of sight of its ground sta- tor and another for reconnaissance, specifically tion, usually no more than a few dozen miles.18 for the air defense force. The Kian drones use Today, Iranian outlets claim the Ababil-3 has jet engines and can reportedly fly more than an eight-hour flight endurance and a maximum 600 miles at a flight ceiling of 15,000 feet.25 ceiling of 15,000 feet. • Meraj. The IRGC unveiled its latest surveillance • Fotros. Produced by the Iran Aviation Indus- drone in September 2019. Weighing 72 pounds, tries Organization, the Fotros was designed it can carry an additional 11-pound load for up to as an air-to-surface missile platform, capable 10 hours at altitudes of up to 12,000 feet. While of flying 25,000 feet with an operational range its flight range is in theory 620 miles, its link con- of approximately 1,250 miles and flight time of nection has only one-sixth of that range. While approximately 30 hours.19 In November 2013, manufactured in Iran, the Meraj appears to Minister of Defense Hossein Dehghan identified have been heavily inspired by the US-produced the Fotros as among his ministry’s top successes Aerosonde drone used elsewhere for both sur- since Rouhani had come into office.20 veillance and weather.26

• Hamaseh. First mentioned in May 2013, little is • Mohajer. Alongside the Ababil, the Mohajer known about the Hamaseh, which the Iranian was the earliest indigenous Iranian UAV line. press says will be used for reconnaissance. At Iran developed the first prototype in 1985, and its unveiling, however, it had one 107 millime- it was first used later that year. While Iranian ter (mm) rocket strapped under each wing.21 forces used it mostly to take photos of Iraqi strongholds, it was also Iran’s first weaponized

5 A SHORT HISTORY OF THE IRANIAN DRONE PROGRAM MICHAEL RUBIN

UAV. When the Mohajer-4 was unveiled in a combat range of 1,050 miles, and a flight ceil- September 2014, Iran’s deputy defense minister ing of 24,000 feet.32 The Shahed-133 can carry bragged it could shoot down helicopters, fighter two bombs and take off vertically from tactical jets, and cruise missiles.27 The Mohajer-4, now vehicles.33 In 2019, the Iranian military unveiled built by the Qods Aviation Industries, report- videos of a newer Shahed-191 variant, which it edly has a 10-horsepower engine capable of said was modeled after the RQ-170 and capable 6,500 foot flight ceiling at a maximum 75 miles of flying nearly 200 miles per hour with a flight per hour.28 It has become a mainstay of the duration of more than four hours, a range of regular army’s ground forces. In April 2017, the 280 miles, a flight ceiling of 40,000 feet, and a IRGC unveiled the Mohajer-6, which the IRGC payload capacity of 110 pounds.34 announced undertook its firstcross-border combat mission in July 2019.29 The Iranian Navy • Sarir. The Iranian press first mentioned the has also announced its own version of the drone Sarir in April 2013, claiming it was a stealth UAV configured to better operate from ships and will capable of surveillance via photo and video and reportedly use them to extend the ship’s missile equipped with air-to-air missiles. Iranian sources detection and carry weaponry.30 The Talash, a compare the Sarir to Israel’s RQ-5 Hunter. variation of the Mohajer, is a cheap UAV model that Iranian officials mostly use to train new • Saegheh. Not to be confused with the fighter jet pilots and harass the enemy who may spot the of the same name, the Saegheh drone was first Talash and take cover believing it to be a more mentioned in the Iranian press in May 2010. lethal mode. Produced by the Qods Aeronautics Industries, the Saegheh is among the fastest Iranian UAVs • Nazir. First mentioned in August 2014, not with a maximum speed of 250 kilometers per much is known about the Nazir, or “observer.” hour. In theory, the Saegheh has a flight endur- It appears to be an unmanned helicopter that ance of 90 minutes and functions as a kamikaze Iran mostly uses for surveillance. drone, but it most often features as an aerial target in Iranian military exercises. • Raad. First mentioned in 2013, the Raad-85 is Iran’s first “kamikaze drone.” Its combat range • Siraf. First mentioned against the backdrop is likely only 60 miles, although some reports of the May 2016 Beit-ol-Moqaddas 28 military suggest it can reach more than twice that.31 It is exercise held in Iran’s central Isfahan prov- produced by the Qods Aviation Industry, which, ince, the 60-mile-range Siraf UAV, designed by according to the annex to UN Security Council students at the College of the Ground Forces Resolution 1747, is an IRGC entity. Artillery Training Center, can take digital images and transmit them in real time via a satellite • Shahed. The Shahed appears to be the mainstay network to command posts.35 While Sirafs are workhorse of the IRGC’s UAV fleet. While var- not yet equipped with laser targeting systems, ious sources mention model numbers 121 and these in theory could be installed during their 123, the Shahed-129 appears to be the culmina- next upgrade.36 tion of the line. Unveiled in September 2012, Iranian officials have claimed the Shahed-129 • Sofreh Mahi. Iran claimed in 2010 that it had has a 1,250-mile range over which the UAV can created a radar-evading drone and unveiled conduct reconnaissance or carry out strikes the Sofreh Mahi in February 2011. Operated by with bombs or up to eight Sadid-1 missiles. It the regular army’s air force, the Sofreh Mahi is reportedly has a flight endurance of 24 hours, primarily a surveillance drone that Iranian

