Altruism and Mutual Advantage 359

new. policy or program.Justification from mutual advantage has roots in Thomas Hobbes and David ~ume.2 The principle of mutual advan­ tage is roughly the collective implication of self-interest. As such, it is represented in the contemporary work of David Gauthier, scholars of normative law and economics, and John Rawls.5 Because altruism is, as noted above, contrary to self-interest, we might wonder whether theories grounded in mutual advantage can justify a principle of altru­ ism. I wish to explore the fit of altruism with mutual advantage not Altruism and Mutual only in theories but also in contemporary political practice. First, it is instructive to survey briefly the vicissitudes of altruism in Advantage philosophical discussions over the past few centuries and the develop­ ment of the principle of mutual advantage. Then I will turn to a quick survey of major welfare issues in contemporary American soci­ ety-these are, along with grievous hunger and destitution in the Third World, the major problem . for altruism in our policy Russell Hardin choices-and I will review the slow historical change that has made New York University these issues now a matter of collective resolution. This sets up a discus­ sion of the institutional provision of welfare, largely at the hand of government.· I conclude with remarks on the prospects of altruistic policies from a polity that may have outreached moral and political Altruism generally involves a conflict of interest betw~n the potentindal altruist and the • be · Contcm rary moral and pohucal theory a contemporary theories in its restrictive commitment to mutual advantage. poten~ nli~aa~ partly irithe grip of the principle of mutual advan~ge: Even Amei:ican ~ ~cs rooted in mutual advantage, which was the sole pnncaple of thcon~ ~ J~suce. areof the all- werful sovereign and the chief principle of Hume's Altruism and Its Variants H=st:::fica~: principle:which is the collective implication of scl_f-.interest, ~s to cono?'~t with altruism and with generally beneficent welfare pohcaes. "Altruism" is the term preferred by contemporary writers to cover the concerns of what was historically referred to as charity. During the At the level of the individual, altruism is very straightforwardly ~fined heyday of utilitarianism in nineteenth-century English philosophy, the as acting to benefit another or others at net cost to oneself. Any mterac­ preferred term was "beneficence." The changes in terminology give tion in which I may choose to act altruistically is in that respect one a clue to changes in actual content, and, to some extent, they mirror of pure conftict of interests: to make the other better off, I must m~ke changes in governmental action. Until about 2 centuries a·go, charity 1 myself worse off. Both elements must be the~e. Moreover, my acuo: was a major part of moral philosophy. Much of moral theory, under t be motivated by expectation of net gam from some conn~cte the influence of Aristotle and church thinkers, was some variant of :~:: from another. It would not be altruistic, but '!1erely self-m~er­ virtue theory. What was right was held to be what gave one a good ested, for me to benefit you today in order to receive an offsettmg character. Charity was a virtue, avarice was the more or less contrary reward from you or someone else tomorrow. . vice, even, in the view of some, the worst of vices. 4 In contem rary moral theory, there is a renewed flowermg of.the The rise of beneficence accompanied the rise of state capacity to rind le of !:itual advantage. Under this principle, a rule for action, deal systematically with large classes of those ostensibly in need of ~ Ii p , or an action is judged right if it serves _the advantag_e of all help. The steady rise in the capacity of states to raise revenues, regu­ co':e:ed. For example, we might just~~y a particular tax pohcy or a larly jogged by the exigencies of war, largely resulted from increased welfare program on the claim that all c1uzens would benefit from the trade and from opportunities to collect taxes from trade and, eventu­ ally, directly from incomes. Charity, an individual personal virtue, is the wrong notion to apply to what states do for the indigent. To some extent, governments have seen their task as one of protecting the Social Stroict R,wu, (September !995). . c 1995 by The Univcnity of Chicago. All nghts reserved. larger populace from crime and radical indigent movements, which 0057-796l/9~6705-0005$01.00 sometimes has even entailed separating indigents from the self-sup- 560 Social Service Review Altruism and Mutual Advantage 361 porting and law abiding. To the extent that welfare policy is motivated has been altruistic in the strong sense of modestly self-sacrificing for by such concerns, it is for mutual advantage. the benefit of others. Utilitarianism is sometimes called the morality of universal be­ . Rec~nt philosophi~al di~cussio~s have often been affected by socio­ neficence, which is simply altruism expanded to include oneself b10log1cal understandmgs of altrmsm and by the economic understand­ equally with all others among the objects of one's care. One way to ing of collective provision and the logic of collective action. In contem­ increase the welfare of those who are destitute or merely poor is porary sociobiological accounts of helping behavior, it is commonly by taxing those who are wealthy, thereby reducing their welf~re. ~upposed that natural selection will not produce altruistic, self-sacrific­ Nineteenth-century utilitarians and economists commonly t~ought mg ~atterns of behavior in general, but only in close kin relations. this move would enhance overall welfare because the wealthy would In w1~er conte?'ts, natural