A Failed Nazism: the Rise and Fall of the Deutschvölkische Freiheitspartei, 1919-1928

Home , Blood and Soil, Die PARTEI, Fascist paramilitary, German Party (Slovakia), Hermann Esser, Julius Langbehn

A FAILED NAZISM: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE DEUTSCHVÖLKISCHE FREIHEITSPARTEI, 1919-1928

A thesis submitted to Kent State University in partial Fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts

Ilya Braverman

May, 2012

Thesis written by Ilya Braverman B.A., University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2010 M.A., Kent State University, 2012

Approved by

______, Richard Steigmann-Gall, Advisor

______, Kenneth J. Bindas, Chair, Department of History

______, Timothy Moerland, Dean, College of Arts and

Sciences

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... iv

ABBREVIATIONS...... vi

INTRODUCTION...... 1

CHAPTER I The Radicalization of the German Right and the Rise of the 'Nazistic' DVFP...... 20

CHAPTER II The NSDAP, DVFP and Nazi Ideologies: A Comparative Examination...... 57

CHAPTER III An Organizational Examination of the DVFP-NSDAP Relationship, 1922- 1928...... 103

CONCLUSION...... 141

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 148

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

During what seems a short period of time that I have spent here at Kent State

University, I have become indebted to a large collection of individuals, without whom this thesis would have been a far less enjoyable and fruitful experience. First, I would like to thank my committee members. I am grateful to my advisor, Dr. Richard Steigmann-

Gall, Associate Professor of history at Kent State University, whose trust in this project and in my abilities was a constant source of motivation during the last year. The suggestion to write on the Deutschvölkische Freiheitspartei was his, and at every step after our initial discussion of the project he was there to help, guide and most importantly, listen. My advisor's unwavering trust in this work was matched by Dr.

Shelley Baranowski, Distinguished Professor of history at the University of Akron, who agreed to serve on the committee without hesitation, and whose support and enthusiasm to help was felt immediately and throughout. I am indebted to Dr. Matthew Crawford,

Assistant Professor of history at Kent State University, for taking on a project that was considerably outside his area of expertise, yet one which he has influenced immensely.

Thank you for your patience, honesty, and conversation.

Many others have been influential in the completion of this project during the last year. This thesis developed from a seminar paper I wrote in spring 2011 and I must thank

Dr. Kenneth J. Bindas, Professor and Chair of the history department at Kent State

University and the participants of his writing seminar for their constructive and honest feedback. I must also thank the staff of the Bundesarchiv Berlin Lichterfelde for helping a clueless American find pertinent material and navigate the complicated hurdles of doing research in a foreign country. I am indebted to Ms. Sarah Žabić, without whom this project would have doubtless turned out much poorer. Thank you for always being there when I needed a question answered or an idea further developed and for offering a critical reading at a moment's notice. Thank you to Emily Wicks for motivating me to stay on task in my coursework and with this project. To my colleagues in Bowman 205, thank you for your conversation, feedback, and support. The last two years would have been difficult without your friendship. On a more personal note, to my parents, thank you for your continuous trust and support. Finally, I am forever indebted to Kelsey Bayer for her endless support of this project and of my endeavors over the last two years. Thank you for making our time in Kent as enjoyable as it has been.

ABBREVIATIONS

BAL Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde

DAP Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (German Workers' Party)

DNVP Deutschnationale Volkspartei (German National People's Party)

DVAG Deutschvölkische Arbeitsgemeinschaft (German National Workers' Group)

DVFB Deutschvölkische Freiheitsbewegung (German National Freedom Movement)

DVFP Deutschvölkische Freiheitspartei (German Volkisch Freedom Party)

GVG Groβdeutsche Volkspartei (Greater German People's Party)

NSDAP Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist German Workers' Party)

VB Volkischer Beobachter (Völkisch Observer)

VNS Verband der Nationalistischen Soldaten (Federation of Nationalist Soldiers)

VSB Völkische Sozialer Block (Völkisch Social Bloc)

INTRODUCTION

“In all of Europe, only National Socialism has really taken seriously the idea of the folkish state” proclaimed Alfred Rosenberg in 1924.1 Rosenberg went on to claim that the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP), was not one of many but rather the leading voice of the völkisch movement. Rosenberg's statements—though unmistakably intended as propaganda—masked the reality of the NSDAP's formative years. By the early 1920s, the politically mobilized völkisch movement—of which the

NSDAP was a part—had in its ranks numerous political parties, organizations, and groups, sharing a nominally similar worldview. As merely one of a variety of parties, the

Bavarian NSDAP sought to work in cooperation with its völkisch allies to fundamentally change the Weimar system, first through violent revolution and later through more traditional political means. The party's ideology, what has since become known as

Nazism, similar to the party itself was not a unique formulation. Rather, the NSDAP subscribed to a political and social worldview that had its roots in the radicalization of the

German right wing prior to the revolution of 1918, and was further radicalized by defeat in war and the implementation of a parliamentary democracy in 1919. Formed in 1922, the Berlin-based Deutschvölkische Freiheitspartei (DVFP) emerged as another voice

1 Barbara Miller Lane and Leila J. Rupp, eds., Nazi Ideology before 1933: A Documentation (Austin & London: University of Texas Press, 1978), 65.

within an expanding völkisch movement. The party subscribed to an ideology that was visibly similar to that of the NSDAP, a 'Nazistic' ideology that was rooted in German conservatism yet radicalized by a völkisch disposition. The rivalrous relationship between the northern DVFP and the southern NSDAP during the years 1922-1928, a story that has rarely been told, reflects the variety of Nazistic voices that existed during the Weimar period; more significantly this story reminds us that the rise of the NSDAP to power was far from a foregone conclusion during its formative years.

This thesis explores the tension that existed within the German völkisch right wing after World War I, between the better-known NSDAP, and a frequently overlooked ideological and institutional rival, the DVFP. Out of the resultant political, social, and cultural chaos of the post-World War I era emerged a plethora of parties set on restoring

Germany's honor after its humiliating defeat. These groups, among which was the DVFP, constituted the rise of a particular discourse centered on right-wing politics, hyper- nationalism, anti-Semitism, and racialism. Yet, the rise of the NSDAP as the voice of the völkisch movement out of this amalgam of parties was not a foregone conclusion.

Moreover, what is referred to as a ‘Nazistic’ discourse was not devoid of variation.

Indeed, political and ideological disparities existed between the parties, and came to the forefront especially as relationships between the parties grew stronger, and the Weimar government grew weaker. As ‘Nazistic’ parties, although connected by a familial thread of shared worldviews, the DVFP and NSDAP differed in their approach to the problems facing Germany, and presented disparate solutions to them. In this thesis, I demonstrate that the DVFP represented a singular strand within a spectrum of Nazism, and while it 3

fractured, and was coalesced by the NSDAP in 1928, it developed on a divergent path within a völkisch movement which did not logically lead to the creation of Hitler's Third

Reich. I utilize the relationship between the DVFP and the NSDAP—growing from outright competition to cooperation—to showcase the plurality of 'Nazistic' movements and ideologies within the extreme right, as well as to examine the similarities and fault lines between the two parties. Constructing a model of a failed 'Nazistic' political group, one that stood as a fraternal rival to the NSDAP at the forefront of the extreme right, will help to elucidate the early path towards the successful establishment of Hitler's Third

Reich.

As an institutional and intellectual history, this thesis is framed theoretically by conceptions of ideology, fascism, and regionalism. I rely on Robert O. Paxton's definition and model of fascist movements to examine the DVFP as a 'fascistic' group, one that embodied a distinctly separate fascism from that of the NSDAP. Utilizing a perspective that emphasizes regional divisions to uncover political, confessional, and class-based particularities enables a more nuanced understanding of the early political courses of both parties. Previous institutional and political studies of the early Weimar era and the

NSDAP have largely relegated 'Nazistic' parties such as the DVFP to the margins of their story, merely presenting them as a stopgap during the weakest era in the NSDAP's institutional history.2 I seek to add to the historiography of Weimar Germany by

2 This is reflected in the curiously limited discussion of the DVFP in the context of early Weimar- era völkisch parties, and especially as a legitimate rival to the young NSDAP. Meaningful discussion of the DVFP can be found in the only monographic-length study of the party: Reimer Wulff, Die Deutschvölkische Freiheitspartei, 1922-1928 (Germany: E. Mauersberger, 1968) and in David Jablonsky's 4

presenting a model of investigation that pluralizes the ideological sentiments so uniquely associated with the NSDAP, and one that highlights the role of rival fascist parties. I rely on a source base that includes speeches, local and regional newspapers, official party programmes, memos, and public pronouncements found in the Bundesarchiv-Berlin

Lichterfelde (BAL) archives, electronically and in multiple sourcebooks.3 This thesis demonstrates not only that a variety of 'Nazistic' parties or voices existed in Weimar

Germany, but that their ideological overlaps coexisted with real differences. Furthermore,

I argue that the failure of one, and success of the other was a more contingent affair than is usually supposed.

As a comparative work seeking to highlight the variety of Nazisms by examining the NSDAP and a familial rival, the DVFP, this thesis is undoubtedly a study of identity.

I define identity here as simply that which "signifies what is unique about an individual or group" as well as "what is common to a group and the individuals who compose it."4 I seek in this work to transcend a simplified generalization of the NSDAP and DVFP as radical right wing groups, by employing a more nuanced approach to their identity. The features of each group that distinguished it from others within the völkisch milieu were

The Nazi Party in Dissolution: Hitler and the Verbotzeit 1923-1925 (Totowa, N.J.: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1989).

3 This work relies heavily on newspapers such as the Völkischer Beobacther (the NSDAP party newspaper) and the Mecklenburger Warte (a publication sympathetic to the DVFP), amongst others. Admittedly, many of the sources used in this work were produced as propaganda, and with a very visible bias. In using these sources, I have attempted, where and if possible to corroborate any claims that may have been inaccurate. Yet, as this work centers on the ideology and identity of the NSDAP and DVFP— and particularly on how they themselves presented their worldviews—the biased perspective is actually useful as it allows us to more clearly understand how each party viewed itself.

4 Simon Gunn, History and Cultural Theory (Longman, 2006), 133. 5

shaped both by internal and external factors.5 By identifying their party as one of the workers', or of the middle class, as well as announcing the aims of the party publically, the NSDAP and DVFP shaped their own parties' identity. On the other hand, those who would come to compose the membership of each party, infusing their own identity with that of the party and the evolution of the party's aims due to participation in the political arena, amongst others, meant that identity was not static, but rather negotiated and re- negotiated over time. A further helpful distinction in the comparative study of both parties is that between 'nominal' and 'virtual' identity. The dichotomy between these two concepts can be explained as the difference between the name of the party, or what the party stands for (for instance, the NSDAP as the party of the workers), and "what it means to be part of that group" (in the case of the NSDAP, not simply working class but part of a cross-class, "national community").6 I argue that we can employ conceptions of regionalism and fascism to more clearly view the nuances behind the contrast in the identities of the NSDAP and DVFP.

There is a tremendously visible emphasis on national unity in studies of Nazism and the Third Reich. Scholars of modern Germany emphasize hyper-nationalism, policies of Gleichschaltung, and the idea of a Volksgemeinschaft to present Nazism as a movement and a set of ideas uncomplicated by regional diversity or particularities.7

5 A useful discussion of identity can be found in Gunn, History and Cultural Theory, 133-134.

6 Ibid, 134.

7 This seems to be the case in works that deal with the post-1933 period, when the Nazi party seized power and was able to implement its policies of Gleichschaltung and by which point its propaganda machine had become a tremendously effective tool. 6

Historian Maiken Umbach has recently attempted to bring this issue to the forefront of contemporary scholarship on Nazism.8 Rather than continue to glance over regional differences, she suggests historians reconsider the significance and role of regionalism, and the disparities associated with it during the 12-year Reich. Historians of the formative years of the NSDAP can also benefit from utilizing an approach which emphasizes regionalism, one that sees region as a significant factor in the development of Nazism. In the case of the NSDAP and DVFP, regional particularities existed and were central in both parties' organizational development and the formation of their respective ideologies.

Throughout the work I utilize an approach which emphasizes region as a significant factor in enabling the conception, growth, and spread of the DVFP and NSDAP, and their respective ideologies. Ultimately, uncovering the regional disparities between the two parties, and more centrally how these operated in their organization and the building of their worldviews, allows for a clearer view of the fault lines within the 'spectrum of

Nazism' and the Nazi-völkisch movement.

The history of the Nazi party, its development and attempts to seize power before

1933, as well as its 12 year tenure in power has become the primary case study, if not an ideal-type in studies of fascism and fascist movements. In The Anatomy of Fascism,

Robert O. Paxton overcomes differences based on geographic, political and social particularities and puts forth a model or definition of fascism, albeit one that

"encompasses its subject no better than a snapshot encompasses a person," however, one

8 Maiken Umbach, "Regionalising the Volksgemeinschaft in National Socialist Germany," (paper presented at the annual conference of the German Studies Association, Oakland, California, on September 26th 2010). 7

that is helpful to the present study.9 Paxton's definition of fascism establishes a baseline model, contending that fascism is a:

political behavior marked by obsessive preoccupation with community decline, humiliation, or victimhood and by compensatory cults of unity, energy, and purity, in which a mass-based party of committed nationalist militants, working in uneasy but effective collaboration with traditional elites, abandons democratic liberties and pursues with redemptive violence and without ethical or legal restraints goals of internal cleansing and external expansion.10 Though there exist a variety of interpretations and definitions of theoretical fascism,11 the

Nazi movement, as a nationalistic, revolutionary, paramilitary group, with a flavor of charismatic politics and a penchant for totalitarianism reflects in the eyes of many scholars an ideal-type.12

If we take up the deductive method and use Nazism as an ideal-type of fascist phenomenon, a method which aims at arriving at an ideological minimum of fascism, we can more clearly see a key fault line between the NSDAP and DVFP as two representatives of a 'Nazistic' identity. To elucidate this point further, we can employ

Paxton's five stages of fascism. Paxton's stages are: "(1) the initial creation of fascist movements; (2) their rooting as parties in a political system; (3) the acquisition of power;

9 Robert O. Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 218.

10 Ibid, 218.

11 Rather than historical fascism, that is, the study of particular manifestations of fascist movements and regimes, theoretical fascism refers to an "exercise in comparative history" which develops further "the idea of generic or universal fascism." Constantin Iordachi's introduction to his edited volume, Comparative Fascist Studies: New Perspectives (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 4-5.

12 By "ideal-type" I mean here the utilization of the deductive method to build a model of "fascism made up of as few but essential set of axioms as possible, identifying the 'core' of fascism." For a discussion on inductive versus deductive method, and the concept of ideal type in comparative fascist studies see: Constantin Iordachi's introduction to his edited volume, Comparative Fascist Studies, 17. 8

(4) the exercise of power; and, finally, in the longer term, (5) radicalization or entropy."13

The comparative study is only useful to us, according to Paxton, if we can identify groups that have reached the second stage. It is exactly the second stage, "rooting-in which a fascist movement becomes a party capable of acting decisively on the political scene—

[which] happens relatively rarely," that is of most use to the present study.14 Both the

NSDAP and DVFP developed as political parties that displayed some, if not all, characteristics of a fascist movement. Yet, the failure of one, and the relative success of the other by 1928 becomes clearer when these fascist, or 'fascistic' inclinations are examined further and in relation to each other. This work utilizes both the methodological and theoretical contributions made by scholars of comparative fascism, employing these to more clearly understand the development and rise to power of the NSDAP at the expense of a variety of other, similar parties, among them the DVFP.

As this work charts and compares ideological dispositions, it is important to define certain terms from the outset. The term völkisch is one without a clear English definition, yet one that is central to this, and to any study of the early Weimar Republic.

Here, I subscribe to George L. Mosse's definition of völkisch as:

an attitude toward life... an ideology which stood opposed to the progress and modernization that transformed nineteenth-century Europe...[ using] romanticism to provide an alternative to modernity, to the developing industrial and urban civilization which seemed to rob man of his individual, creative self while cutting him loose from a social order that was seemingly exhausted and lacking vitality. [This ideology] revitalized the social framework by charging it with the energy of the Volk [nation or people]...it was imperative that the individual be a member of

13 Robert O. Paxton, "The Five Stages of Fascism" in "Comparative Fascist Studies, 173.

14 Ibid, 174. 9

the Volk unit. This process of thought answered the problem of alienation from society by positing a suprasocial unity to which it was vital to belong...Thus rootedness, both in nature and in the history of the Volk's evolution, was viewed as the regenerative natural state of man which transformed the individual into a creative being—while this state also reconstructed the contemporary nation according to the model of the Volk.15

The term völkisch retained its ideological underpinnings from its early roots in nineteenth century romanticism, through its politicization during the Wilhelmine period, up to the period immediately after World War I. The signing of the Weimar Constitution in August of 1919 changed German political representation as it allowed for virtually any party (new or old) to gain seats in the Reichstag based on the amount of votes they received. A surge of political parties formed on both sides of the political spectrum with the signing of the constitution, with interest groups on both extremes of the spectrum gaining most from such a political process. Extreme right wing parties embraced völkisch ideology as it advocated for a romanticized return to previous conditions, socially, politically and culturally. It is such a politicized version of the term völkisch that I use in this work. By the early 1920s, the völkisch movement had visibly influenced the German political right, its ideological tenets having infiltrated the political platforms of the traditional conservatives and influenced the creation of a variety of interest groups formed around the völkisch worldview. Both the NSDAP and DVFP presented themselves as völkisch parties, or part of the völkisch movement in the 1920s, the

15 George L. Mosse. The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York: The Universal Library Grosset & Dunlap, 1964), 16-17. Admittedly, Mosse's definition is one that stresses völkisch as a reactionary feeling. Scholars have largely moved away from an understanding of Nazism and its völkisch roots as being merely reactionary, highlighting the variety of ways in which Nazism was in fact modern. See: Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich (Cambridge University Press, 1986). 10

NSDAP only later attempting to distance itself from a movement they saw as unable to achieve political power.

