Distr. GENERAL S/11248 1 April 1974 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
REPORT OF TKE SECRETARY-GENERALON THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCYFORCE
(for the period 26 October 1973 to 1 April 1974)
CONTENTS
-1P;tpe
INTRODUCTION ...... 3
I. ESTABLISHMENT AND COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE ...... 4 A. Establishment of UNEF ...... 4 B. Composition ...... 4 C. Functions and guidelines ...... 5 II. DEPLOYMENTAND LOGISTICS ...... 7 A. Deployment ...... 7 B. Accommodations of the Force ...... 8 C. Logistic support ...... 1 ...... 1.0 III. ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE ...... f : ...... 1~1 A. Observance of the cease-fire and implemeni;ation of the disengagement Agreement ... ,; ...... 11 B. Negotiations and agreements ...... 1,l (i) Disengagement ...... :LI (ii) Humanitarian activities and co-operation with the International Comi-ttee of the Red Cross ...... 13 (iii) Exchange of prisoners of war md transfer of civilians . . 13 (iv) Convoys of supplies to Egyptian troops on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal and ,to the town o,f Suez ...... 13 (v) Search for bodies ...... 14 C. Co-operation with UNTSO ...... 1.5
74-07977 I... s/11248 English Page 2
CONTENTS (continued)
Page IV. FINANCIAL ASPECTS . . . ~ . . . . ~ , ...... 16 V. OBSERVATIONS ~ ...... 18
MAP. UNEF DEPLOYMENT SITUATION AS OF 1200 GMT 27 MARCH 1974
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INTRODUCTION
1. This report, which covers the period from the inception of the United Nations tiergency Force (UNEF) on 26 October 1973 to 1 April 1974, presents a summary of developments relating to UNEF on which information was submitted to the Security Council in my progress reports on the Force (s/11056 and Add.l-14), as well as an account of events which have taken place since my last progress report (S/11056/Add.14). The purpose of the report is to provide the Security Council with a comprehensive picture of the activities of UNEF' in pursuance of the mandate laid down by the Council in its resolutions 340 (1973) and 341 (1973) of 25 and 27 October 1973.
2. During this period, the military situation in the area of responsibility of UNEF has passed from one of direct and active militar:r confrontation to the present state of disengagement of forces and of substantial compliance, in the Egypt-Israel sector, with the cease-fire provisions of the Council's resolutions 338 (1973), 339 (1973) and 340 (1973). In this process, the tasks of the Force pursuant to its mandate as approved by the Council have gone through three main phases, first as an interposing force and observation element between the Egyptian and Israeli forces, later in controlling the separation and disengagement process, and at present in manning the zone of disengagement and inspecting the zones of l.imited armaments and forces. In carrying out these tasks, UNEF has played an indispensable role as a peace-keeping instrument.
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I. ESTABLISEMENT AND COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE
A. Establishment of lJNEF
3. In my first progress report on 28 October 19'73 (S/11056) I informed the Council that the United Nations Emergency Force, set up by Security Council resolution 340 (1973), had become operational in the evening of 26 October 1973, when Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo, acting as interim Force Command.er, assumed command over the first elements of the Force. These had been transferred to the mission area from the United Nations Peace.-keeping Force in Cyprus (U!VFICYP) and consisted of Austrian,Finnish and Swedish troops, to which Irish troops from UNFICYP were added as from 30 October. These elements were subsequently brought up to battalion strength by additional troops provided by the four countries. Since that time and at different intervals, six additional contingents, in the order of arrival, those from Peru, Panama, Ghana, Indonesia, Senegal and Nepal, as well as the Canadian and Polish logistic elements, have arrived in the mission ai-ea. As regards Kenya's participation in the Force, consultations with that Government are still. underway. The above-mentioned contingents were selected in consul-t&ion with the Security Council.
