Now More Than Ever the Case for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

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An Arms Control Association Briefing Book

Now More Than Ever The Case for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

February 2010

Tom Z. Collina with Daryl G. Kimball

An Arms Control Association Briefing Book

Now More Than Ever The Case for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

February 2010

Tom Z. Collina with Daryl G. Kimball About the Authors

Tom Z. Collina is Research Director at the Arms Control Association. He has over 20 years of professional experience in international security issues, previously serving as Director of the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists and Executive Director of the Institute for Science and International Security. He actively promoted national efforts to end U.S. nuclear testing in 1992 and international negotiations to conclude the CTBT in 1996.

Daryl G. Kimball is Executive Director of the Arms Control Association. Previously he served as Executive Director of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, a consortium of 17 of the largest U.S. non-governmental organizations working together to strengthen national and international security by reducing the threats posed by nuclear weapons. He also worked as Director of Security Programs for Physicians for Social Responsibility, where he helped spearhead non-governmental efforts to win congressional approval for the 1992 nuclear test moratorium legislation, U.S. support for a “zero-yield” test ban treaty, and the U.N.’s 1996 endorsement of the CTBT.

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank our colleagues Pierce Corden, David Hafemeister, Katherine Magraw, and Benn Tannenbaum for sharing their expertise and reviewing draft text. Thanks also to ACA staff Jeff Abramson, Meri Lugo, Cole Harvey, and Volha Charnysh for editing and chasing down facts and photos. Special thanks to Sally James at Cutting Edge Design for layout and design of the report, and to Brian Allen for copyediting. Responsibility for the report’s contents rests exclusively with the authors and our recommendations do not necessarily represent those of the staff, directors or members of the Arms Control Association.

We are grateful for the generous support of The Ploughshares Fund, The Connect U.S. Fund and ACA donors and members, without which this report would not have been possible.

Cover Photo

The Nevada Test Site was the United States’ primary location for nuclear weapons test explosions. Between 1951 and 1992, it was the site of 100 atmospheric and 714 underground detonations.

©Arms Control Association, February 2010. Table of Contents

v Executive Summary

1 Introduction

3 Section 1: The Test Ban Treaty Strengthens U.S. National Security

8 Section 2: Nuclear Tests Are Not Needed to Maintain the U.S. Arsenal

14 Section 3: The Test Ban Treaty Is Effectively Verifiable

20 Section 4: U.S. Ratification Will Encourage Entry Into Force

22 Conclusion

23 Notes

24 Appendix A: Summary of the CTBT

28 Appendix B: CTBT Signatories and Ratifiers

31 Appendix C: Nuclear Testing and the Test Ban, 1945–Present

36 Appendix D: Additional Resources

To achieve a global ban on nuclear testing, my Administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. After more than five decades of talks, it is time for the testing of nuclear weapons to finally be banned.

— President Barack Obama, April 5, 2009

[Republican senators] might have been right voting against [the CTBT] some years ago, but they would be right voting for it now, based on these new facts… [There are] new pieces of information that are very important and that should be made available to the Senate.

— Former Secretary of State George Shultz, April 17, 2009

The devil is in the details. If we could get it done, if it is acceptable, then it is a step forward on the path to the president’s goal and mine of a nuclear free world.

— Senator John McCain, July 22, 2009

U.S. ratification [of the CTBT] has become, in the eyes of many, a litmus test for U.S. leadership in the overall global effort to prevent the use and spread of nuclear weapons.

— Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy,” — April 2009, William J. Perry and Brent Scowcroft, Chairs Now More Than Ever v U.S. ratification of the CTBT is an essential first U.S. ratification of the CTBT is an essential A global, verifiable ban on nuclear testing would As Dr. Siegfried Hecker, former director of Los such as North Korea and Iran have active nuclear such as North Korea and Iran have active been sharing programs, and Pakistani scientists have A resumption of their nuclear weapons know-how. or Russia nuclear testing by China, India, Pakistan at even would put the non-proliferation regime greater risk. for measures step to rebuilding international support weapons. In to prevent the use and spread of nuclear nuclear powers 1995, the United States and the other for the promised to deliver on the CTBT in exchange on the CTBT Action indefinite extension of the NPT. would give the United States additional leverage to win international support for tougher nuclear inspections and more effective responses to cases of NPT noncompliance. substantially constrain the ability of nuclear-armed states, such as China, to develop new and more nuclear weapon deadly nuclear weapons. Without test explosions, would-be nuclear-armed nations—like Iran—would not be able to proof test more advanced, smaller nuclear warhead designs that could be used to arm ballistic missiles. Alamos National Laboratory, recently said: “The single most important reason to ratify the CTBT is to stop other countries from improving their arsenals.” Value ecurity uclear testing is a dangerous and unnecessary vestige of the Cold War that the a dangerous and unnecessaryuclear testing is vestige of the Cold War 1996, the United States became almost 20 years ago. In United States rejected (CTBT), Treaty Test Ban to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear the first nation S , there is no military to resume U.S. nuclear testing. The United States justification

T’s Increasing Increasing T’s Today tional B It isIt in the U.S. national security interest to his support President Barack Obama has declared As the Senate revisits the CTBT for the first time

a Executive Summary Executive does not need nuclear tests to maintain an effective nuclear arsenal. does not need nuclear tests to

compliance. establishes a global verification network with short-notice, on-site inspections to monitor establishes a global verification which “prohibits any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion,” and which “prohibits any nuclear weapon prevent nuclear testing by others and to improve U.S. and international verification capabilities. Even though the United States has already signed the CTBT and thus assumed most treaty-related responsibilities, cannotit reap the full security benefits of the treaty until the Senateapproves it by a two-thirds majority. key component for U.S. ratification of the CTBT as a prevent the of his broader international efforts to use and spread of nuclear weapons. A growing list of bipartisan leaders agree that by ratifying the important the United States stands to gain an CTBT, constraint on the ability of other states to build new and more deadly nuclear weapons that could pose a greater threat to American security. in more than a decade, it needs to consider the following ways in which the case for the treaty has become significantly stronger:

CT N Global efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty are in jeopardy. (NPT) regime has grown weaker after years of neglect by the nuclear-weapon states. Unpredictable nations N Proven Ability to Maintain international system’s full benefits, such as on-site the Arsenal inspections. In 1999, only 25 percent of the CTBT monitoring Over the past decade, the success of the U.S. stations had been built. As of January 2010, 90 Stockpile Stewardship Program has demonstrated percent of the planned global verification network that the nuclear arsenal can be reliably maintained was complete or under construction. North Korea’s under a CTBT. Successful Life Extension Programs nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 demonstrated that have shown that existing weapons can be the CTBT verification system is working well and can refurbished and recertified without nuclear testing. detect very small explosions. Key plutonium parts in warheads have been shown to last 85–100 years, decades longer than previously thought, and limited production capacity has been The Importance of U.S. Leadership reestablished to make new parts when needed. The CTBT has now been signed by 182 nations, Former Secretary of State George Shultz, former including the United States, China, France, Russia, Defense Secretary William Perry, former Secretary and the United Kingdom, and ratified of State Henry Kissinger and former by 151, including Russia, Japan, South Senator Sam Nunn wrote in the The United States has Korea, Australia, and all U.S. allies in Jan. 20, 2010 Wall Street Journal that more to gain from the NATO. The CTBT’s entry into force the success of efforts to extend the CTBT than any other awaits ratification by nine states, service lives of existing weapons has including the United States, China, “obviated the need for underground nation. India, and Indonesia. nuclear explosive tests.” U.S. ratification would spur other The United States has no need to resume nuclear key nations, such as China, to ratify and would testing. It has the most advanced and deadly reinforce the global taboo against nuclear testing. nuclear arsenal in the world. The United States has Without positive U.S. action on the CTBT, the risks conducted 1,030 nuclear tests, more than all other of nuclear weapons proliferation and the resumption nations combined, including Russia (715) and China of testing will only grow. (45). Given this advantage, it is in the U.S. national security interest to prevent other nations from testing nuclear weapons. The Time for the CTBT is Now Today, the United States has more to gain from the Proven Ability to Verify Compliance CTBT than any other nation. U.S. approval of the CTBT would reinforce the global test moratorium and Today, no would-be cheater could confidently accelerate the Treaty’s formal entry into force, helping conduct an undetected nuclear explosion large to constrain the ability of other nuclear-armed states enough to threaten U.S. security. The international to improve their nuclear weaponry. Equally important, verification system, together with U.S. national U.S. ratification would reestablish strong U.S. technical means of verification, would detect leadership to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to militarily significant tests. Unless it ratifies, however, additional nations and to terrorist groups. The CTBT the United States cannot take advantage of the would strengthen American security for years to come. Arms Control Association vi Now More Than Ever 1

2 3 the House of Representatives and then acquitted by the Senate. The November 2000 presidential election was just a Many senators cast their year away. would have preferred votes reluctantly, more time for debate, and ultimately believed that the treaty did not get a fair hearing. “A process that normally would take many months has been reduced to a few days,” lamented Lugar, Global support for the CTBT has grown Described by Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) as Described by Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) The administration of George W. Bush did not ask Bush did not The administration of George W. substantially. To date, the CTBT has been signed by date, the CTBT To substantially. 182 nations, including the United States, China, seeking a delay. We believe many colleagues are of We seeking a delay. would vote at irrespective of how they a like view, denied, and this point.” This bipartisan request was and consent to the Senate declined to give its advice treaty remains ratification on October 13, 1999. The Relations on the executive calendar of the Foreign Committee. “abrupt and truncated” and “highly politicized,” the October 1999 vote said more about the highly the October 1999 vote said more about the time than it partisan atmosphere in the Senate at year before the did about the CTBT itself. Less than a impeached by CTBT vote, President Clinton had been who voted against ratification. it seek to nor did the Senate to reconsider the CTBT, resume nuclear testing. According to then-Secretary of State Colin Powell, “[W]e do not see any need for such testing in the foreseeable future.” Without the ability Without to conduct nuclear explosive tests, a country cannot confidently develop advanced more nuclear weapons. President Bill Clinton 1 global halt to nuclear weapons testing has been a central, bipartisan objective of bipartisan objective a central, weapons testing has been global halt to nuclear Dwight Eisenhower first since the late 1950s, when President the United States ability recognized that, without the ban. It has long been sought a comprehensive

International progress toward the CTBT accelerated International progress toward the CTBT

In September 1996, the United States became the In September 1996, the United States Then-Chairman of the Senate Foreign

A ban on testing embodied in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Ban Treaty Comprehensive Test ban on testing embodied in the the most nuclear testing experience, the United States has the most to gain from the global the United States has the most to gain from the global the most nuclear testing experience, nuclear weapons. As the nation with the most sophisticated nuclear arsenal in the world and with the most sophisticated nuclear arsenal in the world and nuclear weapons. As the nation to conduct nuclear explosive tests, a countryto conduct nuclear explosive tests, cannot confidently develop more advanced following the end of the Cold War, when the Soviet following the end of the Cold War, tests Union announced a moratorium on nuclear Bush initiated a in 1991. President George H. W. 1992, at moratorium on U.S. nuclear testing in the direction of Congress.

extended the moratorium in 1993, 1994, and 1995 extended the moratorium in 1993, 1994, the nations to negotiate to help galvanize the world’s CTBT. which “prohibits any first nation to sign the CTBT, other nuclear nuclear weapon test explosion or any explosion” and establishes a global monitoring network and the option of short-notice, on-site inspections to detect and deter cheating. President Clinton submitted the CTBT to the Senate in September 1997. Relations Committee Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) declined to consider the treaty until the fall of 1999. On September Senate Majority Leader 30 of that year, Lott (R-Miss.) offered a quick debate and vote Trent and the Democratic leadership agreed. on the treaty, The Senate Armed Services Committee held hearings October 5–7, and the Foreign Relations Committee held one hearing October 7. As it became clear that the process was moving too quickly and leading to The failure, senators from both sides sought delay. day before the vote, 62 senators sent a bipartisan letter to their leaders stating, “[W]e all agree on Introduction Introduction France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, and ratified by 151, including Japan, Russia, South Korea, and all U.S. allies in NATO. The CTBT’s entry into force awaits ratification by just nine key countries, including the United States, China, India, and Indonesia. The Obama administration has now renewed hopes for the test ban. On April 5, 2009, in Prague, the president said, “To achieve a global ban on nuclear testing, my administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. After more than five decades of talks, it is time for the testing of nuclear weapons to finally be banned.”4 Today, the CTBT is more important than ever. U.S. approval of the treaty and its entry into force would substantially constrain the ability of other nuclear-armed states to develop new and more deadly nuclear bombs, and perhaps most importantly, it would re-establish U.S. leadership to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to additional nations and to terrorist groups. The treaty would strengthen U.S. security for years to come. Although the 1999 treaty debate was brief and

inadequate, it did shed light on senators’ views on Images Getty the CTBT. Some senators who voted “no” in 1999 President Barack Obama speaks in Prague April 5, 2009, expressed legitimate concerns about the ability of the where he pledged to “immediately and aggressively” United States to maintain its arsenal in the absence pursue U.S. ratification of the CTBT. of testing and to verify compliance with the treaty. Now, ten years later, there is much new information to bring to bear. As former Secretary of State George Shultz said in 2009, “[Republican senators] might have been right voting against [the CTBT] some years ago, but they would be right voting for it now, based on these new facts …[There are] new pieces of information that are very important and that should be made available to the Senate.”5 The goal of this briefing book is to bring new information about the CTBT to the Senate, to lay out the national security case for the treaty, and to show how the United States’ ability both to maintain its arsenal and verify compliance has dramatically improved over the last decade. With the support of MARIO TAMA/AFP/Getty Images TAMA/AFP/Getty MARIO President Obama and bipartisan opinion leaders, Former U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz said in 2009 and armed with the new facts presented here, the that “[Republican senators] might have been right voting prospects and arguments for ratification of the CTBT against [the CTBT] some years ago, but they would be right are stronger than ever before. voting for it now . . . .” Arms Control Association

2 Now More Than Ever 3

ctober 2009 O According to the 6 ,” April 2009, boratory, boratory, a L olicy P ational N eapons eapons 7 uclear W N os Alamos The CTBT would complicate any efforts by Iran Treaty signature by India and Pakistan would help Treaty . L oft, Chairs S . to build nuclear weapons. If Iran decides to build nuclear weapons, it may want to test them to gain in an untested thermonuclear weapon, especially a sophisticated one that could be placed on a long- range ballistic missile. prevent their development of more-sophisticated weapons and help reverse a destabilizing nuclear arms race in South Asia. For example, influential voices in India claim that its May 1998 test of a thermonuclear design was a “fizzle,” i.e., it failed to produce as large an explosion as scientists expected, and thus New Delhi should conduct more tests. U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, India and Pakistan “would likely welcome the opportunity to renew testing if the de facto moratorium were lifted and the international norm against testing weakened or collapsed.” U cowcr S tions, “ , former director, , former director, ker oreign Rela oreign erry and Brent F P iegfried Hec William J. William J. S Council on

— — The Comprehensive Comprehensive The Strengthens Treaty Ban Test Security U.S. National

atifying the CTBT is central to getting U.S. nuclear policy priorities right. It will send getting U.S. nuclear policy atifying the CTBT is central to of nuclear weapons is de-emphasizing the role a clear signal that the United States the need to work cooperatively with in U.S. security policy and emphasizing

The single most important reason to ratify the CTBT is to stop other countries from improving their arsenals – China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran up testing. limiting other countries than we lose by giving from substantially more if it ever progresses that far… We gain