I use the terms 'Nazistic' and 'fascistic' descriptively throughout the work to refer to the DVFP and their ideology. First, I label the DVFP 'Nazistic' due to its significant ideological overlaps with the worldview of the NSDAP (this is directly explored in chapter 1, "The Radicalization of the German Right and the 'Nazistic' DVFP"). In constructing this label I consider not only a political agenda or disposition, but more centrally the Weltanschauung, that is to say, worldview, of the group. The seemingly unique blend of nationalism, socialism, racialism, and anti-Semitism was not invented by the NSDAP, but rather was widely advocated within the völkisch right wing, even if some aspects were emphasized over others.16 As such, I describe the DVFP as a 'Nazistic' party one that formulated an ideology greatly similar to that of the NSDAP, borrowing from the same collection of ideas that had come to characterize the völkisch right wing through the Wilhelmine period, and the revolutions of 1918-1919. The organization and worldviews of the DVFP and NSDAP were underscored by their visible embrace of fascism. Under the term 'Nazistic' I also incorporate the fascist-leaning of both parties. In other words, I define the Nazistic worldview has having an underlying fascist nature.

Both in its aesthetic (image) and framework (ideology), the NSDAP reflected a purer

16 Scholars of late have admitted as much, yet have not inspired much exploration of the role of other proponents of a similar worldview, including the DVFP. See for instance Lee McGowan's chapter titled "The Extreme Right" in Weimar and Nazi Germany: Continuities and Discontinuities, Panikos Panayi, ed. (Longman, 2001). See also Richard J. Evans' section on "The Rise of Nazism" in his The Coming of the Third Reich which contributes a significant narrative of the infancy of the party. Evans admits from the outset that "The triumph of Nazism was far from a foregone conclusion right up to the early months of 1933," yet, his section on the rise of the NSDAP curiously lacks a discussion of the DVFP. Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), 155-230. 11

form of fascism, as has been defined by scholars since.17 In the case of the DVFP, the party displayed a unique blend of fascistic inclinations, emphasizing similar ideological tropes, while never replicating the fascist aesthetic of its Bavarian counterpart. Thus, I utilize the term 'fascistic' in this work to refer to the DVFP's identity as a fascist movement based both on a so-called 'fascist minimum' which has emerged from decades of scholarly research on fascism, as well as in relation to the NSDAP. The term 'fascistic' allows us to transcend a simplistic labeling of the two parties, one, the NSDAP, as fascist, and the other, the DVFP, as not fascist. Rather, I propose we label the DVFP a 'fascistic' party, one that displayed certain key characteristics of scholars' definitions of a fascist movement, while embracing these much less than the NSDAP.

The historical narrative associated with the development of the NSDAP during what we might label its infancy, from its inception in 1919 to the elections of 1928, has remained seemingly uncontested. Perhaps inadvertently, scholars continue to highlight a

Nazi path to power that was inevitable, without much, if any, competition from rival groups. Hitler's joining of the DAP in 1919, the failed Bavarian putsch of 1923, and uninspiring election results in 1924 and 1928 represent the modest pre-history of a Nazi regime that would come to power in 1933, as well as the key events of this part of the larger historical narrative on the NSDAP. Richard J. Evans, in his masterful three volume study of the Third Reich, devotes the entirety of the first volume to the rise of Nazism wherein he charts the pre-history of the NSDAP, negating the controversial Sonderweg

17 Iordachi, Comparative Fascist Studies, 13-27. 12

thesis and providing a much more nuanced view of the rise of Nazism. In the aptly named

The Coming of the Third Reich Evans suggests that the Weimar period in German history saw the spread of post-war depression exacerbated by aversions to the onset of modern art and music, political, social, and economic instability, and a growing, religiously based anti-Semitism. Through an emergent media in Germany with the proliferation of newspapers, Evans argues that "there seemed to be no area of society or politics that was immune from politicalization" as these sentiments were widely disseminated in German society.18 It was in response to this seeming societal decline of the immediate post-war years that Evans argues the variety of radical, right-wing, militant political groups arose.

Yet, he claims, it was no "historical accident" that it was the NSDAP that ultimately emerged as the preeminent voice.19 In a similar vein, Michael Burleigh claims that a specific strand of right-wing, hyper-nationalistic, pro-middle class, völkisch, anti-Marxist, and Christian precepts came to represent an ideology widely disseminated and accepted by a variety of groups, including the Nazi party.20 Though, as does Evans, Kershaw's view of the infancy and development of the NSDAP, as showcased in his, "The

Uniqueness of Nazism" in Comparative Fascist Studies: New Perspectives remains problematic, particularly in his methodological approach.

18 Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), 118.

19 Ibid, xxviii.

20 Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich: A New History, 1st ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001), 80-81. 13

Both Kershaw and Evans, in attempting to distance themselves from the

Sonderweg thesis admit to the existence of a variety of right wing groups, quite similar to the NSDAP, and further, that the existence of these groups complicates arguments of the inevitable rise to power of the NSDAP. Yet, each author sees a uniqueness associated with Nazism that was not present in other groups, be it the role of Hitler, as a leader with a "national mission" and "messianic allures"21 or the deep roots of Nazi ideology in the

"political and ideological traditions and developments that were specifically German in their nature."22 I do not question the validity of the above statements. In fact, as will become clear in the following chapters, I highlight areas in which the NSDAP was a different, not so much a unique, representative of the Nazistic worldview that was shared by many in the völkisch movement. The characteristics that differentiated the NSDAP from its Nazistic rivals, however, are made most clear through a comparative approach. I suggest that as scholars of Nazi Germany, we move away from an NSDAP-centric approach to study what it was that allowed for the party to emerge as the voice of the radical right by the late 1920s, and begin to pay more attention to those groups that espoused a similar worldview, rooted in the same political traditions, yet those that the

Nazi party was able to overcome as challengers.

The story of the NSDAP and DVFP is not merely one of the radical right wing in the early 1920s, but rather, it is one that is inseparable from that of the Weimar Republic

21 Ian Kershaw, "The Uniqueness of Nazism" in Iordachi, Comparative Fascist Studies, 248.

22 Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich, xxviii.

itself . The emergence and development of these two parties, though having roots that precede the establishment of Germany's first parliamentary democracy in 1919, cannot be explained without a clear understanding of the Weimar Republic. For all of its achievements the narrative of Weimar is one that emphasizes inherent failure and ultimate collapse, obscured by the period preceding it. Tremendous political, social and cultural changes marked a transition from previous periods in German history. Changes spurred by Germany's continued urbanization and modernization, the introduction of a parliamentary democracy, the move away from the system of Honoratiorenpolitik

(politics of notables) and a palpable societal malaise that followed the defeat in war characterized Weimar, according to Detlev Peukert, "a brief, headlong tour of the fascinating, and fateful, choices made possible by the modern world."23 These swift changes influenced by modernization, according to Dietrich Orlow constituted the

Republic's "built-in Achilles' heel."24 Some scholars have explained the inherent flaws of the Republic by questioning to what extent 1918 truly marked a break with the past.

Raising this question, Richard Bessel sees a continuation of political interests and agendas regardless of a new constitution, marking a "fatal weakness of the Weimar system."25 Larry Eugene Jones continues this line of thinking: "The collapse of the

Second Empire and the founding of the Weimar Republic did little to change the

23 Detlev Peukert, The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989), xiv.

24 Dietrich Orlow, History of the Nazi Party: 1919-1933 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1969), 2.

25 Richard Bessel, “Introduction” in Social change and Political Development in Weimar Germany, Richard Bessel and E.J. Feuchtwanger, eds. (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 12. 15

fundamental structure of the German party system. For although the November

Revolution witnessed the founding of three new bourgeois parties" these "represented little more than continuations of pre-war political traditions."26 Whether due to decades- long factors such as the radicalization of German politics or revolutions and political unrest spurred by defeat abroad and at home, Weimar was a "'doomed' republic."27

The theme of 'crisis' is wide-spread in Weimar historiography and is difficult to shake off according to historian Anthony McElligott. He argues that scholars have continuously utilized an approach which asks "'How was Hitler possible?'" rather than studying the period and the historical convergences which came to directly shape it.28

Scholars such as Brian E. Crim have suggested that Hitler's Third Reich was in fact "the logical outcome of the campaign of political and racial violence orchestrated by the extreme Right in postwar Germany."29 Such an approach obscures the historical context behind the rise of the NSDAP, neglecting to mention the existence of a variety of extreme right groups such as the DVFP, that actively attempted to challenge the rise to power of the NSDAP which to some may seem inevitable. We would benefit from Eric Weitz's view on such an approach, reminding us that although "[t]he conflicts and constraints of the Weimar period surely helped fuel the Nazi movement...[n]o historical event is

26 Larry Eugene Jones, "The Dissolution of the Bourgeois party System in the Weimar Republic," in Bessel, Social change and Political Development in Weimar Germany, 270-71.

27 See Peukert, The Weimar Republic.

28 Anthony McElligott, "Introduction" in The Short Oxford History of Weimar Germany, Anthony McElligott, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 6-7.

29 Brian E. Crim, "Terror From the Right: Revolutionary Terrorism and the Failure of the Weimar Republic," The Journal of Conflict Studies (2007): 61. 16

predetermined, and most certainly not the Nazi victory."30 The rise of the NSDAP and its rivals, including the DVFP, was contingent upon a variety of pre-existing foundations, both those that had been developing over the course of the preceding decades, as well as those established immediately after the defeat in war. It is important to note that for all of its structural weaknesses, the Weimar Republic did not collapse on its own, it was, as contends Weitz "pushed over the edge" by the extreme right.31 In other words, the

NSDAP and DVFP actively sought to, and did undermine the Weimar system by advocating for its destruction. The Weimar period continues to pose a challenge to historians examining the formative period of the NSDAP and similar parties. The argument of inevitability appears uncomplicated for those who pay little attention to the

NSDAP's formative years. If we are to study Nazism as both an ideology and a movement, we cannot ignore the pre-1928 period as one without significant implications for our overall understanding of the Nazi phenomenon and its place in German history.

We must place in context the rise of the NSDAP, in the crisis-laden Weimar Republic that saw the rise of a plurality of Nazistic voices alongside that of the NSDAP which made it far less unique, and its rise, far from inevitable.

Studies of the early Weimar era political arena focusing specifically on völkisch party politics and ideology are abundant. Micro-histories of a variety of political parties have been written by historians seeking to highlight not only these parties as singular

30 Eric D. Weitz, Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 5.

31 Ibid. 17

entities but to illuminate a larger growing right wing in völkisch politics. The only monograph-length examination of the DVFP, however, has been Reimer Wulff's 1968 dissertation at the University of Marburg, Die Deutschvölkische Freiheitspartei, 1922-

1928. In it, the author sets out to present "a discussion about under what circumstances and with what means and goals a party [NSDAP] facing a rival [DVFP] prevails, [one] which emanates from the same political experience" with the same "population-base and voters."32 As his examination of the DVFP unfolds, Wulff reveals to the reader the inherent antagonisms between the ideologies and supporters of the two parties, seemingly invalidating the starting point of his approach. The study presents a tremendous amount of information on a party that has largely been relegated by scholars of Nazism and the

NSDAP to the footnotes of history. Though he provides a necessary narrative of the development of the DVFP and its relationship with the NSDAP, Wulff offers minimal analysis on the disparities between both parties’ organization and worldviews. Wulff highlights the role of Hitler as the most significant disparity between the two parties, and as the key factor behind the success of one and the failure of the other. Building on

Wulff’s study, as well as on David Jablonsky’s The Nazi Party in Dissolution (1989) which provides perhaps the only, in-depth discussion of the relationship between the

DVFP and NSDAP in English, I seek to add to the minimal historiographical discussion of the DVFP as a key rival to the NSDAP during that party’s formative years.33

32 Wulff, DVFP, 5.

33 David Jablonsky, The Nazi Party in Dissolution: Hitler and the Verbotzeit 1923-1925 (Totowa, N.J.: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1989).

In the first chapter, I seek to establish a historiographical foundation to the political arena of early Weimar by focusing on the radicalization of the German Right wing during the Wilhelmine period. The growing völkisch movement had by the turn of the century penetrated German politics and influenced a visible radicalization of the traditional conservative right wing. Avoiding reading history backward, I suggest we can find the roots of both parties in this process. Moreover, I examine the worldviews of the

NSDAP and DVFP based on their political, economic, and social ideals to suggest that we can label the DVFP a Nazistic party. I continue the comparative study of the two parties’ worldviews in the second chapter. It is in this chapter that I explore more deeply the ideological fault lines between the NSDAP and DVFP, and which I argue, highlight the variety of Nazisms or Nazistic strands which existed in the Weimar Republic. In the last chapter, I investigate the organizational relationship between the two parties, highlighting the causes that contributed to the ultimate failure of the DVFP in constituting a legitimate rival to the NSDAP, and those that allowed for the latter's rise to power in its stead.

I propose in the following chapters a close examination of the formative years of the NSDAP through the study of its relationship, ideological and organizational, with the

DVFP. I seek to reconsider the view that the Nazi phenomenon, and Nazism as an ideology and worldview was a unique development in the early years of the Weimar

Republic. To do so, I seek to bring to the forefront the role of the DVFP as a legitimate rival to the NSDAP, one that subscribed to a similar, Nazistic worldview while reflecting an identity that differed from its Bavarian counterpart. I do not suggest that the two 19

parties had no differentiating qualities, and that they should be viewed as interchangeable. Admittedly, substantial differences on fundamental questions divided the two parties and their supporters. I argue, however, that through a comparative method we can clearly see that the rise of what is considered to be Nazi ideology, a blend of anti-

Semitism, conservatism, hyper-nationalism, anti-Marxism, völkisch romanticism, underlined by a fascist nature within the German right wing was neither unique nor exclusive to the Bavarian, Hitler-led NSDAP. The northern DVFP stood first as an ally, then as the NSDAP's first and potentially most threatening rival up until the elections of

1928.

CHAPTER 1

The Radicalization of the German Right and the Rise of the 'Nazistic' DVFP

To scholars of modern Germany, the Nazi phenomenon continues to present a key problem. Was the emergence of the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei

(NSDAP) in the early Weimar period an aberration from the course of German history, or did it constitute a continuation of the political development of the nation since unification? Though the Sonderweg debate has largely refuted the characterization of

Nazism as a unique phenomenon, scholars still discuss the movement in terms that distinguish it from similar parties.1 According to Eric D. Weitz, "at the start of the 1920s the NSDAP was merely one of numerous völkisch-oriented parties thriving on feelings of injustice, hatred and economic hardship."2 Alongside the NSDAP, the northern

Deutschvölkische Freiheitspartei (DVFP) embraced a political platform and worldview that was to fundamentally transform Germany years later. The early Weimar period saw the rise of such extra- and anti- parliamentary rightist groups to the center of the political

1 See for instance Ian Kershaw, "The Uniqueness of Nazism" in Comparative Fascist Studies: New Perspectives, Constantin Iordachi, ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 238-254.

2 Eric D. Weitz, Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 5. Lee McGowan contends that "By 1919 there were some 73 such [völkisch] groups in Germany..." Lee McGowan, "The extreme right" in Weimar and Nazi Germany: Continuities and Discontinuities, ed. Panikos Panayi. (London: Longman, 2001), 249.

arena. Formed in 1919 and 1922, respectively, the NSDAP and DVFP reflected a period of significant transition in German politics. On the one hand, the emergence of the two parties in the early Weimar years signaled that Germans did not accept the defeat of the

First World War and the nation's turn towards a system of parliamentary democracy.

Rather, Germans showcased a disillusionment with the newly established system due to foreign intervention, economic insecurity, political instability, and a perceived pollution of German culture, turning to a worldview I label 'Nazistic'. On the other hand, the

NSDAP and DVFP also reflected an end-point. The decades-long radicalization of the

German right wing, characterized by the rise of extra-parliamentary interest groups and a growing völkisch worldview established a foundation from which the two parties would emerge after the war. The early 1920s, a point of significant transition for the German right wing, saw the rise of a 'Nazistic' worldview represented by the NSDAP, as well as a variety of other parties, including the DVFP. This worldview had its antecedents in the radicalization of the right during the early twentieth century, as well as the transformation of Germany after the defeat in the First World War.

In this chapter I first explore the radicalization of the German right wing during the Wilhelmine period as having established a foundation of which the NSDAP and

DVFP would emerge in the early Weimar period. As the purpose of the first section is to

'set the stage' for the emergence of the two parties, in it, I summarize and synthesize leading interpretations of the radicalization of the right already present within the historiography. The second, and more central section of the chapter has as its focus the rise of the DVFP as a representative of a worldview which I label 'Nazistic' that was 22

shared by a variety of groups within the völkisch movement. The early Weimar period saw the emergence of a multitude of fringe political groups set on rescuing Germany from a supposed national crisis. On the right of the political spectrum, these groups advocated a fundamental change of the parliamentary system, restoration of a romanticized German culture, the unification of all German-speaking peoples under one nation, and the freeing of Germans from the perceived grip of Jewish finance-capitalism.

The NSDAP and DVFP stood as representatives of the radicalized German right wing by the early 1920s. In charting the emergence of the lesser-known DVFP, combined with that of the NSDAP which the reader is already familiar with, I seek to showcase how the two parties rose to the forefront of the völkisch movement as representatives of a

'Nazistic' worldview that threatened the established parties on the right.

In discussing right wing groups such as the DVFP and NSDAP, I operate at the intersection of two historiographies, that which examines late Wilhelmine and early

Weimar German politics in general, and that which charts the infancy of the Nazi party.

Historians of the late Wilhelmine period have emphasized the emergence of newly mobilized political actors and the formation of pressure groups, particularly manifested as the 'new' right, which complicated a political system based on Honoratiorenpolitik

(politics of notables) by the end of the Great War.3 This literature provides the contextual basis for historians of the NSDAP, studying its infancy, to claim that the party assumed the leadership of the radicalized, völkisch right, largely based on its widely accepted

3 See Geoff Eley, Reshaping the German Right: Radical Nationalism and Political Change after Bismarck (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980). 23

worldview and extra-parliamentary tactics. In exploring the rise of the DVFP, I seek to illuminate the plurality of 'Nazistic' voices that had come to represent the völkisch movement by 1923. In turn, the existence of a plurality of such parties reflects the continuing interpretation within the historiography of Nazism as a broader phenomenon than previously thought, as well as one that was far more a result of continuity than an aberration. The decades-long radicalization of the right, through the synthesis of völkisch ideology with an established conservative tradition set the stage for an extra- parliamentary party to rise to power. Yet, the transition from the collapse of the

Wilhelmine period to the Nazi assumption of power was not a foregone conclusion. I argue in this chapter that the DVFP, a future rival of the NSDAP, subscribed to a similar

'Nazistic' worldview and represented a viable political alternative from the extreme right to the newly established Weimar Republic, just as did the NSDAP. This chapter, by utilizing a variety of primary sources and a synthesis of existing works will add to the historiography of Weimar era politics by showcasing the rise of a 'Nazistic' voice on the extreme-right wing, which was not limited to the NSDAP but rather shared with a variety of other groups, including the DVFP.

