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Arms Control in Europe: in Europe: Arms Control and Threats Trends Regimes, Edited by Tommi Koivula and Katariina Simonen Edited by Tommi Koivula And

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Arms Control in Europe: in Europe: Arms Control and Threats Trends Regimes, Edited by Tommi Koivula and Katariina Simonen Edited by Tommi Koivula And National Defence University Series 1: Research Publications No. 16 Arms Control in Europe: Regimes, Trends and Threats Arms Control in Europe: Regimes, Trends and Threats Edited by Tommi Koivula and Katariina Simonen Arms control issues, especially regarding nuclear weapons, have Arms Control in Europe: been a marginal theme on the European security agenda after the end of the Cold War. One can even talk about the erosion of arms Regimes, Trends and Threats control expertise in several European countries. At the same time, nuclear weapons are actively back in States’ defence policies, while groundbreaking technological advances such as artificial Edited by Tommi Koivula and Katariina Simonen intelligence, unmanned and autonomous weapons systems and other innovations have come to influence our contemporary se- curity environment. This book is written in response to these alarming developments. Its purpose is to reconstruct expertise and raise awareness on arms control and nuclear weapons in Europe. It is a timely collection of essays by eminent experts in different fields of arms control. T. Koivula & K. Simonen (eds.) National Defence University PO Box 7, 00861 HELSINKI Puh. +358 299 800 www.mpkk.fi ISBN 978-951-25-2950-6 (pbk.) ISBN 978-951-25-2951-3 (pdf) ISSN 2342-9992 (print) ISSN 2343-0001 (web) Series 1, No. 16 The Finnish Defence Forces MAANPUOLUSTUSKORKEAKOULU JULKAISUSARJA 1: TUTKIMUKSIA NRO 16 NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY SERIES 1: RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS NO. 16 ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE: REGIMES, TRENDS AND THREATS Edited by Tommi Koivula and Katariina Simonen NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY HELSINKI 2017 Tommi Koivula & Katariina Simonen (eds.) Arms Control in Europe: Regimes, Trends and Threats Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu Julkaisusarja 1: Tutkimuksia nro 16 National Defence University Series 1: Research Publications No. 16 Recent publications in PDF format: http://www.doria.fi/handle/10024/73990 © National Defence University & Authors Cover art by Niklas Pennanen / National Defence University ISBN 978-951-25-2950-6 (pbk.) ISBN 978-951-25-2951-3 (pdf) ISSN 2342-9992 (print) ISSN 2343-0001 (web) Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu National Defence University Juvenes Print Tampere 2017 Finland CONTENTS List of Acronyms and Abbreviations i INTRODUCTION 1 Tommi Koivula and Katariina Simonen Why This Book is Important 1 About the Authors and the Structure of This Book 2 Acknowledgements 5 Chapter One LOOKING FOR STABILITY: AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN NUCLEAR DOCTRINES AND ARMS CONTROL 7 Mika Kerttunen Introduction 7 The Rationale of Becoming and Being Nuclear 9 To Deter and to Fight: U.S. and Russian Nuclear Postures 12 Conclusion: The Limits and Potential of Arms Control and Disarmament 22 Concepts and Abbreviations 30 Chapter Two THE US MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, EUROPE AND RUSSIA 35 Götz Neuneck Introduction: A Short History of BMD – From Global Aspirations to Regional Reality 35 The Current BMD Programs and Rationales: A Closer Look 39 The EPAA and the Implications for European Security 43 Some Conclusions 51 Chapter Three TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS – TREATY REGIME ON THE BRINK OF COLLAPSE 57 Katariina Simonen Introduction 57 Historical Steps 58 Structure of the NPT and Interpretation 61 Practice of the Parties 64 Extension and Review Conferences in a Nutshell 67 Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons 69 Saving the NPT Regime? 72 Chapter Four NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS: DEFINITIONS, ARSENALS, CUTS, PROSPECTS 79 Alexander I. Nikitin On Terms, Criteria and Typology 79 Estimations of Existing Arsenals of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons 82 Previous Cuts and Measures Regarding TNW Arsenals 85 American TNW in Europe: Modernization or Withdrawal? 88 Prospects for International Dialogue on Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons 90 Conclusions 93 Chapter Five INF TREATY – PRESENT STATE AND WAY FORWARD 97 Matti Vuorio How the INF Treaty was Achieved 97 Implementation of the INF Treaty 99 Needs for Possible Modifications to the INF Treaty 100 Relevance of Ballistic Missile Defence to the INF 104 Suspected Violations of the Existing INF Treaty 107 Conclusions and Recommendations 108 Chapter Six CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE AND ITS CURRENT CHALLENGES 113 Tommi Koivula Introduction 113 The (Cumbersome) Definition of Conventional Weapons 114 Conventional Weapons in Arms Control 116 The European Conventional Arms Control Landscape 118 Whither Conventional Arms Control? – Technological and Military-Strategic Challenges 123 Turmoil – or New Ways Ahead? 