selection must favor helping patterns of give up wealth at the margin that would little affect their welfare behavior only if these serve the long-run survival of the individual whereas the poor received income that would radically improve engaging in them.6 In close kin relations, the survival of the group their condition. But this seems to be merely a factual, not a concep­ may be enhanced enough to offset the likely loss to the individual tual, claim. It might happen that the facts were the reverse, that from_ s~lf-sa~rificing behavior. There can be group selection of an transferring money from the very wealthy to the poor would reduce altruistic t~a•t because a_ group whose members develop that trait may the welfare of the wealthy more than it would increase the welfare be more hkely to survive than a group without the trait. For the of the poor. If these were the facts, then utilitarianism might even ~verw~elming bulk of human evolutionary history, humans may have have to prescribe transferring from the poor to the wealthy. But laved m small kin groups in which altruistic traits may have been many moral philosophers just happen to know this would be heinous s~lected thro~~h the prevalence of more cooperative over less coopera­ and immoral-some seem to know this independently of what they tive commumues. know of moral theory. Therefore, they suppose it clearly follows Ordinarily, actions of voluntary contribution toward a collective ben­ that utilitarianism is heinous and immoral. efit can as w~ll be considered altruistic in the sense that you lose more Note that this conclusion is supposed to follow irrespective of th~n you gam from your own contribution, even though you may whether it is at all plausible or whether the critic of utilitarianism gam more overall from the contributions of all than you contribute. actually believes overall welfare could typically be enhanced by trans­ However, when you vote on whether government takes over the role fers from the poor to the wealthy. In plausible instances of isolated of providing some collective good, then, if you can expect to benefit one-on-one interactions, virtually everyone, including the critic of the from the provision, you face the simple choice of voting for what utilitarian focus on welfare as the basic value, agrees that morally there would be ~~ for you or voting against it. You need not worry about 5 should be a trans£er from the poorer to the richer party. any contnbuuon, such as tax payments, you make being squandered With the growth of heavily urbanized, large societies, one-on-one for others who do not contribute fair shares. Your contribution would charity clearly lost its purpose other than the somewhat unseemly legally be tied to the contributions of others, so that your total benefit purpose of lifting the moral character of the charitable by giving them would outw~i~h your own contribution. Now, in the context of govern­ opportunity to demonstrate their virtue. Large numbers of ne~dy re­ !1'1ental provlSlon of group benefits, we may vote exclusively for what quire a bureaucracy,. not happenstance meetings with the charitable. is to our mutual benefit. .In the era of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald In taking over the functions of charity, the state gutted charity's sig­ Reagan, pluralities and even majorities of British and American voters nificance for ordinary, charitable individuals. seemed to do just that. Benevolence, the will to beneficent action, does not require virtue The tendency to prefer policies that are mutually advantageous (and in one-on-one meetings with the needy. It can be channeled through ~her~fore advantageous to oneself) is reinforced by the difficulty of whatever medium might be most effective .. Once the state became Judgmg beneficent policies. All policies could be categorized as either more articulately capable of and available for helping the needy, a advantageous to oneself or not. Welfare policies for the poor fall into penon with a benevolent will could readily accomplish beneficence the second category along with graft, selective regulations to benefit by supporting state action. Successful support would likely entail some some narrow group, and wasteful policies such as egregious military cost to the benevolent through taxes. The benevolent might also gain expenditures. The first category sounds reasonably clean and clear· if welfare programs make society safer or more esthetic. But we might the second is a mess. . ' suppose the general motivation of many supporten of state welfare Historically, the greatest objection to systematic altruism has been or02t11ms, which once claimed impressive levels of popular support, its incentive to welfare dependency. Although his concern was with 562 Social Service Review Altruism and Mutual Advantage 363 individuals-their motivations and effects on them-John Dewey Smi~h. It entails either coercion (Hobbes, Smith) or moral restraint forcefully stated several criticisms of the impulse to altruism, benefi­ (Smith, Gauthier) to block some forms of unadulterated avarice-such cence, philanthropy, and charity.7 Naturally, he noted the problem of as_ theft-~hat could be purely self-interested because it requires mutu­ welfare dependency, although he discussed this at the level of the ahty_ of gam. Mutual advantage, again, is the collective implication of individual beneficiary of other individuals' aid, as in the case of an self-mterest. invalid who becomes a confirmed invalid because the care is so sweet. J:Iobbes's ~iew of the beneficial, enabling consequences of coercive Dewey also claimed that, as in feudal times, the charity of the well social order •.s shared by John Diiulio in his account of the conditions off might