The Radicalization of the German Right: A Historiographical Examination

Signaling the evolution of German historiography over the decades, Lee

McGowan, in a chapter on the extreme right in Weimar and Nazi Germany: Continuities and Discontinuities (2001) has stated that "just as the myth of 1945 as year zero (Stunde 24

Null) has become increasingly discredited, so the same applies to both 1919 and 1933.

There are common threads of ideological continuity and personality that traverse both periods."4 Stated more directly, historians should avoid bracketing the National Socialist phenomenon, from 1919-1945, as one without connection to the rest of German history.

While historians should avoid painting a teleological picture of German history, one that stretches from Luther to Hitler, we cannot ignore the antecedents of the emergence of the

NSDAP and Nazi ideology. The November Revolution and the subsequent centralization of the Weimar government in 1919 signaled, nominally, a point of transition in German political history. The end of the Wilhelmine period, marked by the tragedy of the First

World War, gave rise to a parliamentary democracy in Germany that, for over a decade, was able to thwart revolution from a growingly radicalized right wing.

1918, however, does not mark a breaking point. In other words, the conditions that allowed for radical right wing parties such as the NSDAP and DVFP to emerge in the early Weimar period predated the chaotic political arena of post-war Germany, and the transition to a parliamentary democracy. The theme of continuity within German historiography, between Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany in particular (as well as up to the Nazi rise to power in 1933), has been prevalent since the 1980s.5 Challenging the argument which posited the Third Reich as a unique phenomenon within Germany history, revisionist historians of the 1980s "downgrade[d] the importance of Hitler" and

4 McGowan, "The extreme right," 247.

5 See Richard J. Evans' "From Hitler to Bismarck: Third Reich and Kaiserreich in Recent Historiography" in Rethinking German History: Nineteenth-Century Germany and the Origins of the Third Reich, ed. Richard J. Evans. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 55-92. 25

"reconnect[ed] Nazism to the German past" according to Richard J. Evans.6 Though this historiographical shift resulted in a debate which has little purchase in contemporary studies of modern Germany, its consequences remain significant.7 According to Geoff

Eley, a prominent objector of the Sonderweg thesis, the roots of the political context from which German fascism would emerge post-1918 can be found in the early-century radicalization of the German right wing.

Emerging at the end of the nineteenth-century, nationale Verbände, or, nationalist, extra-parliamentary interest groups signaled a shift in the pattern of German politics which had been dominated by Honoratiorenpolitik (politics of notables). These groups spoke to a newly politicized German population, consisting most visibly of middle-class Germans. The middle-class faced a struggle similar to that which they would face in the early Weimar years, a "highly unstable situation" in which they sought

"desperately to preserve whatever social and economic advantage [they] still held over the industrial proletariat" and searched "for new political forms which would afford...a more effective means of defending their social and economic interests."8 Raffael Scheck

6 Ibid, 67.

7 This was the intentionalism versus functionalism debate which occupied the works of prominent German historians of the 1980s who asked "why did the Third Reich launch a murderous war of genocide and the destruction of human life on a hitherto unprecedented scale?" The answers to this question bifurcated German historians into two groups, those who saw the atrocities of the Third Reich as a testament to the intentions of the individuals who committed these acts, as seen in their ideological pronouncements. The second group, saw these as a consequence of the Nazi administration which was characterized by tensions, fragmented decision making, and internal conflicts. See Evans, Rethinking German History, 67-68.

8 Larry Eugene Jones, "'The Dying Middle': Weimar Germany and the Fragmentation of Bourgeois Politics," Central European History, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Mar., 1972): 26. 26

sees the industrialization of Germany, since 1890, as having "created fears but also aspirations among the German middle classes, farmers, artisans, and employees alike."

These segments of the German population "which had previously been 'politically dormant,' did not see their interests safeguarded by the [established] parties, not even by those on the right. Consequently, they formed interest organizations that often competed with the parties."9 Building on this societal transformation, the nationale Verbände were able to gain traction in the German political arena which would soon influence the direction of German politics.

The nationale Verbände, argues Eley, were not radical dissidents based simply on their disagreements with the German government's policies. Rather, the radicalism of these groups was defined by their thorough hostility "to the conventional way of doing things" and "formed from a protracted conflict with the old governing establishment."10

In more explicit terms, these groups were extra-parliamentary, rejecting the German political system by choosing to operate outside it. Raffael Scheck characterizes these groups as "vocal extraparliamentary pressure groups" and paints their relationship with the established political parties as an ambivalent one." On the one hand, he argues, "the new right offered a welcome propaganda machinery and promised to win mass support for the established parties" as it touted itself the voice of the newly mobilized German middle-class. Yet, "on the other hand, the radicalism and populist pressure of the new

9 Raffael Scheck, Alfred von Tirpitz and German Right-Wing Politics, 1914-1930 (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1998), x.

10 Eley, Reshaping the German Right, 352. 27

right often alienated and worried the old-style right."11 In other words, the nationale

Verbände, falling in line with one of Robert O. Paxton's prerequisites for fascist movements: the rejection of traditional solutions, symbolized an alternative to the 'old' right, speaking to a newly politically mobilized German population.12 The radical nationalism of the 'new' right, exacerbated by the weakening of the 'old' right and the victory of the left in the 1912 elections, according to Eley, led to its successful integration into the political worldview of the old right, forming a "coalition, as old and new right buried their differences for common resistance to the left."13 It is at this juncture that we see the synthesis of an 'old' right, aristocratic, conservative political tradition with a radical nationalism expressed by the Verbände. Most significantly, it was this synthesis, later visible with the emergence of the DNVP in 1918, that infused a völkisch component into the established conservative right wing.

Single-interest groups rose to the forefront of German right wing politics as they rejected the traditional system of Honoratiorenpolitik, working as extraparliamentary organizations, and represented the mobilization of newly politicized segments of

Germany's population. The national pressure groups, the Verbände, provided a "basis for a new 'national opposition' to the government" argues Eley, "claiming superior access to the 'will of the nation.'"14 The 'radical nationalist' ideology of the Verbände was most

11 Scheck, Alfred von Tirpitz and German Right-Wing Politics, 1914-1930, x.

12 Robert O. Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 219.

13 Eley, Reshaping the German Right, 357.

14 Ibid, vii. 28

visible in the two leading organizations of the right prior to the war. The first was the

Alldeutscher Verbande (Pan-German League), a group that represented a key tenet of völkisch ideology, calling for "the consolidation of Germans throughout the world" under one nation.15 Moreover, the Pan-German League according to Roger Chickering was at the forefront of racial anti-Semitism, their policies "a chilling anticipation of the programs which the National Socialists attempted to put into practice" decades later.16

The second group that reflected Eley's 'radical nationalism' at this time was the Deutscher

Flottenverein (Navy League). We can also add the Deutsche Vaterlandspartei (German

Fatherland Party) , emerging in 1917, as a major representative of extraparliamentarism and 'radical nationalism.' The party was officially formed in September 1917, when rightist politicians, including Wolfgang Kapp and Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz aligned and formed the group as one that was to pressure the government and encourage the people to sustain the war effort. According to Scheck, the Fatherland party, through "its synthesis of old-style conservative groups and radical nationalist organizations," appears "as a last manifestation of Wilhelmine Sammlungspolitik17 (though now against the state) and as a model for a broader rightist party."18 As a whole, the emergence of extraparliamentary groups such as the Pan-German League, Navy League, and Fatherland Party symbolized,

15 Roger Chickering, We Men Who Feel Most German (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 1.

16 Ibid.

17 According to Eley, this term "refers to a defensive alliance of capitalists and landowners, convergent protectionist forces united by fear of foreign competition and democratic reform—'the compromise-ideology of the ruling strata of industry and agriculture, with its basis in the common...anti- liberal and anti-Socialist calculation', as one historian has called it." Eley, Reshaping the German Right, 4.

18 Scheck, Alfred von Tirpitz and German Right-Wing Politics, 1914-1930, 67. 29

according to Eley, "an important radicalization of the German right, involving a decisive rupture with past traditions and a renewal of the right's popular credibility."19 These populist parties, by rejecting the established political process spoke for and mobilized the previously 'dormant' segments of the German population, particularly the middle-class, awakened by continued urbanization, modernization, and the First World War.20

It must be stressed at this point that the radicalization of the German right wing during the Wilhelmine period, characterized by an infusion of völkisch principles into the conservative worldview, extra-parliamentary tactics, and the mass mobilization of a previously politically-insignificant segment of the population should not lead us to read history backwards. Admittedly, the above mentioned changes served as a foundation on which the Nazi party was built, and furthermore, one it could exploit to achieve political significance by the late 1920s. Yet, it is this point of transition, the period which serves as a bridge between the late Wilhelmine radicalization of the right wing, and the rise of the

NSDAP as a leading political alternative to the Weimar system by the late 1920s that must not be overlooked.

It is this period, as well, which represents the intersection of two historiographies and at which this work is aimed. Historians examining the entirety of the Nazi phenomenon, when discussing the period 1919-1928, largely avoid any significant

19 Eley, Reshaping the German Right, 357.

20 On the dramatic changes of the German population, from a social and economic perspective, during the First World War and leading up to the November Revolution of 1918, see Richard Bessel's chapter "German Society During the First World War" in Bessel, Germany after the First World War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 1-49. 30

mention of rival parties or organizations that could have jeopardized the Nazi path to power. Moreover, the period known as the Verbotzeit, the time of ban, during which

Hitler was imprisoned and the party banned due to the Munich Putsch of 1923, receives minimal, if any, significant treatment.21 We should not substitute a theory of a German

Sonderweg which historians have largely moved away from, with one of a Nazi

Sonderweg.22 In other words, we should not assume that the emergence of the NSDAP, as a fascist, radically nationalist, extra-parliamentary party was a foregone conclusion. The foundation established by a decades' long radicalization of the German right wing resulted in the emergence of a variety of parties similar to the NSDAP. These parties, most notably the DVFP, stood as legitimate rivals to the NSDAP on the extreme right wing. That the brand of radical nationalism which emerged victorious by 1933 was that

21 Limiting my examples of this to more recent scholarship which attempts to provide a complete picture of the Nazi phenomenon, see Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004); Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich: A New History (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000).

22 A concise and helpful summary of the Sonderweg debate can be found in Jurgen Kocka's "German History before Hitler: The Debate about the German Sonderweg," Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Jan., 1988): 3-16. A more developed counter-argument to the Sonderweg thesis can be found in David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1984). Ian Kershaw suggests that the argument of the Sonderweg "need not occupy us no longer here-not least because historians on both sides of the debate fully accept that, for all its singular characteristics, Nazism belongs to a wider category of political movements which we call 'fascist.'" Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems & Perspectives of Interpretation (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2000), 22. Though some historians continue to subscribe to a modified version of the argument. For instance, Richard J. Evans claims that "The triumph of Nazism was far from a foregone conclusion right up to the early months of 1933. Yet it was no historical accident, either. Those who argued that Nazism came to power as part of an essentially Europe-wide set of developments are right to have done so up to a point. But they have paid far too little attention to the fact that Nazism, while far from being the unavoidable outcome of the course of German history, certainly did draw for its success on political and ideological traditions and developments that were specifically German in their nature." Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), xxviii. 31

of the NSDAP, does not mask the fact that other, 'Nazistic' parties, represented a different course for the future of Germany.

This chapter seeks to add to the historiography of the Nazi party, and that of the

Weimar Republic, through an examination of the DVFP that illuminates the plurality of

Nazisms which existed in the early 1920s. Highlighting the broad phenomenon that was the rise of Nazistic ideology adds to the continuity thesis which sees the NSDAP as merely a phase of the radicalization of the German right. Moreover, by conceptualizing of the DVFP as a 'Nazistic' party, I seek to challenge the too common interpretation of the formative years of the NSDAP as having no real, or significant enough competition from similar rightist parties; a fact worth emphasizing in future studies of the Nazi party and the Weimar Republic for its implications on the view that the development and rise to power of Nazism is unique, or constitutes an aberration from the course of German history more generally.

The Formation of the DVFP

Though 1918 marked a crucial point of transition in German politics, and 1922 a break of the anti-Semitic rank of the DNVP to form the DVFP, we cannot ignore the latter's roots in elitist, Prussian conservatism. Moreover, since "one in three Nazi voters were defectors from the conservative camp," argues Burleigh, it is important to study the conservative roots of both parties as representatives of a 'Nazistic' ideology. Though both the NSDAP and DVFP shared their ideological roots with the new conservative right of 32

post-1918, the latter shared with the DNVP a familial tie that was never fully severed. As the DVFP declared itself a party separate from the DNVP, it did not reject wholesale the ideology of its parent party. Rather, the newly established party's leadership placed anti-

Semitism at the forefront of their message while appropriating elements from both the established conservative worldview, represented by the DNVP, as well as the 'Nazistic' worldview championed by the NSDAP. To understand the conceptualization of the

DVFP as a hybrid party, one that espoused a 'Nazistic' worldview while never fully outgrowing its parliamentary, Prussian conservatism we must first trace its institutional and ideological roots within the DNVP. The conservative foundation from which the triumvirate of von Graefe, Henning and Wulle would break away in 1922 was established well before the outbreak of revolution, yet its freshest roots were to be found in the conservative transformation following the defeat in war.

The conservative right wing in post-war Germany, crippled by dwindling votes prior to the war, quickly mobilized after the November revolution of 1918, according to

Childers, standing united "for the first time in decades."23 Having lost "not only their power base, but also their raison d'etre..." the German conservatives were "forced to pursue their political goals under radically altered conditions."24 Prominent members of the right wing coalesced into an informal committee, seeking to create a party that would

23 Thomas Childers, The Nazi Voter: The Social Foundations of Fascism in Germany, 1919-1933 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 40. On the creation of the DNVP see: Lewis Hertzman, “The Founding of the German National People’s Party (DNVP), November 1918-January 1919,” Journal of Modern History No. 30, vol. 1 (March, 1958): 24-36.

24 Dietrich Orlow, Weimar Prussia, 1918-1925: The Unlikely Rock of Democracy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986), 16. 33

appeal to conservatives across party lines. The new party would stand at the intersection between 'old' and 'new' conservatives, as it would cater to "many of the right-wing forces that had proliferated throughout the Imperial period, namely Junkers, Free Conservatives,

Anti-Semites, Christian Socialists, Pan-Germans and elements of the minority völkisch movement."25 Upon garnering support from a collection of influential conservatives, the

DNVP, (Deutschnationale Volkspartei) a "genuinely modern mass party,"26 was established, with an immediate aim of "heal[ing] the wounds inflicted by the war on our sorely tried Fatherland, and to restore law and order."27 The growth of the DNVP within the conservative right, as well as the breadth of its political ideology can be attributed to the early synthesis of a variety of conservative party representatives into a single, catchall party. The DNVP’s broad political platform, according to Lee McGowan, centered on "an ardent opposition to the Weimar system, the rejection of democracy, the renunciation of the Versailles Treaty, the assertion of distinct nationalist objectives, the dissemination of the Dolchstoβlegende (stab-in-the-back legend) and strong anti-Bolshevik sentiments."28

Moreover, the party displayed a commitment to the German Mittelstand (middle class) through advocating for the protection of small businesses, agriculture, and private property from a supposed Bolshevist threat. The diverse membership of the new party, combining 'old' and 'new' conservatives led to appeals to an expanded constituency,

25 Lee McGown, The Radical Right in Germany: 1870 to the Present (Longman, 2002), 47.

26 Orlow, Prussia, 16.

27 Lewis Hertzman, DNVP: Right-Wing Opposition in the Weimar Republic, 1918-1924 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963), 32.

28 McGowan, "The Extreme Right," 248 34

including "a strong bid for the new women’s vote…direct appeals…to intellectuals, to occupational, and innumerable other interest groups."29 These broad political tenets, however, did not translate to electoral success for the DNVP in 1919, as the party garnered only 10.3 percent of the vote.30 The party’s future success would come from its embrace of a völkisch worldview, and of the increasingly influential role of "supporters of racist (völkisch) ideas" within the party.31

By 1918, the infusion of völkisch thought into the political consciousness of the right wing, which had begun decades earlier, was clearly visible. The völkisch worldview was characterized by a feeling of rootedness, a connection to the homeland (Heimat) and

German Volk which transcended nationalism, resembling more visibly a romanticized, spiritual connection. McGowan sees völkisch parties as espousing "mystical notions of a uniquely German social order, with roots in the Teutonic past, resting on order, harmony, and hierarchy.'"32 In more practical, political terms, the völkische were reactionary, rejecting the newly established Weimar Republic and its constitution, the foreign intervention of the post-war victors, and the enslavement of the German nation to a supposed Jewish finance-capitalism. Above all, the völkisch worldview centered around a racialized, virulent anti-Semitism. As a Volkspartei (nationalist party), the DNVP

29 Hertzmann, DNVP, 46.

30 Ernst Forsthoff, Deutsche Geschichte seit 1918 in Dokumenten (Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1938), 136.

31 Orlow, Prussia, 16.

32 McGowan, "The Extreme Right," 249 35

espoused anti-Semitism, upheld the "stab in the back" myth, and warned of the dangerous role held by Jews in government.33 Standing in opposition to the newly established

Weimar Republic, the DNVP also demanded "a diminution of parliament's powers in favour of a more powerful president; renounc[ed] the Versailles Treaty; assert[ed] strong nationalist objectives; display[ed] elements of anti-Semitism and express[ed] fervent anti- bolshevik sentiments."34 These völkisch viewpoints spearheaded the DNVP’s political ideology leading to its first major electoral success in 1920, collecting over 15 percent of the vote and "ending a thirty-five-year conservative decline."35 It appeared the synthesis of 'old' and 'new' right, that is to say traditional conservatism and a politicized völkisch ideology, was a successful pairing.