B. Comnosition
4. As of 1 April 1974, the strength of the Force, including UNEF headquarters and brigade headquarters staff, was as follows:
Austria 613 CZUladCi 1,074 Finland 602 Ghana 508 Indonesia 551 Ireland 266 Nepal 571 F'anama 406 F'eru 352 P0land 824 SflW@l 399 Sweden 622
7lotal 6,788
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c. Functions__--- and &delines 5. 'The functions of the Etnrrgency Force are outlined in the Secretary-General's re?ort on the implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973) (S/11052/Rev.l), which was approved by the Council by its resolution 341 (1973). Accordinfi to its terms of reference, the Force is to supervise the implementation of paragraph 1 of the Council's resolution 340 (1973) j ,which demanded the immediate and complete observance of the cease-fire and return to the positions of 22 October 1973; it is to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of the figh-ting and to co-operate with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in its humanitarian endeavours in the area. In the fulfilment of its tasks, the Force is to have the full co-operation of the military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).
6. The essential conditions for the Force to be effective and the XUidelines for its establishment and operation are set out in the same report (S/11052/Rev.l, puss. 3-4).
7. Specific tasks consistent with its terms of reference were entrusted to UNEF by the A(q?eement of the parties of 11 November 1973 regardinq the implementation of Security Council resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973) (~/11056/~dd.3, annex) and by the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement on disengagement of forces in pursuance of the Geneva Peace Conference (s/1.1198 and Add.1). The Force is at present fulfilling: its tasks and carrying out inspections in the areas defined in the latter Agreement.
8. Discussions have been held by UNEF with officials of Egypt and Israel respectively in connexion with the negotiation of agreements on the status of the Force. These discussions are beine pursued with a view to concluding agreements that will embody the principles of the Charter and of the Convention on the Privileges and :Immunities of the United Nations as well as the experience of previous United Nations peace-keeping operations, so as to ensure the independent functioning of the Force in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council. It is hoped that these negotiations will. lead shortly to a successful outcome.
9. The Force Commander continues the practice of separate high-level meetings with military representatives of Egypt and Israel concerning the implementation of the -terms of re:~erence of the Force and the inspections cooducted by UNEF in the areas of limited armaments and forces. Since the maintenance of full co--operation wkth the parties is an essential condition for carrying out the tasks of the Force (S/llO52/Rev.l, para. 3), UNEF maintains close contact with the military liaison staffs of Egypt and Israel.
10. One of the problems still outstanding relates to restrictions on the freedom of movement of personnel of certain contingents. I have consistently taken the position that UMEF must function as an "integrated and efficient military unit", that its contingents serve on an equal basis under the command of the Force Commander and that no differentiation can be made regardintx the United Nations status of the various contingents. The matter is bein& pursued. I . . . S/11248 English page 6
Discipline
11. The discipline, understanding and bearing of the soldiers of the United Nations Emergency Force have been of a high order, reflecting credit on the soldiers and on their commanders, as well as cm the countries that contribute contingents to the Force.
Casualties
12. During the first five months of operation, UNEF has suffered four fatal casualties and 15 injured as a result of the explosion of mines and other explosive devices. Another soldier was Ikilled in an accident while driving in the supply convoy to the town of Suez. One member of the Force was killed in a traffic accident, and two others died from other causes.
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II. DEFLQYMENT AND LOGISTICS
A. Deployment
13. During its first five months, the deployment of the Force has been subject ,to frequent changes. As indicated above, the original role of the Force in interposing itself between the armed forces of Egypt and Israel in areas of direct confrontation was followed by the manning of successive temporary buffer zones during the process of disengagement. The operational details of the initial deployment and control of these zones were described in my progress reports to the Security Council in the S/:1.1056/. . series. 14. In my last progress report (S/llO56/Add.l4, paras. 5-7), I indicated that it was the intention of the Force Commander to deploy three additional battalions - those of Austria, Ghana and Panama - in the present UNEF zone of disengagement, bringing to nine the number of battalions in the zone. This redeployment started on 18 March and was completed on 24 March 1974. The present UNEF area of deployment lies between the Egyptian and Israeli lines, defined in paragraph B.2 of the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement on disengagement of forces of 18 January 1974, as shown on the map attached to the Agreement (S/lll98/Add.l).