displace a more cogent concern with their own injustice. of the poor m American inner cities. DiI ulio argues that it is not so Moreover, benevolence tends to contribute to the egoism of the bene­ much the. conditions of the underclass that lead to crime but rather ficiary and to that of the benefactor. Finally, as in the philanthropy the opposite: the background of crime leads to the conditions of the 11 of the robber barons of Dewey's early years, benevolence may readily underclass. The evident correlation between the rise of crime and be used to rationalize or mask great immorality. He did not include the de~y of the inner cities is causal, but the cause is crime and the in his litany the appalling vision of medieval church fathers who sup­ effect ~s deca~ rather than the reverse. This is Hobbes's theory applied posed that God could have made us all rich-but he wanted poor to th~ _mner cuy. Hobbes supposed that the resolution of the dreadful people so that the rich might have opportunity to redeem themselves cond1uons of the state of nature or of anarchy, in which he was sure life through charity. 8 would be nasty, brutish, and short, can be overcome only by coercive In contemporary philosophical vernacular, charity is still used in government that imposes order. Under such a government, individuals the way Dewey excoriates. Benevolence is often used in the broader c~n prosper because they can be confident that their acquisitive efforts utilitarian sense, which Dewey approved, that includes concern to wall benefit themselves. create institutional structures that enable individuals to be self-reliant. Smith defends _ava~ice and even the frivolous pursuit of baubles as Altruism may be the more ii:iclusive term, but it seems most often to generally ?Cnefic1al virtues. Your avarice and your desire for even silly be used for relatively small-scale, even one-on-one, interactions. ~onsumpuons_ push you to make better goods for trade in order to Note that Dewey's criticism of the cluster of notions of altruism is mcrease you! mcome and consumption beyond subsistence. If we were not addressed to their moral theoretic justification but entirely to their all moral stoics, not interested in finery, display, and consumption, we pragmatic, psychological implications. He wanted general improve­ would not ~ so prosper?us ,~r so well cared for. Through no benevo­ ments in welfare-that was his chief moral principle. But he did not lence on their part: t~e r~ch advance the interest of society and afford want these to come through the partly, even largely, self-defeating means to the muluphcataon of the species. "12 Self-interest is therefore ramifications of individual motivations for altruism, motivations that g~ for the larger community. Indeed, we must suppose it is sociobio­ could go awry. One could follow him all the way in his arguments but log1cally selected. turn away at the point of his factual assessment of the overall effect on . Despite the general concern with mutual advantage in the~e theo­ welfare of altruistic motivations, on which he presented no evidence. ries, ther~ is a dramatic shift in focus after Hobbes. Hobbes was con­ cerned wu~ ad~antages that follow from simple coordination, in his Mutual Advantage case, ~oor?mauon on a sovereign who would impose stable order. ~rdmauon on all of us driving either on the left or the right is Commitment to altruism in the form of straight beneficence has been s1malar to Hob~s's concern, although of course it is also much simpler. undercut in recent decades by the rise of mutual-advantage theories We can coor?mate on the left, as in England, or on the right, as in of morality. Gauthier supposes that what is moral is what we could all North Amer:ica. Eit_h_er resu!t brings order to what would otherwise agree to in a fair bargain. 9 The minimum to which most of us would be the chaotic concl1t1on of hfe without a standard driving rule. That agree in most bargains is some gain to ourselves. If all agree, all gain. order_ e~ables us to do many things better; it liberates us. 13 Gauthier is not the first to put forward a theory of mutual advantage. Smith s economics takes the legal order for granted and focuses on Hobbes's theory of political sovereignty has its minimalist moral exchanges between individuals. Typically, when you and I engage in grounding in mutual advantage. 10 Adam Smith's vision of the free an exchange, we do so because each of us expects to be better off market economy is also one of mutual advantage. To make mutual afterward. H~nce, t~e exchange serves our mutual advantage. Yet, advantage the foundation of moral theory is not merely to ensconce the exchan~e •~ n~t simply a coordination except in the sense that we self-interest, however, as one might suppose from the example of have legal msutuuons to coerce us if necessary to prevent mere theft 564 Social Service Review Altruism and Mutual Advantage 365 14 instead of exchange. If legal protections secure me in making the system is just. Much more talk is therefore required to persuade us of exchanges I want to make with those who want to make them with !he somewhat more s~ecific conclusions Rawls reaches. His final theory me, I might see the range of options now open to me as essentially is that there are certam basic or "primary" goods that are more funda­ matters of coordination. Hobbes sought coordination on a legal sys­ mental to our well-being and to our sense of self-respect than are such tem; Smith and many later writers have focused on coordination in other goo?s as weal~h far beyond the needs for survival and good exchanges once legal protections are in place. Smith's concern was health. It is these primary goods that must first be distributed fairly. principally with the