Racialism and anti-Semitism were not merely political tools utilized by the DNVP pragmatically to gain votes in a growingly völkisch political atmosphere. Rather, the

DNVP’s racialist, anti-Semitic position was established prior to the war as the German conservative right wing drew "dangerously close to the Volkish movement...in the 1880's and 1890's."36 By the early Weimar years, the centrality of anti-Semitism within the

DNVP's worldview was made clear when the party did not renounce the murder of

33 The idea that Jews and Marxists betrayed the German people and military especially in surrendering and accepting the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. See: Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich: A New History (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), 51.

34 McGown, The Radical Right in Germany, 47.

35 Childres, The Nazi Voter, 41.

36 George Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York: The Universal Library Grosset & Dunlap, 1964), 239. 36

Germany's Jewish Foreign Minister, Walther Rathenau.37 During a wave of political assassinations known as fememorde that spanned Weimar's early years, the murder of

Rathenau in the summer of 1922, led to a "tense atmosphere in German public life" concerned with rising political anti-Semitism.38 It was only for fears of having taken part in the assassination of Rathenau, not the act itself, that the party would purge itself of its most radical anti-Semites.39 Other signs of the DNVP's unwavering anti-Semitic disposition include the anecdotal reputation of some of the party's leaders as active anti-

Semites. Richard Kunze, the party's propaganda chief, was "referred to as Knüppel Kunze

(Kunze with the stick) because of his virulent attacks on the Jews."40 Those within the party who had come to view anti-Semitism as the central component of their political worldview were soon labeled the racialist [völkisch] rank by the party's leadership. Yet, anti-Semitism remained a significant current within the worldview of the DNVP.

The conservative right’s turn towards radical anti-Semitism in the 1890s serves as the foundation out of which a radically anti-Semitic, völkisch rank of the DNVP would form the DVFP. This political strategy, according to Karl Dietrich Bracher, would prove

"fatal" since "it kept the anti-Semitic undercurrent alive, made its radical methods

37 Rathenau, who was Jewish, was Germany's Foreign Minister during the Weimar period, shot by a right wing group en route to his office in 1922. This murder was one of the most notorious examples of political terrorism and anti-Semitism from the right during the Weimar years. Burleigh, The Third Reich: A New History, 53; Donald L. Niewyk, The Jews in Weimar Germany (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980), 10.

38 Hertzman, DNVP, 133.

39 Herman Beck. The Fateful Alliance: German Conservatives and Nazis in 1933: The Machtergreifung in a New Light (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 36.

40 Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology, 239. 37

acceptable and respectable, and thus made possible the revitalization and success of a more determined, purposeful radical movement" in the DVFP.41 The vehement anti-

Semitism of the DVFP's leaders is what made them stand out within the right wing prior to the formation of their own party. Their anti-Semitism was highlighted during a period of growing political violence, most visibly with Rathenau's assassination and its aftermath. The then-Reichstag deputy of the DNVP, Wilhelm Henning penned a

"venomous article" about Rathenau that was published in the Konservative Monatsschrift, coinciding with the foreign minister's assassination.42 Henning's unapologetic position, reflecting a growing radicalization of the right wing, led to demands of purging the

DNVP of "radical elements to avoid having the party as a whole suspected of sanctioning political murder."43 The growing and expanding anti-Semitic disposition of von Graefe,

Henning, and Wulle that led to the three men being labeled a "völkisch rank," broadened an ideological cleavage within the party and led to the creation of the DVFP. Following the publication of his article, Henning's association with non-DNVP anti-Semitic organizations such as the VNS (Federation of Nationalist Soldiers), as well as von

Graefe’s support of a constitutional clause to exclude Jews from DNVP membership led to an examination of the völkisch rank of the party (Wulle was also included in this).

Shortly thereafter, a "Racist [sic] Cooperative Group (Deutsch-volkische

Arbeitsgemeinschaft-DVAG)...a party-within-a-party" was created to placate the three

41 Karl Dietrich Bracher, Jean Steinberg, trans., The German Dictatorship: The Origins, Structure, and Effects of National Socialism (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 42.

42 Beck, The Fateful Alliance, 36.

43 Ibid, 37. 38

leaders.44 Ultimately, the anti-Semitic platform of Von Graefe, Henning, and Wulle was the grounds based on which the DNVP expelled the three men. This bifurcation of the

DNVP, more significantly, symbolized a beginning for the emergent völkisch rank of the party, and would later mark a tremendous contribution to the growing völkisch movement and its political success.

The establishment of the DVAG and its operation as the völkisch component of the DNVP was short-lived. Ideological differences rooted in questions of anti-Semitism and racialism underlined a split between von Graefe as the leader of the DVAG and the leadership of the DNVP. While some within the DNVP’s leadership, such as Kuno von

Westarp, sought to work in coalition with the völkische, most could no longer advocate for their inclusion after rumors and accusations were put forth by Wulle, Henning, Count

Reventlow and others regarding the DNVP’s corrupted interests.45 More significantly, the men of the völkisch rank "broke with the DNVP because of that party’s failure to adopt a more radical völkisch platform."46 If they could not influence the DNVP to adopt an even more radical anti-Semitic disposition than it had already, the leaders of the völkisch rank would seek their own political path. Disassociating themselves from the DNVP allowed von Graefe, Henning and Wulle to establish their own party, one built specifically on the tenets of their völkisch ideology. Following this falling-out, the three established the

44 Hertzman, DNVP, 152.

45 Ibid, 156.

46 David Jablonsky, The Nazi Party in Dissolution: Hitler and the Verbotzeit 1923-1925 (Totowa, New Jersey: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1989), 10. 39

DVFP (German völkisch Freedom Party) in Berlin on December 17, 1922. As the DVFP sought its own political course, the newly established party distanced itself ideologically from the DNVP, pulling closer to the Nazi-völkisch worldview.

The Roots of the DVFP's Ideology

The ideological alternative advanced by the DVFP to the DNVP's 'tame' völkisch disposition was, still, rooted in the conservative, nationalistic politics of the reconstituted party they had come to abandon in 1922. Yet, the roots of the DVFP's ideology can also be found within the NSDAP's early sentiments, which they later came to appropriate. The unique synthesis that was the DVFP's ideology represented an important strand of

Nazism in the early Weimar period, reflecting a synthesis of 'old' and 'new' right, underscored by a full embrace of völkisch ideology. In this section, I first compare the programs of the DNVP and the NSDAP in terms of their political worldviews to more clearly situate the roots of the DVFP, and to understand its role as a hybrid group. I then explore more directly the ideology and political program of the DVFP, emphasizing the similarities between it and that of the NSDAP based on which I label the party 'Nazistic.'

The themes discussed here include anti-Semitism, politics, economics, and the demographic appeal of both parties. Though significant fault lines between the ideologies of the NSDAP and DVFP would come to the forefront most visibly as the two parties attempted to cooperate in the mid 1920s, the worldview of the DVFP reflected a synthesis of ideologies that can be labeled 'Nazistic'. 40

As the representative of the 'new' right, the DNVP's political platform shared some elements with völkisch groups such as the NSDAP while building on its conservative roots. The DNVP demanded a "return from the dictatorship of a single class to the parliamentary form of government," maintenance of the "unity, freedom and independence against external coercion" of the German people, as well as the support of their "liberal 'freedoms.'"47 The vague mention of 'liberal freedoms' by the DNVP reflects a much larger change within the German right, discussed at the outset of the chapter, which had come to distance itself from its earlier Honoratiorenpolik or 'rule by notables' to "stress merit rather than birth"48 as a qualification for political involvement and leadership.49 The NSDAP joined the DNVP in advancing a politics centered on the protection of the German people based on a new type of 'open' elitism. The 'open' elitism of the NSDAP, characterized as an "open-yet-authoritarian" elitism emphasizing that the recruitment of such an elite to rule Germany was not to be "restricted to any one segment of society."50 A later program of the DNVP echoed the NSDAP’s calls for a "national rebirth" through a strong national military force, a welfare state dedicated to the national health of its population, and the cultivation of a German nationalism unadulterated by

47 Hertzman, DNVP, 33.

48 Walter Struve, Elites Against Democracy: Leadership Ideals in Bourgeois Political Thought in Germany, 1890-1933 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 219.

49 See "Popular representation" in "German National People's Party (DNVP) Program" as document 136 in Anton Kaes, and Martin Jay, eds., The Weimar Republic Sourcebook (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 349.

50 Reimer Wulff, Die Deutschvölkische Freiheitspartei, 1922-1928 (Germany: E. Mauersberger, 1986), 3. 41

"un-German spirit in all forms, whether it stems from Jewish or other circles."51 Yet the two parties placed emphasis on disparate ideological points, establishing a clear delineation within the German right wing. Although both parties espoused a redefined social elitism, one based on 'openness,' the program of the NSDAP was far less 'liberal' than that of the DNVP. Perhaps due to its diverse leadership and membership, the

DNVP's later program contains sections discussing the "equality of all faiths"

(denominations) as well as "ecclesiastical freedom," "equal rights of women," and "care of the youth," while giving less voice to its anti-Semitic disposition.52 In contrast to the

'tame' nature of the DNVP's stance on anti-Semitism and its uncertain commitment to a völkisch ideology, the program of the NSDAP provided a discourse that was far more attractive to the bourgeoning völkisch movement.

Anti-Semitism

Exacerbated by the loss of war and a failed Bolshevik revolution, anti-Semitism came to define the political worldview of many extreme right wing groups during the early years of the Weimar era. As the extreme right subscribed to a "brand of politics...that idealized violence and racial anti-Semitism" argues Weitz, the early

Weimar period saw a rise in incidents based on anti-Semitism.53 The basis on which von

51 "German National People's Party (DNVP) Program" in The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, 350.

52 Ibid, 351.

53 Weitz, Weimar Germany, 59, 83. 42

Graefe, Henning and Wulle seceded from the DNVP and formed their own party, anti-

Semitism represented the central component of the DVFP's worldview.54 The DVFP's anti-Semitism was exclusionary, just as they supported a clause to ban Jews from DNVP membership, their new party strictly prohibited Jews, as visible from their membership card which asserted that prospective members must, under oath, prove that their parents and grandparents were neither Jewish or colored.55 Such an exclusionary policy echoed the NSDAP's conception that "one may only be a citizen in Germany if, first, he is free from Asiatic-Jewish blood..."56 In order to protect the German state and people from the

Jewish threat, the DVFP advocated for a philosophical foundation that would stress caring for the country's history, as well as the deepening of the understanding of

Germanic culture.57 Anti-Semitism was visibly at the core of all components of the

DVFP's ideology. On the subject of the German economy, the DVFP's propaganda continuously reminded the disillusioned German that the Jew, his Marxism and international allegiance, were to blame.58 The DVFP further saw the Judeo-dominated

54 From the standpoint of the DNVP, the "racist rank" left the party due largely to its vehement anti-Semitism, as well as the rank's other positions on the future of Germany which conflicted with the DNVP's. See the DNVP's criticism of the DVFP for its lack of a real program, having only "goals" which reflected the ideological weakness of von Graefe, Henning and Wulle, and their newly established party in Deutschnationales Rüstzeug heft nr. 1., Jahrg. 1924, "Die Deutschvölkische Freiheitspartei, " 12.

55 Bernhard Sauer, "DVFP und der Fall Grütte," in Berlin in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Jahrbuch des Landesarchivs Berlin (Berlin, 1994), 1.

56 Barbara Miller and Leila J. Rupp, eds., Nazi Ideology Before 1933: A Documentation (Austin & London: University of Texas Press, 1978), Rosenberg, "A Folkish Idea of State," 66.

57 "Das Programm der Deutschvölkischen freiheitspartei" in Wulff, DVFP, 18.

58 "Gründungsaufruf der Deutschvölkischen Freiheitspartei vom 17.12.1922" as document 1 in Wulff, DVFP, 285. 43

Weimar Republic as having led to a social decay of German society, making less visible the development under Bismarck.59 The anti-Semitism of the DVFP was thus reflected in all facets of its political worldview. As a völkisch party, the DVFP espoused a nationalism that was highly racialized, seeking a German spiritual and moral renewal that was to be accomplished by combating the immediate Jewish threat.

The anti-Semitic disposition of the NSDAP, a key point of similarity with the

DVFP, was visible from the outset. The first political pronouncement made by Adolf

Hitler as a member of the DAP was in response to a letter regarding the Jewish problem.

In this letter, Hitler established rhetorical themes stemming from his anti-Semitic views that would soon be incorporated into an official party programme, and would go on to define Nazi ideology. Identifying multiple strands of anti-Semitism, Hitler is careful in the presentation of his party's views on the Jews, stating that "Antisemitism as a political movement must not be, cannot be, determined by emotional criteria, but only through the recognition of facts." These 'facts' depend largely on Hitler and the DAP's racialist and political views of the Jew. Stressing that the Jews are a race rather than a religion, allows

Hitler to more distinctly separate Jews from their fellow Germans. A Jew who happens to live in Germany and uses the "German language cannot be called a German" but is rather a "foreign race." Politically, Hitler portrays the Jews as primarily concerned with

"material things," where the "value of an individual" is solely determined "by the amount

59 "Unsere Waffen- Rüstzeug der Deutschvolkischen Freiheitsbewegung," BAL R 8034II/6185, 16- 17.

of his possessions, by his money." Moreover, Hitler draws a clear connection to the implications of a materialist foreign race living in Germany, contending that the nation as well suffers under the existence of the Jew, as its value is measured simply by its wealth, rather than the "sum of its moral and spiritual forces." Thus, identifying the Jews racially and politically demands a similar political, rational non-emotive response.

An "anti-Semitism based on reason" argued Hitler, "must lead to the systematic legal combating and removal of the rights of the Jew, which he alone of the foreigners living among us possesses. Its final aim, however, must be the uncompromising removal of the Jews altogether. Both are possible only under a government of national strength, never under a government of national impotence."60 This last point of emphasis, although seeming to suggest what was to come during the Third Reich, must be contextualized.

During the early 1920s, the völkisch right wing saw Jews at the center of all that was wrong with Germany, from its political impotence, to its economic crisis to its social disillusionment. The NSDAP shared with the DVFP a rhetoric that called for the purification of German culture, and the German citizenry by removing Jewish components from it. Yet, no explicit references to violent, or murderous removal can be found during this period in either party's rhetoric.

60 "Hitler's first Political Tract" in Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, eds. Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945 (New York: The Viking Press, 1974), 35-7. 45

Politics

The political worldviews of the NSDAP and DVFP echoed the larger, anti-liberal, anti-Marxist, nationalist sentiment on the right wing during the early Weimar period. The most pressing issues for the newly established government were the Versailles Treaty and its stipulations, the economic recovery of Germany, and the loss of territory and military capacity. Both parties opposed the Versailles Treaty, and successive political efforts to what they claimed was robbing Germany of its territory, military capabilities, and infrastructure. The negative effects of foreign intervention on Germany after the defeat in the First World War was the most common trope of völkisch propaganda in the early

1920s. Alongside this, both parties were highly vocal in their fundamental rejection of the newly established Weimar government. The new government was seen to be pursuing the politics of fulfillment, controlled by the Jews and destroying the German nation. In this sense, as representatives of the extreme right, both parties threatened the established parties on the right.61 In the 1925 programme of the DVFB (a later iteration of the

DVFP), we see a continued commitment to challenging, and overcoming the destructive, and dishonorable Weimar government. The "völkisch national opposition" was offered the DVFB's hand to combat, before it was too late, in parliament the developing threat of dishonor (engendered from the reparations plan), and the reduction of the German

61 See "Aus der wahlbewegung: Warum ist die Deutschvölkische Freiheitspartei keine Rechtspartei?" BAL R 8034II/6182, 52R. 46

army.62 The message emphasized the representation of all German people in government, rather than allowing for the Jews and the market to control Germany's future.63 The

DVFP wanted a "strong-minded government" one that would be "able to restore order" and would be committed to rejecting policies of fulfillment, alluding to the pre-war strength of the system which was dominated by Prussian, aristocratic conservatism.64

Though the key fault line between both parties was the question of parliamentary participation (examined in chapter 2), the rejection of the system as a legitimate form of government was a shared view. The political agendas of both parties as well included similar views on Pan-Germanism, a prevalent theme on the right which advocated the notion that all Germans (based on blood) should live under one nation.

The concept of a Groβdeutschland (greater Germany) was of central importance to the völkisch worldview. "The basic premise" of the pan-German ideology, according to

Roger Chickering's study of its foremost advocate, the Pan-German League, was that

"German national development was incomplete." Based on the völkisch notion of an ethnic bond between all Germans, regardless of the borders they may live under, the pan-

Germans sought the unification of the entire Volk.65 The roots of the NSDAP's pan-

62 On the question of Germany's military, the DVFP proposed that compulsory military service should be introduced, and those that do not perform military service should pay a military tax. "Military service is perceived as a privilege..." in the völkisch worldview. See Wulff, DVFP, 17.

63 "Unsere Waffen-Ruftzeig der Deutschvolkischen Freiheitsbewegung," BAL R 8034II/6185, 16- 17.

64 Wulff, DVFP, 18.

65 Chickering, We Men Who Feel Most German, 76-77. 47

Germanism, which would manifest as the call for Lebensraum (living space) were visible early on in the development of the party. According to Richard Evans, Hitler, before having left Linz, Austria had already been influenced by the Pan-Germanism of Georg

Ritter von Schönerer, a prominent Austrian nationalist of the early twentieth century.66 In the program of the DAP, announced February 25 1920, the significance of the Pan-

German ideology to the Nazi worldview was made clear. The first of the 25 points read,

"We demand the union of all Germans to form a Great Germany on the basis of the right of self-determination enjoyed by nations."67 Similarly, the DVFP proclaimed that it believed in the right of each nation (Volk) to pursue the unification of its people. In regards to Germany, the party supported a greater Germany that would include many of the territories lost after World War I. The matter of unification of all German speaking peoples, meant for the DVFP, the "challenge of reunion with our German brethren in the

Saar, Alsace Lorraine, Eupen-malmedy, Sudtirol, german Osterreich, Sudenteland,

Silesia, Posen and West Prussia, Gdansk and Memel country and in Schleswig." The party was clear, "we are not willing to haggle this natural right of our people to live, this right is not the object of political horse-trading."68 The question of Südtirol (south Tirol), was one of the central points of emphasis by those who sought the unification of all

66 Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich, 42, 164. See also Steven Beller, "Hitler's Hero: Georg Von Schönerer and the Origins of Nazism," Rebecca Haynes and Martyn Rady, eds., In the Shadow of Hitler: Personalities of the Right in Central and Eastern Europe (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 38-53.

