Altruism and Mutual Advantage 359

Altruism and Mutual Advantage 359 new. policy or program.Justification from mutual advantage has roots in Thomas Hobbes and David ~ume.2 The principle of mutual advan tage is roughly the collective implication of self-interest. As such, it is represented in the contemporary work of David Gauthier, scholars of normative law and economics, and John Rawls.5 Because altruism is, as noted above, contrary to self-interest, we might wonder whether theories grounded in mutual advantage can justify a principle of altru ism. I wish to explore the fit of altruism with mutual advantage not Altruism and Mutual only in theories but also in contemporary political practice. First, it is instructive to survey briefly the vicissitudes of altruism in Advantage philosophical discussions over the past few centuries and the develop ment of the principle of mutual advantage. Then I will turn to a quick survey of major welfare issues in contemporary American soci ety-these are, along with grievous hunger and destitution in the Third World, the major problem . for altruism in our policy Russell Hardin choices-and I will review the slow historical change that has made New York University these issues now a matter of collective resolution. This sets up a discus sion of the institutional provision of welfare, largely at the hand of government.· I conclude with remarks on the prospects of altruistic policies from a polity that may have outreached moral and political Altruism generally involves a conflict of interest betw~n the potentindal altruist and the • be · Contcm rary moral and pohucal theory a contemporary theories in its restrictive commitment to mutual advantage. poten~ nli~aa~ partly irithe grip of the principle of mutual advan~ge: Even Amei:ican ~ ~cs rooted in mutual advantage, which was the sole pnncaple of thcon~ ~ J~suce. areof the all- werful sovereign and the chief principle of Hume's Altruism and Its Variants H=st:::fica~: principle:which is the collective implication of scl_f-.interest, ~s to cono?'~t with altruism and with generally beneficent welfare pohcaes. "Altruism" is the term preferred by contemporary writers to cover the concerns of what was historically referred to as charity. During the At the level of the individual, altruism is very straightforwardly ~fined heyday of utilitarianism in nineteenth-century English philosophy, the as acting to benefit another or others at net cost to oneself. Any mterac preferred term was "beneficence." The changes in terminology give tion in which I may choose to act altruistically is in that respect one a clue to changes in actual content, and, to some extent, they mirror of pure conftict of interests: to make the other better off, I must m~ke changes in governmental action. Until about 2 centuries a·go, charity 1 myself worse off. Both elements must be the~e. Moreover, my acuo: was a major part of moral philosophy. Much of moral theory, under t be motivated by expectation of net gam from some conn~cte the influence of Aristotle and church thinkers, was some variant of :~:: from another. It would not be altruistic, but '!1erely self-m~er virtue theory. What was right was held to be what gave one a good ested, for me to benefit you today in order to receive an offsettmg character. Charity was a virtue, avarice was the more or less contrary reward from you or someone else tomorrow. vice, even, in the view of some, the worst of vices. 4 In contem rary moral theory, there is a renewed flowermg of.the The rise of beneficence accompanied the rise of state capacity to rind le of !:itual advantage. Under this principle, a rule for action, deal systematically with large classes of those ostensibly in need of ~ Ii p , or an action is judged right if it serves _the advantag_e of all help. The steady rise in the capacity of states to raise revenues, regu co':e:ed. For example, we might just~~y a particular tax pohcy or a larly jogged by the exigencies of war, largely resulted from increased welfare program on the claim that all c1uzens would benefit from the trade and from opportunities to collect taxes from trade and, eventu ally, directly from incomes. Charity, an individual personal virtue, is the wrong notion to apply to what states do for the indigent. To some extent, governments have seen their task as one of protecting the Social Stroict R,wu, (September !995). c 1995 by The Univcnity of Chicago. All nghts reserved. larger populace from crime and radical indigent movements, which 0057-796l/9~6705-0005$01.00 sometimes has even entailed separating indigents from the self-sup- 560 Social Service Review Altruism and Mutual Advantage 361 porting and law abiding. To the extent that welfare policy is motivated has been altruistic in the strong sense of modestly self-sacrificing for by such concerns, it