Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-2012)
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Liberalism, Contractarianism, and the Problem of Exclusion
Edinburgh Research Explorer Liberalism, Contractarianism, and the Problem of Exclusion Citation for published version: Cook, P 2015, Liberalism, Contractarianism, and the Problem of Exclusion. in S Wall (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Liberalism. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 87-111. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139942478 Digital Object Identifier (DOI): 10.1017/CBO9781139942478 Link: Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer Document Version: Peer reviewed version Published In: The Cambridge Companion to Liberalism General rights Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. Take down policy The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 28. Sep. 2021 LIBERALISM, CONTRACTARIANISM AND THE PROBLEM OF EXCLUSION Philip Cook University of Edinburgh [email protected] Final Pre-Publication Draft Published Version Appeared in The Cambridge Companion to Liberalism. Wall, S. (ed.). (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 87-111 Introduction For liberal contractarians, moral and political principles are justified if agreeable to persons as free and equals.1 But for critics of liberal contractarianism, this justification does not apply to all those who should be treated as free and equal, but only to those capable of agreement. -
By Virgil W Topazio
VOLTAIRE AND ROUSSEAU: HUMANISTS AND HUMANITARIANS IN CONFLICT by Virgil W Topazio Whether judged as men, philosophers, or writers, it would be difficult to imagine two persons more different than Voltaire and Rousseau, yet they were both literary giants of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment who believed they had devoted most of their adult lives to the cause of political and moral freedom and justice. Voltaire was the beneficiary of a formal classical education that served as a solid base to his broad cultural background and wide reading. He un- abashedly enjoyed the flourishing eighteenth-century salon life with its pre- mium on wit, conversational skills, and intellect. And despite his capacities for strong emotions, his manner of coping with the overriding problen~of injustice was through the exercise of reason and intellect. Theodore Bester- man informs us in his recent biography of Voltaire: "The truth is that this nlost profound conviction (i.e., love of justice) was the fruit of Voltaire's reason, but it was expressed with all the deepest passions of his being.. Indeed, Voltaire was utterly a man of the mind."' Rousseau, on the other hand, possessed neither the classical education nor the broad systematic learning of Voltaire, though he was an unusually well- read autodidact in the eyes of Marguerite Reichenburg.' What is more important, Rousseau was by nature much more introverted than his extra- verted contenlporary, lacked Voltaire's conversational skills and sharp wit, and what is more, notwithstanding his protestations, was almost totally devoid of a sense of humor. He himself would probably have admitted that in his youth he had sold his soul to a Mephistophelian Paris. -
No Need for Morality: the Case of the Competitive Market
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by The College at Brockport, State University of New York: Digital Commons @Brockport Philosophic Exchange Volume 13 Article 2 Number 1 SUMMER 1982 Volume 13 1982 No Need for Morality: The aC se of the Competitive Market David Gauthier University of Pittsburgh Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex Part of the Philosophy Commons Repository Citation Gauthier, David (1982) "No Need for Morality: The asC e of the Competitive Market," Philosophic Exchange: Vol. 13 : No. 1 , Article 2. Available at: http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol13/iss1/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @Brockport. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophic Exchange by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @Brockport. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Gauthier: No Need for Morality: The Case of the Competitive Market DAVID GA UTHIEH Professor of Philosophy Unh·prsily of Pittsburgh Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1982 1 Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 13 [1982], No. 1, Art. 2 No Need for Morality: The Case of the Competithe �tarket by Da,·id Gauthier Morality is a Visible Fool. This unappealing metaphor 1s derived. of coum'. from Adam Smith's Invisible Hand. Where the Invisible Hand fails to direct each person's actions to the public interest · or. as l shall prefer to say. lo mutual bene fit · the Visible Foot takes over. Hand and Fool share a common aim. But they work in very different ways. -
Occurrent Contractarianism
