sign in sign up
<<
Home , Arms control, Darfur, Disarmament

SIPRI YEARBOOK 2020 Armaments, and International Security

Summary STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public.

THE SIPRI YEARBOOK SIPRI Yearbook 2020 presents a combination of original data in areas such as world expenditure, international arms transfers, arms production, nuclear forces, armed conflicts and multilateral peace operations with state-of-the-art analysis of important aspects of arms control, peace and international security. This booklet summarizes the contents of SIPRI Yearbook 2020 and provides samples of the data and analysis that it contains.

CONTENTS 1. Introduction: International stability and human security in 2019 1

Part I. Armed conflict and conflict management, 2019

2. Global developments in armed conflict, peace processes and peace operations 2 3. Armed conflict and peace processes in the 4 4. Armed conflict and peace processes in and 5 5. Armed conflict and peace processes in 6 6. Armed conflict and peace processes in the and North 7 7. Armed conflict and peace processes in sub-Saharan Africa 8

Part II. Military spending and armaments, 2019

8. Military expenditure 10 9. International arms transfers and developments in arms production 12 10. World nuclear forces 14

Part III. Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, 2019

11. , arms control and non-proliferation 16 12. Chemical and biological security threats 18 13. Conventional arms control and new technologies 19 14. Dual-use and arms trade controls 20

Annexes 22

www.sipriyearbook.org © SIPRI 2020 1. INTRODUCTION: Reduction and Limitation of Strategic INTERNATIONAL STABILITY Offensive Arms (New START) would be AND HUMAN SECURITY IN 2019 extended beyond its current expiry date of February 2021. In addition, discussions on dan smith denuclearization between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) This 51st edition of the SIPRI Yearbook pro­ and the USA lost traction during 2019 and vides evidence of an ongoing deterior­ation by the end of the year the Iran nuclear deal in the conditions for international stability. (2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) This trend is reflected in the con­tinued rise was largely non-functional. in military spending and the estimated value of global arms transfers, an unfolding The climate crisis crisis of arms control that has now become There were some welcome signs in 2019 that chronic, and increasingly toxic global opinion was moving towards support for geopolitics and regional rivalries. There serious action to address the climate crisis. also remains a persistently high number of However, there will be a considerable time armed conflicts worldwide, with few signs lag between action and impact, and it will of negotiated settlements on the horizon. also be necessary to adapt to the effects of

Flashpoints climate change and build resilience. In add­ ition, it is now clear that the impact of Events in 2019 included dangerous clashes climate change often needs to be addressed between major powers in the Middle East amid peacebuilding in war-torn settings. and in South Asia. strikes, proxy There is still time to prepare for future attacks and challenges to freedom of navi­ climate- ­ related security challenges; the key gation in the Persian Gulf in mid-2019 raised to success will be increased international the possibility of Iran going to war with cooperation. Saudi Arabia and other regional powers, and potentially with the . International cooperation Armed clashes also escalated between two The need for cooperation on climate change nuclear-armed states, India and Pakistan, is matched by a similar need for cooper­ation over Kashmir. In both cases the situation on other major challenges of our age. The eventually calmed, but not as a result of degree to which international politics are trad ­itional crisis management. characterized by tensions and disagree­ ments, especially among the three great Arms control powers—, and the USA—is a In 2019 there were no gains and some serious cause for concern. Nonetheless, further set­backs in nuclear arms control. even governments that express loathing of The USA withdrew from the 1987 find it next to impossible to do on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range without cooperative approaches to shared and Shorter-Range (INF Treaty) problems. The spread of coronavirus and Russia formally suspended its obli­ disease 2019 (COVID-19) underlines the gations under it. Uncertainty continued message that other global challenges today about whether the Russian–US bilateral also require cooperation for human security 2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further and international stability. •

introduction 1 2. GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS clashes between India and Pakistan), and IN ARMED CONFLICT, two were fought between state forces and PEACE PROCESSES AND armed groups that aspired to statehood PEACE OPERATIONS (between Israel and Palestinian groups and between Turkey and Kurdish groups). All Active armed conflicts occurred in at least three major armed conflicts and most of the 32 states in 2019: 2 in the Americas, 7 in high -intensity armed conflicts were inter­ Asia and Oceania, 1 in Europe, 7 in the nationalized. Middle East and and 15 in sub­ -Saharan Africa. As in preceding years, Consequences of armed conflict most took place within a single country The reduction in the severity of several (intrastate), between government forces armed conflicts in 2019 led to a further and one or more armed non-state group(s). decrease in conflict fatalities, continuing Three were major armed conflicts (with a recent downward trend since 2014. more than 10 000 conflict-related deaths in the year): , Yemen and Syria. The number of forcibly displaced people Fifteen were high-intensity armed conflicts worldwide at the beginning of 2019 (with 1000–9999 conflict-related deaths): was 70.8 million (including more than Mexico, Nigeria, Somalia, the Democratic 25.9 million refugees). Protracted displace­ Republic of the Congo (DRC), Iraq, Burkina ment crises continued in Afghanistan, the Faso, , Mali, South , the Philip­ Central African Republic (CAR), the DRC, pines, India, Myanmar, Cameroon, Myanmar, Somalia, , Syria, Pakistan and . The others were low- Venezuela and Yemen, as well as in the intensity armed conflicts (with 25–999 . In 2019 almost 30 million conflict- ­ related deaths). Only one armed people in five countries (Afghanistan, the conflict was fought between states (border CAR, Haiti, Somalia and South Sudan) and

armed conflicts in 2019

Major armed conflicts with 10 000 or more conflict-related deaths in 2019. High-intensity armed conflicts with 1 000 to 9 999 conflict-related deaths in 2019. Low-intensity armed conflicts with 25 to 999 conflict-related deaths in 2019.

Note: The boundaries used in this map do not imply any endorsement or acceptance by SIPRI.

2 sipri yearbook 2020, summary conflict-related fatality (MINUJUSTH). Three operations started estimates in 2019: the UN Integrated Office in Haiti, which succeeded MINUJUSTH, the UN The five armed conflicts with the highest fatality estimates in 2019 were in Afghani­ Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agree­ stan, Yemen, Syria, Mexico and Nigeria. ment in Yemen and the European Union With a combined total of nearly 98 000 fatal­ (EU) Integrated Border Assistance Mission ities, these conflicts accounted for about in Libya, which qualified as a multilateral 78 per cent of the total conflict-related deaths peace operation following the entry into in 2019. force of its new mandate. Despite this slight increase in the number two (the Lake Basin and cen­ of multilateral peace operations, the tral Sahel) needed urgent food, nutrition number of personnel deployed in them and livelihood assistance. decreased by 4.8 per cent during 2019, from Peace agreements 144 791 on 31 December 2018 to 137 781 on 31 December 2019. This reduction was Of the 21 new peace agreements in 2019, mainly driven by peace operations con­ 10 related to local agreements and 11 to ducted by the UN and primarily by draw­ national agreements, although most of the downs in sub-Saharan Africa. Nonetheless, latter were renewal or implementation the UN remains the leading organization in accords. Two new substantive national the field, with responsibility for over one- peace agreements were signed in sub-­ third of all multilateral peace operations Saharan Africa: in the CAR and in Mozam­ and nearly two-thirds of all personnel bique. Relatively peaceful transitions of deployed in them. power in Ethiopia (in 2018) and Sudan (in The Mission in Somalia 2019) and the implementation of a 2018 remained the largest multilateral peace peace agreement in South Sudan led to sig­ operation in 2019, despite a force reduction. nificant decreases in armed violence in The top three troop-contributing countries those three states in 2019. Peace processes remained the same as in 2018, with Ethiopia in two of the most protracted and complex leading, followed by the USA and Uganda. armed conflicts had mixed results in 2019: The latter two owe their high ranking pri­ in Afghanistan the Taliban–United States marily to their contributions to non-UN peace talks collapsed, before resuming in operations. November 2019; and in Yemen the 2018 In 2019 the annual hostile death rates in Stockholm Agreement was supplemented UN operations remained by a new peace accord, the November 2019 relatively stable compared with the pre­ Riyadh Agreement. vious year. Notably, all but one of the Trends in multilateral peace operations hostile deaths among uniformed UN person­nel were recorded in the UN Multi­ There were 61 active multilateral peace dimensional Integrated Stabilization operations in 2019; one more than the Mission in Mali. previous year. Two operations ended in • 2019: the Temporary International Pres­ ence in Hebron and the Mission for Justice Support in Haiti

