The BEER HALL PUTSCH Was Faked

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

The BEER HALL PUTSCH Was Faked beer hall putsch fake faked hoax hoaxed false flag psyop manufactured never happened hitler actor return to updates The BEER HALL PUTSCH was faked by Miles Mathis First published February 8, 2016 As usual, this is just my opinion, based on personal research. The Beer Hall Putsch was the failed coup in Munich in 1923, led by Hitler. I will show that—like most everything else in the 20th century—it was faked. We can tell it was faked without much effort, since the story makes no sense. If we go to Wikipedia for the mainstream gloss, the first clue we get is with the early mention of Marxism. We are told that Hitler and other revolutionaries were angry about the outcome of WW1, believing the German army to have been betrayed by its leaders. We will leave the question of whether they were betrayed open for now, since it has nothing to do with the clue. The clue is that we are told the revolutionaries believed they had been betrayed by Marxists—the so-called November Criminals. See the Wikipedia page for the Stab-in-the-Back Myth for more on this. This will lead you to the German Revolution of 1918, which is indeed a curious event. This November revolution came at the end of the Great War, and although they tell you it happened because Germany had been defeated, historians admit that isn't really true. In reality, nothing had been decided in the War, and in October there was supposed to have been a decisive naval battle between Germany and England—a battle most (in the lower ranks) in England expected to occur. The fact that it didn't occur is one of the great mysteries of the War. Instead of fighting this great battle, Germany decided instead to collapse into a heap. We are told that sailors and then workers revolted, and that almost immediately Emperor [Kaiser] Wilhelm II abdicated and fled the country. Of course none of that makes any sense, either. It is claimed that Hindenburg and Ludendorff were running the country at the time. Hindenburg was a Field Marshall and Ludendorff a General of the Army, so if what we have been told about them is true, it is unlikely they would lead or allow a revolution right on the cusp of a decisive battle. Obviously, something happened in November 1918 we aren't being told about. Notice that we are never told who these November Criminals were. I encourage you to study all the interlinked pages at Wikipedia on this subject. Study the textbooks and the history books. They are all misdirection. Such major revolutions require leaders, but we are never told who the leaders were or how the revolution proceeded so quickly. For instance, go to the page for the Weimar Republic. We get nothing on the question until Philipp Scheidemann declares the Weimar Republic on November 9. Normally a successful revolution requires more than a declaration. I can tell the truth is being hidden just by the form the mainstream story takes. It reads like a lie because you aren't told the things you expect to be told in a sensible story. You are told the leaders after the revolution, but not before, for instance. The entire revolution is sold to you as taking place in less than one week, with no leaders. It is just glossed over as a fait accompli, although of course an important revolution like this is never a fait accompli, much less something that can happen in a week. We are told that the revolution was achieved simply by a few discontented sailors revolting around Halloween, and a week later the Kaiser fled the country. And you believe that? For a start, notice the date. Halloween. This curious event allegedly took place on Halloween. We are told the German naval fleet planned to attack the English fleet on the morning of Halloween. Instead, some sailors mutinied. That by itself is a sign this story is a fake. See my previous papers, where we see Military Intelligence running many fake events on Halloween. Another sign is that they admit only a few sailors mutinied and that “the mutineers gave up and were led away without resistance”. If the small mutinies were immediately quashed, how could they end up leading to nationwide revolt and the fall of the monarchy? It makes no sense. Only successful mutinies could lead to a nationwide revolt. Here is your next clue: The squadron commander Vice-Admiral Kraft carried out a maneuver with his battleships in Heligoland Bight. The maneuver was successful, and he believed that he had regained control of his crews. While moving through the Kiel Canal, he had 47 of the crew of the SMS Markgraf, who were seen as the ringleaders, imprisoned. Why did I quote that? Do you see it? The number 47. That is one of the signals of Intelligence, as I have shown you again and again. You will tell me, “This was before 1947 and the start of the CIA, so they could not have been referring to that later event”. No, they could not have been referring to that later event, if