OCCURRENT CONTRACTARIANISM: A Preference-Based Ethical Theory by Malcolm Murray A thesis presented to the University of Waterloo in fulfilment of the thesis requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 1995 i © Robert Malcolm Murray 1995 ii DECLARATION I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. I authorize the University of Waterloo to lend this thesis to other institutions or individuals for the purpose of scholarly research. I further authorize the University of Waterloo to reproduce this thesis by photocopying or by other means, in total or in part, at the request of other institutions or individuals for the purpose of scholarly research. iii BORROWER'S PAGE The University of Waterloo requires the signatures of all persons using or photocopying this thesis. Please sign below, and give address and date. Thank you. iv OCCURRENT CONTRACTARIANISM: A Preference-Based Ethical Theory ABSTRACT There is a problem within contractarian ethics that I wish to resolve. It concerns individual preferences. Contractarianism holds that morality, properly conceived, can satisfy individual preferences and interests better than amorality or immorality. What is unclear, however, is whether these preferences are those individuals actually hold or those that they should hold. The goal of my thesis is to investigate this question. I introduce a version of contractarian ethics that relies on individual preferences in a manner more stringent than has been in the literature to date. "Occurrent contractarianism," as I have called it, is rooted in our social- psychological state. Given the characteristics we have, and given the social situation in which we are embedded, the best resolve we have of furthering our individually defined preferences is to adopt and adhere to a moral system. -
Capitalism in the Classical and High Liberal Traditions*
CAPITALISM IN THE CLASSICAL AND HIGH LIBERAL TRADITIONS* By Samuel Freeman I. Essential Features of Liberalism Liberalism holds that there are certain individual liberties that are of fundamental political significance. These liberties are fundamental or basic in that they are preconditions on the pursuit of other social values, such as achieving economic efficiency, promoting the general welfare, and mod- erating the degree of inequality in the distribution of income and wealth. None of these liberties are absolute, but the reasons for limiting their exercise are to protect other basic liberties and maintain essential back- ground conditions for their effective exercise. For example, freedom of speech and expression can be limited when it imminently endangers others’ safety or the freedom of their person, but not because the ideas expressed are found to be offensive by vast majorities of people. Liberal basic liberties are also inalienable: they cannot be given up voluntarily or permanently transferred to anyone else, though some liberties are forfeit- able upon criminal conviction for serious crimes. No liberal government would enforce a contract in which a person sold himself into permanent servitude, or alienated his freedom to change religions, or legally bound himself to vote only as his employer insisted. An integral feature of a liberal constitution is the protection of the basic rights and liberties nec- essary to establish and maintain the equal civic status of citizens. What liberties do liberals generally find to have this extraordinary status? Liberals now would all agree that among the basic liberties are freedom of thought, expression, and inquiry, freedom of conscience and of association, freedom and security of the person, and free choice of occupation. -
"Justice As a Kind of Impartiality"
Article "Justice as a Kind of Impartiality" Kai Nielsen Laval théologique et philosophique, vol. 50, n° 3, 1994, p. 511-529. Pour citer cet article, utiliser l'information suivante : URI: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/400868ar DOI: 10.7202/400868ar Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir. Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/ Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents scientifiques depuis 1998. Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : [email protected] Document téléchargé le 10 février 2017 12:49 Laval théologique et philosophique, 50, 3 (octobre 1994) JUSTICE AS A KIND OF IMPARTIALITY Kai NIELSEN RÉSUMÉ: Les approches kantiennes de la justice conçoivent celle-ci comme impartialité, les approches hobbesiennes la conçoivent comme avantage mutuel. Uarticle montre que ces concep• tions ne sont pas rivales, mais que la justice en est venue à signifier la prise en compte égale des intérêts légitimes de tous : chaque homme étant considéré comme l'égal moral de chaque autre. Tel est l'aboutissement de la justice conçue comme impartialité. Les théories de l'avantage mutuel, en revanche, ne disent pas ce qu'est la justice ou ce quelle est devenue, mais fournissent des raisons prudentielles pour agir de manière juste, dans la mesure où une telle conduite est profitable. -
