Nuclear and Missile Trade and Developments NUCLEAR- AND MISSILE-RELATED TRADE AND DEVELOPMENTS FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES, MARCH - JUNE 1999

by Clay Bowen, Erik Jorgensen, Gaurav Kampani, and Fred Wehling

The material in this overview is drawn from selected abstracts that appear in the Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ nuclear and missile databases. Transactions of nuclear and missile technologies, parts, and materials are listed according to the recipient country. Other developments are listed according to the country where the event or development took place.

Laboratory in New Mexico. The espionage and military sites—the main vertebrae of reportedly occurred in the mid-1980s but it China’s strategic backbone.” According to ASIA was not detected until 1995 when US intelli- the report, China spent more than half of the gence analyzed Chinese nuclear tests and $15 billion on high-technology equipment found that the technology used was very such as computers. Most sales occurred in similar to America’s latest nuclear warhead 1993 after President Clinton loosened export design, the W-88. China has denied the US rules on computers. The report also states ANGLADESH B allegations of nuclear theft and Chinese that “several of the Chinese buyers later sup- Nuclear Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao plied nuclear, missile, and military equipment The Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commis- said that the allegations were groundless to Iran and Pakistan.” Some of the sales listed sion reported in late March 1999 that the and irresponsible. in the Wisconsin Project report are: (1) com- Bangladeshi government is considering re- James Risen and Jeff Gerth, New York Times, 6 puter and imaging equipment with potential viving plans for a small nuclear power plant March 1999, p. A1; Walter Pincus, Washington for uranium prospecting sold to the China Post, 7 March 1999, p. A19; Inside China To- in Rupper. An agreement for a 60-MW unit day [Online], , National Nuclear Corp.; (2) equipment that was signed with Belgian firms in 1970, but 12 March 1999. could be used to develop powerful anti-air- the project fell through when Bangladesh craft radar sold to the China National Elec- separated from Pakistan. Financing has not A Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Con- tronics Import-Export Corp.; (3) gear that yet been negotiated. trol report, titled “U.S. Exports to China, could be used to develop C-802 and C-801 Nucleonics Week, 25 March 1999, pp. 17-18. 1988-1998: Fueling Proliferation,” states that cruise missiles sold to the China Precision since 1988, China has purchased high-tech- Machinery Import-Export Corp.; and (4) com- nology strategic equipment from the United puter equipment sold to the Chinese Acad- CHINA States worth over $15 billion. US exports in- emy of Sciences that could be used to Nuclear cluded equipment used in nuclear weapons develop a fusion nuclear reactor. China also According to US officials, China’s recent production, cruise missiles, aircraft radar, and purchased “semiconductor manufacturing progress in the miniaturization of its nuclear other military goods. Furthermore, “some of equipment, high-speed oscilloscopes (used warheads was accelerated by the theft of [the] dual-use equipment was licensed di- in nuclear weapons tests), precision ma- nuclear secrets from Los Alamos National rectly to leading Chinese nuclear, missile, chines tools (used in weapons and long-

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1999 179 Nuclear and Missile Trade and Developments range missiles), and vibration testing gear 13 June 1999. The suspected test was car- fer theater missile defense (TMD) technol- (for nuclear weapons and missiles)” from the ried out at the Lop Nor test facility, although ogy to Taiwan it would be “considered a United States. it is not clear whether the blast produced a hostile act and would certainly lead to seri- Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, nuclear yield. If the test produced a yield, ous consequences,” and would be the “last “U.S. Exports to China 1988-1998: Fueling Pro- China would be in violation of its announced straw” in US-China relations. The senior liferation,” April 1999. moratorium on nuclear testing. Chinese official said that a TMD system in Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, Washington Taiwan might give it a “false sense of secu- Western diplomatic officials believe that Times, 18 June 1999, p. A5. rity” providing the motivation to declare in- China may be preparing to decommission dependence. Furthermore, China “reserves some of its older military nuclear processing The Russian Atomic Energy Ministry the right to attack Taiwan if the island de- facilities and designate large amounts of (MINATOM) has approved a proposal that clares independence.” According to China’s waste material for geological disposal. The allows the Tvel nuclear group to negotiate a Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, any transfer Lanzhou uranium plant and the plutonium contract with China to design the core of a of a TMD system to Taiwan would be an production complex at Guangyuan in fast breeder reactor (FBR). The contract will encroachment on China’s sovereignty and Szechwan Province are reportedly slated for include the possibility of transferring highly territorial integrity. Tang also said that closure. Some Western analysts dispute that enriched uranium and reactor control rods China is against any transfer of TMD tech- China would shut down the Guangyuan fa- to China. All sales and transfers will be sub- nology to Japan. Tang suggested that a cility as it is China’s only remaining pluto- ject to Russian export regulations, and the TMD system would “violate Japan’s consti- nium production facility, although China has process will be monitored by MINATOM. tutional pledge to maintain only defensive supposedly stockpiled a large amount of Nuclear Engineering International, 22 June 1999, military capabilities.” p. 4. weapons-grade plutonium. The decommis- John Pomfret, Washington Post, 6 March 1999, sioning of the plants was ordered by Chi- p. 13; John Pomfret, Washington Post, 8 March nese Premier Zhu Rongji to force the China Missile 1999, p. 13. National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) to cut According to a US Department of Defense its workforce and carry out structural reor- intelligence report, China is continuing to On 10 March 1999, a US grand jury indicted ganization. China is building a second, larger secretly transfer missile and weapons tech- a Chinese citizen and a naturalized Canadian uranium enrichment facility utilizing gas nologies to Middle Eastern and Asian coun- on charges of smuggling US missile tech- centrifuges at Lanzhou with Russian help. tries despite promises to stop. The classified nology to China. Both individuals, Yao Yi of This facility will replace an older gaseous report concludes, “the Chinese are prolifer- China and Collin Xu of Canada, and their diffusion plant at the site. According to Chi- ating on a consistent basis without techni- companies, Lion Photonics of China and nese officials, the first enrichment facility at cally breaking agreements with the United Lion Photonics Inc. of Canada, allegedly at- Hanzhong has been completed and is pro- States,” by going through government- tempted to smuggle out fiber optic gyro- ducing low-enriched uranium. The Sino- owned companies. China is believed to have scopes from a Massachusetts firm to China. Russian project originally called for the supplied Iran with specialty steel compo- According to court papers, the Chinese firm construction of further centrifuges at nents for building missiles and telemetry said that it would use the gyroscopes on a Hanzhong, but China relocated them to equipment to test them. China is presently railroad project. After the first application Lanzhou. The first stage of the Lanzhou training 10 Iranian scientists on inertial guid- was rejected by US customs, the manufac- project involves the construction of a ance techniques. Reportedly, China trans- turer of the gyroscope received another ap- 500,000 SWU per year plant. A second ferred US-manufactured equipment plication for the same device from the 500,000 SWU per year plant is to be built disguised as cookware to a missile produc- Canadian firm. Suspicious, the manufacturer later at Lanzhou. Officials said that the plant tion facility in Pakistan. A separate intelli- alerted US Customs, who set up a success- was transferred to Lanzhou to prevent lay- gence report concludes that China has ful sting operation. offs, maintain the location as a uranium en- provided North Korea with high-grade steel Inside China Today [Online], , 10 March 1999. strategy of having multiple, dispersed, stra- assisting the North Korean space program. tegic nuclear processing locations. When the Bill Gertz, Washington Times [Online], , 15 April 1999. Yuxi denied a Newsweek magazine allegation have a gas centrifuge enrichment capacity that China had seized two US cruise missiles According to a senior Chinese official, the of 1.5 million SWU per year by 2005. that did not detonate when the United States Mark Hibbs, NuclearFuel, 17 May 1999, p. 11. United States has been warned against sell- attacked suspected terrorist bases in Af- ing to Taiwan any military equipment that ghanistan in 1998. Sun referred to the allega- could enhance the latter’s defensive ability According to US military sources, China con- tion as a “groundless fabrication.” against missile attacks. The Chinese official ducted an underground nuclear test on 12 or China Times [Online], , 23 March 1999.

180 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1999 Nuclear and Missile Trade and Developments

INDIA the Cold War deterred both sides from using India Albert S. Chernyshev said that 10 nuclear weapons. percent of the cost will be taken from the Nuclear The Hindu [Online], , 16 March 1999. be in hard currency. The credit will be re- tions (ASEAN) Regional Forum on 3 March paid over 12 years, after the commission- 1999, the Indian delegation proposed a mul- The Chief Executive of India’s Nuclear Fuel ing of Kundankulam, which will be tilateral dialogue on disarmament to Complex (NFC), C. Ganguly, said that the NFC constructed in two phases, the first of strengthen global security and confidence- was ready to enter the global market to ex- which is scheduled to be completed in building in the Asia Pacific region. Indian port natural uranium oxide fuel assemblies, seven years and the second in an addi- delegates also called for no-first-use com- zirconium alloy coolant tubes, reactor core tional two to three years. Chernyshev said mitments by the nuclear powers. The Indian components, and fuel cladding. Ganguly said that most of the equipment for the nuclear delegation suggested de-targeting and de- that India had “a number of advantages in power project will be supplied from Rus- alerting all nuclear weapons to reduce their competing with the United States, France, sia, involving over 200 factories and re- role in the security postures of the nuclear Russia ... and China.” NFC started its inte- search establishments, and some weapon states. The Indian delegates said grated fuel fabrication facility in 1972, where equipment will be manufactured in India. these steps would lead to the zirconium oxide fuel pellets and zirconium Anoop Saxena, Indian Express, 9 April 1999. “delegitimization” and the eventual aboli- alloy clad fuel assemblies for reactor cores tion of nuclear weapons. were fabricated. According to an Indian military spokes- P.S. Suryanarayana, The Hindu [Online], , man, the Indian nuclear arsenal should /www.webpage.com/hindu/>, 4 March 1999. 24 March 1999. include three components: bombers (Su- 30 or Mirage 2000 aircraft), surface-to-sur- India has increased its nuclear-related Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes face missiles (SSMs), and submarines. budget by nearly Rs3.5 billion to Rs29.62 said during an interview that the Indian gov- Previously it was presumed that the In- billion for fiscal year (FY) 1999. The ernment was willing to sign the Comprehen- dian nuclear force structure would only Nuclear Power Corporation of India will sive Test Ban Treaty before the September include bombers and SSMs. The spokes- receive Rs12.81 billion to support con- 1999 deadline. However, he said that signing man said that Indian will have 20-100 struction at the Kaiga-1, Kaiga-2, the treaty would be subject to addressing nuclear warheads and it will take about 15 Rajasthan-3, Rajasthan-4, Tarapur-3, and India’s security concerns. Regarding a pro- years before India can deploy them. Tarapur-4 nuclear power plants. Approxi- posed moratorium on fissile material pro- Unian, 12-18 April 1999, p. 26. mately Rs1.07 billion was set aside for the duction, Fernandes said that India would Russian-aided Koodankulam project, two resolve such matters “through formal multi- The Indian Department of Atomic Energy VVER-1000 units. Funds were also allo- lateral talks.” In speaking about Indo-Paki- is reportedly preparing to build an addi- cated to improve operations at Tarapur, stani relations, Fernandes said that “a tional research reactor at the Bhabha Rajasthan, and Narora stations. Bhabha nuclearized South Asia shouldn’t bother ei- Atomic Research Center (BARC) in Atomic Research Center will receive ther [India or Pakistan]” and that “in a vicari- Trombay. The new research reactor would Rs5.3461 billion in FY99. The Indira ous or conscious way it has made us sit be similar to the existing 100-MW Dhruva Ghandi Center for Atomic Research is al- down and talk to each other.” He said that reactor, but appropriate design modifica- located Rs1.16 billion in FY99 for the op- Indo-Chinese relations suffered following tions would be incorporated based on eration of the Fast Breeder Test Reactor India’s May 1998 nuclear tests and China’s operating experience. BARC scientists and developing materials in support of the subsequent reactions and responses, but that expect the new reactor to become opera- fast breeder program. both sides were seeking to restore a dia- tional by 2010. The existence of an addi- Neel Patri, Nucleonics Week, 11 March 1999, p. logue. 11. tional research reactor would increase Maleeha Lodhi, The News (Islamabad), 5 April 1999, in FBIS Document FTS19990405000108, India’s production capacity of Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee 5 April 1999. unsafeguarded plutonium. said on 15 March 1999 that India was willing Indian Express [Online], , 27 April 1999. to “resolve all outstanding issues with Paki- Russia has offered to fund the entire cost of stan through talks.” Vajpayee also said that the 2,000-MW Kudankulam nuclear power A spokesman for the Indian External Affairs since both India and Pakistan had nuclear project through a $2.6 billion soft credit. The Ministry on 3 May 1999 refuted reports that weapons, “they had no option but to live Russian state bank Vnesheconombank has India was among those countries posing a together in peace.” He said that nuclear weap- already given India’s Nuclear Power Corpo- threat to the United States by spying in ons were defensive weapons, stressing that ration (NPC) a letter of guarantee for comple- nuclear weapons laboratories. The spokes- the “balance of terror” maintained during tion of the project, which will be executed by NPC and the Russian counterpart, man said that a recent US report claiming Atomstroyexport. Russian Ambassador to that India posed an “immediate” threat was

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1999 181 Nuclear and Missile Trade and Developments