While a state could develop a first-generation Hiroshima-type nuclear bomb without nuclear testing, the CTBT would prevent a testing state that from advanced nuclear gaining weapons guaranteed would work technical reliably. The that assurance it has been political strongly linked to through the benefitvitality of the ofnonproliferation regime. nuclear The Force Task believes the CTBT is and that the CTBT is in U.S. national security interests. that the benefits outweigh the costs

SE 1 ON CTI A global ban on nuclear explosions would The test ban constrains nuclear weapons

constrain the ability of all parties to develop more- a state advanced nuclear weapons. Technically, might have some degree of confidence that a simple, relatively cumbersome fission device would work without testing, as the United States did with the Hiroshima bomb in 1945. An emerging nuclear state might attain a primitive, ambiguous nuclear capability without testing, but under the test ban, it could not use a nuclear test to demonstrate or as did India and Pakistan advance its capability, (1998) and North Korea (2006, 2009), with a resulting rise in regional and global tensions. development by blocking the progression from simple fission designs to boosted fission designs and two-stage thermonuclear designs with better yield-to-weight ratios. The treaty essentially rules out the possibility of a nation gaining confidence R strengthen global nonproliferation efforts, and maintain its deterrent all at the same time. strengthen global nonproliferation other nations to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. The United States can ratify the CTBT, of nuclear weapons. The United States can ratify the CTBT, other nations to stop the spread confidence that they would work or to gain prestige, “The cost is intolerable if India tests.... We will suffer as North Korea did. Yet, to conduct a nuclear test international isolation. It will be a huge setback to our in violation of a globally supported CTBT would bid for permanent membership of the United Nations risk further isolation and sanctions for Tehran. The Security Council.”9 United States would be in a better position to lead “The single most important reason to ratify the a successful international campaign against Iranian CTBT is to stop other countries from improving nuclear testing if the United States had itself ratified their arsenals—China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, the treaty. and Iran if it ever progresses that far…We gain In China’s case, a new round of nuclear testing substantially more from limiting other countries could advance the miniaturization of warhead designs than we lose by giving up testing,” said Dr. Siegfried and help it to put multiple warheads on its relatively Hecker, former director of Los Alamos National small arsenal of strategic ballistic missiles, an increase Laboratory.10 to its nuclear strike capability that is clearly not in the U.S. interest. CTBT and Nonproliferation The CTBT would deter a state from conducting nuclear tests for political purposes. For example, The CTBT is critical to sustained political support India’s tests in 1998 were seen to have been used to for the NPT and related U.S. and global efforts to build support for the nationalist Bharatiya Janata stop the spread of nuclear weapons. According to Party, which had risen to power in part on its promise former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General to conduct nuclear tests.8 India’s actions were then John Shalikashvili, “Proliferation is held in check used as a political excuse by Pakistan to conduct its by an intricate web of bilateral, regional, and global own tests soon after. arrangements. Weakening or removing one element The CTBT is essential to strengthening a global can damage other components and erode the overall consensus that nuclear testing is no longer an system of constraints.… Our closest allies see the Test internationally accepted activity. The treaty embodies Ban Treaty as something that they have fought for the view that nations that test are outside the bounds alongside the United States since the days of President of the international mainstream and will bear the Eisenhower. All other NATO members, Japan, South consequences of global isolation. For example, former Korea, and most of our other security partners have Indian Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal recently said, ratified it.”11

Figure 1. Global Nuclear Test Explosions by Year

180 178

160

140

120 116

100

79 80 76 71 67 66 64 64 60 60 58 57 58 57 55 53 55 54 54 55 50 51 50 48 49 47 44 40 40 36 33 28 24 23 18 18 18 20 16 14 11 8 7 3 4 1 2 3 1 3 1 2 1 1 0 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Arms Control Association Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Arms Control Association

4 Now More Than Ever 5

2 North Korea North 15 2

xplosions xplosions Pakistan E

3 India

45 China

United Kingdom United

210 France uclear Test Test uclear

N 715 USSR/Russia

1030 14 0 States United 800 600 400 200 1200 1000 igure 2. igure F Country by Once the United States ratifies the test ban, General John Shalikashvili, former chairman of Protocol, were finally adopted by the IAEA in 1997, Protocol, were finally adopted by the accept them. but each nation must still individually to accept more Many nations have been less willing intrusive inspections on their territory in the face According to then- of U.S. opposition to the CTBT. IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei, “The Senate vote against the ban on nuclear tests was a devastating blow to our efforts to gain acceptance of more intrusive inspections of nuclear facilities around the world.” Washington will be in a much better position to enlist will be in a much better Washington cooperation on export controls, economic sanctions, and other coordinated responses to specific problems. undersecretary of In the words of Ellen Tauscher, state for arms control and international security, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, examined the net benefit of the CTBT and concluded that “it is very much in our national interest to secure these benefits If Ban Treaty. of the Test through entry into force this opportunity is lost, the United States’ ability to lead an effective global campaign against nuclear proliferation will be severely damaged.” Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Arms Control Association Arms Control of Energy, Department U.S. Source:

13 12 As could be expected, CTBT setbacks have had Lack of progress on arms control has also In the 1995 Statement of Principles and Objectives In the 1995 Statement of Principles and The international community views the test ban the test views community The international letter from France, Russia, the In an April 19, 1995, negative NPT consequences. For example, U.S. failure to ratify the CTBT was a contributing factor to the collapse of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, and undermined U.S. leverage to focus states’ attention on challenges to the nonproliferation regime posed by countries such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. complicated U.S. efforts to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the inspection system. After the Persian Gulf War, United States helped lead an effort at the IAEA to strengthen the safeguards that states agree to have on More their civilian nuclear programs under the NPT. intrusive inspections, known as the Model Additional on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament the NPT that accompanied the resolution to extend to conclude a all NPT parties agreed indefinitely, review conference The 1995 NPT CTBT in one year. completion agreed on the following objective: “The the by the Conference on Disarmament of and negotiations on a universal and internationally Ban effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test no later than 1996. Pending the entry into Treaty nuclear- the Treaty, Ban Test Comprehensive a of force utmost restraint.” weapon States should exercise as a vital component of global nonproliferation nonproliferation component of global as a vital NPT the preamble to the is no accident that efforts. It 6 ban and that Article mentions the test specifically and states calls on the nuclear-weapon of the NPT The disarmament. to pursue nuclear all other parties Extension Conference agreed 1995 NPT Review and at a time when hopes for to an indefinite extension Indeed, commitments by the the CTBT were high. to complete CTBT negotiations nuclear-weapon states were essential to this vital by the end of 1996 It is difficult to imagine nonproliferation success. states mounting a successful the nuclear-weapon extension of the NPT campaign to win indefinite arms control achievements today based on their since 1995. (China agreed United Kingdom, and the United States the nuclear- later) to the 1995 NPT review conference, to complete weapon states coupled a determination states to the CTBT with a request to the nonweapon pro quo: “We make the NPT permanent, i.e., a quid to negotiate reaffirm our determination to continue a universal and as a high priority, intensively, comprehensive verifiable effectively and multilaterally our support for and we pledge nuclear test-ban treaty, call upon all States We its conclusion without delay. provisions parties to the [NPT] to make the treaty full realization permanent. This will be crucial for the of the goals set out in article VI.” “We are not so naïve as to believe that problem The United States has not tested nuclear weapons states will end their proliferation programs if the for almost two decades. There is neither the technical United States and Russia reduce our nuclear arsenals. need nor the political support in Congress for But we are confident that progress in this area will renewed U.S. nuclear weapons testing. Yet until the reinforce the central role of the NPT and help us build Senate consents to ratification, the treaty cannot enter support to sanction or engage states on favorable into force. In the current state of limbo, the United terms to us. Our collective ability to bring the States is denying itself the national security and weight of international pressure against proliferators political benefits of the treaty, which are to compel would be undermined by a lack of effort towards other nations to stop testing and to fully implement disarmament.”16 the treaty’s verification system to detect and deter

Table 1. Purposes and Plausible Achievements for Testing at Various Yields

In its 2002 report, Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the National Academy of Sciences summarized the utility of nuclear tests at various yields. The NAS concluded that:

Those countries that are best able to successfully conduct … clandestine testing already possess advanced nuclear weapons of a number of types and could add little, with additional testing, to the threats they already pose or can pose to the United States. Countries of lesser nuclear test experience and design sophistication would be unable to conceal tests in the numbers and yields required to master nuclear weapons more advanced than the ones they could develop and deploy without any testing at all.

Countries of lesser prior nuclear test Counties of greater prior nuclear test Yield* experience and/or design sophistication† experience and/or design sophistication

Subcritical testing only •• Equation-of-state studies same as column to left, plus (permissible under a CTBT) •• High-explosive lens tests for implosion • limited insights relevant to designs for weapons boosted fission weapons •• Development & certification of simple, bulky, relatively inefficient unboosted fission weapons

Hydronuclear testing •• one-point safety tests (with difficulty) • one-point safety tests (yield < 0.1 t TNT, likely to • validation of design for unboosted fission remain undetected under a weapon with yield in 10-ton range CTBT)

Extremely-low-yield testing •• one-point safety tests • validation of design for unboosted fission (0.1 t < yield < 10 t, likely to weapon with yield in 100-ton range remain undetected under a • possible overrun range for one-point CTBT) safety tests.

Very-low-yield testing •• limited improvement of efficiency & • proof tests of compact weapons with (10 t < yield < 1–2 kt, weight of unboosted fission weapons yield up to 1-2 kt concealable in some compared to 1st-generation weapons not • partial development of primaries for circumstances under a CTBT) needing testing thermonuclear weapons •• proof tests of compact weapons with yield up to1-2 kt (with difficulty)

Low-yield testing •• development of low-yield boosted fission • development of low-yield boosted fission (1–2 kt < yield < 20 kt, weapons weapons unlikely to be concealable •• eventual development & full testing • development & full testing of some under a CTBT) of some primaries & low-yield primaries & low-yield thermonuclear thermonuclear weapons weapons •• proof tests of fission weapons with yield • proof tests of fission weapons with yield up to 20 kt up to 20 kt

High-yield testing •• eventual development & full testing • development & full testing of new (yield >20 kt, not concealable of boosted fission weapons & configurations of boosted fission under a CTBT) thermonuclear weapons weapons & thermonuclear weapons

* t = tons, kt = kilotons TNT equivalent

† That is, lacking an adequate combination of nuclear-test data, advanced instrumentation, and sophisticated analytical techniques, and without having received assistance in the form of transfer of the relevant insights. Arms Control Association

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o mobilize domestic and international domestic and international o mobilize elopment of nuclear weapons based on new weapons elopment of nuclear lobal leadership and strengthen international According to former Defense Secretary William Secretary to former Defense According William est for almost 20 years, and the need for future future and the need for almost 20 years, est for Entry into force of the test ban treaty would make make would ban treaty of the test force Entry into it easier t nuclear tests dealing with suspected for support nation if any vigorously responding and for conducts a nuclear test. a nuclear has not conducted States The United t interest It is in the U.S. is highly unlikely. testing not conducting that other nations are ensure to put the would testing Widespread nuclear tests. at risk. NPT system The treaty will help prevent Russian and Chinese Russian and Chinese will help prevent The treaty dev developing from Beijing designs and will prevent its ballistic for nuclear warheads miniaturized the to a new threat avoiding thereby missiles, States. United U.S. ratificationU.S. of the CTBT will help restoreU.S. g Insupport 1995 thefor the United NPT. States and the other nuclear powers promised to achieve the CTBT in exchange for the indefinite extension a good dealof the that NPT, must be Visible progressratification U.S. honored.toward of the CTBT before NPTthe ReviewMay 2010 Conference will be important to achieving agreement on new measures to strengthen global nonproliferation rules.

and qualitative advantage, it is in U.S. national security security national U.S. in is it advantage, qualitative and testing. from nations other prevent to interests has to the United States “the capability Perry, weapons without confidence in nuclear maintain of all other nation…we exceeds that of any testing far ones that are going to be needing nations are the least our confidence, and therefore are testing to maintain be arguing that we would the last ones that should to maintain our deterrence.” need to test in order     The The ed a 17 y France, Russia, Russia, y France, ent aspiring nuclear states, nuclear states, ent aspiring orts to stop the spread of nuclear the spread stop to orts ince 1999 S The CTBT will prev The CTBT has been ratified b The CTBT has been ratified U.S. Kingdom—151 nations in all. and the United as recognized of the CTBT is widely ratification and rebuilding the NPT to an essential first step The efforts. global nonproliferation advancing aimed at agreement international NPT is the key other to of nuclear weapons the spread stopping groups. terrorist nations and to confidently from and Iran, Korea as North such types of nuclear weapons advanced developing the United to threat pose a greater that would States. Global eff The nuclear in jeopardy. are weapons weaker has grown (NPT) Treaty Nonproliferation the nuclear-weapon by of neglect years after Korea as North nations such Unpredictable states. their nuclear programs. advancing are and Iran seeking nuclear weapons. are groups Terrorist The UN Security Council unanimously adopt The UN Security on all calling 2009, 24, on September resolution refrain the CTBT and to and ratify sign to states into enters until the treaty conducting tests from force. ew ew

The United States has more to gain from the CTBT CTBT the from gain to more has States United The  Key Points Key   N  violations. The United States has already assumed already assumed has United States The violations. cannot reap but it responsibilities, most CTBT-related Senate benefits until the and political the full security the treaty. approves reliable, most safest, the has It nation. other any than world. the in arsenal nuclear capable most and United States has conducted 1,030 nuclear tests, more more tests, nuclear 1,030 conducted has States United including (1,022), combined nations other all than quantitative this Given (45). China and (715) Russia The United States Does on 2 Not Need Nuclear Tests to cti e

S Maintain Its Arsenal

The U.S. nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure and reliable; no one should doubt our capabilities or our resolve to defend U.S. and allies’ interests by deterring aggression.

— Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, January 2009

Lifetimes of today’s nuclear warheads could be extended for decades, with no anticipated loss in confidence. — JASON Report on “Lifetime Extension Program,” September 2009

uring the Cold War, the United States conducted more than 1,000 nuclear tests, primarily to develop new types of nuclear warheads of ever-increasing Dsophistication. Once new nuclear warheads were certified and introduced into the stockpile, they were rarely if ever tested again.

