DOCSLIB.ORG

Occurrent Contractarianism

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Occurrent Contractarianism OCCURRENT CONTRACTARIANISM: A Preference-Based Ethical Theory by Malcolm Murray A thesis presented to the University of Waterloo in fulfilment of the thesis requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 1995 i © Robert Malcolm Murray 1995 ii DECLARATION I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. I authorize the University of Waterloo to lend this thesis to other institutions or individuals for the purpose of scholarly research. I further authorize the University of Waterloo to reproduce this thesis by photocopying or by other means, in total or in part, at the request of other institutions or individuals for the purpose of scholarly research. iii BORROWER'S PAGE The University of Waterloo requires the signatures of all persons using or photocopying this thesis. Please sign below, and give address and date. Thank you. iv OCCURRENT CONTRACTARIANISM: A Preference-Based Ethical Theory ABSTRACT There is a problem within contractarian ethics that I wish to resolve. It concerns individual preferences. Contractarianism holds that morality, properly conceived, can satisfy individual preferences and interests better than amorality or immorality. What is unclear, however, is whether these preferences are those individuals actually hold or those that they should hold. The goal of my thesis is to investigate this question. I introduce a version of contractarian ethics that relies on individual preferences in a manner more stringent than has been in the literature to date. "Occurrent contractarianism," as I have called it, is rooted in our social- psychological state. Given the characteristics we have, and given the social situation in which we are embedded, the best resolve we have of furthering our individually defined preferences is to adopt and adhere to a moral system. Occurrent contractarianism remains true to the original contractarian insight; that morality is a rational institution, capable of being designed for and adhered to even by non-tuistic rational beings following merely their own occurrent preferences. v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Above all else, I am indebted to Jan Narveson. He has helpred me in many ways and my gratitude to him exceeds the boundaries of this formal acknowledgement. I wish also to thank Larry Haworth and Paul Thagard for their unwavering support and encouragement, even in pursuits tangential to their own. Peter Vallentyne and Mike Ross agreed to act on my committee on short notice and I very much appreciate that. Most of what I have gleaned from game theory I owe to Paul Viminitz. Various conversations I have had over the years with Craig Beam, Andre Blom, Brian Fleming, Carl Hahn, Louis Groarke, Alix Nalezinski, Doug Mann, Darryl Pullman, and Jason West have been extremely helpful in shaping the current thesis. Behind the scenes are a number of people whom I also wish to thank. They include Debbie Dietrich and Linda Daniel for their maintaining good humour and friendship while supplying on-call administrative assistance. Dave DeVidi and Morgan Forbes offered timely advice to make the process easier. My gratidude also extends to the Philosophy Graduate Student Association, the University of Waterloo Scholarship fund, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for their generous contributions to my academic career. Closer to home, I must give special thanks to my wife, Pat Murray, and my daughter, Emma Murray, for their enduring economic hardship with unparalleled patience. My aunt, Jean Wild's generous patronage purchased the computer upon which this thesis was written and to her I give my sincere thanks. To my father, John Murray, I owe gratitude for my entire education, and from my mother, Joan Murray, I received the undying encouragement to pursue my dreams. vi DEDICATION I dedicate this thesis to Joan Murray, who died, unfortunately, prior to its coming to fruition. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION x PART I PRELIMINARIES 1 1. CONTRACTARIANISM: AN OVERVIEW 2 1.1 The Nature of Moral Theory 2 1.2 Contractarianism 4 1.3 Some Criticisms 8 1.4 Hypothetical Contractarianism 10 1.5 Applications 16 2. THEORY AND ANTI-THEORY IN ETHICS 19 2.1 The Scope of Morality 20 2.1.1 Broad and Narrow Ethics 20 2.1.2 Justice 23 2.1.3 Ignored Virtues 29 2.2 The Non-Cognitivist Critique 31 2.2.1 Reason and Passion 31 2.2.2 The Evils of Reductionism and the Obliging Stranger 33 2.3 Self-Defeating 37 2.3.1 Communal Self-Identity 39 2.3.2 Inevitable Cultural Biases 43 2.4 Summary 45 2.4.1 Where to from Here? 46 PART II SELF-INTEREST AND PREFERENCE 47 3. SELF-INTEREST 48 3.1 Duty Versus Interest 48 3.2 Rational Self-Interest 53 3.3 The Attraction of Self-Interest 54 3.4 Kant 56 3.5 Moral Reasons 61 3.6 The Nature of Self-Interest 64 viii 4. CONSIDERED SELF-INTEREST 70 4.1 Frankfurt's Model 71 4.2 Gauthier's Considered Self-Interest 75 4.3 Schmidtz's Reflective Rationality 80 4.4 Taylor's Strong Evaluation 84 4.5 Summary 94 5. OCCURRENT PREFERENCES 96 5.1 Occurrent Preferences 96 5.2 Hedonism and Death 101 5.3 Time Independence 104 5.4 Summary 110 6. INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY 111 6.1 The Instrumental Model of Rationality 111 6.2 Information 116 6.3 Intransitivity and Indifference 126 PART III OCCURRENT CONTRACTARIANISM 133 7. OCCURRENT CONTRACTARIANISM 134 7.1 Occurrent Contractarianism 135 7.2 Hypothetical Contractarianism 138 7.3 Sensitive Standard-Based Contractarianism 142 7.3.1 Drug Rehabilitation 143 7.3.2 Surprise Parties 145 7.3.3 Suicide 146 7.3.4 Unconsciousness and Consent 147 7.4 Further Constraints? 148 8. HOW PREFERENCE-BASED CONTRACTS ARE BINDING 152 8.1 Promises, Debts, and Assurance 154 8.1.1 Defaults 156 8.1.2 Spot and Forward Contracts 157 8.1.3 Assurance 158 8.2 Enforcement 159 8.2.1 Formalism 160 8.2.2 Enforcement 162 8.2.3 Realism and Utilitarianism 162 8.3 Agreeing to Enforcement 166 8.4 A Paradox Resolved 167 8.5 Summary 168 ix 9. SELF-EFFACEMENT 171 9.1 A Game Theoretic Approach 173 9.1.1 Gauthier's Model 174 9.1.2 Danielson's Pluralistic Model 179 9.1.3 Chicken 182 9.1.4 The Threat Game 185 9.2 Results 190 10. COMPLICATIONS FOR GAME THEORY 193 10.1 Transparency 194 10.2 The Making of the Translucency Formula 199 10.3 Outcome Values 206 10.4 Population 208 10.5 King Breakers 215 10.6 Computational Costs 220 10.7 Conclusion 225 PART IV SOCIAL & POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS 226 11. THE STATE AND PROPERTY 227 11.1 Hobbes 227 11.2 Locke 231 11.3 Limited Sovereignty 235 11.4 Justification for the Limited State 239 11.5 The Schism 245 11.6 Property Rights 247 11.7 Summary 250 12. WHY I AM NOT A LIBERTARIAN 252 12.1 Libertarianism and Contractarianism 253 12.2 Self-Interest Revisited 255 12.3 Paretianism 258 12.4 Occurrent-Based Libertarianism 266 12.5 Standard-Based Libertarianism 269 12.6 Summary 276 BIBLIOGRAPHY 277 x Murray INTRODUCTION There is a problem within contractarian ethics that I wish to resolve. It concerns individual preferences. Contractarianism holds that morality, properly conceived, can satisfy individual preferences and interests better than amorality or immorality. What is unclear, however, is whether these preferences are those individuals actually hold or those that they should hold. The goal of my thesis is to investigate this question. In my dissertation, I introduce a version of contractarian ethics that relies on individual preferences in a manner more stringent than has been in the literature to date. One of the fundamental tenets of contractarianism is that morality must be individually motivating. The merit of this approach is that contractarianism is committed to keeping a wary eye on human nature; it is a psychologically