6 A SHORT HISTORY OF THE IRANIAN DRONE PROGRAM MICHAEL RUBIN

officials claim can transmit video in real time as Iran. Iran is six times the size of Great Britain, back to a control room. or about the combined size of California, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington. The • Yasir. Unveiled in September 2013, the Iranian Zagros Mountains straddle the border with Iraq, press claims the Yasir was the result of reverse while the high Alborz chain—capped by 19,000-foot engineering the ScanEagle downed over Iran Damavand—stretches across northern Iran. The 10 months earlier. While Iranian military offi- southern frontier with Iraq is marked by malarial cials say their Yasir is a “totally stealth” UAV, swamps and oppressive heat and humidity. Badlands this seems to be an exaggeration, as it is not and rugged hills mark the Sistan and Baluchistan clear that the Yasir is actually operational. That regions near the border of Pakistan and along the said, Iranian officials claim the Yasir has a flight Arabian Sea. endurance of eight hours, a combat radius of While the Iranian army focuses on territorial 200 kilometers, and a ceiling of approximately defense, IRGC statutes task that elite unit with 5,000 meters. defense of the revolution, whether enemies are foreign or domestic. Hence, it is natural that both wings Iranian drone development continues apace as of the Iranian military embraced UAVs enthusiasti- the Iranian military upgrades existing platforms cally to secure key infrastructure and the border. and develops new models. In April 2016, Gen. Amir In September 2013, Hajizadeh suggested that while Ali Hajizadeh, commander of the IRGC Air Force, the Shahed-129 could have external military applica- announced that Iran has upgraded drones to take bility, it would be used mostly “inside Iran, to pro- advantage of satellite-based GPS technology. As tect international waters, and in the borders and Mashregh News, an IRGC media outlet, explained, central desert.”39 In September 2013, IRGC Commander Mohammad With the use of such systems, not only are com- Ali Jafari defined the Shahed-129’s role as “protect- manders able to have much better insight into such ing the Islamic homeland’s vast borders whether matters such as the presence of friendly forces, but confronting bandits or any other insecurities.”40 they are also able to communicate better with them, Six weeks later, Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan and they are also able to deliver bombs and missiles said that Iran would use its new Fotros UAV to “pro- with much greater accuracy.37 tect our land, maritime borders, and oil pipelines.”41 In an April 2016 press conference, Gen. Ahmad The Iranian military’s embrace of drones has Reza Pourdestan, army ground force commander, become so public that, in recent years, Iranian remarked, “Right now, UAVs and perimeter sur- authorities have sponsored contests in which sev- veillance radar have been provided to border units” eral dozen teams from universities and military units as part of their complement of equipment.42 The compete to find hidden markers over both land and army has also used UAVs to monitor the entrance of sea. In one instance, teams even race around Mount religious pilgrims into Iran.43 Damavand, which, at approximately 19,000 feet, is Aerial surveillance is an important capability Iran’s highest peak.38 for Iran, especially in its southeast. Ethnic and sectarian tension are rife in Baluchistan, whose indigenous population is a minority twice over: How Iran Uses Drones Not only are they ethnically Baluch rather than Persian, but they are also Sunni in a state that Iran uses drones for two main purposes: surveillance upholds Shi’ism as paramount. As such, the group and attack. Surveillance can be a huge challenge for has suffered among the most severe repression of a country as large as and with as inhospitable terrain any Iranian minority.

7 A SHORT HISTORY OF THE IRANIAN DRONE PROGRAM MICHAEL RUBIN

In 1993, groups supportive of the Iranian govern- Not every surveillance application is military. In ment seized and, in some cases, destroyed several Sunni February 2015, the IRGC held exercises in Tehran mosques. Many Baluchi Sunni leaders have died under to test drones for search-and-rescue purposes, an suspicious circumstances. In March 1996, for exam- important capability given the combination of harsh ple, Iranian operatives killed Molavi Abdul Malek, an terrain in parts of Iran and a history of devastating Iranian Baluch Sunni cleric, in Karachi, Pakistan.44 Ter- earthquakes throughout the country.52 That the IRGC rorist bombings struck the region in 2000 and again in rather than nonmilitary first responders maintains 2005.45 Two years later, a bomb destroyed a bus carry- the technology, however, might show Iranian gov- ing revolutionary guardsmen, killing almost a dozen.46 ernment distrust of such surveillance technology in After Baluchi separatists killed 14 Iranian border guards nonmilitary hands. and captured three others in October 2013, the Iranian Passive defense, however, is only one Iranian goal. government responded by hanging 16 Baluch.47 “Our drones are usually intelligence, eavesdropping, Traditional counterinsurgency went nowhere. and recording types but they could be used for other With no oil and little possible in the way of agricul- purposes,” Adm. Farhad Amiri, the military’s deputy ture, Baluchistan is now a center of smuggling and for industrial research and self-sufficiency, explained drug trade, a chief transit point for opium produced in 2011. “For example, we need long-range drones in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Roads are few and far for the Navy’s distant operations and we need UAVs between and generally in poor condition. Simply put, capable of firing missiles.”53 the central government has for decades been unable Increasingly, the Iranian government is emphasiz- to cement its authority in the region. This may now be ing its drones’ military capabilities. Here, “kamikaze changing as UAVs give central authorities a leg up on drones” play an important role. Suicide—or mar- the restive population for the first time. In 2016, the tyrdom in the religious context—has long played a IRGC, using the Shahed-129 surveillance drones, said central, symbolic role in post-revolutionary Iranian it put the southeastern borders with Afghanistan and military doctrine. During the Iran-Iraq War, the para- Pakistan under complete control.48 military Basij sent hundreds, if not thousands, of While Baluchistan (alongside Iranian Kurdistan) unarmed young teens running across battlefields to might be the Iranian government’s chief insurgency sweep for mines. concern, the presence of US forces in the Persian Gulf Iran once used suicide bombers to strike deep into is the Islamic Republic’s chief strategic concern.49 enemy territory directly or, more frequently, by proxy. Here, too, the Iranian military has pressed UAVs The problem with such attacks, however, is find- into surveillance. In September 2015, for example, ing cadre willing to commit suicide. Not only does Hossein Salari, commander of the IRGC Ground age temper revolutionary ideology, but demography Forces, bragged in a television interview, “We are able also affects the availability of volunteers. Because the to photograph all [American] movements around the birth rate in Iran is only half of what it was during the Persian Gulf, the Sea of Oman, parts of the Indian Iran-Iraq War, the Iranian government recognizes Ocean and elsewhere.”50 it cannot assume an endless supply of young men Alongside the surveillance and counterinsurgency willing to take their own lives in pursuit of religious utility of UAVs is their psychological function. Iranian or revolutionary ideals. Hence, the idea of a suicide leaders hope UAVs can be used to intimidate those drone that can dive and detonate on targets of oppor- who do not possess any, be they Kurdish and Baluch tunity is increasingly attractive to Iranian strategists. insurgents or some neighboring states who do not This was a capability that Iranian authorities have a broad array of drones. As Brig. Gen. Amir quickly moved from the drawing board to the bat- Mehrabi, Iranian Army deputy for ground operations, tlefield. In October 2015, five Iranian Ra’ad sui- said, “The UAV unit is in part responsible for psycho- cide drones struck an Ahrar Ash-Sham base in logical war, too.”51 Syria’s Idlib province.54 Hassan Abu Hamid, a Syrian