In 1992, President Bush halted nuclear testing Maintaining the existing nuclear arsenal without for the purpose of developing new weapons. Almost nuclear testing is not new—it is the way it has always 20 years later, the United States has not conducted been. What is new is that warheads are no longer a nuclear test, even though Congress specifically being replaced at regular intervals and are staying in authorized 15 additional tests in 1992. The United the arsenal longer than originally planned. This is a States did not sign the CTBT until 1996, the manageable challenge. Senate rejected it in 1999, and the George W. Bush administration actively opposed the treaty. Nuclear Stockpile Stewardship testing has not been resumed because once the development of new types of weapons ended, there The Department of Energy’s Stockpile Stewardship was no need to test and compelling national security Program (SSP) started in earnest soon after the United reasons not to test. States halted nuclear testing in 1992. The program Test ban critics claim that nuclear tests are needed has resulted in annual certifications of U.S. warheads throughout the stockpile life of a warhead and that if as safe and reliable and has been so effective that the United States cannot test, it cannot maintain its the Energy Department’s National Nuclear Security arsenal. In fact, nuclear tests have never been used for Administration (NNSA), which oversees the SSP and maintaining the arsenal or “spot-checking” warheads. the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, noted in 2008 So-called stockpile confidence tests involved new that “[t]he scientific and analytical tools of stockpile warheads, not old ones, and are better described as stewardship (which were not available to [the] “production verification tests.”19 According to a 2002 previous generation of designers) have led to a much National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study, whose better understanding of the intricacies of nuclear participants included former directors of Los Alamos weapons operation. We know more about the complex and Sandia National Laboratories, “Even in the issues of nuclear weapons performance today than we absence of constraints on nuclear testing, no need was ever did during the period of nuclear testing.”21 ever identified for a program that would periodically The primary job of maintaining the existing subject weapons to nuclear tests.”20 arsenal is surveillance: observing warhead parts Arms Control Association

8 Now More Than Ever 9 So far, So far, 24 LEP refurbishment involves 23 (fusion fuel) The NNSA has shown can that it deal with lithium deuteride and the B61-7/11 strategic bomb; is in the process of and the B61-7/11 strategic bomb; is in D5 missile warheads; refurbishing 2,000 W76 Trident missile is planning to refurbish the W80-1 cruise the B61 tactical warhead, the B83 strategic bomb, and to life bomb; and is evaluating a common approach W88 Trident extension for the W78 Minutemen and D5 missile warheads. swapping older warhead parts with new ones of nearly identical design or that meet the same “form, fit, and function,” according to the NNSA. LEPs generally involve the non-nuclear parts of warheads and the lithium-deuteride secondary components, also known as “canned subassemblies”. LEPs have not refurbished nuclear primaries, which contain plutonium cores, or “pits.” The NNSA has concluded that pits can last 85 to 100 years or more (see below). unexpected hiccups in the LEP process. For example, the when NNSA refurbish to set out the realized warhead, it W76 immediately could not it classifiedproduce a key material,whichto the NNSA refers only as “Fogbank.” The NNSA firstto sought re-create Fogbank ran but difficulties. into It then produce an to sought alternative material. In the succeededend, it in doing both. According the to uranium inner layer uranium uranium outer layer outer uranium Fusion “Secondary” “boost” gas deuterium/tritium neutron generator neutron Fission “Primary” Fission plutonium pit 22 chemical explosive xtension Program E igure 3. Interior View of a Thermonuclear Weapon Thermonuclear of a View 3. Interior igure A typical U.S. nuclear warhead has approximately F ifetime ifetime 6,000 individual parts. Of these, only those parts in primary and secondary—the nuclear the weapon’s components—would be subject to testing limitations the The non-nuclear parts of under the CTBT. warhead and its delivery system can be fully tested under the test ban. The Lifetime Extension Program refurbishes warheads and recertifies them to extend their service life the beyond original expectations. Through the LEP, NNSA has refurbished the W87 Minutemen warhead L closely for signs of degradation that might justify closely for signs of degradation that might refurbishment. The SSP includes a surveillance from the program that removes actual warheads parts, stockpile, takes them apart, inspects individual Some and if all is well, puts them back together. and have to warhead parts are destructively examined importance be replaced. This process takes on greater as the arsenal ages and more age-related defects can be expected to be found. According to the NAS report, “[N]uclear testing is not needed to discover however, these problems and is not likely to be needed to address them.” Source: Amanda Wait/Union of Concerned Scientists Wait/Union Amanda Source: NNSA, “The newly produced Fogbank has been key factor that determines the overall performance demonstrated to achieve its design requirements. The of the warhead, so concerns about warhead aging Fogbank being produced today is as good as, if not typically focus on the primary’s plutonium better, than the original product.”25 pit. Fortunately, pits can last much longer than previously thought. How Long Do Warheads Last? When the CTBT was considered by the Senate in 1999, the Energy Department estimated that The fact that warheads are no longer replaced plutonium pits would last roughly 45 to 60 years. by new designs means that the average age of Given that the average stockpile age at that time was existing plutonium pits (but not necessarily the approximately 15 years, one might have expected to non-nuclear parts, or secondaries, which are see aging effects in 30 years or so, or by 2030. being refurbished) will increase beyond previous In late 2006, however, using tools in the SSP, experience. The performance of the primary is the the Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National

Table 2. U.S. Nuclear Stockpile, 2010

Lifetime Estimated Extension Modern Year Number Program (LEP) Safety Weapon System/Warhead Deployed a Deployed b Status c Features d Notes

ICBMs: Minuteman III, Air Force

W78 1979 350 Begin 2011 EEI Being partially replaced by W87

W87 1986 200 Completed 2004 EEI, IHE, FRP Lifetime extended 20–30 years

SLBMs: Trident II D5, Navy

W76 1978 768 2006 though 2021 EEI Lifetime extended 30 years

W88 1989 384 Begin 2020 EEI Production resumed 2007

Strategic Bombers: B-52H and B-2, Air Force

B61-7/11 Bomb 1985 85 Completed 2009 EEI, IHE Lifetime extended 20 years

B83 Bomb 1983 65 Begin 2010 EEI, IHE, FRP In storage

W80-1 Cruise Missile 1982 350 Begin 2013 EEI, IHE In storage

Tactical Forces: Tactical Aircraft, Attack Submarines

B61-3/4/10 Bomb, AF, NATO 1979 400 Begin 2011 EEI, IHE In storage

W80-0 Cruise Missile, Navy 1984 100 No plans EEI, IHE In storage

Total Stockpile ~2,700

a. National Nuclear Security Administration, Maintaining the US Nuclear Arsenal Through Forefront Science, Technology and Engineering, viewgraphs by Dr. Allan A. Hauer and Dr. Robert Hanrahan, August 12, 2009.

b. “US Nuclear Forces, 2009,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2009. In addition to the 2,700 deployed warheads, there are approx. 2,500 warheads in reserve and approx. 4,200 retired warheads awaiting dismantlement.

c. National Nuclear Security Administration, FY08 Refurbishment Planning Schedule, as of Jan. 25, 2008 and Department of Energy, FY2011 Congressional Budget Request, Vol. 1, Feb. 2010.

d. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Report to Congress: Assessment of the Safety of U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Related Nuclear Test Requirements, R.E. Kidder, July 26, 1991. EEI=Enhanced Electrical Isolation, IHE=Insensitive High Explosive, FRP=Fire-Resistant Pit. Arms Control Association

10 Now More Than Ever 11 31 30 However, the 2009 JASON report did not endorse However, Reuse options exist for improving the surety of “The JASON study offers yet more evidence that more evidence that study offers yet “The JASON concerns put should report JASON the Although the need for surety improvements but instead found and engineering that “[f]urther scientific research development is required.” The panel noted that implementation of “intrinsic” surety features, i.e., those inside the nuclear explosive package, would require “reuse or replacement” options. Such changes could not be made through typical “refurbishment” of existing designs. Instead NNSA would have to “reuse” surplus nuclear parts with modern safety features or develop new “replacement” designs. nuclear weapons carried by strategic bombers, the panel found. This is likely a reference to a safety feature known as a fire-resistant pit, which is intended to prevent the dispersal of plutonium during an fire. This feature is used in the most recently aircraft the United States can maintain a safe, secure, and the United States can without resorting to nuclear effective nuclear arsenal official said in a tests,” an Obama administration interviewNovember 20, 2009, with the authors. is now on CTBT skeptics to “The burden of proof States must continue to lay out why the United when we have not tested for plan for future testing and our weapons experts enjoy almost two decades of how our nuclear weapons a greater understanding time, thanks to the work than at any previous of our Stockpile Stewardship demonstrable successes Program,” the official said. that out points it rest, to reliability warhead about “surety” latest the have not do warheads current and security, safety, encompasses that term a systems, when 1992, to back goes discussion This control. use mandated congressionally a approved Bush President time, same the at and, tests nuclear on moratorium security and safety for tests additional authorized because conducted never were tests Those purposes. the that determined Navy the and Force Air the budgetary the worth not were improvements marginal later, decades Two systems. new the deploying of cost The changing. be may analyses cost-benefit those 30, August the and attacks terrorist 11 September six of track lost Force Air the which in incident 2007, the on attention focused have missiles cruise nuclear theft. to weapons nuclear of vulnerability potential make to willing more be now may military U.S. The acquisition terrorist prevent to changes operational Strategic U.S. the to According use. possible and to designed not is stockpile “current the Command, terrorism.” nuclear for potential [the] address aging and LEPs have increased risk to certification certification to risk increased have LEPs and aging that and warheads” nuclear deployed today’s of no with decades, “for last could warheads U.S. current approaches using by confidence, in loss anticipated date.” to LEPs in employed those to similar Based on the new 26 29 28 NNSA resumed production W88 pit at 27 It would still be prudent to increase the It would still be prudent to increase the Yet, the 2009 JASON study on the LEP found no no found LEP the on study JASON 2009 the Yet, Plutonium pits may eventually may pits Plutonium need be to ew Warhead Designs? Warhead ew Los Alamos in 2007. performance margins of existing warheads in ways performance margins of existing warheads most likely that do not require nuclear tests. The an age-related problem that could affect of source warhead performance is a primary yield that falls the secondarybelow the minimum needed to “drive” to full yield. Primary can be increased yield margins used to boost by measures relating to tritium, a gas example, because tritium For the yield of the primary. the frequency increasing per year, decays 5.5 percent of tritium replacements can increase the performance margins of the primary. Laboratories concluded that the plutonium pits in plutonium that the concluded Laboratories to a shelf-life of 85 weapons have current nuclear by was endorsed or more. This conclusion 100 years that studies show by the NNSA. “These JASON and in our nuclear weapons of plutonium the degradation said for decades,” warhead reliability will not affect Linton Brooks. “It is now then-NNSA Administrator plutonium aging contributes, clear that although the overall life expectancy other factors control systems.” of nuclear weapons Some have argued that making small changes to warheads to address aging issues may over time overall lead to the inability to certify the warhead’s performance. For example, Defense Secretary Robert Association in September Gates told the Air Force 2009 that, “in one or two cases,” the United States would “probably” need “new [warhead] designs that will be safer and more reliable.” to efforts and aging warhead that concern for basis had which panel, The reliability. reduce it address “no found data, weapons nuclear classified to access from incurred changes of accumulation that evidence N estimates, plutonium parts in the 2010 stockpile will estimates, plutonium aging issues for roughly 50 not be facing significant years or more. refurbished, and a limited production process has already been established. When the Rocky Flats the inPlant main Colorado, production U.S. pit safety down for was in shut 1989 site, reasons, it production completed yet plutonium of had not the W88 for pits warhead. The EnergyDepartment decided re-establish to production Los pit at Alamos’ usingTA55 a different casting process (mold at Los Alamos, wrought production Rocky at Flats), and, after significant effort, succeeded.According theto NNSA, “[T]he recent success pit the of TA55 production capability demonstrated that the process qualifyingof the manufacture a known of design pit is possible.” U.S. Department of Energy Department U.S.

A typical U.S. nuclear warhead has approximately 6,000 parts, of which only the nuclear components would be subject to testing limitations under the CTBT. A B61 gravity bomb is pictured.

developed weapons, including the W87 warhead and plutonium pits at Los Alamos is only 10 to 20 per the B83 strategic bomb. The tested primaries of these year.32 As a result, in the next decade, at most 200 weapons or others in reserve could be “reused” in warheads could be upgraded with intrinsic surety, and combination with other warhead parts. the entire project would likely take 20 to 30 years to Unlike intrinsic safety, intrinsic security and use complete, depending on the scale of the effort. control options do not generally exist in the current There are other, much faster approaches to arsenal and would require new designs. According to surety than rebuilding the nuclear stockpile, such Stratcom, a “small percent of [the] stockpile has as increasing physical security around nuclear internal disablement features to prevent unauthorized weapons, centralizing their storage, and removing use.” Concepts under consideration are highly them from forward deployment. In 1991, President classified, but Stratcom refers to “Active Protection Bush did this with nonstrategic nuclear weapons Systems” that presumably involve ways to prevent a when he announced that the United States would stolen nuclear warhead from being detonated, such as remove almost all tactical nuclear forces from by deforming the pit so it is no longer spherical and deployment so that Russia could undertake similar thus unable to implode correctly. This approach may actions, reducing the risk of nuclear theft. President still leave enough plutonium available for reforming Bush also took strategic bombers off alert and into a sphere, so another approach could be to transferred their nuclear weapons into storage. These disperse the plutonium fully with explosives, but steps were taken in a matter of weeks or months, not without nuclear detonation, in such a way that the years or decades. material could not be recovered. Even if the United States were to begin a decades- Because these approaches would require new long effort to produce new warheads with intrinsic warhead designs, JASON noted that upgrading surety, which were theoretically perfect against misuse, intrinsic surety features would “require more than terrorists in the meantime could target the large supply a decade to complete,” as almost the entire arsenal of older weapons; the surety of the entire system would would need to be replaced. At the NNSA’s planned not increase much until all warheads were replaced. surge production rate of 125 warheads a year, it “Of course, a U.S. [surety optimized warhead] does would take 20 years to replace 2,500 warheads. nothing to increase the surety of Russian or Pakistani This production rate for pits is not likely to be weapons,” noted JASON member Dick Garwin. achieved until roughly 2020, however, when the new “Encouraging other nations to develop [new weapons Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement designs] or their equivalent is not something that is planned for operation at Los Alamos National should be advocated, although they should take steps 33 Arms Control Association Laboratory. The current production rate for to increase the surety of existing weapons.”

12 Now More Than Ever 13 oven oven 03 Defense 03 Defense ent that the United States States ent that the United elies on well-established methods. methods. elies on well-established 34 ough non-nuclear tests and evaluations, and evaluations, ough non-nuclear tests arhead designs that have been refurbished than been refurbished designs that have arhead .S. nuclear arsenal has been determined to be to nuclear arsenal has been determined .S. Concerns along these lines were recently raised In the highly unlikely ev In the highly unlikely needed for was concluded that a nuclear test its right it can exercise reasons, national security national interest” “supreme under the CTBT’s testing. clause and resume withdrawal Maintaining the existing nuclear arsenal without Maintaining the existing nuclear arsenal r nuclear testing with replaced being no longer are That warheads staying and are intervals new designs at regular planned is a than originally longer in the stockpile challenge. manageable can be maintained nuclear stockpile The U.S. thr nuclear of key combined with the refurbishment design specifications. components to tested in previously confidence is greater There w Building tested. not been in new designs that have under as envisioned such warheads, new-design program, (RRW) Warhead Replacement Reliable the about concerns Moreover, sense. does not make can be addressed of nuclear weapons “surety” the without nuclear tests. year 20 Section 3143 of the fiscal Every year since 1994, each warhead type in the warhead each since 1994, year Every U certification a rigorous through and reliable safe nuclear U.S. of end the following instituted process testing. reliability of pr Maintaining confidence in the designs does not depend nuclear warhead U.S. In fact, explosions. of nuclear test on a program a statistical provided has never nuclear testing confidence in the nuclear stockpile. basis for this has served surveillance stockpile Historically, do so. to and will continue propose weapon” “new nuclear defines a Act Authorization “that contains a pit or canned as a nuclear weapon or in production not in the stockpile subassembly” as of 2002.

by the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, which stated in its December 2009 report that “[e]ven if the CTBT were not directly breached, it would raise questions about its value—and certainly undermine the presentational impact worldwide of U.S. ratification ofit—if new weapon designs could be developed, especially ones with a new military role.”      Key Points Key   oposed a .S. warheads has warheads .S. Administration Administration 09 report, JASON, a panel of JASON, 09 report, ince 1999 S ector Siegfried Hecker testified before the before testified Hecker Siegfried ector ewardship Program (SSP) has demonstrated that demonstrated has (SSP) Program ewardship oduce new plutonium parts and began new and began parts oduce new plutonium Confidence in the reliability of U Confidence in the systems, boost gas improving by been increased nuclear testing. does not require which has pr The Obama administration In 2003, the NNSA demonstrated the ability to the ability to the NNSA demonstrated In 2003, pr in 2007. production Senate, “I definitely come out in favor that it’s in that it’s favor come out in “I definitely Senate, actually to interest and the world’s our nation’s the [CTBT].” ratify The National Nuclear Security in parts (NNSA) concluded in 2006 that plutonium years, 100 can last at least 85 to nuclear warheads With a assumed. than previously decades longer existing of 25 years, age stockpile average current for not need refurbishment may parts plutonium refurbish time to is ample There or more. 50 years as needed. these parts Nuclear Security National for increase percent 10 year fiscal for programs stockpile Administration complex the nuclear weapons ensure to 2011 and highly-trained facilities, “state-of-the-art has maintain our us to people that allow motivated arsenal without testing.” In May 2008, former Los Alamos National Lab Alamos Los former 2008, In May dir In a September 20 In a September of “[l]ifetimes that found scientists, senior defense for could be extended warheads nuclear today’s loss in confidence,” with no anticipated decades, LEP the current similar to using approaches also found JASON and without nuclear testing. “no evidence that accumulation of changes increased have aging and LEPs from incurred nuclear deployed today’s of certification to risk warheads.” Over the past decade, the success of the Stockpile Stockpile the success of the the past decade, Over St maintained be effectively the nuclear arsenal can Programs Extension Successful Life under a CTBT. can be that weapons shown (LEPs) have testing. without nuclear and recertified refurbished ew ew

      N  At a minimum, the United States should not should not States the United At a minimum, pursue surety improvements in ways that increase the in ways that increase improvements pursue surety in or reduce confidence proliferation risks of nuclear After all, the greatest of the stockpile. the reliability to U.S. nuclear weapons relate not security concerns If and other nations. in Pakistan, Russia, but to those to rebuild its arsenal in ways the United States were of U.S. nonproliferation the credibility that undercut lead to greater proliferation commitments, it could in global nuclear security. risks and a net loss The Comprehensive on 3 Test Ban Treaty Is cti e

S Effectively Verifiable

As of now, the [Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization] is capable of performing the monitoring mission given to it by the Treaty. And as of tomorrow, no State will be able to carry out a nuclear test without the knowledge of the international community.