this story had been written at the time. But it wasn't. It was written later to retell and hide all those events in 1918. All this fake history has massive signs of later pawing, as I am showing you. We will see the number 47 several more times below. And more nonsense: The sailors were now looking for closer ties to the unions, the USPD and the SPD. Thereupon the Union House was closed by police, leading to an even larger joint open air meeting on 2 November. If the police had closed the Union House, then why would the police or navy allow an open air meeting of sailors and Socialists? It is impossible. In such conditions, the sailors would have been confined to quarters, and any sailors wandering from their posts would have been shot on sight as deserters or mutineers. And it continues: Sub-Lieutenant Steinhäuser, in order to stop the demonstrators, ordered his patrol to fire warning shots and then to shoot directly into the demonstration. Seven people were killed and 29 severely injured. Some demonstrators also opened fire. Steinhäuser himself was seriously injured by rifle-butt blows and shots, but contrary to later statements, he was not killed.[12] After this eruption, the demonstrators as well as the patrol dispersed. Nevertheless, the mass protest turned into a general revolt. Again, any person with any knowledge of the military or of history or of anything else can see that is not believable. The patrol would not disperse unless it was utterly defeated, and we have no indication of that. Military patrols trying to quash an uprising do not just disperse just because “some demonstrators opened fire”. If this event happened at all, we should assume most or all of those killed or injured were demonstrators, not members of the military. In which case there would be no reason for the patrol to disperse. And if an officer like Steinhauser had really been injured, reinforcements would have immediately been sent in. This was during war time, and the entire German military was already mobilized. There is no way a few fake Socialists were going to defeat the German military during the war. The very idea is so asinine it passes belief. As usual, the fake historians are piecing together completely irrational histories—and peppering them with spook numerology—and expecting you to swallow them. Also notice you are expected to swallow this alliance between sailors and Marxists. Then as now, military men would have no interest in allying with Marxists, which they would see as a group of pompous Intellectuals and armchair philosophers. Soldiers are by and large patriots—albeit naïve ones —and they would have no truck with these transparent fake revolutionaries, many of whom weren't even German. These young men in the navy would have been brought up under the monarchy and been taught all the proper salutes to that. Once in the navy, the same applies, and they would have had the current patriotism drilled into them, including a violent distaste for any foreign revolutionaries or leftist academics. Nonetheless, we are expected to believe this: SPD deputy Gustav Noske arrived in Kiel and was welcomed enthusiastically, although he had orders from the new government and the SPD leadership to bring the uprising under control. He had himself elected chairman of the soldiers' council and reinstated peace and order. Some days later he took over the governor's post, while Lothar Popp of the USPD became chairman of the overall soldiers' council. During the following weeks Noske succeeded in reducing the influence of the councils in Kiel, but he could not prevent the spread of the revolution throughout Germany. The events had already spread far beyond the city limits of Kiel. Wait, this is just November 4, so where did the “new government” come from? Aren't they getting a little ahead of themselves? Shouldn't you have a revolution before a new government? But here, the new government has already installed itself somewhere before the revolution. And what does it mean, “He had himself elected”? How do you have yourself elected? And why would he wish to reinstate peace and order? If what we are told is true, he would need to quickly accelerate the revolution, which could not be achieved through peace. And more misdirection: “He could not prevent the spread of revolution.” As a Marxist, why would he want to? His only hope was to spread it, right? Nonetheless, “the events had already spread far beyond the limits of Kiel”.
Recommended publications
  • Armenian Genocide and the Jewish Holocaust: from Impunity to Retributive Justice*