“malicious and completely baseless.” The affairs. The Indian missile program has other to withdraw from this side of the Line of spokesman said that India’s nuclear program objectives other then being anti-Pakistan.” Control.” was “an excellent example of indigenization.” He said that if the North Atlantic Treaty Or- Pakistan Link [Online], , 27 May 1999; Dawn [Online], , 29 May 1999. hindu>, 4 May 1999. ons and missiles at the place of their choosing, India too would have an “inde- According to Indian military officials, there pendent policy.” In early June 1999, independent experts said was little to no effort to involve the military The News (Islamabad), 18 May 1999, in FBIS India and Pakistan were “miles away” from services in nuclear planning after the 11 Document FTS19990518000801, 18 May 1999. being able to deploy nuclear weapons, “let May and 13 May 1998 nuclear tests. A se- alone ordering strikes similar to the ones that nior army official said, “The services have There have been indications within India’s obliterated Hiroshima and Nagasaki.” Former no clue about the installation, utilization, or nuclear establishment that signing the Com- chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Com- dynamics of nuclear weapons.” prehensive Test Ban Treaty would not mission K. Srinivasan said, “Both [India and Rahul Bedi, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 5 May 1999, weaken India’s nuclear deterrent capability. Pakistan] have limited capability.” Director pp. 25-31. In early May 1999, head of India’s Atomic of the Institute of Peace and Conflict in New Energy Commission (AEC) Rajagopala Dehli Padmanabha Chari said there was The government of Indian Prime Minister Atal Chidambaram said the AEC advised the gov- “nothing to worry about” because neither Behari Vajpayee resigned on 17 April 1999, ernment to declare a moratorium on testing Pakistan nor India had “an established ca- after losing a parliamentary confidence vote. because the 11 May and 13 May 1998 nuclear pability to attack each other with nuclear The Vajpayee government had made con- tests generated a “valuable scientific data- weapons.” siderable progress toward signing the Com- base on which to base a credible deterrent.” AFP, 8 June 1999, in FBIS Document FTS19990608000060, 8 June 1999. prehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In regard He said the May 1998 designs were “robust” to signing the CTBT before the September and new ideas and sub-systems had been 1999 deadline, Indian Defense Minister “tested to perfection.” Chidambaram said On 9 June 1999 the US Senate voted to sus- George Fernandes said that the “Parliament the May 1998 tests gave India enough data pend economic sanctions that were placed is dissolved and therefore nothing is going that simulation tests could be conducted at on India and Pakistan after their May 1998 to happen on that front, certainly not until a “modest” cost if India were to pursue a nuclear tests. The sanctions will be sus- late October.” nuclear program. pended for five years, after which the Senate International Herald Tribune, 6 May 1999. Rahul Bedi, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19 May 1999, measure grants the US president a national p. 15. interest waiver to renew suspension of the On 14 May 1999, officials at the Bhabha sanctions. The ban on military and nuclear Atomic Research Center (BARC) said the In late May 1999, analysts said India and technology sales remains in effect, but the nuclear tests at Pokaran on 11 May and 13 Pakistan had taken a “dangerous step measure allows the president to grant a na- May 1998 did not cause any radioactive con- closer to conflict” over the skirmishes in tional security waiver for sales of defense tamination. “Radiation monitoring of the Kashmir. Gerald Segal of the International articles and services, foreign military financ- area is being carried out at regular intervals Institute for Strategic Studies said, “This ing, and dual-use technologies not used pri- and it is confirmed that the entire area is to- is a definite deterioration. ...This blows a marily for missile development or nuclear tally free of any radioactivity as a result of hole in the argument that after the nuclear weapons programs. the tests.” BARC officials added that there tests, relations between India and Pakistan AFP, 10 June 1999, in Lexis-Nexis [Online], , 10 June 1999. have been no established cases of radiation- were starting to look more stable.” Execu- related sickness in the area. tive director of the Forum for Strategic and Times of India (Internet Version), 15 May 1999, Security Studies Vijai Nair said, “I don’t United States scientists report that India ex- in FBIS Document FTS19990515000040, 15 see this going beyond a skirmish. ...But aggerated the yield of its 11 May 1998 May 1999. the Line of Control no longer exists as far nuclear test by at least 200 percent and per- as I’m concerned, and there is now tech- haps by as much as 500 percent. The Indian On 17 May 1999, Indian High Commissioner nically a war on.” On 28 May, Indian Department of Atomic Energy reported that G. Parathasarthy told journalists at the Paki- Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) spokesman one of the tests was a thermonuclear device stan Institute of International Affairs that a K.R. Malkani said that the use of nuclear called Shakti-1 that had a nuclear yield of 43 draft agreement for exchange of information weapons by India over the Kashmir con- KT, and that the other two were fission de- about nuclear and missile technology was flict was “completely out of the question.” vices with yields of 12 KT and 0.2 KT. US almost ready for approval by India and Paki- He said the attacks were unlikely to stop Department of Energy analysts concluded stan. Parahtasarthy said, “India is not wor- immediately, but that it was clear that the that India had exaggerated the yield of its 11 ried about Pakistan’s missile tests because it situation would not escalate. He said, “We May 1998 tests to “support its claim that it [Pakistan] has the right to handle its own would very much like the Pakistani force had tested an H-bomb.” According to US

182 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1999 Nuclear and Missile Trade and Developments officials, analysts said India had probably to 23 March 1999. Russian and Indian offi- Indian DRDO head A.P.J. Abdul Kalam said tried to detonate a two-stage thermonuclear cials discussed the possible sale of the S- in late May 1999 that India’s missile capa- weapon, but that a complete ignition of the 300 anti-missile system to India. bility is not Pakistan-centric. According to fusion energy stage did not occur, resulting Hindustan Times, 23 March 1999, in FBIS Docu- Abdul Kalam, unlike Pakistan’s capability, in a lower yield than India expected. United ment FTS19990323000032, 23 March 1999. India’s missile capability was “indigenous.” States government officials would neither He said the “import content is less than 10 confirm nor deny the report. On 11 April 1999 at 9:47 am, India test-fired percent” and that the Agni-2 was “designed Nucleonics Week, 10 June 1999, pp. 1, #12-13. its Agni-2 intermediate-range ballistic mis- to carry a nuclear warhead if required.” He sile (IRBM) from inner Wheelers Island off said that if the government approves “I On 9 June 1999, the Group of Eight (G-8) lead- the Orissa coast. The Indian Defence Re- would like to neutralize the Missile Technol- ing industrial countries urged India and Pa- search and Development Organization ogy Control Regime (MTCR) that has tried kistan to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban (DRDO) and Indian Defence Minister George but failed to throttle our program.” He said Treaty. The foreign ministers also de- Fernandes claimed that the launch was a that India did not support proliferation, but manded an immediate cease-fire in Kashmir success. The missile was launched from a he would like to “devalue missiles by selling and the resumption of peace talks. mobile-rail launcher. The missile’s flight the technology to many nations and break AP, 10 June 1999 in Lexis-Nexis [Online], , 10 June 1999. 2,000 km before it reached the splashdown Raj Chengappa, India Today International, 26 point. According to Prime Minister Atal April 1999, p. 31. On 18 June 1999, Indian Foreign Minister Behari Vajpayee, Pakistan was notified on 9 Jaswant Singh said the fighting in Kashmir April 1999 of the decision to launch the Agni- India’s Integrated Guided Missile Develop- was “unlikely to escalate into a full-fledged 2 and India “remains committed to minimum ment Program (IGMDP) is believed to be de- war with fellow nuclear power Pakistan.” He deterrence, to no first-use of nuclear weap- veloping a 3,700 km-range Agni-3 and a said India had no intention of escalating the ons, and never to use them [nuclear weap- 4,000-5,000 km-range Agni-4. Reports indi- conflict. In late June 1999, director of the ons] against a non-nuclear state.” cated the Agni-3 is based upon merging ex- Indian Institute of Defense Studies and BBC News [Online], , 11 isting Agni propulsion technology with the Analysis (IDSA) Air Commodore Jasjit April 1999; Times of India [Online], , 12 April 1999; Singh said there was “no risk of even a full- Manvendra Singh, Indian Express [Online], oped by the Indian Space Research Organi- fledged war” between India and Pakistan over , 12 April 1999. zation (ISRO). According to an Indian defense Kashmir. He said that a nuclear war re- analyst, the diameter of the Agni-2 “would mained a “far-fetched possibility.” After days of international pressure urging need to be widened from 1 m to 1.8 m to in- Krishnan Guruswamy, AP, 18 June 1999, in Lexis- restraint following India’s 11 April 1999 Agni- corporate the PSLV propulsion system.” Nexis [Online], , 18 The PSLV solid-fuel rocket propellant has a June 1999; Indian Express [Online], , 20 June 1999. Foreign Ministry official announced that In- diameter of 2.8 m; India would therefore have dia would “go ahead with more tests-flights to modify the PSLV technology to the Agni- On 30 June 1999, Indian Defense Minister of the Agni-2.” The Indian official said, “In- 3 1.8 m specification. The Agni-4 “could be George Fernandes said that Pakistan’s threat dia will do whatever is required to develop derived from either the successful conver- of making a nuclear strike against India in its minimum credible nuclear deterrent,” sion of the PSLV as an SSM which could the event of a fourth India-Pakistan war which may mean at least five to six additional itself achieve intercontinental range, or in- should not be taken lightly. He said that he tests before the Agni-2 could be deployed. corporating ISRO’s rocket technology from hoped international pressure on Pakistan Pranay Sharma, The Telegraph (Calcutta), 13 the Geostationary Satellite Launch Vehicle April 1999; in FBIS Document “would deter it from using nuclear weapons program.” A challenge facing India in con- FTS19990413001276, 13 April 1999. Indian verting its satellite launch vehicles (SLVs) to in case of a war.” On the same day, Indian Express [Online], , Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee said that 14 April 1999. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) India was prepared to face a nuclear attack would be the development of a re-entry ve- from Pakistan. He said that India was “pre- Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant hicle capable of withstanding the extreme pared for all eventualities.” Singh said Pakistan’s 14 April 1999 Ghauri-2 temperatures faced by 3,700 km and 5,000 Hindustan Times [Online], , 30 June 1999; Times an arms race in the region. Singh said that of India [Online], , 1 July 1999. Pakistan informed India of its plans to test launch a missile. However, he said that the Indian officials reported that the Prithvi-1 and Missile missile launch was not good for Indo-Paki- Prithvi-2 surface-to-surface missiles (SSM), Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev stani relations. which were to be deployed with the Indian paid an official visit to India from 19 March Indian Express [Online], , 14 April 1999. Air Force, would be ready for extended se-

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1999 183 Nuclear and Missile Trade and Developments rial production after extended trials. The In- late 1999. DRDO will produce 20 Agni bal- including “the clandestine nuclear and mis- dian Army’s 333 Missile Group, a new artil- listic missiles with a range of more than sile technology cooperation between China lery regiment based in Scunderabad, had an 2,000 km by the end of 2001 at a cost of and Pakistan.” undeclared number of Prithvi-1s and was $150 million. Indian Express [Online], , 14 June 1999. army projected a requirement for 75 Prithvi p. 14. missiles. INDONESIA Rahul Bedi, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 5 May 1999, An Indian Defence Ministry spokesman said pp. 25-31. that India test fired a naval version of its Nuclear Trishul surface-to-air (SAM) missile at 10:05 According to Russian First Deputy Prime In an interview with the newspaper Mainichi GMT from the Dronacharya naval base in Minister Yury Maslyukov, Moscow is con- Shimbun in early May 1999, Indian Defence Cochin on 26 May 1999. He said the “flight sidering exporting small floating nuclear Minister George Fernandes said that his gov- marked a step towards user evaluation and power plants to Indonesia. ernment does not “plan to conduct work on induction of the Trishul system in the navy ITAR-TASS, 15 March 1999, in Inquisit [Online], , 15 March 1999. creating” the Agni-3 intermediate-range bal- by the year 2000.” He said the Trishul was listic missile (IRBM) or the Surya interconti- tested against low-altitude maritime targets nental ballistic missile (ICBM). He said the and the mission objectives “were fully met.” JAPAN AFP, 26 May 1999, in Lexis-Nexis [Online], such “allegations” published in Jane’s De- Missile fence Weekly were “speculative and un- , 26 May 1999. According to Japan’s Chief Cabinet Sec- founded.” He said the Agni-2 was at the retary Hiromu Nonaka, Japan will rely on stage where production could begin, but no Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee its own technology to develop the four decision has been made on a production said the 26 May 1999 launch of India’s po- intelligence satellites that are planned for time frame due to security considerations. lar satellite launch vehicle (PSLV) was “per- launch in 2002. He added that developing He denied that India has a program to create fect” and that it was a “proud day for Indian the satellites domestically would be in the a nuclear submarine. science.” Vajpayee said the launch of the best interest of Japan. Nonaka explained RIA Novosti, 11 May 1999. PSLV-C2 showed India’s mastery of space technology. Indian officials said its space that “[Japan] decided to develop the sat- ellites using Japanese technology because In an interview with Defense News, Indian program was only for peaceful purposes. [the] satellites will be launched for the main DRDO scientists said India was launch- The PSLV-C2 was launched from the space purpose of gathering necessary data for ing a comprehensive plan to develop a center on an island in the Bay of Bengal. Japan’s national security.” In addition, he wide range of modern nuclear missiles. Indian Express [Online], , 26 May 1999. said that “[Japan] is going to acquire sat- Within two years, India would develop an ellite parts and a system on intelligence intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), analysis from the United States and other a medium-range naval missile, and me- The United States has “reportedly accused” foreign companies.” dium-range air-to-air missiles. DRDO offi- Israel of transferring radar technology from the US-Israeli Arrow anti-missile system to Japan Times [Online], , 1 April 1999; South India. Israel claimed the technology was de- of 5,000 km. DRDO officials said the Surya China Morning Post [Online], , 2 April 1999. 2,000 km. DRDO officials said $50 million project and therefore did not require ap- proval from the United States to be exported. will be spent on the Surya. It will be ready KAZAKHSTAN In September 1998, the head of Israel Air- for launch by mid-2001. An advanced ver- Nuclear sion will be developed after the test launch craft Industries, which is developing the Director of the Moscow Center of the of Surya-1. DRDO, the Defense Research Arrow, declared that the “missile or systems” World Association of Nuclear Operators and Development Laboratory in would be sold “only to countries friendly” Farit Tukhvetov said that the BN-350 re- Hyderabad, and 90 other scientific and to both Israel and the United States. P.R. Kumaraswamy, Jane’s Intelligence Review, actor at Aktau was officially decommis- private institutions are involved in the de- June 1999, pp. 21-22. sioned on 22 April 1999. According to velopment of the Surya program. DRDO Tukhvetov, Kazakhstani autorities decided officials said they were extending the On 14 June 1999, Indian External Affairs Min- that the reactor was too isolated from range of the Prithvi ballistic missile from ister Jaswant Singh arrived in China for high- technical support and design organizations 150 km to 350 km. Officials said they were level talks with the Chinese government. in Russia. also developing a naval version of the India’s officials hope the talks will improve Nucleonics Week, 24 June 1999, p. 16. Prithvi, called the Dhanush, with a range political-level ties between China and India of 250 km. The Dhanush will be tested in and generate a discussion of several issues