8 A SHORT HISTORY OF THE IRANIAN DRONE PROGRAM MICHAEL RUBIN

opposition commander, stated matter-of-factly that In a March 2019 exercise, for example, the IRGC Iran normally uses its suicide drones “to target mil- launched drones to strike 50 targets simultaneously.59 itary gatherings and to kill a greater number at those Increasingly, Iran is also turning to drones for elec- gatherings.”55 He also said that Iranian drones gener- tronic warfare. During May 2016 military exercises, ally film the target area at around 75 meters before Brig. Gen. Amir Mehrabi, Iranian Army deputy for dive bombing on whatever target its controllers sub- ground operations, said that “the special task done by sequently identify.56 The Ahrar al-Sham commander the UAV unit in these exercises was to use them in observed that each suicide drone had the destructive areas of electronic warfare and also to jam [transmis- force of an 82 mm mortar round but with a higher sions] in the area.”60 fragmentation rate.57 Almost all branches of the Iranian military seem The September 14, 2019, Iranian cruise missile to have recognized the value of drones for their own and drone attack on Saudi Aramco’s Abqaiq facil- specific needs. Brig. Gen. Hossein Salami, deputy ity demonstrated Iran’s capability. Abqaiq was per- commander of the IRGC, said, “The IRGC Air Force haps the world’s largest crude oil stabilization plant. focuses on the development of ballistic and cruise That it was struck at 4:00 a.m. and successfully missiles as well as drones, while the regular air force knocked offline showed the sophistication of Iran’s focuses on manned fighters.”61 In May 2014, Brig. Gen. UAV navigation and its ability to penetrate deep into Ali Fadavi, commander of the IRGC Navy, declared, enemy territory. “We have established drone bases in the east, west, Suicide drones do not require the same techni- and north of the Strait [of Hormuz] and are conduct- cal sophistication as the well-armed predators that ing constant flights over the area as well as north of Iranian officials have claimed to have developed. Still, the Persian Gulf.”62 That might have been hyperbole, they can be quite effective. Every US aircraft carrier but Iran has apparently built a drone base at Jask, an and landing helicopter deck operates helicopters car- Iranian naval base on the Arabian Sea, from which rying rescue divers that hover or patrol slowly just a Iranian drones can operate far out into the Arabian few kilometers port or starboard of the ship and can Sea and cover the Strait of Hormuz.63 be vulnerable to suicide drones. Packed with explo- Adm. Habibollah Sayyari, head of Iran’s regular sives, Iranian suicide drones could wreak havoc with navy, has also declared that UAV development is on international shipping in the Persian Gulf or Red Sea. the navy’s agenda.64 And Fadavi subsequently said Any Iranian attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz, the drone force would become “one of the pillars of for example, might involve kamikaze drones rather the IRGC-Navy’s combat power.”65 By 2019, drone than mines. possession also extended to the regular, non-elite Even absent explosives, an Iranian willingness to Iranian armed forces.66 collide drones with helicopters and jet fighters could hamper both routine military and civilian aviation along Iran’s borders. Indeed, on January 12, 2016, Forward Deployment of Drones Iranian state television underscored this point by showing footage of an Iranian drone flying over the The Islamic Republic has deployed drones abroad USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier.58 for its own use and provided them to proxies almost Whether armed with explosives or inert, Iranian as quickly as it produced them. Lebanese Hezbollah drones are also increasingly prominent in Iran’s first claimed the capability to field UAVs in 2004.67 asymmetric warfare strategy. Drones are far cheaper Just weeks later, the group flew aMirsad-1 UAV near to produce than the missiles or aircraft needed to the northern Israeli town of Nahariyya, the first shoot them down. Rather than rely on drones simply hostile penetration of Israeli airspace in 17 years.68 for surgical strikes, the IRGC has increasingly drilled It was the first instance of Iran or its allies sponsoring in swarming tactics and simultaneous operations. drone overflight of Israel, but not the last. Hezbollah

9 A SHORT HISTORY OF THE IRANIAN DRONE PROGRAM MICHAEL RUBIN

repeated the incursion the following year.69 Hassan crashed in Deir az-Zour, Syria, and several months Nasrallah, secretary general of Hezbollah, boasted later, a Turkish F-16 shot down a drone that violated that the Mirsad could reach “anywhere, deep, deep” Turkish airspace from Syria.81 Pictures of its wreck- into Israel.70 age seemed consistent with an Iranian Shahed-123 In 2006, during its brief war with Israel, Hezbollah drone.82 Five months later, the Syrian opposition sought to show that its rhetoric was not empty, send- claimed to have downed another drone, which, from ing Iranian-made Ababil UAVs into Israeli airspace pictures posted on Facebook, also appears to be three times. On October 6, 2012, the Israeli Air Force a Shahed-123.83 shot down a drone over the Negev desert, near the The Iranian military has also used and prolifer- town of Dimona, home to Israeli’s nuclear facil- ated its drones in Iraq. Tehran has reportedly given ity. Hezbollah claimed that the Ayoub surveillance Yasir drones, similar to the American ScanEagle, to drone belonged to it and had been supplied by Iran.71 Harakat Hizbullah al-Nujaba, a pro-Iranian militia Hajizadeh said, “Hezbollah intentionally designed the in Iraq.84 In addition, Jaafar al-Husseini, a spokes- path of the drone to bypass Zionist regime observa- man for Kata’ib Hezbollah, said his group has flown tion balloons, about which both Hezbollah and Iran Basir-1 drones over Tikrit to collect information on have intelligence.”72 Iranian officials subsequently Islamic State movements.85 claimed they had received photos of the facility trans- In 2009, US-led forces downed an Ababil-3 overfly- mitted by drone.73 ing Iraqi airspace.86 The IRGC also used the Rasheed More recently, the IRGC has used drones in Syria. Air Base near Baghdad to direct drones over Iraq.87 “Shahed-129, a surveillance and combat drone, is There was a surge in Iranian drone activity over Iraq among the Iranian drones whose lethal fame has following the Islamic State capture of Mosul in June crossed our country’s borders and has made the ter- 2014, and in early January 2015, the Islamic State rorists in Syria desperate,” an IRGC website bragged.74 distributed photographs of a downed Mohajer-4 in The Bahraini government also reported that it recov- Jalawla near Kirkuk.88 ered an Iranian drone off its coast, a claim the Iranian Iran also appears to have sold the Mohajer-2 foreign ministry denied.75 design to Venezuela and the Ababil-3 to Sudan.89 It On February 8, 2013, Iran’s Deputy Defense has also reportedly provided drones to Armenia.90 Minister Mohammad Eslami stated outright that Iran On the sidelines of the 2015 Maks Air Show, Head of would proliferate the new technology to its proxies Iran’s Aviation Industries Organization Manouchehr and allies. “With the strategic depth that Iran pos- Manteghi even said that Russia had sought out sesses, our advancements and equipment will be Iranian drone technology, although this is likely useful to them.”76 Eslami said that Iran had exported an exaggeration.91 not only drones but also “factories and production capabilities,”77 a claim repeated by Hajizadeh.78 Hezbollah’s embrace of the Iranian drone goes Counter-Drone Operations beyond simple transfer of equipment or partnership with the IRGC. Sometime between February 27, 2013, Iranian officials know well that they are not alone and June 19, 2014, Hezbollah apparently constructed a in developing drones for their military and that just drone base in the Bekaa Valley approximately 10 kilo- as they use them against their adversaries, so too meters south of Hermel and about 18 kilometers from will many regional countries seek to deploy UAVs the Syrian border, which could accommodate the against Iran. It is not surprising, then, that the Islamic Ababil-3 or larger Shahed-129.79 Republic of Iran began counter-drone operations in The Syrian government also reportedly used 2007.92 In or around 2009, a European intelligence Iranian-built drones to direct fire against opposition source said that Iran had successfully blinded a CIA forces.80 In January 2015, an Iranian Mohajer-4B spy satellite with a laser burst, surprising Western

