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Arms Control: for and by Europe CSS Policy Perspectives ETH Zurich Vol. 8/10, September 2020 Arms Control: For and By Europe The nuclear arms control architecture that underwrites European security is crumbling. Europe cannot achieve global nuclear disarmament or build its own credible deterrent, but it can clear the path for the next generation of arms governance through joint action. By Alex Bollfrass and Mariana Budjeryn urope is unprepared for the resurgence of great power Unrestrained power politics also subvert the broad- Epolitics. As Russia, China, and the United States inten- er post-Cold War international order. Russia shed legal in- sify their global competition, they show little care for pre- hibitions in its seizure of Crimea, military involvement in serving the residual security architecture built on agree- Eastern Ukraine, and nefarious lethal, cyber, and disinfor- ments accumulated over the past half-century to limit mation activities in Europe and the United States. While weapons and offer transparency. amassing conventional forces along NATO borders, Rus- European security strategies over the past three de- sia has been modernizing its nuclear arsenal, including a cades consciously shifted away from military and defense large cache of non-strategic weapons. toward transformative engagement with its neighbors. The Trump presidency, though it might prove an These strategies were made possible by European integra- exception to the US long-term commitment to its allies, tion, the American security guarantee within NATO, and the legacy of US-So- viet agreements. Most of these agreements have collapsed, or are about to. The last two Key Points years saw the United States pull out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Cooperative strategic nuclear arms control, key to Europe’s post-Cold (INF) Treaty and Open Skies Treaty. This War security, has become hostage to returning great power competi- comes on the back of the US withdrawal tion. from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002, and Russian abrogation A European diversity in nuclear weapons status and NATO affiliation of the Conventional Forces in Europe makes the pursuit of a nuclear ban or a credible pan-European (CFE) Treaty in 2007. The last standing deterrent untenable. US-Russian arms control treaty, New START that limits deployed strategic An institutionalized European coalition for arms control will amplify nuclear arms, is due to expire in February European capacity to influence nuclear arms reductions and shape 2021. Prospects for its extension are un- multilateral non-nuclear arms governance. certain. Arms Control: For and By Europe 2 exposes Europe’s vulnerability to Washington’s whims. composition of the European arms control coalition is sec- Further, the fate of the INF Treaty showed how the US ondary, it should be led by European middle powers to in- focus on containing China’s rise could imperil European clude both NATO allies and like-minded partners with a security. While the US withdrawal from the Treaty was stake in the continent’s stability and state capacity to driven by Russia’s noncompliance, it was also helped along match it. German and French support is particularly cru- by the US’ desire to counter China’s INF-range missiles in cial to the coalition’s success. East Asia.1 Consequently, Europe is now exposed to Rus- sia’s unconstrained deployment of INF-range missiles. Europe’s Arms Control and Disarmament Coalition The European arms control coalition would be built on the Considering Europe’s Options mutual recognition of three basic facts about European se- As the continent’s security deteriorates, European capitals curity. One is that Russia is a threat, and that geopolitics are are seeking to ameliorate the US-Russian nuclear compe- particularly unfavorable to Europe’s north and east. Until tition that degrades their security, but to which they are Russia shows a serious interest in re-imagining its objec- not parties. Formulating a unified security policy is chal- tives and methods in its relations with other states, US ex- lenging because Europe is heterogeneous in its nuclear re- tended deterrence will continue to benefit the security of lations. There are the two nuclear powers, France and Brit- not only European NATO allies, but also non-allied part- ain; NATO allies that host American nuclear arms on ners like Switzerland, Sweden, and Finland. their territory; the non-nuclear members of the nuclear Two, a nuclear-weapons-free world is an imperative alliance; and those outside NATO without nuclear arms. but remote goal. Until then, nuclear deterrence remains a Given these differences, how can Europe provide for its necessity, although nuclear powers must strive for strategic security without undermining its unity? stability through engagement, transparency, and arms re- One option is to pursue Europe’s security through ductions. The pledge of the nuclear Nonproliferation Trea- armed autonomy that relies on a French-operated nuclear ty (NPT) to work toward nuclear disarmament is thus a deterrent. If such a deterrent could be made credible, it