armed conflict and conflict management 3 3. ARMED CONFLICT AND PEACE Peace operations PROCESSES IN THE AMERICAS There were four multilateral peace oper­ In 2019 non-international armed conflicts, ations active in the Americas in 2019: the as defined under international humani­ new United Nations Integrated Office in tarian , were present in two countries Haiti; the UN Mission for Justice Support in the Americas: Colombia and Mexico. in Haiti; the UN Verification Mission in Beyond the strict definitions of inter­ Colombia; and the Organization of Ameri­ national humanitarian law, various forms can States (OAS) Mission to Support the of armed violence affected these and other Peace Process in Colombia. Additionally, countries in the region in 2019. the OAS established a special commission on Nicaragua. However, the OAS Mission Colombia to Support the Fight against Corruption Implementation of the 2016 Colombian and Impunity in Honduras failed to reach peace agreement with the Revolutionary agreement on renewal of its mandate with Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army the Government of Honduras. (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Criminal violence Colombia–Ejército del Pueblo, FARC–EP) continued throughout 2019. At the same According to the UN Office on Drugs and time, the Government of Colombia was Crime, global deaths caused by criminal involved in several non-international activity far exceeded those caused by con­ armed conflicts with non-signatory non- flicts and terrorism combined. By the state armed groups, while there were add­ metric of homicides, in which organized itional conflicts among such groups. The crime has a significant role, the Americas fragmentation of armed groups threatens remained the world’s most violent region to destabilize the fragile peace that has in 2019. sustained since ratification of the peace Political unrest agreement. The year 2019 was also marked by political Mexico unrest in which waves of mass demon­ In Mexico, which in 2019 had the highest strations swept across many of the number of homicides in a century, a non- countries in the region. While triggered by international armed conflict has emerged differing issues or events, the often between the state and the criminal had similar underlying causes, including syndicate Jalisco New Generation Cartel economic pressures from slow rates of (Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación, CJNG). economic growth since 2015, persistently Based on the level of armed violence high levels of inequality, discontent with between government forces and the CJNG the functioning of democratic institutions and the latter’s well-organized structure, and processes, and enduring problems of by early 2019 the threshold for a non- corruption and abuse of power by political international armed conflict between the and economic elites. • Government of Mexico and the CJNG had been met.

4 sipri yearbook 2020, summary 4. ARMED CONFLICT AND armed clashes between PEACE PROCESSES IN two nuclear-armed states: ASIA AND OCEANIA india and pakistan A suicide attack in February 2019 by a Seven countries in Asia and Oceania Pakistan- ­ based militant group in Indian-­ experienced active armed conflicts in 2019. administered Kashmir—the deadliest attack There were three in South Asia: Afghani­ in Kashmir for over three decades—sparked stan (major internationalized civil war), a sharp but short escalation in the conflict India (high-intensity interstate border and between India and Pakistan, both of which subnational armed conflicts) and Pakistan have nuclear . Although the immedi­ (high -intensity interstate border and sub­ ate crisis abated, tensions continued through­ out the year as India indicated that the national armed conflicts). The other four episode had brought to an end its unstated were in South East Asia: Indonesia (low- policy of strategic restraint, and that retalia­ intensity subnational armed conflict), tion for any attack perceived to be linked to Myanmar (high-intensity subnational Pakistan was now the ‘new normal’. armed conflict), the Philippines (high- intensity subnational armed conflict) and in particular the Taliban, and an expansion Thailand (low-intensity subnational armed in US air strikes, contributed to increased conflict). civilian casualties. Two emerging trends remained cause for concern in 2019: (a) the growing violence Myanmar related to identity politics, based on ethnic In Myanmar, an ongoing peace process or religious polarization or both; and (b) the made little headway during 2019, against a increase in transnational violent jihadist backdrop of rising violence, especially in groups. Some of the most organized of Rakhine state. The voluntary return to these groups are active in South East Asia, Myanmar of almost a million Rohingya most notably in Indonesia, Malaysia and people forcibly displaced in 2017 seemed the Philippines. even less likely by the end of the year, even though humanitarian conditions in refugee Afghanistan and North Korea camps in continued to worsen. Two peace processes deteriorated in 2019: Accountability and justice for alleged on the Korean peninsula, discussions atrocities committed against the Rohingya between North Korea and the United States people and other ethnic minorities in stalled; and the collapse of the Taliban– Myanmar remained elusive, despite legal USA peace talks in September 2019 led to efforts pending at the International Crim­ renewed pessimism about the prospects of inal Court and the International Court of ending the long-running war in Afghani­ Justice. • stan (despite the resumption of talks in November 2019). The war in Afghanistan was the deadliest armed conflict in the world, with nearly 42 000 fatalities in 2019. A rise in suicide and improvised explosive device attacks by anti-government groups,