    The Historical and Legal Interconnections Between the Armenian Genocide and the Jewish Holocaust: From Impunity to Retributive Justice* Vahakn N. Dadrian I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 504 II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND AFTERMATH OF THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE ............... 507 A. Outlines of the Problem .......................................................................... 507 B. Conflict in the U.S. Government Regarding the Lausanne Treaty ........................ 511 M. COMPARATIVE ASPECTS OF THE TwO CASES ........................................................... 517 A. The Historical Vulnerability of the Jews and Armenians to Victimization ............... 517 B. The Factorsof Power and Opportunity........................................................ 519 C. Strategiesfor Taking Advantage of the Opportunity Structure ............................ 521 1. The Use of Wartime Emergency Powers by the Executive ......................... 521 2. The Role of PoliticalParties ........................................................... 524 3. Trial Balloons ............................................................................. 529 IV. THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE AS A PRECEDENT AND A PRECURSOR OF THE HOLOCAUST ........... 531 A. Nazi Germany's Knowledge of the Fate of the Armenians ................................. 532 B. Hitler'sAppreciation of the Armenian Genocide............................................. 537 C. The Legacy of Genghis Kum as a Functional
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 5. Between Gleichschaltung and Revolution
    Chapter 5 BETWEEN GLEICHSCHALTUNG AND REVOLUTION In the summer of 1935, as part of the Germany-wide “Reich Athletic Com- petition,” citizens in the state of Schleswig-Holstein witnessed the following spectacle: On the fi rst Sunday of August propaganda performances and maneuvers took place in a number of cities. Th ey are supposed to reawaken the old mood of the “time of struggle.” In Kiel, SA men drove through the streets in trucks bearing … inscriptions against the Jews … and the Reaction. One [truck] carried a straw puppet hanging on a gallows, accompanied by a placard with the motto: “Th e gallows for Jews and the Reaction, wherever you hide we’ll soon fi nd you.”607 Other trucks bore slogans such as “Whether black or red, death to all enemies,” and “We are fi ghting against Jewry and Rome.”608 Bizarre tableau were enacted in the streets of towns around Germany. “In Schmiedeberg (in Silesia),” reported informants of the Social Democratic exile organization, the Sopade, “something completely out of the ordinary was presented on Sunday, 18 August.” A no- tice appeared in the town paper a week earlier with the announcement: “Reich competition of the SA. On Sunday at 11 a.m. in front of the Rathaus, Sturm 4 R 48 Schmiedeberg passes judgment on a criminal against the state.” On the appointed day, a large crowd gathered to watch the spectacle. Th e Sopade agent gave the setup: “A Nazi newspaper seller has been attacked by a Marxist mob. In the ensuing melee, the Marxists set up a barricade.
    [Show full text]
  • Geschichte Des Nationalsozialismus
    Ernst Piper Ernst Ernst Piper Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus Von den Anfängen bis heute Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus Band 10264 Ernst Piper Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus Schriftenreihe Band 10291 Ernst Piper Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus Von den Anfängen bis heute Ernst Piper, 1952 in München geboren, lebt heute in Berlin. Er ist apl. Professor für Neuere Geschichte an der Universität Potsdam, Herausgeber mehrerer wissenschaft- licher Reihen und Autor zahlreicher Bücher zur Geschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhun- derts. Zuletzt erschienen Nacht über Europa. Kulturgeschichte des Ersten Weltkriegs (2014), 1945 – Niederlage und Neubeginn (2015) und Rosa Luxemburg. Ein Leben (2018). Diese Veröffentlichung stellt keine Meinungsäußerung der Bundeszentrale fürpolitische Bildung dar. Für die inhaltlichen Aussagen trägt der Autor die Verantwortung. Wir danken allen Lizenzgebenden für die freundlich erteilte Abdruckgenehmigung. Die In- halte der im Text und im Anhang zitierten Internetlinks unterliegen der Verantwor- tung der jeweiligen Anbietenden; für eventuelle Schäden und Forderungen überneh- men die Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung / bpb sowie der Autor keine Haftung. Bonn 2018 © Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung Adenauerallee 86, 53113 Bonn Projektleitung: Hildegard Bremer, bpb Lektorat: Verena Artz Umschlagfoto: © ullstein bild – Fritz Eschen, Januar 1945: Hausfassade in Berlin-Wilmersdorf Umschlaggestaltung, Satzherstellung und Layout: Naumilkat – Agentur für Kommunikation und Design, Düsseldorf Druck: Druck und Verlagshaus Zarbock GmbH & Co. KG, Frankfurt / Main ISBN: 978-3-7425-0291-9 www.bpb.de Inhalt Einleitung 7 I Anfänge 18 II Kampf 72 III »Volksgemeinschaft« 136 IV Krieg 242 V Schuld 354 VI Erinnerung 422 Anmerkungen 450 Zeittafel 462 Abkürzungen 489 Empfehlungen zur weiteren Lektüre 491 Bildnachweis 495 5 Einleitung Dieses Buch ist eine Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus, keine deutsche Geschichte des 20.
