OCCURRENT CONTRACTARIANISM: A Preference-Based Ethical Theory by Malcolm Murray A thesis presented to the University of Waterloo in fulfilment of the thesis requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 1995 i © Robert Malcolm Murray 1995 ii DECLARATION I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. I authorize the University of Waterloo to lend this thesis to other institutions or individuals for the purpose of scholarly research. I further authorize the University of Waterloo to reproduce this thesis by photocopying or by other means, in total or in part, at the request of other institutions or individuals for the purpose of scholarly research. iii BORROWER'S PAGE The University of Waterloo requires the signatures of all persons using or photocopying this thesis. Please sign below, and give address and date. Thank you. iv OCCURRENT CONTRACTARIANISM: A Preference-Based Ethical Theory ABSTRACT There is a problem within contractarian ethics that I wish to resolve. It concerns individual preferences. Contractarianism holds that morality, properly conceived, can satisfy individual preferences and interests better than amorality or immorality. What is unclear, however, is whether these preferences are those individuals actually hold or those that they should hold. The goal of my thesis is to investigate this question. I introduce a version of contractarian ethics that relies on individual preferences in a manner more stringent than has been in the literature to date. "Occurrent contractarianism," as I have called it, is rooted in our social- psychological state. Given the characteristics we have, and given the social situation in which we are embedded, the best resolve we have of furthering our individually defined preferences is to adopt and adhere to a moral system. Occurrent contractarianism remains true to the original contractarian insight; that morality is a rational institution, capable of being designed for and adhered to even by non-tuistic rational beings following merely their own occurrent preferences. v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Above all else, I am indebted to Jan Narveson. He has helpred me in many ways and my gratitude to him exceeds the boundaries of this formal acknowledgement. I wish also to thank Larry Haworth and Paul Thagard for their unwavering support and encouragement, even in pursuits tangential to their own. Peter Vallentyne and Mike Ross agreed to act on my committee on short notice and I very much appreciate that. Most of what I have gleaned from game theory I owe to Paul Viminitz. Various conversations I have had over the years with Craig Beam, Andre Blom, Brian Fleming, Carl Hahn, Louis Groarke, Alix Nalezinski, Doug Mann, Darryl Pullman, and Jason West have been extremely helpful in shaping the current thesis. Behind the scenes are a number of people whom I also wish to thank. They include Debbie Dietrich and Linda Daniel for their maintaining good humour and friendship while supplying on-call administrative assistance. Dave DeVidi and Morgan Forbes offered timely advice to make the process easier. My gratidude also extends to the Philosophy Graduate Student Association, the University of Waterloo Scholarship fund, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for their generous contributions to my academic career. Closer to home, I must give special thanks to my wife, Pat Murray, and my daughter, Emma Murray, for their enduring economic hardship with unparalleled patience. My aunt, Jean Wild's generous patronage purchased the computer upon which this thesis was written and to her I give my sincere thanks. To my father, John Murray, I owe gratitude for my entire education, and from my mother, Joan Murray, I received the undying encouragement to pursue my dreams. vi DEDICATION I dedicate this thesis to Joan Murray, who died, unfortunately, prior to its coming to fruition. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION x PART I PRELIMINARIES 1 1. CONTRACTARIANISM: AN OVERVIEW 2 1.1 The Nature of Moral Theory 2 1.2 Contractarianism 4 1.3 Some Criticisms 8 1.4 Hypothetical Contractarianism 10 1.5 Applications 16 2. THEORY AND ANTI-THEORY IN ETHICS 19 2.1 The Scope of Morality 20 2.1.1 Broad and Narrow Ethics 20 2.1.2 Justice 23 2.1.3 Ignored Virtues 29 2.2 The Non-Cognitivist Critique 31 2.2.1 Reason and Passion 31 2.2.2 The Evils of Reductionism and the Obliging Stranger 33 2.3 Self-Defeating 37 2.3.1 Communal Self-Identity 39 2.3.2 Inevitable Cultural Biases 43 2.4 Summary 45 2.4.1 Where to from Here? 46 PART II SELF-INTEREST AND PREFERENCE 47 3. SELF-INTEREST 48 3.1 Duty Versus Interest 48 3.2 Rational Self-Interest 53 3.3 The Attraction of Self-Interest 54 3.4 Kant 56 3.5 Moral Reasons 61 3.6 