10 A SHORT HISTORY OF THE IRANIAN DRONE PROGRAM MICHAEL RUBIN

intelligence agencies that were unaware Iran had Brig. Gen. Ramezan Sharif testily responded, “I rec- developed such a capability.93 ommend the US commander accurately count his That same year, Iran reportedly shot down two drones once again. . . . Iran will release more informa- drones, and, in July, it showed Russian experts tion on the drone if deemed necessary.”104 a number of US drones it had downed.94 US law The truth of that incident may not soon be known, enforcement has also sought extradition of Jalal but in January 2013, RADM Amir Rastegari said that Rohollahnejad from France on charges that he sought Iran had stopped 30 incursion attempts by drones to smuggle anti-drone technology from the United and foreign aircraft in the vicinity of the Velayat-91 States to Iran.95 naval drills.105 And, in the wake of December 2014 war The most famous incident that may have demon- games, Gen. Amir Farzad Esmaili, the commander of strated an advanced Iranian counter-drone capabil- Iranian air defense, announced that Iranian forces ity occurred in December 2011, when an American had successfully demonstrated the ability to detect RQ-170 Sentinel, a stealth drone operated by the CIA, and destroy small drones.106 landed deep inside Iranian territory. American offi- Clearly, countering drones is a capability the cials say the drone went down because of a simple Iranian military increasingly strikes to master. Indeed, malfunction, but Iranian military officials say their the Islamic Republic’s relative success using drones hackers downed the drone.96 Specifically, an Iranian on offense have led its strategists to consider Iran’s engineer said the Iranian military first jammed own vulnerabilities should regional rivals develop the drone’s communication, causing it to shift to similar capabilities. The Iranian government increas- GPS-reliant autopilot, and then spoofed the GPS to ingly believes the threat real. fool it into landing inside Iran.97 This might have Early in 2016, a drone operating in restricted been possible had the UAV been programmed to fall airspace in Tehran triggered antiaircraft fire. The back on civilian GPS signals if military signals were Army Ground Forces’ Self-Sufficiency Research jammed.98 However, US officials say this was not the and Jihad Organization cited this incident, when in case with the RQ-170.99 Regardless, Iranian forces October 2019, it announced development of a multi- recovered the drone almost intact and claimed to layer “dome defense” to protect Iranian cities from have reverse engineered it.100 drones and other low-flying objects.107 While that is an exaggeration, Iranian engineers might have been able to extract some information or reverse some components with Russian and Conclusion Chinese assistance. While some of the subsequent Iranian claims were fanciful, the Iranian govern- Whereas the RAND Corporation speculated in 2014 ment did subsequently prove some success when that Iran might only want UAVs to compensate for it showed the video feed from one of the drone’s its antiquated air fleet, its continued embrace of the cameras.101 Iranian proxies, too, have demonstrated technology after the JCPOA lifted many sanctions such a capability. In 2009, Shi’ite militiamen in Iraq and started a countdown to the expiration of other downloaded live, unencrypted video from American sanctions suggests Iranian strategic interest in the Predator drones.102 UAV runs deeper.108 Indeed, the Iranian commit- The Iranian capture of a US drone is not a ment to expanding the quantity, diversity, and range one-time occurrence. In December 2012, Iranian offi- of its UAV fleet suggests a more deliberate, proactive cials claimed to have downed a US drone. Brig. Gen. investment rather than simply a strategy of last resort Esmail Kowsari said, “The unmanned aircraft took off embraced because sanctions blocked other pathways from a warship. The Americans will have no choice to military development. but to confirm that one of their drones is missing.”103 Iran’s UAV strategy is multifaceted. It seeks to When the United States Navy denied the claim, IRGC use drones to deter against other powers and groups

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opposing the established order inside Iran and to exaggerate the capabilities of their drone fleet,112 real- amplify Iran’s offensive and defensive capabilities. ity may soon catch up with Iranian rhetoric. Drones Iranian drones are cost-effective and can conduct and drone swarms will quickly become a fact of life surveillance better than manned aircraft. The biggest not only along Iran’s periphery and in the Persian weakness of Iranian drones, however, remains their Gulf but also in the Gulf of Aden and Eastern inability to defend themselves. As such, Iranian UAVs Mediterranean as the Iranian military exports its tech- still need manned fighter jets to provide cover over nology to terrorist proxy groups. Regional militaries, the battlefield or airspace.109 international shipping, and civilian aircraft should be Other problems affecting Iran’s drone fleet include on guard. technical reliability and issues as mundane as poor weather.110 However, as Iranian engineers continue to make advancements—most recently with GPS About the Author guidance and lightweight carbon fibers111—the Iranian military should be able to operate drones with Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American increasing confidence over larger expanses of land Enterprise Institute, where he specializes in Iran, and sea. While Iranian officials may therefore today Turkey, and the broader Middle East.