184 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1999 Nuclear and Missile Trade and Developments

KYRGYZSTAN The report indicated that a North Korean firm, atomic reaction in the reactor’s graphite Daesong Yushin Trading Co., was trying to core. Apparently some US State Department Nuclear purchase “frequency converters” from a officials knew about the missing parts, but Kyrgyzstani security agents at Manas air- Japanese manufacturer. It is believed the neither Congress nor the lead negotiator of port, outside Bishkek, arrested an Uzbek na- converters are the first parts of a “centrifuge the 1994 Agreed Framework, Robert Gallucci, tional who was trying to smuggle a capsule cascade.” A US secret intelligence assess- were made privy to that information. Clinton of radioactive material onto a flight to the ment indicated that North Korea plans to set administration officials say they were aware United Arab Emirates, Vecherniy Bishkek up a uranium enrichment capability for of the missing parts, which can be used in reported on 14 May 1999. According to the nuclear weapons with the assistance of Pa- another nuclear reactor. According to US report, the smuggler, identified as Takhir kistan. State Department officials, the 1994 Agreed Naizov, was carrying the material in a metal Bill Gertz, Washington Times, 12 March 1999, p. Framework was successful in freezing activ- capsule wrapped in rubber in his pocket. 9; Bill Gertz, Washington Times, 11 March 1999, ity at Yongbyon and Taechon. It is entirely p. 6. Security guards checking passengers board- possible that North Korea is still continuing ing the flight became suspicious of Naizov nuclear research at other sites. The officials when they noticed he was very pale and ap- On 16 March 1999, the Democratic People’s also said that this research might not even peared nauseated. Upon searching him, they Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United be in violation of the Agreement. Accord- discovered the capsule, 3 cm in diameter States issued a joint press statement saying ing to a nuclear expert, the concern is not and 7 cm in length, marked with the interna- that both sides had reached an agreement that the missing parts are now in a nuclear tional symbol for radiation hazard. The on access to a suspected underground reactor, but how much plutonium North Ko- guards then called on specialists of the nuclear site at Kumchang-ri. The US Secre- rea processed at Yongbyon before the 1994 Kyrgyzstani State Sanitary Commission to tary of State Madeleine Albright stated that Agreed Framework. United States State De- conduct an examination of the capsule. A North Korea will allow: (1) multiple site vis- partment spokesperson James Rubin said check of the capsule with a dosimeter indi- its by a US team to the underground site at that the United States had no basis to con- cated that it was emitting fatal doses of ra- Kumchang-ri; (2) the first visit in May 1999, clude that North Korea is in violation of the diation at close range. The radiation with follow-up visits continuing as long as 1994 Agreed Framework. He added that the diminished to near normal background lev- the US concerns about the site remain; and, International Atomic Energy Agency never els at a distance of about 1 meter from the (3) access to the entire site during each visit. reported the equipment as missing but said capsule, however, and the background ra- The agreement also states that the United that the parts were unaccounted for. In addi- diation level of the room in which the cap- States “has decided to take a step to improve tion, Rubin said that the unaccounted parts sule was being held was also normal. The political and economic relations between the were discussed with Congress on the public article reports that “most likely, the capsule two countries.” Albright highlighted that the record in a General Accounting Office report holds plutonium.” However, the characteris- United States did not agree to DPRK de- in 1998. tics of the capsule described and the radia- mands for “compensation” in return for ac- Stewart Stogel and Ben Barber, Washington Times, tion it was emitting make it seem likely that it cess to the site. Albright also announced 24 March 1999, p. 3; James Rubin, “State De- contains a radioactive isotope stolen from a that the DPRK and the US agreed to resume partment Noon Briefing, March 23, 1999,” USIA medical or industrial facility, rather than plu- missile talks on 29 March 1999 in Pyongyang. Transcript, 24 March 1999. tonium. The suspect, Mr. Naizov, told police During the meetings held between 27 Febru- that he had agreed to carry the capsule to ary-13 March 1999 in New York, the DPRK Kim Tok-yong, a member of the South Ko- the United Arab Emirates in return for a and the US also reaffirmed their commit- rean parliament and the Hannara opposition $16,000 payment. He had received the cap- ment to the Agreed Framework of 21 Octo- party, has alleged that in addition to sule at the airport from an unidentified man. ber 1994 in its entirety and to the principles Kumchang-ri, North Korea has another un- Naizov had an accomplice, a Kyrgyzstani citi- of their bilateral relations expressed in the derground nuclear complex located between zen, who was also arrested. US-DPRK Joint Statement of 11 June 1993. Tongsan-ri and Huiyon-ri in Kusong City in Yu. Gruzdov, Vecherniy Bishkek, 14 May 1999, p. DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan the northwestern part of the country. Ac- 1; Timur Isayev, ITAR-TASS, 14 May 1999; AFP, and US Special Envoy Charles Kartman led cording to Kim, the complex consists of three 14 May 1999; AP, 14 May 1999. the delegations. facilities located within three kilometers of US Department of State, 16 March 1999. each other. He has alleged that a reservoir NORTH KOREA and a small island exist behind the third facil- Nuclear According to International Atomic Energy ity. In addition, plutonium is being produced in the underground nuclear development fa- According to a US Department of Energy Agency (IAEA) officials, critical parts of the cility. intelligence report, North Korea is in the ini- North Korean 50-MW nuclear reactor have been missing since the first IAEA investiga- Shukan Post, 16 April 1999, in FBIS Document tial stages of developing a uranium enrich- FTS19990410000079, 16 April 1999. ment capability, which in six years will be tors arrived at the North Korean nuclear cen- able to produce weapons-grade uranium. ter in 1994. The parts are vital to control the

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1999 185 Nuclear and Missile Trade and Developments

On 4 May 1999, the Japanese foreign minis- in May 2000 and will examine the feasibil- A US spy satellite has confirmed that North try announced that Japan had signed a con- ity of converting the facility to commercial Korea has deployed Nodong ballistic mis- tract making $1 billion available to the Korean use. siles. The missiles have been deployed near Peninsula Energy Development Organiza- US Department of State Press Statement, 25 June the North Korea-China border. The satellite tion (KEDO). On 30 June 1999, the Japanese 1999. photos indicate that the Nodong launchers House of Councilors approved Japan’s have been vehicle mounted. The Nodong scheduled payment of $1 billion to KEDO Missile missiles have a range of 1,000-1,300 km, and for the construction of two light-water South Korea has confirmed that North Ko- are capable of striking Japan. nuclear reactors in North Korea. rea has at least four missile factories and 10 AFP, 28 March 1999. Gamini Seneviratne and Simon Rippon, Nuclear missile bases. Further, North Korea is build- News, June 1999, p. 59; Kyodo (Tokyo), 30 June ing additional bases and there is specula- North Korea conducted a combustion test 1999, in FBIS Document 19990630000226, 30 June 1999. tion that North Korea has eight missile for a rocket engine in early May 1999. Ob- plants and over 12 bases, the official said. servers suspect that the engine tested was On 14 May 1999, US State Department According to the official, missile factory no. for the Taepodong-2 ballistic missile, an up- spokesperson James Rubin said that the 26 in Kanggye (Jagang Province) manufac- dated version of the missile that North Ko- United States supplied 90,000 metric tons of tures missile parts, factory no. 118 in rea tested in August 1998. A US heavy fuel oil to North Korea between Janu- Kaechon (South Pyongan Province) pro- reconnaissance satellite detected heat sig- ary and April 1999. Further shipments will duces launch engines, factory no. 125 at Mt. natures from the engine test. It is assumed continue in May and June 1999, he said. In Hyongje in Pyongyang assembles missile that the purpose of the test was to ensure addition, US President Bill Clinton signed parts, and an additional factory in that the engine would combust smoothly and certifications on 4 March 1999 to release Mangyongdae-ri, Pyongyang, develops ex- generate propulsion strong enough to en- $15 million to the Korean Peninsula Energy plosive compounds. In addition, a North able the Taepodong-2 missile to develop Development Organization. Korean defector has confirmed missile fac- sufficient range and speed. South Korean Yonhap (Seoul), 15 May 1999, in FBIS Docu- tory locations in Kangso, (Nampo, South and US intelligence analysts believe that the ment FTS19990514001834, 15 May 1999. Pyongan Province). Further, the official said Taep’o-dong-2 could have a maximum range that the 10 missile bases are located at Mt. of 4,000-6,000 km. Furthermore, North Korea On 25 June 1999, US Department of State Kanggamchan (Jungsan, South Pyongan may have developed sufficient competence spokesman James Rubin announced that Province), Mayangdo (Sinpo, South after the August 1998 Taep’o-dong launch US inspectors, who visited the suspected Hamkyong Province), Paekun-ri (Kusong, to develop larger ballistic missiles. nuclear site at Kumchang-ri in North Ko- North Pyongan Province), Rodong- Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), 24 June 1999, in FBIS Document 19990623001649, 24 June 1999. rea from 18-24 May 1999, found no evi- taepodong (Hwadae, North Hamkyong Prov- dence or indication that the site was being ince), Chonggang-up (Huchang, Jagang used for nuclear-related activities. The Province), Okpyong (Munchon, Kangwon On 15 June 1999, undisclosed Japanese gov- inspectors photographed certain parts of Province), Jiha-ri (Ichon, Kangwon Province), ernment sources said that North Korea has the facility and inspected the underground and the three Pyongyang metropolitan ar- started preparations for launching a Taep- portions, per the March 1999 agreement eas of Sangwon-kun, Oryu-ri and odong ballistic missile with a range of more that allowed them to visit the site. The site Chunghwa-kun. Further, two additional than 1,500 km in July or August 1999. Infor- was empty with bare rock walls. The State bases are under construction in Tocksong mation from US reconnaissance satellites Department press release said that “the County (South Hamgyong Province) and and South Korean government sources in- site at Kumchang-ri does not contain a Yongo-tong (South Hamgyong Province). dicates that North Korea is expanding con- plutonium production reactor or repro- The South Korean official noted that North struction on its missile launching facilities. Korea has trained missile development ex- Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Tokyo), 16 June 1999, cessing plant, either completed or under in FBIS Document FTS19990615001749, 15 construction.” It added that although the perts since the establishment of its National June 1999. underground facility was unsuitable for a Defense University in 1965. Apparently, plutonium reprocessing plant or graphite- North Korea recently told a delegation from PAKISTAN moderated nuclear reactor, it could be a Middle Eastern country that missile fac- modified in the future. The United States tory no. 125 is an assembly line for Scud-B Nuclear cannot rule out Kumchang-ri’s potential missiles. The official added, “North Korea is The Pakistani press reported on 11 March utility for nuclear-related activities. The currently capable of producing more than 100 1999 that the Pakistani Commerce Division site does not violate the 1994 Agreed Scud-type missiles a year.” has issued a statutory regulatory order to Framework because there is no evidence Yonhap (Seoul), 25 March 1999, in FBIS Docu- control the export of nuclear technology to ment FTS19990324002145, 24 March 1999; of North Korean nuclear activity at this Hangyore (Seoul) [Online], , 25 March 1999, in FBIS Document nuclear technology cannot be transferred to FTS19990324002145, 25 March 1999.

