The Strategic Roots of Russian Expansionism in the Middle East Reza Parchizadeh
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The Journal for Interdisciplinary Middle Eastern Studies Volume 6, No. 2, Fall 2020, pp. 131-163 DOI: https://doi.org/10.26351/JIMES/6-2/2 ISSN: 2522-347X (print); 2522-6959 (online) The Strategic Roots of Russian Expansionism in the Middle East Reza Parchizadeh Abstract Russian expansionism in the Middle East follows a systematic approach to the region that is predicated on a profound understanding of the geopolitical, cultural, and religious landscape of the Middle East along the lines of the historical Russian strategic imperatives. For the time being, Russia’s aim is to supplant the United States as the main political power in the Middle East. However, in the long run, the ultimate Russian goal is to dominate the world as the sole global superpower. My argument is that although Russia’s fortunes have ebbed and flowed throughout modern history, what the Russian political establishment has demonstrated in regard to ideological/territorial expansionism, from the Tsarist Empire to the USSR to the Russian Federation, is strategic continuity. As such, in this article I am going to conduct a strategic survey of the Russian expansionism in the Middle East throughout modern history and then warn of the impending dangers of unchecked Russian expansionism for contemporary US and Middle East security and for the future of global democracy and liberal world order. Keywords: Aleksandr Dugin, Eurasianism, geopolitics, Halford John Mackinder, Middle East, Russian expansionism, Vladimir Putin Dr. Reza Parchizadeh – Indiana University of Pennsylvania (IUP); [email protected] 131 132 Reza Parchizadeh Introduction Russia is no stranger to the Middle East, and Russian expansionism in that region of the world is by no means a new phenomenon. In fact, contrary to the popular belief in Western analyst circles, the recent trend of Russian interventionism in the Middle East is not just some sort of crude, random, opportunistic, brute-force, and “strategy-less” intervention. Rather, it follows a methodical and systematic approach to the region that is predicated on a profound understanding of the geopolitical, cultural, and religious landscape of the Middle East along the lines of the historical Russian strategic imperatives. Although Russians were mired in the complications of the collapse of the Communist Bloc during the 1990s, since the beginning of the new millennium they have demonstrated their resolve to resume the previous trend of expansionism, pursued first by the Tsarist Empire and then the Soviet Union. In hindsight, it can be seen that the Russian intervention in the Caucasus and the Black Sea basin – and assessing the West’s response – was only a warm-up exercise towards that goal; and now the Middle East is increasingly perceived by Russia as a permanent zone of influence. As such, although Russia’s fortunes have ebbed and flowed throughout modern history, what the Russian political establishment has demonstrated in regard to ideological/territorial expansionism, from the Tsarist Empire to the USSR to the Russian Federation, is strategic continuity. In fact, the fundamental assumptions of the Russian state theorist1 Aleksandr Dugin’s so-called “Fourth Political Theory,” where he treats geopolitical expansionism as a Russian “Manifest Destiny,”2 and pseudo-mystically philosophizes about the “Sacred Space,” the “Spiritual Mission of the State,” and the inevitability of a unified “Eurasia” led by Russia,3 represent only a fashionable version of the centuries-old Tsarist and Communist imperialist discourse that has been cast in quasi-Mackinderian terminology. Sir Halford John Mackinder (1861–1947), an innovative British geopolitical thinker, in an 1 For Dugin’s relations with the Russian deep state, see: Charles Clover, “The Unlikely Origins of Russia’s Manifest Destiny,” Foreign Policy, July 27, 2016, https://foreignpolicy. com/2016/07/27/geopolitics-russia-mackinder-eurasia-heartland-dugin-ukraine-eurasianism- manifest-destiny-putin/ (Accessed on October 30, 2020). 2 Ibid. 3 Alexandr Dugin, The Fourth Political Theory (Moscow: Eurasian Movement, 2012). The Strategic Roots of Russian Expansionism in the Middle East 133 ever-evolving string of papers and books that he produced in the course of the first half of the 20th century, most notably “The Geographical Pivot of History” (1904),4 Democratic Ideals and Reality (1919),5 and “The Round World and the Winning of the Peace” (1943),6 developed a groundbreaking theory that he would eventually call “geopolitics.” According to Mackinder’s theory, the world constitutes a closed political system in which geography plays an essential role in shaping the behavior of states. Simply put, geography determines politics. Mackinder specifically divides the globe between two major powerbases across two geopolitical fault-lines: the sea power (thalassocracy) whose locus is around the Atlantic basin; and the land power (tellurocracy) whose seat is in Eurasia. He regards the Atlantic powers as the periphery and the