A Short History of the Iranian Drone Program MICHAEL RUBIN AUGUST 2020 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE Executive Summary he 1980–88 Iran-Iraq War was a formative The third is the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) Tevent for the Islamic Republic of Iran. The sur- fleet, the focus of this report. While Iranian UAVs prise Iraqi invasion caught Iran’s revolutionary have been, until recently at least, among the least pub- regime unprepared. In the last decade of his rule, the licized Iranian asymmetric tools, they are among the ousted shah centered the Iranian military around Islamic Republic’s oldest, in service now for 35 years. big ticket items such as F-14 Tomcats, M60 tanks, The Iranian military utilizes its UAV fleet for two and AH-1 SuperCobra helicopters. At the time of the main purposes: surveillance and attack. Over the revolution, however, not only did many Iranian pilots last decade, Iranian UAV platforms for both pur- choose not to return to their homeland from training poses have expanded tremendously with not only ranges abroad but some of the equipment purchased the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps but also the by Iran also got stuck overseas. The Islamic Republic’s regular Iranian military and civil authorities gaining inability to purchase spare parts from Western sup- access to Iranian-made drones tailored for their spe- pliers further undercut its ability to defend itself over cific needs and mission sets. Whereas once, Iran did subsequent years. little more than attach cameras or grenades to rudi- As a result, both during and after the Iran-Iraq mentary drones that were limited both by weather War, Iranian authorities doubled down on indige- and line of sight to their controllers, today Iranian nous military industry so as not to become reliant on controllers can pilot drones for hours at a time over any overseas power and asymmetric technologies to hundreds of miles utilizing GPS coordinates. That bypass the fact that they no longer had access to the said, Iranian claims to have reverse engineered cap- most modern, expensive platforms on which many of tured US drones appear exaggerated, as do some their adversaries relied. In practice, there have been Iranian claims about the utility of their drones in the three main pillars to the Islamic Republic asymmetric fight against the Islamic State. military response. That said, whether for surveillance or attack, The first is naval. After what for Iran was a disas- the United States and its regional partners cannot trous confrontation with the US Navy in April 1988, afford to dismiss the threats posed by Iran’s drone Iranian authorities recognized that neither the Iranian fleet. Iranian forces have successfully demonstrated Navy nor the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps their ability to utilize drones to infiltrate Saudi air Navy could defeat the US Navy head-on. Instead defenses, stay aloft to find and hit targets of oppor- Iranian authorities began to rely on speedboats to tunity in Syria, and undermine adversary defenses by harass and swarm the larger, more expensive ships. using drone swarms in Yemen. The second is the ballistic missile program. Iran’s A broader concern, however, is not only Iran’s increasing investment in longer-range and more pre- provision of UAVs to proxy groups in Iraq and cise ballistic missiles compensates for the regime’s Lebanon but also its transfer of the capability airpower deficiencies and enables Iran in theory to manufacture drones to them. This buys both to strike far beyond its borders without the need Iran and its proxies plausible deniability as, when to invest in a top-tier air force. Any nuclear war- drones are utilized against US interests or those of head capability would only enhance this asymmetric US allies, there will be a question mark about who ability further. ordered their attack. Proliferation of Iranian drones 1 also raises the possibility that they might endanger Simply put, Iranian drones are here to stay. The civilian air and ship traffic across the Middle East, threat they pose cannot be underestimated, and but they could also become tools for terrorists they will remain part of the operational environment further abroad. across the Middle East for decades to come. 2 A SHORT HISTORY OF THE IRANIAN DRONE PROGRAM MICHAEL RUBIN A Short History of the Iranian Drone Program Michael Rubin he 21st century is shaping up to be the century to leapfrog centuries of military stagnation and bypass Tof the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Military an investment in military man power that it could not strategists have understood the UAV’s potential for realistically afford to embrace the latest military tech- decades, but their use has become increasingly public nology. Later, Mohammad Reza Shah, who ruled Iran against the backdrop of conflict in Afghanistan, Iraq, from 1941 until