BIGGEST INEQUALITY SURGE SINCE 1980S

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BIGGEST INEQUALITY SURGE SINCE 1980S & Workers’ Liberty SolFor siociadl ownershaip of the branks aind intdustry y No 433 22 March 2017 50p/£1 Inside: BIGGEST INEQUALITY Keep the guard on the SURGE SINCE 1980s train! Strikes against driver-only operation spread. See page 10 Greece: a fourth memorandum? Theodora Polenta discusses the current political situation in Greece. See pages 6-7 The art of Buffy “If nothing is done to change [the] outlook, the current parlia - ment [2015-20] will go down as being the worst on record for in - come growth in the bottom half of the income distribution. “It will also represent the biggest rise in inequality since the end of the 1980s”. More page 5 On the 20th anniversary of the TV RICH AND series, Carrie Evans discusses its impact. See page 9 Join Labour! POOR: THE Grassroots Momentum: an opportunity almost missed GAP WIDENS See page 4 2 NEWS More online at www.workersliberty.org G20 deletion signals danger By Rhodri Evans From revolutionary to bourgeois minister When 20 governments met for the G20 summit in late 2008, at the worst of the global credit crash, their agreed joint state - Martin McGuinness ment included just one hard commitment: to resist protec - tionism, to avoid new trade By Gerry Bates minister, and made a series of real barriers. and symbolic concessions to union - Not perfectly, but on the whole, ism — signing up to support Police Martin McGuinness became a that commitment held, and Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), helped the slump level out in late revolutionary, by his own lights, and shaking the Queen’s hand in as a teenager, and ended his life 2009 rather than continuing June 2012, which he described as downwards for three or four as a bourgeois minister in a po - “in a symbolic way offering the litical system he had vowed to years as in the 1930s, when states hand of friendship to unionists”. spiralled into competitive tariff- shun. He died on 21 March, only We wrote in 1995: “The Provi - a couple of months after resign - raising and world trade col - sionals will become a narrower lapsed. ing as Deputy First Minister of communally-based Northern Ire - Northern Ireland. On 18 March, the statement He was a young commander of land reproduction of Fianna Fail — from a meeting of G20 finance the Provisional IRA in the early which, from origins very like the ministers and central bank gover - 1970s. We wrote: “The Northern Provos, became the main party of nors deleted the now-traditional Ireland Catholics fight in isolation, bourgeois rule in Ireland — or of pledge against protectionism. It in the most unfavourable condi - the smaller, more left-wing, splinter also deleted commitments to ac - tions imaginable. The rearguard of of the 1940s and 50s, Clann na tion on climate change. the Irish fight for national freedom, Poblachta”. Steve Mnuchin, Donald they... are simultaneously cut off Sinn Fein has made more politi - Spanish dockers win Trump’s US Treasury Secretary, from the allies that would make an cal progress in the South than blocked both pledges. Mnuchin seemed likely then, or when it is reckoned less nationalist than advance on a socialist basis possi - Jordi Aragunde, coordinator of dockworkers. dropped abstention from the Dail others in Trump’s circle. He soft - ble — the Orange majority of the the International Dockworkers’ - “Action has been cancelled indef - in 1986. It scored 14% in the Febru - ened his stance by claiming: “It is Northern Ireland working class” Council, has reported a victory, initely. However, IDC will continue ary 2016 general election, and is not our desire to get into trade (Workers’ Fight , 23 July 1972). at least a temporary victory, for to watch over new developments The Provisional IRA’s campaign currently running in the polls at closely. wars... The president does be - about 20%. the Spanish dockworkers. had already won a first victory — They have been fighting the “IDC would like to express lieve in free trade but he wants the abolition, in March 1972, of But the underpinnings, in na - Spanish government’s plan to abol - gratitude for the great show of free and fair trade.” Protestant-majority home rule in tional-communal division, of the ish the “pools” through which they support to Spanish dockworkers Coming with the Tories’ de - Northern Ireland. Such were the re - poisonous Partition structures are employed. these past weeks, which is a sire to make Brexit “hard” by alities, and the limits of the Provi - which McGuinness set out to “As of March 17, the Spanish point of pride for the interna - quitting the EU Single Market sionals’ politics, that the further 22 fight remain entrenched. Only Government was unable to pass the tional docker community — and and Customs Union, and the years of their war could produce working-class and consistently Royal Decree to reform the Spanish one