15. The location of UNEF battalions in the zone of disengagement (see attached map) is as follows from north to south in this order:
(a) Irish battalion: Base camp in the Robah area. It is manning a forward command post ) a reserve position and five outposts in the UnTEF zone in a sector from the Mediterranean Sea to the road leading from Kantara to Baluza. (b) Panamanian battalion: Base camp in the Rabah area. It is manninn a forward command post, one reserve position and six outposts in the zone of disengagement from the southern limit of the Irish sector to a line at mid-point between Ksntara and Ismailia.
Cc) P eruvian battalion: Base camp in the Rabah area. It is manning a forward command post and five outposts in the zone of disengagement from the southern limit of the Panamanian sector to a line directly east of Ismailia.
(d) Swedis:h battalion: Base camp at Ismailia. It is manning a forward command post and eleven outposts in the zone of disengagement in a sector from the southern limit of the Peruvian sector to a line 5 kilometres to the south, parallel to the Deversoir-El Tasa road.
(e) I n d onesian battalion: Base camp at Ismailia. It is manning a forward command post and eight outposts in the zone of disengagement in a sector from the southern limit of the Swedish battalion to a line east of the middle part of Great Bitter Lake.
(f) Ghanaian battalion: Base camp at Fayid-Fanara. It is manning a forward command post and six outposts in the zone of disengagement from the southern limit of the Indonesian battalion to a line east of the southern end of Great Bitter Lake.
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(g) Austrian battalion: Base camp at Suez. It is manning a forward command post and six outposts in the zone of disengagement from the southern limits of the Ghanaian sector to a line due Ieast of the southern end of Little Bitter Lake.
(h) Senegalese battalion: Base camp at Suez. It is manning a forward command post) a reserve Position and seven outposts in the zone of disengagement from the southern limit of the Ghanaian sector to a line due east of Suez.
(i) Finnish battalion: Base camp at Suez. It is manning a forward command post, a reserve position and ll outposts from the southern limits of the Senegslese sector to the Gulf of Suez.
(j) Xepalese battalion: It is based in Cairo, engaged in receiving its allotment of vehicles and communications equipment, conducting a training programme and acting as the Force Reserve. 16. The Canadian and Polish logistic elements continue to operate from their base camp in Cairo and provide logistic, engineering, transport and communications support for the Force.
17. The total strength of the nine battalions assigned. to the UNEF zone of disengagement is approximately 4,000 officers and other ranks. These are distributed between the command posts and manned positions within the zone and the base camps where, in accordance with normal military practice, they are assigned to local reserve functions and perform the necessary regimental, rotation and construction tasks. In addition to constant patrolling, the manned positions in the zone are maintained 24 hours a day. Because of the nature of the terrain of the zone, which is a desert area and contains no inhabited localities or longitudinal roads, it would have been impractical to establish and maintain the base camps in the zone of disengagement itself. The shortage of tentage and equipment, as well as the presence of uncleared ninefields, has also hampered the deployment of UNEF troops in the zone. 18. Pending its planned move to Jsmailia, the headquarters of the Force remains in Cairo. The headquarters of the Northern Brigade is at Rabah and the headquarters Of the Southern Brigade is at Suez. A liaison office is maintained in the premises of UNTSO headquarters in Government House, Jerusalem.
B. Accommodations of the Force
19. UNEF battalion base camps have been set up as close as possible to the disengagement zone in the areas of Rabah, Ismailia, Fayid and Suez. The present arrangements in this regard are as follows:
(a) The Northern Brigade headquarters and the Irish, Panamanian and Peruvian base camps are located under canvas in the area of Rabah.
(b) The Swedish and Indonesian base camps are housed in buildings in Ismailia.
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(c) The Ghanaian base camp is accommodated in an old army camp on the west shore of Great Bitter Lake in Fayid-Fanara. in S,,LP;) The Austrian, Senegalese and Finnish base camps are housed in bu~ildiws 1 as is the Southern Brigade headquarters.
(e) The Nepalese battalion and the Polish and Camadim logistic support elements are accommodated at Shams Camp, Cairo, mainly under canvas.
20. The Force has faced and still is confronted with acute accomodation problems which have been alleviated by establishing certain base camps in &:yptian-owned buildings put at the disposal of the Force by the Qyntian authorities at different stages of the operation.