67 "German Workers' Party (DAP), The Twenty-Five Points" as document 47 in The Weimar Sourcebook, 125.

68"Unsere Waffen," 6. Folge- Rüstzeug der Deutschvölkischen Freiheitsbewegung: Wehrlos- ehrlos! von Alrbecht von Graefe, M. d. R.," BAL R 8034II/6185, 116, 16-17. 48

German speaking peoples under one nation. Annexed by Italy in 1919, the territory would only come under the realm of Germany under Hitler's Third Reich in the 1940s.

Surprisingly, it would be the DVFP who would take a stronger position on the territory, criticizing the NSDAP, and Hitler especially, for conceding to the Italians and not fighting for the annexation of Südtirol.69

Economics

Weimar Germany, particularly in the early 1920s, was characterized by tremendous economic difficulties which were instrumental in shaping political policy, and social sentiment. Facing these difficulties, the new Weimar government, according to historian Harold James had "a preoccupation with economic performance, economic policy, and economic constraints."70 It is not surprising that political groups, and particularly those within the völkisch right wing allotted a significant space within their political worldviews to economics, and moreover, that "To Germans living through these years of crisis, the 'good old days' of the monarchy were bound to take on a nostalgic afterglow."71 The DVFP and NSDAP saw international pressure as the root of Germany's economic woes, particularly the impact of Versailles, the Dawes Plan, and allegedly

69"Unsere Waffen," 6. Folge- Rüstzeug der Deutschvölkischen Freiheitsbewegung: Wehrlos- ehrlos! von Alrbecht von Graefe, M. d. R.," BAL R 8034II/6185, 17.

70 Anthony McElligot, ed., Weimar Germany (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 102.

71 Detlev J.K. Peukert, The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity (New York: Hill and Wang, 1987), 13. 49

Jewish-controlled high finance.72 In his "A Folkish Idea of state" Alfred Rosenberg in

1920 claimed that the "[D]efeated Germany is today obviously the colony of international banking powers..."73 while Hitler stated that "Capital is not the master of the State, but its servant. Therefore the State must not be brought into dependence on international loan capital."74 Rather, both parties advocated for the reduction in the amount of influence held by large corporations that were disallowing for the economic development or security of the middle-classes.

The economic platform of both parties could generally be described as reactionary. Wulff contends that the two parties advocated for the development of "an economic...model which is facing backwards." He continues, "the industrial society of today, which threatens many mid-sized businesses and professions in its existence is doomed."75 The economic platform of the NSDAP, which was largely mirrored by the

DVFP, was centered on the opposing ideas of bodenstandigen kapitalismus (productive capitalism) and unproductive or loan capitalism, advocated and practiced by the Jews.

Productive capitalism meant profit that was accumulated from one's own labor, rather than profit which derived "from speculation or 'the greatest possible income with the least

72 Of the 25 point list announced by the DAP in 1920 as the party's program, 10 of the 25 points directly addressed Germany's economy and its future. See "German Workers' Party (DAP), The Twenty- Five Points" as document 47 in Kaes, Jay, and Dimendberg, eds., The Weimar Sourcebook, 124-6.

73 Alfred Rosenberg's "A Folkish Idea of State," Miller and Rupp, eds., Nazi Ideology Before 1933, 63.

74 Hitler's speech on "Race and Economics: the German Workman in the National Socialist State," delivered on 24 April 1923, Norman H. Baynes ed., The Speeches of Adolf Hitler: April 1922-August 1939 (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), 64.

75 Wulff, DVFP, 18. 50

amount of work.'"76 According to William Brustein, "By distinguishing between good capitalists and bad capitalists, the Nazis staked out their own space between the Left, which was critical of all forms of capitalism, and the Right which was a staunch proponent of big business."77 Under a system of productive capitalism as advocated by both parties, the state would have a central role in protecting the middle-class from being exploited by corporations and businesses. Though the NSDAP and DVFP were committed to their economic platforms, international and national events such as the

French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 weighed heavily on the parties' views.

For the völkisch movement, the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 provided a significant point on which to make public their economic views and criticism of the

German government. In a January 1923 publication regarding the Ruhr situation, the

DVFP called on German men and women to protest the French and Belgian occupation, calling it a violation of a defenseless government (Weimar).78 The coalition of both parties as the NSFB called also for opposition to the Dawes plan, seeing it not as a plan to assuage Germany's economic situation, but rather one designed to enslave the German people by forces of international capitalism and labeling it a "world-historical crime."79

76 William Brustein, The Logic of Evil: The social Origins of the Nazi Party, 1925-1933 (Yale University Press, 1996), 91.

77 William Brustein, "European antisemitism before the Holocaust and the roots of Nazism" in The Routledge History of the Holocaust, ed. Jonathan C. Friedman (New York: Routledge, 2011), 24.

78 "Aufruf der Deutschvölkischen Freiheitspartei zur fransüsischfrelgischen Besetzung des Ruhrgebietes, 13.1.1923" as document 2 in Wulff, DVFP, 287-288.

79 "Drei Aufrufe der Nationalsozialistischen Freiheitsbewegung, 21.10.1924" as document 8 in Wulff, DVFP, 297-303. 51

Much of this propaganda was directed towards the German worker. In 1924, the NSFB called for the German to protect his cultural property and become a pioneer of German industriousness and creative place, to struggle for his freedom amidst the German government's wavering of its land and industrial areas.80 This sentiment was echoed and accepted within the Prussian ranks of the völkisch movement.81 The solution to

Germany's economic woes, according to the leading voices of the völkisch movement, was the empowerment of the German farmer and worker and the weakening of the foreign [Jewish] grip on the German economy.

The economic dispositions of both the DVFP, and the NSDAP, just as with their socio-political dispositions were greatly shaped by their more central tenets of anti-

Semitism and hyper-nationalism. Here, the stab in the back myth that those of the völkisch movement were so entrenched in illuminates the root of both parties' economic sentiments. Both saw a Judeo-Bolshevik threat to the German economy, the middle-class, and the working class (particularly agricultural workers). Jews posed a dual threat in the minds of DVFP and NSDAP leaders; domestically, Jews were seen to ruin the German economy through their association with high-finance. A position which allowed them as well to control the German working-classes. "If it had not been for the boundless blindness and stupidity of our bourgeoisie" exclaimed Hitler in a 1923 speech, "the Jew

80 "NSFB programme," BAL R 8034II/6185, 20.

81 See for example: "Völkisch Arbeit in Westpreussen," BAL R 8034II/6182. 52

would never have become the leader of the German working-classes."82 Additionally,

Jews were painted by both parties as having international allegiances, standing behind a global Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy to ruin Germany, particularly as public sentiment regarding reparations, hyper-inflation, and the Dawes plan was heightened and radicalized. Anti-Semitism was a strong influence on the economic worldviews of both parties, as they advocated for a strong Germany, and the rejection of a Weimar government that practiced the fulfillment of international pressures manifested as treaties and pacts.

In the DVFP's founding manifesto of 1923, the party's leadership - composed of

Von Graefe, Wulle, Henning, Reventlow, Ahlemann, and Stelter - cited Germany's economic hardships as central to the development of their ideology. "Inflation rises to unbearable [levels]...Germans must starve, German children must languish without even the fact that we can raise money for the insatiable greed of our enemies."83 The causes of this hardship according to the DVFP were multifarious, citing policies implemented after

Bismarck's dismissal from government and the November Revolution of 1918 that led to the creation of a parliamentary democracy. Most centrally, however, it was the result of

"the Jewish spirit and his Marxism...by which we are to become a nation of slaves." The worldview of the Jew was a "mammonistic and materialistic" one, standing in clear opposition to that of the "German youth, the belief of the combatants in the experience of

82 Hitler's speech, "Race and Economics: the German Work-man in the National Socialist State," 24 April 1923, Baynes, ed., The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, 61.

83 Wulff, DVFP, 1. 53

war" and in the "true spirit of the front." Only through a "racial and moral renewal" could

Germany overcome these economic obstacles. 84 The DVFP's economic platform mirrored that of the NSDAP, both embracing the concept of productive capitalism, a central role for the state concerning the economy, and embracing a reactionary view for the future of Germany. The two parties' economic views included the rejection of a free market economy, the prevention of "interest-slavery" and "speculative capital" and the protection of the working- and middle- class and its transformation into an "independent middle class," free from the supremacy of big banks, large corporations and department stores.85 The DVFP's and NSDAP's economic worldviews were formed around an understanding of capitalism which saw the state as the protector of the people from big businesses, and a rejection of a supposed world dictatorship based on a system of

Weltkapitalismus controlled by the Jews. Though the economic future of Germany would undoubtedly differ between a DVFP or NSDAP controlled government, the two parties shared, along with most on the right wing, a similar view of what the causes of

Germany's economic downturn were during the early Weimar years. Similarities between the two parties were not merely limited to their worldviews, but as well to their appeal to and formation of constituencies and membership ranks that would allow for each party's development.

84 Ibid.

85 See points #11, #13, #14, #16, #18 of the 25 Points. "German Workers' Party (DAP), The Twenty-Five Points" as document 47 in Kaes, Jay, and Dimendberg, eds., The Weimar Sourcebook, 125. Wulff, DVFP, 18. 54

Demographic Appeal

A final category which allows us to conceptualize and label the DVFP as

'Nazistic' is demographic appeal. Though the membership and demographic appeal of both parties would constitute a significant point of contention and difference later on, it is important to establish that, nominally, the NSDAP and DVFP spoke to a constituency unified by certain characteristics. The supporters and future constituents of the NSDAP and DVFP were, on the surface, similar. According to McGowan, "the ranks of the extreme right were often swollen by students, young demobilized officers who were not prepared or could not easily adapt to a postwar world, and large elements of the lower middle classes."86 Of their original members, those who made up the 'Front Generation' were attracted to both parties. Experiencing the horrors as well as honor of war, these men returned to Germany as disillusioned citizens of a new Republic. Politically, many felt betrayed by the new parties that arose from, and supported a new parliamentary democracy. Some, inspired by a popular sentiment of veneration for the war, the front, and the soldier, reading works such as Ernst Jünger's Storm of Steel sought more militant and revolutionary means to combat the new Republic. Although many joined the

Freikorps, others joined groups such as the nascent DAP. Thus, in the early years of the

Weimar Republic, a "typical supporter of the far right was the young officer back from the front, unable and unwilling to adapt to the constricting conditions of daily post-war life." Students, perhaps too young to have experienced the front, yet inspired by its

86 McGowan, "The Extreme Right," 249-250. 55

mythology represented another group of supporters for the extreme right wing. In terms of class, "middle-class people frightened by revolutionary disorder and embittered by inflation" joined as well as working class Germans and "young people from the provinces who had been uprooted from parish-pump politics by the war."87 These characteristics were shared by members of both the DVFP and NSDAP, as well as more broadly by those aligned with the völkisch right wing. It would be the NSDAP and DVFP's identities and ability to direct their message that would highlight, ultimately, the variations in their demographic appeal.

Conclusion

The emergence of the NSDAP and DVFP in the early Weimar era signaled both a culmination and a continuation of the radicalization of the German right wing which began around the turn of the nineteenth century. Extra-parliamentary groups such as the

Pan-German League and the Fatherland party challenged the established parties on the right by speaking for the newly politically mobilized German middle- and lower- classes.

These agitators on the right reflected a worldview that was nationalist, conservative, and radical in its rejection of the established political process. More significantly, the worldview of the extra-parliamentary parties was underscored by a völkisch ideology which had come to define their political and social agenda. A racialized anti-Semitism

87 Peukert, The Weimar Republic, 74. On middle-class attitudes towards National Socialism see Rudy Koshar, "Contentious Citadel: Bourgeois Crisis and Nazism in Marburg/Lahn, 1880-1933," Thomas Childers, ed., The Formation of the Nazi Constituency 1919-1933 (Totowa, New Jersey: Barnes & Noble Books, 1986), 11-36. 56

combined with a romanticized nationalism defined the growing radical right wing, and by

1918, had penetrated the established parties' worldviews. The creation of the DNVP in

1918 symbolized the direction of the German right wing after the First World War.

Reflecting 'old' right conservatism, and a 'new' right völkisch and anti-Semitic disposition, the DNVP emerged as the voice of the right in the newly established Weimar

Republic. Yet, the establishment of the NSDAP (DAP) in 1919, and the DVFP in 1922 also signaled the continued radicalization of the right. These parties espoused an even more vehement anti-Semitism, and condemned the parliamentary system as a culprit behind Germany's continued crisis. While rooted in the Prussian, conservative, bourgeois politics of the DNVP, the nascent DVFP reflected a worldview that, as I have argued throughout this chapter, could be labeled 'Nazistic.' As representatives of the growing völkisch movement, on the extreme end of the German right wing, the NSDAP and

DVFP subscribed to an ideology that was nominally similar. Though tensions between both parties' leadership would soon emerge, and ideological fault lines slowly rise to the surface, the emergence of both the NSDAP and DVFP reflected a radicalization of the

German right that was decades in the making. The plurality of Nazistic voices on the right also shows that 1918 did not mark a breaking point in the political development of

Germany. Though undoubtedly mutable, the sentiments reflected by the NSDAP and

DVFP show that rather than an aberration, the rise of Nazism signaled merely an additional phase in the decades-long radicalization of the German right.

CHAPTER 2

The NSDAP, DVFP and Nazi Ideologies: A Comparative Examination

By 1922, the nascent Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) had already established a political ideology centered on conservative politics synthesized with hyper-nationalism, and a völkisch-inspired racialism and anti-Semitism: "The

German right" according to George L. Mosse, "was rapidly becoming a Volkish right."1

The gravitation of the Deutschvölkische Freiheitspartei (DVFP)'s founders towards such an ideology and away from the DNVP’s (Deutschnationale Volkspartei) relatively tame disposition on anti-Semitism would ultimately culminate with the party's absorption by the NSDAP in 1928. Yet, the leadership of the DVFP did not immediately choose to coalesce with the NSDAP, as organizational and ideological disparities existed between the two parties and had come to the forefront. This ambivalence would characterize the four-year relationship of the two parties. During these six crucial years, 1922-1928, the

DVFP cultivated its own strand of a ‘Nazistic’ ideology influenced both by its parent party’s conservative disposition and by the NSDAP’s racialist, anti-Semitic nationalism.

1 George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York: The Universal Library Grosset & Dunlap), 238.

This ideology would represent merely one voice within a völkisch movement which saw the rise of a variety of Nazisms by the early 1920s.

In this chapter I use a comparative mode of analysis to examine the ideological fault lines between the DVFP and the NSDAP (taking into account as well their future iterations including the NSFB and VSB). I emphasize that the nominal similarities shared by the two parties, as discussed in chapter 1, should not mask the existence of significant differences between both parties' identity and within their worldviews. This illuminates the existence of a plurality of Nazisms in the early Weimar Republic. In order to provide a broad scheme of comparison of the parties and their ideologies, this chapter is divided into three distinct sections. In the first, "Political Worldviews," I examine both parties' political ideologies as relating to the most important aspect of German politics during the early Weimar years, the new system of parliament. I argue that parliamentarism represented a key fault line between the NSDAP and DVFP in terms of the parties' ideology and identity. As both parties described and molded themselves as movements, rather than simply political parties, in "Social Components" I examine how the question of confession fit within the parties' respective worldviews. I emphasize here that the confessional divide that characterized Germany was translated as well to the formation and identity of both the NSDAP and DVFP, and remained a key difference and point of tension between the two. Lastly, in "Demographic Appeal," I compare the constituencies of the DVFP and NSDAP.2 The makeup of both parties' constituencies helps to reveal

2 I subscribe to Michael Freeden's conception of ideology in this study, particularly his definition of ideology as a political device, packaging "sets of ideas, beliefs, opinions and values that exhibit a recurring pattern, are held by significant groups, compete over providing and controlling plans for public 59

which segments of the German population were attracted to the NSDAP and DVFP, and more importantly, what led them to commit to one party over the other. While both parties can be labeled members of the völkisch right wing, this affiliation did not translate into their subscription to a singular, monolithic ideology. Nor does the fact that the

NSDAP absorbed the DVFP in 1928 contribute to the notion that both appealed to the same constituency. Though the two parties can be conceptualized as sharing a familial bond, substantial differences existed between the DVFP and NSDAP in terms of their worldviews and membership, contributing to the existence of what I label a 'spectrum of

Nazism' in the early Weimar Republic.

The lines of disparity or distinction between the two parties at times can seem obscure or minimal in a discussion of such familial worldviews. The fault lines that are so significant to understanding the relationship and comparison of both parties can be made clearer if we frame this study around two key concepts, fascism and regionalism. As discussed in the previous chapter, the German extreme right's turn towards fascism was realized with the formation of the NSDAP in 1919. Formed in 1922, the DVFP reflected a similar fascist identity as its Bavarian counterpart, yet one that highlighted some key disparities between the two. Germany's regional diversity, most significantly its north- south division as it was viewed during the Weimar years must also not be neglected in

policy" and "do so with the aim of justifying, contesting or changing the social and political arrangements and processes of a political community." Moreover, based on his conception of 20th century ideology, Freeden sees 20th century ideologies—conservatism, liberalism and socialism—undergoing a transformation at the beginning of the 20th century leading to the rise of special interest groups that represent segments of larger ideological families that pertains directly to this study. Michael Freeden, Ideology: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press: 2003); Michael Freeden, ed., Reassessing Political Ideologies: The Durability of Dissent (New York: Routledge, 2001). 60

any discussion of its political history. The worldviews of both the DVFP and NSDAP were highly shaped by their regional origins, and regionalism would prove a major factor in highlighting the differences in their organizational and ideological development as well. Though approaching the topic from disparate perspectives, one emphasizing organizational form and ideology, and the other, geographic origin and particularities, together, fascism and regionalism as categories enable us to more clearly draw lines of distinction between the two parties.