Biography of Sismondi
1 BIOGRAPHY OF SISMONDI HELMUT O. PAPPE I. Jean Charles Léonard Simonde was born on the 9th May 1773 into a Genevan family. In later life he changed his family to de Sismondi after an old Pisan aristocratic family from which he believed the Simondis to be descended. Charles’s parents were the pasteur Gèdèon François Simonde and his wife Henriette Ester Gabriele Girodz; a sister, Sara, called Serina by the family and her friends, saw the light of day two years later. The families of both parents were du haut the Simondes being on the borderline between nobility and upper bourgeoisie, the Girodz being members of the well-to-do upper bourgeoisie. Both the Simondes and the Girodz had come to Geneva as members of the second éimgration after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, that is, both families were Protestant fugitives from religious persecution in France. The Girodz had come to Geneva from Chàlons-sur-Saône in 1689. Henriette’s father, Pierre Girodz, became a successful and highly respected businessman engaged in various commercial enterprises connected with the watchmaking trade. He owned a substantial town house close to the cathedral in the Bourg-de-Four and an imposing country seat ‘Tourant’ at Chênes, both to be the residences of Sismondi after his return from exile in Italy. On the occasion of the marriage of his daughter on the 12th January 1770 Pierre Girodz was able to give her a dowry his town house worth 30,000 Livres as well as 10,000 Livres in cash and 2,000 Livres worth of jewellery. -
1. Robert J. Ellrich, Rousseau and His Reader: the Rhetorical Situation of the Major Works (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969)
NOTES CHAPTER 1 1. Robert J. Ellrich, Rousseau and His Reader: The Rhetorical Situation of the Major Works (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969). In Rousseau and His Reader, Ellrich sees this sentence as evidence of Rousseau’s “fundamental posture in the work, his presentation of himself to the reader as the virtuous outsider” (28). 2. I use “Controversy” with a capital letter here as a technical term to refer to those writings by Rousseau and his “opponents” that followed the publication of the First Discourse. The Controversy lasted until the publication of Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (1755). 3. All of these quotes are taken from the entries, “Scandale” and “Scandaleux,” in The Encyclopedia of Diderot & d’Alembert, trans. Jason Kusnicki, vol. 14 (Ann Arbor: Scholarly Publishing Office of the University of Michigan Library, 2002), 741, available at http://quod.lib.umich.edu/d/did/. Cf. Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, Paris, Neuchâtel, 1751–1765. 4. The Encyclopedia of Diderot & d’Alembert s.v. “scandale.” 5. Dictionnaire de l’Académie française (first edition, 1694) s.v. “scandale,” available at http://colet.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/dico1look.pl?strippedhw=scandale&dicoid=ACAD1694. 6. Gouhier has some very enlightening reflections on Rousseau’s rejection of this dogma in Henri Gaston Gouhier, Les méditations métaphysiques de Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Paris: J. Vrin, 1970). He sees it has Rousseau’s “troisième refus fondamental,” the other two being the historical revelation and the idea of church that would interpret that revelation (37). 7. Christophe de Beaumont quotes this sentence as a proof text (CW 9:4). -
Altruism and Mutual Advantage 359
Altruism and Mutual Advantage 359 new. policy or program.Justification from mutual advantage has roots in Thomas Hobbes and David ~ume.2 The principle of mutual advan tage is roughly the collective implication of self-interest. As such, it is represented in the contemporary work of David Gauthier, scholars of normative law and economics, and John Rawls.5 Because altruism is, as noted above, contrary to self-interest, we might wonder whether theories grounded in mutual advantage can justify a principle of altru ism. I wish to explore the fit of altruism with mutual advantage not Altruism and Mutual only in theories but also in contemporary political practice. First, it is instructive to survey briefly the vicissitudes of altruism in Advantage philosophical discussions over the past few centuries and the develop ment of the principle of mutual advantage. Then I will turn to a quick survey of major welfare issues in contemporary American soci ety-these are, along with grievous hunger and destitution in the Third World, the major problem . for altruism in our policy Russell Hardin choices-and I will review the slow historical change that has made New York University these issues now a matter of collective resolution. This sets up a discus sion of the institutional provision of welfare, largely at the hand of government.· I conclude with remarks on the prospects of altruistic policies from a polity that may have outreached moral and political Altruism generally involves a conflict of interest betw~n the potentindal altruist and the • be · Contcm rary moral and pohucal theory a contemporary theories in its restrictive commitment to mutual advantage. -