21. One method of solving the long-term accommodation problem is to locate al.1 base camps of the UNEF battalions in army camps. Rowver ) no adequate areas for camps have yet been made available, and such facilities would, in any case, require extensive financial commitments for renovation, reconstruction and housing. In the meantime, it is expected that the authorities concerned will continue to extend their co-operation and understandine in dealing; with this problem and that the Force will be offered adequate facilities if and when the buildings at Iresent occupied as base camps are vacated.
22. The logistic support base of the Force, at present located at Shams Camp, Cairo, accommodates the Canadian and Polish logistic elements as well as the Nepalese battalion. This base will be moved~ in the near future to Camp Alagla ?n Ismailia, which has been made available by the Egyptian authorities. The new camp will facilitate the logistic support of the Force by shortening the distance to the United Nations zone of disengagement. It will, however, require extensive engineering work before it is put to full use. It will also be necessary to find shortly new accommodation for the Nepalese battalion and base camp.
23. The Polish medical services, which have not yet entered in-to full operation owing to the lack of accommodation, will be established in the buildinKs at present occupied by the Indonesian battalion in Ismailia. This will necessitate findinE new premises for thee Indonesian base camp.
24. As indicated above, it is planned to move the headquarters of the Force from Cairo to Ismailia as soon as practic&le. The headquarters will be located in the buildings at present occupied by the base camp of the Swedish battalion, which will then have to be relocated.
25. The accommodation plans and budgetary arrangements of the Force have been made on the customary assumption that the Governments of Israel and Egypt will extend their full co-operation to the Force by making available to it the necessary facilities for accommodation of headquarters and camp areas.
/ . . C. _---J&is-tic-m-t -- 26. The distribution of logi!;tic tasks between the Canadian and Polish contingents was the subJect of a memorandum of understanding drawn up after detailed discussions between the Secretariat and the two delegations concerned (S/llO56/Add.6, annex). On the basis of that memorandum, the logistic support elements of the Force have been carrying ou-t the activities set out below.
27. The Canadian logistic su-uport element is organized in-to three indeoendent units under the operational control of UNEF headquartxs, namely, the signals unit, the service unit and the air -transport unit. The signals unit provides communications for the Force ;and has permanent detachments in each battalion base camp. This unit operates by means of telex, voice communications, land line, switchboards and signals disp:xtch service. The service un 20. The Polish logistic support element has a transport company which provides the transportation needs for the 'Force and operates from .the logistic support base in Cairo. It serves al.1 the battalions deployed in the zone of disengagement. The engineering company is engaged in numerous tasks, including mine and explosive clearance, construction and supervision of works in UKEF premises and water purificatioc plants for the provision of drinking water to UNEF troops, especially those s.Lationed in the zone of disengagement. As indicated above, the Polish medical services will. be est%blished in Ismailia,and, in the meantime, have been providinii rredical assistance and conducting laboratory tests for the Force. s/11240 English Page ll III. ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE A. Observance of the cease-fire and implementation of the disengagement Agreement 29. Reports of the Secretary-General on the situation regarding the observance of the cease-fire in the UNEF area of responsibility, based on reports of UNEF cnits and UNTSO military observers, were circulated in the S/11057/A&d. . . . series. Since the time when the implementation of the Agreement on disengagement of forces began under UNEF supervision on 25 January 1974, the military situation has remained quiet. 30. Inspections of t'ne areas of limited armaments and forces, as provided in the Egypt-Israel Agreement on disengagement of forces (S/11198), continue to be carried out by UNEF on a weekly basis, with the assistance of UNTSO military observers, accompanied by Egyptian and Israeli liaison officers in the respective areas. According to the terms of the Agreement, the findings of the inspections are made available only to the parties. The Force Commander lends his assistance and good offices in cases where one of the parties raises questions concerning the observance of the agreed limitations or armaments and forces. B. Negotiations and agreements 31.. The Force Commander and his staff have played an active role, within the context of the UNEF mandate, in meetings and negotiations, as well as in the implementation of agreements reached by the parties in matters pertaining to the cease-fire, disengagement of forces and humanitarian questions. 