CHAPTER A Historical-Ph ilosophical Overview 1. Learning from the History of Vegetarianism Two approaches to the history of ideas have relevance to the topic of vegetarianism. One of these is the view, suggested by William James (1842-1910), that theories pass through three “classic” stages: “First, you know, a new theory is attacked as absurd; then it is admitted to be true, but obvious and in- significant; finally it is seen to be so important that its adver- saries claim that they themselves discovered it.”’ James’s metatheory about theories may be applied to ideas equally well. A catchy but oversimplified formula, it derives its force from the notions that the truth will triumph, and that a baptism by fire must first be endured by positions that initially defy con- ventional wisdom, human prejudices, or vested interests. Usual examples include such theories as the fundamental equality of all human beings, the heliocentric solar system, the evolution of species, and the nonexistence of absolute truth. While some 1 2 Chapter 1 might contend that vegetarianism is an idea whose time has ar- rived, it seems unlikely that, even if this were so, such a claim could be construed as implying that vegetarianism has passed through all of these stages, let alone the first. Vegetarianism-long well-established in the East-is no longer being ignored in the West by such prominent portions of society as opinion-makers, publishers, and the service sector, but it is still frequently subject to ridicule and hostile/aggres- sive or suspicious/skeptical interrogation. It is somewhat easier to place attitudes toward vegetarianism on a scale of develop- ment or evolution if we acknowledge that the broader concept of animals as beings having or deserving moral status-an ini- portant ground for vegetarianism-is itself in its infancy in terms of social acceptance, normative affirmation, and public advocacy. One could scarcely expect vegetarianism, when seen as a specific implication of this moral status, to be any further along in its journey toward general cultural endorsement. The second way of perceiving the history of ideas that relates to vegetarianism was put forward by Daniel A. Dombrowski, and focuses on its “intermittent” or “phoenixlike” quality: “Of- ten an idea is suggested, held to be true for a while, then ig- nored, finally to be rediscovered. But if the idea is ignored for too long, the rediscoverers may consider themselves discover- ers.”* Dombrowski maintains that Western philosophical vege- tarianism is properly viewed as “an idea with a history of nearly 1,000 years in ancient Greece. Then the idea curiously died out for almost seventeen hundred years. After such a long dor- mancy, all that remained of the idea was ashes, out of which blooms the phoenix of contemporary philosophical vegetarian- ism.”3 Arguments for vegetarianism are accordingly reaffirmed in a way that is reminiscent of the cyclical manner in which the history of Western thought has been peppered with such an- timetaphysical views as Greek skepticism, medieval nominalism, Humean skepticism, the “Scottish School” of common sense, logical positivism, ordinary language philosophy, and the “end A Historical-Philosophical Overview 3 of philosophy” theories. The difference, however, would appear to reside in the fact that in relation to vegetarianism-at least if we adopt Dombrowski’s position-a process of reinventing the wheel is at work. A certain amount of truth in the “phoenix” view of the his- tory of ideas cannot be denied. For example, S~renKierkegaard (1813-1855) pointedly suggested that there are those who for- get “what it means to be a human being,” adding that “the ex- isting individual who forgets that he is existing will become more and more ab~entrninded.”~It is just as easy to forget what it means to exist as a humane being. And when we forget, we even- tually have to remind ourselves of the meaning. Or, as G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) would observe, the history ofideas, like the history of anyhng else, reveals a dialectical process in which be- liefs are initially championed, then scorned, then reaffirmed in an enriched, “higher” form. Hence some acquaintance with the historical sources of vegetarian thought not only generates an appropriate sense of humility but also imparts greater depth to our understanding of its contemporary manifestations. The two perspectives on vegetarianism outlined above are neither incompatible nor exhaustive. We are not forced to choose between mutually antagonistic views about the history of ideas in general and of ideas about vegetarianism in particu- lar. Perhaps vegetarianism has, in some meaningful sense, been rediscovered of late in the West. But the contrasting “baptism of he” image also captures central features of the attempt to es- tablish vegetarianism as a mainstream or socially normative idea. Indeed it might be argued that it is precisely because