victory among many yet to rise of Marine Le Pen in only deaths and deep communal France, the G20 deletion sig - democratic politics will change port system. The Spanish Parlia - be achieved.” division. No further political ad - ment has rejected this Decree, nals dangers of a rise of eco - that. vance. therefore acting to protect Spanish • www.idcdockworkers.org/en/ nomic nationalism. McGuinness became a big figure in the Provisionals’ turn to politics, which followed the hunger strikes of 1981. In 1982 the Provisionals dropped their clumsy version of advocating a federal Ireland, and Italy: a shift in the political centre argued (as McGuinness put it in 1995): “Unionists will come to the to the heights of party leader, then, inist leaders in the Communist and figures more explicitly pointing negotiating table... but they will By Hugh Edwards after ruthlessly shafting the then in - Party who, after 1989, were princi - to the need for a more social dem - only do so when the British govern - cumbent, seized the office of pre - pal actors in the formation and pro - ocratic orientation, even the notion ment actively encourages them to At its recent conference Italy’s mier. Renzi stamped on both gressive mutation of, first, the Social of an explicitly working-class party. do so”. “Encourage” meaning “co - governing party, il Partito Demo - government and party and cen - Democratic Party of the Left (PDL); The details remain unclear. As to erce”. cratico (PD), split. This follows a tralised management and control, then the Democrats, to finally to the “radical” left, Sinistra Italiana He became chief negotiator for massive defeat in the December surrounding himself with young fa - embrace in 1996 the Left/ Liberal (SI), a group of them have aban - the Provisionals up to the Good Fri - 2016 referendum for party leader natic loyalists, openly and contemp - centre of the Democratic Party in doned their party in order to join up day Agreement of 1998. It reinsti - and head of government Matteo tuously humiliating and the “Olive Tree” coalition govern - with D’Alema. tuted the political deal brought in Renzi. Defeat and a subsequent resigna - marginalising older leaders. The ment headed by Romano Prodi. As events unfold in what has ef - by Britain in the aftermath of 1972, split is a vindictive retort of those The former Stalinists’ historic fectively been a shift in the centre of the Sunningdale power-sharing tion as premier did not stop Renzi from deciding to remain as leader of usurped forces who considered links to the Italian trade union gravity of the Italian political sys - agreement of 1973-4, but in a more Renzi as an abusive interloper in movement served to help impose a tem, the PD crisis will deepen fur - intricate institutionalised-sectarian the party. And at the party conven - tion he gave no quarter to his oppo - “their” party. program of ruthless fiscal, mone - ther. form. The split consists of 30 members tary and social counter-reform de - As the European bank prepares In 1974 a Protestant general nents — representing a diffuse spectrum of left /liberal forces. He of the Camera, 15 in the Senate. It manded as a condition of Italy’s to raise interest rates and end Quan - strike had smashed the deal, but in seems unlikely to become a new fitness to join the single currency. titative Easing, the vulnerability of 1998 the deal survived Protestant declare for a general election in June, reiterating the need for him to party; its name, Democrats and Pro - Beneath the cant about Renzi’s the country to any systemic shock is resistance. McGuinness became gressives Movement, suggests a awful treatment of ordinary people, apparent. Minister of Education in a power- keep hold of the power of the party profile as vague as it is tentative. the splitters are more than eager — Meanwhile the Five Star Move - sharing regime in 1999, and Deputy leader so as to control the selection The principal political compo - again in tandem with marginalised ment is ahead in the opinion polls First Minister from 2007 to 2017. of electoral lists and mandates. nents come from the camp of the union bureaucrats — to rise to be - and in spite, or because of, its He refused to take his full minis - A rupture has been developing left/liberal bourgeoisie, associated come trustworthy servants of capi - congenital incoherence, it might ter’s pay. He approved two new in - ever since Renzi rose from relative anonymity and political obscurity with Massimo d’Alema and Pier - tal. just light a fuse in Italian politics. tegrated schools when education luigi Bersani. Both are former Stal - There are a number of groups Workers’ Liberty @workersliberty NEWS 3 Israel enters Syrian conflict Abortion: denying the Syrian regime to be under - By Simon Nelson mined and a consequent under - mining of regional influence for women A surprise rebel assault on the Iran, a vastly weakened Hezbollah.
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