186 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1999 Nuclear and Missile Trade and Developments any other country without a “no objection export controls, and an exercise of strategic Pakistan has set up a command structure to certificate” from the Pakistani Atomic En- restraint. The phased plan called for recip- address nuclear attacks. The command struc- ergy Commission. The new restrictions ap- rocal visits, military exercises, officer educa- ture would be headed by the chairman of the ply to nuclear substances, radioactive tion, troop training and strategic planning Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, General material, equipment, arms, ammunition, ex- activities. US military officials stressed the Pervez Musharraf, and would decide in con- plosive ingredients, complete rocket and plan would not involve equipment provided sultation with the prime minister whether or unmanned aerial vehicle systems, and the through the US foreign military sales pro- not to counterattack in the event of a nuclear parts for all aforementioned items. gram, but the last phase of re-engagement attack. In the event of an enemy missile at- Ansar Abbasi, Dawn [Online], , 11 March 1999. Barbara Opall-Rome, Defense News, 10 May, to eight minutes to respond. 1999, p. 28; Indian Express [Online], , 6 May 1999. Nexis [Online], , 16 neither India nor Pakistan has performed May 1999. “one-point safety” tests on nuclear warheads In early May 1999, US government nuclear to reduce the chances of accidental detona- intelligence analysts concluded that Paki- Pakistan nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan said on tion during fabrication, installation, or flight. stan produced enough heavy water to start 11 May 1999 that Pakistan had achieved a Praful Bidwai, Kashmir Times, 15 March 1999, up and operate the unsafeguarded pluto- major breakthrough in its nuclear weapons in FBIS Document FTS19990317000472, 15 nium production reactor at Khushab. Offi- program by enriching uranium up to 96.4 March 1999. cials said there was no information, classified percent U-235. or unclassified, to substantiate allegations BBC, 13 May 1999, in Lexis-Nexis [Online], As the September 1999 deadline for signing that Pakistan diverted heavy water supplied , 13 May 1999. the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) under International Atomic Energy Agency approaches, the Pakistani government has (IAEA) safeguards by China to Pakistan’s According to government officials, Pakistan attempted to convince domestic critics of the power reactor at the Karachi Nuclear Power has decided to equip its navy with a nuclear treaty’s “non-discriminatory” nature. Paki- Plant (Kannup). China has denied any heavy capability. The naval nuclear capability stani Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz told the water diversion to Khushab. According to would be kept under the central command country’s National Assembly on 18 March information compiled by the US Central In- and control system. There would be four 1999 that Pakistan “could sign the CTBT even telligence Agency (CIA), the 50-MWt components to this system: development, before September 1999 in conditions free of Khushab reactor was constructed in the control, strategic force command, and a sec- coercion and pressure.” Aziz said that there 1990s with Chinese assistance. In 1997, US retariat of the three armed service commands are “certain misconception that signing the officials said the reactor was nearly com- through the governing body of the National CTBT will either cap [Pakistan’s nuclear] pro- pleted, but lacked enough heavy water to Command Authority. gram and some newspaper comments went operate. By May 1998, the Khushab reactor Jang (Rawalpindi), 18 May 1999, in Lexis-Nexis to the extent [of saying] it will roll back our [Online], , 20 May had gone critical and was being operated to 1999. program.” He explained that the CTBT only generate plutonium for Pakistan’s nuclear calls for halting nuclear test explosions, weapons program. In May 1999, US officials which Pakistan has already declared a mora- Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy said it was likely that Pakistan mastered the Commission Ishfaq Ahmad said that a ma- torium on. The CTBT would formalize that engineering process for heavy water pro- moratorium but place “no restrictions on a jor amount of uranium and other chemical duction during Khushab’s construction and substances used in the preparation of nuclear country’s nuclear program, including pro- dedicated the output from an indigenous duction of further weapons.” bombs and other nuclear arms was obtained heavy water plant to the production reactor. from district Lukki Marwat of North-West Amit Baruah, The Hindu [Online], , 27 March 1999. Frontier Province (NWFP). He said Pakistan the most common heavy water production has acquired every kind of nuclear technol- technology, employing hydrogen sulfide ogy and that it had gathered enough data to US Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni (H2S), was nearly identical to that used in briefed Pakistani Army Chief General of Staff continue its work in the future. Ahmad said standard petrochemical refineries. If Paki- the Chagai site was established in 1981 and Pervez Musharaf on conditions for resum- stan were to build a heavy water plant in an ing military ties on a 21 April 1999 visit to Pakistan had nuclear capability in 1984. He industrial location adjacent to a petrochemi- said, “we have every kind of modern Islamabad. Indian military and political lead- cal complex, it would be difficult to detect ers were also informed through the US Em- weapon and no government created any using conventional satellite surveillance. hurdles in this regard.” bassy in New Delhi on the conditions for Mark Hibbs, NuclearFuel, 10-17 May 1999, pp. Nawa-I-Waqt (Rawalpindi), 19 May 1999, in FBIS resuming US military ties. Those conditions 1,10-11. Document FTS19990520000490, 19 May 1999. included signing the CTBT, a ban on fissile material production, implementation of clear

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1999 187 Nuclear and Missile Trade and Developments

Missile Pakistan’s “policy of maintaining deterrence actors in North Korea would be made According to a report published in Current in the interest of our security.” The state- through the KEDO. Consequently, South Science, Pakistan’s Ghauri missile is the ment also said that the latest missile tests Korea will provide $3.22 billion for the project North Korean Nodong missile, “probably would contribute to the Hatf-2 and -3 mis- as a grant rather than a loan. During talks supplied to Pakistani on a turnkey basis by sile programs. Unnamed official Pakistani with the United States in early April 1999, North Korea.” The Nodong missile is a single- sources said that a second, more advanced South Korea agreed to vague provisions stat- stage liquid fuelled missile with a range of Shaheen missile with a 2,300-km range was ing that repayment of the loan would be guar- 950-1,020 km and capable of carrying a 700- “ready and waiting to be tested.” anteed after consultation by the executive 1,000 kg warhead. The report warned that if CNN [Online], , 15 April 1999; member countries of KEDO, not by KEDO North Korea were to supply Pakistan with Umer Farooq, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 21 April itself. Earlier, South Korea had demanded 1999, p. 3. its two-staged Taepodong missile, which has loan repayment guarantees from KEDO. A a range of between 1,900-2,100 km, Pakistan US official criticized South Korea’s policy On 6 June 1999, the Indian Express newspa- would have the ability to strike all of India. and said “this posture of being reluctant to per reported that US Stinger surface-to-air The report also indicated that the Ghauri mis- give up repayment of the loan while pursu- missiles (SAMs) have been deployed by sile was derived from the Russian Scud-B ing a sunshine policy toward North Korea is “Pakistani intruders” in the Kargil sector of missile. S. Chandrashekar from the Indian inconsistent.” The KEDO loan agreement Kashmir. The paper reported that in 1994 to Institute of Management said that Pakistan’s has to be ratified by the South Korean Na- 1995, the US Central Intelligence Agency Ghauri missile is probably kerosene-based tional Assembly. (CIA) attempted to recover all the Stinger and that its total fuel load equaled thirteen Tong-a Ilbo (Seoul), 23 April 1999, in FBIS Docu- missiles supplied to Afghan guerillas during tons. ment FTS19990423001945, 23 April 1999. Indian Express [Online], , 4 March 1999. 120 Stinger missiles were “missing.” Indian On 7 May 1999, South Korea’s government Express reported that the Stinger missiles announced that it would issue SWon330 bil- The Ghauri (Hatf-5) and Shaheen (Hatf-4) were used by the “Pakistani intruders” to lion in government bonds to cover South ballistic missiles were displayed for the first shoot down a Mi-17 military helicopter. Korea’s contribution for the construction of time at the Pakistan Day parade in Islamabad Manvendra Singh, Indian Express [Online], light-water nuclear reactors in North Korea. , 7 June 1999. on 23 March 1999. The Ghauri missile, devel- The government also stated that if the do- oped by the Kahuta Research Laboratories, mestic economy improved, it would cancel has a range of 1,500 km and was tested on 6 SOUTH KOREA the bond issuance and instead impose a 3 April 1998. The Shaheen had not been tested Nuclear percent surcharge on electricity bills. at the time of the parade, and was developed South Korea and Russia have initialed an Shin Jong-rok, Chosun Ilbo (Seoul) [Online], , 7 May 1999. by the National Development Complex agreement to upgrade an extant 1994 proto- (NDC). The Shaheen can reportedly be col on cooperation in peaceful uses of launched from both mobile and static launch- nuclear energy. The agreement calls for both Missile ers. Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, the NDC di- states to cooperate in the use of peaceful On 26 April 1999, South Korean Vice Defense rector, said that the Shaheen has a range of nuclear energy. It also places restrictions on Minister Ahn Byung-kil announced that the 750 km and could carry a payload of 1,000 transferring nuclear materials to third coun- United States has agreed to let South Korea kg. He said that the Shaheen is a solid-fuel tries and delineates other obligations in the develop private-use space projectiles with- missile and is highly accurate due to its ter- transfer of nuclear technology. Both coun- out limits on range or payload. In addition, minal guidance system. tries also agreed to resume a joint steering Ahn said, the United States is close to al- The Hindu [Online], , 24 March 1999. development of laser and nuclear fusion, as a range of 300 km and payload of 500 kg, well as other nuclear-related technologies. which would effectively end the 1979 agree- Pakistan test-launched its Ghauri-2 (Hatf-6) Yonhap (Seoul), 8 April 1999, in Inquisit [Online], ment that restricts South Korean missiles to ballistic missile on 14 April 1999 and its , 8 April 1999. a 180-km range. However, the two parties are Shaheen-1 surface-to-surface missile on 15 divided on how to formalize the agreement. April. Pakistani officials said that the two On 13 April 1999, South Korea ratified the Ahn said, “Seoul is trying to conclude the missile tests concluded a “series of flight Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. agreement through a letter of intent, while tests involving solid and liquid fuel rocket Korea Herald [Online], , 14 April 1999. motor technologies.” An official statement randum of understanding.” At a meeting of released by the Pakistani Foreign Office said the South Korean defense committee of the On 22 April 1999, South Korea agreed in that the missile tests were “part of the re- National Assembly, some officials called for principle that the repayment of support search and development of Pakistan’s indig- building missiles with ranges up to 700 km. funds for the construction of light-water re- enous missile program,” which was a part of Ahn also denied reports that the United

188 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1999 Nuclear and Missile Trade and Developments

States had protested the 10 April 1999 mis- operation ideas” to South Korean space Taiwanese military sources suggest that the sile launch by South Korea. He said, “no prior officials.The package reportedly included Tien Ma (Sky Horse) surface-to-surface consultations were required with respect to proposals to jointly develop telecommuni- missile program will be revived, with similar the test-firing because the missile’s range cations and Earth-monitoring satellites, data pre-emptive strike capabilities. Taiwan has fell short of the 180 km, the limit set by the sales from Russia’s Earth-monitoring satel- already purchased the Modified Air Defense U.S.” The spokesperson for North Korea’s lites, and an offer to use Russia’s Glonass System (MADS) or Patriot-T, which is an Foreign Affairs Ministry criticized the global navigation system, which has already improved US Patriot high-to-medium surface- United States for supporting the develop- been offered to the European Union. Yulrae to-air missile. According to a US Department ment of South Korea’s missile program. He Cho, South Korea’s science attaché in Mos- of Defense report, Taiwan cannot exclusively said such support was hostile to North Ko- cow, confirmed South Korea’s interest in ac- rely on an active missile defense system to rea and could harm current missile talks with quiring Russian optical and launch technolo- deter China. By 2005 China will have an over- the United States. gies. He also suggested that South Korea whelming advantage in offensive missiles. Korea Times [Online], , 27 April 1999; Yoo Yong- cal knowledge” about spacecraft design and fence Weekly, 10 March 1999. p. 4. won, Chosun Ilbo [Online], , 27 April 1999; Jangsoo Seo, launch vehicles, as long as it would not vio- JoongAng Ilbo [Online], , 27 April 1999. ogy proliferation. He stated it would take General Wang Chih-ke said that Taiwan several years for any significant accomplish- would acquire a US-built long-range early Seoul’s Sisa Journal reported that South Ko- ments in South Korean-Russian space rela- warning system to increase its air-defense rea conducted a ballistic missile test on 10 tions. Cho also said that South Korean in- capability against China. He added that the April 1999. According to the report, South dustry is currently actively cooperating with budget had been set for the planned acqui- Korea’s Agency for Defense Development the Russian space industry. sition. Earlier, Liberty Times reported that the (ADD) test fired “Hyonmu,” a 300 km-range Simon Saradzhyan, Space News, 14 June 1999, radar system would cost an estimated 26 bil- missile on the west coast of the country. As pp. 1, 36. lion Taiwanese dollars ($785.7 million) and the missile was partially fueled, it flew only would be operational within six years. The 50 km. The report further stated that South TAIWAN system will be used to track aircraft and mis- siles. The report added that Taiwan’s cur- Korea manufactured a prototype of a 300 Nuclear km-range missile several years ago and con- rent military radar systems can only track On 17 March 1999, Taiwan’s Atomic Energy ducted flight-tests secretly. aircraft movement within a range of 600 km. Council (AEC) granted licenses for the con- Yi Chong-hun, Sisa Journal, 29 April 1999, p.14, China Times [Online], , 24 March 1999. April 1999. fourth nuclear plant to the Taiwan Power Company (Taipower). Each unit will have a According to Taiwan’s Defense Minister On 3 May 1999, a high-ranking South Ko- production capacity of 1.35 million kilowatts. Tang Fei, Taiwan would have to spend ap- rean official reaffirmed that Seoul has no The first and second units are expected to proximately $9.23 billion over the next de- plans to join the US-led theater missile de- become operational by June 2004 and June cade to build and deploy a low-altitude fense (TMD) program. The official said that 2005, respectively. The new units will bring missile defense system. The defense system “at this stage, [South Korea has] neither an Taiwan’s gross installed nuclear power gen- would have the capability to destroy 70 per- intention nor ability to take part in the TMD erating capacity to 7.8 million kilowatts, cent of all missiles launched against Taiwan. plan, which requires a huge sum of invest- “about one third of the island’s total installed Tang said it is important for Taiwan to begin ment and up-to-date technology.” Accord- [electricity production] capacity.” the foundation work for joining the US-led ing to officials at South Korea’s Defense Maubo Chang, Taiwan Central News Agency, 17 theater missile defense system. March 1999, in FBIS Document Taiwan Central News Agency, 24 March 1999, in Ministry, skepticism is arising in Seoul about FTS19990317001025, 17 March 1999. whether the TMD plan would be able to ef- FBIS Document FTS19990324001145, 24 March 1999. fectively intercept short-range North Ko- rean missiles. The Defense Ministry officials Missile also underlined the huge cost of the planned Taiwan is planning to increase its indigenous Taiwan’s China Times reported that Taiwan TMD. missile program budget by $600 million for will buy or build Aegis-equipped guided Jun Kwan-woo, Korea Herald [Online], , 4 May 1999. used to modify the anti-ship Hsiung Feng 2 four such ships at about $800 million each. missile to produce a version with cruise mis- The Taiwan Defense Ministry declined to Russia’s Aviation and Space Agency has sile capabilities. Such a capability would al- comment on the report. Meanwhile, Taiwan- offered to launch satellites for South Korea low Taiwan to launch pre-emptive strikes ese military authorities have approved plans and has proposed “an entire package of co- against China’s land-based missile sites. to dredge the Tsoying harbor by an addi-