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Notes

1. Kendra L. B. Cook, “The Silent Force Multiplier: The History and Role of UAVs in Warfare” (conference paper, IEEE Aerospace Conference, Big Sky, MT, 2007); and Noel Sharkey, “The Automation and Proliferation of Military Drones and the Protection of Civil- ians,” Law, Innovation, and Technology 3, no. 2 (2011): 229–40. 2. Dan Gettinger, The Drone Databook, Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College, September 2019, https://dronecenter. bard.edu/files/2019/10/CSD-Drone-Databook-Web.pdf. 3. Gregory K. James, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Special Operations: Future Directions” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December, 2000), https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/7818; and Alyssa Sims, “The Consequences of Global Armed Drone Proliferation,” Diplomat, July 9, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/the-consequences-of-global-armed- drone-proliferation/. 4. Husayn Mahbubi Ardakani, “Tarikh-i Mu’assast-i Tamaddun-i Jadid dar Iran” [The History of the Institutions of Modern Institutions in Iran], Tehran: Anjuman-i Daneshjuyan-i Tehran, 1990. 5. Michael Connell, “Iran’s Military Doctrine,” in The Iran Primer, ed. Robin Wright (Washington, DC, United States Institute of Peace Press: 2010). 6. Mashregh News, “Negahi Beh Naqash Nashanakhteh ‘Talash; va ‘Mohajer’ dar Karbalaye-5 va Valfajr-8” [Taking a Look at Unknown Roles of ‘Talash and ‘Mohajer’ in Karbala-5 and Valfajr-8], October 2, 2011, www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/69193/ .8-رجفلاو-و-5-یالبرک-رد-رجاهم-و-شالت-هتخانشان-شقن-هب-یهاگن 7. Lee Allen Zatarain, Tanker War: America’s First Conflict with Iran, 1987–88 (Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2009), 205–40. 8. Robert Pear, “Khomeini Accepts ‘Poison’ of Ending the War with Iraq,” New York Times, July 21, 1988, http://www.nytimes. com/1988/07/21/us/khomeini-accepts-poison-of-ending-the-war-with-iraq-un-sending-mission.html. 9. Exec. Order No. 12,957, 3 C.F.R. 14,615 (1995); and Exec. Order No. 12,959, 3 C.F.R. 24,757 (1996). 10. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, H.R. 3107, 104th Cong. (1995–96). 11. Peter W. Singer, “A Revolution Once More: Unmanned Systems and the Middle East,” Brookings Institution, October 29, 2009, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/a-revolution-once-more-unmanned-systems-and-the-middle-east/. 12. Michal Shmulovich, “Hezbollah Drone Reportedly Manufactured in Germany,” Times of Israel, October 17, 2012, https://www. timesofisrael.com/hezbollahs-drone-reportedly-manufactured-in-germany-and-sold-to-iran-lebanese-paper-reports/. 13. Adam Rawnsley, “Like It or Not, Iran Is a Drone Power: Sanctions Have Not Stopped Tehran’s Robot Development,” War Is Boring, September 5, 2014, https://medium.com/war-is-boring/like-it-or-not-iran-is-a-drone-power-e9899c954a3f. 14. US State Department, “Iran’s UAV Program Seeking German-Origin Engines via French Intermediary,” WikiLeaks, December 24, 2008, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08STATE134297_a.html. 15. US Embassy Berlin, “Demarche Delivered: Continued Iranian Interest in Limbach UAV Engines,” WikiLeaks, January 7, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BERLIN14_a.html. 16. David Rising, “Germany Charges 2 with Selling Iran Drone Motors,” AP News, February 20, 2013, https://apnews. com/7220f389bd5649b09ecce148826b0edf. 17. US v. David Levick and ICM Components, Inc. (DC Ct. May 16, 2011). 18. Lynn E. Davis et al., “Armed and Dangerous? UAVs and U.S. Security,” RAND Corporation, 2014, https://www.rand.org/pubs/ research_reports/RR449.html. 19. Mehr News, “Qabiliyatha-ye Bozorgtarin Havapeyma-ye Bidun Sarbashin Keshvar” [The Country’s Largest Unmanned Aircraft], .ود-یتایلمع-عاعش-روشک-نیشنرس-نودب-یامیپاوه-نیرتگرزب-یاه-تیلباق/November 18, 2013, www.mehrnews.com/news/2177245 20. DefaPress.Ir, “Jaygah Mumtaz Sani’at Havaye Iran dar Jihan” [The Prominence of Iran’s Aviation Industry in the World], November 18, 2013, http://www.defapress.ir/Fa/News/6458.

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21. MilitaryNews.ir, “Hamaseh: Jadidtarin Pehpad-e Tahajami Sakht-e Iran” [Hamaseh: Newest Offensive UAV Produced by Iran], .اریا-تخاس-یمجاهت-داپهپ-نیرتدیدج-هسامح/April 12, 2016, www.militarynews.ir/2016/04/12 22. Donya-e Eqtesad, “In Pehpad Irani, Ostad-e Jang-e Havay-e Ast” [This Iranian Drone Is a Master of Air Warfare], April 9, 2019, .ریواصت-تسا-ییاوه-گنج-داتسا-یناریا-داپهپ-نیا-3640177/62-ناوخ-تیاس-شخب/https://donya-e-eqtesad.com 23. Fars News Agency, “Pehpadha-ye razme Iran be moshak-e mohjehaz mishavand” [Iran’s Combat UAVs Equipped with Missiles], September 2, 2012, https://web.archive.org/web/20120904014412/http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13910612000367. 24. Scott Shane, “Coming Soon: The Drone Arms Race,” New York Times, October 8, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/ sunday-review/coming-soon-the-drone-arms-race.html. 25. Euronews, “Pehpad-e Irani Kian Chehguneh Ast?” [What Is the Iranian Kian Drone?], September 4, 2019, https://per.euronews. com/2019/09/04/specifications-of-2-types-of-iran-kian-new-drones. 26. Tasnim News, “Film-e Ekhtisasi, Amaraj: Jadidtarin Pehpad Shenasayi Niru-ye Zamani Sepah” [Exclusive Movie, Meraj: The Latest IRGC Ground Forces Surveillance Drone], May 9, 2020, https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1399/02/20/2259537. 27. Adam Rawnsley, “Iran Has a Dogfighting Drone: It Probably Doesn’t Work Very Well,” War Is Boring, September 24, 2014, https:// medium.com/war-is-boring/iran-has-a-dogfighting-drone-e083c57440a8. 28. Ze’ev Schiff and Yoav Stern, “Report: Iran Admits Supplying Hezbollah with Eight Drones,” Haartez, November 11, 2004, https:// www.haaretz.com/1.4753206. 29. Tasnim News, “Avalin ‘Amaliyat Barunmarzi Mohajer-6 ba Bombha-ye Gha’im” [The First Overseas Operation of the Mohajer-6 with ‘Vertical’ Bombs], July 12, 2019, https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1398/04/21/2052437. 30. Tasnim News, “Nasl-e Jadid Pehpadha-ye Nizami Irani ‘Amaliyat-e Shod” [The New Generation of Iranian Military Drones Became Operational], November 29, 2019, https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1398/09/08/2149179. 31. Alsuriya.net, “Qa’ad ‘Askari l’Al-Suriya Net: 5 Ta’irat Intihariyet Iraniya Istikhadimat Dhad Ahdaf L’al-Ma’aridhiyeh barif Idlib” [Military Commander to al-Suriya.net: 5 Iranian Suicide Planes Used Against Opposition Targets Near Idlib], October 20, 2015. 32. Fars News Agency, “Model-e jadid Pehpad-e Sepah beh Samaneh ‘Ertebat-e Mohavareh-aye Mojhez Shod” [Latest IRGC UAV Model Is Equipped with Satellite Connection System], March 14, 2016, https://web.archive.org/web/20160315133027/http://www. farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13941219001306. 33. Mashregh News, “Iran Chehgoneh Saheb-e Bozorgtarin Navagan-e Pehpad Razmi Montagheh Shod?“ [How Did Iran Become the -بحاص-هنوگچ-ناریا/Owner of the Largest Fleet of UAVs in the Region?], June 7, 2020, https://www.mashreghnews.ir/news/1080777 .سکع-دش-هقطنم-یمزر-داپهپ-ناگوان-نیرتگرزب 34. Mashregh News, “Iran Chehgoneh Saheb-e Bozorgtarin Navagan-e Pehpad Razmi Montagheh Shod?” [How Did Iran Become the Owner of the Largest Fleet of UAVs in the Region?]. 35. Mashregh News, “Az ‘Amaliyati Shodan Tank Fallagh dar Razmayesh Nazaja ta Ravanmaye az Pehpad Siraf” [From Fallagh Tanks Entering an Operational Phase to the Unveiling of the Siraf Drone in Army Ground Force Exercises], May 23, 2016, http://www. .فاریس-داپهپ-زا-ییامنور-ات-اجازن-شیامزر-رد-قالف-کنات-ندش-یتایلمع-زا/mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/577898 36. Mashregh News, “Cheshm Tupkhanehha-ye Artesh ba Perandeh-haye ‘Siraf’ Motahul Shod” [Eye of the Army’s Artillery Was . چشم-توپخانه های-ارتش-با-پرندههای-سیراف-متحول-شد-عکس/Revolutionized by Siraf Birds], May 26, 2016, http://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/579226 37. Mashregh News, “Iran Chaharmen ‘Azu Bashgah Sazandgan ‘Pehpad Masaleh’ ba Hadayat Ma Havareha-ye dar Jahan Shod” [Iran Is the Fourth Member of the Satellite-Guided ‘Armed UAV’ Club], April 1, 2016, https://www.mashreghnews.ir/news/549591. 38. Adam Rawnsley, “Iran Runs Drone Development Competitions,” Wired, September 23, 2011, https://www.wired.com/2011/09/ iran-drone-competition/. 39. Fars News Agency, “Ba Yek Tamash va Lebkhand Namitavan Doshmani Amrika ra Faramush Kard” [Laughing and Smiling Won’t Make Us Forget the Enmity of America], September 29, 2013, http://farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13920707001478. 40. Fars News Agency, “Jadidtarin Balgerd Bidun Sarnashin Iranin Ravanmaye Shod” [Iran Unveils Newest Drone Helicopter], Mashregh News, Nvember 19, 2014, https://www.mashreghnews.ir/news/364047. 41. Mehr News Agency, “Ghabiliyatha-ye Bozorgtarin Havapeyma-ye bidun Sarnashin Keshavar,” [The Capabilities of Our Country’s .ود-یتایلمع-عاعش-روشک-نیشنرس-نودب-یامیپاوه-نیرتگرزب-یاه-تیلباق/Largest Unmanned Aircraft], November 18, 2013, www.mehrnews.com/news/2177245