armed conflict and conflict management 5 5. ARMED CONFLICT AND Ongoing security concerns PEACE PROCESSES IN EUROPE Although most of Europe has seemed One armed conflict was active in Europe in peaceful for about two decades, various 2019: the low-intensity internationalized, tensions remain, including: (a) persistent subnational armed conflict in Ukraine tensions between Russia and large parts of between Ukrainian Government forces and the rest of Europe; (b) long-standing con­ separatists backed by Russia. This armed flicts that have not yet been resolved— conflict has led to about 13 000 deaths especially in the post-Soviet space, the (at least 3330 civilians and approximately Western and Cyprus; and (c) the 9670 combatants) since April 2014. How­ security response to problems on Europe’s ever, since 2018, combat-related deaths southern flank, which encompasses several have been much lower than in earlier European states’ involvement in armed years. In 2019 there were an estimated conflicts in Afghanistan, the Middle East 405 combat-­related deaths, down from and North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa. 886 in 2018. In Cyprus, for example, a political settle­ ment to the conflict remained elusive in Promising developments in Ukraine 2019, with oil and gas discoveries, maritime Political changes in Ukraine during 2019, border disputes and regional power rival­ and especially the presidential victory by ries adding to tensions. Volodymyr Zelensky and his acceptance There were 18 mult­ilateral peace oper­ of the so-called Steinmeier formula for ations active in Europe in 2019, all of which resolving the conflict, created a new had been active in the previous year. opportu ­nity for further negotiations. Irregular migration and terrorism Among other things, the formula would involve holding local elections in separatist-­ Two issues that have been at the forefront controlled districts in eastern Ukraine, of European security thinking in recent which could result in the implementation years—irregular migration and terrorism— of special self-governing status for these both have a strong connection to develop­ territories. ments in the south. The European Union In December 2019 at the first Normandy (EU) has been at the forefront of managing Format meeting for more than three years, irregular migration to Europe, and it is an the leaders of , Germany, Russia and issue that has been a prominent driver in Ukraine endorsed the Steinmeier formula, EU engagement with Libya and Turkey. and agreed to implement a ‘full and com­ Terrorism continued to constitute a sig­ prehensive’ ceasefire by the end of the year nificant threat to security in Europe in and to hold further talks in the first half of 2019, although trend reports suggested 2020. Despite this promising new opening, that the risk is declining. Dealing with funda ­mental disagreements endured returning foreign fighters remained one among the parties about the nature of the of Europe’s main counterterrorism conflict and their involvement in it, as well challenges. • as about the sequencing and implemen­ tation of the formula.

6 sipri yearbook 2020, summary 6. ARMED CONFLICT AND PEACE the israeli–palestinian PROCESSES IN THE MIDDLE EAST conflict AND NORTH AFRICA The complex Israeli–Palestinian conflict con­ There were seven countries with active tinued in 2019, with rising instability in the Golan Heights and the West Bank adding to armed conflicts in the Middle East and tensions in Gaza. Although the USA unveiled North Africa in 2019 (the same as in 2018): the economic part of its proposed Israeli–­ Egypt (high-intensity, subnational armed Palestinian peace plan in mid-2019, by the conflict), Iraq (internationalized civil war), end of the year it appeared that there had Israel (low-intensity, extrastate armed con­ been no progress on resolving the underlying flict), Libya (internationalized civil war), conflict. Syria (major internationalized civil war), Turkey (low-intensity, extrastate and sub­ combat -related fatalities remained at the national armed conflict) and Yemen (major level of a high-intensity armed conflict— internationalized civil war). All the armed with weak institutions and growing conflicts had fewer fatalities than in 2018, protests. except for Libya. Many of these conflicts, Libya which have resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people and dis­ In Libya the fighting escalated between the placed millions more, were interconnected two competing governments in 2019. There and involved regional and international was also a deepening internationalization powers, as well as numerous non-state of the conflict—with Egypt, Russia, Saudi actors. On several occasions during 2019 Arabia and the United Arab Emirates on tensions between Iran and the United one side and and Turkey on the other. States (and its Gulf allies) threatened to Yemen escalate into a more serious interstate mili­ tary conflict. Large-scale anti-government The humanitarian crisis in Yemen protests occurred in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, remained the worst in the world in 2019. Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the While initial steps were taken to implement Palestinian territories and Tunisia. the December 2018 Stockholm Agreement, in Yemen’s fractured south, fighting Complex and interlinked armed conflicts intensi ­fied and the rivalry within the anti- in Iraq, Syria and Turkey Houthi coalition risked escalating into a Turkey continued its military operations in fully -fledged civil war within a civil war, northern Iraq and carried out a new incur­ until a peace deal was concluded in Riyadh sion into northern Syria, after an in November 2019. The Stockholm and announced US withdrawal. Russia and Riyadh agreements provide a potential path Turkey subsequently created a ‘safe zone’ towards a political settlement of the Yemen in north-east Syria in October 2019, while civil war, but many challenges remain with the Syrian Government consolidated its continued inter- and intra-coalition hold over most of the country and achieved fighting. • further strategic gains. Iraq remained a fragile, largely post-conflict state— although available data suggested that

armed conflict and conflict management 7 7. ARMED CONFLICT AND often rooted in a combination of state PEACE PROCESSES IN weakness, corruption, ineffective delivery SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA of basic services, competition over natural resources, inequality and a sense of There were at least 15 countries with active marginal ­ization. Two other cross-cutting armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa in issues continued to shape regional security: 2019: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, the ongoing internationalization of the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, counter ­terrorism activities, and the grow­ the Democratic Republic of the Congo ing impact of climate change—with water (DRC), Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Mozam­ scarcity being a particularly serious bique, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan challenge. and Sudan. Eight were low-intensity, sub­ national armed conflicts, and seven were Peace operations high -intensity armed conflicts (Nigeria, There were 20 multilateral peace oper­ Somalia, the DRC, Burkina Faso, Mali, ations active in sub-Saharan Africa in 2019 South Sudan and Cameroon). Almost all the (two fewer than in 2018), including several armed conflicts were internationalized, large -scale operations in countries that including as a result of state actors were experiencing armed conflict such as (whether directly or through proxies) and the CAR, the DRC, Mali, Somalia and South the transnational activities of violent Sudan. The number of personnel deployed Islamist groups, other armed groups and in the region (97 519 on 31 December 2019) criminal networks. The conflict dynamics decreased for the fourth year in a row and and ethnic and religious tensions were reached the lowest point since 2012.

conflict-related deaths in high-intensity armed conflicts in sub-saharan africa, 2013–19

12 000

10 000

8 000

6 000

4 000 Conflict-related deaths Conflict-related 2 000

0

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Burkina Faso Cameroon DRC Mali Nigeria Somalia South Sudan

DRC = Democratic Republic of the Congo. Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, ‘Data export tool’, [n.d.].

8 sipri yearbook 2020, summary external national and multilateral peace and counterterrorism operations in the sahel and region

Contributing countries/ Launched/ Country of Name organizations established Force level deployment EU Capability Mission EU member states 2012 115 and Niger Sahel Niger civilians Multidimensional UN (mainly African 2013 14 438 troops, Mali Integrated Stabilization countries, Bangla­desh, police and Mission in Mali Egypt, China and civilians Germany) EU Training Mission EU member states 2013 697 troops and Mali in Mali 3 civilians Multinational Joint Benin, Cameroon, 2014a 10 746 troops Cameroon, Chad, Task Force Chad, Niger and Niger and Nigeria Nigeria Operation Barkhane France 2014b 4 700 troops Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Niger EU Capability Mission EU member states 2015 127 police and Mali Sahel Mali civilians Joint Force of the G5 for Burkina Faso, Chad, 2017 5 000 troops Burkina Faso, Chad, the Sahel Mali, Mauritania Mali, Mauritania and Niger and Niger EU = European Union; G5 = Group of Five; UN = United Nations. a Initiated as a solely Nigerian force in 1994; expanded to include Chad and Niger in 1998. b Succeeded Operation Serval, which was launched in Jan. 2013 and ended in July 2014.