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1999 189 Nuclear and Missile Trade and Developments tional 20 meters and build four additional 20,000 kg of excess plutonium in the BN-600 piers to accommodate the 8,000-ton vessels. reactor by 2020 and reduce the proliferation China Times [Online], , 18 May 1999. nium removed from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons into fuel for nuclear power THAILAND stations. Nuclear Atoms in Japan, April 1999, p. 10; BBC Soviet ARMENIA Union Economic, 5 April 1999; Vladimir According to Kriangsak Bhadrakom, the di- Missile Solntsev, ITAR-TASS, 5 February 1999; Nikkan rector-general of the Office of Atomic En- Kogyo Shimbun, 24 February 1999. ergy for Peace (OAEP) and secretary of the According to an Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement released on 3 Nuclear Safety Committee (NSC), the On 20 April 1999, Japan announced a plan to June 1999, the defense ministers of Russia Ongkharak nuclear research reactor project offer Russia about $35 million in aid to dis- and Armenia signed a deal on delivery of in Thailand should be reviewed by both the mantle 50 deteriorating nuclear-powered eight Chinese-built Typhoon missiles to Ar- US Oak Ridge Laboratory and the Interna- submarines of the latter’s Pacific Fleet. A menia during their joint visit to China in sum- tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Japanese Foreign Ministry official said that mer 1998. Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister US company General Atomic, which is con- the submarines “are weather-beaten and in Wang Yingfan denied knowledge of the clo- structing the reactor, has not requested a serious condition, which may affect Japan’s sure of the deal and explained that though safety guarantee from the US Nuclear Regu- environment.” Specifically, the aid would go the number of Chinese arms exporting firms latory Commission (NRC) because the latter towards removing spent nuclear-fuel rods is limited and their activity is strictly con- cannot give guarantees abroad. The OAEP from the submarines and scrapping the sub- trolled by the government, Chinese law does has decided that General Atomic needs to marine hulls. not require arms exporting firms to receive seek reviews from Oak Ridge and the IAEA Daily Yomiuri [Online], , 21 April 1999. Statement by the Foreign Affairs Ministry of the will be submitted to the NSC to verify that Republic of Azerbaijan, 3 June 1999. safety standards for the project are approved On 21 April 1999 the Strategic Rocket Forces before any construction begins. (SRF) launched the first converted RS-20 Kamol Sukin, The Nation (Bangkok), 28 April ESTONIA [NATO designation SS-18 ‘Satan’] booster 1999, in FBIS Document FTS19990427001948, Nuclear rocket, the Dnepr-1, from the Baykonur 28 April 1999. The Riigikogu (Estonia’s parliament) ratified cosmodrome. The Dnepr-1 was carrying a the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on 21 British research satellite. The SRF has about VIETNAM June 1999. 180 RS-20 missiles that are scheduled for Missile Interfax, 21 June 1999. destruction by 2002 if the START-2 Treaty is According to Asian intelligence sources, ratified. About 150 missiles can be con- North Korea has sold modified Scud ballis- RUSSIA verted into boosters for launching commu- nications satellites weighing up to 4,000 kg. tic missiles to Vietnam. It is believed that the Nuclear missiles are Scud-C variants. North Korea’s Kosmotras, an international space company, According to Mr. Yamato, a member of the Scud-C has a range of 550 km and can carry ordered the launch as part of the Russian- Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute a 770 kg payload. The missile also uses an Ukrainian Dnepr program. ITAR-TASS re- (JNC) board of directors, and Mr. Tsutomu improved guidance system. Vietnam’s former ported that Russia and Ukraine could launch Imamura, deputy director-general of the Sci- vice defense minister, Nguyen Thoi Bung, between four and eight Dnepr boosters per ence and Technology Agency (STA), Japan oversaw the purchase during his December year, if they gain access to the international and Russia are in the process of concluding 1996 visit to North Korea. The deal for the launch vehicle market. In an interview with an agreement on disposition of plutonium Scud-C included two Sang-o-class subma- ITAR-TASS on 21 April, Deputy Com- from dismantled nuclear weapons. Accord- rines and a number of man-portable air-de- mander-in-Chief of the Russian Strategic ing to the 3 April 1999 issue of Nihon Keizai fense systems believed to be the SA-16 Rocket Forces Vladimir Nikitin stated that the Shimbun, the STA has already sent the Rus- Gimlet. successful launch indicated that all Russian sian Ministry of Atomic Energy a plan for Robert Karniol, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 14 April ICBMs removed from service should be 1999, p. 17. cooperation in carrying out this agreement. converted into commercial space boosters Under the agreement, the JNC will assist rather than destroyed. Russia in remodeling the core of the BN-600 Nikolay Novichkov, ITAR-TASS, 21 April 1999. fast breeder reactor (FBR) at the Beloyarsk nuclear power plant so that it can be loaded The Security Council of the Russian Federa- with mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel. The primary tion conducted a closed meeting to discuss objective is to help Russia burn a total of the status and the prospects of the nuclear

190 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1999 Nuclear and Missile Trade and Developments deterrent forces. Reports were made by De- rials meet international standards, and cise featuring simulated nuclear strikes by fense Minister Igor Sergeyev and Minister claimed that US specialists who have visited air-launched cruise missiles against Europe of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov. At a these sites have declared that the materials and the United States. Code-named Zapad- subsequent briefing the secretary of the Se- stored there are subject to a “high level of 99 (West-99) the exercise involved exten- curity Council, Vladimir Putin, reported that security.” Minatom’s press service also told sive cooperation between Russian and the council adopted three documents. One Interfax that “in recent years there has not Belarusian forces, while Kazakhstani military covers the development and security of the been a single confirmed leak of nuclear ma- officers attended as observers. The Russian nuclear weapons complex (i.e. development, terials from Russia.” Minatom officials said forces involved included all of the armed production, and testing of nuclear war- the only exception was the shipment of services, with up to 50,000 troops taking part. heads); another is a concept for the use of “contraband” plutonium to Germany, an ap- According to Russian Defense Minister Igor nuclear weapons, including tactical nuclear parent reference to the August 1994 Munich Sergeyev, the purpose of the exercises was weapons; the third document, said Putin, was case. The Minatom officials hastened to add to “work out one of the provisions of the so secret that even its title could not be dis- that they are grateful for the financial assis- Russian military docrine—the use of nuclear closed. He stressed that Russia would con- tance provided by the United States Depart- weapons in the case when all other methods tinue “to abide by all obligations it had ment of Energy through the Materials of organizing defense have been ex- undertaken” in the area of arms control and Protection, Control, and Accounting Pro- hausted.” While Russian Ministry of De- international security. Press reports sug- gram. fense officials denied any direct link between gested that in the view of the breakdown of Interfax, 20 May 1999. the exercise and NATO’s air campaign the START-2 ratification process, the Secu- against Serbia, claiming that the exercise had rity Council decided to extend the service On 3 June 1999, at 18:20 hours Moscow been planned in December 1998, several as- life of RS-20 [NATO designation SS-18 ‘Sa- time, Russia conducted a flight test of its pects of Zapad-99 were designed to test pos- tan’] heavy ICBMs, retain eight nuclear pow- RS-12M2 Topol-M [NATO designation SS- sible countermeasures to the tactics used by ered Delta-3 ballistic missile submarines 27 ‘Sickle’] ICBM, the seventh such test since NATO against Serbia. The exercise included previously slated for decommissioning, and December 1994. The missile was launched simulated nuclear strikes beginning on 26 buy eight Tu-160 and three Tu-95 heavy from the Yuzhnaya-1 launch pad at the June, when two Tu-95 MS Bear-H bombers bombers from Ukraine. The Security Council Plesetsk Cosmodrome (Arkhangelsk Oblast) from the 22nd Guards Heavy Bomber Divi- also reportedly decided to develop a new, and hit its target at the Kura test range in sion flew near Iceland on a simulated cruise low-yield nuclear warhead and to develop a Kamchatka after 23 minutes and 48 seconds. missile launch mission, reportedly with the capability to ensure the reliability of Rus- The two sites are approximately 9,000 km United States as the target. The same day sian nuclear weapons within the framework apart. The launch was unprecedented in that two Tu-160 Blackjack bombers flew down the of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. it tested a “lateral anti-missile maneuver,” coast of Norway, reportedly in a simulated Considerable attention was devoted to the the main object of which was to simulate nuclear strike against continental Europe. safety and security of Russian nuclear weap- avoiding anti-missile defense systems. Colo- These strikes apparently ended the exercise, ons design, production, and storage facili- nel General Vladimir Yakovlev, commander- indicating that Defense Ministry planners ties. in-chief of Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces, believe that escalation to limited nuclear Interfax, 29 April 1999; Ilya Bulavinov and Ivan explained: “Problems have now arisen with strikes might successfully terminate a con- Safronov, Kommersant-Daily, 30 April 1999; Igor the 1972 Russian-US ABM [Anti-Ballistic flict. No cost figures for the exercise have Korotchenko, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 30 April 1999, p. 2; Rossiyskaya gazeta, 30 April 1999, Missile] Treaty, and therefore we have been been released, but the Russian press has p. 2; Pavel Felgengauer, Segodnya, 6 May 1999, obliged to incorporate into our new missiles speculated that the cost could run into the pp. 1, 2. the potential to overcome anti-missile de- billions of rubles, and may have exhausted fense systems.” In addition, it was the first the training budget for the year. According Specialists at the Russian Ministry of time that the missile was equipped with the to Defense Minister Sergeyev, similar exer- Atomic Energy (Minatom) disagree with the “terminator” navigation system. The “ter- cises may be held every two years in the conclusions reached in the 18 May 1999 re- minator” system uses the Glonass satellite future. port of the Committee on Upgrading Rus- navigation system, enabling the missile to Dmitriy Litovkin and Roman Fomishenko, sian Capabilities for Controlling Highly “know” its exact position throughout its Krasnaya zvezda, 13 July 1999, p. 2; Aleksandr Babakin, Rossiyskaya gazeta, 26 June 1999, p. 2; Enriched Uranium and Plutonium of the US flight and communicate that information back Interfax, 22 June 1999; Michael R. Gordon, New National Research Council, Interfax reported to the ground. York Times, 10 July 1999, p. A1; Interfax, 9 July on 20 May 1999. Minatom officials particu- Yuriy Golotyuk, Izvestiya, 5 June 1999, p. 1. 1999; Yuriy Golotyuk, Izvestiya, 29 June 1999, larly dispute the conclusion in the report that p. 2; Vladimir Georgiyev, Nezavisimaya gazeta, p. 2; Ivan Safronov, Kommersant, 10 July 1999, the threat of diversion of nuclear materials From 21 to 26 June, the Russian armed forces p. 2; Aleksandr Koretskiy, Segodnya [Online], from Russian facilities is now greater than conducted what was described as the larg- , 2 July 1999; previously estimated. The officials argued est military command-staff exercise of the Anatoliy Yurkin, ITAR-TASS, 28 June 1999; that Russian facilities storing nuclear mate- past 10 years, with the final stage of the exer- Nikolay Karpov, Delovoy vtornik, No. 24, 13 July 1999, p. 2.