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42. Shargh, “Farmandeh Niru-ye Zamini Artesh dar baraye ‘Azam Tip 65 Nohed beh Suriya” [Chairman of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army Ground Forces on Deploying 65th Nohed Brigade to Syria], April 12, 2016, http://www.sharghdaily.ir/News/90069. 43. Shargh, “Sarkub Harguneh Tahrek Zad Amniyate dar Morzha” [Suppressing Any Anti-Security Action], December 5, 2013, http:// www.sharghdaily.ir/News/80161. 44. US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Iran Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996,” January 30, 1997, https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/iran.html. 45. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iran Report: October 23, 2000,” https://www.rferl.org/a/1342899.html; and Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, “Iranian President Says Blasts Will Not Affect Election,” June 14, 2005, https://www.rferl.org/a/1059252.html. 46. Nazila Fathi, “Car Bomb in Iran Destroys a Bus Carrying Revolutionary Guards,” New York Times, February 15, 2007, https://www. nytimes.com/2007/02/15/world/middleeast/15tehran.html. 47. Tasnim News, “Dadstan-e Zabul be Dast Salafiha-ye Al-Qaeda va ba Hamayat Doshman-e Jomhuri Islami Teror Shod” [Zabul Prosecutor Was Assassinated at the Hands of the Al Qaeda Salafis and the Enemies of the Islamic Republic], November 7, 2013, http://www.tasnimnews.com/Home/Single/186292. 48. Mashregh News, “Avalin ‘Almapik Pehpadi Sepah’ cheguneh dar ‘Amaq Asman Bargazar Shod” [How First ‘IRGC’s Drone Making Olympiad’ Was Held in the Depth of the Sky], May 2, 2016. 49. Khamenei.Ir, “’Amiq-e Estategik-e Iran va Bluf-e Tahdid Nizami Amrika” [Iran’s Strategic Depth and the Bluff of America’s Military Threat], September 8, 2014, http://farsi.khamenei.ir/others-note?id=27382. 50. Fars News Agency, “Sepah Hich dar Shalik Mohaduditi Mushak Nadarad” [The Revolutionary Guard Have No Restrictions in Firing Missiles], Fars News Agency, September 15, 2015, https://web.archive.org/web/20151010010700/http://www.farsnews.com /newstext.php?nn=13940624001731 51. Mashregh News, “Az ‘Amaliyati Shodan Tank Fallagh dar Razmayesh Nazaja ta Ravanmaye az Pehpad Siraf” [From Fallagh Tanks Entering an Operational Phase to the Unveiling of the Siraf Drone in Army Ground Force Exercises], May 23, 2016, http://www. .فاریس-داپهپ-زا-ییامنور-ات-اجازن-شیامزر-رد-قالف-کنات-ندش-یتایلمع-زا/mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/577898 52. DefaPress.Ir, “Bargozari Razmayesh Emdad va Nejat dar Tehran az 4 ta 15 Esfand; beh Kargiri Pehpadbaraye Nakhstin Bar dar Razmayesh Sepah Tehran” [Search and Rescue Efforts Held in Tehran from February 23 to March 6; UAVs Used for the First Time in Tehran Revolutionary Guards Exercise], February 23, 2015, http://www.defapress.ir/Fa/News/41799. 53. Institute for Sciences and Education of the Holy Defense, “Daryadar Amiri: ‘Anvan Kard Tajhiz Zirsatahiha-ye Artesh beh Samanehha-ye Modern Mosheki” [Admiral Amiri: Equipping the Military’s Submarines with Advanced Missile Systems], May 3, 2011, . 54. YJC.Ir, “Pehpadha-ye Iran Mavaza’ Teroristha ra dar Suriya” [Iranian UAVs Bombed Terrorist Camps in Syria], October 25, 2015. 55. Alsuriya.net, “Qa’ad ‘Askari l’Al-Suriya Net: 5 Ta’irat Intihariyet Iraniya Istikhadimat Dhad Ahdaf L’al-Ma’aridhiyeh barif Idlib,” [Military Commander to al-Suriya.net: 5 Iranian Suicide Planes Used Against Opposition Targets Near Idlib]. 56. Alsuriya.net, “Qa’ad ‘Askari l’Al-Suriya Net: 5 Ta’irat Intihariyet Iraniya Istikhadimat Dhad Ahdaf L’al-Ma’aridhiyeh barif Idlib,” [Military Commander to al-Suriya.net: 5 Iranian Suicide Planes Used Against Opposition Targets Near Idlib]. 57. Alsuriya.net, “Qa’ad ‘Askari l’Al-Suriya Net: 5 Ta’irat Intihariyet Iraniya Istikhadimat Dhad Ahdaf L’al-Ma’aridhiyeh barif Idlib,” [Military Commander to al-Suriya.net: 5 Iranian Suicide Planes Used Against Opposition Targets Near Idlib]. 58. PressTV, “Iran Navy Drone Flies over US Aircraft Carrier in Persian Gulf: Video,” January 29, 2016, http://www.presstv.com/ Detail/2016/01/29/447805/Iran-US-Velayat-94-Persian-Gulf-Drills-Aircraft-Carrier/. 59. Mashregh News, “Hamleh Hamzaman 50 Faravand Pehpad-e Irani beh Ahdaf” [Simultaneous Attack by 50 UAVs upon Targets], March 14, 2019. 60. Mashregh News, “Az ‘Amaliyati Shodan Tank Fallagh dar Razmayesh Nazaja ta Ravanmaye az Pehpad Siraf” [From Fallagh Tanks Entering an Operational Phase to the Unveiling of the Siraf Drone in Army Ground Force Exercises], May 23, 2016, http://www. .فاریس-داپهپ-زا-ییامنور-ات-اجازن-شیامزر-رد-قالف-کنات-ندش-یتایلمع-زا/mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/577898 61. Sepah News, “’Sardar Salami dar Goftegu Zandeh Televizioni” [Gen. Salami in a Live Television Interview], April 19, 2015, http:// www.sepahnews.com/shownews.Aspx?ID=dafffb88-7158-4343-812f-64cec1cb0002. 62. JamNews, “Pegham Jangi Sepah beh Vazir-e Defah Amrika” [The IRGC’s Military Message to the Secretary of Defense of