realist position. What humans are psychologically capable of matters. The problem is that the concept of morality is often depicted as being xi Murray precisely antithetical to individual self interest. Morality is designed partly to curb self-interest. It appears to be in my interest to steal, but it is immoral to do so. If rationality is defined as a tool to maximize individual preference, whatever that preference may be, then there is little hope, evidently, of linking morality to individual motivation. Recent contractarian answers to this problem focus primarily on the claim that it is not really in my or anyone's self-interest to steal (or cheat, lie, murder, etc.). In the long term, given the social context of human lives, one does better, individually defined, to live within and according to a moral structure. David Gauthier (1986) believed that so long as an ethical theory appeals to considered self-interest, we have a solution to the paradox of constraining self-interest on self-interested grounds. My criticism of appeals to considered self-interest is that morality becomes standard-bound, not preference-based. What counts as "considered" depends on standards independent of the individual's preferences. If we appeal to standards that determine what interests individuals should possess, then it follows that a particular moral rule is really in a person's self-interest to abide (not merely to have others abide) whether or not that person thinks so. Appealing to standards that have no necessary connection to individual preferences is to abrogate the raison d'etre of contractarian ethics. Consider: a perfectly sensible question is to ask in what way is this standard more motivating to me than any given actual xii Murray preference I may happen to have.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-2012)
    É T U D E 5 5 U R L E 1 8' 5 1 È ( L E X V 1 1 1 Revue fondée par Ro land Mortier et Hervé Hasquin DIRECTEURS Valérie André et Brigitte D'Hainaut-Zveny COMITt tDITORIAL Bruno Bernard, Claude Bruneel (Université catholique de Louvain), Carlo Capra (Università degli studi, Milan), David Charlton (Roya l Holloway College, Londres), Manuel Couvreur, Nicolas Cronk (Vo ltaire Foundation, University of Oxford), Michèle Galand, Jan Herman (Katholi eke Universiteit Leuven), Michel Jangoux, Huguette Krief (Un iversité de Provence, Aix-en-Provence), Christophe Loir, Roland Mortier, Fabrice Preyat, Dan iel Rabreau (U niverSité de Paris l, Panthéon-Sorbonne), Daniel Roche (Collège de France), Raymond Trousson et Renate Zedinger (Universitat Wien) GROUPE D'ÉTUDE D U 1 8' 5 1 È ( L E tCRIREÀ Valérie André [email protected] Brigitte D'Hainaut-Zveny Brigitte.D Hainaut @ulb.ac.be ou à l'adresse suivante Groupe d'étude du XVIII' siècle Université libre de Bruxelles (CP 175/01) Avenue F.D. Roosevelt 50 • B -1050 Bruxelles JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU (1712-2012) MATÉRIAUX POUR UN RENOUVEAU CRITIQUE Publié avec l'aide financière du Fonds de la recherche scientifique - FNRS Ë T U DES 5 URL E 1 8' 5 1 È ( L E x v 1 1 1 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU (1712-2012) MATÉRIAUX POUR UN RENOUVEAU CRITIQUE VOLUME COMPOSÉ ET ÉDITÉ PAR CHRISTOPHE VAN STAEN 2 0 1 2 ÉDITIONS DE L'UNIVERSITÉ DE BRUXELLES DAN 5 L A M Ê M E COLLECTION Les préoccupations économiques et sociales des philosophes, littérateurs et artistes au XVIII e siècle, 1976 Bruxelles au XVIIIe siècle, 1977 L'Europe et les révolutions (1770-1800), 1980 La noblesse belge au XVIIIe siècle, 1982 Idéologies de la noblesse, 1984 Une famille noble de hauts fonctionnaires: les Neny, 1985 Le livre à Liège et à Bruxelles au XVIIIe siècle, 1987 Unité et diversité de l'empire des Habsbourg à la fin du XVIIIe siècle, 1988 Deux aspects contestés de la politique révolutionnaire en Belgique: langue et culte, 1989 Fêtes et musiques révolutionnaires: Grétry et Gossec, 1990 Rocaille.