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1999 191 Nuclear and Missile Trade and Developments

Missile shipped into Serbia in early 1999, concealed the town of Berehovo (located near the Interfax reported on 8 March 1999 that Rus- in railway cars carrying scrap iron. It is be- Ukrainian-Hungarian border) to sell 2 kg of sia intends to equip its Tupolev Tu-160, Tu- lieved that up to 20 missiles may have en- the uranium. When one of the suspects met 95MS, and Tu-22M2 strategic bombers with tered into Serbia in this fashion. The with the buyer to complete the deal, carrying “precision cruise missiles that cannot be high-ranking source noted that the MAZ- the uranium in a sports bag, he was arrested detected by radar.” The cruise missiles have 7910, which houses the Flap Lid B radar ve- at the Berehovo bus station. The police be- a range between 3,000 and 5,000 km. Accord- hicle/command post, was difficult to deliver lieve that the smuggler was planning to mar- ing to experts from the Air Force Main Staff, clandestinely and added that the delivery of ket the uranium in Western Europe. After plans to equip bombers with stealth cruise the 36D6 Clam Shell target designation and his arrest, the suspect told the police that missiles capable of carrying nuclear or con- tracking radar, which is a part of the S-300 another 18 kg of uranium was buried outside ventional charges is the “most important SAM system, was interrupted by NATO a house in nearby village, and it was subse- modernization program for the Russian Air bombings. However, Yugoslav engineers quently recovered. The material was sent to Force.” claimed to have successfully modified the Uzhorod State University for analysis, Interfax, 8 March 1999. existing P-15M (Squat Eye) radar and PVR- where physicists said it was “enriched ura- 11 (Side Net) height-finder systems to be nium ore.” The level of enrichment was not According to reports prepared by US and paired with older-generation S-300 missiles. specified. According to the report, the ura- Israeli intelligence agencies, ballistic missile It is believed that the S-300s were deployed nium “is known to have been stolen at a ra- and nonconventional weapons technology in the Banat plains of Vojvodina, 10 km east dioactive materials recycling facility in and expertise continue to flow from Russia of Pancevo. Serbian sources claimed that the Krasnoyarsk.” This information comes from to Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Israeli Prime Minis- Serbian units failed to launch the S-300 be- police interrogation of one of the suspects. ter Benjamin Netanyahu is expected to lodge cause NATO aircrafts covering the F-16s If this report is accurate, the facility involved a formal complaint over Russian military aid bombing the Pancevo refinery detected ra- is probably the Mining and Chemical Com- to Iran, Iraq, and Syria during his upcoming dar emissions from the Serbian launch site bine in Zheleznogorsk (formerly known as meeting with Russian Prime Minister and eventually destroyed the intended S-300 Krasnoyarsk-26), which is located in Yevgeny Primakov. launch site, killing several Yugoslav offic- Krasnoyarsk Kray. Other sources, however, Eytan Rabin, Ma’ariv (Tel Aviv), 12 March 1999, ers. Following this, the Serbs withdrew the report that the material involved is low-en- p. 4, in FBIS Document FTS19990312000642, remaining S-300s to underground tunnels in riched uranium metal suitable for making fuel 12 March 1999. the Rakovica suburb south of Belgrade. The for RBMK-type reactors. The material’s Russian Foreign Ministry dismissed the re- properties and origin may be clarified by a Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ports of the alleged supply of the S-300 sys- second examination by the Kiev Institute of announced in Moscow on 22 March 1999 tems to the Serbs as “speculations.” Nuclear Research, the main expert organiza- that Israel and Russia have agreed to an ini- Zoran Kusovac, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 4 August tion consulted by Ukrainian authorities in tiative to create a jointly administered mecha- 1999, p. 4; Interfax, 13 August 1999; ITAR- nuclear smuggling cases. The suspected TASS, 2 August 1999. nism to combat the flow of nonconventional smugglers will be charged with violating Sec- weapons technology and expertise from tion 1 of Article 228-2 of the Ukrainian Crimi- Russia to Iran. Israeli Foreign Minister Ariel UKRAINE nal Code, and could receive up to five years Sharon and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Nuclear in prison if convicted. Ivanov are expected to head a committee to Ukrainian authorities on 19 May 1999 ar- Yaroslav Halas, Fakty i Kommentarii, 22 May discuss how the mechanism will be estab- 1999; Oleksandr Ilchenko, Segodnya (Kiev), 21 rested four Russian citizens of Armenian lished and function. May 1999, pp. 1-3; Aleksey Breus, Nucleonics Danna Harman, Jerusalem Post [Online], , 23 March 1999. kg of “enriched uranium ore” to Western Europe, Fakty i Kommentarii reported on According to unconfirmed reports, the Rus- 22 May 1999. Colonel Vasyl Vartsaba, head sian government or parties within Russia are of the Transcarpathian directorate for fight- LATIN AMERICA believed to have supplied elements of be- ing organized crime, said that the suspects, tween six and ten Russian-built S-300PM residents of the Krasnoyarsk and Stavropol [NATO designation SA-10b ‘Grumble’] sur- regions of Russia, had brought the uranium to Ukraine in December 1998, hoping to find face-to-air missile (SAM) systems to air de- BRAZIL fense units of the Yugoslav Air Force before a buyer. They originally hoped to sell it for the launch of NATO air campaign. Accord- $60,000/kg, which would have netted them Missile ing to an unidentified high-ranking Serbian $1.2 million, but later reduced their asking Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Boris military source, S-300 missiles without their price to $35,000/kg. After several weeks of Tarasyuk announced on 28 April 1999 that self-propelled transporter-launchers were searching for a buyer, they made a deal in Ukraine will use Brazil’s Alcântara aerospace

192 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1999 Nuclear and Missile Trade and Developments facility to launch satellites into orbit. Ukraine VENEZUELA that the United States agreed to finance sta- plans to carry out its first launches from tions for the BOT system [likely to mean Missile Alcântara in the next two years. A formal “Build-Operate-Transfer” processed] and agreement for space cooperation was sched- The Dutch defense firm Signaal has won a the generation of electricity by use of wind uled to be signed in May 1999 when Brazil- contract from the Venezuelan Ministry of and solar energy, in return for Egypt’s post- ian Minister for Special Projects and Affairs Defense (MoD) to integrate fire-control op- ponement of its nuclear program. There is Ronaldo Sardenberg visits Kiev. Brazil’s erations of Barak-1 surface-to-air missiles no report on the Egyptian government’s re- Infraero, Italy’s Fiat-Avia, and Ukraine’s purchased from Israel with Venezuela’s ex- sponse to the US offer. However, Egypt’s Yuzmash and Yuzhnoye firms are expected isting anti-aircraft artillery. Signaal will sup- electricity ministry has asked Canada and to collaborate in marketing Alcântara’s ply its Flycatcher Mk2 all-weather Germany to supply it with small nuclear re- space launch services. Tarasyuk also dis- fire-control radar system to coordinate op- actors with capacities between 100,000kW cussed possible Ukrainian-Brazilian coopera- erations between the two systems. The Fly- and 150,000kW and a life span of 50 years. tion on uranium enrichment and reactor catcher Mk2 system is reportedly capable of These reactors are known for their safety lev- construction during his visit. identifying and tracking up to four targets els at comparably lower prices than their US Correio Brasiliense (Brasilia), 29 April 1999, in simultaneously at a maximum range of 20 counterparts. Lexis-Nexis [Online], , 4 May 1999. Patrick J. O’Donoghue, Vheadline, 26 May 1999, 1999, p.6, in FBIS Document in FBIS Document FTS19990526001956, 26 FTS19990624000932, 22 June 1999. May 1999. Five military officers and 13 civilians are the first to complete a two-year course in liquid Missile propulsion technology for rockets at Brazil’s On 11 March 1999, US Secretary of Defense Aeronautical Technology Institute (ITA). MIDDLE EAST AND William Cohen announced the Clinton The course was administered by 30 experts administration’s approval of a $3.2 billion from the Moscow Aviation Institute in con- AFRICA military assistance package requested by junction with the ITA. Aluzio Weber, direc- Egypt. Pending congressional approval, the tor of Brazil’s Aerospace Technical Center package will provide Egypt with an eight- (CTA), said that “this is the first step towards missile fire unit of Patriot PAC-3 surface-to- developing, in Brazil, rockets run on liquid air missiles, 24 F-16 fighter aircraft, and 200 NGOLA propellant.” Brazil reportedly plans to de- A M-1A1 tank kits to be assembled in Egypt. velop liquid-fueled space launch vehicles to Missile The tank kits and F-16 aircraft will be deliv- complement its solid-fueled Satellite Launch Unconfirmed intelligence reports state that ered over the next two years. The Patriot Vehicle (Veículo Lançador de Satelites-VLS). Jonas Savimbi’s National Union for the To- missile system will not be delivered for sev- Virginia Silveira, Gazeta Mercantil (Saõ Paulo), 3 tal Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebel eral years, however, as it is still undergoing June 1999, in FBIS Document group may have received more than 20 Rus- testing in the United States. Following the FTS19990603001829, 3 June 1999. sian-built FROG-7 artillery rockets, and announcement, Cohen met with Israeli Prime three Mi-25 Hind military helicopters from Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to assure him CUBA Ukraine. According to the reports, UNITA that the United States remains “committed Nuclear may take delivery of an additional seven Mi- to Israel’s qualitative edge in military capa- On 12 May 1999, members of the Intergov- 25 helicopters from Ukraine. bility to protect its people.” Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), 19 March 1999, Linda D. Kozaryn, American Forces Press Ser- ernmental Russo-Cuban Commission for in FBIS Document FTS199903360001092, 19 vice [Online], , Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical March 1999. 11 March 1999; John Diamond, Washington Cooperation, met in Moscow to discuss Times, 12 March 1999, p. 15. completion of Cuba’s Juragua nuclear power EGYPT plant as well as other matters. Russian and IRAN Cuban officials reportedly agreed to form a Nuclear joint venture that will seek international According to media sources in Cairo, the US Nuclear partners to finance construction of two government has reportedly offered Egypt Russian Minister of Atomic Energy VVER-40 reactors at Juragua. The project is $200 million in exchange for delaying its Yevgeniy Adamov informed Interfax that Iran estimated to cost up to $700 million to com- nuclear power program. Sources say that the has officially offered to expand its coopera- plete. US government offered to assign US com- tion with Russia on the peaceful use of Nuclear News, July 1999, p. 51. panies to build non-nuclear power stations, nuclear energy and explore the possibility of which would cost $200 million and would be building a second unit at the Bushehr paid by the US Exports Bank as a non-re- nuclear power plant. Adamov said that both turnable loan. The Egyptian sources also say sides should carefully study the feasibility

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1999 193 Nuclear and Missile Trade and Developments of constructing a second reactor at the Bu- Energy to discuss the sale of “cooling and and equipment were involved in production shehr nuclear power plant. He added that ventilation equipment and a steam turbine,” of the missile. Russia had not yet decided on this offer. among other items. The Czech government Iran Times (Washington, DC), 5 March 1999, in Russia is continuing the work on the first was expected to decide on whether to pro- TAAS (Tokyo), 25 February 1999. block, which “is going actively enough, ceed with the sale on 9 June 1999. The Iran Brief reports that in February 1999, CTK (Prague), 19 May 1999, in FBIS Document strictly in line with the contract,” Adamov Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani said said. FTS19990519001110, 19 May 1999, CTK (Prague), 19 May 1999, in FBIS Document that Iran’s Shahab-3 ballistic missile is “fully Interfax, 8 May 1999, in FBIS Document FTS19990519000090, 19 May 1999; Bill Samii, FTS19990508000294, 8 May 1999. operational.” A top secret US intelligence Iran Report [Online], , 24 May 1999; CTK (Prague), 7 June After Iranian President Mohammad 1999, in FBIS Document FTS19990607000384, Mohammed Khatami has ordered the pro- Khatami’s five-day state visit to Saudi Arabia, 7 June 1999. duction of 15 Shehab-3 missiles, to be de- Iran and Saudi Arabia issued a joint state- ployed in underground bunkers near ment. The Saudi news agency SPA reports Missile Khorramabad, Iran. According to sources that the two countries “expressed their sup- The New Jersey Justice Department said that familiar with the report, Iran is expected to port for turning the Middle East into a zone Daniel Malloy, president and part owner of flight test its 2,000 km-range Shehab-4 bal- free from weapons of mass destruction, in- the New Jersey-based International Heli- listic missile by 2002, several years earlier cluding nuclear weapons, expressing their copter Inc., admitted he shipped missile and than originally anticipated. The Shehab-4 is absolute belief that Israel’s policy, based on military jet parts to Iran between January 1996 believed to be based heavily on the Russian producing and stockpiling types of weap- and September 1997. The shipments were R-12 [NATO designation SS-4 ‘Sandel’] in- ons of mass destruction and its non-compli- first made to Joseph Balakrishna Menon in termediate-range ballistic missile. Shamkhani ance with international laws and treaties Singapore, owner of Heli-World Aviation, has said that the Shehab-4 “will have no mili- poses a real and serious threat to peace and Ltd., who then sent them to Iran. Spare parts tary purpose” and is “intended to carry sat- security in the region.” for the Northrop F-5 fighter, the Pratt and ellites into orbit.” Shamkhani has also said SPA (Riyadh), 19 May 1999 in BBC [Online], Whitney TF30 military jet engine, the that the Shehab-4 will use the same RD214 , 19 May 1999. Grumman F-14A fighter and 100 batteries for engines that are used in the R-12. In October the Hawk surface-to air missile were shipped, 1998, Russia’s Energomash and Khrunichev The Czech daily Mlada fronta Dnes reported according the Justice Department report. firms delivered RD214 engines to Iran. on 19 May 1999 that Czech government of- Malloy is to pay more than two million dol- Iran Brief (Bethesda, MD), 8 March 1999, pp. 4- 5. ficials do not intend to block the sale of com- lars in fines and serve between five and 10 ponents to Iran for its Bushehr nuclear years in prison for the illegal exports. Malloy According to US government officials fa- power plant despite US pressure to cancel admitted to falsely declaring the shipments miliar with classified US intelligence reports, the sale. However, Michael Zantovsky, chair- to US Customs as “commercial aircraft parts.” Iran test-launched a short-range ballistic man of the Czech government’s Foreign Af- Malloy had not registered as an exporter with missile from a barge in the Caspian Sea in fairs, Defense, and Security committee, said the State Department. US Customs and De- 1998. The missile is believed to have been that the proposed sale should be studied fense Logistics Agency officials began scru- liquid-fueled and may have been based on “very carefully” but that cooperation with tinizing Malloy’s activities when in February Russian sea-launched ballistic missile de- Iran should not be ruled out. Zantovsky also 1997 he ordered 20 missile batteries from a signs. Western analysts believe that Iran said that he would ask Deputy Premier Egon Missouri company that could only be used could equip cargo ships with sea-launched Lansky for more information about the sale. for the AIM-54 Phoenix missile on the F- ballistic missiles to directly threaten the Premier Milos Zeman has not made a clear 14A. In the 1970s, the United States sold United States or Middle Eastern countries statement on the issue. According to the 24 Phoenix-equipped jets to Iran. such as Israel. May issue of the Iran Report, Zeman stated Agence France Presse, 4 March 1999. Iran Brief (Bethesda, MD), 8 March 1999, pp. 1- that “Iran is not Iraq” to justify the sale of 3. nuclear reactor components to Iran. Accord- According to Japanese officials, North Ko- ing to Lansky, money is the deciding factor. rean technicians assisted with the produc- IRNA reported that Iran has successfully The total amount of the contracts is worth tion of Iran’s Shahab-3 ballistic missile. The tested a surface-to-air missile (SAM) named approximately $200 million, and Iran is also North Koreans reportedly used the same Sayyad-1. Quoting Keyvan Khosravi, the recruiting Czech scientists to work in the equipment used to produce the Nodong bal- spokesman of the Iranian Ministry of De- Bushehr nuclear power plant. Representa- listic missile. The Shahab-3, which was tested fense and Armed Forces Logistics, IRNA tives from the Czech firm Skoda met with in 1998, can reach targets in Israel, Saudi reports that the missile successfully de- members of the Atomic Energy Organization Arabia, and Southern Russia. Iranian offi- stroyed a target drone at the desired alti- of Iran and the Russian Ministry of Atomic cials reported that only Iranian technicians tude. Khosravi added that the missile, which is named after army commander Lieutenant-