—Bernard Kouchner, Foreign Minister of France, September 2009

he goal for any treaty monitoring regime is to provide effective verification. It is generally recognized that no verification system gives absolute assurances. Effective Tverification means that any attempts to cheat in ways that could threaten U.S. national security must be uncovered in a timely manner. Describing this concept in the context of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, Ambassador Paul Nitze said, “If the other side moves beyond the limits of the treaty in any militarily significant way, we would be able to detect such violation in time to respond effectively and thereby deny the other side the benefit of the violation.”35

If CTBT parties know the treaty is effectively information from the IMS and disseminates the raw verifiable, cheating would be deterred because the and processed data to member states for their own potential gains of a nuclear test that might escape evaluation. detection would be small (not militarily significant) The nuclear-weapon states are well monitored, and the potential costs would be high in terms of with 32 IMS sites in Russia, 12 in China and 39 in international reaction and the possibility of sanctions the United States. The South American cone has 23 and military measures in response. The goal of the sites in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. North Korea CTBT verification system is thus not only to detect is well covered with 23 sites in China, Japan, and significant cheating, but todeter violations in the first South Korea. The Middle East has 17 sites. India and place by convincing potential cheaters that the risks Pakistan are surrounded with more than 40 sites in and costs of cheating outweigh any plausible benefits. Australia, Bangladesh, China, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. To these assets must be added the IMS sites not listed here, hundreds of seismographs that are not part of Global Alarm System the IMS, and additional data from U.S. intelligence The CTBT established the International Monitoring services.36 System (IMS) to detect potential nuclear explosions Importantly, the CTBT recognizes the right of the using four primary technologies: seismic, United States and others to monitor compliance using hydroacoustic, radionuclide, and infrasound. Since their own highly sophisticated satellites and other 1999, 160 additional IMS stations have been built national technical means (NTM). In the United States, and, of the planned 337 IMS facilities, to date 276 the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) have been built and 28 are under construction. New operates a global network of nuclear event detection technologies such as InSAR (Interferometric Synthetic sensors called the U.S. Atomic Energy Detection Aperture Radar) can now pinpoint the location of System (USAEDS). This system can detect a suspicious an explosion within 100 meters. An International event underground, underwater, in the atmosphere

Arms Control Association Data Center based in Vienna collects and analyzes and in space. In addition to the CTBT, AFTAC

14 Now More Than Ever 15 38

39 kiloton) nuclear explosion at 22 seismic stations kiloton) nuclear explosion at 22 seismic

Tests even below these levels can be detected. levels can be detected. even below these Tests The second North Korean test on May 25, 2009, 2009, 25, May on test Korean North second The orth Korean Tests orth Korean ellowknife, Canada. globe from 500 tons to 1 kiloton, and underwater1 kiloton, tons to from 500 globe 1 ton or less. as small as ocean explosions Test preparations may be revealed by satellites or revealed by satellites preparations may be Test may “vent,” releasing Underground tests informants. be detected after materials that can radioactive seismic signal is registered. For the fact, even if no underground tests at of Soviet example, 90 percent of all Soviet as did 40 percent Novaya Zemlya vented, of underground States, 17 percent tests. In the United radioactive materials into the tests since 1970 released atmosphere. N two recent real-world tests North Korea provided system. In October 2006, of the CTBT verification relatively low-yield the IMS detected North Korea’s (0.6 within five and had a solid estimate of its location this test were hours of the event. Radionuclides from away in detected in South Korea and 4,600 miles Y by detected was kilotons, three to two of yield a with detected were radionuclides No stations. seismic 61 2006 the given outcome surprising a test, this from gases. radioactive vent tests many that and test perfect on count cannot violator potential a Although would alone evidence seismic the containment, 37 IMS Network 2006-2009 Network IMS IMS Network 2006 Network IMS Stations to be installed be to Stations gnificant progress has been made since 2006, as shown below. shown as 2006, since made been has progress gnificant In a suspected the of event nuclearexplosion entire According to the 2002 NAS report, the As of 2010, 90 percent of the planned 337 international monitoring stations (including seismic, hydroacoustic, hydroacoustic, seismic, (including stations monitoring international 337 planned the of percent 90 2010, of As 1999. in percent 25 only to compared construction, under or complete are infrasound) and radionuclide, Si The International Monitoring System International The 4. Figure that cannot be resolved sensing, by remote once the CTBT is call in may states force short- for inspections on-site notice, (OSIs) a suspected of location.test The Preparatory Commission for Ban Organization Treaty the Comprehensive Test (CTBTO) in Vienna has been conducting field exercises different test to inspection on-site methods. In September 2008, carried it a simulated on-site out inspection the former at Soviet at nuclear site test Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan, which demonstrated that the organization has the capacity conduct a real to OSI the once treaty is enacted. inspection On-site requests can be based IMS on a data on solely or national intelligencestate’s data. detect and international monitoring regime can probability) identify with high confidence (90 percent a yield of one underground nuclear explosions with regions, kiloton or more worldwide, and in specific Europe, North Across Asia, it can do much better. tests with a Africa, and North America, underground can be reliably yield as small as 0.1 kiloton (100 tons) nuclear former detected. At Novaya Zemlya, Russia’s (10 tons) test site, underground tests of 0.01 kiloton explosions can or less can be detected. Atmospheric on the be detected with high confidence anywhere monitors compliance with the 1963 Limited Test Ban Test Limited the 1963 with compliance monitors and the Ban Treaty, Threshold Test the 1974 Treaty, Treaty. Nuclear Explosions 1976 Peaceful Figure 5. Identifying Low Yield Explosions: The North Korean Example

Seismograms of the October 9, 2006 North Korean test show that nuclear explosions can be differentiated from earthquakes. The graphic below depicts seismograms recorded in northeast China from the North Korea nuclear test (top); from an earlier nearby earthquake (middle); and from a small chemical explosion (bottom). The nuclear test (magnitude 4, approximately 0.6 kilotons) can be distinguished from the earthquake (magnitude 4) by the fact that the nuclear test has stronger primary waves and weaker shear waves. The primary wave amplitude oscillates in the direction the wave travels, whereas the shear wave amplitude oscillates at right angles to the travel direction, such as a “wave” at a sporting event where people oscillate up and down but the wave travels

horizontally. The nuclear 30 60 90 120 150 180

test can be differentiated primary waves from a two-ton chemical

explosion (magnitude 1.9) Nuclear Test 373.1 km with a similar pattern of 9.7 µ/s az= 6 2006/10/09 baz=186 primary and shear waves M ~4.0 by the fact that the chemical explosion’s seismic primary waves shear waves signal at this station is of Earthquake 341.6 km lower quality and is about 11 μ/s az= 23 fifty times smaller than the 2004/12/16 baz=204 M 4.0 nuclear test. Combining

seismic data with other primary waves shear waves tests, such as air sampling

for radionuclides, indi- Explosion 289.1 km 0.19 μ/s az= 14 cates that nuclear explo- baz=194 1998/08/19 sions below 0.010 kiloton M 1.9, 2 ton yield (below 10 tons yield) could be detected in the 30 60 90 120 150 180 region. time (sec)

Source: Paul Richards and Won-Young Kim, “Seismic Signature,” Nature Physics (2007); “North Korean Nuclear Test: Seismic Discrimination at Low Yield,” EOS (2007).

have provided a firm basis for on-site inspections. 50-story building. No such cavity has ever been The treaty specifies an area of up to 1,000 square built, and it would be essentially impossible to do kilometers for an inspection, and the seismic data so without anyone noticing. In addition, the need located the test well within this limit. According to the to conduct multiple tests for weapons development CTBTO, “The data would have provided a clear lead to would increase the risk of detection even if a cavity the inspection team regarding where to look.”40 were used. The former chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission, P.K. Iyengar, said recently that “nobody makes a weapon out of a single test.”41 Cheating Scenarios Unlikely Getting away with cheating would be no simple In its 2002 report, the NAS examined 10 evasion matter. It is unlikely that a state could simultaneously scenarios suggested by the U.S. intelligence overcome all of the technical hurdles listed below and community and concluded that the only potentially conduct a test having a significant yield. Even if each credible ones are cavity decoupling and mine of these tasks could be carried out with a 90 percent masking. Neither withstands close scrutiny. The most chance of success, there would be a cumulative 50 commonly cited concern in the 1999 Senate debate percent chance of not getting caught for one test and was cavity decoupling, in which a large underground only a 15 percent chance that three tests would not cavity is used to muffle the shock wave from an be discovered. explosion. During the debate, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) mistakenly claimed that 1) Violators must avoid significant yield excursions. a 70-kiloton explosion in a cavity could be hidden All successful first tests, if they had been carried from IMS detection. In practice, this would require out in a cavity, would be detected by the IMS: Arms Control Association a 200-meter-wide cavity equal to the height of a United States (21 kilotons), Soviet Union

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4 Andreas Persbo Andreas 6 2 No later than 24 hours after the conclusion of the inspection, the No later than 24 hours after to the inspection team will meet with the inspected state-party the inspectors review the preliminary findings document, which The inspection report can then submit to the director-general. to the Executive Council as soon and transmitted will be written inspected state- from the the team has departed as possible after Should the council come to the conclusion that a nuclear party. the test explosion has been conducted in violation of the treaty, can either recommend collec- CTBT conference of states-parties as sanctions, or bring the issue to the attention tive actions, such Council. of the United Nations Security spection in A suspicious A suspicious event is A detected. CTBT state-party requests an on- site inspection to clarify whether a nuclear test explosion has taken place in violation of the treaty. lear Test? lear The inspection team begins assembling and arrives at the point of entry in the inspected state-party no later than seven days after on-site inspection request has been filed. No later than 72 hours after the team has ar- rived at the point of entry, the begins.

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Detected ? ?

7 3

? 5 Kirsten Hauph Kirsten Andreas Persbo Andreas Kirsten Hauph Kirsten igure 6. Was it a a it Was 6. igure 1 Below are the steps that would be taken if an on-site inspection were launched under theTest Comprehensive (CTBT).Treaty Ban F (20 kilotons), United Kingdom (25 kilotons), other technologies. The Indian, North Korean, and France (65 kilotons), India (12 kilotons), Pakistan Pakistani test sites were located with commercial (9 kilotons), North Korea (0.6 kilotons observed by satellite images. 22 IMS stations in October 2006). 4) Practically all the radioactive gases and particles 2) The materials removed to create a test shaft and must be trapped. Detectors on airplanes can fly cavity must be hidden from satellites. into radionuclide plumes.

3) Crater and surface changes due to testing must be 5) Cheaters must avoid detection of weak seismic hidden from space-based InSAR, a remote sensing signals by closer stations and arrays; and technique that uses radar satellite images and

Table 3. Tools for Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Verification The following array of technologies and assets provides capabilities to detect potential violations of the Com- prehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). They could be further enhanced with various means of national intelligence and monitoring, such as satellites. Together, these capabilities make the CTBT “effectively verifiable.”

Technology/Method Description IMS Assets (When Completed)

The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) The IMS will use 50 primary and 120 auxiliary seismic concluded this technology can detect explosions stations. In addition, 140 Global Seismic Network above 0.1 kilotons in Asia, Europe, North Africa, stations and more than 10,000 national and civilian and North America. International Monitoring research seismographic stations will produce relevant System (IMS) arrays and regional seismology can data that can be used to monitor and trigger an on- Seismic do significantly better. site inspection if so voted by the Comprehensive Test Tests conducted in cavities can be detected if Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Executive Council. their yield is greater than 1-2 kilotons for advanced nuclear states and at much lower levels for other states.

The NAS says this technology can detect explo- The IMS will use six hydrophone arrays and five sions with a few kilograms of explosive yield in T-phase monitoring stations. Hydroacoustic the Southern Hemisphere and those explosions of less than 1 ton for all oceans.

NAS says this technology can detect explo- The IMS will use 60 infrasound monitoring stations. sions with a yield of more than one kiloton for Infrasound atmospheric nuclear explosions (0.5 kilotons over continents), with the ability to discriminate between chemical and nuclear explosions.

The NAS says this technology can detect tests The IMS will use 80 monitoring stations to detect with a yield of 0.1-1 kiloton. This number has particles; 40 of these detect radio-xenon. National fallen substantially in relation to radioactive technical means (NTM) sensors on airplanes have Radionuclide particles and noble gases, which are keys to greater sensitivity because they can fly close to interpreting nuclear tests. The IMS detected the the test. NTM sensors can also be placed close to 0.6-kiloton October 2006 North Korean nuclear suspected test sites. test at a distance of 7,000 kilometers.

This technology can measure subsidence of the The United States can use this technology with four Inteferometric earth by as little as 0.2-0.5 centimeters in many classified Lacrosse satellites. Canada, European coun- Synthetic Aperture locations. Using InSAR, analysts can determine tries, and Japan also sell unclassified data that can be Radar (InSAR) the location of a nuclear test within 100 meters. utilized for this purpose.

Any CTBT state-party can request the CTBTO On-site inspections measure radioactivity and On-Site Inspections Executive Council to conduct an on-site geological and other data. inspection.

After the CTBT enters into force, states-parties Close-in sensors could detect seismic, infrasound, Confidence-Building could agree to locate sensors at known test electromagnetic-pulse, radionuclide, and other data Measures sites. With such sensors, very low detection indicative of nuclear test explosions. levels would be possible.

Sources: National Academy of Sciences, Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 2002. Ted Bowyer et al., “Field Testing of Collection and Measurement of Radioxenon for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,” Journal of Radioanalytical Nuclear Chemistry, 1999. Paul Vincent et al., “New Signatures of Underground Nuclear Tests Revealed by Satellite Radar Interferometry,” Geophysical Research

Arms Control Association Letters, 2003. David Hafemeister, “Progress in CTBT Monitoring Since its 1999 Senate Defeat,” Science and Global Security, 2007.