mutual benefit we get from exchange. Hobbes Because we are all in it together, we must all expect to be at least as saw such exchanges as what a coercive legal order enables us to achieve. w_ell _off _as the worst-of~ class of people in any possible system of If property relations are protected, we have incentive to produce what d1stnbut1on. Therefore, 1£ the worst-off class in system A is better off we need without fear of its being stolen, without need of great efforts than the worst-off class in system B, A is more just than B. to protect it. The energies we might have put into protection we can Raw!s's _gene~al _arg?ment might be expected to lead immediately put into further production or into leisure. t? egahtanan d1stnbut10n. It does not if, as Smith supposes, the incen­ Both Hobbes and Smith make the possibility of coordination a causal tive for greate_r consumption is a significant part of what leads people factor in explaining the general rise in prosperity of well-ordered t9 be productive. Because their productivity benefits not only them­ societies. But Hobbes, writing in a period of chaos, makes the order s~lves but also t_he !arg~r society, we may readily imagine that a society brought by coercive legal institutions his central focus, whereas Smith, with unequal d1stnbut1on of wealth and income could have a distribu­ writing in a period of relative stability, makes production and exchange tion of primary goods .that provided greater benefits to its worst-off his focus. Hobbes focused on the first-order problem, Smith on the ~lass than could an egalita~ian so~iety, in which all might be impover­ second. We may tend to see the world more nearly as Smith did, except •s~ed for lack of adequate mcenuve to be more productive. If perfect when we look at the impoverished inner city. fairness would seem to require equality of distribution of primary Note that Smith's views of avarice and frivolous consumption wreck goods, the concern for mutual advantage trumps fairness and allows traditional notions of virtue. There are still practicing virtue th~orists for inequality. today, but the generally persuasive power of the virtues as the founda­ In t~is sta!ement, it is clear that the concerns with mutual advantage tion of moral theory has not recovered from the sociobiological thrust and with fairness are separate concerns. At times, however, Rawls of Smith's account of how avarice, the archvice, turns beneficial. In seems to hold that the notion of fairness itself derives from what it this account, incidentally, avarice may be selected because of its individ­ woul? be mutually. ad_v~ntageous for us to do. If we are rationally ual-level effects, and yet it becomes a seeming virtue because of its working out the prmc1p_Ies for ~ur social institutions without regard group-level effects. Avarice is a virtue, therefore, because of its contin­ t? how we personally wdl rank m the system, and if we are severely gent connection to collective welfare. But then virtue theory is deriva­ nsk averse about the possibility of winding up in a worst-off class we tive. Traditional notions of human nature and its per£ection, the focus might, thi~k ~t indivi~ua!ly, ?ence mutually, advantageous to opi' for of virtue theory, were rolled under the juggernaut of social welfare Rawls s. prmc1ple of d1stnbut1on. There is no beneficence, no altruism. by the modern economists and their progeny, utilitarians. ~ose no­ T?ere 1s only mutual advantage and fairness, and the latter may be tions have yet to recover. In general, the rise of mutual advantage tncked out of mutual advantage. 17 theory is mirrored in the decline of virtue theory and concern with altruism. 15 The most inftuential advocate of mutual advantage in our time is Contemporary Welfare Issues John Rawls, whose complex theory ofjustice is grounded in a com?ina­ One of the chief revisions of the understanding of welfare in our time 16 tion of considerations of fairness and mutual advantage. Very bnefly, recalls a debate that has gone back' at least to the Elizabethan Poor Laws. Rawls holds that a national economy and system of distribution of Man~ opponents of ~elfare programs have argued in essence that the wealth, income, and privilege is essentially a joint creation by all of most important constituent of one's welfare is what one can bring about us. Hence, to be just, it must be jointly beneficial to motivate us all. for oneself. Charity has perverse incentive effects that tend to work Also, it must be fair in some sense that we could reasonably accept against t!1e inc~ntive to do things for oneself. Hence, even though it under circumstances in which we judge the system independently of ') •.. ~ay be amm~iately beneficial to someone who is hungry or urgently knowing how well we individually would fare in it. This is not a suffi­ !n n~, chanty may harm more than it helps in the longer run because ciently specific set of conditions to yield a unique conclusion on what it may uxluce dependency. 18 This is particularly likely for charity that is 366 Social Service Review Altruism and Mutual Advantage 367 regularized arxl dependable, either through begging on a consistently profitable street corner or through a long-term government program. times called a public goods theory of the state. In this theory, it is A core thesis of Charles Murray's recent books is the traditional supposed we need a central organizing institution to supply certain thesis of Samuel Johnson, John Stuart Mill, Joseph Tow_n~end, and goods, such as national defense, that are not easily marketed.25 They Alexis de Tocqueville-an odd collection who share ~kep~1c1sm _about are not easily marketed because few would have incentive to buy the beneficial effects of welfare programs that a~ect 11~1v1du~l !nce~­ any. No matter how much defense is already being supplied by the tives for productive work and self-betterment. 