The Nature of Self-Interest 64 viii 4. CONSIDERED SELF-INTEREST 70 4.1 Frankfurt's Model 71 4.2 Gauthier's Considered Self-Interest 75 4.3 Schmidtz's Reflective Rationality 80 4.4 Taylor's Strong Evaluation 84 4.5 Summary 94 5. OCCURRENT PREFERENCES 96 5.1 Occurrent Preferences 96 5.2 Hedonism and Death 101 5.3 Time Independence 104 5.4 Summary 110 6. INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY 111 6.1 The Instrumental Model of Rationality 111 6.2 Information 116 6.3 Intransitivity and Indifference 126 PART III OCCURRENT CONTRACTARIANISM 133 7. OCCURRENT CONTRACTARIANISM 134 7.1 Occurrent Contractarianism 135 7.2 Hypothetical Contractarianism 138 7.3 Sensitive Standard-Based Contractarianism 142 7.3.1 Drug Rehabilitation 143 7.3.2 Surprise Parties 145 7.3.3 Suicide 146 7.3.4 Unconsciousness and Consent 147 7.4 Further Constraints? 148 8. HOW PREFERENCE-BASED CONTRACTS ARE BINDING 152 8.1 Promises, Debts, and Assurance 154 8.1.1 Defaults 156 8.1.2 Spot and Forward Contracts 157 8.1.3 Assurance 158 8.2 Enforcement 159 8.2.1 Formalism 160 8.2.2 Enforcement 162 8.2.3 Realism and Utilitarianism 162 8.3 Agreeing to Enforcement 166 8.4 A Paradox Resolved 167 8.5 Summary 168 ix 9. SELF-EFFACEMENT 171 9.1 A Game Theoretic Approach 173 9.1.1 Gauthier's Model 174 9.1.2 Danielson's Pluralistic Model 179 9.1.3 Chicken 182 9.1.4 The Threat Game 185 9.2 Results 190 10. COMPLICATIONS FOR GAME THEORY 193 10.1 Transparency 194 10.2 The Making of the Translucency Formula 199 10.3 Outcome Values 206 10.4 Population 208 10.5 King Breakers 215 10.6 Computational Costs 220 10.7 Conclusion 225 PART IV SOCIAL & POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS 226 11. THE STATE AND PROPERTY 227 11.1 Hobbes 227 11.2 Locke 231 11.3 Limited Sovereignty 235 11.4 Justification for the Limited State 239 11.5 The Schism 245 11.6 Property Rights 247 11.7 Summary 250 12. WHY I AM NOT A LIBERTARIAN 252 12.1 Libertarianism and Contractarianism 253 12.2 Self-Interest Revisited 255 12.3 Paretianism 258 12.4 Occurrent-Based Libertarianism 266 12.5 Standard-Based Libertarianism 269 12.6 Summary 276 BIBLIOGRAPHY 277 x Murray INTRODUCTION There is a problem within contractarian ethics that I wish to resolve. It concerns individual preferences. Contractarianism holds that morality, properly conceived, can satisfy individual preferences and interests better than amorality or immorality. What is unclear, however, is whether these preferences are those individuals actually hold or those that they should hold. The goal of my thesis is to investigate this question. In my dissertation, I introduce a version of contractarian ethics that relies on individual preferences in a manner more stringent than has been in the literature to date. One of the fundamental tenets of contractarianism is that morality must be individually motivating. The merit of this approach is that contractarianism is committed to keeping a wary eye on human nature; it is a psychologically realist position. What humans are psychologically capable of matters. The problem is that the concept of morality is often depicted as being xi Murray precisely antithetical to individual self interest. Morality is designed partly to curb self-interest. It appears to be in my interest to steal, but it is immoral to do so. If rationality is defined as a tool to maximize individual preference, whatever that preference may be, then there is little hope, evidently, of linking morality to individual motivation. Recent contractarian answers to this problem focus primarily on the claim that it is not really in my or anyone's self-interest to steal (or cheat, lie, murder, etc.). In the long term, given the social context of human lives, one does better, individually defined, to live within and according to a moral structure. David Gauthier (1986) believed that so long as an ethical theory appeals to considered self-interest, we have a solution to the paradox of constraining self-interest on self-interested grounds. My criticism of appeals to considered self-interest is that morality becomes standard-bound, not preference-based. What counts as "considered" depends on standards independent of the individual's preferences. If we appeal to standards that determine what interests individuals should possess, then it follows that a particular moral rule is really in a person's self-interest to abide (not merely to have others abide) whether or not that person thinks so. Appealing to standards that have no necessary connection to individual preferences is to abrogate the raison d'etre of contractarian ethics. Consider: a perfectly sensible question is to ask in what way is this standard more motivating to me than any given actual xii Murray preference I may happen to have.