194 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1999 Nuclear and Missile Trade and Developments

General Ali Sayyad Shirazi who was killed The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force tic missiles in Eastern Europe. on 10 April 1999, is designed and con- (IRIAF) recently unveiled two new laser- Douglas Davis, Jewish Telegraphic Agency (Lon- structed by the Aerospace Industries Orga- guided air-to-surface missiles, which were don), [Online] http://www.jta.org, 3 June 1999. nization, an affiliate of the Iranian Defense built under Project ASSR-67, at Tactical Air Ministry. Base 1 in Mehrabad, Iran. The Sattar-1, which Iraq accused Iran on 11 June of firing three IRNA (Tehran) [Online], , reportedly has a 20-km range, closely re- long-range, surface-to-surface missiles at a 14 April 1999. sembles a combination of the US-built base of the Iranian opposition group, HAWK surface-to-air missile and the AIM- Mujaheddin-i Khalq Organization (MKO), Grigoriy Rapota, general director of Russia’s 54 Phoenix air-to-air missile. The Sattar-2, located deep inside Iraq. Iraq has threatened Rosvoorouzhenie arms export agency, said which is reportedly designed and manufac- to retaliate for this attack. An MKO spokes- on 21 April 1999 that the company has com- tured by Iran, is equipped with a Paveway- man said that three Scud-B missiles landed mitted itself under the provisions of the Gore- type search sensor and has a 30-km range. on their base, approximately 110 km north- Chernomyrdin Commission to end all The two missiles are apparently for use by east of Baghdad, and another Scud exploded military-technical cooperation with Iran by Iranian F-4E and F-5E fighter aircraft. in mid-air. He said that the missiles were the end of 1999. Rapota declared that “as a Homa Farmehr, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 30 June launched by the Iranian Revolutionary state company, Rosvoorouzhenie strictly 1999, p.18. Guard Corps from the Iranian city of observes the law and therefore has no right Bakhtaran (western Iran), approximately 700 to sign new contracts (with Iran).” He added IRAQ km from the MKO base. The leader of the that the company would resume arms sales Iranian opposition sent a letter to the Secre- Nuclear to Iran once the ban on such transactions is tary General of the United Nations, Kofi lifted. The New Yorker magazine reported on 28 Annan, accusing Iraq of the attack. Interfax (Moscow), 21 April 1999, in FBIS Docu- March 1999 that US and British intelligence Al-Khaleej (Dubai) [Online], , 12 June 1999. Minister Yevgeny Primakov $800,000 in No- The Tel Aviv-based Ha’aretz newspaper re- vember 1997 for “strategic materials from On 15 June 1999 in the Bavarian High Court, ported on 20 June 1999 that Iranian Presi- Moscow to build up its nuclear weapons German engineer Karl-Heinz Schaab con- dent Mohammed Khatami is seeking to open stockpile.” The report claimed that “while it fessed to illegally selling blueprints for a gas a secret dialogue with the Israeli govern- was not clear how Primakov was identified, ultra-centrifuge to Iraqi buyers in Septem- ment aimed at improving relations between the intelligence officials say it was traceable ber 1989. He said that the Iraqis paid the two countries through the implementa- to the Russian Prime Minister.” The report DM100,000 for the plans in sales totaling tion of confidence-building measures. Uni- quoted former head of the UN Special Com- DM980,000. Schaab also said that he knew dentified senior British government officials mission on Iraq (UNSCOM) Rolf Ekeus as the blueprints could be used to produce said that they received the Iranian request saying “Russia is hopeless now. It is clear weapons-grade uranium in militarily signifi- and relayed it to Israeli leaders. The British that Russia is not making a serious effort to cant quantities. According to Schaab, a col- sources said that Khatami’s two major sug- control events. [Iraqi President Saddam league, Bruno Stemmler, acquired the plans gestions were: “a regional agreement among Hussein] will get a bomb, because these that were subsequently sold to Iraqi busi- all Middle Eastern countries possessing material are floating in. Every day, they are nessmen in Vienna, Austria. Schaab added ground-to-ground missiles not to launch a more advanced.” that he met with Iraqi scientists in Baghdad pre-emptive missile attack on another coun- Reuters, 28 March 1999. on five occasions. The court found Schaab try that is a party to the agreement;” and “a guilty of treason on 29 June, and sentenced bilateral agreement regarding the disarma- According to the London-based Foreign him to five years in prison. ment of long-range ballistic missiles with Report, the Iraqis have accelerated their hunt Robert Jaquet, Süddeutsche Zeitung (Munich) non-conventional warheads, to be followed for components to develop nonconventional [Online], , 16 June by a treaty in which both sides would under- weapons and ballistic missiles while West- 1999; AFP (Munich), 16 June 1999, in Taz, die tageszeitung [Online], , 16 take not to develop long-range missiles for ern intelligence agencies have been preoc- June 1999; AP (Munich), 14 June 1999, in Lexis- military purposes, but solely for the launch- cupied with the crisis in the Balkans. Iraq’s Nexis [Online], , 14 ing of satellites into space.” On 21 June 1999, chemical and biological warfare programs June 1999; Deutschlandfunk Network (Cologne), the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) could be resumed within the next nine 29 June 1999, in FBIS Document FTS19990629000348, 29 June 1999. carried a story describing the Ha’aretz re- months and its nuclear weapons program port as “baseless.” could be resumed within the next 18 months. Sharon Sadeh, Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv) [Online], Iraq’s nuclear weapons program has report- Missile , 20 June 1999; edly been helped by Russian scientists em- On 10 March 1999, the Russian arms export IRNA (Tehran) [Online], , agency Rosvoorouzhenie denied sending 21 June 1999. ployed by the Iraqi government and the Iraqis have tried to purchase parts for ballis- any anti-aircraft systems to Iraq, and added

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1999 195 Nuclear and Missile Trade and Developments that it has not aided Iraq in the moderniza- man Richard Shelby, labels Israel as a commissioned by the end of 1999 and the tion or maintenance of its air defenses. “sensitive” country, thus banning its sci- third in 2000. Deputy Head of Rosvoorouzhenie’s anti-air- entists from working at US nuclear labora- Amnon Barzilai, Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv) [Online], craft systems exports division Sergey tories. A Senate Armed Forces Committee , 30 March 1999. Kulakov said at a 10 March Moscow news spokesperson said that the Department of conference that all contacts with Iraq were Energy (DOE) includes Israel on its list of suspended once the United Nations imposed sensitive countries because it has not Based on a report published by the Jaffee sanctions on the country. Kulakov did say, signed the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera- Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv however, that Rosvoorouzhenie has sup- tion of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Other University, Ha’aretz defense correspondent plied arms to Iran in quantities that the Rus- Middle Eastern states listed as “sensitive” Amnon Barzilai reports that Israel has devel- sian government permits. Vladimir Svetlov, by the DOE include Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, oped a third generation of Jericho surface- director general of the Fakel Design Bureau, and Syria. to-surface missiles. The information, which said that in his opinion all Iraqi air defenses Ran Dagoni, Globes (Tel Aviv) [Online], , 4 May 1999. ports, adds that the original Jericho missile Svetlov said that Fakel has no business with had a range of 1,500 km. Missile Amnon Barzilai, Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv) [Online], Iraq, even though Iraq has sought contacts , 12 April 1999. with his company. “If Iraq had Russian anti- According to the Tel Aviv-based Globes aircraft systems,NATO pilots would not newspaper, Israel is requesting US finan- cial and political support to develop a new Following his 27 April 1999 meeting with find flying over [Iraq] so easy,” he said. Chinese leaders in Beijing, Israeli President Interfax, 10 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis missile defense system known as Boost [Online], , 11 March Phase Launcher Intercept (BPLI). BPLI is Ezer Weizman said that Russian missile sales 1999. described as a refinement of the Israeli to Syria pose a greater threat to Israel than Boost Phase Intercept System (IBIS), and Chinese weapon sales to Iran. According to Unidentified Middle Eastern sources have envisions using unmanned aerial vehicles Weizman, Syria’s Russian-supplied ballistic indicated that Ukraine and Iraq signed a se- (UAVs) to destroy enemy ballistic missile missiles pose the greatest military threat to cret military cooperation agreement in No- launchers as they attempt to fire missiles Israel. vember 1998. The agreement, which would Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv) [Online], , 28 April 1999. be in violation of UN sanctions against Iraq, with infrared guided missiles that would allegedly provides for the export of Ukrai- detect the heatsignature of an initial mis- The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) General Staff nian industrial equipment to Iraq in ex- sile launch and destroy the launcher. BPLI has held a series of meetings to reassess the change for Iraqi oil. The agreement was differs from the earlier IBIS concept, which threats facing Israel. Distant states such as reportedly signed by the chief executives of involved destroying ballistic missiles af- Iran and Iraq that are developing long-range two Ukrainian arms companies, a senior Iraqi ter they were launched and not the launch- ballistic missiles and weapons of mass de- diplomat, and representatives of an Iraqi ers themselves. US Department of struction (WMD) are now considered to be arms firm. According to the Middle Eastern Defense officials estimate that the devel- the primary security threat. These states were sources, the tractor engines, trucks, heavy opment cost of the BPLI could reach $500 previously considered a secondary threat, vehicles, generators, tires, gears, and elec- million over four to five years, with the less dangerous than the prospect of a large trical circuitry that Ukraine reportedly plans cost of deployment reaching up to $1 bil- conventional war with Israel’s immediate to ship to Iraq could be used to overhaul lion. neighbors. Israeli planners believe that the missile launchers and upgrade tanks. The Ran Dagoni, Globes (Tel Aviv) [Online], , 23 March 1999. threat posed by distant WMD and missile- could be a model for future military coopera- armed states jeopardizes Israel’s existence, tion pacts between Ukraine and Iraq once On 20 March 1999, the Israeli navy took de- and is likely to grow in the future. UN sanctions against Iraq are lifted. Ze’ev Schiff, Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv), 5 May 1999, livery of the first of three Dolphin-class sub- p. B1, in FBIS Document FTS19990507001392, Foreign Report (London), 20 April 1999, in FBIS marines from the German Ministry of 5 May 1999. Document FTS19990421001682, 20 April 1999. Defense. The 1,700-ton diesel-electric sub- marine has 10 torpedo tubes capable of fir- The future of Israel’s Moav air-to-air missile ISRAEL ing torpedoes, missiles, mines, and decoys. appears uncertain due to disagreements in Nuclear A senior Israeli military source said that the Israel’s defense establishment over the A draft bill under consideration by the US Dolphin submarines will “create a new era” system’s merits. The Moav is designed for Senate Armed Forces Committee could for Israeli navy strategy. The first Dolphin is use by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to ban Israeli scientists from working at US scheduled to be piloted to Israel later in intercept and destroy enemy ballistic mis- nuclear laboratories. The bill, introduced 1999, with the second boat scheduled to be siles during their vulnerable boost phase. In by Senate Intelligence Committee chair- late 1998, Israeli defense establishment offi-