A worsening crisis in the Sahel of conflict: the government’s conflict with and Lake Chad region heavily armed Islamist groups, clashes The armed conflicts in Burkina Faso, between armed ethnic and Islamist groups, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Niger and Nigeria and inter­communal violence. all worsened in 2019. The security challenges are linked to the rise of violent extremism and the proliferation of armed There were two main challenges in Central non -state groups, such as Boko Haram, Africa in 2019: (a) the implementation of a which has spread from Nigeria across the new peace agreement in the CAR between Lake Chad region. The violent extremist the government and armed groups, and groups are interwoven with rural insurgent (b) a period of political transition in the groups, feeding off intercommunal tensions DRC, which was accompanied by an and exploiting grievances of marginalized increase in insecurity and political violence communities. in the eastern provinces and an ongoing Armed conflict fatalities increased sig­ health emergency from measles and Ebola nifi ­cantly in Burkina Faso in 2019 due to a outbreaks. • broadening of three inter­connected layers

armed conflict and conflict management 9 8. MILITARY EXPENDITURE world military spending, 2019

World military expenditure is estimated to Spending Change have been US$1917 billion in 2019. It Region (US$ b.) (%) accounted for 2.2 per cent of world gross Africa (41.2) 1.5 domestic product (GDP) or $249 per person. North Africa (23.5) 4.6 Sub-Saharan Africa 17.7 –2.2 Spending in 2019 was 3.6 per cent higher Americas 815 4.7 than in 2018 and 7.2 per cent higher than 8.7 8.1 in 2010. The growth in total global military and the spending in 2019 was the fifth consecutive 754 5.1 annual increase and the largest of the 52.8 0.2 decade 2010–19, surpassing the 2.6 per cent Asia and Oceania 523 4.8 rise in 2018. Military expenditure also 2.2 16 363 4.6 increased in at least four of the world’s East Asia Oceania 29.0 3.5 five regions: by 5.0 per cent in Europe, South Asia 88.1 6.4 4.8 per cent in Asia and Oceania, South East Asia 40.5 4.2 4.7 per cent in the Americas and 1.5 per cent Europe 356 5.0 in Africa. For the fifth successive year, 31.5 14 SIPRI cannot provide an estimate of total 74.0 4.9 spending in the Middle East. 251 3.9 Middle East . . . . The largest military spenders in 2019 World total 1 917 3.6 The growth in total spending in 2019 was ( ) = uncertain estimate; . . = data unavailable. largely influenced by expenditure patterns Spending figures are in current (2018) US$. All changes are in real terms for the period in the United States and China, which 2018–19. together account for over half of the world’s military spending. The USA increased its However, the largest increase in spending spending for the second straight year to among the top 15 military spenders in 2019 reach $732 billion in 2019. This was was made by Germany: its military spend­ 2.7 times larger than the $261 billion spent ing rose by 10 per cent to $49.3 billion. by China, the world’s next highest spender. China’s total was 5.1 per cent higher than in Regional comparisons 2018 and 85 per cent higher than in 2010. Military expenditure is not evenly distrib­ With a 16 per cent decrease in its spending, uted among the world’s regions. Total mili­ Saudi Arabia fell from being the third-­ tary expenditure in Europe totalled largest spender in 2018 to fifth position in $356 billion in 2019, accounting for 2019. India’s spending of $71.1 billion 19 per cent of global spending. This was ranked it as the third-largest spender for behind spending by states in the Americas, the first time, while Russia’s increase of at $815 billion (43 per cent of the world 4.5 per cent moved it up from fifth to total), and Asia and Oceania, at $523 billion fourth. (27 per cent of world spending). Spending in Among states in Western Europe, France the Middle East is estimated to have been continued to spend the most, with mili- around 9.4 per cent of the world total. The ­tary expenditure of $50.1 billion in 2019.

10 sipri yearbook 2020, summary percentage changes in military expenditure by

% change 2010–19 % change 2018–19

World 7.2 3.6 North Africa 67 4.6 Sub-Saharan Africa −15 −2.2 Central America and the Caribbean 49 8.1 North America −15 5.1 South America 8.9 0.2 Central Asia 63 16 East Asia 58 4.6 Oceania 25 3.5 South Asia 41 6.4 South East Asia 34 4.2 Central Europe 61 14 Eastern Europe 35 4.9 Western Europe −0.6 3.9

$41.2 billion spent by African countries was other European members of NATO, the lowest of all the regions, at only increases in equipment spending as a share 2.1 per cent of global military expenditure. of military expenditure have been more moderate. Military spending by NATO members Transparency in military expenditure In 2014, North Atlantic Treaty Organi­ zation (NATO) members pledged to Tracking countries’ military expenditure increase their military expenditure as a requires transparency. However, the rate of share of GDP to 2 per cent and to spend at reporting to military spending information least 20 per cent of their military expendi­ exchange mechanisms administered by the ture on equipment. The number of Euro­ United Nations and the Organization for pean NATO countries allocating 20 per cent Security and Co­operation in Europe con­ or more of their military expenditure to tinued to decrease in 2019, while reporting equipment increased from 5 in 2014 to 14 in to a South American registry seems to have 2019. The five with the highest relative ended entirely. increase in equipment spending as a share Transparency varies widely at the of total military expenditure—Bulgaria, national level. In some states, often those Hungary, Lithuania, Romania and ruled by military regimes, military expend­ Slovakia—are all in Central Europe. While iture is funded outside the government their sharp increases were driven by budget. The case of Myanmar—highlighted numerous factors—such as the need to in a 2019 UN report—underscores how off- modernize their weaponry or to decrease budget funding mechanisms and opacity in their dependence on Russia for main­ military expenditure can allow the military tenance of existing weapon systems—the to act unchecked and to perpetrate crimes primary reason was their perception of a against minorities. • heightened threat from Russia. Among

military spending and armaments 11 9. INTERNATIONAL ARMS consecutive five-year periods since TRANSFERS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1950–54. The flow of arms to two regions IN ARMS PRODUCTION increased between 2010–14 and 2015–19 —the Middle East (61 per cent) and Europe The volume of international transfers of (3.2 per cent)—while flows to the other major arms grew by 5.5 per cent between three regions decreased—the Americas 2010–14 and 2015–19, reaching its highest (–40 per cent), Africa (–16 per cent) and level since the end of the . This Asia and Oceania (–7.9 per cent). growth is a continuation of the steady upward trend that began in the early Suppliers of major arms . However, the total volume for The five largest suppliers in 2015–19 2015–19 was still 33 per cent lower than —the United States, Russia, France, the total for 1980–84, when arms transfers Germany and China—accounted for peaked. 76 per cent of the total volume of exports. Importers of major arms Since 1950, the USA and Russia (or the SIPRI identified 160 states as importers before 1992) have con­sist­ of major arms in 2015–19. The five largest ently been by far the largest suppliers. In arms importers were Saudi Arabia, India, 2015–19 US arms exports accounted for Egypt, and China, which 36 per cent of the global total and were together accounted for 36 per cent of total 23 per cent higher than in 2010–14. By arms imports. The region that received the far the largest recipient of US arms in largest volume of major arms supplies in 2015–19 was Saudi Arabia, which received 2015–19 was Asia and Oceania, accounting 25 per cent of US arms exports, up from for 41 per cent of the total, followed by the 7.4 per cent in 2010–14. In contrast, Middle East, which received 35 per cent— Russian arms exports decreased by a higher share than in any of the 13 other 18 per cent and its share of the global total

the trend in transfers of major arms, 1950–2019

50

40

30

20

Volume of arms transfers 10 (billions of trend-indicator values)