32. The first meeting between military representatives of Egypt and Israel in the presence of LINEF officers was held at kilometre marker ILO9 on the Cairo-Suez road, on 27 October 1973. Four subsequent meetings were held at that location, on 29 and 30 October and on 1 and 3 November. These exchanges of views covered matters relating to the observance of the cease-fire, return to the positions held on 22 October 1973, possible mutual disengagement and establishment of buffer zones manned by UNEF, as well as humanitarian questions (s/11056, para. 13, and S/11056/Add.2, para. 16). 33. These matters were subsequently discussed at meetings held at kilometre marker 101 on the Cairo-Suez road, and within the context of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East, as set out below. (i) Disengagement 34. On 9 Noveml,er 1973, the Permanent Representative of the United States of America handed to me a letter transmitting a message of the Secretary of State of the United States (S/11091). The message contained the text of an agreement that the Governments of Egypt and Israel were prepared to accept for the implementation of paragraph 1 of Security Council resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973). / . . . 35. I instructed .thc Force Coxunander to m&e available his good offices, and General Siilasvuo entered into contact dth both parties, who agreed to hold a meeti.ng under his ampices on 11 Noverhzr at kil.ometre marker I.01 on .the Cairo- Suez road. The e~reement was si@ed on that date, and the parties immediately started discussions on ,the mcdalities of its implementation under the auspices of the l?orcfL Commander. On 14 November 9 an accord was reached,between the parties on the implementation of parsgriiphs C, II, E and I' of the Agreement of 11 IVovember; the terms of this ;I~cc"rd were sunlnled up by the ~~~~~ c~~~ma~?cier (S/ll056/~dd.5), and im:@ementati"n began immediately. This included the withdrawal of Israeli checkpoints 01 the Cairo-Suez wad snd their replace::;ent by Uni.ted M&ions checkpoints. 36. IXscucsions "n the imple.ment&cion of paragraph, B of the Agreemen.t were held at liilomet,re marker 101 at. irtervals &ring the mon,th of November 1973. In the course of those discixvsion,s) the parties exchanged proposals on slteme.tive disengagement plans. 37. Y!he ma.t,ter w&s la'ci;er t&en up by the Mil.itary Working Group, establis'hed withj.n .the framewor 7.k of the Geneva Peace Conference on -the Middle East, held under the auspices of the United N%tions, as mentioned i.n Security Council resolution 344 (1973) (see the rqmrt of .the Secretary-General of 24 December 1973 in document S/lllh9). The Force Commander acted as chairman of the Military Working Group, vhich held si.x r;!eetings in Ge:lev& "n 26 an,d 28 Ceceaber 1973 and on 2, 4, 7 and $2 January 1974. In these ~meetings there was a. detailed and frank preparatory discwssion "f nossil)le al.te:rr!ative plans. 38. :iVegotiations then took place a.t other levels in the area. After & successful outcome of these negotj.a:tionz:, on 18 Januery 1974, at in meeting held at kilometre ma,I.ke:r l(!l &II Agreement "17 the disengagement of forces in pursuance of the Geneva Fewe Conference was signed by the Chiefs of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces and Of t,he krael I‘efence Forces, and by the Force Comma.nder as witness (S/11198). Further meetings were held duri.ng .January at kilometre marker 101 under the chairmanship of the Force Co~xnander, in order to work out procedures for the impl.ewntation of the f!greement on the disengagement of forces. 39. At the ,final. meeting he2.d on 24 Ja.n,usry, the par-ties agreed to a plan for implementing the disengagment of forces in successi,ve phases. A time-table of the rwleployment to be undertaken d~uring each phase by the parties and by UNEF was a,lso agreed upon. The proceiis of disengagement of forces began on 25 January (s/lro56/Aaa.9). ho. 'I& disengagement operation proceeded .with precision and wns successfully C"i!i,pl~t,~Xl , on scheclule, on 5 liarc!l (S/11056/Add.13). 111. Undoer the Agreement on the discngagewnt of forces of 18 January 1974, the military forces 31' Egypt and Israel were to be separated and deployed west of / . . . S/112:48 English Page 13 42 ~ The survey md marking of' the full i.en,gth of I,ine B was effected by lJN!CSO mili-tary observers, under UNEF supervision, with the asistance of Israeli surveyors ~ This task was con@eted on 2 February 1974 (S/llO56/Add,lO). The survey and. marking of Line A by UNTSO military observers under WEF supervis:on and with the assistance of EWptian array surveyors vtls completed on 30 March 1.974. 