1 Their skepuc1sm, 1t purchases of others in my society, I have no interest in buying any should be clear, is not theoretical but is merely factu~l. True, th_e more. Why? Because my purchase would benefit me less than it would direction of the incentive effect of welfare programs weighs theoreu­ cost me. From considerations of my own self-interest, therefore, I cally against incentives for self-help. Still, the skepticism is not merely would prefer simply to enjoy a free ride on the provisions of others. theoretical because in theory the effeet of the supposedly perverse If we can somehow create a state to raise taxes to pay for defense, we incentive could go either way. For example, if we tax away part of might all vote in favor of substantial expenditures. But if defense someone's income or profit, the result could be less ef~ort because depends on voluntary contributions, we may get very little. effort pays less or it could be more effort be~ause more !s needed to Mancur Olson calls the strategic incentive structure of national de­ achieve a desired level of welfare. Welfare assistance may induce so~e fense and similar problems the logic of collective action. 24 We could people to strive harder on their own to provide themsel~es a~ their overcome this logic if all were motivated by benevolence, utilitarianism, families with things that would have been out of reach en~1rely ~1thout or various other moral principles. Or, if we somehow come to have the assistance. But Murray and the earlier welfare skepucs c~a1m---:or government, we can overcome the logic in some cases because it will wonder whether-the perverse incentive trumps the normal mcenuve be the interest of the governors as well as of the populace to make 20 and leads to less self-help and greater dependency. • • public provisions from tax or other public revenues or to compel all As with Dewey's litany of complaints against benevolent mouvau~ns, of us to do relevant things, such as serve in the military. Murray's claim is a factual matter. The data are not yet conclusive, Suppose we are in a group that would benefit from collective provi­ although some data support skepticism about at least some forms of sion of some good. If we do not have the coercive power of the state welfare assistance for at least some classes of recipients: O~e of the ~st behind us, we may not be able to provide ourselves the good. But severely criticized of the American welfare programs ts Aid to Famibes some of us might act from moral principles that encourage us to with Dependent Children (AFDC). A· recent survey of the depe~ncy contribute to the cause. My contribution might now be essentially effects of this program reports that about 30 percent of AFDC rec1p1ents altruistic. Suppose it costs me far more than I will benefit from what received welfare for only 1 or 2 years but another 30 percent for ~ ~ears my contribution alone purchases for us. Hence, my contributing meets or more. 21 Assistance arxl self-help may go together for many rec1p1ents the opening definition of altruism. Yet it is also a contribution to a while they conflict for other recipients. Those who benefit from short­ cause that, if it is successful, will benefit me. It is in this sense unlike term assistance may face a short-term crisis, whose survival must first be my contribution te help relieve hunger in the Sahel or to help educate secured if they are to be able to help themselv~s. In this respect, t~ey blacks in South Africa. It is more like a contribution to my local opera or museum. may be like foreign beneficiaries of food aid dunng ~ments o~ famme. lrxlividuals cannot generally protect themse~ves aga_a~st f~m1?e· . Pre­ The striking thing about my altruistic contribution to my nation's venting arxl resolving famine generally requares pohtacal, msutuuonal defense or to the amenities of my community, however, is its woeful devices. Famine relief may therefore be necessary to enable people to inadequacy as compared to what could be raised by government using engage in self-help once their crisis is past, and 1t can be u~ed, as any the force of law. Although it is altruistic for me to give voluntarily to Hobbesian might recommerd, to help a governmen~ or regional body my nation's or community's cause, it is not altruistic for me to vote create a structure of order within which food supp!1es can be ~vened for the taxes to pay for those provisions more effectively. My share of out over years of drought or to enable a population !o sutv1ve the the taxes will typically be less than my evaluation of the benefits to disruptions in food supply caused by a momentary war. 2 myself. If this condition were not true for most of us who vote for the provision, our vote would seem to be a mistake. By voting for it to be a matter of public policy, I work to force my contribution to be Collective Provision matched, so that I do not suffer a loss from it. In parallel with their contributions to utilitarian moral thinki~g, eigh­ In general, provision of domestic goods that benefit large groups, teenth- and nineteenth-century economists developed what 1s some- even whole societies, has increasingly been taken over by the state, so that the field of play for altruis111 has plausibly been steadily reduced. Altruism and Mutual Advantage 369 568 Social Service Review W~ may still be altruistic in the simple sense when we contribute to for making the transfers. With such a structure, my contributions may the well-being of those starving in the Sahel or Bangladesh. But many be of significant value to someone; without such a structure, they may of the ostensibly