0

1950–541955–591960–641965–691970–741975–791980–841985–891990–941995–992000–042005–092010–142015–19

5-year average Annual total

12 sipri yearbook 2020, summary the main exporters and and regional reporting instruments. The importers of major arms, number of states fulfilling their treaty obli­ 2015–19 gation under the 2013 (ATT) to report arms exports and imports Global Global has grown: from 53 for 2016 to 61 for 2018*. Exporter share (%) Importer share (%) However, as more states have ratified the 1 USA 36 1 Saudi Arabia 12 ATT, the proportion of states parties sub­ 2 Russia 21 2 India 9.2 3 France 7.9 3 Egypt 5.8 mitting a report has fallen: from 71 per cent 4 Germany 5.8 4 Australia 4.9 for 2016 to 66 per cent for 2018. 5 China 5.5 5 China 4.3 The financial value of states’ 6 UK 3.7 6 Algeria 4.2 7 3.1 7 South Korea 3.4 arms exports 8 Israel 3.0 8 UAE 3.4 While SIPRI data on arms transfers does 9 Italy 2.1 9 Iraq 3.4 not represent their financial value, many 10 South Korea 2.1 10 Qatar 3.4 arms-exporting states do publish figures on UAE = United Arab Emirates. the financial value of their arms exports. Based on such data, SIPRI estimates that dropped from 27 per cent in 2010–14 to the total value of the global arms trade was 21 per cent in 2015–19. Arms exports by the at least $95 billion in 2017*. three other largest suppliers—France (72 per cent), Germany (17 per cent) and Arms production and military services China (6.3 per cent)—all increased between The SIPRI Top 100 list of arms-producing 2010–14 and 2015–19. and military services companies ranks the The top 10 list of suppliers has histor­ largest companies in the ically been dominated by the USA, Russia (outside China) by their arms sales, both and West European suppliers, and has gen­ domestic and for export. The total value of erally only included suppliers that had pre­ the arms sales of the SIPRI Top 100 in viously appeared among the top 10. In 2018* was $420 billion, a 4.6 per cent 2015–19, South Korea was the first state in increase compared with 2017. The growth decades to become a top 10 supplier having in arms sales was mainly attributable never been one before. Many of the 68 states to companies based in the USA, which identified by SIPRI as exporters of major dominate the SIPRI Top 100. arms in 2015–19 are small exporters. The • states in the top 25 supplied 99 per cent of total exports. States in North America and Europe (including Russia) accounted for 87 per cent of all arms exports.

Transparency in arms transfers

The number of states reporting their arms exports and imports to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) remained at a low level and no major changes occurred in the various national * The latest year for which data is available.

military spending and armaments 13 10. WORLD NUCLEAR FORCES all the states are either developing or deploying new weapon systems or have At the start of 2020, nine states—the announced their intention to do so. China is United States, Russia, the , in the middle of a significant modern­ization France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and expansion of its arsenal, and India and and North Korea—possessed approxi­ Pakistan are also thought to be increasing mately 13 400 nuclear weapons, of which the size of their nuclear arsenals. North 3720 were deployed with operational Korea continues to prioritize its military forces. Approximately 1800 of these are nuclear programme as a central element of kept in a state of high operational alert. its national security strategy, although in 2019 it continued its moratorium on the Nuclear arsenals testing of nuclear weapons and long-range Overall, inventories of nuclear warheads delivery systems. continue to decline. This is primarily due to the USA and Russia dismantling retired Low levels of transparency warheads. At the same time, both the USA The availability of reliable information on and Russia have extensive and expensive the status of the nuclear arsenals and programmes under way to replace and capabilities of the nuclear-armed states modernize their nuclear warheads, missile varies considerably. The USA has disclosed and aircraft delivery systems, and nuclear important information about its stock­pile weapon production facilities. In late 2019 and nuclear capabilities but in 2019 the US the USA started to deploy a new low-yield administration ended the practice of warhead on some of its nuclear-powered publicly disclosing the size of the US ballistic missile . stockpile. The UK and France have also The nuclear arsenals of the other nuclear- declared some information. Russia refuses armed states are considerably smaller but to publicly disclose the detailed breakdown

global stockpiles, 2019

UK 215 RUSSIA 6 375

FRANCE 290

USA ISRAEL NORTH 5 800 90 KOREA 30–40

PAKISTAN 160 CHINA 320 INDIA 150

= 10 warheads USA and Russia China, France and UK India and Pakistan Israel and North Korea

Note: The boundaries used in this map do not imply any endorsement or acceptance by SIPRI.

14 sipri yearbook 2020, summary global stocks of fissile world nuclear forces, 2019 materials, 2019 Deployed Other Total The raw material for nuclear weapons is Country warheads warheads inventory fissile material, either highly enriched USA 1 750 4 050 5 800 uranium (HEU) or separated plutonium. Russia 1 570 4 805 6 375 China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA UK 120 95 215 have produced both HEU and plutonium for France 280 10 290 use in their nuclear weapons; India and Israel China – 320 320 have produced mainly plutonium; and India – 150 150 Pakistan has produced mainly HEU but is Pakistan – 160 160 increasing its ability to produce plutonium. Israel – 90 90 North Korea has produced plutonium for use North Korea – [30–40] [30–40] in nuclear weapons but is believed to be producing HEU for nuclear weapons as well. Total 3 720 9 680 13 400 All states with a civilian nuclear industry are – = zero; [ ] = uncertain figure not included in capable of producing fissile materials. the total. The International Panel on Fissile Notes: ‘Other warheads’ includes operational Materials compiles information on global war ­heads held in storage and retired stocks of fissile materials. warheads awaiting dismantlement.

Global stocks, 2019 The figures for Russia and the USA do not necessarily correspond to those in their Highly enriched uranium ~1 335 tonnes 2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further Separated plutonium Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Military stocks ~220 tonnes Offensive Arms (New START) declarations Civilian stocks ~300 tonnes because of the treaty’s counting rules. All estimates are approximate and as of Jan. 2020. SIPRI revises its world nuclear of its forces counted under the 2010 Treaty forces data each year based on new on Measures for the Further Reduction and information and updates to earlier Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms assessments. (New START), even though it shares the information with the USA. China now publicly displays its nuclear forces more frequently than in the past but releases little information about force numbers or future development plans. The govern­ ments of India and Pakistan make state­ ments about some of their missile tests but provide no infor­mation about the status or size of their arsenals. North Korea has acknowledged conducting nuclear weapon and missile tests but provides no infor­ mation about its nuclear weapon capabil­ ities. Israel has a long-standing policy of not commenting on its nuclear arsenal. •

military spending and armaments 15 11. NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, systems as well as significant improve­ ARMS CONTROL AND ments in Chinese strategic capabilities. NON-PROLIFERATION North Korean–US nuclear dialogue