18 Now More Than Ever 19 44 ests already ests already em, no would-be no would-be em, y other states will be y other states When it considered ratification of START in 1994, in When it considered ratification of START In essence, the NAS study concluded that states In essence, the NAS JASON study concluded For example, the 1995 The United States’ capability to detect and deter and deter detect capability to States’ The United b clandestine nuclear testing than force with the CTBT in significantly greater of the CTBT is essential ratification U.S. without it. inspections on-site making short-notice, to political possible and maintaining long-term for the other nations from and financial support system. monitoring of the CTBT’s operation Under the CTBT verification syst Under the CTBT verification could confidently conduct an undetected cheater threaten enough to nuclear explosion large would detect system The verification security. U.S. tests. significant militarily best able that are countries the NAS, to According t successfully conduct clandestine to of Countries nuclear weapons. possess advanced be unable to would experience lesser nuclear test to required in the numbers and yields conceal tests weapons. more-advanced develop The United States has the most sophisticated sophisticated has the most States The United in the means of verification national technical to will add system The CTBT verification world. this capability.

the U.S. Senate concluded that potential violations the U.S. Senate concluded that potential that Russia were not militarily significant, meaning alter the would gain little from cheating that would same standard, U.S.-Russian strategic balance. By this verifiable the Senate should find the CTBT effectively as well. be gained from tests in this yield range would have have range would this yield tests in from be gained have simple for states that already limited use found that states The NAS also fission weapons. (China and Russia) testing experience with extensive testing at clandestine more likely to succeed would be nor would need to try, have the technical but do not alter the militarysuch tests significantly threat they already pose. from cheating do not have the that might benefit it off, and states that could do so experience to pull explosions nuclear Moreover, do not need to cheat. useful for advanced weapons large enough to be be detected by the IMS, while design would likely escape detection would be smaller tests that might much less useful. with yields that, for the United States, arsenal tests than the SSP less than 500 tons are less important any yield less for maintaining warheads, and tests at including than that required to initiate boosting, pounds of TNT hydronuclear (the equivalent of four value. or less) and 100-ton tests, are of limited  Key Points Key    42

erification erification a public partnership a public partnership ignificant? S ification could only detect ification could only detect 43 ince 1999 S national Monitoring System (IMS) facilities (IMS) facilities System national Monitoring The Global Seismic Network, that can the world of seismic stations across than 150 has more now supplement the IMS, stations. had been built. As of 2010, 90 percent of the 90 percent As of 2010, had been built. completed was network verification global planned or under construction. means (NTM) of v National technical greater and have since 1999 improved have at nuclear tests and locate detect capacity to locations than the IMS. sensitive some critics in 1999, debate the Senate During claimed that ver in one kiloton explosions at or above underground capabilities monitoring nuclear test In reality, yield. and have that in 1999 than better much were substantially in the last decade. improved in 2006 nuclear tests and 2009 Korea’s North is system that the CTBT monitoring demonstrated one below well tests and can detect well working kiloton. In 1999, only 25 percent of the planned only 25 percent In 1999, Inter ew ew

    N As for potential mine masking scenarios, where As for potential mine Cheaters must prevent detection by NTM, which by NTM, detection prevent must Cheaters IMS at specific powerful than the are more must also be Human intelligence locations. of Iran’s it provided the locations considered; clandestine sites. facilities and other enrichment

mining explosions would be used to “hide” a nuclear mining explosions explosions in mines are ripple- one, most chemical from single-point nuclear fired and thus distinct singled-fired mine explosion explosions. A high-yield, suspicion and inspection. is rare and would draw multiple tests would increase the Again, the need for concluded that “taking all factors risk. The NAS study a fully functional IMS, we into account and assuming nuclear explosion cannot judge that an underground if its yield is larger than 1 or be confidently hidden 2 [kilotons].” Ultimately, the United States must be confident that the United States must Ultimately, between no nation could alter the strategic balance cheating it and the United States through successful The NAS study concluded that it under the CTBT. would be very with less nuclear difficult for states North Korea, testing experience, such as India, Iran, secret because and Pakistan, to conduct small tests in is technically controlling yields of less than 1 kiloton the information that could challenging. Moreover, What Is Militarily What 6) 4

ON U.S. Ratification Will CTI

SE Encourage Entry Into Force

As we work with the Senate to ratify the CTBT, we will encourage other countries to play their part— including the eight remaining Annex 2 countries. Those who haven’t signed should sign. Those, like us, who haven’t ratified, should ratify.

—Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, September 24, 2009

U.S. ratification would be a circuit-breaker, having an immediate impact on the other CTBT hold-out states, and creating much new momentum in itself for the broader non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. —–International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, December 2009

o date, the CTBT has been signed by 182 nations, including China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, and ratified by 151, including Russia and all U.S. allies in TNATO. The CTBT cannot enter into force without ratification by 44 nuclear-capable states as defined by Annex 2 in the treaty. Of those states, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and the United States have yet to ratify.

U.S. ratification is the essential step toward discussion on the CTBT.” In 2005, India said that “it entry into force. David Hannay, a former British will not stand in the way of entry into force of the ambassador to the United Nations, said in September treaty.”49 If India ratifies, Pakistan wouldli kely follow. 2009 that “[i]f the United States does not take the In June 2009, Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan lead, in essence, as we saw in the last eight years, Wirajuda said, “We share [Obama’s] vision of a world nothing happens.” 45 in which nuclear weapons have been eradicated. Once the United States ratifies, China will We trust that he will succeed in getting the CTBT likely follow. Beijing submitted the CTBT to the ratified—and we promise that when that happens, National People’s Congress for ratification in 2000. Indonesia will immediately follow suit.”50 In September 2009, Beijing stated that “China is With no shortage of conflict and hostility in the the Treaty’s constant supporter and abides by its Middle East, ratification by Egypt, Iran, and Israel, commitment to moratorium on nuclear test [sic]” which have all signed the treaty, would reduce nuclear and will “continue to work with the international weapons-related security concerns in the region. Also, community to facilitate the early entry into force.”46 it would help create the conditions necessary for the In December 2009, Indian Prime Minister realization of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other Manmohan Singh told his Japanese counterpart, weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, as Yukio Hatoyama, that if the United States and China called for in the Middle East resolution adopted by the ratify the CTBT, then “it will create a new situation.”47 1995 NPT review conference. In August, India’s National Security Advisor M. K. Likewise, Israel’s ratification the CTBT, which is Naranyanan said, “As of now, we are steadfast in the sole nuclear arms control treaty it has signed, our commitment to the moratorium. At least there would bring it closer to the nuclear nonproliferation is no debate in the internal circles about this.”48 He mainstream and encourage other states in the region, continued, “I think we need to now have a full-fledged such as Egypt and Iran, to ratify as well. Arms Control Association

20 Now More Than Ever 21 In the event that Iran or North Korea do not In the event that Iran Without entry into force, it should not be assumed it should not be assumed force, Without entry into will be system verification that the treaty’s voluntary or that the current indefinitely available down. will not break moratoria without U.S. force into cannot enter The treaty ratification. will States by the United Ratification of the CTBT including China, other holdout states, prompt India, on Egypt, and will put pressure ratify to suit. follow to and Pakistan Israel, Indonesia, sustain the current, While it might be possible to several for moratoria global nuclear test de facto that one or more and uncertainties the risks years, unless the will grow testing will resume states force. into CTBT enters Without entry into force, the United States will be States the United force, Without entry into including on- denied the full benefits of the treaty, inspections and compulsory consultation and site procedures. clarification

such as this are not without precedent. For example, example, For precedent. not without as this are such of the approval blocked final consensus when India Disarmament, Australia Conference on CTBT by the in a working paper, the treaty text incorporated for General Assembly brought to the UN which was approval. way is found to have the treaty ratify and no other in the U.S. national security take effect, it is still Nuclear tests by Iran treaty. interest to ratify the serious matters, would and North Korea, although security in a way that could not undermine U.S. U.S. nuclear testing. be addressed by resuming and Russia would continue to be Meanwhile, China As a ratifying state, the bound by CTBT restrictions. greater leverage to increase United States will have on Iran and North Korea to international pressure limit their nuclear programs.     Key Points Key  ince 1999 S Russia ratified the treaty in 2000. Moscow has in 2000. Moscow the treaty Russia ratified continue its to that it intends stated repeatedly into enters until the treaty on testing moratorium do the or as long as other nuclear powers force same. In June 2009, Indonesia announced that when the In June 2009, “Indonesia will the CTBT, ratifies States United suit.” follow immediately the National the CTBT to In 2000, China submitted In September ratification. for Congress People’s with work “continue to it will China stated 2009, the early facilitate community to the international force.” entry into In September 2009, Secretary of State Hillary of State Secretary 2009, In September Article the CTBT addressed Rodham Clinton U.S. the first force, on entry into 14 conference do so since the conferences to representative be back,” glad to are “We ago. years 10 began the gathering. told Clinton In December 2009, Indian Prime Minister Minister Indian Prime In December 2009, counterpart, his Japanese Manmohan Singh told and States that if the United Hatoyama, Yukio a new “it will create then the CTBT, China ratify situation.” ew ew

     N Iranian ratificationwould reduce the potential ratification of the CTBT case, its In North Korea’s ratification by U.S. ratification leading to With for its nuclear program to be used to develop and deploy deliverable nuclear warheads. Continued failure by Iran to ratify the CTBT raises further questions about the nature of its sensitive nuclear fuel-cycle activities. in ongoing talks with China, will depend on progress other states on its nuclear the United States, and program. Indonesia, Israel, and Pakistan, China, Egypt, India, would be the final holdouts Iran and North Korea In specified for entryof the 44 countries into force. could be explored that would this situation, options on a provisional basis force bring the treaty into of the IMS and and allow for full implementation in situations on-site inspections. Creative solutions Conclusion

.S. nuclear testing policy is in a state of limbo that does not advance U.S. national security interests. After more than 1,000 nuclear test explosions, there is neither Uthe need nor the political support for renewed U.S. nuclear testing. Instead, the United States would benefit greatly by outlawing nuclear testing for all. Though the United States has already assumed most CTBT-related responsibilities, it cannot reap the full security benefits of the CTBT until the Senate approves the treaty by a two-thirds majority.

U.S. ratification of the CTBT would substantially the world’s nuclear-armed states, uncertainties and constrain the ability of other nuclear-armed states to the risk of a resumption of testing will only grow perfect new and more deadly nuclear bombs, limit with time. Without the CTBT in force, concerns the capabilities of would-be nuclear-armed nations, about clandestine nuclear testing might arise that substantially improve national and international could not be resolved in the absence of inspections capabilities to detect and investigate surreptitious provided for under the treaty. If Washington fails to nuclear testing, and bolster U.S. leadership to stop the fulfill its commitment to ratify the CTBT, U.S. efforts spread of nuclear weapons—enhancing U.S. security to organize international support for strengthening for years to come. the beleaguered NPT—including tougher As the Senate prepares to reconsider the CTBT in the safeguards, restrictions on the spread of sensitive coming months, it will be important to evaluate new nuclear technologies, and automatic penalties for technical advances that strengthen the overall case noncompliance or withdrawal—would be severely for U.S. ratification. These advances include evidence weakened. Leaving the CTBT in limbo would increase confirming that the United States can maintain an uncertainty and reduce U.S. security. effective nuclear stockpile without resuming testing As this briefing book makes clear, the United States or building new-design warheads and that it can stands to benefit from entry into force of the CTBT effectively verify compliance with the treaty. more than any other nation. At the same time, if It is also important to recognize there is nothing the hard-fought international trend against nuclear to gain and much to lose by delaying U.S. ratification testing were to collapse, the United States would have of the CTBT. While it might be possible to sustain the most to lose. The stakes are high, and the path is for several years the testing moratoria undertaken by clear. The time for the CTBT is now.

Arms Control Association

22 Now More Than Ever 23 ,” .gov/ est Ban Treaty: est Ban Treaty: reaty,” InformationSheet, No. 15 reaty,” s Nuclear Stockpile: Policy and s Nuclear Stockpile: Applications Center, Technical Air Force .fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/perfmarg.pdf. August 31, 2009, p. 7. eapons & Materials Monitor, win, “A Different Kind of Complex: The Future of win, “A Different Kind of Complex: The Future ithout Testing,” August 2007. ithout Testing,” ce, “Independent Business Case Analysis of the ill Not Affect Reliability Soon,” November 29, 2006, ill Not Affect Reliability Soon,” November 29, 2006, echnical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Nuclear Test echnical Issues Related to the Comprehensive echnical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Nuclear Test Related to the Comprehensive echnical Issues y.googlepages.com/PitReuseFinalReport.pdf. , Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford David Hafemeister, Responses to questions raised on the David Hafemeister, Fact Sheet, U.S. Air Force NAS, T 1663 Los Alamos Science and Technology Magazine, “W88 Pit 1663 Los Alamos Science and Technology See JASON, “Primary JSR-99-305, Performance Margins,” Summary JASON, “Lifetime Extension Program (LEP) Executive Deterrent.” U.S. Strategic Command, “Managing the U.S. Nuclear TechSour Richard L. Gar International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation “The Comprehensive T David Hafemeister, Ibid., p. 3. Ibid., “Today’ Thomas D’Agostino, NAS, T (NNSA), “FY08 Security Administration National Nuclear “The B61 life of Energy, According to the U.S. Department Than the “NNSA: New Fogbank Is ‘As Good as, If Not Better’ U.S. Nuclear NNSA, “Studies Show Plutonium Degradation in Pits for the NNSA, “Report on the Feasibility of Using Existing

arheads and Infrastructure,” n.d., http://media.washingtontimes. arheads and Infrastructure,” October 2008, Arms Today, Control Effectively Verifiable,” www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_10/Hafemeister. 36. CTBT 26, 2009. Draft, March University, 37. June 2007. 38. p. 57. Treaty, Programs,” August 11, 2008, p. 12. Programs,” August 22. defense_programs/print/life_extension_programs.htm. 25. 26. http://nnsa.energy.gov/news/999.htm. 27. 28. Certification W 29. December 1, 1999, www 30. JSR-09-334E, September 9, 2009, p. 2, www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/ jason/lep.pdf. 31. 32. Enterprise,” Arms and the Nuclear Weapons U.S. Nuclear Weapons December 2008, www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_12/ Today, Control Garwin. 34. and Disarmament, “What the Commission Report Says on the T Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban (n.d.), www.icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/infosheets/InfoSheet_ No15.doc. 35. 20. 21. p. 2. Treaty, 23. Schedule,” JanuaryRefurbishment Planning 25, 2008. See U.S. the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent: Strategic Command, “Managing W the life of the B61 Mods 7 and 11 for extension program extended refurbishing the canned subassembly and an additional 20 years by seals, foam supports, cables and connectors, replacing the associated life components.” See NNSA, “Life washers, o-rings, and limited 14, 2009. http://nnsa.energy Extension Programs,” August Original,” Nuclear W W Weapons Program,” p. 12, http://lanl.the.rest. Reliable Replacement Warhead of.the.stor Nuclear Consolidation Options for Defense Programs Special Assembly/Disassembly Missions,” December Materials and Weapons 2007, pp. 5–7, www.complextransformationspeis.com/RM_ 276%20-%20TechSource%202007a.pdf. 33. com/media/docs/2009/Sep/03/090903-ring.pdf. com/media/docs/2009/Sep/03/090903-ring.pdf. 24. ia , eapons Policy, echnical Issues Related to the opriations Act, 1993, Public Law opriations Act, Findings and Recommendations , Remarks to U.S. Strategic Command Deterrence mament,” CQ Researcher, Volume 19, Number 34, Volume mament,” CQ Researcher, The Washington Post, October 5, 2009, ith U.S.,” The Washington es The Washington Post, June 15, 2000. The Washington t imes of India, August 27, 2009, http://timesofindia.indiatimes. , October 12, 1999, USIA, www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/ , October 12, reaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” NPT/ reaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” .un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/1995-NPT/pdf/NPT_ There are only two exceptions to this, involving weapons John C. Browne, “Maintaining America’s Nuclear Deterrent V John C. Browne, “Maintaining America’s Shalikashvili report, pp. 29–33. Ellen Tauscher William Drozdiak, “Missile Shield Eroding U.S. Arms Control William “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation “Declaration Dated 6 April 1995 by France, the Russian “Declaration Dated 6 April 1995 by France, the “Nuclear Disar John M. Shalikashvili, “ Rama Lakshmi, “Key Indian Figures Call for New Nuclear Tests Nuclear Tests Rama Lakshmi, “Key Indian Figures Call for New “Council on Foreign Relations, U.S. Nuclear W Ibid., pp. 55–56. Conference on Overcoming Nuclear Dangers, Rome, Italy Nuclear Conference on Overcoming “Pokhran II Not Fully Successful: Scientist,” Sachin Parashar, Remarks by President Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Remarks by President Obama, Colin Powell, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Colin Powell, Statement Energy and Water Development Appr Development Energy and Water to Announcing his Opposition Statement Senator Lugar’s