charitable actions of the middle classes in wealthy be of no value to those I wish to reach. The duty I have therefore societies are directed at provisions that they themselves want and depends on the quality of relevant institutions. Hence, in this sense, my would benefit from but that they cannot substantially affect. When duty of beneficence is what Hume calls artificial: the nature and content 25 we go to the state for provision of such benefits, we t~ade altrui~tic of the duty depend on contingent facts of social organization. motivations for concern with mutual advantage. We might also turn Suppose one group has a right, a welfare right, and another has a to the state to make our actions toward those in the Sahel more effec­ correlative duty of beneficence. But also suppose members of the tive. But this move would be altruistic if we think it would cost us first group do not wish to exercise their right through institutional without benefiting us tnough to offset the cost. arrangements to which the second group is committed. The second Appeal to beneficence or altruism is commonly swamped by the group has attempted to meet its duty of beneficence, but their effort power of the appeal to mutual advantage,just as th~ appeal to concern is rejected. Now what duty does the second group have toward the for others is commonly swamped by appeal to self-interest. The force first group? Do they somehow have a duty to do what the first group of the appeal of mutual advantage should come as no surprise because would like-for example, making handouts on the street? it is typically made in contexts in which it is de facto an appeal to self­ To some extent, this is a question of whether I may reasonably interest. When we vote for a policy that coerces all of us to pay taxes determine the content of my duties or whether that content depends to make a collective provision that benefits us all, we can individually on what duties others might want me to have. Obviously, in many view the problem as one of assessing our own personal interest. We contex~ ot.hers' wants or views should have no force. For example, I get the provision or we do not. If we get it, we pay for it, but if we may !hm~ 1t my duty to help someone in a political or ethnic minority who 1s bemg persecuted, and the fact that others think I have a con­ pay less than it is worth to us, it is !n our inte~est. . . . It is an oddity of our great capacity for public prov1s1on that 1t may trary duty to join in the persecution need have no moral force for me. substantially displace beneficent actions. For some of us, the lack of Of course, if one holds a moral view that stipulates the duties we prods to beneficence in routine one-on-one contexts may e~entually have from abstract rationalist argument or from instant intuition, the dull our sensitivity to needs for beneficence. At th~ sam~ ume,. t~e formal content of those duties may have no contingent determinates. massiveness of the prods to one-on-one beneficence m the mn~r c1ues The only consideration of contingency may be in deciding when the of Amsterdam, Delhi, New York, and San Francisco may convmce us duty comes into play. For a utilitarian, however, that a group wants its beneficences one that only institutional solutions can handle the problem. war rather than another is a fact that may matter. A program of assistance that requires voluntary participation but in which the target Beneficence through Institutions population will not participate is unlikely to be an effectively utilitarian Hume called beneficence a natural duty. He conceived it as a motiva­ program. Personal handouts on the street may also not seem utilitarian tion you or I have if we face a person in dire straits whe~ we have even if many of the indigent want a system of handouts. Therefore, the capacity to rescue the person. Modern beneficence earned o~t by the utilitarian duty of beneficence might rightly commend a policy the state cannot take this form. My taxes go toward care for the mch­ that the beneficiaries would not choose. One who agrees with the gent in exceedingly impersonal ways. I may seldom ~ace anyone in widely accepted view that the perverse incentive effects of charity or dire need even though I yearly pay hundreds of dollars m taxes toward welfare outweigh the good effects might conclude on utilitarian my proportionate share of aid to the poor, and I may also give furth~r grounds that the only correct form of beneficence is the creation of hundreds to charitable organizations to benefit people whom I will institutions and incentives that' will stimulate and enable self-help. Indeed, a benevolent person must generally prefer that the economic never meet and, moreover, whose type I may never meet. The natural duty of beneficence that Hume thinks can be evoked only system work well enough that there would be little call for altruism. Failing that, an altruist would want a system of welfare that generally by near contact is not the duty I might feel for the indigent at home or 26 abroad. Rather, I feel a relatively generalized, humanitarian duty. The resolved problems by preventing poverty rather than by correcting it. motivating force of this duty may be very weak. Hence, th~t force may The Politics of Mutual Advantage lead me to give too little to overcome the obstacles to reachmg the class of those whom I wish to help. For my few thousand dollars to reach Contemporary public policy discussions in the United States seldom them efficiently will require ~e existence of an institutional structure appeal to altruism. Instead, w~lfare programs are often justified as in 570 Social Service Review Altruism and Mutual Advantage 371 the interest of the middle class, and, indeed, some of them-support