Europe Responds to the Crisis of Multilateral Arms Control
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Yes, we can? Europe responds to the crisis of multilateral arms control GLOBAL SECURITY POLICY BRIEF Oliver Meier November 2020 The European Leadership Network (ELN) is an independent, non-partisan, pan-European network of nearly 200 past, present and future European leaders working to provide practical real-world solutions to political and security challenges. About the author Dr Oliver Meier is senior researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH). Published by the European Leadership Network, November 2020 European Leadership Network (ELN) 8 St James’s Square London, UK, SE1Y 4JU @theELN europeanleadershipnetwork.org Published under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 © The ELN 2020 The opinions articulated in this report represent the views of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the position of the European Leadership Network or any of its members. The ELN’s aim is to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address pressing foreign, defence, and security challenges. Over the last four years, Europeans “Over the last four have been facing the fundamental years, Europeans challenge of Russia and the United have been facing States turning away from, or even the fundamental against, arms control. challenge of Russia and the United By definition, Europeans can have little States turning away from, or even against impact on the progress of bilateral arms, control.” Russia-U.S. arms control. In facing the crisis of multilateral arms control On foreign and security policies, regimes, however, Europe has begun to including arms control, the next US find its voice in countering great power administration is unlikely to simply recalcitrance. Europeans increasingly revert to the pre-Trump status quo but focus on their own interests, speak will have take changed circumstances plainly, co-operate on the preservation into account. Last but not least, it is of arms control—even when it means quite possible that Donald Trump is not dealing with difficult partners—and the last populist in the White House.2 strive to develop their own policy Europeans will keep in mind that the instruments to address arms control election of Joe Biden marks the fourth 1 deficiencies. successive radical shift of America’s foreign policy. Others may follow. To be sure, with Joe Biden moving into the White House, transatlantic Thus, Europe should continue to cooperation on preserving and strive for greater strategic autonomy strengthening multilateral arms control even if reason returns to the White will become easier. Nevertheless, House. Such a pursuit of the ability there are a number of reasons why to act more independently, however, Europeans would be well advised to should not only aim at greater preserve and build the on progress European capacities for defence they made during the Trump years and military interventions. Given towards a more autonomous arms Europe’s economic and political control policy. At least initially, the powers, it must also include greater Biden administration is likely to capabilities to strengthen diplomacy, be preoccupied with addressing a including Europe’s pursuit of effective multitude of domestic problems. 1. This policy brief is a translation, updated and expanded version of Meier, Oliver, “Yes, we can? Europäische Antworten auf die Krise der Rüstungskontrolle“, Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg. Hamburg (IFSH Policy Brief, 07/20), September 2020, https://ifsh.de/file/publication/Policy_Brief/20_07_Policy_Brief.pdf. 2. Acemoglu, Daron, “Trump Won’t Be the Last American Populist”, Foreign Affairs Magazine, 6 November 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-11-06/trump-wont-be- last-american-populist. 1 The ELN / Yes, we can? arms control, disarmament and “A sustainable non-proliferation regimes. Such European policy a sustainable European policy to to strengthen strengthen multilateral arms control multilateral agreements will require additional arms control and sometimes difficult steps. But agreements will require Europeans can take courage from additional and some of their achievements of the sometimes last four years, made under extremely difficult steps.” difficult circumstances. For European supporters of arms proliferation instruments such as control, dealing with obstinate export and technology controls.3 superpowers is hardly a new problem. Only seldom have all permanent At the time, Washington proclaimed the members of the Security Council lived divide between “old” and “new” Europe. up to their special responsibilities for Indeed, it were just a few countries upholding disarmament, arms control that led the way in strengthening and non-proliferation regimes. multilateral regimes and thus set the pace for the rest of Europe. The The US rejection of multilateral arms prime example: after the United States control during the George W. Bush occupied Iraq in 2003 under the guise administration constituted the first of WMD disarmament, Germany, endurance test for arms control France and Great Britain, despite after the end of the Cold War. Those fierce opposition from Washington, European nations which backed global paved the way for a diplomatic co-operation on non-proliferation solution to the conflict over Iran’s and disarmament of weapons of nuclear programme.4 Subsequently, mass destruction (WMDs) weathered in December 2003, the EU adopted this period by playing for time, its first security strategy and used prioritizing secondary instruments the slogan “effective multilateralism” and accommodating Washington, to label its disarmament and non- particularly on supply-oriented non- proliferation policies.5 The EU then 3. Daase, Christopher; Meier, Oliver, “The changing nature of arms control and the role of coercion”, Oliver Meier/ Christopher Daase (eds), Arms control in the 21st century. Between coercion and cooperation, New York: Routledge, 2012, pp. 233–241. 4. Meier, Oliver, “European efforts so solve the conflict over Iran’s nuclear programme: how has the European Union performed?”, Non-Proliferation Consortium (Non-Proliferation Papers, 27), 2012, http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/nonproliferationpapers/olivermeier51191b5bdb350.pdf. 5. Council of the European Union, “A Secure Europe In A Better World. European Security Strategy“, Brussels, 10 December 2003, https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/european-security-strategy- secure-europe-better-world, zuletzt aktualisiert am 12.12.2003. 2 The ELN / Yes, we can? joined, chaired and brought to a weapon state France on the one side successful conclusion the nuclear and disarmament proponents such negotiations with Iran. as Ireland and Austria on the other side, the strategy moved away from At the same time, the limits of ambitious arms control goals such as European arms control engagement fostering new agreements. became obvious. Europeans were unable to counter effectively Russia’s Russia and the United States as Anti- rejection of conventional arms control, Multilateralists which began in 2008. The EU lacked the instruments and persuasive power Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 to convince Moscow of the value of and Donald Trump’s election as US co-operative arms control. European President marked the beginning of a multilateralists, such as Germany, new phase of European arms control could only watch from the sidelines policy. Over the last five years, the as the architecture of bilateral US- conflicts between the United States Russian arms control was dismantled. and Russia as well as between China Barack Obama’s “reset” of relations and the United States have increasingly with Moscow in 2009 did nothing to affected multilateral regimes. fundamentally change this problem. Russia has weakened the Chemical Transatlantic co-operation in Weapons Convention (CWC) by strengthening multilateral arms control backing Syria politically and militarily, regimes improved during the Obama despite the fact that the Assad administration. However, the EU failed regime since 2012 has used chemical to recalibrate its own list of goals. weapons against its own population.7 The 2016 “A Global Strategy for the From Europe’s perspective, the Kremlin European Union’s Foreign And Security crossed another red line when, in Policy” remained focused on improved Russian intelligence officers in March implementation and universalisation of 2018 used the nerve agent Novichok 6 existing global instruments. Against to assassinate the former double the backdrop of internal divisions, agent Sergei Skripal in the British such as those between the nuclear town Salisbury.8 The fact that China 6. European Union, “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy”, Brussels, June 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/ eeas/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf. 7. Schneider, Tobias; Lütkefend, Theresa, “Nowhere to Hide. The Logic of Chemical Weapons Use in Syria”, Global Public Policy Institute. Berlin, February 2019, https://www.gppi.net/media/GPPi_ Schneider_Luetkefend_2019_Nowhere_to_Hide_Web.pdf. 8. “Salisbury: What we know a year after the Skripal poison attack”, Deutsche Welle, 4 March 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/salisbury-what-we-know-a-year-after-the-skripal-poison- attack/a-47757214. 3 The ELN / Yes, we can? “Europe appears The Europeans initially reacted to have found its to the dismantling of multilateral step, and has been instruments with hesitation