(Washington, DC: National (Washington, Ban Treaty Nuclear Test Comprehensive Academy Press, 2002), p. 21. types that were of low priority and were retired soon after the tests. National Academy of Sciences (NAS), T Symposium, Omaha, Nebraska, July 30, 2009, www.state.gov/t/ remarks). us/126862.htm (hereinafter Tauscher 17. CONF199501.pdf. 14. 15. 16. before the Senate Armed Service Stockpile Stewardship,” Testimony Committee, October 7, 1999, http://armed-services.senate.gov/ statemnt/1999/991007jb.pdf. Eliminating Nuclear “Recommendations for 18. Event Transcript, Threats,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Friday, January 22, 2010. 19. Goals,” Concerning the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,” January 5, Ban Treaty,” Concerning the Comprehensive Nuclear Test 2001. The text may be found at www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_ 01-02/ctbtreport (hereinafter Shalikashvili report). 12. Conf.1995/20, April 19, 1995 (annex). 13. (Part I), Annex, Decision 2, Disarmament,” NPT/CONF.1995/32 www Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain With Ireland and the United States of America in Connection the T October 2, 2009, p. 820. 11. Despite Deal W www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/04/ AR2009100402865.html. 10. 9. April 17, 2009. 6. com/news/india/Pokhran-II-not-fully-successful-Scientist/ articleshow/4938610.cms. 7. J. Perry and Brent Scowcroft, Chairs, 2009, p. 54. William 8. The T news/991012-ctb3-usia.htm 3. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_ Republic, April 5, 2009. office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered 5. Committee, January 17, 2001. 4. 1. 2, 1993), sec. 507. Cong., 2nd sess. (October 377, 102nd 2. CTBT N 39. David Hafemeister, “CTBT Evasion Scenarios: Possible or 45. Olivia Hampton, “Parliamentary Group Presses Obama on Probable?” CTBTO Spectrum, September 2009, p. 22. Nuclear Policy,” Agence France-Presse, September 9, 2009.

40. Tibor Tóth, “Building Up the Regime for Verifying the CTBT,” 46. Yang Jiechi, “to the Sixth Conference on Facilitating the Entry Arms Control Today, September 2009, www.armscontrol.org/ Into Force of the CTBT,” New York, September 24, 2009. act/2009_09/Toth. 47. “Indian Hints at Flexibility in Signing CTBT,” NDTV, December 41. Lakshmi, “Key Indian Figures Call for New Nuclear Tests Despite 29, 2009, www.ndtv.com/news/videos/video_player.php?id=1189061. Deal With U.S.” 48. Siddharth Varadarajan, “NSA: India Doesn’t Need Another 42. Hafemeister, “CTBT Evasion Scenarios.” Nuclear Test,” The Hindu, August 30, 2009, www.thehindu. com/2009/08/30/stories/2009083059910800.htm. 43. NAS, Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, p. 7. 49. Ibid.

44. JASON, “Nuclear Testing: Summary and Conclusions,” JSR-95- 50. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 8, 2009. 320, August 3, 1995, www.fas.org/rlg/jsr-95-320.htm. Arms Control Association

24 Now More Than Ever 25 The Conference of the States Parties is the overall The Conference of regularly The Executive Council, which will meet The members of the council will be elected Secretariat is the primary body The Technical in Vienna, is structurally independent from, but is structurally independent in Vienna, with, the International operating in collaboration (IAEA). Atomic Energy Agency the organization. It handles governing body of the treaty’s treaty-related policy issues and oversee of the implementation, including the activities Secretariat. The Executive Council and the Technical unless otherwise conference will meet once a year, decided. body, principal decision-making and act as the treaty’s distribute will consist of 51 members. In order to the membership evenly throughout the world, from Executive Council will comprise 10 states-parties from Latin Africa; seven from Eastern Europe; nine the Middle America and the Caribbean; seven from and East and South Asia; ten from North America Europe; and eight from Southeast Asia, the Western each of these Pacific and the Far East. The states in 1 to the geographical regions are listed in Annex treaty. that those by the conference. In order to ensure are countries with a vested interest in a CTB at least one- adequately represented in the council, third of the seats allotted to each region will be filled by states-parties on the basis of their nuclear such as the capabilities applicable to the treaty, number of monitoring facilities they contribute to the International Monitoring System (IMS). One seat allocated to each region will be designated on an alphabetical basis and the remaining seats will be determined by rotation or elections. Thus, each state- party will eventually have the opportunity to serve on the council. verification responsible for implementing the treaty’s it supervises the operation provisions. In this capacity, of the IMS and receive, process, analyze and report on data. It also manages the International the system’s Data Center (IDC) and performs procedural tasks related to conducting on-site inspections. Until the these functions are being treaty enters into force, Secretariat. handled by the Provisional Technical rganization O

Summary the CTBT of Appendix A Appendix cope Article II establishes the Comprehensive Nuclear- Organization, which will ensure Ban Treaty Test treaty implementation and provide states-parties with a forum for consultation and cooperation. The organization will consist of a Conference of the States Parties, an Executive Council and a Technical Secretariat. The organization, which is located Implementing Article I establishes that all states parties are prohibited from conducting “any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.” On the basis of the negotiating record, this includes all nuclear explosions, in accordance with President Bill August 1995 “zero yield” proposal. Clinton’s S The preamble, which lists disarmament principals The preamble, which lists disarmament context of and objectives, sets the overall political it stresses the need for the In particular, the treaty. worldwide continued reduction of nuclear weapons Also of with the ultimate goal of their elimination. that a CTBT significance, the preamble recognizes nuclear will constitute an effective measure of “constraining disarmament and non-proliferation by the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development It of advanced new types of nuclear weapons.” constitute “a further recognizes that a test ban will a systematic meaningful step in the realization of process to achieve nuclear disarmament.” Preamble The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) prohibits (CTBT) Ban Treaty Test The Comprehensive test explosion or any other “any nuclear weapon anywhere. In order to verify nuclear explosion” provisions, the treaty establishes compliance with its monitoring facilities and allows a global network of The for on-site inspections of suspicious events. treaty articles, overall accord contains a preamble, 17 two annexes two treaty annexes, and a protocol with detailing verification procedures. Article III requires each state-party, in accordance The inspection request must be based on information with its constitutional process, to take any necessary collected by the IMS; data obtained through national measures to implement its treaty obligations. technical means (NTM) of verification, such as satellites, in a manner consistent with international Verification and Compliance law; or a combination of IMS and NTM information. The request must contain the approximate Article IV and the verification protocol establish geographical coordinates and the estimated depth the treaty’s verification regime, which will consist of the ambiguous event, the proposed boundaries of of four basic elements: the IMS, consultation and the area to be inspected (not to exceed 1,000 square clarification, on-site inspections and confidence- kilometers), the state-party or parties to be inspected, building measures. The verification regime will not the probable environment and estimated time of be completely operational until the treaty enters into event, all evidence upon which the request is based, force. For instance, on-site inspections cannot be the identity of the proposed observer (if available) authorized until the treaty formally comes into effect. and the results of the consultation and clarification The purpose of the IMS is to detect nuclear process (if any). explosions, which are prohibited under Article I. The Executive Council will make a decision on The monitoring system will comprise a network the on-site inspection request within 96 hours of its of 50 primary and 120 auxiliary seismological receipt from the requesting state-party. The inspection monitoring stations designed to detect seismic will be authorized to proceed if it has been approved activity and distinguish between natural events, such by at least 30 of the council’s 51-members, the so- as earthquakes, and nuclear explosions. In addition, called “green light” procedure. An inspection team the system will incorporate 80 radionuclide stations will arrive at the point of entry within six days of the and 16 radionuclide laboratories that seek to identify council’s receipt of the inspection request. During radioactivity released during a nuclear explosion. The the course of the inspection, the inspection team IMS will also include 60 infrasound (acoustic) and 11 may submit a proposal to extend the inspection to hydroacoustic stations designed to pick up the sound begin drilling, which must be approved by 26 council of a nuclear explosion conducted in the atmosphere members. The duration of the inspection must not or underwater, respectively. The host state and the exceed 60 days, but may be extended by a maximum location of each facility is listed in Annex 1 to the of 70 additional days (subject to council approval) protocol. if the inspection team determines that more time is Information collected by the IMS will then be needed to fulfill its mandate. transmitted to the IDC-an essential part of the If the Executive Council rejects an on-site Technical Secretariat responsible for data storage inspection request (or terminates an inspection and processing. Because the IMS will generate an already underway) because it is of a frivolous or enormous amount of raw data, the IDC will regularly abusive nature, the council may impose punitive provide states-parties with a number of services measures on the requesting state-party. In this regard, designed to help them monitor compliance with the it may require the requesting state-party to provide treaty’s provisions. In this regard, the data center will financial compensation for preparations made by the produce integrated lists of all signals picked up by Technical Secretariat and may suspend the party’s the IMS, as well as standard event lists and bulletins. right to request an inspection and serve on the In accordance with the parameters outlined in council for an unspecified period of time. Annex 2 to the protocol, the center will also generate The verification regime also incorporates standard event bulletins that screen out those events confidence-building measures intended to promote that appear to be of a non-nuclear nature. However, treaty compliance. In order to reduce the likelihood notwithstanding this analysis role, the IDC must that verification data may be misconstrued, each make both the raw and processed information state-party will voluntarily provide the Technical available to all states-parties. Secretariat with notification of any chemical The consultation and clarification component explosion involving a magnitude of 300 tons or of the verification regime encourages states-parties more of TNT-equivalent on its territory. Each state- to attempt to resolve, either among themselves or party may also assist the Technical Secretariat in the through the organization, possible instances of non- calibration of IMS stations. compliance before requesting an on-site inspection. A In order to ensure compliance with the treaty’s state-party must provide clarification of an ambiguous provisions, Article V empowers the conference event within 48 hours of receiving such a request to revoke a state-party’s rights under the treaty, from another state-party or the Executive Council. recommend to the states-parties punitive measures Each state-party has the right to request an on-site such as sanctions or bring the case to the attention inspection in the territory of the party in question. of the United Nations. Article VI describes the Arms Control Association

26 Now More Than Ever 27 orce F If the treaty has not entered into force “three years If the treaty has not entered into force ther Provisions ntry into O will provisions Article XV stipulates that the treaty’s not be subject to reservations. Article XVI establishes the UN Secretary General as the depositary of the Under Article XVII, the treaty will be authentic treaty. in six languages. Miscellaneous Provisions Miscellaneous annexes, protocol specifies that the treaty’s Article X the are a formal part of to the protocol and annexes open to all that the treaty is Article XI declares treaty. Article entrysignature prior to its states for force. into that each signatoryXII maintains ratify the state will its own constitutional procedures. treaty according to any state that has not signed the Under Article XIII, may accede to it any treaty prior to its entry into force time thereafter. E force the treaty will not enter into Under Article XIV, and ratified by 44 states listed until it has been signed These states include 2 to the treaty. by name in Annex States, states—United weapon nuclear original five the well as India, Russia, Britain, France and China—as entryIsrael, North Korea, and Pakistan. (Actual into occur 180 days after all 44 states deposit will force the UN Secretarytheir instruments of ratification with participating General.) The 44 states, all of which are on members of the recently expanded Conference and research Disarmament, possess nuclear power reactors as determined by the IAEA. after the date of the anniversary of its opening for held for those signature,” then a conference may be instruments states that have already deposited their what measures of ratification to “decide by consensus be undertaken consistent with international law may Since 1999, the to accelerate the ratification process.” of the CTBT Conference Facilitating Entry Force Into has been convened everyyear. other xplosions E uclear N Duration and Withdrawal and Duration be of unlimited Under Article IX, the CTB treaty will has the right to duration. In addition, each state-party withdraw from the treaty if it decides, “extraordinary have events related to the subject matter of this Treaty jeopardized its supreme interests.” Notice of intent to withdraw must be given at least six months in advance. Under Article VIII, a conference will be held 10 Under Article VIII, to review entry into force years after the treaty’s including the the implementation of its provisions, any state-party preamble. At this review conference, “peaceful may request that the issue of so-called the agenda. nuclear explosions” (PNEs) be put on is that PNEs remain the presumption However, prohibited unless certain virtually insurmountable First, the review conference obstacles are overcome. may be must decide without objection that PNEs treaty must permitted, then an amendment to the a separate also be approved without objection at above. The amendment conference, as is explained no militaryamendment must also demonstrate that This benefits would result from such explosions. that double hurdle makes it extremely unlikely be permitted peaceful nuclear explosions will ever under the treaty. Peaceful Peaceful Amendment Process Amendment state-party has the right to Under Article VII, each to the treaty after its entrypropose amendments requires the Any proposed amendment into force. majority of states-parties at approval of a simple with no party casting a an amendment conference negative vote. mechanism by which disputes pertaining to the pertaining which disputes by mechanism be of the treaty may or interpretation application settled.

Appendix B CTBT Signatories and Ratifiers

The CTBT will formally enter into force after 44 countries, India, Pakistan, and North Korea still have designated “nuclear-capable states” have deposited not signed, and only 35 have ratified the treaty. their instruments of ratification with the UN The following chart identifies the treaty’s secretary-general. To date, 182 states have signed and signatories and ratifiers. States whose ratification is 151 have ratified the treaty. Yet of the 44 specified required for the treaty to take effect are shaded.