130th Lines A and B sre marked with barrels painted in Black with the iJN l&twine: in white. (iv) _-_.-_-Convoys of supplies.___. to--._ Efiyptian __.__- -trospsL,-I on +he.___.. ea.tern i ___.._,___ 'daYii.'.. ._-_.o::' "?.?s!cz- -_I_Canal and to-----.--,.I_._ the town of Suez s/l1248 English Page 14 27 October 1973 between military representatives of Egypt and Israel, in the presence of UNEF officers, an agreement was reached regarding the transfer of supplies to Egyptian troops on the east bank of the Suez Canal. In pursuance of that agreement, UNEF organized a system of truck convoys, using vehicles made available to UNEF by the Eaptian authorities. On 28 October, the first lorries of a convoy comprising 125 trucks proceeded from kilometre marker 101 on the Cairo-Suez road, through Israeli-held territory, to a point on the west bank of the Suez Canal, where the lorries were unloaded. Members of the Israeli Defence Forces inspected the conten-ts at the unloading point under UNEF and Red Cross supervision. Egyptian soldiers crossed the Suez Canal from the east and loaded the supplies into amphibiow vehicles for transfer to the east bank of the Canal where UNEF personnel were also stationed to supervise the unloading operation. 49. The parties agreed on :28 October 1973 to an additional convoy of 50 truck- loads of supplies which, fo:Llowing the same procedure, started moving across the Canal on 7 November. 50. Pursuant to paragraphs C and D of the Agreement of 11 November 1973 (S/11056/Add.3), the town of Suez would receive daily supplies of food, water and medicine and there would be no impediment to the movement of non-military SupplieS to the east bank of the Canal. With the agreement of the parties, the convoys to both the town of Suez and t:he east bank proceeded at regular intervals as from 15 November under UNEF's responsibility and with UNEF drivers. At the request of the Secretary-General, the Governments of Austria, Finland and Sweden provided additional military personnel as drivers for these supply trucks. With the commencement of the process of disengagement of forces, these supply convoys ceased to operate on 26 January 1974. (v) Search for bodies 51. A meeting between Israeli and Egyptian representatives took place at kilometre marker 101 on 27 January 1974, with a UNEF representative in attendance, in order to co-ordinate the operation for the recovery of the bodies of soldiers killed during the hostilities in the Suez Canal area (Operation Omega). UNEF assistance in carrying out this operation was requested by the parties and by ICRC. 52. It was agreed that teams comprising Egyptian and Israeli representatives, as well as a LJNEF officer or UNTSO military observer would, as from 29 January, conductsearches on the east bank of the Canal in Egyptian territory and in Israeli-controlled areas. Bodies would also be exhumed from cemeteries in the presence of ICRC officials who would arrange for their hand-over. 53. In order to expedite the operation, and with the agreement of the parties, specially trained dog teams have been used with success by UNEF since 18 February. The operation, which was to have concluded on 5 March, was extended by agreement between the parties until 31 March. The bodies recovered have been turned over to the respective national authorities. / . . . s/11240 English Page Il.5 C. Co-operation-_I--- with UNTSO 54. As provided in its terms of reference, UNEF has had the co-operation of UNTSO military observers for carrying out, under the operat:ior.al control and supervision of UNEF, certain of the tasks entrusted to the Force. 55. The provisional headquarters staff of UNEF set up by the interim Force Commander on 26 October 1973 consisted of military oh::ervers from IJKr,rTSO; indeed, the availability of such officers was a key factor in the success of 'JNI?F during the first weeks of operation. Up to the commencement of the process of disengagement of forces, UNTSO military observer patrols operated along the cea.se- fire lines in the Egiipt-Israel sector. The observations Of the irii1itary ,:>bservers of UI\JTSO were incorporated with the observations of UNEF's own military .uniis ir! the Secretary-General's reports on the status of the cease- fire ~S/!.1057./Add. . 1 ~ series). 56. During the process of disengagement of forces, UNTSO military observers were assigned. to conduct inspections on the redeployment of forces. 57. With the establishment of the UNEF zone of disengagement, khe Force Comnander 'has entrusted to the UNTSO military observers the task of carrying out periodic inspections of the area.s of limited armaments and forces under the con.troi ni' iJNW .brigade commanders. 