196 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1999 Nuclear and Missile Trade and Developments cials agreed to move to the second phase of According to Israeli Defense Ministry Di- able to penetrate any naval defense system the Moav’s development and allocated rector-General Ilan Biran, the Arrow anti-mis- known today.” funding for it. However, Major General Yitzhak sile system will be on display at the Paris Air Arye Egozi, Yedi’to Aharonot (Tel Aviv), 15 June Ben Israel, head of the Israeli Defense Show even though it is not for sale. “The 1999, p.5, in FBIS Document FTS19990627001132, 15 June 1999. Ministry’s weapons development authority, Arrow system is not for sale,” Biran said, decided against proceeding with the project. denying that Turkey and India may be nego- Ben Israel’s decision, which went against of- tiating with the United States and Israel to Israel Air Force (IAF) Commander-in-Chief ficial Defense Ministry policy, was based on purchase it. Biran added that Israel hoped Major-General Eitan Ben-Eliahu said that the his opinion that the Moav project faced too to deploy the system between the end of IAF has successfully completed a three-year many technical hurdles to be successful. Due 1999 and the beginning of 2000. Speaking initiative to develop means to counter the to Ben Israel’s action, the Defense Ministry at the event, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe threat posed to Israel by surface-to-surface failed to submit a formal request for US fund- Arens said on 13 June 1999 that the Arrow missiles. Ben-Eliahu said that the IAF pack- ing and the United States thus has not allo- system could be used to protect not just Is- age of measures includes pilot training, cated any funds for the Moav project in its rael, but also Jordan, Turkey, and the West force exercises, and “adapting our command- 2000 budget. Bank from regional ballistic missile threats. and-control system to run this sort of mis- Reuven Pedatzur, Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv) [Online], Arens said that he has discussed such a sion.” According to Ben-Eliahu, the IAF , 25 May 1999. possibility with US Secretary of Defense conducted training scenarios to combat mis- William Cohen and expects the United States sile attacks from countries directly border- The US Army Space and Missile Defense to grant Israel approval to sell the Arrow ing Israel and from more distant countries. Command (SMDC) and US defense contrac- Arieh O’Sullivan, Jerusalem Post [Online], , 28 June 1999. tor TRW have reached a tentative agreement Show marked the debut of the Etrog Zahav to restructure their contract for development (Golded Citron) command-and-control sys- of the US-Israeli Tactical High Energy Laser tem produced by Israel’s Tadiran defense JORDAN (THEL). TRW told the SMDC in late May firm. The system is used to manage opera- Nuclear 1999 that it intended to pull out of the project tions of the Arrow system. On 13 June 1999, Jordanian King Abdullah effective 1 June 1999 due to disputes over Heidi Gleit, Jerusalem Post [Online], , 8 June 1999; Amnon Barzilai, Al Khalifa issued a joint communiquJ‚ which nal contract, TRW was liable for 100 percent Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv) [Online], , 14 June 1999. “stressed the need to pressure Israel to join of the cost over-runs. Under the new con- the [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of tract the liability will be split with TRW as- Nuclear Weapons] and to bring Israeli suming half the burden and the US and Israeli On 15 June 1999, US defense manufacturer nuclear establishments into the interna- governments liable for the remaining 50 per- Raytheon and Israel Aircraft Industries tional inspection and monitoring system.” cent. These terms will be in effect until the (IAI) announced they had signed an agree- ment for joint development of an unmanned Petra (Amman) [Online], , 13 June 1999. following which TRW’s liability will be re- aerial vehicle (UAV) based on IAI’s Harpy duced to 25 percent of the total with the rest UAV. Israeli Ministry of Defense Director- LEBANON shared between the United States and Is- General Ilan Biran said that the new UAV, rael. TRW has agreed to provide “a techni- dubbed Cutlass, “can serve for hunting down Nuclear cal data package, a ‘predictive avoidance ballistic missile launchers, and for suppress- Lebanese security agents have arrested two analysis’ year 2000 certification and addi- ing enemy air-defense systems.” Marketing men, Fu’ad ‘Abduh al-Shuwayri and Butrus tional data reports” not included under the efforts for the Cutlass will reportedly focus Michael Najim, who were allegedly attempt- terms of the original contract. The United primarily on the US military. ing to sell 6 kg of uranium to Syrian nation- Dror Marom, Globes (Tel Aviv) [Online], , 15 June 1999. $130.8 million on the THEL project, which is Al-Shuwayri told interrogators that he de- veloped a friendship with Syrian national designed to provide Israel with a laser sys- At the June 1999 Paris Air Show, Israel Air- Makram Sukkariyah. While visiting tem for destroying artillery rockets launched craft Industries announced that its MABAT Sukkariyah’s Damascus home, al-Shuwayri at the country from positions in Lebanon. division is developing a “next generation” met Suhayl Lurba, and an engineer known TRW has spent $21.5 million on the project, version of its Gabriel anti-ship cruise mis- only as Ahmad. Ahmad allegedly told al- which is expected to cost another $50 mil- sile. The new missile will reportedly have Shuwayri that he possessed 6 kg of a radio- lion to complete. over-the-horizon range and, according to Michael C. Sirak, Inside the Pentagon, 2 June active substance, which he would like to sell MABAT manager Yitzhaq Nisan, “will be 1999, p. 1. to people linked with Hezbollah or Iran for $210 million. Later, al-Shuwayri, Sukkariyah, and Najim met at Lurba’s Damascus home.

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1999 197 Nuclear and Missile Trade and Developments

At Lurba’s home, Najim met ‘Ali Nayazi station from Russia for $4 billion may also raeli armament and its unlimited weapons Dandash who reportedly had close links with be revived. development program. If people intention- Tehran, and offered to sell him a sample of Foreign Report (London), 22 April 1999, in ally neglect such a development they have the uranium. Dandash agreed and Najim then Inquisit [Online], , 22 to review it.” According to an article in April 1999. contacted Ahmad to obtain a uranium the Tehran Times, “The crown prince even sample. Najim said that he provided Dandash scolded those who target Iran with base- with the sample in a glass tube wrapped in Missile less, vitriolic propaganda, all the while black adhesive tape. Dandash took the Russia is planning to sell S-300 surface- willfully ignoring the immense thermo- sample to Tehran and returned to Lebanon to-air missiles (SAM) to Libya. Accord- nuclear, biological, and chemical arsenals 45 days later. Upon his return, Dandash told ing to Yuri Rodin-Sofa, the president of that Israel has amassed illegally.” Najim that he would buy the uranium and Oboronitelnyye Sistemy [Defense Sys- Reuters (Riyadh), 1 June 1999, in CNN [Online], gave him the glass tube and a check for $5 tems], the firm that produces the missiles, , 2 June 1999; Tehran “since the lifting of the United Nations Times (Tehran) [Online], , 4 June 1999. Beirut, as a down payment. Najim said that sanctions against Tripoli, Libya has been before his arrest, Dandash gave him a sec- placed at the top of the list [of potential ond check for 400 billion Iranian riyals. Al- buyers].” He added that a proposed com- SOUTH AFRICA prehensive air-defense package for Libya Shuwayri and Najim also said that when Nuclear will be based on S-300PMU-1 and S- Dandash returned the glass tube containing On 28 April 1999, Russia and South Africa 300PMU-2 SAM systems. The report in the sample to them, the uranium had been signed an agreement on the formation of a Al-Hayat adds that Rosvoorouzhenie, replaced by a charcoal-like substance. joint intergovernmental committee on Russia’s principal arms export intermedi- Al-Nahar (Beirut), 18 March 1999, in FBIS Docu- trade and economic cooperation, and on ment FTS19990318001196, 18 March 1999. ary company, will handle the weapon sales the development of mining, and a declara- to Libya. In his opening remarks to the eighth gather- Al-Hayat (London), 24 April 1999, p. 6. tion of cooperation in nuclear energy. This ing of Mediterranean news agencies in declaration provides for the initiation of contacts between the two countries re- Beirut, Anwar al-Khalil, the Lebanese min- SAUDI ARABIA ister of information, stated, “what greater garding developing modular helium threat can there be in the region than the Nuclear nuclear reactors. These reactors are con- insistence of the Zionist regime [Israel] on A delegation of Saudi Arabian govern- sidered to be among the safest. Interfax, 28 April 1999. continuing its program of producing nuclear ment officials, led by Prince Sultan Bin- weapons and [weapons] of mass destruc- ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz, toured Pakistani nuclear tion.” He asked the participants of the gath- facilities and the ballistic missile develop- The German company HTR GmbH (a joint ering to decide on ways to alleviate the ment facility on 7 May 1999. The Saudi venture made up of Siemens and Asea nuclear threats to the region coming from delegation was accompanied by Pakistani Brown Boveri) signed a licensing and co- Israel. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and other operation deal with South African energy IRNA (Tehran) [Online], , Pakistani government officials. The visi- company Eskom. The deal would give 24 June 1999. tors went to the Kahuta research center Eskom the right to use high-temperature and the center of nuclear research and the reactor technology in the construction of missile and nuclear weapons programs led small-scale, high-temperature, 100-MW LIBYA by A.Q. Khan. Khan briefed Sultan on ura- nuclear reactors in South Africa. Nuclear nium enrichment processes. SAPA, 11 May 1999, in FBIS Document In March 1998, Russia’s Atomenergoeksport Al-Sharq-al-Awsat (London), internet version, 9 FTS19990511001423, 11 May 1999. company and Libya signed an $8 million deal May 1999, in FBIS Document for partial overhauling of the Tajura nuclear FTS19990509000652, 9 May 1999. Nozipho Joyce Mxakato-Diseko, South research center near Tripoli. The Tajura Africa’s permanent representative to the nuclear center has a Soviet-built 10-MW re- In an interview with Al-Sharq al-Aswat, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organiza- search reactor and a staff of 750. The Libyan Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdullah de- tion (CTBTO), and CTBTO chairman nuclear program lacks technical expertise, fended the right of Iran to arm itself. “Iran Wolfgang Hoffman signed South Africa’s finances, and the support of foreign suppli- has every right to develop its defense ca- facilities agreement under the terms of the ers. However, this is expected to change with pabilities for its security without harming Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) on Russian involvement. Libya’s Soviet-era others, we also do the same. All countries 21 May 1999. Signing the agreement brings plans to purchase an 800-MW nuclear power follow the same policy, then why only Iran South Africa into full compliance with the is singled out here without mentioning CTBT, making it the first country to reach others. Why don’t you ask about the Is- such status. Construction can now begin in

198 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1999 Nuclear and Missile Trade and Developments

South Africa of five stations to monitor the missiles will be produced in Turkey under vacate the occupied territories and restore ban on nuclear explosions in the region. the direction of an Israeli company. This the rights of Palestinians.” SAPA, 21 May 1999, in ANC Daily News Brief- project will begin immediately after obtain- Zulfikar Raja, Gulf News (Dubai), [Online] http:/ ing [Online], , 21 May ing agreement from the two countries’s fi- /www.gulf-news.co.ae, 27 May 1999. 1999. nance ministries, and will cost approximately $200 million. On 25 May 1999, UAE Minister for Informa- Missile Al-Khaleej (Dubai) [Online], , 10 June 1999. Zayid Al Nuhayyan met with Pakistani forts to sell arms to the Gulf states of the nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Kahn at A. Middle East. George Tait, a spokesman for Nuclear Q. Khan Research Laboratories in South Africa’s state-owned Denel defense Bulgarian customs agents at the Dunav Rawalpindi. Zaiyid was interested in obtain- firm, said that Saudi Arabia is anxious to buy Most checkpoint on the Bulgarian-Turkish ing Pakistani help in the nuclear field. Khan surface-to-air missiles and G-6 artillery from border arrested a Turkish citizen on 29 May replied: “Pakistan would not present the South Africa. According to South African 1999 after they found a lead container with atomic bomb or a missile on a platter but Defense Minister Joe Modise, Saudi Arabia uranium in his car. According to customs could train UAE manpower.” is also interested in purchasing unmanned spokesperson Roumyana Kroumova, the Pakistan (Islamabad), 26 May 1999, in Lexis- aerial vehicles from South Africa. Speaking suspect was driving a Toyota Corina from Nexis [Online], , 27 Turkey to Chisinau (the capital of Moldova), May 1999; Karachi Jasarat, 26 May 1999, in at the International Defense Exposition FBIS Document FTS19990527000106, 28 May (IDEX) ‘99 in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emir- when his nervousness attracted the suspi- 1999. ates, Tait said that negotiations were under- cion of customs officers at the Bulgarian way to sell some of the same systems to border crossing. When the officers searched Kuwait and Qatar in contracts that could be the car, suspecting that the driver might be a worth “several millions” of dollars. drug courier, they found “a certificate for the SAPA, 16 March 1999, in ANC Daily News Brief- purchase of uranium 235,” and a 2.4 kg lead ing [Online], , 16 March container with “uranium 235.” The report is 1999. not clear about the quantity of uranium seized. It says that the exact amount of ura- SYRIA nium in the container is unknown, but that Nuclear “expectations are that it contains the stan- Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeny dard 10 g.” It also does not specify the level Adamov and Ibrahim Osman, director of the of enrichment of the uranium. Specialists Syrian Commission for Atomic Energy, later measured “weak radioactive emmissions signed an agreement on 18 May 1999 for through the lead walls of the container.” The Russian-Syrian cooperation on peaceful suspect, Uskan Hanifi, a Turkish citizen of uses of nuclear energy. The agreement pro- Kurdish extraction, told police that he had vides for cooperation in nuclear energy, sci- originally purchased the uranium in Moldova ence and technology, and commerce for the and then taken it to Turkey in an attempt to next 10 years. On 19 May, Osman signed an sell it. After failing to market the material in agreement with the Russian government for Turkey, he was driving it back to Moldova at the construction of two nuclear reactors in the time of his arrest. Syria that would be used for peaceful pur- BTA (Sofia), 29 May 1999, in FBIS Document poses. The agreement was concluded within FTS19990529000729, 29 May 1999. the framework of the Comprehensive Co- operation Agreement, which the two coun- UNITED ARAB EMIRATES tries signed in 1997. Nuclear IRNA (Tehran), 19 May 1999; Al-Bayan (Dubai), 23 May 1999, p. 24, in FBIS Document The United Arab Emirates (UAE) Minister FTS19990530000096, 23 May 1999. of Information and Culture Shaykh Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, during his TURKEY visit to Pakistan in May, stated that Pakistan could contribute to the Middle East peace Missile process through their nuclear capabilities. Turkey and Israel are to start implementing “Islamabad’s nuclear capabilities can serve their joint project to produce the Popeye as a catalyst and Pakistan can play a key role air-to-surface missile. The Israeli-designed in putting tremendous pressure on Israel to

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1999 199