Country Signature Ratification Country Signature Ratification Afghanistan 9/24/03 9/24/03 Chad 10/8/96 Albania 9/27/96 4/23/03 Chile 9/24/96 7/12/00 Algeria 10/15/96 7/11/03 China 9/24/96 Andorra 9/24/96 7/12/06 Colombia 9/24/96 1/29/08 Angola 9/27/96 Comoros 12/12/96 Antigua and Barbuda 4/16/97 1/11/06 Congo 2/11/97 Argentina 9/24/96 12/4/98 Cook Islands 12/5/97 9/6/05 Armenia 10/1/96 7/12/06 Costa Rica 9/24/96 9/25/01 Australia 9/24/96 7/9/98 Côte d’Ivoire 9/25/96 3/11/03 Austria 9/24/96 3/13/98 Croatia 9/24/96 3/2/01 Azerbaijan 7/28/97 2/2/99 Cyprus 9/24/96 7/18/03 Bahamas 2/4/05 11/30/07 Czech Republic 11/12/96 9/11/97 Bahrain 9/24/96 4/12/04 Dem. Republic of Congo 10/4/96 9/28/04 Bangladesh 10/24/96 3/8/00 Denmark 9/24/96 12/21/98 Barbados 1/14/08 1/14/08 Djibouti 10/21/96 7/15/05 Belarus 9/24/96 9/13/00 Dominican Republic 10/3/96 9/4/07 Belgium 9/24/96 6/29/99 Ecuador 9/24/96 11/12/01 Belize 11/14/01 3/26/04 Egypt 10/14/96 Benin 9/27/96 3/6/01 El Salvador 9/24/96 9/11/98 Bolivia 9/24/96 10/4/99 Equatorial Guinea 10/9/96 Bosnia and 9/24/96 10/26/06 Eritrea 11/11/03 11/11/03 Herzegovina Estonia 11/20/96 8/13/99 Botswana 9/16/02 10/28/02 Ethiopia 9/25/96 8/8/06 Brazil 9/24/96 7/24/98 Fiji 9/24/96 10/10/96 Brunei Darussalem 1/22/97 Finland 9/24/96 1/15/99 Bulgaria 9/24/96 9/29/99 France 9/24/96 4/6/98 Burkina Faso 9/27/96 4/17/02 Gabon 10/7/96 9/20/00 Burundi 9/24/96 9/24/08 Gambia 4/9/03 Cambodia 9/26/96 11/10/00 Georgia 9/24/96 9/27/02 Cameroon 11/16/01 2/6/06 Germany 9/24/96 8/20/98 Canada 9/24/96 12/18/98 Ghana 10/3/96 Cape Verde 10/1/96 3/1/06 Greece 9/24/96 4/21/99 Central African 12/19/01 Grenada 10/10/96 8/19/98 Republic

Arms Control Association Guatemala 9/20/99

28 Now More Than Ever 29 4/5/01 2/7/06 3/3/97 6/9/99 3/3/98 9/9/02 8/1/07 11/4/08 10/4/01 9/17/01 5/19/04 3/19/99 6/10/04 2/23/01 10/5/99 6/29/01 9/27/01 3/12/02 4/13/04 7/15/99 6/13/03 3/30/99 9/24/99 7/31/98 5/25/99 4/27/05 9/23/09 9/27/02 8/31/99 3/23/99 3/23/99 12/5/00 6/26/00 6/30/00 11/10/01 11/12/01 11/12/97 11/30/04 Ratification 6/8/01 6/8/01 7/2/09 9/8/00 9/8/00 9/8/00 6/10/04 6/10/04 10/4/96 10/4/96 10/9/96 10/7/96 10/3/96 10/8/96 10/8/96 10/3/96 1/14/97 1/14/97 1/14/99 1/14/99 8/12/03 8/12/03 9/26/96 9/24/96 9/24/96 9/24/96 9/24/96 9/25/96 9/24/96 9/24/96 9/24/96 9/24/96 9/24/96 9/24/96 3/33/04 9/26/96 9/26/96 9/24/96 9/30/96 9/24/96 9/24/96 9/24/96 9/27/96 9/24/96 9/24/96 9/23/99 9/24/96 9/25/96 9/25/96 11/30/04 11/30/04 11/25/96 11/25/96 10/24/96 10/24/96 Signature South Africa South Korea South Spain Sri Lanka Sudan Suriname Swaziland Peru Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Qatar Romania Russia Rwanda and Nevis St. Kitts St. Lucia and the Vincent St. Grenadines Samoa Marino San and Principe Tome Sao Senegal and Montenegro Serbia Seychelles Leone Sierra Singapore Slovakia Slovenia Islands Solomon Country Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nauru Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Korea North Norway Oman Pakistan Palau Panama New Guinea Papua Paraguay 3/7/01 8/4/99 8/8/97 1/6/04 2/1/99 7/8/97 5/6/03 9/7/00 2/7/00 9/7/00 7/18/01 7/23/01 10/5/99 9/14/99 5/14/02 10/5/00 1/17/08 1/16/07 9/15/05 12/1/05 7/13/99 7/15/99 4/30/03 7/25/97 9/21/04 5/26/99 8/25/98 3/14/00 4/17/00 6/26/00 11/13/01 11/20/01 11/21/08 11/30/00 10/23/06 10/28/09 10/02/03 10/30/03 12/18/98 Ratification 9/7/00 9/7/00 4/11/97 4/11/97 8/19/08 8/19/08 10/1/97 10/1/97 10/1/96 10/1/96 10/1/96 10/1/96 10/7/96 10/9/96 10/9/96 10/8/96 10/8/96 10/3/96 10/3/96 2/18/97 2/18/97 9/16/05 9/16/05 9/24/96 7/23/98 9/24/96 9/24/96 9/24/96 9/24/96 9/24/96 9/24/97 9/24/96 9/30/96 9/27/96 9/24/96 9/25/96 9/24/96 9/24/96 9/26/96 9/30/96 9/24/96 7/30/97 9/24/96 9/24/96 9/25/96 9/25/96 9/24/96 9/24/96 9/24/96 9/24/96 11/11/96 11/11/96 11/13/01 11/13/01 11/14/96 11/14/96 10/23/06 10/23/06 10/29/98 10/29/98 Signature Morocco Mongolia Montenegro Micronesia Moldova Monaco Marshall Islands Mauritania Mexico Maldives Mali Malta Madagascar Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Luxembourg Macedonia Libya Liechtenstein Lithuania Lebanon Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan Laos Latvia Kiribati Kuwait Jordan Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Italy Jamaica Japan Iraq Ireland Israel Indonesia Iran Hungary Hungary Iceland India Haiti Holy See Honduras Guinea Guinea-Bissau Guyana Country Country Signature Ratification Country Signature Ratification Sweden 9/24/96 12/2/98 United Arab Emirates 9/25/96 9/18/00 Switzerland 9/24/96 10/1/99 United Kingdom 9/24/96 4/6/98 Tajikistan 10/7/96 6/10/98 United States 9/24/96 Tarzania 9/30/04 9/30/04 Uruguay 9/24/96 9/21/01 Thailand 11/12/96 Uzbekistan 10/3/96 5/29/97 Togo 10/2/96 7/2/04 Vanuatu 9/24/96 9/16/05 Trinidad and Tobago 10/8/09 Venezuela 10/3/96 5/13/02 Tunisia 10/16/96 9/23/04 Viet Nam 9/24/96 3/10/06 Turkey 9/24/96 2/16/00 Yemen 9/30/96 Turkmenistan 9/24/96 2/20/98 Zambia 12/3/96 2/23/06 Uganda 11/7/96 3/14/01 Zimbabwe 10/13/99 Ukraine 9/27/96 2/23/01 TOTAL 182 151 Now More Than Ever 31

1960s bruary 11, 1960, the Eisenhower August 22, Eisenhower proposes 1-year test August 22, Eisenhower proposes 1-year moratorium if Soviets also refrain from testing and the initiation of U.S.-U.K.- begin U.S.S.R. test ban negotiations, which on October 31. Ban negotiations continue in Geneva Test about despite opposition from lab scientists test ban verification. Februaryfirst nuclear 13, France conducts it test in Algeria. Fe Administration redoubles its efforts by proposing a phased approach to achieving a comprehensive ban. The proposal is endorsed by British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, and with some further modifications, is accepted by Soviet Premier makingKhrushchev, it likely that the test ban treaty could be signed at a Paris summit that both President Eisenhower and Premier Krushchev agreed to attend theHowever, shoot-downin May. of an American U-2 spy plane over the Soviet Union on May 1st leads to an atmosphere of hostility that cuts short the Paris summit and the chance for the test ban. The United Kingdom conducts its first The United Kingdom and the U.S. and hydrogen bomb test testing. These countries U.S.S.R. accelerate nuclear blasts conduct 42 above-ground during the year. U.S.S.R. trade test ban and U.S. and May, but weapons production cut-off proposals fail to reach agreement. Soviets announce unilateral 31, March their suspension of testing after completing latest series of blasts. April 8, Eisenhower proposes technical conference to explore test ban verification.

1957 1959 1960 1958

Lucky Dragon. States conducts 193 atmospheric 193 conducts States , a nuclear test ban as the initial 1950s 1940s s MIKE, results in 10 megaton Nuclear Testing, Testing, Nuclear the Present 1945 to

step toward nuclear disarmament. April 2, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru proposes a nuclear testing “standstill” agreement, which is later forwarded to the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Albert Einstein and Pope Pius XII call for a cessation of nuclear testing. May 10, the Soviet Union proposes, for the first time by either superpower explosion which obliterates the island explosion which obliterates the island of Elugelab in the Marshall chain in the Pacific. The U.S. CASTLE series of tests and Soviet tests in Siberia arouse international outrage about radioactive fallout, particularly after test contaminates the 15 megaton BRAVO the Marshall Islands and the Japanese fishing vessel, October 3, the U.K. conducts its first nuclear October 3, the U.K. conducts its first Australia. November 1, test in Western the first hydrogen bomb test explosion, the U.S.’ August 29, the U.S.S.R. explodes its first August 29, the U.S.S.R. explodes its first arms nuclear test, accelerating the nuclear of race. By 1962, the Soviets explode a total 142 atmospheric nuclear tests. tests mainly in the Pacific and in Nevada tests mainly in the Pacific and in Nevada involving over 200,000 military and civilian personnel, of which 2,000-3,000 serve as subjects of government-sponsored medical research. The United United The July 16, first nuclear test explosion, July 16, first nuclear Alamagordo, is conducted near TRINITY, New Mexico. bombings of August 6 and 9, U.S. Hiroshima and Nagasaki, leading to over 200,000 casualties. Appendix C Appendix

1954 1952 1949 1945

1946– 1962 1961 January–July, Kennedy accelerates U.S. 1964 October 16, China explodes its first nuclear nuclear weapons deployments and East- bomb, a 20 kiloton atmospheric blast, at West relations deteriorate over the Berlin Lop Nor in northwestern China. crisis. August, resumption of Soviet nuclear 1968 June, nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty tests followed by resumption of U.S. testing (NPT) signed in Washington, London, in September. October 30, Soviet Union and Moscow. Among other obligations, conducts largest nuclear test explosion ever, the NPT requires parties to the Treaty to a 58 megaton atmospheric blast. “seek to achieve the discontinuance of all 1962 Eighteen Nation Committee on test explosions of nuclear weapons for all Disarmament, later to become the time and to continue negotiations to this Conference on Disarmament, will continue end,” and under Article VI, to “pursue multilateral discussions on the test ban for negotiations in good faith on effective over three decades. October, Cuban Missile measures relating to the cessation of the Crisis brings the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to the nuclear arms race at an early date and to brink of nuclear war. nuclear disarmament....” 1963 June 8, 1963, Khrushchev invites British and American negotiators to a conference in Moscow in July to negotiate a 1970s comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. 1972– Australia and New Zealand ask the June 10, President Kennedy accepts the 1974 International Court of Justice to halt Soviet invitation for renewed talks in continuing French atmospheric tests in his commencement address at American Polynesia and send naval vessels to the test University and says that peace without area to signal their opposition. competition between the United States and 1974 May, India conducts its first nuclear the Soviet Union is not possible, but the test in the Thar Desert near its border prevention of nuclear war is. with Pakistan. Bowing to international July 15, U.S., British, and Soviet negotiators pressure, France announces that all of meet in Moscow to try to work out an its future nuclear tests will be conducted agreement on a comprehensive test ban. underground. But due to disagreements concerning 1974– The United States and the Soviet Union on-site inspections, agreement on a 1976 conclude the Threshold Test Ban and comprehensive ban is not reached. Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties Negotiators turn their attention to the limiting military and non-military conclusion of a limited ban, prohibiting underground tests to explosive yields below tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and 150 kilotons. They continue to design, beneath the surface of the seas. develop and produce new warhead designs. July 25, the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) 1977– American, British and Soviet negotiators is signed by the United States, Britain and 1980 make substantial progress toward an the Soviet Union. agreement on a Comprehensive Test Ban July 26, 1963, President Kennedy addresses Treaty but opposition from the Pentagon, the nation on the merits of the LTBT and the Energy Department, and Congress, asks for their support in ensuring Senate combined with the deterioration of East- approval. August 8, Kennedy places the West relations after the Soviet invasion of Treaty before the Senate for its advice and Afghanistan scuttle the chance for a Test consent. Ban agreement as well as further controls September 24, 1963, the LTBT is ratified by on U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals. the Senate and receives an overwhelmingly favorable vote of 80 to 14. October 11, 1963, the Treaty goes into effect. Nuclear weapons development and production continue with underground nuclear testing. Arms Control Association

32 Now More Than Ever 33

y 1994.

reaty as rapidly as est Ban Treaty (CTBT). est Ban Treaty

perecnt of the U.S. public favor

breaks the story, triggering ashington Post breaks the story, possible. CTBT negotiations begin at the CD January, in Geneva. continuing the moratorium. June, Clinton administration debates testing policy with the Energy Department, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the White House Science Advisor favoring extension of the moratorium. he July 3, President Clinton announces that will extend the moratorium at least through a test 1994 unless another nation conducts by and will pursue completion of a CTBT September 1996. Clinton states that the current U.S. arsenal is “safe and reliable” and that there is no immediate need for further tests. August 10, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) decides to give its Ad Hoc Committee Ban a mandate to begin on a Nuclear Test negotiations on a CTBT in Januar December 16, the United Nations unanimously adopts a resolution calling on the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to proceed with the negotiation of a Ban T Comprehensive Test September 24, House of Representatives Representatives House of 24, September amendment by “Hatfield-Exon” adopts the of 224–151.a margin 2, President October containing signs the law Bush reluctantly legislation. the test moratorium Security Advisor 3, National March completion of Anthony Lake orders Review of an interagency Presidential testing and a U.S. policy on nuclear Comprehensive T uncover a April, CTBT advocates draft plan to Clinton administration and to substitute a renew U.S. testing treaty in place one-kiloton threshold one. April 30, The of a comprehensive W national debate. Mitchell Senators Exon, Hatfield, and May, to and Rep. Kopetski express opposition the one-kiloton plan. They and Senator Harkin organize letters from 38 Senators a and 159 Representatives in support of Polls moratorium extension and a total ban. show 72

1994 1993

, the 40. –155) calling for a ves unilateral test moratorium. test unilateral ves 1980s 1990–1994 September 13, the U.S. Senate adopts the “Hatfield-Exon” amendment that would effect a 9-month U.S. testing moratorium; place strict conditions on any further U.S. testing; and require test ban negotiations and a prohibition on U.S. testing after September 30, 1996, unless another nation conducts a test. The test moratorium amendment is approved 55– December 26, the Soviet Union is dissolved. April 8, French President Mitterrand announces a unilateral French nuclear testing moratorium. June, Russian President extends the Soviet test Boris Yeltsin moratorium. October 5, Soviet President Gorbachev October 5, Soviet President Gorbachev announces a unilateral, one-year moratorium on Soviet nuclear testing a and invites the U.S. to join. October 29, by bipartisan Congressional coalition led Rep. Kopetski and Sen. Hatfield introduce legislation that would effect a 1-year U.S. testing moratorium. January, LTBT Amendment Conference LTBT January, amend convenes but no decision is made to the limited test ban into a comprehensive one because of opposition from the declared nuclear powers. However August, six non-aligned states request a August, six non-aligned states request special conference to consider amending to make it comprehensive. the 1963 LTBT 1-year U.S. testing moratorium if the Soviets 1-year U.S. testing accept on-site inspections. meet in Reykjavik, Reagan and Gorbachev Iceland and discuss nuclear disarmament but fail to reach agreement. to Conference gives its President a mandate reconvene the Conference at a later stage. U.S.S.R. obser U.S.S.R. passes a non- U.S. House of Representatives led by Reps. Schroeder, binding resolution (224 Markey and Leach July, President Reagan decides to set aside Reagan decides President July, effort, calling it test ban the comprehensive and approves U.S. objective, a “long-term” and testing deployment, the development, of new nuclear warheads.