    [Show full text]
  • Page | 32 Anglisticum Journal (IJLLIS), Volume: 10 | Issue: 6 | June 2021  E-ISSN: 1857-8187  P-ISSN: 1857-8179 Suspended
    June 2021 e-ISSN: 1857-8187 p-ISSN: 1857-8179 https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5084928 August 2017 e-ISSN: 1857-8187 p-ISSN: 1857-8179 Research Article History THE HUNGARIAN BEER HALL PUTSCH Keywords: radical right-wing organisations, coup d'état, political THE SZEMERE–BOBULA–ULAIN COUP PLAN, 1923 violence, irredentism, anti- Semitism. Balázs Kántás National Archives of Hungary Abstract The years following World War One belonged to a crisis period when political extremities strengthened throughout Europe. In Hungary, it was also the peak of the radical right wing, and some radical political circles even planned coups d’état against the conservative government that was working on the political consolidation of Hungary. A group of radical right-wing politicians led by Member of the Parliament Ferenc Ulain who had been in confidential contact with German radical right-wing movements and politicians (Adolf Hitler and General Erich Ludendorff among them) decided to execute a takeover attempt in 1923, with the help of Bavarian paramilitary movements, harmonizing their plans with the Munich Beer Hall Putsch being in preparation. The present research article makes an attempt to reconstruct this strange chapter of Hungarian political history. Although domestic policy of Hungary was fully determined by British and French interests after the signing of the Peace Treaty of Trianon, secret negotiations with radical right-wing German and Austrian organizations, which went back to 1919, continued for a time in 1921 and 1922 with less intensity than before. The Bethlen Government continued to maintain moderate contacts with German radical right-wing politicians, including former Bavarian Premier and later Commissioner General Gustav von Kahr, General Erich Ludendorff and Adolf Hitler, who was then an emerging and very ambitious young far-right politician in Munich, the centre of the German radical right-wing movements.
    [Show full text]
  • The Kpd and the Nsdap: a Sttjdy of the Relationship Between Political Extremes in Weimar Germany, 1923-1933 by Davis William
    THE KPD AND THE NSDAP: A STTJDY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL EXTREMES IN WEIMAR GERMANY, 1923-1933 BY DAVIS WILLIAM DAYCOCK A thesis submitted for the degree of Ph.D. The London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London 1980 1 ABSTRACT The German Communist Party's response to the rise of the Nazis was conditioned by its complicated political environment which included the influence of Soviet foreign policy requirements, the party's Marxist-Leninist outlook, its organizational structure and the democratic society of Weimar. Relying on the Communist press and theoretical journals, documentary collections drawn from several German archives, as well as interview material, and Nazi, Communist opposition and Social Democratic sources, this study traces the development of the KPD's tactical orientation towards the Nazis for the period 1923-1933. In so doing it complements the existing literature both by its extension of the chronological scope of enquiry and by its attention to the tactical requirements of the relationship as viewed from the perspective of the KPD. It concludes that for the whole of the period, KPD tactics were ambiguous and reflected the tensions between the various competing factors which shaped the party's policies. 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE abbreviations 4 INTRODUCTION 7 CHAPTER I THE CONSTRAINTS ON CONFLICT 24 CHAPTER II 1923: THE FORMATIVE YEAR 67 CHAPTER III VARIATIONS ON THE SCHLAGETER THEME: THE CONTINUITIES IN COMMUNIST POLICY 1924-1928 124 CHAPTER IV COMMUNIST TACTICS AND THE NAZI ADVANCE, 1928-1932: THE RESPONSE TO NEW THREATS 166 CHAPTER V COMMUNIST TACTICS, 1928-1932: THE RESPONSE TO NEW OPPORTUNITIES 223 CHAPTER VI FLUCTUATIONS IN COMMUNIST TACTICS DURING 1932: DOUBTS IN THE ELEVENTH HOUR 273 CONCLUSIONS 307 APPENDIX I VOTING ALIGNMENTS IN THE REICHSTAG 1924-1932 333 APPENDIX II INTERVIEWS 335 BIBLIOGRAPHY 341 4 ABBREVIATIONS 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Document Contains 1,126 Words