critical linchpin that reconciles the practice of deterrence would ween Europe off America’s tutelage and allow it to with the goal of abolition. balance against Russia. A second option is to pursue nuclear Three, intensifying great power competition is not abolition, heeding European public opinion and political an impediment, but an impulse for stepping up arms con- preferences for lesser, not greater reliance on nuclear weap- trol efforts. Europe’s own security hinges on a robust bilat- ons.2 This would entail joining the Treaty on the Prohibi- eral and multilateral arms control architecture. Verified tion of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), opened for signature US-Russian arms limitations stabilize relations and reduce by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in Sep- the risk of inadvertent or intentional escalation of tensions tember 2017, which grew out of justified frustration with between the two into a conventional and ultimately nucle- the nuclear powers’ inadequate arsenal reductions. ar conflict. Moreover, in order to shore up the NPT re- While strategic autonomy from the United States might be a tempting prospect for some European nations, and nuclear abolition is the right long-term goal for all, in the foreseeable future nei- Further Reading ther option provides a tenable answer to the European security predicament. Both Johanna Möhring, “Three Elephants of European Security,” options threaten to drive a fatal wedge War on the Rocks, 28.01.2020. into the transatlantic security architec- As power politics return, the author outlines the ineffectiveness of ture and Europe’s own political and secu- European efforts to preserve multilateral security arrangements. rity cohesion.3 A third option, best calibrated to Andrew Futter / Benjamin Zala, “Emerging non-nuclear technology advancing European security, is a formal- and the future of the global nuclear order,” ized European coalition for arms control in: Bard Nikolas Vik Steen / Olav Njolstad (ed.), and disarmament with an assertive and Nuclear Disarmament: A Critical Assessment (London: Routledge, 2019), coherent agenda to pressure Moscow, pp. 209 – 223. The authors argue that new non-nuclear technologies Washington, and eventually Beijing. Un- will reshape strategic deterrence. like abolitionism or Eurodeterrence, an ef- fective arms control and reductions agen- William Walker, “Nuclear Order and Disorder,” da is that common security policy International Affairs 76:4 (2000). denominator behind which all European An overview of the tensions and contradictions in global nuclear states can rally, no matter their nuclear weapons governance. and NATO affiliations. While the exact Arms Control: For and By Europe 3 gime, the European coalition must adopt an understanding of arms control not only as cooperation between adversaries for the sake of strategic stability, but as reductions leading to disarmament. A European arms control coali- tion must contend with formidable ob- stacles that include a tradition of defer- ence to the United States, uneven threat perceptions across Europe, and an un- willingness to make costly trade-offs. That European exhortations on arms control seem not to affect nuclear states’ policies exacerbates the feeling of power- lessness, as when Russia ignored NATO complaints about INF-banned weapons and the United States could not be per- suaded to remain in the agreement. Eu- ropean calls for New START extension Europe is not powerless against the collapse of arms control. Wolfgang Rattay / Reuters have had no effect, either. While appreciation of the impor- tance of arms control is growing, current European approaches to revitalizing arms control are largely fragmented and aspirational. Debates ors, as well as launch a standing forum for multilateral are driven by nostalgia for the positive arms control mo- arms governance. The agenda should include the following: mentum of the late Cold War and immediate post-Cold New START Extension. The priority must be New War US-Russian rapprochement, rather than an honest START’s extension before it expires on 5 February 2021. assessment of new geostrategic realities. Europe needs The Trump administration’s policy of using the extension more effective means to pursue its arms control ends. as leverage to bring China to the strategic arms control table is misguided. The coalition must mobilize all Europe- From Stepping Stones to Firm Foothold an NATO allies to clearly and forcefully favor the Treaty’s Banding together and speaking in a united voice would extension without China, especially now that the adminis- amplify European capability to shape the arms control tration appears to be softening its insistence on China’s agenda. Some productive efforts have already been inclusion in the next round of arms control talks.5 broached. Germany looks poised to take the European P5+ Strategic Transparency Dialogue. US concerns lead in arms control: foreign minister Heiko Maas set arms about the opacity of China’s nuclear forces and its strategic control, nonproliferation, and disarmament as one of Ber- modernization have merit.
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