supposition that we all benefit ex ante from the state program. But for higher education, the arts, and medical research-may be in their t~en ~he st~te program is likely to be delimited by the concern above interest even to the point of redistributing from the relatively poor to with mcenuve effects. There are two reasons I might suppose even the well off. (fhe same is plausibly true of defense spending, but this ex ante that I _would be better off if the state would not rescue many claim requires trickier subjective assessments.) Appeals to fairness, as people who might become dependent on state programs. First, I might in politics over civil rights, have had some force in our time, but suppose I a'? unlikely to be one of those ever to need such programs. appeals to altruism have little or none. President Kennedy called for Se~ond, I might think· that, even if I did need the programs at some sacrifice in his inaugural address, saying we should ask not what our pomt, I would be better off if I still were given strong incentive to country could do for us but what we could do for our country. But work my way out of the programs. Hence, I might think mutual that was largely an appeal to nationalism and the national role in advantage would be served by programs that addressed at most criti­ foreign affain. And it was cast almost entirely in the language of cal transitional moments of poverty or other need and that b~ilt in nationalism. There was little hint of the core of altruism, which is strong incentives for independence once the transitional need has beneficence to others, even at cost to oneself. passed. One who shares Dewey's criticism of the workings of the motivation · Contemporary_ ~ral and political philosophy are not fully domi­ of altruism might find this reassuring. But one could also agree with n~ted by the _prmc1ple of mutual advantage-there are utilitarian, Dewey, even holding that charity has been more harmful than benefi­ fa1rn~ss, Ka_nu~n, ~nd other theories that allow and even require sub­ cial on balance, and still think public policy should be benevolent. stantial red1stnbuuon that would not meet the principle of mutual Dewey's criticisms were addressed almost entirely to individuals, espe­ advantage. But contemporary politics in the United States has come cially to individuals who act from benevolence. He was against personal to be very heavily grounded in a-perhaps murky-vision of mutual charity but committed to general welfare. This, on any articulate un­ advantage. Even the politics of sacrifice that President Bill Clinton dentanding of how our world works, suggests the construction of pus?es is of~en fra?1ed as a politics of mutual advantage: we must all relevant institutions, such as those that undergird individual freedom sacnfice a bit now m order that we will not all be even worse off in a to engage in exchange and production. Even many of those who agree few years. Clinton's characterization of sacrifice seems to answer to a with relatively pessimistic claims of welfare dependency in long-term sense of what would be fair in our society. What would be fair is programs might also agree that interventions in crises can provide that all benefit from any changes that are made, that the changes be both immediate benefits and longer-run institutions for self-help.27 mutually advantageous. In the politics of mutual advantage altruism Smith's view of the mutual advantage of free markets was liberating does not thrive. ' 2 centuries ago, and it seems to be liberating in East Europe today. But it may be a forlorn and pointless challenge for many in America's Notes ghettos and in some of the most impoverished nations of the Third World. There is too little scope for a free market in a context in which . An carlie~ version of this article was presented to the Centennial confcrencc "Altru­ there are enormous individual costs of stabilizing and securi_ng daily ism_: Ex~lonng t~c Intellectual Concept," at the School of Social Service Administration, Umvcrsaty of Chica~, November 7_and 8,. 1991. I wish to thank the conference organiz­ life, which was, rightly, Hobbes's fint concern. It would be odd, how­ cn a!1'1 fellow part1c1pants _for a st1mulatmg occasion. I also thank William Schweiker ever, if the scope of our morality and our moral theory were reduced for. has extended oral and wnttcn commentary on this article, Paul Bullen for his research to concern with the mutual advantage of order and of generalized assistance! and the Andrew W.. Mellon Foundation for generous general support. 1. Ty_p1cally, w~ would no! mcludc under altruism actions that arc directed at the self-help-that is, with nothing more than the mutual satisfaction prospcnty of one s near rclabvcs, especially one's children. of our selves' interests. Strict concern with mutual advantage would 2. Thomas Hobbes, Ltviad&an, any ed. (first published 1651)· David Hume A Trealist typically recommend programs that tax the middle class to benefit the of Human Nalurt, any ed. (first published 1739-40), bk. 3; Ru~ll Hardin, "Fr°om Power to Order, from Hobbes to Hume," Journal of Polilital Plailosopla1 1 (March 1993)· middle class, programs such as elite schools and museums, but would 195-207. . recommend against programs that entail taxing the well off to benefit 3. David G~uth~cr, Morals bJ Agrtmamt C?xford: Oxford University Press, 1986). Be~o~ Gauthier, at woul~ hayc_ been plausible to say that mutual advantage was a the poor. pohUca! theory; for Gauthier, 1t 1s also a theory for individual moral choice outside the Clearly, mutual advantage and altruism do not fit well together rcgu~tion of the state. For n~>nnativc law and economics, sec Russell Hardin, "lnc unless the altruism can be tricked into a form of mutual advantage. Morality of Law and Econo~ncs," /JJw and Philosopla1 11 (November 1992): SSl-84; This can be done through use of state capacity to deliver assistance, Jo~n Rawls, A ~ of )":flU:t (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971); Bnan Barry, 77aeorw o/Jwtu:e (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press which trumps the individual's hope of doing much, coupled with some 1989), esp. pt. 3. • 572 Social Service Review Altruism and Mutual Advantage 573