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America], May 11, 2014, www.jamnews.ir/detail/News/350166. 63. Adam Rawnsley and Chris Biggers, “We Found Iran’s Secretive Drone Base,” Daily Beast, April 2, 2015, https://www.thedailybeast. com/we-found-irans-secretive-drone-base. 64. Islamic Republic of Iran News Network, “Tawsea’ah-e Pehpadha dar Dastur Kar Niru-ye Darya-ye” [Developing UAVs Is in the Navy’s Agenda], January 30, 2016, http://www.irinn.ir/news/149420. 65. Tasnim News, “Tabdil-e Pehpadbeh Yeki as Payehha-ye Tavan Razmi Niru-ye Daraya-ye Sepah” [Turning Drones into One of the IRGC-Navy’s Combat Pillars], January 6, 2016, http://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1395/03/19/1099731. 66. Islamic Republic News Agency, “Guruh-e Pehpad-e Havaniruz Tashkil Mishavad” [An UAV Unit for the Islamic Republic of Iran Army Aviation Is Formed], December 17, 2018, http://www.irna.ir/fa/News/83137088. 67. BBC News, “Hezbollah Drone Flies over Israel,” November 7, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3990773.stm. 68. Eugene Miasnikov, “Terrorists Develop Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” Center for Arms Control, Energy, and Environmental Studies, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, December 6, 2004. 69. Defense Industry Daily Staff, “Hezbollah Mirsad-1 UAV Penetrates Israeli Air Defenses,” Defense Industry Daily, April 20, 2005, https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/hezbollah-mirsad1-uav-penetrates-israeli-air-defenses-0386/. 70. Milton Hoenig, “Hezbollah and the Use of Drones as a Weapon of Terrorism,” Federation of American Scientists 67, no. 2 (Spring 2014). 71. Asr-e Iran, “Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah: Pehpad beh Pervaz dar Amadeh bar feraz Filistin Sakht Iran va Motalegh beh Hezbollah Ast” [Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah: The UAV That Flew over Palestine Was Built by Iran and Owned by Hezbollah], October 11, 2012, .تسا-هللا-بزح-هب-قلعتم-و-ناریا-تخاس-نیطسلف-زارف-رب-هدمآرد-زاورپ-هب-داپهپ-هللارصن-نسحدیس/www.asriran.com/fa/news/236065 72. Fars News Agency, “Pervaz 400 Kilometeri Pehpad-e Ayoub dar Faza-ye Israil” [400 Kilometer Flight of the Ayoub UAV over Israeli Space], February 25, 2015, https://web.archive.org/web/20130227021745/http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=139 11206001408. 73. Carlo Munoz, “Iran Claims Drones Gained Access to Secret Israeli Facilities,” Hill, October 29, 2012, https://thehill.com/policy/ defense/264691-iran-claims-drones-gained-access-to-secret-israeli-facilities. 74. Mashregh News, “Avalin ‘Almapik Pehpadi Sepah’ cheguneh dar ‘Amaq Asman Bargazar Shod” [How First ‘IRGC’s Drone Making Olympiad’ Was Held in the Depth of the Sky]. 75. Mehr News, “Tekzib Khabar Moshahedeh Pehpad-e Irani dar Asman-e Bahrain” [The Denial of Reports of an Iranian Drone in the Skies of Bahrain], May 23, 2013, https://www.mehrnews.com/detail/News/2061379. 76. Fars News Agency, “Iran dar Keshevarha-ye Digar Pehpad Misazad/Tavalid Bish az 20 Noa’ Pehpad dar Keshevar” [Iran Builds Drones in Other Countries/Produces More Than 20 Types of UAVs in the Country], February 7, 2013, https://web.archive.org/ web/20130209173549/http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13911119000210. 77. Fars News Agency, “Iran dar Keshevarha-ye Digar Pehpad Misazad/Tavalid Bish az 20 Noa’ Pehpad dar Keshevar” [Iran Builds Drones in Other Countries/Produces More Than 20 Types of UAVs in the Country]. 78. Daily Star Lebanon, “Iran Says Exported Weapons Production Technology to Hezbollah,” February 3, 2015, http://www.dailystar. com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Feb-03/286264-iran-says-exported-weapons-production-technology-to-hezbollah.ashx. 79. Nicholas Blanford, “Hizbullah Airstrip Revealed,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 23, 2015. 80. J. Binnie, “Syrian UAVs Spotted Above Homs,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 29, 2012. 81. Jassem Al Salami, “Iran’s New Drone Is a Twin-Engine Bomber: But It’s Probably Unreliable,” War Is Boring, February 3, 2015, https://warisboring.com/iran-s-new-drone-is-a-twin-engine-bomber/; and Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, “The Statement of Presidential Spokesperson Ambassador İbrahim Kalın,” May 18, 2015, http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/spokesperson/1696/32160/the- statement-of-presidential-spokesperson-ambassador-ibrahim-kalin.html. 82. Adam Rawnsley, “Syria’s ‘New’ Iranian Drone,” Bellingcat, January 28, 2016, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2016/01/28/ syria-new-iranian-drone/. 83. Rawnsley, “Syria’s ‘New’ Iranian Drone.”