    [Show full text]
  • Liberalism, Contractarianism, and the Problem of Exclusion
    Edinburgh Research Explorer Liberalism, Contractarianism, and the Problem of Exclusion Citation for published version: Cook, P 2015, Liberalism, Contractarianism, and the Problem of Exclusion. in S Wall (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Liberalism. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 87-111. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139942478 Digital Object Identifier (DOI): 10.1017/CBO9781139942478 Link: Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer Document Version: Peer reviewed version Published In: The Cambridge Companion to Liberalism General rights Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. Take down policy The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 28. Sep. 2021 LIBERALISM, CONTRACTARIANISM AND THE PROBLEM OF EXCLUSION Philip Cook University of Edinburgh [email protected] Final Pre-Publication Draft Published Version Appeared in The Cambridge Companion to Liberalism. Wall, S. (ed.). (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 87-111 Introduction For liberal contractarians, moral and political principles are justified if agreeable to persons as free and equals.1 But for critics of liberal contractarianism, this justification does not apply to all those who should be treated as free and equal, but only to those capable of agreement.
    [Show full text]
  • Meet the Philosophers of Ancient Greece
    Meet the Philosophers of Ancient Greece Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Ancient Greek Philosophy but didn’t Know Who to Ask Edited by Patricia F. O’Grady MEET THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ANCIENT GREECE Dedicated to the memory of Panagiotis, a humble man, who found pleasure when reading about the philosophers of Ancient Greece Meet the Philosophers of Ancient Greece Everything you always wanted to know about Ancient Greek philosophy but didn’t know who to ask Edited by PATRICIA F. O’GRADY Flinders University of South Australia © Patricia F. O’Grady 2005 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Patricia F. O’Grady has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identi.ed as the editor of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Ashgate Publishing Company Wey Court East Suite 420 Union Road 101 Cherry Street Farnham Burlington Surrey, GU9 7PT VT 05401-4405 England USA Ashgate website: http://www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Meet the philosophers of ancient Greece: everything you always wanted to know about ancient Greek philosophy but didn’t know who to ask 1. Philosophy, Ancient 2. Philosophers – Greece 3. Greece – Intellectual life – To 146 B.C. I. O’Grady, Patricia F. 180 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Meet the philosophers of ancient Greece: everything you always wanted to know about ancient Greek philosophy but didn’t know who to ask / Patricia F.
    [Show full text]
  • Maurice Finocchiaro Discusses the Lessons and the Cultural Repercussions of Galileo’S Telescopic Discoveries.” Physics World, Vol
    MAURICE A. FINOCCHIARO: CURRICULUM VITAE CONTENTS: §0. Summary and Highlights; §1. Miscellaneous Details; §2. Teaching Experience; §3. Major Awards and Honors; §4. Publications: Books; §5. Publications: Articles, Chapters, and Discussions; §6. Publications: Book Reviews; §7. Publications: Proceedings, Abstracts, Translations, Reprints, Popular Media, etc.; §8. Major Lectures at Scholarly Meetings: Keynote, Invited, Funded, Honorarium, etc.; §9. Other Lectures at Scholarly Meetings; §10. Public Lectures; §11. Research Activities: Out-of-Town Libraries, Archives, and Universities; §12. Professional Service: Journal Editorial Boards; §13. Professional Service: Refereeing; §14. Professional Service: Miscellaneous; §15. Community Service §0. SUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS Address: Department of Philosophy; University of Nevada, Las Vegas; Box 455028; Las Vegas, NV 89154-5028. Education: B.S., 1964, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Ph.D., 1969, University of California, Berkeley. Position: Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Emeritus; University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Previous Positions: UNLV: Assistant Professor, 1970-74; Associate Professor, 1974-77; Full Professor, 1977-91; Distinguished Professor, 1991-2003; Department Chair, 1989-2000. Major Awards and Honors: 1976-77 National Science Foundation; one-year grant; project “Galileo and the Art of Reasoning.” 1983-84 National Endowment for the Humanities, one-year Fellowship for College Teachers; project “Gramsci and the History of Dialectical Thought.” 1987 Delivered the Fourth Evert Willem Beth Lecture, sponsored by the Evert Willem Beth Foundation, a committee of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Sciences, at the Universities of Amsterdam and of Groningen. 1991-92 American Council of Learned Societies; one-year fellowship; project “Democratic Elitism in Mosca and Gramsci.” 1992-95 NEH; 3-year grant; project “Galileo on the World Systems.” 1993 State of Nevada, Board of Regents’ Researcher Award.