First, I use a theory of fascism as a particular social movement as set forth by historian Robert O. Paxton. While case studies of fascism's two most infamous manifestations, Italy and Germany, dominate the historiography, scholars are seemingly unable to come to a consensus on a definition.3 As discussed in the introduction to this work, the definition of fascism or fascist groups that is most useful to this study is the following:

3 See: F.L. Carsten. The Rise of Fascism, 2nd ed (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Zeev Sternhall, The Birth of Fascist Ideology: From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution (Princeton, 1994); Gilbert Allardyce, "What Fascism Is Not: Thoughts on the Deflation of a Concept," American Historical Review 84 (1979): 367-98; Walter Laqueur, Fascism: Past, Present, Future (Oxford, 1996); Michael Mann, Fascists (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

4 Robert O. Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 218. 61

Paxton further lays out some of the ideas that underlie fascist actions, among these the most significant being:

a sense of overwhelming crisis beyond the reach of any traditional solutions; the primacy of the group...dread of the group's decline under the corrosive effects of individualistic liberalism, class conflict, and alien influences...the need for authority by natural chiefs (always males)...the superiority of the leader's instincts over abstract and universal reason.5 Seemingly, Paxton's conceptualization of fascism and creation of a list of fascist prerequisites appear to define what he labels a "fascist minimum."6 To be considered fascist, groups must display the above organization and worldview, while those which lack these components would nominally be labeled otherwise. Yet, what of those groups, such as the DVFP that merely reflect some of the above characteristics and not others?

Can we, in a meaningful way, use the DVFP and its relationship with the NSDAP to discuss both fascism in Germany and Fascism as a theoretical concept? It is here that I suggest we employ the term 'fascistic,' allowing for a more nuanced discussion of the

DVFP as a social movement that displayed certain, but not all, of Paxton's conditions.

There undoubtedly exists a collection of movements that we can label fascist, some successful, while others failed. In the case of the NSDAP and DVFP, if we subscribe to a limited understanding of fascism as a concept, it would be far too simplistic to label one fascist, and the other not, as this overlooks the complexities of not only fascist movements in general, but also those of the NSDAP and DVFP more specifically.

5 Ibid, 219.

6 Ibid, 206. 62

The tenets of Paxton's definition of fascism can be made clearer if viewed as those associated with a group's framework, that is to say, its ideology or worldview; and those associated with its form, its organization and outward facing image. Without modification, such a model seems to suggest that certain traits must exist within a group's dynamic for it to fit the fascist label. Through such an understanding of Paxton’s definition—one that distinguishes between form and framework and extends the conception to "failed fascisms"—we can see the varied manifestations fascism took, particularly in the German case. We should avoid absolutes when examining a group or movement in terms of its identity as a fascist party. Michael Mann concedes that under his definition, "movements can be more or less fascist."7 Put another way, movements that embodied what can be considered central aspects of a fascist ideology, yet lacked a distinctly fascist form could, and did exist alongside other variations of fascist movements. In the case of Germany, and the NSDAP and DVFP particularly, I argue that the DVFP's lack of a fascist form was a likely factor in its inability to compete with its

Bavarian counterpart, and ultimately take on a central position within the völkisch right wing.

As I chart the worldviews of both parties, from their political and social agendas to the makeup of their constituency, I incorporate a perspective that emphasizes the regional particularities of the areas of origin of both parties. The worldviews of both the

NSDAP and DVFP were not formed in an ideological vacuum, nor were they formed

7 Mann, Fascists, 17. 63

without direct correlation to the two parties' geographies. Rather, each group constructed its ideology from already existing foundations, and I argue that these were rooted in their specific regional orientation. Recently, Maiken Umbach has challenged the notion that the Third Reich's conception of Volksgemeinschaft translated into a real overcoming of regional differences in Germany from 1933-1945.8 Citing Shelley Baranowski's study of tourism in the Nazi era, Umbach emphasizes the regional divisions between Germans aboard KdF cruise ships.9 Umbach's call to challenge the idea of a united community of

Germans under the Nazis by emphasizing regionalism is a useful concept for studies of the völkisch right wing in early Weimar, as well as the nascence of the NSDAP. While the call for a Volksgemeinschaft was put forth by Nazi propaganda, the building of its constituency—and most importantly the political ideology it took on from its inception— was deeply colored by its regional origins. Just as the NSDAP was a product of a southern German social and political climate that molded it into a Catholic, hyper- nationalistic, paramilitary, working-class movement, so was the rise of the DVFP, a

Protestant, parliamentary-oriented, bourgeois party a reflection of its northern (Prussian) origins. These regional roots were reflected quite differently in the attempts of both the

8 Maiken Umbach, "Regionalising the Volksgemeinschaft in National Socialist Germany" (paper presented at the annual German Studies Association conference, Oakland, California, September 26, 2010).

9 Shelley Baranowski, Strength Through Joy: Consumerism and Mass Tourism in the Third Reich (Cambridge University Press, 2004). 64

NSDAP and DVFP to grow their constituency and attain political power, thus illuminating the central role of region in the early histories of both parties.10

I rely in this chapter on both the central publications of the DVFP and NSDAP concerning their ideological programme, as well as a variety of articles published in numerous newspapers, speeches made by members of both parties, and personal writings.

Early works on Nazism, that is to say the NSDAP, have largely dismissed the existence of any coherent, or cogent set of ideas behind the movement. Mann sees these early views as reflecting a "tradition of not taking fascism seriously."11 He cites language that characterized Nazi ideology as "a ragbag of ideas" or having been based on political

"semi-illiteracy," only compelling due to its political-emotional attachment.12 Works on

Nazi ideology have used a variety of approaches to examine the type of political thought the NSDAP adhered to and propagated. Less explicit in their treatment of ideology, biographical accounts of the party's leaders—with a strong emphasis on Hitler's own

10 Historians of modern Germany have long utilized a regional perspective in studies of Weimar Germany particularly through a variety of case studies of German states and their experiences under Weimar. Yet, using Umbach's concept I seek to utilize such a perspective comparatively, to underscore ideological differences that existed between two national parties. For literature that uses a regional perspective see: Dietrich Orlow, Weimar Prussia, 1918-1925: The Unlikely Rock of Democracy (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986); Arnold Brecht, Federalism and Regionalism in Germany: The Division of Prussia (Oxford University Press, 1945); Rudolf Heberle, From Democracy to Nazism: A Regional Case Study on Political Parties in Germany (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1970); Claus-Christian W. Szejnmann, Nazism in Central Germany: The Brownshirts in 'Red' Saxony (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999); Anthony McElligott, Contested City: Municipal Politics and the Rise of Nazism in Altona, 1917- 1937 (University of Michigan Press, 1998).

11 Mann, Fascists, 140.

12 Detlev J.K. Peukert, Inside Nazi Germany: Conformity, Opposition, and Racism in Everyday Life (Yale University Press, 1987), 39; Martin Broszat, Hitler and the Collapse of Weimar Germany (New York: Berg, 1987), 38. 65

writings—dominated the field early on.13 Other works such as George Mosse's landmark

The Crisis of German Ideology and Fritz Stern's The Politics of Cultural Despair charted the rise of a particular German ideology, drawing connections to nineteenth century völkisch romanticism and intellectuals who championed these ideas.14 These works were followed by more nuanced accounts of Nazi ideology, expanding the sampling group of individuals associated with the NSDAP and their public and personal writings.15 Yet, a limited amount of discussion has been devoted to comparisons of the NSDAP's ideology with others within the völkisch milieu. We can add to Barbara Miller Lane's call to nuance our understanding of Nazi ideology by focusing on the period before 1933 a further call to contextualize Nazi ideology within a larger völkisch worldview of the time.16 Many accounts that have attributed völkisch ideology to having had an effect on early Nazi ideology have neglected to examine it in comparison to other champions of a similar, (what I label) 'Nazistic' worldview. In studying the DVFP's and NSDAP's ideologies comparatively, I seek to add to our understanding of the individual

13 See: Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (London, Odhams Press, 1952); Joachim C. Fest, Clara Winston and Richard Winston, trans., Hitler (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1974); Joachim C. Fest, The Face of the Third Reich: Portraits of the Nazi Leadership (New York: Random House, 1970); John Toland, Adolf Hitler: The Definitive Biography, vol. 2 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976).

14 George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York: The Universal Library Grosset & Dunlap, 1964); Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963).

15 See: Bradley F. Smith. Himmler: A Nazi in the Making, 1900-1926 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Publications, 1979); Helmut Heiber, Goebbels, trans. John K. Dickinson (New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1972); Joseph Ackermann, Himmler als Ideolog (Gottingen, 1970); Robert Cecil, The Myth of the Master Race: Alfred Rosenberg and Nazi Ideology (New York: Batsford, 1972).

16 Barbara Miller Lane, "Nazi Ideology: Some Unfinished Business," Central European Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Mar., 1974): 3-33. 66

development of their systems of thought, as well as to place the development of Nazism back into the context of early Weimar Germany's völkisch movement.

What is termed völkisch ideology had long existed in Germany prior to its championing by established political parties in the early 1920s. This ideology, first developed in the nineteenth century as a purely intellectual or social critique of

Germany's path towards industrialization, was marked by a romantic nationalism, a sense of rootedness, and the conception of the Volk (the nation or people). Here, George L.

Mosse's definition is most useful. He sees it as "an attitude toward life... an ideology which stood opposed to the progress and modernization that transformed nineteenth- century Europe" and which used "romanticism to provide an alternative to modernity, to the developing industrial and urban civilization which seemed to rob man of his individual, creative self while cutting him loose from a social order that was seemingly exhausted and lacking vitality." The individual was seen as a necessary part of the Volk, giving rise to a nationalism that was tied to both the land, and to a perceived German race. This "process of thought answered the problem of alienation from society by positing a suprasocial unity to which it was vital to belong."17 Fritz Stern sees a more political aspect to what he calls "Germanic" ideology. The men who would come to shape this system of thought during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, Paul de

Lagarde, Julius Langbehn, and Moeller van den Bruck, attacked liberalism, were anti-

Semites, and sought the "revival of a mythical Deutschtum and the creation of political

17 Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology, 16-17. 67

institutions that would embody and preserve this peculiar character of the Germans."18

Thus, völkisch thought appears to have arisen as a social critique of German society, seeking a rootedness, both in nature and in the Volk, a mystical romantic ideology that slowly was politicized by public intellectuals, and later approbated by the extreme right wing.19

Völkisch ideology and its proponents grew tremendously during the early years of the Weimar Republic, seeing the rise of a völkisch nationalism that came to be a leading voice in German politics. Though völkisch ideology "had been widely disseminated before the war" argues Mosse, "afterward it was suddenly transformed into a politically effective system of thought. It was after the war that the ideology acquired a mass base."20 Not only did völkisch ideology tremendously affect extra-parliamentary groups such as the Youth Movement,21 veterans', students', and teachers' organizations, but established political parties such as the DNVP also benefited from the völkisch atmosphere. Pressures from a 'new right' that had by then embraced components of the völkisch movement shaped the organization, and ideology of the DNVP, influencing its

18 Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair, xii-xiii.

19 Long since the publication of Mosse's and Stern's works, historians have challenged the argument that Nazism was a reactionary, anti-modern movement. That Nazism displayed an affinity to nineteenth century romanticism, a vague notion of "blood and soil" alongside an appreciation for industrialization, technology, and more generally modernization, a sort of "reactionary modernism" has become a widely accepted notion within modern German historiography. See: Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich (Cambridge University Press, 1986).

20 Mosse, Crisis of German Ideology, 237.

21 Wandervögel 68

leadership and conservative base to adhere to a more visible anti-Semitism. It is from the early history of the DNVP that we see just how völkisch thought penetrated the

"respectable right," and established itself as a viable political ideology.22 Von Graefe would come to define the völkisch worldview as "an inner spiritual mood," a "racial pride," a pride in the German community and of German history, and finally, a "holy anger" and a "sacred vow," an "internal struggle" for the liberation of the German people from the "conquest of outer bondage."23 The Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (DAP) itself, upon

Hitler's joining, also showcased how völkisch thought was to be politicized. Hitler's views on the völkisch movement were that it could not combat the threat of Judeo-Bolshevism faced by Germany without abandoning "pure theoretic considerations" and deciding "to transform its insight into political power, to exchange tolerant academic research with organized power."24 The German right-wing appropriated and transformed this romantic, mythical intellectual critique of German society to fit into their political platforms, giving rise to a völkisch politics that both the DVFP and NSDAP came to represent.

As an official organization, the NSDAP (DAP until 1920) existed for three years before the formation of the DVFP in late 1922. This period saw the NSDAP's foundation and growth, leadership changes—and ultimately the support of a failed putsch followed

22 Mosse, Crisis of German Ideology, 238-241.

23 "Die Deutschvölkische Freiheitspartei, Zweite ergänzte Auflage" in Deutschnationales Rüstzeug, heft nr. 1, Jahrg. 1924 (Berlin: Deutschnationale Schriftenvertriebsstelle, 1924), 29-30.

24 "The völkisch Idea and the Party (By Adolf Hitler), VB, No. 1, 1 January 1921," in Detlef Mühlberger, ed., Hitler's Voice: The Völkischer Beobacther, 1920-1933, Vol. II Nazi Ideology and Propaganda (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2004), 66. 69

by the imprisonment of leaders and members—and the ban of the party. Dietrich Orlow contends that prior to the 1923 Putsch, "there were few ideological or strategic differences among the various groups [of the far right], although personality differences and the fetish for organizational independence abounded. Neither the NSDAP nor most of its kindred organizations had as yet discovered the political usefulness of exclusive dogmas and programs..."25 More directly, others have stated that "no real programmatic differences existed" between the NSDAP and DVFP during this time period.26 While the extreme right was solidifying its political worldview, Weimar Germany was experiencing a multitude of changes brought on both by the onset of modernity and the lingering defeat in the Great War. Nazistic ideology was formed in reaction to these changes, viewed as a national crisis sparked by the loss of war and November Revolution of 1918. This ideology, however, was not a monolithic development and can be better understood as reflecting a spectrum, or variety of strands represented and appropriated by various völkisch organizations, including the DVFP.

The November Revolution of 1918 which led to the creation of Germany's first parliamentary democracy represented a key moment for parties of all political stripes.

Parties that survived the war and those created immediately after its end contributed to a proliferation of political ideology. Newspapers across Germany published manifestos, declarations, and official party programmes as parties worked to mobilize a mostly

25 Dietrich Orlow, The History of the Nazi Party: 1919-1933 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1969), 39.

26 Richard Steigmann-Gall, The Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 56. 70

disillusioned population around particular political agendas. Moreover, the signing of the

Weimar constitution in 1919 also introduced proportionate representation, allowing for virtually any group that could muster support to hold a seat in the newly established government.27 The roots of both the NSDAP and DVFP can be found in this period of

German history. Established in 1919, the then Deutsche Arbeiter Partei (DAP) produced its own political manifestos, the most infamous being the "25 Points" of 1920 which would come to define the Nazi worldview. The party from which the leaders of the DVFP would secede in 1922, the Deutschnationale Volkspartei (DNVP) was created by German conservatives in 1918 as a new conservative party. In 1918, its sixteen point list made public the new conservatives' political ideology. Similarly, parties such as the SPD

(social democrats), KPD (Communists), and Zentrum (Catholics) joined in identifying their aims and function within the newly established Republic. Following defeat in war, the introduction of a new system of parliamentary democracy, and a pronounced societal disillusionment, Germany's political parties fought for social influence for purposes of political power by constructing new—or reshaping old—worldviews. In this chapter I use the above mentioned public pronouncements of the parties' ideologies, including many others that were circulated, or printed in local newspapers to examine the spectrum of

Nazism I argue can be found within the extreme right-wing of the Weimar Republic.

27 Eric D. Weitz, Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy (Princeton University Press, 2009), 33. 71

Political Worldviews: The Question of Parliamentarism

As discussed in the previous chapter, the German political landscape witnessed a shift from traditional, bourgeois party politics that led up to Germany's defeat in 1918, to the rise of extra- or anti- parliamentary groups. These 'interest' groups spoke to Germans who were disillusioned with the November Revolution and the newly constituted Weimar

Republic. As in the case of the DVFP, its roots within a bourgeois tradition were crucial in the group's secession from a party that came to be identified with the Weimar government, and the advocacy of a message that rejected bourgeois parliamentary politics. According to Larry Eugene Jones, the dissolution of the bourgeois party system that represented the political arena of the Second Reich, "passed through four distinct phases" leading to its ultimate demise during the late years of the Weimar Republic.28

The first two phases are of interest to this study. First being the period from 1918-1924 which Jones contends was "characterized by the general instability of the bourgeois middle parties and by the increasing disaffection of the German middle strata from those parties which had become either directly or indirectly identified with the Weimar

Republic." The second phase, from 1924-1928 saw the "emergence of special-interest parties which no longer addressed themselves to the German nation as a whole, but to specific segments of the German population."29 The emergence of the NSDAP and particularly the DVFP reflect Jones' conceptualization of the dissolution of bourgeois

28 Richard Bessel and E.J. Feuchtwanger, eds., Social Change and Political Development in Weimar Germany (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 268.

29 Ibid, 269. 72

politics; this can most significantly be seen through both parties' political worldviews, and their position on the question of parliamentary participation.

The central difference between the bourgeois parties of the Second Reich and the parties and groups which came to be associated with the völkisch right was their stance on parliamentary politics. As discussed in chapter 1, extra-parliamentary groups proliferated during the late Wilhelmine period in Germany as a mass electorate composed of peasants and workers mobilized, and the established system of Honoratiorenpolitik

(politics of notables) was rejected. Moreover, following its crushing defeat in 1918,

Germany witnessed thousands of returning officers and soldiers who, entrenched in the

"stab in the back myth" and not yet ready to disassociate themselves from their military duty, formed what came to be known as Freikorps. These paramilitary groups embodied a militant, anti-parliamentary approach to combating the 'crisis of Weimar.' Other groups embodied a seemingly more traditional political approach, mobilizing the population around socio-political agendas that sought to work from outside the system (Weimar) in order to change it. The early NSDAP (then DAP) emerged as an anti-parliamentary group that, by 1920 was militarized yet distinguished itself from strictly paramilitary organizations such as the Freikorps by advancing a political agenda. Albrecht von

Graefe, Wilhelm Henning, and Reinhard Wulle, who in 1922 would secede from the

DNVP's ranks and form the DVFP, reflected perhaps both parliamentary and extra- parliamentary approaches to rescuing Germany from Weimar's crisis. As they witnessed the failure of bourgeois party politics from within as members of the conservative DNVP these men established their own party as one that rejected the Weimar Republic and its 73

constitution. Alongside this, they witnessed a growingly radicalized völkisch right wing that espoused militarism and advocated for the destruction of the Weimar system. The

DVFP represented a hybrid group. Borrowing from the NSDAP, the Freikorps, and similar völkisch organizations, the group took on an identity of an extra-parliamentary, fascistic group, while advocating the use of the parliamentary system as a means to an end, which would see the system fundamentally changed.