is for mutual advantage. the benefit of others. Utilitarianism is sometimes called the morality of universal be . Rec~nt philosophi~al di~cussio~s have often been affected by socio neficence, which is simply altruism expanded to include oneself b10log1cal understandmgs of altrmsm and by the economic understand equally with all others among the objects of one's care. One way to ing of collective provision and the logic of collective action. In contem increase the welfare of those who are destitute or merely poor is porary sociobiological accounts of helping behavior, it is commonly by taxing those who are wealthy, thereby reducing their welf~re. ~upposed that natural selection will not produce altruistic, self-sacrific Nineteenth-century utilitarians and economists commonly t~ought mg ~atterns of behavior in general, but only in close kin relations. this move would enhance overall welfare because the wealthy would In w1~er conte?'ts, natural selection must favor helping patterns of give up wealth at the margin that would little affect their welfare behavior only if these serve the long-run survival of the individual whereas the poor received income that would radically improve engaging in them.6 In close kin relations, the survival of the group their condition. But this seems to be merely a factual, not a concep may be enhanced enough to offset the likely loss to the individual tual, claim. It might happen that the facts were the reverse, that from_ s~lf-sa~rificing behavior. There can be group selection of an transferring money from the very wealthy to the poor would reduce altruistic t~a•t because a_ group whose members develop that trait may the welfare of the wealthy more than it would increase the welfare be more hkely to survive than a group without the trait. For the of the poor. If these were the facts, then utilitarianism might even ~verw~elming bulk of human evolutionary history, humans may have have to prescribe transferring from the poor to the wealthy. But laved m small kin groups in which altruistic traits may have been many moral philosophers just happen to know this would be heinous s~lected thro~~h the prevalence of more cooperative over less coopera and immoral-some seem to know this independently of what they tive commumues. know of moral theory. Therefore, they suppose it clearly follows Ordinarily, actions of voluntary contribution toward a collective ben that utilitarianism is heinous and immoral. efit can as w~ll be considered altruistic in the sense that you lose more Note that this conclusion is supposed to follow irrespective of th~n you gam from your own contribution, even though you may whether it is at all plausible or whether the critic of utilitarianism gam more overall from the contributions of all than you contribute. actually believes overall welfare could typically be enhanced by trans However, when you vote on whether government takes over the role fers from the poor to the wealthy. In plausible instances of isolated of providing some collective good, then, if you can expect to benefit one-on-one interactions, virtually everyone, including the critic of the from the provision, you face the simple choice of voting for what utilitarian focus on welfare as the basic value, agrees that morally there would be ~~ for you or voting against it. You need not worry about 5 should be a trans£er from the poorer to the richer party. any contnbuuon, such as tax payments, you make being squandered With the growth of heavily urbanized, large societies, one-on-one for others who do not contribute fair shares. Your contribution would charity clearly lost its purpose other than the somewhat unseemly legally be tied to the contributions of others, so that your total benefit purpose of lifting the moral character of the charitable by giving them would outw~i~h your own contribution. Now, in the context of govern opportunity to demonstrate their virtue. Large numbers of ne~dy re !1'1ental provlSlon of group benefits, we may vote exclusively for what quire a bureaucracy,. not happenstance meetings with the charitable. is to our mutual benefit. .In the era of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald In taking over the functions of charity, the state gutted charity's sig Reagan, pluralities and even majorities of British and American voters nificance for ordinary, charitable individuals. seemed to do just that. Benevolence, the will to beneficent action, does not require virtue The tendency to prefer policies that are mutually advantageous (and in one-on-one meetings with the needy. It can be channeled through ~her~fore advantageous to oneself) is reinforced by the difficulty of whatever medium might be most effective .. Once the state became Judgmg beneficent policies.

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