Russian–US nuclear arms control In 2019 tensions persisted between the USA The prospects for sustaining the achieve­ and North Korea over the latter’s ongoing ments made in Russian–US nuclear arms programmes to develop nuclear weapons control appear to be increasingly remote. and ballistic missile delivery systems. The During 2019, the long-running dispute two countries remained locked in a diplo­ between the United States and Russia over a matic stalemate over the commitments seminal cold war-era arms control treaty, made by their respective leaders during a the 1987 Soviet–US Treaty on the Elimin­ summit meeting the previous year to work ation of Intermediate-Range and Shorter- towards establishing peaceful relations and Range Missiles (INF Treaty), culminated achieving the denuclearization of the with the collapse of the treaty. The USA Korean Peninsula. A second summit meet­ alleged that Russia had developed and ing between the leaders held in February deployed a mobile ground-launched cruise 2019 ended with no concrete results. In missile that had a flight range prohibited addition, while North Korea continued to under the treaty—an allegation that Russia adhere to its self-declared moratorium on consistently dismissed as baseless. In the testing of nuclear weapons and long- August 2019 the USA confirmed its with­ range ballistic missiles, during the year it drawal from the INF Treaty in the light of conducted multiple flight tests of shorter- Russia’s failure to address US compliance range ballistic missiles, including several concerns. The decision marked the effective new types of system. demise of the treaty, which could result in Iran and the Joint Comprehensive the deployment of new nuclear weapons in Plan of Action Europe. Russia and the USA also failed to make In 2019 there continued to be controversy progress towards extending the sole over the implementation of the 2015 Joint remaining nuclear arms control agree­ment Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), an between them—the 2010 Treaty on eight-party agreement designed to limit Measures for the Further Reduction and Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activ­ Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ities and to build international confidence (New START). The two countries achieved about the exclusively peaceful nature of its the final New START force reduction limits nuclear programme. During the year, Iran by the specified deadline in 2018. However, announced that it would incrementally the treaty will lapse if there is no agreement scale back its compliance with the limits set between them to extend it by February out by the agreement in response to the 2021. The impasse over New START came re-imposition of US sanctions (following against the background of tensions the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in between Russia and the USA over missile 2018). Iran appealed to the other JCPOA defences and advanced weapon delivery participants to provide guarantees that at least some degree of sanctions relief—one of

16 sipri yearbook 2020, summary aggregate numbers of russian and us strategic offensive arms under , as of 5 feb. 2011, 1 mar. 2019 and 1 sep. 2019

Russia United States Feb. Mar. Sep. Feb. Mar. Sep. Category of data Treaty limits 2011 2019 2019 2011 2019 2019 Deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy 700 521 524 513 882 656 668 bombers Warheads on deployed ICBMs, 1 550 1 537 1 461 1 426 1 800 1 365 1 376 SLBMs and heavy bombersa Deployed and non-deployed 800 865 760 757 1 124 800 800 launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers ICBM = intercontinental ballistic missile; SLBM = -launched ballistic missile. Note: The treaty entered into force on 5 Feb. 2011. The treaty limits had to be reached by 5 Feb. 2018. a Each heavy bomber is counted as carrying only 1 warhead.

Iran’s principal benefits under the JCPOA— ban on nuclear weapons, including their could be provided despite the extra­ development, deployment, possession, use territorial impact of the US sanctions. and threat of use. In December the United Against the background of growing politi­ Nations General Assembly adopted a cal tensions, the International Atomic resolution calling on all states that had not Energy Agency confirmed that Iran contin­ yet done so to ‘sign, ratify, accept, approve ued to facilitate inspection and monitoring or accede to the Treaty at the earliest activities by the agency pursuant to the possible date’. JCPOA. In September 2019 the 11th biannual Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Multilateral arms control Force of the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear- and disarmament Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was convened in In the framework of the 1968 Treaty on the New York. The conference took place Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons against the backdrop of US allegations that (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT), the third Russia was violating its commitments and final session of the Preparatory Com­ under the CTBT. In November a Confer­ mittee for the 2020 NPT Review Con­fer­ ence on the Establishment of a Middle East ence was convened in New York in April Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other and May 2019. Given persistent divisions Weapons of Mass Destruction held its first among NPT members on several issues, the session at the UN in New York. Calls to Preparatory Committee was unable to establish a nuclear weapon-free zone in the agree on joint recommendations for the Middle East date back to 1974. • 2020 NPT Review Conference. There were also continued multilateral diplomatic efforts to promote the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which is the first treaty establishing a comprehensive

non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 17 12. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL Destruction of chemical weapons SECURITY THREATS As of 31 October 2019, 97.3 per cent of Allegations of use declared Category 1 chemical weapons had in Syria and the United Kingdom been destroyed under international verifi­ cation. The USA remains the only declared Allegations of chemical weapon use in Syria possessor state party with chemical continued to be investigated by the Organ­ weapons yet to be destroyed, but is expected isation for the Prohibition of Chemical to complete its remaining destruction Weapons (OPCW) in 2019. The Fact-Finding activi ­ties within the planned timeline. Mission in Syria reported in March 2019 that there were ‘reasonable grounds’ for Biological arms control believing that a chemical weapon attack Key biological disarmament and non- occurred in Douma in April 2018. Some of proliferation activities in 2019 were carried the report’s findings proved controversial out in connection with the second set of and were challenged by a few states. Out­ 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Con­ side of Syria, investigations were ongoing vention (BWC) intersessional Meetings of into the use of a toxic chemical from the Experts (MXs), the BWC Meeting of States novichok nerve agent family in the United Parties (MSP) and the First Committee of Kingdom in March 2018. the United Nations General Assembly. The Attribution of responsibility 2019 MSP meeting considered the reports for chemical weapon use of each MX, but as in 2018 the MSP report simply noted that ‘no consensus was Divisions continued in 2019 among states reached on the deliberations including any parties to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Con­ possible outcomes of the Meetings of vention (CWC) over the decision adopted in Experts’. However, the chair proposed and 2018 to establish an Investigation and initiated a new process to circumvent the Identi ­fication Team (IIT) to identify the reporting impasse and feed substantive MX perpetrators of the use of chemical work into the MSP and the 2021 Review weapons. These divisions placed high levels Conference. The process encourages states of institutional stress on the OPCW. None­ parties to establish continuity between the theless, the IIT became fully operational work of the three intersessional years, to in March 2019 and is focusing on nine synthesize the work and identify areas of incidents of use. convergence, and to avoid a confrontational The main conference of the year, the 24th approach. Session of the Conference of States Parties One of the developing trends in the field is to the CWC, agreed for the first time to the rise of civil society as a major contrib­ additions to the lists of chemicals that come utor to shaping global dialogues around bio­ under routine verification. The families of logical threats and appropriate responses chemicals that have been added include the to them. This could have significant impli­ novichok agent used in the UK in 2018. cations for the direction of the biological disarmament and non-proliferation field in the years to come. •