Although von Graefe, Henning and Wulle seceded from their parent party due to ideological conflicts over anti-Semitism, the DVFP's political worldview would come to echo the larger sentiments of the völkisch right, and further distanced it from the DNVP.

Most centrally, the political worldview of the DVFP saw Weimar's system of parliamentary democracy as a failure and rejected what it had become after the signing of the Versailles Treaty. As did the NSDAP, the DVFP rejected the Versailles Treaty and sought to defend Germany against its internal and external enemies. Versailles' impact was most felt through Germany's economic development in the early 1920s. The DVFP blamed the Weimar Government for its "policy of fulfillment" regarding the variety of requests made by the enforcers of Versailles.30 The members of the DVFP (having origins in Prussian conservatism) saw parliament as a tool which they could use to implement their Weltanschauung which called for fundamental change. The party leaders

30 Reimer Wulff, Die Deutschvölkische Freiheitspartei, 1922-1928 (Germany: E. Mauersberger, 1968), 2. Germany, during this time period saw "a certain measure of rivalry between the two strategies of 'Erfullungspolitik' and 'Katastrophenpolik' – fulfillment of the terms of the treaty, and defiance to the point of confrontation." The latter being much "simpler and more straightforward inasmuch as its proponents assumed that a German revival would come only from a new escalation of international conflict." Detlev J.K. Peukert, The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993), 55-56. 74

were themselves politicians, both before their ousting from the DNVP, and after as their parliamentary career continued well after the establishment of the DVFP. "For all the resoluteness of our fundamental rejection of the party system" wrote the leaders in the

DVFP's official founding manifesto of 1923, "we can fight under today's parliamentary constitution and win but only if we organize ourselves as planned."31 For its cynical view of the party system, this position does not necessarily imply an outright rejection of parliamentarism. Rather, the DVFP saw an opportunity to use the system in order to ultimately change it, or remove the excesses they believed existed within it. Though the

DVFP's views on the Versailles Treaty and the ineffectiveness of the Republic's ruling parties were echoed within the völkisch right, it was their position on parliamentary participation that led the way within a völkisch movement set largely on extra- parliamentary tactics to achieve power. From the outset, the DVFP's parliamentary platform stood in opposition to that of the NSDAP, which would shift its own course according to that of the DVFP after 1923.

The DVFP's acceptance of parliamentary participation for purposes of subverting the system was contrasted by the anti-parliamentarism of Hitler and the NSDAP during its early history, specifically from its founding until Hitler's release from Landsberg prison in 1924. The early NSDAP used its central propaganda tool, the newspaper

Völkischer Beobacther ("People's Observer") to consistently attack parliamentarism and the new Republic. Attacks centered on the supposed corruption of the system—a system

31"Gründungsaufruf der Deutschvölkischen Freiheitspartei vom 17.12.1922" as document 1 in Wulff, DVFP, 285-287. 75

"in which the quick-witted scoundrel, but not the people, determin[e] what happens". The lack of democratic representation and the inherently faulty democratic process was central to the NSDAP's attack on the party system. "'The people govern! Strange!" claimed Hitler cynically in a speech later printed in the VB, "The people? No!

Governments, which one fine day presented themselves as governments, in whose election the people have not been involved."32 The party system was portrayed as a

"pestilential bubo in our people,"33 a barren system of government suffering from non- existent discussion, poor compromises, and a lack of consideration of the German people.34 Supporters of the parliamentary system on the left were portrayed by Hitler as using their energy to ruin Germany, while those on the right, having lost all energy, merely worked to once in their life form a government.35 Only after Hitler's release from

Landsberg would the NSDAP's position on parliamentary participation change, ushering in a new period in its history, falling in line with the DVFP's tactics.36 By 1928, the party reflected the same position regarding parliamentary participation introduced by the DVFP in 1923, the party would enter parliament to destroy it from within, retaining its

32 "The Malicious Agitators of the Truth, VB, No. 32, 22 April 1922," in Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice, vol. 2, 32.

33 "The Swindle of Democracy! VB, No. 79, 19 October 1921," in Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice, vol. 2, 27.

34 "The Great Betrayal! (By Gregor Strasser, MdR), VB, No. 114, 12 August 1925," in Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice, vol. 2, 35-36.

35 Hitler's speech on "Race and Economics: the German Workman in the National Socialist State," delivered on 24 April 1923, in Norman H. Baynes, The Speeches of Adolf Hitler: April 1922-August 1939 (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), 63.

36 Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998), 228. 76

revolutionary identity.37 The outright rejection of parliamentary participation early on in the history of the NSDAP can be attributed to several components: I argue the most central was the organization of the NSDAP as a fascist, paramilitary party as well as its origins in a hyper-nationalistic, anti-parliamentary state in Bavaria.

The distinction between the DVFP's acceptance of parliamentary participation and its rejection by the NSDAP becomes more clear when we use fascism as a lens of inquiry to examine both parties. A central component of fascist ideology and rhetoric is the rejection of traditional institutions and systems as valid tools of change. Paxton argues that it is a prerequisite for a fascist group to display an aversion to any established solution to overcome the crisis the group finds itself in. Building further on this notion,

Michael Mann labels this attitude with the term "transcendence," the fascists' rejection of the social order which must be destroyed and replaced with new institutions.38 Most evidently, the traditional solution in the case of Weimar Germany was its newly established parliamentary system. Though both parties were entrenched in the "stab in the back" myth, believing that it was Germany's politicians (amongst others notably Jews) who had caused the dishonorable loss in 1918, the NSDAP's position on parliamentarism until 1923 was sharply distinct from that of the DVFP. From its inception, the NSDAP's fascist identity was highlighted by its rejection of parliamentarism and espousal of paramilitary tactics. If we use 1923 as a point of transition in the development of the

37 See Joseph Goebbels' essay in Der Angriff, published 30 April 1928. Accessed 2/11/2012, http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/angrif06.htm

38 Mann, Fascists, 14. 77

NSDAP, we can clearly label the early party (1919-1923) fascist, as it reflected, both in its rhetoric and action an aversion to traditional solutions. On the other hand, the DVFP's stance on parliamentarism was from the outset pragmatic. The party's rootedness in the traditional political system allowed its leaders to recognize its utility as a means to an end. If we distinguish between the DVFP's rhetoric and its actions, we can clearly see that the party hardly reflected Mann's conception of "transcendence" fitting more clearly under the banner of a fascistic party.

The NSDAP and DVFP's differing views on parliamentary participation can also be examined from the perspective of the two parties' regional origins. Though the two could (and did) continue to mold their political worldviews, organizations, and tactics as they grew, the impact of their regional origin was highly apparent. As the seat of the

German government Prussia did not experience the same proliferation of nationalist, anti- parliamentary groups after the war as did the rest of the country, especially Bavaria.

According to Orlow, after 1918, "Prussia was to serve as a model not of authoritarianism, but of the viability of parliamentary democracy in Germany."39 This is not to say that extreme rightist groups did not exist in Prussia. Evidenced by continued political assassinations, terrorism, and antagonisms with established parties, extra-parliamentary, paramilitary groups did pose a threat to the Prussian state. Yet, argues Orlow, "popular success for the radical right" throughout Germany, "also called forth effective

39 Orlow, Prussia, 9. 78

countermeasures by the republican authorities, especially in Prussia."40 The emergence of the DVFP in 1923 as a party willing to work within parliament, then, should not be seen as an anomaly if we examine its regional origin. The party's leaders were never the political outsiders that Hitler and his young party leaders could claim to be. Rather, entering the Reichstag in 1920, Wulle and Henning joined with von Graefe who had already been serving as a deputy for the old conservative party since 1912 in the ranks of the DNVP. Politicians such as von Graefe, and later Henning and Wulle–even as they slowly ventured away from the old right towards the new—represented a distinctly

Prussian, bourgeois establishment that had controlled German politics prior to the establishment of the Weimar Republic.

The political platform of the DVFP remained one that was based on parliamentary participation even as the party came to represent an extreme völkisch right wing that espoused extra-parliamentarism, political terrorism, and the destruction of the Weimar

Republic. Even with its ban in Prussia in March 1923 due to continued agitation from rightist extremists, the DVFP's position regarding parliamentarism remained consistent.41

The three leaders appealed to Prussia's Minister of the Interior to restore their constitutional rights as members of the Reichstag to organize as the DVFP.42 It also

40 Ibid, 161.

41 See "Der preußische Innenminister Severing über das Verbot der Deutschvölkischen Freiheitspartei" as document 3 in Wulff, DVFP, 288-289.

42 See "Beschwerde der drei deutschvolkischen Reichstagsabgeordneten über das Verbot ihrer Partei(Schreiben an den Reichsminister des Innern vom 25. Marz 1923" as document 4 in Wulff, DVFP, 289-291. 79

remained consistent throughout the party's various alliances with the southern National

Socialists, manifested as the NSFB (Nationalsozialistische Freiheitsbewegung) and VSB

(Völkisch-Sozialer-Bloc). Unlike Prussia, Bavaria was a state which more clearly tolerated, and perhaps even accepted extra-parliamentary, paramilitary groups, reflecting its disdain for a Germany controlled exclusively by the north. Orlow argues that "Until

Hitler's and Ludendorff's abortive Beer Hall Putsch in November 1923, Bavaria remained hospitable ground for the radical right..." yet, "Prussia...consistently moved vigorously against rightist extremist groups."43 Combined with the threat of the Prussian government to ban or dissolve extreme right organizations working to undermine the parliamentary system, the rootedness of the DVFP's leaders within the established political process highlights the centrality of region when comparing the political worldviews of völkisch parties.

Social Components: Religiosity and Confession

The worldviews of both the NSDAP and DVFP, as was völkisch ideology, were rooted in a religiosity based on Christianity and a spirituality that venerated the concept of 'blood and soil.' Religion and confession would prove a significant breaking point between the worldviews of both parties, since the DVFP was rooted in a Protestant

43 Orlow, Prussia, 161. 80

tradition, while the NSDAP more in Catholicism.44 Regional divisions between the

DVFP and NSDAP dictated differences in their religious affiliation, and conceptions of religion within their worldview. The same geographic north-south division that contributed to the varied political tactics of both parties also came into play in shaping their confessional affiliation. Yet, the difference between both parties' confession lies not only in such a seemingly simplistic binary; rather, the diverse makeup of the NSDAP as it grew outside the boundaries of Bavaria, the position of its leadership (particularly Hitler) on the confessional divide, and its role in the future of Germany translated into a unique outlook on the question of faith. The NSDAP displayed a far more open religiosity than did the DVFP, appropriating not only Catholicism but also Germanic Christianity, the attempt to overcome the German confessional divide and subscribe to a single, Aryanized

Christian faith. Whether this was pragmatic or genuine in nature is a point of dispute among historians; yet it appears the NSDAP understood the future political implications

44 The debate over Nazism as 'political religion,' an important one within the study of Nazi ideology is not examined in this work. Admittedly, the role of symbols, pageantry and performance that developed more visibly after the NSDAP's rise to power highlights a key difference between itself and the DVFP. Yet, while present, these aspects of the NSDAP's aesthetic were not representative of the party's orientation as a whole, and more significantly, did not represent a rejection of Christianity, or a religion ersatz. Moreover, these aspects of the Nazi movement—namely the aestheticization of the movement— were not brought to the forefront during the party's infancy nor during the period of the Verbotzeit in which its relationship with the DVFP was at its closest. On Nazism and 'political religion' theory see Richard Steigmann-Gall, “Nazism and the Revival of Political Religion Theory,” Totalitarian Movements & Political Religions 5 (2004): 376-396; See also the critique of Steigmann-Gall's The Holy Reich by Manfred Gailus, Ernst Piper, Stanley Stowers, Doris Bergen, and Irving Hexam in the Journal of Contemporary History 42 (2007) and his response, Richard Steigmann-Gall, "Christianity and the Nazi Movement: A Response." Journal of Contemporary History 42 (2) (2007): 185-211. 81

of coming down on either side of the question of confession, while the DVFP was far too entrenched in its Prussian-Protestant roots to cease from attacking Catholicism.45

As two leading voices of the völkisch right wing, both the DVFP and NSDAP saw religion as a significant facet of their völkisch worldview. This new ideology seemed to transcend the decades-old Kulturkampf that came to represent Prussia's contentious relationship with Germany's Catholics prior to the turn of the century.46 Within the völkisch worldview, Christianity was fused with intense nationalism, racialism, and anti-

Semitism to form what many saw as a unique confessional affiliation. Yet, both parties did not display an equal appropriation of völkisch views on religion in their worldviews.

The Protestant, anti-Catholic DVFP was less inclined then its Catholic counterpart to bridge the confessional divide and embrace a Christianity that was above the confessions.

From Rosenberg's "A Folkish Idea of State" we can see how the völkisch stance on religion constituted a new faith that was seemingly above the traditional confessions. He proclaims that "in all spiritual and political camps a process of fermentation is building up" and that "there comes a moment for every person who is truly searching when, out of thinking and fighting, suddenly an experience results." These experiences, he argues, are independent of Germany's confessional divide. "We see that religious differences are

45 Though many works have examined the relationship between the Third Reich and the churches, few have investigated the role of religion in the formation of the NSDAP and Nazi ideology. See: Richard Steigmann-Gall, The Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919-1945 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Derek Hastings, Catholicism and the Roots of Nazism: Religious Identity and National Socialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

46 James Retallack, ed. Imperial Germany: 1971-1918 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 34-36. 82

hardly active in folkish circles anymore, that no one forbids another the form of his faith because he knows and feels that this form, however, oddly decked out with strange ornaments, is inwardly folkish."47 Rosenberg here is speaking in highly spiritual and religious terms, describing a völkisch "process of fermentation" that is enveloping

Germany, rising "like a dome over the entire organic nationality."48 Religious barriers, the foremost being the division of Germany between Catholicism and Protestantism are presented by Rosenberg to become secondary, or perhaps even to disappear in the view of a new völkisch worldview. Yet, Germany's religious division and Christianity as a system of belief itself would hold a significant role in the development of both the DVFP and the NSDAP and their ideologies.

The role confession played in the formation and early years of the NSDAP's ideology can be measured in a variety of ways including biographical examinations of its most infamous leaders; its constituents' religious affiliations; or the role party ideologues and intellectual currents had in affecting the party's worldview. Scholars such as Derek

Hastings have examined the Catholic roots of the Bavarian NSDAP, while emphasizing that the question of confession was tied directly to the political and organizational development of the NSDAP. Though the NSDAP, until 1923, remained highly Catholic in its confessional orientation, upon joining the "kampfbund in September 1923" the party had "opened [itself] to the increased influence of Ludendorff and his anti-Catholic

47 Alfred Rosenberg, "A Folkish Idea of State," in Barbara Miller and Leila J. Rupp, eds., Nazi Ideology Before 1933, 71.

48 Ibid. 83

followers."49 Perhaps most clearly though, we can use the party's official programme and pronouncements to understand its religiosity and stance on the question of confession. In the NSDAP's infamous "25 Points" we find one explicit mention of religion in the second to last point. Only a small paragraph, point #24 set out the party’s religious agenda.

Following a multitude of political specificities and demands, point #24 highlighted the

NSDAP's demand for "freedom of religion for all religious denominations in the state so long as they do not endanger it…"50 The vagueness of the statement is telling in its apparent intentionality. Pragmatically, it seems, the authors of the list sought to avoid the real confessional divide that plagued Germany. Continuing, the point asserts that "the

Party as such stands for positive Christianity, without binding itself confessionally to any one denomination…"51 What would later evolve into a much more complex religious platform, Positive Christianity also reflected an ideological commitment to uniting

Germany around a singular faith that would overcome confessional differences.52

49 Hastings, Catholicism and the Roots of Nazism, 185.

50 "The program of the NSDAP" in Roderick Stackeleberg and Sally A. Winkle, eds., The Nazi Germany Sourcebook: An Anthology of Texts (New York: Routledge, 2002), 65.

51 Ibid.

52 Positive Christianity would later be appropriated by the German Christians, a movement and ideology that built on the NSDAP's platform of a faith that was above the confessional divide. This religious ideology was highly influenced by the völkisch romanticized concepts of blood and soil, and synthesized Teutonic nationalism with Christianity. In the 1930s, with the NSDAP's rise to power and policy of Gleichschaltung, the German Christian platform would overcome the Protestant church system of Germany to form a Reichskirche led by Ludwig Müller. Yet, the synthesis of the Nazi political and theological Weltanschauung with Protestant Christian beliefs produced much tension and ultimately fragmentation leading to the dissolution of the German Christian movement. See: Doris Bergen, Twisted Cross: The German Christian Movement in the Third Reich (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996). 84

Similarly to the NSDAP, the DVFP in their founding manifesto discussed the question of confession. In it, the DVFP emphasized that the Weimar crisis should be solved not only through economic and political means, but "moral and religious forces must be mobilized" as well. The way to a national community could only be through an

"intimate, deeply religious movement."53 Their movement was "a religious movement to the core. It wants a deepening of the German people and knows that the German without religion is unthinkable." Yet, unlike the ambiguity surrounding the NSDAP's public pronouncements regarding confession, the DVFP's Protestant orientation was visible: while claiming that "'hundreds of thousands of Catholics' were followers," they also urged "'Protestant Christians" to "defend [their] Christianity against party politics.'"54 The

DVFP's völkisch ideology, underscored by a Protestant orientation, would produce conflict with the NSDAP. This division was visible to members of both parties. "In a revealing comparison, Goebbels claimed: 'the two certainly do not belong together. The one wants Prussian Protestantism (they call it the 'German Church'), the other a Greater

German compromise – perhaps something with a Catholic touch. Munich and Berlin remain opposed.'"55 The DVFP questioned the commitment of Hitler and his party to the völkisch view on religion. They asked, "'Is Hitler still völkisch?' and answered by accusing Hitler of selling out: 'Volkisch means fighting against all three supranational

53 "Das Programm der Deutschvölkischen freiheitspartei," in Wulff, DVFP, 15.