58. In addition, UNTSO mil.itary ohservers have actively participxted~ in -she search for the mortal remains of soldiers killed during hostilities in the uea, as w%l as in the marking of the lines of disengagement of forces. In carryin,: out %hese tasks , UNTSO military observers acted under the comman.ci of the UNIW Force Cornmartder. 59. The contribution of experienced UNTSO military observers has bE!en a val.uahle asset to LJNEF. In accordance with the terms of reference of the Force (S/11052/Rev.l, pars. 2 (c)), and in close co-operation with the Chief of Sta,ff of UNICSO, the services of these officers will continue to be used as necessary i.n the performance of the tasks of UNEF. / I, . . S/11248 English page 16 IV. FINANCIAL ASPECTS 60. By its resolution 3101 (XXVIII) of 11 December 1973, the General Assembly, on the basis of very approximate initial cost estimates submitted by the Secretary-General, appropriated $30 million for the initial period of UNEF's operation. Since that time, there have been a number of unexpected expenses attributable, for example,to the fact that a number of troop contributors were unable to provide their contingents with the required supplies and equipment, which therefore had to be purchased by the United Nations; to the fact that substantial portions of logistic support (except for initial transportation) were not contributed free of charge to the United Nations as had been assumed in the estimates; and to the need to relocate the headquarters of the Force as a consequence of the disengagement process. Other items, including rations and allowances, have proved to be somewhat higher in cost than estimated. Price increases have also been experienced in such items as petroleum, oil and lubricants. On the other hand, the gradual rate of build-up of the Force resulted in somewhat greater offwtting savings in costs than had been anticipated. The result of consultations now in progress with respect to standardized costs and a reimbursement ceiling will also have a bearing on the costs of the Force. United Nations accounts pertaining to UNEF, based as they are on information which must be received from Force Headquarters and from Governments, inevitably lag behind actual expenditures. More accurate and detailed information on the costs for the first six months, as well as on costs beyond 24 April 1974, should be available for submission to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session, which will then be in a posi-tion to consider what adjustments and changes are necessary. 61. With respect to the standardized cost and ceiling study, I am hopeful that the consultations now under way with all the Governments concerned will lead to an agreed and satisfactory solution to this difficult and sensitive problem. Any agreement reached will, of course, be submitted to the General Assembly for review and approval, as requested by the Assembl.y at its twenty-eighth session. 62. Though all of the cash problems in connexion with UNEF have not yet been fully solved, the financial authority given to me by the General Assembly in its resolution 3101 (XXVIII) of 11 December 1973 will permit me to carry on the operation, if the Security Council extends the mandate of the Force. Various aspects of financing the Force, including some of those to which I have alluded earlier in this report, will, of course, have to be dealt with and the necessary additional actions taken by the General Assembly. With respect to the estimated cost of the Force of $5 million per month for the six-month period beyond 24 April 1974, a slight increase in the amount would seem to be inevitable in the present circumstances. This increase, if it comes about, would be due to new expenses, such as the expense of necessary rotation of contingents, unanticipated United Nations expenditures for heavy logistical equipment and continuing cost increases for such items as petroleum, oil and lubricants and rations. Much will depend on the willingness of Member States to continue to provide services free of charge, as was done for some items during the initial period. / . . . s/11.248 English Page 17 63. Regarding the present financial situation, I wish to report that by the end of March 1974,, payments on the contributions due from Member States have so far been received from 38 Member States in the amount of $19.5 million plus a $0.3 million voluntary contribution in cash made by the Government of Japan. In addition, a number of Member States have made available transport facilities free of charge to the United Nations for the movement of contingents and equipment to the mission area. The costs defrayed by them are estimated to total sax $15 million. As the Council is aware, the original estimates for LJNEF were based on the assumption that initial transport would 'be provided free of charge. / . . . s/l1248 English page 2.8 v . DBSERVATIONS 64. The establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force by the Security Council at the height of the crisis in the Middle East in October 1973 is a milestone in the history of the United ITations. 