    No. 19-351 ================================================================================================================ In The Supreme Court of the United States --------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, a foreign state, and STIFTUNG PREUSSICHER KULTURBESITZ, Petitioners, v. ALAN PHILIPP, et al., Respondents. --------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- On Writ of Certiorari To The United States Court of Appeals For The D.C. Circuit --------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- JOINT APPENDIX --------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- JONATHAN M. FREIMAN NICHOLAS M. O’DONNELL Counsel of Record Counsel of Record TADHG DOOLEY ERIKA L. TODD BENJAMIN M. DANIELS SULLIVAN & WORCESTER LLP DAVID R. ROTH One Post Office Square WIGGIN AND DANA LLP Boston, MA 02109 265 Church Street (617) 338-2814 P.O. Box 1832 [email protected] New Haven, CT 06508-1832 Counsel for Respondents (203) 498-4400 [email protected] DAVID L. HALL WIGGIN AND DANA LLP Two Liberty Place 50 S. 16th Street Suite 2925 Philadelphia, PA 19102 (215) 998-8310 Counsel for Petitioners Petition For Certiorari Filed September 16, 2019 Certiorari Granted July 2, 2020 ================================================================================================================ COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964 WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Relevant Docket Entries from the United States District Court for the District
    [Show full text]
  • Catholicism and the Roots of Nazism: Religious Identity and National Socialism'
    H-German Weir on Hastings, 'Catholicism and the Roots of Nazism: Religious Identity and National Socialism' Review published on Wednesday, November 3, 2010 Derek Hastings. Catholicism and the Roots of Nazism: Religious Identity and National Socialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 312 S. $29.95 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-19-539024-7. Reviewed by Todd Weir (Queen's University, Belfast) Published on H-German (November, 2010) Commissioned by Benita Blessing Was the Early NSDAP a Confessional Party? Given the growing number of studies charting the complicity of segments of the Protestant lay and clerical leadership with National Socialism, it comes as no surprise that historians are also turning up skeletons in the closet of Germany's Catholic community. What is surprising about Derek Hastings's monograph is the time frame he charts for Catholic complicity with the Nazi movement. Whereas the course of Protestant entanglement appears as an ascending line through the final phase of the Weimar Republic, Hastings argues that Catholic involvement with the Nazi movement was substantial and even critical in the first years of the movement, until relations soured in the run-up to and aftermath of the "Beer Hall Putsch" of October 1923. Thereafter both the NSDAP and the Catholic Church were happy to sweep the memory of this interlude under the carpet. Hastings begins his study by alerting the reader to the peculiarities of Catholic politics in Bavaria, and particularly in its capital. Although predominantly Catholic, the voters of Munich gave the Center Party a scant 15.9 percent of their votes in the Reichstag election of 1912.
    [Show full text]
  • Cinema and the Swastika
    Cinema and the Swastika October-2010 MAC/CIN Page-i 9780230_238572_01_prexxiv Also by Roel Vande Winkel NAZI NEWSREEL PROPAGANDA IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR Also by David Welch NAZI PROPAGANDA: The Powers and the Limitations PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN CINEMA 1933–45 THE THIRD REICH: Politics and Propaganda HITLER: Profile of a Dictator October-2010 MAC/CIN Page-ii 9780230_238572_01_prexxiv Cinema and the Swastika The International Expansion of Third Reich Cinema Edited by Roel Vande Winkel and David Welch October-2010 MAC/CIN Page-iii 9780230_238572_01_prexxiv © Editorial matter, selection, introduction and chapter 1 © Roel Vande Winkel and David Welch, 2007, 2011 All remaining chapters © their respective authors 2007, 2011 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published in hardback 2007 and this paperback edition 2011 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.
    [Show full text]
  • A Hamburg Childhood: the Early Life of Herbert Bernstein
    1HAAGAN_FMT 09/10/03 4:12 PM A HAMBURG CHILDHOOD: THE EARLY LIFE OF HERBERT BERNSTEIN PAUL H. HAAGEN* On the evening of April 19, 2001, Herbert Bernstein’s wife, Wal- traud, decided to watch Schindler’s List, and she invited Herbert to join her. That evening, her mind was very much on the past, because the following day would be the anniversary of Hitler’s birthday.1 Herbert told her that he could not, that he had too much work to do. The following day he had to teach his final two classes of the term, and he still had to do last minute revisions on the manuscript of the book he was writing with Joseph Lookofsky, the second edition of Understanding the CISG in Europe. As the evening wore on, how- ever, the lure of the movie and of the chance to spend the evening with Waltraud proved too strong and he left his study to join her. The movie, which is powerful enough for audiences with little connec- tion to that time and place,2 deeply moved Herbert, who had strong ties of memory with both. He slept very fitfully that night.3 No one who encountered him the next morning would have had any sense of the burden of that past on him. I suspect that none of his colleagues were aware that it was Hitler’s birthday. If there were those who were, theirs would have been an intellectual or political awareness, not a personal one. Unlike Herbert, they had not lived Copyright © 2003 by Paul H.