    [Show full text]
  • No Need for Morality: the Case of the Competitive Market
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by The College at Brockport, State University of New York: Digital Commons @Brockport Philosophic Exchange Volume 13 Article 2 Number 1 SUMMER 1982 Volume 13 1982 No Need for Morality: The aC se of the Competitive Market David Gauthier University of Pittsburgh Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex Part of the Philosophy Commons Repository Citation Gauthier, David (1982) "No Need for Morality: The asC e of the Competitive Market," Philosophic Exchange: Vol. 13 : No. 1 , Article 2. Available at: http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol13/iss1/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @Brockport. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophic Exchange by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @Brockport. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Gauthier: No Need for Morality: The Case of the Competitive Market DAVID GA UTHIEH Professor of Philosophy Unh·prsily of Pittsburgh Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1982 1 Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 13 [1982], No. 1, Art. 2 No Need for Morality: The Case of the Competithe �tarket by Da,·id Gauthier Morality is a Visible Fool. This unappealing metaphor 1s derived. of coum'. from Adam Smith's Invisible Hand. Where the Invisible Hand fails to direct each person's actions to the public interest · or. as l shall prefer to say. lo mutual bene­ fit · the Visible Foot takes over. Hand and Fool share a common aim. But they work in very different ways.
    [Show full text]
  • Capitalism in the Classical and High Liberal Traditions*
    CAPITALISM IN THE CLASSICAL AND HIGH LIBERAL TRADITIONS* By Samuel Freeman I. Essential Features of Liberalism Liberalism holds that there are certain individual liberties that are of fundamental political significance. These liberties are fundamental or basic in that they are preconditions on the pursuit of other social values, such as achieving economic efficiency, promoting the general welfare, and mod- erating the degree of inequality in the distribution of income and wealth. None of these liberties are absolute, but the reasons for limiting their exercise are to protect other basic liberties and maintain essential back- ground conditions for their effective exercise. For example, freedom of speech and expression can be limited when it imminently endangers others’ safety or the freedom of their person, but not because the ideas expressed are found to be offensive by vast majorities of people. Liberal basic liberties are also inalienable: they cannot be given up voluntarily or permanently transferred to anyone else, though some liberties are forfeit- able upon criminal conviction for serious crimes. No liberal government would enforce a contract in which a person sold himself into permanent servitude, or alienated his freedom to change religions, or legally bound himself to vote only as his employer insisted. An integral feature of a liberal constitution is the protection of the basic rights and liberties nec- essary to establish and maintain the equal civic status of citizens. What liberties do liberals generally find to have this extraordinary status? Liberals now would all agree that among the basic liberties are freedom of thought, expression, and inquiry, freedom of conscience and of association, freedom and security of the person, and free choice of occupation.
    [Show full text]
  • "Justice As a Kind of Impartiality"
    Article "Justice as a Kind of Impartiality" Kai Nielsen Laval théologique et philosophique, vol. 50, n° 3, 1994, p. 511-529. Pour citer cet article, utiliser l'information suivante : URI: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/400868ar DOI: 10.7202/400868ar Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir. Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/ Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents scientifiques depuis 1998. Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : [email protected] Document téléchargé le 10 février 2017 12:49 Laval théologique et philosophique, 50, 3 (octobre 1994) JUSTICE AS A KIND OF IMPARTIALITY Kai NIELSEN RÉSUMÉ: Les approches kantiennes de la justice conçoivent celle-ci comme impartialité, les approches hobbesiennes la conçoivent comme avantage mutuel. Uarticle montre que ces concep• tions ne sont pas rivales, mais que la justice en est venue à signifier la prise en compte égale des intérêts légitimes de tous : chaque homme étant considéré comme l'égal moral de chaque autre. Tel est l'aboutissement de la justice conçue comme impartialité. Les théories de l'avantage mutuel, en revanche, ne disent pas ce qu'est la justice ou ce quelle est devenue, mais fournissent des raisons prudentielles pour agir de manière juste, dans la mesure où une telle conduite est profitable.