18 sipri yearbook 2020, summary 13. CONVENTIONAL ARMS lethal autonomous weapon CONTROL AND NEW WEAPON systems TECHNOLOGIES Efforts to regulate lethal autonomous weapon Global instruments for conventional systems () continued to take place in the format of a Group of Governmental arms control Experts (GGE) within the framework of the Despite growing international concern over 1981 Convention on Certain Conventional the use of incendiary weapons and explo­ Weapons (CCW Convention). While a sive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA), consensus has emerged among states that autonomy in weapon systems cannot be including the use of improvised explosive unlimited, there is still disagreement on devices (IEDs) by non-state armed groups, whether additional regulation is needed. In discussions within the framework of the 2019 the GGE adopted 11 guiding principles 1981 Convention on Certain Conventional (10 of which had been proposed in 2018) and Weapons (CCW Convention) failed to agreed to meet again in 2020 and 2021 to generate new concrete outcomes. The lack continue discussions. A majority of states of progress under the CCW Convention is would like the GGE to present substantial and politically ambitious recommendations at the leading some states to explore the creation 2021 CCW Review Conference, but a handful of new arms control instruments. Ireland of technologically advanced military powers convened the first of a series of open con­ continue to impede progress. sultations on a political declaration on EWIPA in Geneva in 2019, with a view to landmines in 2019. There was continued finalizing and adopting a declaration in use of cluster munitions in Syria in 2019. 2020. International differences on the develop­ Preventing an in ment of norms of responsible state behav­ Since 2017, some states, most notably the iour in cyberspace led to two parallel United States, have openly declared space processes starting in 2019: an Open-ended to be a domain of war or an area for both Working Group and a new Group of Govern­ offensive and defensive military operations. mental Experts. However, in the absence of Others, including France, India and Japan, consensus, a binding agreement within announced new dedicated military space either seems unlikely in the near future. units in 2019, and in March 2019 India While new uses of Anti-Personnel Mines tested an anti-satellite weapon. In addition, (APMs) by states are now extremely rare, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization their use by non-state armed groups in con­ (NATO) announced in 2019 that outer space flicts is a growing problem, especially the is now a domain of operation. Despite the use of victim-activated IEDs. APMs were growing risk of a conflict in outer space, used by such groups in at least six states inter ­national discussions on both security between mid-2018 and October 2019: and safety aspects of space activities, Afghanistan, India, Myanmar, Nigeria, including the United Nations agenda item— Pakistan and Yemen. The non-state armed the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer group Polisario Front of Western Space (PAROS)—remained blocked. completed the destruction of its stockpiled •

non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 19 14. DUAL-USE AND multilateral arms ARMS TRADE CONTROLS embargoes in force, 2019

Global, multilateral and regional efforts United Nations (13 embargoes) continued in 2019 to strengthen controls on • Central African Republic (Partial) • Democratic Republic of the Congo (Partial) the trade in conventional arms and in dual- • Iran (Partial) • Iraq (NGF) • ISIL (Da’esh), use items connected with conventional, al -Qaeda and associated individuals and biological, chemical and nuclear weapons entities • Korea, North • Lebanon (NGF) and their delivery systems. Membership of • Libya (Partial) • Somalia (Partial) • South the different international and multilateral Sudan • Sudan (Darfur) (Partial) • Taliban instruments that seek to establish and • Yemen (NGF) promote agreed standards for the trade in European Union (21 embargoes) arms and dual-use items remained stable. Implementations of UN embargoes (10): At the same time, there were growing signs • Al -Qaeda, the Taliban and associated that the strength of these instruments is individuals and entities • Central African being increasingly tested by stretched Republic (Partial) • Democratic Republic of the Congo (Partial) • Eritrea (Lifted Dec. national resources and broader geopolitical 2018) • Iraq (NGF) • Lebanon (NGF) • Libya tensions. This could be seen in the short­ (Partial) • Korea, North • Somalia (Partial) falls in compliance with mandated report­ • Yemen (NGF) ing and funding obligations under the Adaptations of UN embargoes (2): 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), the various • Iran • Sudan (Darfur) reported violations of United Nations arms In place before UN counterpart (1): embargoes, and differences both within • South Sudan and among groups of states about how the Embargoes with no UN counterpart (8): • Belarus • China • Egypt • Myanmar obligations generated by these different • Russia • Syria • Venezuela • Zimbabwe instruments should be implemented. How­ ever, states did make substantive progress Arab League (1 embargo) on reaching agreement on expanding and • Syria developing many of the aspects of ISIL = Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant; these agreements in 2019. For example, NGF = non-governmental forces; Partial = Embargo allows transfers of arms to the states continued to outline in more detail government of the target state provided that how key obligations under the ATT should certain conditions have been met. be implemented and made a number of additions to the set of good practice docu­ (GBV). The ATT remains the only inter­ ments and control lists connecting the national agreement in the field of arms or various regimes. arms transfer controls that includes explicit The Arms Trade Treaty provisions on GBV, and states’ attempts to specify what they mean in practice could The Fifth Conference of States Parties to have significance for other instruments. the ATT took place in Geneva in August During 2019, the United States announced 2019. Despite tensions and disputes, pro­ its intention to ‘unsign’ the ATT while gress was made on articulating how the China stated that it was taking steps treaty’s provisions should be implemented, towards acceding to the treaty. These particularly those on gender-based violence

20 sipri yearbook 2020, summary contrasting moves will no doubt have impli­ number of pending applications in several cations for efforts to expand the member­ regimes. Geopolitical tensions continued to ship of the ATT but the way in which this affect the work of the regimes, particularly will happen remains hard to predict. work of a politically sensitive nature, such as information sharing on procurement Multilateral arms embargoes efforts. In contrast, progress was made on During 2019, 13 UN arms embargoes, the more technical aspects of the regimes’ 21 European Union (EU) arms embargoes work, such as control list amendments. and 1 Arab League arms embargo were in This included new controls on cyber-­ force. No new embargo was imposed and surveillance and cyber-warfare tools made none was lifted. Ten of the EU arms embar­ by the . Several goes matched the scope of embargoes regimes took steps to engage more sub­ imposed by the UN, three were broader in stantially with each other on overlaps in terms of duration, geographical scope or their control lists, including with regard to the types of weapon covered, and eight had their coverage of emerging technologies. no UN counterpart. The single Arab League EU controls arms embargo, on Syria, had no UN counter­part. As in previous years, investi­ To implement the four export control gations by the UN revealed numerous regimes in its common market, the EU has reported cases of violations of varying sig­ established a shared legal basis for controls nificance. The implementation of the UN on the export, brokering, transit and trans- arms embargo on Libya, for example, has shipment of dual-use items and, to a certain done little to halt the flow of arms into the degree, military items. During 2019, the conflict. During 2019, some arms transfers EU’s two main instruments in this area— raised questions about what specific activ­ the EU Common Position on Arms Exports ities and goods are covered by EU arms and the EU Dual-use Regulation—were the embargoes, and also highlighted the subject of review processes. The process of potential need for improved mechanisms reviewing the EU Common Position was of national reporting and independent completed in September 2019 and led to monitoring. limited changes to both the text of the instrument and its accompanying User’s Export control regimes Guide. However, the review of the EU Dual- Each of the four multilateral export control use Regu­lation, begun in 2011, was still regimes—the (on chemical ongoing at the end of 2019. While substan­ and biological weapons), the Missile Tech­ tive progress was made in 2019, the discus­ nology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppli­ sions also highlighted differences among ers Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement the parties—the European Commission, on Export Controls for Conventional Arms European Parlia­ment and the Council of and Dual-use Goods and Technologies— the EU—about the overall purpose of the reviewed its respective trade control lists regulation. • and guidelines in 2019. None of the four regimes admitted any new participating states (or partners) during 2019, despite a