1992 1991 1988 1986 1982

1985– 1987 1996 January, CTBT talks resume in Geneva as 1995–1999 India conditions it support on agreement for a commitment to a time-bound nuclear 1995 January, U.S. officials announce that they disarmament framework. India will later will pursue a test ban that is permanent announce that it does not intend to in duration. CTBT talks resume in Geneva sign the CTBT. China insists on allowing without agreement on the scope of the peaceful nuclear explosions. Treaty, with the declared nuclear states favoring low-yield, hydronuclear tests May–June, China drops its insistence on under a CTBT. Australia begins effort to get peaceful explosions, but new disagreements consensus on a zero-yield test ban. March, emerge on verification issues and entry- U.S. officials announce the extension of the into-force. June 18, the U.S. indicates its U.S. moratorium. willingness to allow an entry-into-force formula that requires all nuclear capable April–May, over 180 nations meet and states to ratify the CTBT. agree to indefinitely extend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and also agree to June 28, CD Chairman Jaap Ramaker conclude CTBT negotiations no later than presents a final CTBT text but formal 1996. China conducts a nuclear test one agreement is not reached before end of day after the conclusion of the NPT Review second negotiating session. and Extension Conference. July 29, CTBT talks resume in Geneva. June 13, newly-elected French President China announces that it will not test after Chirac announces that France will resume September 1996. nuclear testing before signing a CTBT, August 22, consensus on a final CTBT text which foments international outrage and a is blocked by India and Iran. Australia spontaneous worldwide consumer boycott intensifies work to bring the CTBT directly of French goods. U.S. officials debate new to the U.N. for endorsement. proposal backed by the Pentagon and Joint September 10, with 127 co-sponsors for Chiefs of Staff calling for the U.S. to pursue the Australian CTBT resolution, a special a 500-ton threshold test ban that would session of the U.N. General Assembly allow low-yield blasts. overwhelmingly approves the CTBT by a Clinton administration debates 500 ton margin of 158 to 3, with 5 abstentions, threshold proposal with the National opening the way for CTBT signature and Security Council, Energy Department, the ratification. U.S. Ambassador to the United Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Nations describes the Treaty as: “... a treaty and the White House Science Advisor sought by ordinary people everywhere and favoring a zero-yield CTBT. today the power of that universal wish August 10, the U.S. Senate unanimously could not be denied.” adopts a resolution introduced by Senator September 24, the Comprehensive Test Ban Akaka condemning continued French and Treaty is opened for signature at the U.N. Chinese nuclear testing. President Chirac in New York. The United States is the first announces that France will support a zero- nation to sign. yield test ban. 1997 September 22, President Bill Clinton August 11, President Clinton announces his transmits the CTBT to the United States support for a “true zero yield” test ban. Senate for its advice and consent for September 6, France renews nuclear testing ratification. despite intentional opposition. CTBT talks in Geneva end for the year without producing an agreement. September 14, the United Kingdom announces that it will support a zero-yield CTBT. Arms Control Association

34 Now More Than Ever 35

reaty . Bush administration “will not “will not . Bush administration 2000–2009 January 17, Secretary of State-designate that the tells Congress Colin Powell George W ratify the for the Congress to be asking will but Ban Treaty,” Comprehensive Test on nuclear testing. uphold the moratorium announces its October 9, North Korea drawing widespread first nuclear test, International condemnation. The (IMS) of the Monitoring System Ban T Comprehensive Test the seismic effects of Organization detects telltale radioactive later, the test, and, weeks gases. April 5, President Barack Obama announces his intention to “immediately and of the aggressively pursue” U.S. ratification CTBT. May 25, North Korea announces its second nuclear test. The IMS detects the the shockwaves generated by the blast and test is universally condemned.

2001 2006 2009

, culate

.” reaty before a special conference of October 13, the U.S. Senate rejects the CTBT 48–51, nineteen votes short of the 67 needed for ratification. September, deadline for ratification of the deadline for September, 2 CTBT by the 44 countries listed in Annex of the T to explore ratifiers may be convened Treaty entry into ways to accelerate the Treaty’s all the CTBT enters into force, Until force. of signatories are bound by Article XVIII not Convention on Treaties the Vienna the to undertake any action that violates “purpose or intent” of the Treaty. a resolution calling for Senate Foreign a resolution calling for Senate Foreign CTBT Relations hearings and a vote on the “as expeditiously as possible.” May 28 and 30, Pakistan announces that it has conducted 6 nuclear test explosions. The tests are met with global condemnation and and calls for Pakistan and India to sign ratify the CTBT without conditions. May 13, Senators Arlen Specter (R-PA) and May 13, Senators Arlen Specter (R-PA) Joseph Biden (D-DE) draft and cir January his annual State of the Union 27, in calls on the address, President Clinton of the CTBT in 1998. Senate to approve under the leadership May 11 and 13, India, Minister Atal Bihari of newly elected Prime BJP of the Hindu-nationalist Vajpayee has conducted five announces that India test explosions in the underground nuclear are met with global Thar Desert. The tests calls for India to sign condemnation and and ratify the CTBT without conditions. January (R-NC), Jesse Helms Senator 21, Relation of the Senate Foreign Chairman Clinton and writes President Committee of the Senate consideration argues that Senate addresses wait until the CTBT should “higher priority of issues of

1999 1998

D Statements of Support

Appendix for the CTBT

George Shultz, former Secretary of State, Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor, Reagan Administration George H.W. Bush Administration “[CTBT opponents] don’t have to say they changed “Well, on CTBT, of course, it was—it was not ratified their mind. They can say there’s new evidence that when it came to the Senate before. I think—I’m not we have, and on the basis of new evidence they can an expert on vote counting. I think it’ll be a tough— support it . . . [Republicans] might have been right I think it’ll be a tough struggle, but I think we—we’ve voting against it some years ago, but they would be learned a lot since it was before the Senate before and right voting for it now, based on these new facts… circumstances have changed. And I am cautiously [There are] new pieces of information that are very optimistic that if the administration makes a good, important and that should be made available to the clear case, then it has a chance.” Senate.” —Conference call hosted by Council on —Rome, April 17, 2009 Foreign Relations, May 1, 2009

George Shultz, former Secretary of State, Reagan Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor, Administration; William J. Perry, former Secretary of George H.W. Bush Administration; Joseph Nye, former Defense, Clinton Administration; Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Clinton Administration; former Secretary of State, Nixon Administration; and former Nicholas Burns, former Undersecretary of State, Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) George W. Bush Administration; and Strobe Talbott, “Near-term steps that the U.S. and Russia could former Deputy Secretary of State, Clinton Administration take, beginning in 2008, can in and of themselves “Ratifying [the CTBT] will be to the international dramatically reduce nuclear dangers. They include… advantage of the United States. The CTBT is especially Adopt[ing] a process for bringing the Comprehensive important to the goal of reducing nuclear weapons. Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into effect, which would Its ratification by the U.S. and eight other holdout strengthen the NPT and aid international monitoring countries will considerably strengthen the global of nuclear activities. This calls for a bipartisan review, nonproliferation regime in numerous ways. By first, to examine improvements over the past decade actively seeking ratification, the U.S. will be more able of the international monitoring system to identify to persuade Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty member and locate explosive underground nuclear tests in states to erect stronger barriers against the acquisition violation of the CTBT; and, second, to assess the of nuclear weapons. When ratified, the CTBT technical progress made over the past decade in will expedite agreement on more rigorous export maintaining high confidence in the reliability, safety controls, measures to protect against the theft of and effectiveness of the nation’s nuclear arsenal dangerous materials and know-how and measures to under a test ban. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty discourage the spread of enrichment and reprocessing Organization is putting in place new monitoring facilities. Implementation of the CTBT’s international stations to detect nuclear tests—an effort the U.S monitoring system will add significantly to U.S. should urgently support even prior to ratification.” national capabilities to detect covert nuclear testing —The Wall Street Journal, “Toward a worldwide. It will also impede the ability of countries Nuclear-Free World,” January 15, 2008 with nuclear weapons to develop and deploy more advanced nuclear systems, including taking steps to miniaturize and otherwise make more usable their offensive nuclear capabilities.” —“U.S., Russia Must Lead on Arms Control,” Politico, October 13, 2009 Arms Control Association

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loss of confidence, which stockpile stewardship has held to an acceptable level. The U.S. has carried out more than 1,000 nuclear tests, and the Chinese have in the can see the difference done about 45. You sophistication of our arsenals.” Dr. Sie Dr. Alamos National Laboratory off versus the “So now what I have to do is trade that I say today benefits of a nuclear test ban. And there nuclear testing that the greatest risk of going back to testing and is that the Chinese would go back to the Pakistanis the Indians would go back to testing, today would go back to testing. And as I personally out in favor that weigh those risks, I definitely come interest to actually and the world’s in our nation’s it’s ratify the comprehensive test ban treaty.” “The single most important reason to ratify the CTBT is to stop other countries from improving their arsenals—China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran if it ever progresses that far substantially more from limiting other countries than we lose by giving up testing John Shali John Gen. Administration Clinton Chiefs of Staff, Joint to of nuclear weapons tests slows the spread “Banning another tough obstacle by throwing more countries to acquire nuclear of anyone who wants in the way make simple proliferators can potential arms. True, testing. But a test ban makes fission bombs without nuclear weapons down to the it much harder to get the weights most dangerous sizes, the shapes and light airplanes, rudimentaryto us: deliverable in luggage a terrorist’s missiles, or even in our ratification of the CTBT ally strongly supports Most have ratified the CTBT. All of them have signed it already borders has any doubt about the else outside of our nuclear deterrent. Instead, credibility of the U.S. away from what our allies fear is that if we walk the T seriously and nonproliferation will be seriously, weakened.”

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John Shali D submitted “On September 22, 1997, President Clinton (CTB) Treaty the Comprehensive Nuclear test Ban and to the United States Senate for its advice that define the consent, together with six Safeguards will enter conditions under which the United States will strengthen our The Safeguards into this Treaty. monitoring commitments in the area of intelligence, maintenance and verification, stockpile stewardship, They of our nuclear laboratories, and test readiness. under which the also specify the circumstances President would be prepared, in consultation with our supreme national interest Congress, to exercise rights under the CTB to conduct necessary testing if the safety and reliability of our nuclear deterrent we With these Safeguards, could no longer be verified. support Senate approval of the CTB Treaty.” Former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Generals of Staff Chiefs Chairmen of the Joint Former C William the last Congress to be the final word the last Congress to of nuclear tests instituted by that the suspension and Congress in 1992 will President George Bush many years to come. There are remain in place for international advantages to the United States in our The treaty is relations in ratifying the test ban treaty. an important element of the global nonproliferation of those regime and crucial to American leadership efforts.” In the debate preceding its October 1999 vote preceding its October “In the debate Senate was presented the ban treaty, on the test conflicting statements on the with compelling but of the treaty and questions nonproliferation benefits on the long-term safety and regarding its impact reliability—and hence deterrence value— of our the truncated debate meant nuclear arsenal. But answers given on these there were no adequate issues M Administration; Perry, J. and William Administration; Defense, Carter Administration Clinton of Defense, former Secretary Thomas H. Kean (R) and Lee H. Hamilton (D), Ambassador Linton Brooks, former Under Secretary of former Co-chairmen of the 9/11 Commission Energy for Nuclear Security, George W. Bush Administration “More nuclear armed states means more risks to peace “It certainly can’t be done without U.S. leadership, and stability . . . We can help by making deeper nuclear and— but what we don’t know is what will actually arms reductions, ratifying the Comprehensive Test happen if we take some of the steps, ratification Ban Treaty and fulfilling the Nuclear Nonproliferation of CTBT being the most obvious. The argument Treaty— steps that would have a powerful and as I understand it is not that it has anything to positive effect.” do with North Korea, but that a number of states —the Washington Post, November 9, 2008 whose cooperation is necessary for an effective nonproliferation regime are reluctant to cooperate while the five recognized nuclear powers are not, in their view, meeting their Article VI obligations. And the touchstone of that, at least with regard to the United States, has become CTBT. What we don’t know is whether that’s a reason or an excuse. We don’t know whether it’s a convenient way to blame the United States for things people don’t want to spend time and effort and money on. One of the reasons that, I think, we probably ought to go ahead and ratify the CTBT in the United States is it will let us find that out.” —Carnegie Nonproliferation Conference, April 6, 2009 Arms Control Association

38 Now More Than Ever 39 est 09 T , 20 est Ban T ON S A uclear- omprehensive omprehensive N C ienna V omprehensive omprehensive xtension Program, J xtension Program, C E ife L rganization in O reaty T eport on reaty www.CTBTO.org the for of the Project Website www.ProjectfortheCTBT.org www.twitter.com/CTBTnow R scientific study A congressionally-commissioned effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear concludes that the indefinitely through arsenal can be maintained for stockpile stewardship and the existing program explosions or pursuit of new without nuclear test warhead designs. www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/ jasonreportpressrelease of the Website T Ban ysis of e nal A dvisor to A ticle reaty r T 995 A cademy of cademy , 1 oncerning the reaty, reaty, A omprehensiv T C C ON S est-Ban A T ticle-By- r ational est Ban A T N uclear N esting, J T e elated to the reaty, reaty, uclear R tment’s tment’s T N . Shalikashvili, Special ecommendations e M R epar Additional Resources Additional uclear

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est Ban Appendix Appendix E T omprehensiv resident and Secretary of State, 2001 of State, resident and Secretary C uclear .S. State omprehensiv eport on ciences, 2002 indings and echnical echnical the The report challenged several concerns expressed by The report challenged several concerns treaty opponents over monitoring global testing and asserted that effective U.S. stockpile stewardship does not require further tests. www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_09/nassept02 T N S Concluding a 10 month-long review, General John Concluding a 10 month-long review, Ban Test Shalikashvili reported on the Comprehensive voicing strong (CTBT) to President Clinton, Treaty to build support for the treaty and outlining measures bipartisan support for it. www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_01-02/ctbtreport F C General John the P R finds the Influential group of independent scientists in the safety, United States can have high confidence of the nuclear and performance margins reliability, weapons in the enduring stockpile. www.fas.org/rlg/jsr-95-320.htm www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/16522.htm U

The Arms Control Association (ACA), founded in 1971, is a national nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies. Through its public education and media programs and its magazine, Arms Control Today (ACT), ACA provides policy-makers, the press and the interested public with authoritative information, analysis and commentary on arms control proposals, negotiations and agreements, and related national security issues. In addition to the regular press briefings ACA holds on major arms control developments, the Association’s staff provides commentary and analysis on a broad spectrum of issues for journalists and scholars both in the United States and abroad.

Nuclear testing is a dangerous and unnecessary vestige of the Cold War that the United States rejected almost 20 years ago. There is no military justification for resuming U.S. testing, and the United States does not need nuclear testing to maintain the effectiveness and reliability of its nuclear deterrent.

The 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is an essential part of a commonsense strategy to reduce nuclear dangers.

It is in the U.S. national security interest to prevent nuclear weapons testing by others and to improve the U.S. and international ability to monitor compliance with the treaty.

A growing list of bipartisan leaders agree that by ratifying the CTBT, the United States stands to gain an important constraint on the ability of other states to build new and more deadly nuclear weapons that could pose a greater threat to American security.

This briefing book reviews the key facts and issues at stake.

Arms Control Association 1313 L Street, NW, Suite 130 Washington, DC 20005 202-463-8270 • fax: 202-463-8273 www.armscontrol.org