vegetari- anism has not fully emerged as a guiding idea (or ideal) that it can be periodically rediscovered and relaunched. Even when a particular idea is triumphant-and vegetarian- ism is far fi-om being proclaimed victorious-it is not exempt fi-om having to be rediscovered yet again, after an age of forget- fulness, at some future time. It seems to be the fate of Western and other nonindigenous peoples always to be recovering or un- 4 Chapter 1 earthing the lessons of the past, many of which they themselves have intentionally buried or are actively erasing. And maybe this fateful condition of rediscovery, inasmuch as it is part of the di- alectic of moral enlightenment, ought not to be despised. For perhaps it keeps vegetarianism vital and progressive as it gains ever-greater acceptance within new historical contexts. Beyond the two theories concerning the history of ideas discussed above lies another perspective: that an idea such as vegetarianism may be percolating through the ages in a sub- terranean and subversive, countercultural manner. It is this PO- sition I shall adopt in the discussion that follows. There are of course plenty of nay-sayers on the issue of whether we can learn from history. We all know the adage that “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to re- peat it.”s This may be perceived by some as a warning rather than as a pronouncement on the possibility of benefiting from a close scrutiny ofthe past. But other voices are even more neg- ative. Hegel, for instance, opined that “what experience and history teach is that peoples and governments have never yet learned from history, let alone acted according to its less~ns.”~ And Henry Ford (1863-1947) once notoriously declared that “history is more or less bunk.”7 Presumably Hegel would have exempted the history of ideas from his own censorious gener- alization, for otherwise he should be at a loss to explain why his approach to so many subjects, philosophy not least among them, was historically constructed in a painstaking and highly self-conscious manner. Sound ideas, for Hegel, grow organi- cally out of a fertile seedbed of past hunches, inklings, insights, and partially correct attempts to understand; out of a process of trial and error in the search for knowledge. Perhaps, then, we may reasonably expect to be rewarded by an investigation into the ideas that lie behind modern vegetarianism. And yet here too we find detractors. The author of an arti- cle on vegetarianism in the Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics claims that “in this particular subject no sound inferences as to A Historical-Philosophical Overview 5 modern problems can possibly be drawn from any records of the past.”* This seems an astounding statement from a scholar of religious studies, a field that is inevitably historical. And we would do well to ignore such counsel, for while it may be granted that knowing about vegetarian tendencies of the past cannot tell us all we need to know concerning the tendencies of the present, such historical knowledge is nevertheless instruc- tive for several reasons. First, it demonstrates that vegetarianism is not merely an isolated or faddish aberration of our era or of any other. Second, it illuminates the origins of particular argu- ments as well as their various expressions and amplifications over time. Third, it explains how vegetarianism and its promi- nent proponents relate to certain historical contexts. Fourth, and most important for our purposes, it enables us to appreci- ate the complexity and power of vegetarianism by recognizing the diverse sources of the positions that support it. These dif- ferent dimensions are best explored in their entirety within the framework of a comprehensive historical study of vegetarian theories and practices, which the reader is encouraged to seek in works such as those listed in the Bibliography.9 My goals in this chapter are much more modest: to connect contemporary arguments in support of vegetarianism with important histori- cal precursors, and to illustrate, by taking a careful look at the ancient philosopher Porphyry (c. 234-c. 305 CE), how “mod- ern” certain early views about vegetarianism have been. 2. Antiquity and the Special Case of Porphyry The most striking feature of the history of vegetarianism is its length. Some scholars suggest that prehistoric hominids were vegetarians and develop their case at considerable effort. lo Per- haps more persuasively (or at least less speculatively), it has been claimed that from observations of present-day tribal groups our ancestors were basically omnivorous scavengers who were nonetheless “semivegetarians.”l This seems scarcely very 6 Chapter 1 illuminating, however, both because the evidence is thin and because our interest is in vegetarianism as a product of modern critical reflection, not of sheer necessity. For these reasons I shall not discuss this debate hrther here (but see Chapter 7, Section 4).