his 1979 ouster, embraced the same Libya, Syria, Yemen, and even Saudi Arabia.1 While spirit. He established a nuclear program in 1957 and, many drone technologies remain classified, their capa- despite US entreaties, began to experiment with laser bilities have been featured in popular culture, mak- enrichment and plutonium reprocessing in the next ing appearances in Hollywood blockbusters such as decade. Such efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon The Bourne Identity, Syriana, and Thirteen Days. Allies came to naught, but in his last decade, he pushed and adversaries across the globe have quickly grasped forward to construct what was then a state-of-the- their potential. Whereas just over 20 countries used art air force. When the shah fell, Iran may still drones at the turn of the century, today that number have been a third-world country, but it possessed a has quintupled.2 More than a dozen have used them first-world military. in combat.3 That changed quickly with the Islamic Revolu- That the Islamic Republic of Iran saw the drone’s tion, the officer purges it heralded, and the 1980–88 potential and moved early to fold it into its arsenal Iran-Iraq War. A host of international sanctions fur- should not be a surprise. While historically Iran has ther devastated the Iranian military. No longer able not been an incubator for new technology, it has to purchase big-ticket platforms to keep up with rival always been quick to adopt it. Whereas Sunni reli- Gulf Cooperation Council militaries, Iranian officials gious clergy regularly condemned new technologies, sought to capitalize on cheap, indigenous alternatives Shi’ite leaders in Iran (or Persia as it was called before and asymmetric strategies. For example, unable to 1935) often embraced it. Iran was among the first compete against the US Navy with big surface ships, countries outside the United States and Europe to the Iranian military developed a naval doctrine depen- embrace telegraphy, laying its first lines just a decade dent on swarming small boats.5 after its invention and well before many European It was against this backdrop that Iran first countries did. began experimenting with UAVs. Iran launched the Nasir al-Din Shah, Iran’s ruler through the latter Mohajer-1 in 1985 and began experimenting with the half of the 19th century, quickly understood that the Ababil-1 the following year.6 It used both to spy on communications benefits mitigated the military gap Iraqi movements and positions behind the World that Iran was experiencing at the time in the face of War I–style trenches that marked the front line. growing British and Russian challenges. Iran adopted Then, in 1988, the US Navy devastated Iran’s air force quickly both to radio and television even while other and navy in a skirmish that quickly morphed into the regional countries lagged behind.4 The shah sought largest surface naval engagement since World War II.7 3 A SHORT HISTORY OF THE IRANIAN DRONE PROGRAM MICHAEL RUBIN In its aftermath, Iranian strategists understood they Emirates and Turkey. It was a lot easier to smuggle could not hope to confront the United States directly smaller electronic components for a drone than larger by sea. Drones, however, were relatively inexpensive computers or nuclear or ballistic missile parts. and had broad utility. The Iranian investment took off. The Iranian government has made little secret of its turn toward UAVs. While the war was a stalemate Iran’s Ballooning Drone Program and the cease-fire ending it was akin to drinking “a chalice of poison” in the words of Iranian revolution- Much of the manufacturing of Iranian UAVs remains ary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Iranian indigenous. While Iranian officials spoke openly government found its drones a silver lining around about upgrading the Ababil in 1990, Iran’s UAV pro- which to rally its beleaguered and war-weary popu- gram remained relatively uniform, relying on just a lation.8 Indeed, in 1990, Mohammad Khatami, then couple models. This began to change in 2009, when the Islamic Republic’s minister of culture and Islamic Iran developed the Karrar prototype and then quickly guidance, promoted a mass-market movie Mohajer, unveiled several new UAV platforms. which depicted a drone division taking out Iraqi Qods Aeronautics Industries makes the Mohajer targets during the Iran-Iraq War. and Saeqeh drones, while Iran Aircraft Manufac- In subsequent years, as the Islamic Republic turing Industrial Company produces the Ababil.11 sought to regroup and rebuild, it continued to However, while companies affiliated with the labor under sanctions. On January 19, 1984, the economic wing of the Islamic Revolutionary US Department of State formally designated Iran Guards Corps (IRGC) might assemble UAVs, Iran a state sponsor of terrorism, leading to a ban on still appears dependent on technology produced defense exports and controls over exports of abroad.