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84. Azad News Agency, “Iran She Pehpad Shenasayi beh Komiteh-haye Mardami ‘Iraq Tahvil Dad” [Iran Provided Iraq with Three Surveillance Drones], Azad News Agency, January 24, 2015, http://www.ana.ir/news/37518. 85. Alsumaria.TV, “Hizbullah Ya’alin Istinafah L’amiliyat Tahrir Tikrit wa Yuakid Anah Qasf Muwaqa’ Da’ish” [“Hezbollah announces its resumption of operations to liberate Tikrit and confirms that it has bombed ISIS sites], March 31, 2015 https://www.alsumaria.tv/ news/129398 86. Donna Miles, “Coalition Jets Shoot Down Iranian Drone over Iraq,” US Airforce Expeditionary Center, March 16, 2009, https:// www.expeditionarycenter.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/438824/coalition-jets-shoot-down-iranian-drone-over-iraq/. 87. Michael R. Gordon and Eric Schmitt, “Iran Secretly Sending Drones and Supplies in Iraq, U.S. Officials Say,”New York Times, June 25, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/26/world/middleeast/iran-iraq.html. 88. Adam Rawnsley, “Iran’s Drones Are Back in Iraq: They Weren’t Gone for Long,” War Is Boring, January 24, 2015, https://medium. com/war-is-boring/irans-drones-are-back-in-iraq-ed60bb33501d. 89. Asr-e Iran, “Ada’ye Sazman-e Melli darbaraye Ferush-e Adavat Nazami Mamnu’ah beh Sudan Tavasat Chand Irani” [The Claims of the United Nations About the Sale of Banned Military Goods to Sudan by Several Iranians], November 9, 2009; and El Nuevo Herald, “Militar iraní a cargo de programa venezolano de aviones no tripulados,” [“Iranian military in charge of Venezuelan drone program”], June 18, 2012. 90. Ynet News, “Report: Israel Sells Drones to Azerbaijan,” October 25, 2012, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4296758,00. html. 91. Fars News Agency, “Russia Asks for Iranian Drone Technology,” August 26, 2015, https://en.farsnews.ir/newstext.aspx?nn= 13940604000921 92. Scott Peterson, “Exclusive: Iran Hijacked US Drone, Says Iranian Engineer,” Christian Science Monitor, December 15, 2011. 93. Peterson, “Exclusive.” 94. Peterson, “Exclusive.” 95. Luc Leroux, “Le sort d’un Iranien entre justices française et américaine” [“The Fate of an Iranian Between French and American Judges” Le Monde, April 30, 2019, https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2019/04/30/le-sort-d-un-iranien-entre-justices- francaise-et-americaine_5456844_3210.html. 96. Scott Shane and David E. Sanger, “Drone Crash in Iran Reveals Secret U.S. Surveillance Effort,” New York Times, December 7, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/08/world/middleeast/drone-crash-in-iran-reveals-secret-us-surveillance-bid.html. 97. Peterson, “Exclusive.” 98. Daniel P. Shepard, Jahshan A. Bhatti, and Todd E. Humphreys, “Evaluation of Smart Grid and Civilian UAV Vulnerability to GPS Spoofing Attacks” (conference paper, ION GNSS Conference, Nashville, TN, September 19–21, 2012). 99. David A. Fulghum, “Tale of RQ-170 Hijack in Doubt as Told in Tehran,” Aviation Week, December 16, 2011. 100. Fars News Agency, “Gozaresh Fars dar Salgard Shoker Muhimtarin Pehpad-e Jasusi Amrika” [Fars News Agency’s Report on Anniversary of Capture of America’s Most Important Spy Drone], November 28, 2012, https://web.archive.org/web/20120908091942/ http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9106061460; and Fars News Agency, “Pehpad RQ-170 Irani beh Nam ‘Simorgh’ Namgezari Shod” [Iranian RQ-170 UAV Was Named ‘Simorgh’], March 10, 2015, https://web.archive.org/web/20160310123155/www. farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13941219001623. 101. David Cenciotti, “Iran Releases Decoded Footage from Captured U.S. Stealthy RQ-170 Drone,” Aviationist, February 6, 2013, https://theaviationist.com/2013/02/06/footage-sentinel/. 102. Peterson, “Exclusive.” 103. Ali Akbar Dareini and Associated Press, “Official: Iran Has Evidence It Captured U.S. Drone,” Capital Gazette, December 5, 2012, https://www.capitalgazette.com/cg2-arc-10f96a21-2078-597a-87fd-2d2afe627d92-20121205-story.html. 104. PressTV, “Iran Commander Urges US to Accurately Recount Its Drones,” December 6, 2012. 105. Khabar Online, “Iranian Forces Warn Off 30 Spy Drones in Drill: Iran Cmdr.,” January 1, 2013,http://english.khabaronline.ir/ detail/183824.

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106. DefaPress.Ir, “Kontrol-e Kemal Tamami Havapeyma-ha-ye Fara Montegeha-ye dar Zaman, Bargezari Razmayesh” [Full Control of All Aircraft Across Regions at the Time of the Exercise], December 31, 2014, https://web.archive.org/web/20150102200354/http:// www.defapress.ir/Fa/News/37483. 107. Fars News Agency, “Dastyabi Iran beh Pedafand Gonabadi” [Iran’s Access to Dome Defense], October 5, 2019, https://web. دست یابی-ایران-به-پدافند-گنبدی-سامانه-اخاللگر-برای-جلوگیری-از-ورود/archive.org/web/20191005204919/https://www.farsnews.com/news/13980711000828 108. Davis et al., “Armed and Dangerous?” 109. Farhad Kiani Falavarjani, “Jaygah Perendehha-ye Bidun Sarnashin dar Doktrin va Rahbarad-e Dafa’ye va Nabardha-ye Darayaye Ayendeh” [The Place of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Doctrine and Defensive Strategy and Future Naval Battles] (conference paper, 16th Marine Industries Conference, Tehran, Iran, December 2, 2014). 110. Falavarjani, “Jaygah Perendehha-ye Bidun Sarnashin dar Doktrin va Rahbarad-e Dafa’ye va Nabardha-ye Darayaye Ayendeh” [The Place of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Doctrine and Defensive Strategy and Future Naval Battles]. 111. YJC.Ir, “Alyaf-e Karbon: Az Badneh-e Pehpad ta Ghata’at Sentrifugizh” [Carbon Fibers: From UAV Body to Centrifuge Parts], .ملیفمواقم-هدام-کی-یارب-تمواقم-ژویفیرتناس-تاعطق-ات-داپهپ-هندب-زا-نبرک-فایلا/June 15, 2016, http://www.yjc.ir/fa/news/5652060 112. Amos Yadlin and Avner Golov, “If Attacked, How Would Iran Respond?,” Strategic Assessment 16, no. 3 (October 2013): 9.

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