Eurasian powers as the “Heartland.” Historically, Russia in its different incarnations has embodied Eurasia – or at least most of it. According to Mackinder, throughout modern times the Atlanticists have had the upper hand globally. However, if the Eurasians manage to unite and utilize their resources in unison, they will eventually be able to supplant the Atlanticists as the greatest global power. Mackinder’s main concern in the course of his half a century of theorizing is the rise of Russia as the global superpower. As Francis P. Sempa has put it, “His greatest geopolitical nightmare was that a hostile power or alliance of powers would gain effective political control of the Eurasian land mass and use its resources to out-build and overwhelm the insular powers.”7 Ironically, Dugin stands Mackinder on his head by advocating for the supremacy of Eurasia. Through a show of “multipolarity” that is invested in the historical religious and cultural affinities of the peoples of Europe and Asia with Russia, and by dwelling on their collective grievances against Western Civilization and especially the United States, Dugin, Putin, and all the contemporary “Eurasianists”8 strive to create a 4 Halford John Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” The Geographical Journal, Vol. 23, No. 4 (1904), pp. 421–437. 5 Halford John Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality (New York: W. W. Norton, 1962). 6 Halford John Mackinder, “The Round World and the Winning of the Peace,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 4 (1943), pp. 595–605. 7 Francis P. Sempa, “The Roots of Mackinder’s Geopolitics,” Orbis, Vol. 59, No. 4 (2015), p. 619. 8 For a comprehensive treatment of Eurasianism among the contemporary Russian elite, see: Dmitry Shlapentokh, Russian Elite Image of Iran: From the Late Soviet Era to the Present (Carlisle: The Strategic Studies Institute, 2009). 134 Reza Parchizadeh hegemonic unipolar front led by Russia against the American-led liberal world order. As the Russia expert Mariya Y. Omelicheva has stated, For the Kremlin, Syria represents a tactical theater in a broader strategy of anti-Westernism [...] In a nutshell, Moscow’s main political “end” is a global Russia that holds a prominent place on a multi-polar international stage where the rules of the game are suited to the Kremlin. To accomplish this “end,” Moscow has pursued a host of approaches to minimize the main threat thereto, namely the U.S. and the U.S.-led liberal international order.9 For the time being, Russia’s aim is to supplant the United States – the current Atlanticist superpower – as the main political power in Europe and the Middle East; in the long run, however, the overarching Russian imperative is world domination. By utilizing the geopolitical advantages, alliances, and resources that global expansionism puts at its disposal, Russia is aiming for the status of the sole superpower, which will eventually bring it to blows with the West. As such, in this article I am going to conduct a strategic survey of the Russian expansionism in the Middle East throughout modern history, and then warn of the impending dangers of the hitherto unchecked Russian expansionism for contemporary US and Middle East security and for the future of global democracy and liberal world order. Russia’s Roots The Russians were a race of Slavic people who settled in what is now western Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus during the Dark Ages. The Varangian chieftain Rurik settled Novgorod in 862. Two decades later, Rurik’s successor, Oleg, founded Kievan Rus’, the first major Russian polity. The Russians would go on to set up small and interdependent 9 Mariya Y. Omelicheva, “Russia in Syria: Reshaping the Global Order or Fighting Terrorism?” in Marlene Laruelle (ed.), Russia’s Policy in Syria and the Middle East: Determination, Delight, and Disappointment (Washington, DC: Central Asia Program, 2019), p. 40. The Strategic Roots of Russian Expansionism in the Middle East 135 fiefdoms around that area, gradually bringing those fiefdoms together to create a more expansive polity. For most of the Middle Ages, the descendants of Rurik would rule the Russians. The Rus’ were a pagan people. Due to their considerable distance from the major centers of Christendom, they were among the last European people to convert to Christianity. In 988 the Rus’ eventually adopted Greek Orthodox Christianity from the Byzantine Empire. From then on, the fusion of Slavic paganism and Orthodox Christianity would define the contours of the Russian culture. During the Rurik era, the Russians were mostly engaged in civil wars and territorial conflicts among themselves; in addition, they occasionally battled the invading Mongol hordes from the east and the Teutonic Knights from the west. Those struggles eventually led to the creation of a unified Russian political entity with Slavo-Orthodox characteristics called the Tsardom of Russia. But it was after the Romanovs’ accession to the throne in the early 17th century that Russians developed major tendencies for expansionism towards the east and the south.