PMA Polonica Catalog
PMA Polonica Catalog PLACE OF AUTHOR TITLE PUBLISHER DATE DESCRIPTION CALL NR PUBLICATION Concerns the Soviet-Polish War of Eighteenth Decisive Battle Abernon, De London Hodder & Stoughton, Ltd. 1931 1920, also called the Miracle on the PE.PB-ab of the World-Warsaw 1920 Vistula. Illus., index, maps. Ackermann, And We Are Civilized New York Covici Friede Publ. 1936 Poland in World War I. PE.PB-ac Wolfgang Form letter to Polish-Americans asking for their help in book on Appeal: "To Polish Adamic, Louis New Jersey 1939 immigration author is planning to PE.PP-ad Americans" write. (Filed with PP-ad-1, another work by this author). Questionnaire regarding book Plymouth Rock and Ellis author is planning to write. (Filed Adamic, Louis New Jersey 1939 PE.PP-ad-1 Island with PE.PP-ad, another work by this author). A factual report affecting the lives Adamowski, and security of every citizen of the It Did Happen Here. Chicago unknown 1942 PA.A-ad Benjamin S. U.S. of America. United States in World War II New York Biography of Jan Kostanecki, PE.PC-kost- Adams , Dorothy We Stood Alone Longmans, Green & Co. 1944 Toronto diplomat and economist. ad Addinsell, Piano solo. Arranged from the Warsaw Concerto New York Chappell & Co. Inc. 1942 PE.PG-ad Richard original score by Henry Geehl. Great moments of Kosciuszko's life Ajdukiewicz, Kosciuszko--Hero of Two New York Cosmopolitan Art Company 1945 immortalized in 8 famous paintings PE.PG-aj Zygumunt Worlds by the celebrated Polish artist. Z roznymi ludzmi o roznych polsko- Ciekawe Gawedy Macieja amerykanskich sprawach. -
Trust, Trade, and Moral Progress
Trust, Trade, and Moral Progress Jonathan Anomaly Duke University, UNC – Chapel Hill Duke PPE working paper # 15.0525 Written for Social Philosophy and Policy, 2016 “Wherever the ways of men are gentle, there is commerce, and wherever there is commerce, the ways of men are gentle” ~Baron de Montesquieu Trust is important for a variety of social relationships. With the right background institutions in place, trust facilitates trade, which increases prosperity and induces us to interact with people of different backgrounds on terms that benefit all parties. Trade promotes trustworthiness, which enables us to form respectful as well as mutually beneficial relationships. In what follows, I argue that when we erect institutions that enhance trust and reward people who are worthy of trust, we create the conditions for moral progress.1 1. Introduction Many people have defended market exchange on the grounds that it increases material prosperity. This defense often rings hollow to communitarians who emphasize moral goals that they suspect are better achieved by living together in communities where risk is pooled, income is more evenly divided, and social values can be taught and transmitted to members of the group. Of course, communitarian critics of markets are free to forge their own communities in market society, but they are right that none of us can insulate ourselves from the cumulative cultural effects that markets produce. As Samuel Bowles observes, “Because states, communities, and markets influence the process of cultural evolution, any normative evaluation of the role and scope of these institutions must attempt to take their cultural effects into account.”2 Defenders of markets do themselves no favors, then, by ignoring the social orders that markets help shape, and the legal institutions that shape market exchange. -
John Locke and the Fable of Liberalism
This is a repository copy of John Locke and the fable of liberalism. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/121796/ Version: Accepted Version Article: Stanton, Tim orcid.org/0000-0002-8282-9570 (2018) John Locke and the fable of liberalism. Historical Journal. pp. 597-622. ISSN 0018-246X https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X17000450 Reuse Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record for the item. Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing [email protected] including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. [email protected] https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ The Historical Journal JOHN LOCKE AND THE FABLE OF LIBERALISM Journal: The Historical Journal Manuscript ID HJ-2017-062.R1 Manuscript Type: Article Perio : 1600-99, 1700-99, 1800-99, 1900-99, 2000- Intellectual, Historiographical, Religious, Political, A ministrative ( Legal, Thematic: Social Geographic: ,urope, Continental, .ritain, America, North Cambridge University Press Page 1 of 46 The Historical Journal Locke and the fable of liberalism JOHN LOCKE AND THE FABLE OF LIBERALISM TIMOTHY STANTON University of York ABSTRACT. This essay explores the ways in which John Locke was claimed by liberalism and refashioned in its image.