    [Show full text]
  • The Stormtrooper Family
    THE STORMTROOPER FAMILY : HOW SEXUALITY , S PIRITUALITY , AND COMMUNITY SHAPED THE HAMBURG SA A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History By Andrew Wackerfuss, M.A. Washington, DC December 15, 2008 Copyright 2008 by Andrew Wackerfuss All Rights Reserved ii THE STORMTROOPER FAMILY : HOW SEXUALITY , SPIRITUALITY , AND COMMUNITY SHAPED THE HAMBURG SA Andrew Wackerfuss, M.A. Thesis Advisor: Roger Chickering, Ph.D. ABSTRACT The dissertation explains the attraction of the stormtroopers ( Sturmabteilung ; SA), the Nazis’ paramilitary band of “political soldiers” in the city of Hamburg. It argues that social networks and personal relationships – including family ties, religious affiliations, and sexual bonds among stormtroopers – represented the primary means of recruiting and integrating new members into the Nazi movement. The SA emphasized the social, emotional, and political benefits that young men could accrue by joining the group, which established an array of social welfare systems during the dismal days of the depression. In return for food and housing, male camaraderie, a sense of ersatz family, and the promise of social and economic integration into the local community, young stormtroopers became the Party’s foot soldiers. SA pubs and barracks were simultaneously places of refuge and sites of violence, where the stormtroopers were taught to strive for a sacrificial death that Party propagandists could use to argue for Nazi heroism, Communist criminality, and republican inability to maintain order in the German state. Hamburg’s stormtroopers claimed to defend their communities and families.
    [Show full text]
  • Nietzsche and the Nazis Antipodes Or Ideological Kin?: Articulating Chasms and Connections
    University of Montana ScholarWorks at University of Montana Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers Graduate School 1999 Nietzsche and the Nazis antipodes or ideological kin?: Articulating chasms and connections Mathew M. Stevenson The University of Montana Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd Let us know how access to this document benefits ou.y Recommended Citation Stevenson, Mathew M., "Nietzsche and the Nazis antipodes or ideological kin?: Articulating chasms and connections" (1999). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 5589. https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/5589 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Maureen and Mike MANSFIELD LIBRARY The University ofMONTANA Permission is granted by the author to reproduce this material in its entirety, provided that this material is used for scholarly purposes and is properly cited in published works and reports. ** Please check "Yes" or "No" and provide signature ** Yes, I grant permission __ No, I do not grant permission ____ Author's Signature Date Y , *Z<30C)_______________ Any copying for commercial purposes or financial gain may be undertaken only with the author's explicit consent. Nietzsche and the Nazis, Antipodes or Ideological Kin?: Articulating Chasms and Connections by Mathew M. Stevenson B.A. The University of Montana, 1996 presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts The University of Montana 1999 Approved by: Chairperson Dean, Graduate School t-S'-oo Date UMI Number: EP41053 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
    [Show full text]
  • The Einwohnerwehr, Bund Bayern Und Reich, and the Limits of Paramilitary Politics in Bavaria, 1918-1928 Roy G
    University of Nebraska - Lincoln DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln Dissertations, Theses, & Student Research, History, Department of Department of History 4-2010 Conservative Radicals: The Einwohnerwehr, Bund Bayern und Reich, and the Limits of Paramilitary Politics in Bavaria, 1918-1928 Roy G. Koepp University of Nebraska - Lincoln Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/historydiss Part of the History Commons Koepp, Roy G., "Conservative Radicals: The Einwohnerwehr, Bund Bayern und Reich, and the Limits of Paramilitary Politics in Bavaria, 1918-1928" (2010). Dissertations, Theses, & Student Research, Department of History. 29. http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/historydiss/29 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the History, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, & Student Research, Department of History by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. Conservative Radicals: The Einwohnerwehr, Bund Bayern und Reich, and the Limits of Paramilitary Politics in Bavaria, 1918-1928 By Roy G. Koepp A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of The Graduate College at the University of Nebraska In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Major: History Under the Supervision of Professor Alan E. Steinweis Lincoln, Nebraska April 2010 Conservative Radicals: The Einwohnerwehr, Bund Bayern und Reich, and the Limits of Paramilitary Politics in Bavaria, 1918-1928 Roy George Koepp, Ph.D. University of Nebraska, 2010 Advisor: Alan E. Steinweis In the years after the First World War numerous paramilitary organizations were set up in Bavaria with the expressed purpose of preventing a communist revolution in the state.
    [Show full text]