non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 21 ANNEXES 1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes Arms control and disarmament (Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, agreements in force, 1 January 2020 PNET) 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in or Any Other Hostile Use of Environ­ War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other mental Modification Techniques (Enmod Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Convention) Warfare (1925 ) 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities Punishment of the Crime of 1981 Convention on Prohibitions or (Genocide Convention) Restrictions on the Use of Certain 1949 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Conventional Weapons which may be Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to War; and 1977 Protocols I and II Relating have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW to the Protection of Victims of Inter­ Convention, or ‘Inhumane Weapons’ national and Non‑International Armed Convention) Conflicts 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty 1959 Antarctic Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Europe (CFE Treaty) Under Water (Partial Test-Ban Treaty, 1992 PTBT) 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Development, Production, Stock­piling Activities of States in the Exploration and and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Use of Outer Space, Including the their Destruction (Chemical Weapons and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Convention, CWC) Treaty) 1995 Treaty on the Nuclear 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok) Weapons in and the 1996 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Caribbean () Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 1996 Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Control (Florence Agreement) Treaty, NPT) 1997 Inter-American Convention Against the 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and , Ammunition, Explosives, and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on Other Related Materials (CIFTA) the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof (Seabed Treaty) 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Development, Production and Stockpiling Destruction (APM Convention) of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction 1999 Inter-American Convention on (Biological and Toxin Weapons Transparency in Conventional Weapons Convention, BWC) Acquisitions 1974 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground 2001 Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Nuclear Weapon Tests (Threshold Test- Ammunition and other related Materials Ban Treaty, TTBT)

22 sipri yearbook 2020, summary in the Southern African Development chronology 2019, selected Community (SADC) Region events 2004 Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and 16 Jan. The United Nations Security Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region Coun ­cil establishes a UN Mission and the to support the Hodeidah Agree­ 2006 ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and ment in Yemen. Light Weapons, their Ammunition and 6 Feb. The Government of the Central Other Related Materials African Republic and 14 armed 2006 Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in groups sign a peace agreement. Central Asia (Treaty of Semipalatinsk) 27 Mar. India announces that it success­ fully tested an anti-satellite 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions weapon for the first time. 2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further 30 Apr. Juan Guaidó, the leader of the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic opposition in Venezuela, insti­ Offensive Arms (New START) gates an attempted uprising 2010 Central African Convention for the against President Nicolás Maduro. Control of Small Arms and Light 19 May A further allegation of chemical Weapons, Their Ammunition and All weapon use in Kabanah, Syria, is Parts and Components That Can Be Used investigated by the Organisation for Their Manufacture, Repair and for the Prohibition of Chemical Assembly (Kinshasa Convention) Weapons. 2011 Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- 20–21 June Iran shoots down a US military and Security-Building Measures drone. The United States responds 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) with cyberattacks against Iranian intelligence and military assets. Agreements not yet in force, 17 July The World Health Organization 1 January 2020 (WHO) declares the Ebola out­ break in the Democratic Republic 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty of the Congo a Public Health Emer­ (CTBT) gency of International Concern. 1999 Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE 2 Aug. The USA formally withdraws Treaty from the 1987 Treaty on the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Elimination of Intermediate- Weapons Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty). Security cooperation bodies 8 Sep. US President Donald J. Trump Developments in 2019 included declares the Afghan peace talks becoming a participant of the Proliferation ‘dead’. Security Initiative; and Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 9 Oct. Turkey announces the start of Colombia and Paraguay withdrawing from the military operations in north-east Union of South American Nations (Unión de Syria to create a ‘safe zone’. Naciones Suramericanas, UNASUR), while 4 Nov. The USA formally notifies the UN Ecuador and Peru initiated the with­drawal of its intention to withdraw from process. Discussions to form a new regional the 2016 Paris Agreement on group, known as the Forum for the Progress of climate change in 2020. South America (Foro para el Progreso de 31 Dec. A pneumonia of unknown cause América del Sur, PROSUR), were ongoing. • detected in Wuhan, China, is reported to the WHO.

annexes 23 SIPRI DATABASES SIPRI National Reports Database

SIPRI Military Expenditure Database Provides links to all publicly accessible national reports on arms exports and is Gives the annual military spending of constantly updated to include links to countries since 1949, allowing comparison newly published national reports on arms of countries’ military spending in local exports. currency at current prices; in US dollars at constant prices and exchange rates; and as SIPRI Multilateral Peace a share of gross domestic product. Operations Database Offers information on all UN and non-UN SIPRI Arms Industry Database peace operations conducted since 2000, Contains annual data on total revenue and including location, dates of deployment and revenue from arms sales and military operation, mandate, participating coun­ services since 2002 for the 100 companies tries, number of personnel, budgets and with the highest arms sales in the world fatalities. (with the exception of Chinese companies). The SIPRI databases can be accessed at the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database SIPRI website. • Shows all international transfers of major conventional arms since 1950. It is the most comprehensive publicly available source of information on international arms transfers.

SIPRI Arms Embargoes Database

Gives information on all arms embargoes that have been implemented by an inter­ national organization, such as the Euro­ pean Union or the United Nations, or by a group of nations. All embargoes that are in force, or have been in force since 1998, are included.

24 sipri yearbook 2020, summary HOW TO ORDER SIPRI YEARBOOK 2020

SIPRI Yearbook 2020: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security

Published in print and online by Oxford University Press

ISBN 978-0-19-886920-7, hardback ISBN 978-0-19-190570-4, online

More information is available at www.sipriyearbook.org

Signalistgatan 9 SE-169 72 Solna, Sweden Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00 Email: [email protected] Internet: www.sipri.org STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

SIPRI YEARBOOK 2020 Armaments, Disarmament and International Security

The SIPRI Yearbook is as an authoritative and independent source of data and analysis on armaments, disarmament and international security. It provides an overview of developments in international security, weapons and technology, military expenditure, arms production and the arms trade, and armed conflicts and conflict management, along with efforts to control conventional, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. This booklet summarizes the 51st edition of the SIPRI Yearbook, which covers developments during 2019, including • Armed conflict and conflict management, with an overview of armed conflicts and peace processes across the Americas, Asia and Oceania, Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa, as well as a focus on global and regional trends in peace operations • Military expenditure, international arms transfers and developments in arms production • World nuclear forces, with an overview of each of the nine nuclear-armed states and their nuclear modernization programmes • Nuclear arms control, featuring North Korean–US nuclear diplomacy, developments in the INF Treaty and Russian–US nuclear arms control and disarmament, and implementation of Iran’s nuclear deal • Chemical and biological security threats, including the investigation of allegations of chemical weapon use in Syria and developments in the international legal instruments against chemical and • Conventional arms control, with a focus on global instruments, including efforts to regulate lethal autonomous weapon systems, cyberspace and explosive weapons in populated areas, and the dialogue on preventing an arms race in outer space • Dual-use and arms trade controls, including developments in the Arms Trade Treaty, multilateral arms embargoes and export control regimes, and review processes in the legal framework of the European Union for such controls as well as annexes listing arms control and disarmament agreements, international security cooperation bodies, and key events in 2019.

www.sipriyearbook.org