4. For a typical twelfth-century view, sec John of Salisbury, Policraticus: Tiu Statesman '.r ~2. John W. Mellor and Sarah Gavian, "Famine: Causes, Prevention, and Relief," Boole (1159; New York: Frederick Ungar, 1979; abridged and edited by Murray F. Same, 235 (January SO, 1987): 539-45. Markland), bk. 8, chap. 4, pp. 118-19. 25. Willia~ J. ~aumol, Welfar, Economies and Ila, Theory of th, State (Cambridge, Mass.: 5. Russell Hardin, Morality widain Ila, Limits of Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Harvard Umvcrsaty Press, 1952). Press, 1988), P· 59. 2_4. ~ancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 6. R. L. Tnvcn, -rhc Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism," Qµ4rurl1 Rroi#w of Biolor, Un!ven!ty Press, 1965); Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 46 (1971): 55-57, esp. 55. Umvenaty Press, for Resources for the Future, 1982). 7. John Dewey and James H. Tufu, Ellaia (1908; Carbondale: Southern Illinois Uni­ 25. Hume (n. 2 above), bk. 5, esp. pu. 1 and 2. Also sec Schneewind (n. 15 above), vcnity Press, 1978), pp. 547-51. This discu11ion is in pt. 2, which, on the testimony pp. 50-54. of the authon, wu wntten by Dewey (p. 6). 26. See further, Brian Barry, "The Welfare State versus the Relief of Poverty "Ellaia 8. Michel Mollat, 7M Poor in Ila, Middu Ages: An Essa1 in Social Hutory, trans. Arthur 100 (April 1990): 505-29, esp. 505. ' Goldhammer ( 1978; English ed., New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univenity Preas, 1986), p. 44. . 27. ~or example, the current program to eradicate polio in Latin America may 9. Gauthier (n. 5 above). yield direct bcncfiu to protect those immediately at risk, while it also builds a modest 10. Hobbes (n. 2 above), chaps. 15-15; Russell Hardin, "Hobbesian Political Order," mfrastructure for subsequent medical care. Polilieal Thtory 19 (May 1991): 156-80. 11. John J. Diiulio, Jr., "The Impact of Inner-City Crime," Pub& lnurat, no. 96 (Summer 1989), pp. 28-46. 12. Adam Smith, Thtory of Moral Stnmnnlls, ed. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Madie (1759; Oxford: Oxford Univenity Press, 1976; reprint, Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1982), pt. 4, chap. I, par. 10. See further, Adam Smith, An Inquiry into Ila, Na1UT1 and C.Ousa of 1M Wtallh of Nalion.l, ed. R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner ( 1776; Oxford: Oxford Univenity Press, 1976; reprint, Indianapolis: Liberty Pre11, 1981), bk. 5, chap. 4, pan. 15-16; Istvan Hont and Michael lgnatieff, .. Needs and Justice in the W,allla of Nalunu: An Introductory Essay," in W,alt/a and Virlul: Tht Sl,aping of Political Econom1 in Ila, &oau/a Enliglatnamnat, ed. Istvan Hont and Michael lgnatieff (Cambridge: Cambridge Univenity Press, 1985), pp. 10-11; and Stephen Holmes, ''The Secret History of Self­ Interest," in BIJO'lll Self-lnurtSI, ed. Jane J. Mansbridge (Chicago: Univenity of Chicago Press, 1990). 15. Hardin, MoralitJ widain Ila, Limil.s of Ria.son (n. 5 above), chap. 2. 14. Exchange hu the strategic structure of the Prisoner's Dilemma. The status quo is an inferior equilibrium from which both parties could gain by exchanging. Legal institutions put strong constrainu on the possibilities of such one-sided moves as my promising to give you A tomorrow if you give me B today and then reneging once I have B. See Russell Hardin, "Exchange Theory on Strategic Bases," Social Sanae, lnformalion 2 (1982): 251-72. 15. For a different and more detailed account of what happened to virtue theory, see J. B. Schneewind, "The Misfortunes of Virtue," EllaiCJ 101 (October 1990): 42-65. 16. Rawls (n. 5 above). 17. Hardin, Moralily widain Ila, Limits of R,ason (n. 5 above), pp. 150-55. 18. For extended discussion, ICC Russell Hardin, "Incentives and Beneficence," Social Juslic, RaMTcla 4 Uune 1990): 87-104. · 19. Charles Murray,LosingGt-ound (New York: Basic, 1984), andlnPurs':"l: Of Happi­ nar and Good Gowmmml (New York.: Simon & Schuster, 1988). For Samuel Johnson, ICC James Bdswell, Lif, of Johnson ( 1791; London: Oxford Univenity Press, 1976), pp. 947-48; John Stuart Mill, Principles of Polilieal Econom1, ed. J. M. Robson (7th ed., 1871; Toronto: Univenity of Toronto Press, 1965), bk. 5, chap. 11, sec. 15, p. 960; Joseph Townsend, A Disslrlalwm on Ila, Poor 1.4a,s, BJ a W,U-Wuhtr lo Manlcind (1786; Berkeley: UniYenity of California Press, 1971); AICXJS de Tocqueville, "Memoir on Pauperism," · in T~ and B,a"""1fll on S«ial Reform, ed. Seymour Drescher (1855; New York: Harper, 1968), pp. 1-2. 20. Michael J. Lipsky reporu that demand for welfare support tends to rise to meet supply in American experience. See Michael J. Lipsky, Strtet-llwl Bur,auaac, (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1980), pp. 27-28. For a survey and analysis of English experience with the poor law, ICC George R. Boyer, An Economic Hutory of Ila, English Poor 1.4w, n,o-18'0 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univenity Preas, 1990). Within the con­ strainu of his model and his data, Boyer finds that the birth rate increases with level of child support (chap. 5). 21. Greg J. Duncan, Martha S. Hill, and Saul D. Hoffman, 11 Wclfare Dependence within and across Generations," Sdnac, 239 (January 29, 1988): 467-71.