    [Show full text]
  • 1. Robert J. Ellrich, Rousseau and His Reader: the Rhetorical Situation of the Major Works (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969)
    NOTES CHAPTER 1 1. Robert J. Ellrich, Rousseau and His Reader: The Rhetorical Situation of the Major Works (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969). In Rousseau and His Reader, Ellrich sees this sentence as evidence of Rousseau’s “fundamental posture in the work, his presentation of himself to the reader as the virtuous outsider” (28). 2. I use “Controversy” with a capital letter here as a technical term to refer to those writings by Rousseau and his “opponents” that followed the publication of the First Discourse. The Controversy lasted until the publication of Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (1755). 3. All of these quotes are taken from the entries, “Scandale” and “Scandaleux,” in The Encyclopedia of Diderot & d’Alembert, trans. Jason Kusnicki, vol. 14 (Ann Arbor: Scholarly Publishing Office of the University of Michigan Library, 2002), 741, available at http://quod.lib.umich.edu/d/did/. Cf. Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, Paris, Neuchâtel, 1751–1765. 4. The Encyclopedia of Diderot & d’Alembert s.v. “scandale.” 5. Dictionnaire de l’Académie française (first edition, 1694) s.v. “scandale,” available at http://colet.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/dico1look.pl?strippedhw=scandale&dicoid=ACAD1694. 6. Gouhier has some very enlightening reflections on Rousseau’s rejection of this dogma in Henri Gaston Gouhier, Les méditations métaphysiques de Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Paris: J. Vrin, 1970). He sees it has Rousseau’s “troisième refus fondamental,” the other two being the historical revelation and the idea of church that would interpret that revelation (37). 7. Christophe de Beaumont quotes this sentence as a proof text (CW 9:4).
    [Show full text]
  • Altruism and Mutual Advantage 359
    Altruism and Mutual Advantage 359 new. policy or program.Justification from mutual advantage has roots in Thomas Hobbes and David ~ume.2 The principle of mutual advan­ tage is roughly the collective implication of self-interest. As such, it is represented in the contemporary work of David Gauthier, scholars of normative law and economics, and John Rawls.5 Because altruism is, as noted above, contrary to self-interest, we might wonder whether theories grounded in mutual advantage can justify a principle of altru­ ism. I wish to explore the fit of altruism with mutual advantage not Altruism and Mutual only in theories but also in contemporary political practice. First, it is instructive to survey briefly the vicissitudes of altruism in Advantage philosophical discussions over the past few centuries and the develop­ ment of the principle of mutual advantage. Then I will turn to a quick survey of major welfare issues in contemporary American soci­ ety-these are, along with grievous hunger and destitution in the Third World, the major problem . for altruism in our policy Russell Hardin choices-and I will review the slow historical change that has made New York University these issues now a matter of collective resolution. This sets up a discus­ sion of the institutional provision of welfare, largely at the hand of government.· I conclude with remarks on the prospects of altruistic policies from a polity that may have outreached moral and political Altruism generally involves a conflict of interest betw~n the potentindal altruist and the • be · Contcm rary moral and pohucal theory a contemporary theories in its restrictive commitment to mutual advantage.