65. Less than 30 hours after the decision of the Security Council, the first elements of UNEF arrived in the mission area. Their arrival, and the immediate actions taken by them, served to defuse a highly explo;i.ve situation which could otherwise well have had major consequences for world peace. 66. The contrast between the extremely tense and violent situation that existed in October 1973 and the quiet now prevailing in the Egypt-Israel sector is clear testimony to the effectiveness of the Force in implementing the agreements reached on the diplomatic level. In addition to its normal peace-keeping functions, the Force has also shown its efficiency and. usefulness in its co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross in a variety of humanitarian tasks, such as exchanges of prisoners, provision of non-military convoys and the search for the bodies of soldiers killed during the October hostilities. 67. Another important feature of UNEF is its broad geographical basis. That units from so many different regions and with such different backgrounds could work harmoniously and efficiently for the common cause of peace is highly encouraging for the future. 68. Although quiet now prevails in the Egypt-Israel sector, the situation in the area remains unstable and potentially dangerous. The disengagement of Egyptian and Israeli forces is only a first step, although a very important one, towards the settlement of the Middle East problem. The continued operation of UNEF is essential not only for the maintenance of the present quiet in the Egypt-Israel sector but also to assist if required, in further efforts for the establishment of a just and durable peace z!n the Middle East. I therefore consider it necessary to recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNEF for another period of six months. 69. Despite the changes that have taken place since the time of the establishment of the Force, I feel that the original mandate as approved by the Security Council on the basis of my re?ort of 27 October 1973 (S/llO52/Rev.l) is still generally adequate to cover the activities which UNEF is at present undertaking. Of course, I shall continue to refer to the Security Council all matters which may affect the nature 01‘ the continued effective functioning of the Force. 70. As a result of steps I have taken recently, I am hopeful that it will be possible to keep the strength of UNEF within the figure of 7,000 as originally proposed. In the light of the present situation, and provided there are no new developments which will require unforeseen major commitments, I do not anticipate that any increase in the strength of UMEF will be necessary. I shall keep under constant review the required strength of the Force with a view to making reductions and economies when the situ&ion allows. Naturally, any such changes will be referred to the Security Council. I . . . S/11248 English Page 19 71. In connexion with the strength and composition of the Force, two problems have arisen which require urgent solution. One concerns the rate of' reimbursements to contributing Governments for the costs incurred as a result of supplying troops to the United Nations. The other relates to the freedom of movement of all contingents in the operational area. The Security Council may be assured that I am giving Close attention to both problems and shall continue to exert every effort to solve them in a satisfactory way. 72. The financial aspects of UNEF are a matter to which I have given close attention, and I shall spare no effort to ensure that the Force functions as economically as possible without impairing its efficiency. The obvious need for economy must, of cowse, be balanced by the necessity to administer and support the Force in a way commensurate with the importance of its task and with the difficult conditions under which it has to operate. 73. In concluding this report, I wish to place on record my gratitude to the Governments contributing troops to the United Nations Emergency Force. My gratitude goes also to the many Governments which have given assistance of one kind or another to the United Nations to facilitate the establishment of the Force, particularly to those Governments which have provided airlift free of charge to the United Nations for the transport of contingents to .the mission area or have made voluntary contributions over and above their budgetary assessments. 74. I wish also to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Commander of the Force, Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo, to its officers and men and to its civilian staff, as well as to the military observers of UNTSO who co-operate with and assist UNEF in the fulfilmert of its task, for the exemplary manner in which they have performed their important and difficult duties. / . . .