127 Chapter Seven THE PANDORA’S BOX OF MILITARY ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 133 Johanna Friman The Pandora’s Box of Military Artificial Intelligence: Introductory Remarks 133 Uncovering the Need for an Arms Control Regime Regarding Autonomous Weapons 137 Contemplating the Elements of an Arms Control Regime Regarding Autonomous Weapons 144 The Pandora’s Box of Military Artificial Intelligence: Concluding Remarks 146 Chapter Eight CYBER: ARMS CONTROL WITHOUT ARMS? 151 Eneken Tikk Introduction 151 Arms Control – the Discourse in a Nutshell 152 The Problematique of ‘Cyber’ Security 153 Cyber Capabilities and Operations: Theory and Practice 157 Arguments Against Cyber Arms Control 161 Alternatives to Cyber Arms Control 163 Implications on Arms Control Theory 166 Conclusion 168 Chapter Nine CURRENT CHALLENGES REGARDING ARMS CONTROL AND THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 171 Tamás Lattmann Introduction 171 International Law Applicable to Outer Space 172 UN Bodies Dealing with Questions Related to Outer Space and Arms Control 173 The Outer Space Treaty 174 The Partial Test Ban Treaty 178 Developments Related to Arms Control in Outer Space 179 Conclusions 184 ABOUT THE AUTHORS 189 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ABL CM Airborne Laser Cruise Missile ABM COPUOS Anti Ballistic Missile System Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space AG CSBM Australia Group Confidence- and Security- Building Measures ALCM CTBT Air-Launched Cruise Missile Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty ARF C2 ASEAN Regional Forum Command and Control ASEAN C4ISR Association of Southeast Asian Nations command, control, communications, com- puters, intelligence, surveillance, and recon- ASMPA naissance French system of cruise missiles (Air-Sol Moyenne Portee Amelioree) DDPR Deterrence and Defense Posture Review AWS Autonomous Weapon Systems DOD Department of Defence A2/AD Anti-Access Area Denial DPRK Democratic People´s Republic of Korea BM Ballistic Missile DSB Defense Science Board BMDR Ballistic Missile Defense Review EMD European Missile Defense BMD(S) Ballistic Missile Defense (System) EMR European Missile Radar CBM Confidence Building Measures EPAA European Phased Adaptive Approach CCW Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions EPW on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Earth Penetrating Warheads which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects EU European Union CD Conference on Disarmament FBX Forward-based radars CFE Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe GAO Government Accountability Office i GBI IO Ground Based Interceptors information operations GGE IRBM Group of Governmental Experts Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile GLCM ISODARCO Ground Launched Cruise Missile International School on Disarmament and Research of Conflicts GMD Ground-based Midcourse Defense IT information technology GPALS Global Protection Against Limited Strikes ITU International Telecommunications Union HTK Hit-to-kill IW information warfare HINW humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons JASSM Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile IAEA International Atomic Energy Organization JCG Joint Consultative Group ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ICJ International Court of Justice JP Joint Publication ICoC International Code of Conduct for Outer KV Space Activities Kill Vehicle ICRAC LAM International Committee for Robot Arms Loitering Attack Munitions Control LAW ICRC Lethal autonomous weapons International Committee of the Red Cross LRSO ICTs Long-range standoff weapon information and communication technologies MDA IHL Missile Defense Agency International Humanitarian Law MEADS IISS Medium Extended Air Defense System International Institute of Strategic Studies MENWFZ/WMDFZ INF Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces and other weapons of mass destruction INF Treaty MilBal Treaty on Intermediate and Shorter Range Military Balance Nuclear Forces ii MIRV OAS Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Organization of American States Vehicle OECD MLF Organization for Economic Co-operation multilateral force and Development MRBM OSCE Medium-Range Ballistic Missile Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime OST Outer Space Treaty NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization PAC Patriot Advanced Capability NATO ALTBMD NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Mis- PAROS sile Defence Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space NATO MD PGM NATO Mediterranean Dialogue (policy) Precision Guided Munitions NIAMDS PPD NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defense Presidential Policy Directive System PRC NCND People’s Republic of China ‘Neither Confirm, Nor Deny’ policy PTBT NFU Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty No First Use Policy PTSS NGO Precision Tracking and Space Surveillance Non-governmental Organisation RV NMD Re-entry Vehicle National Missile Defense R&D NNWS Research and Development non-nuclear weapon state SALT NPT Strategic Arms Limitations Talks Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons SBIRS Space-based Infrared System
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