    [Show full text]
  • Trust, Trade, and Moral Progress
    Trust, Trade, and Moral Progress Jonathan Anomaly Duke University, UNC – Chapel Hill Duke PPE working paper # 15.0525 Written for Social Philosophy and Policy, 2016 “Wherever the ways of men are gentle, there is commerce, and wherever there is commerce, the ways of men are gentle” ~Baron de Montesquieu Trust is important for a variety of social relationships. With the right background institutions in place, trust facilitates trade, which increases prosperity and induces us to interact with people of different backgrounds on terms that benefit all parties. Trade promotes trustworthiness, which enables us to form respectful as well as mutually beneficial relationships. In what follows, I argue that when we erect institutions that enhance trust and reward people who are worthy of trust, we create the conditions for moral progress.1 1. Introduction Many people have defended market exchange on the grounds that it increases material prosperity. This defense often rings hollow to communitarians who emphasize moral goals that they suspect are better achieved by living together in communities where risk is pooled, income is more evenly divided, and social values can be taught and transmitted to members of the group. Of course, communitarian critics of markets are free to forge their own communities in market society, but they are right that none of us can insulate ourselves from the cumulative cultural effects that markets produce. As Samuel Bowles observes, “Because states, communities, and markets influence the process of cultural evolution, any normative evaluation of the role and scope of these institutions must attempt to take their cultural effects into account.”2 Defenders of markets do themselves no favors, then, by ignoring the social orders that markets help shape, and the legal institutions that shape market exchange.
    [Show full text]
  • Interoffice MEMORANDUM To: Senate Committee for Quality Assurance From: Anthony Clarke, Assistant V.P
    Office of Assistant Vice-President (Program Quality Assurance) x54124 interoffice MEMORANDUM to: Senate Committee for Quality Assurance from: Anthony Clarke, Assistant V.P. (PQA) subject: Periodic Review of the Department of Philosophy date: 12 March 2013 Please find attached the documents for the periodic review of the Department of Philosophy: Final Assessment Report, the Executive Summary which includes the responses of the Chair and Dean, and the responses of the Chair, Dean, and Provost as separate documents. As per section IV.4.A.(vii) of our IQAP for the review of departments and schools, the Executive Summary has been prepared for the information of Senate, and submission to the Ontario Universities Council for Quality Assurance. SENATE COMMITTEE FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE PERIODIC REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY of FINAL ASSESSMENT REPORT March 2013 Membership of Internal Review Subcommittee (IRS) External Reviewers: Dr. Andrew Hunter, Ryerson University Dr. Eduardo Mendieta, Stony Brook University, New York Facilitator: Dr. Michèle Preyde, The Internal Review Committee (IRC) received the Final Assessment Report for the Department of Philosophy from the IRS on 05 February 2013. The IRC now presents an Executive Summary of the review, which includes the following: - Introduction - Summary of the review process - Review Committee’s recommendations - Administrative responses to the report from the Chair, Dean, and Provost INTRODUCTION The Department of Philosophy is a community of dedicated teachers and productive philosophical researchers. It was founded in 1965 with an initial complement of five male faculty (John Bruce (chair), Brian Calvert, Michael Ruse, Donald Stewart, George Todd) which quickly grew: in 1975 there were 21 regular faculty (1 female).
    [Show full text]
  • John Locke and the Fable of Liberalism
    This is a repository copy of John Locke and the fable of liberalism. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/121796/ Version: Accepted Version Article: Stanton, Tim orcid.org/0000-0002-8282-9570 (2018) John Locke and the fable of liberalism. Historical Journal. pp. 597-622. ISSN 0018-246X https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X17000450 Reuse Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record for the item. Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing [email protected] including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. [email protected] https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ The Historical Journal JOHN LOCKE AND THE FABLE OF LIBERALISM Journal: The Historical Journal Manuscript ID HJ-2017-062.R1 Manuscript Type: Article Perio : 1600-99, 1700-99, 1800-99, 1900-99, 2000- Intellectual, Historiographical, Religious, Political, A ministrative ( Legal, Thematic: Social Geographic: ,urope, Continental, .ritain, America, North Cambridge University Press Page 1 of 46 The Historical Journal Locke and the fable of liberalism JOHN LOCKE AND THE FABLE OF LIBERALISM TIMOTHY STANTON University of York ABSTRACT. This essay explores the ways in which John Locke was claimed by liberalism and refashioned in its image.
    [Show full text]