54 Steigmann-Gall, Holy Reich, 57.

55 Quoted in Steigmann-Gall, Holy Reich, 56. 85

powers; Freemasons, Jesuits and Jews. Hitler fights for Rome and the Jesuits... '"56

Ludendorff, a leading figure in the coalition between the two parties was perhaps the most vocal opponent of Catholicism in the völkisch ranks. During his trial after the failed putsch, the former General verbally assaulted the Pope, the Catholic Church and

Archbishop of Munich, Cardinal Faulhaber57 "dominat[ing] local headlines for weeks" and spearheading what Hastings labels a broad anti-Catholic groundswell.58 Though demagoguery dominated Hitler's statements in his own trial, the leader disconnected himself from the anti-Catholic sentiment raised by Ludendorff by upholding his identity as a Catholic. Believing that the völkisch movement had pursued a harsh anti-Catholic course since his failed putsch, Hitler was even "willing to give up entirely the use of the term völkisch to avoid future confusion with the counterproductive efforts of Catholic- baiters."59 If, as Hastings argues, 1924 marked a breaking point in the religious development of the NSDAP, with the party disassociating itself from its Catholic roots and advocating a message that emphasized the need to bridge the confessional divide in

Germany, its northern counterpart, the DVFP, would not undergo a similar transformation. The DVFP's commitment to its Protestant roots, and anti-Catholic

56 Ibid, 64.

57 Robert Wistrich, Who's Who in Nazi Germany (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc., 1982), 73-74.

58 Hastings, Catholicism and the Roots of Nazism, 147.

59 Ibid, 156. 86

rhetoric marked a key fault line within the völkisch-Nazi milieu and would serve a central point of contention during their rivalrous relationship after 1925.60

The two groups chose distinctly opposing paths in terms of their appeals to their constituencies based on religion. The NSDAP's Catholic roots were transformed, perhaps pragmatically, into a position that, on the surface, espoused a "German Christianity," overcoming the confessional divide between Catholicism and Protestantism to reach a wider constituency. The ability of the NSDAP to evolve in terms of its religious worldview was unmatched by the staunchly Protestant position of the DVFP. According to Hastings, the NSDAP took on a different course regarding how the movement would incorporate religion into its worldview, and overcome the historic antagonisms between

Catholicism and Protestantism. Hastings argues the NSDAP distanced itself from its

Catholic roots due to the visible antagonism between the confessions most visible with völkisch attacks on Catholicism between 1923 and 1925, referencing Ludendorff's anti-

Catholic rhetoric as he took over the fractionalized NSDAP and coalesced it with the northern DVFP. The NSDAP then took on a "highly stylized form of political religion, with its secular-liturgical symbolism and powerful participatory aesthetic, that so strikingly characterized the Third Reich and at the same time left so little room for the simpler and more straightforward Catholic orientation at the heart of the early Nazi movement."61 Religion would in a sense become one of the key points of contention

60 Ibid, 157.

61 Ibid, 4. 87

between the two parties during the 1920s, and would dictate the abilities of both to appeal to Germans outside of their regional strongholds in the north and south, respectively.

Demographic Appeal

On 8 January 1926, the Deutsch Tagesblatt printed a two-page article written by the leaders of the DVFB (Deutschvölkische Freiheitsbewegung, a successor organization of the DVFP), titled "The Call of the DVFB To Germans of All Occupations!" In it, the

DVFB's leaders called on railroad workers, construction workers, farmers, doctors, lawyers, students, state workers, officers and soldiers to support and join the NSFB

(Nationalsozialistische Freiheitsbewegung, a party formed after the failed Beer Hall

Putsch). Though the article was divided into small tracts, each with a distinct message to the particular occupation, as a whole, it represented a message of national community, and unity across class divisions.62 Having emerged as a Prussian, bourgeois, Protestant party in 1922, the DVFP attempted to shed this identity as it sought the support of a population disillusioned with traditional, Prussian-based politics, calling on all Germans, regardless of occupation, class or confession to join its ranks. Unlike the NSDAP, the

DVFP did not successfully tailor its message to various segments of German society, undermining the party's ability to appeal directly to Germans of a variety of classes, occupations, and confessions, who saw these as real differences. Most significantly, the

62 BAL R 8034II/6185, 186. 88

DVFP neglected to appeal to the German worker as a key constituent as did the NSDAP.

The DVFP's calls to a united German community were vague, and when attempts were made to incorporate various social groups into their constituency, the message was contrasted by the party and its leadership's identity and role in government. From its inception in 1922 to its ultimate demise in 1928, the DVFP directed its appeals to a unified German community, overlooking real divisions based on class, confession, and occupation to build their constituency. Though similar to the NSDAP in its attempt to foster an identity as a völkisch [populist] party, the DVFP could not develop a strong propaganda arm that pragmatically tailored its message to the diverse German population as it grew in size. The reasons behind this failure on the part of the DVFP may stem from the party leadership's continued emphasis on working to subvert the Weimar system from within, its leaders continued to serve as Reichstag deputies and representatives until the party's ultimate demise. In turn, this served as a key difference between the two parties and reflected why the NSDAP was able to attract and build a much larger and diverse constituency than the DVFP. In this section I examine perhaps the most evident fault line between the NSDAP and DVFP: the building of their social base.

In building their parties and growing their membership, the DVFP and NSDAP took divergent paths to shaping their constituencies. Though the DVFP and NSDAP shared a similar völkisch language in their propaganda, the NSDAP took a seemingly opposite path in building its constituency, displaying a more direct approach to attracting new members as the movement grew in size. The NSDAP, whether genuinely or pragmatically "emphasized [its] interest in the lower and especially the urban-worker 89

classes"63 separating itself from its völkisch competitor. In 1919 and 1920, the young

NSDAP championed the cause of—and saw themselves as the only true voice of—

German workers. The VB, in November 1920 claimed that "the appearance of the

National Socialist Workers' Party was...a necessity" for German workers, since these

"lacked unity up to now and because a real party of the workers did not exist to date."64

In expanding its social base later in the 1920s, the NSDAP moved away from speaking only to the German worker and by the late 1920's would appeal broadly to the German population. The party continued to tailor its message to specific sectors of the German population, but did not speak exclusively to any particular group. The young DVFP sought to contrast its bourgeois identity by appealing to a broad cross section of the

German population.65 Its propaganda relied on völkisch language to attract membership as both parties' appeals to the German population were visibly evolving as their membership and influence grew. From its inception as the advocate of German workers, the NSDAP broadened its appeal to include middle-class Germans as well as corporations and businesses. The DVFP's evolution saw the party attempt to shed its Prussian, bourgeois roots to attract a more diverse constituency in order to compete with the

NSDAP.

63 Orlow, The History of the Nazi Party, 19.

64 "From Volkisch Parties, VB, No. 101, 21 November 1920" in Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice, vol. I, 40.

65 "This nationalist movement knows no party bounds, knows no class and class differences, it will gather those who are willing to finally clean up this dissolute party business, to finally reach true inner freedom and social reconciliation." in "Gründungsaufruf der Deutschvölkischen Freiheitspartei vom 17.12.1922" as document 1 in Wulff, DVFP, 285. 90

Before examining the makeup of the DVFP and NSDAP constituencies, we must highlight the geographical context that allowed for the rise of both parties and their unique constituencies. Region came to play a tremendous role in both the ability of the

NSDAP and DVFP to establish themselves as legitimate political groups, as well as for their ability to attract membership and form a constituency. As merely one "of a number of similar völkisch groups which sprang up all over Germany during 1919" the NSDAP had the "particular advantage of being based in Bavaria." Bavaria epitomized political instability immediately following German defeat. Although a moderate socialist regime was put in place in May 1919, the previous six months saw a number of left-wing regimes and a number of revolutionary groups seeking to achieve power. The revolutionary events while unsuccessful in leading to the establishment of a new regime had succeeded in "alienat[ing] the traditionally conservative population." Moreover, extreme right groups such as the NSDAP benefitted from government institutions such as the police who allowed for their mobilization. These individuals—some of whom would later join Hitler's movement such as Ernst Röhm—"were eager to overthrow the Republic and openly encouraged and protected all effective ultranationalist movements in their jurisdictional areas." Thus, "for the next few years, Bavaria became a haven for right- wing extremists from all over Germany" allowing for the establishment, and growth of the German Workers' Party.66

66 Orlow, The History of the Nazi Party, 19. 91

The situation outside Bavaria, particularly in the north in Prussia—was substantially different. Right-wing extremist groups in Prussia were far less tolerated by police and the government, disallowing for a similar development of a Nazistic group.67

As the center of German politics during the Second Reich, Prussia's unique role in shaping the politics of the entire German nation were somewhat challenged with the creation of a parliamentary democracy. Yet, even with its central role diminished,

Prussia did not see the same proliferation of nationalistic, anti-parliamentary, militant groups after the defeat in the Great War as did Bavaria. Orlow argues that "the right radicals were never able to achieve the status of a major political force in Prussia in the years between 1921 and 1925." The major reason behind the failure of these groups to gain momentum was the "vigilance of the Prussian authorities. In contrast to their experience in Bavaria, right-wing extremist groups were not tolerated in Prussia. They remained short-lived organisms that were dissolved as soon as they became a threat to parliamentary democracy in the state."68 This meant that politically, Prussia's parties—the

DVFP among them—continued their already laid path towards attaining political power and national influence rather than attempting to work outside the system.69

On the surface it appears that the DVFP and NSDAP appealed to the same, monolithic constituency that had come to reject the established political parties and

67 Geoffrey Pridham and Jeremy Noakes, eds., Nazism 1919-1945 Vol. 1: The Rise to Power 1919- 1934: A Documentary Reader (Exter: University of Exter Press, 1998), 33-34.

68 Orlow, Prussia, 162.

69 Ibid, 9. 92

process in the early 1920s. Supporters of the völkisch right wing consisted of disillusioned soldiers back from the front, students and young people inspired by the mythology of war, middle-class conservatives who had come to reject the established political parties, and workers to an extent.70 However, the superficial similarities of those the DVFP and NSDAP appealed to, as well as the ranks of both parties' membership begin to fracture when we examine these more closely. Soon after the formation of the

DVFP in 1922, according to Wulle's claims, there were 30,000 registered members.71 Of these, Wulff finds that "we can identify three major groups..." First, he lists "landowners, members of academic professionals and civil servants, whose political ideas of the governing parties of the German rights are not met;" second, "members of lower middle classes - entrepreneurs, businessmen, craftsmen - who are threatened in their economic viability through increased competition;" and lastly, "former professional soldiers...and members of the now dissolved Freikorps..."72 While this constituency was divided by class, and occupation, politically, "they were among the conservatives, social and Pan-

German" dissatisfied with the status quo and pushing for political action.73 The DVFP's constituency also grew from its ability to tap into the reservoir of the extreme völkisch members of the conservative, bourgeois, DNVP.74 The representation of each of the

70 Peukert, The Weimar Republic, 74.

71 Sauer, "DVFP und der Fall Grütte," 1.

72 Wulff, DVFP, 21.

73 Ibid.

74 David Jablonsky, The Nazi Party in Dissolution: Hitler and the Verbotzeit, 1923-1925 (London: F. Cass, 1989), 10. 93

above mentioned groups within the membership of the DVFP, however, was not proportional.

Wulff's findings do not correspond to a propaganda campaign that appealed to each of the above mentioned groups individually. Rather, the DVFP continuously called on all Germans as members of the race rather than a particular class to join the freedom movement. Similarly to the NSDAP, the DVFP used language that emphasized race, culture, blood, and nation as unifying concepts.75 Yet, unlike the NSDAP which had geared its message more narrowly to segments of the German population, the DVFP's message was addressed to no group in particular. The ability of the NSDAP to shape its propaganda based on the audience it was attempting to reach would not be matched by the DVFP. Alongside its propaganda, the membership of the DVFP reveals that the party attracted mostly northern, bourgeois Germans compared to the more broad and varied constituency of the NSDAP. As a founder of the party, Count Reventlow would later write in his Der Weg zum Neuen Deutschland (1931) that the DVFP was "purely a burger party" that while displaying a friendly attitude to German workers "was determined to stay in their old segments of the population." Moreover, Reventlow, who would secede from the DVFP in 1927, accused the party of dissonance between its name and outward posturing and with its nature. In other words, the DVFP was outwardly a party of all

75 See for instance: "Gründungsaufruf der Deutschvölkischen Freiheitspartei" as document 1 in Wulff. Even in 1927, as the DVFB, the party continued to address all Germans as "revered member[s] of the race" and emphasized a community of "people of all ranks." See: BAL N S26/841, 3VS. 94

Germans—bourgeois and working class—yet its ideological roots reflected a party that was bourgeois, Prussian, Protestant and anti-Catholic.76

From its inception as a party in 1919, the then DAP appealed widely to German workers, isolating them as their primary audience.77 While the NSDAP effectively broadened its social base during the early 1920s, calling for the protection of the

Mittelstand, it continuously appealed more directly and successfully to the German workers than its competitor, the DVFP. Though the results of this were uninspiring, the

NSDAP largely failing to garner a significant working-class following, it was the attempt of the party to attract a particular segment of the German population that differentiated it from the northern DVFP. "Like other völkisch parties, the DAP was bellicosely nationalistic, opposed to Jewish influence in the state and society, and vehemently anti-

Marxist" claims Thomas Childers. "Yet, unlike the others, the DAP was determined to win working-class support for these causes."78 In its 1919 "Guidelines", the DAP established itself as the voice of the worker. At the forefront of the "Guidelines," structured around rhetorical questions posed by the authors, stood the DAP’s commitment to the German worker. “The DAP seeks the ennoblement of the German worker” through his protection within the German economy by means of profit sharing rather than socialization. Moreover, the NSDAP, realizing the importance of bridging

76 Reventlow, Der Weg zum Neuen Deutschland, 140, quoted in Wulff, DVFP, 195f.

77 Thomas Childers, The Nazi Voter: Social Foundations of Fascism in Germany, 1919-1933 (The University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 45.

78 Ibid, 44. 95

regional divides to build a strong constituency, directly spoke to the German people as a geographically united community. Rosenberg exclaimed that "the concept of a 'Bavarian people' in contrast to a 'Prussian people' must disappear. There is only a Prussian branch and a Bavarian branch, which both belong to the German people."79 Hitler saw before him "not Bavarians, Saxons, or Prussians, [he] saw before [him] German fellow- countrymen, who belonged together by birth, blood, and destiny..."80 In its formative years, the NSDAP appealed to and presented itself as the party of the German worker while advancing the concept of a national community of all Germans.

Appealing to the workers and attempting to bridge regional divides, at least superficially, was central to the successful build up of the NSDAP's constituency. In the

25 November, 1920 edition of the VB, an explicit call was made to the German worker outlining his crucial role in Germany's future. "All working elements must be fused together into a group of German workers, regardless whether these were workers of the hand or of the brain."81 The German worker must be racially pure, his work must serve the common good, and only then could the spiritual health of the citizenry and the nation be preserved.82 Other pronouncements published in the VB venerated the worker,

79 Rosenberg, "A Folkish Idea of State," in Barbara Miller and Leila J. Rupp, eds., Nazi Ideology Before 1933: A Documentation, 70 (author's emphasis).

80 "Hitler speech to the Sudeten Germans, 2 December 1938," in Norman Baynes, Hitler's Speeches, 92.

81 Original emphasis. The words "hand" and "brain" symbolize class associations here, with the worker of the brain being considered a bourgeois.

82 "The Worker in the Germany of the Future, VB, No. 102, 25 November 1920," in Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice, vol. I, 123, (original emphasis). 96

claiming "work is the source of every value"83 and celebrating the creation of völkisch trade unions that "will become a major factor in fighting for the recognition of völkisch ideas" and that are "calling to all workers and employees: Awaken, the day is near!"84

More specific calls to workers were made as the NSDAP strategically broadened its message to attract a wider constituency. Himmler's "Farmer, Wake Up!" of 1926 represents such a growing consciousness on the part of the NSDAP. In this instance, the farmer, threatened by modernization and urbanization and by its representatives, the Jews and capitalists, is singled out. Himmler appeals to the farmer to resist the enslavement of the German people by the Jews and big capital, warning of a potential Bolshevik

Revolution that, as in Russia, would lead to "mass murder and starvation in town and country, robbery and expropriation of [your] farms and [your] soil."85

Only a few months prior to the formation of the DVFP, the NSDAP had already established itself as the völkisch representative of the German workers, and did so at the expense of bourgeois parties. Anton Drexler's speech in a packed Burgerbräu in October

1922 was explicit in its attack on the German bourgeoisie for the conditions faced by the

German worker. The NSDAP called out to the disillusioned German worker who had suffered a substantial decline in pay under the Versailles treaty. Drexler directly calls into account those responsible, exclaiming

83 "National Community", VB, No. 117, 16 June 1923 in Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice, vol. I, , 129.

84 "German-Volkisch Combat Trade Unions," VB, No. 89, 10-11 May 1923 in Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice, vol. I, 131.

85 "Farmer, Wake Up!" in Miller Lane and Rupp, Nazi Ideology Before 1933, 97. 97

But we should not lose sight of the fact that the pre-war period carries considerable responsibility for our misfortune. The German-national petite bourgeoisie naturally puts all the blame on the November crime. But wasn't it just these circles who drove the German worker into the hands of socialism? Did any of them offer his hand to a worker? Did they not shift over a little when a worker sat next to them on the tram? Did the agrarian in the East not employ Poles, rather than German, agricultural workers on their estates? All of these questions must be answered with the word 'guilty' by those circles and officials whose duty it should have been to protect the German worker from exploitation and international incitement. It was surely the Jew who stabbed our army, people and state in the back, but the weapon that he used was forged by the exploiters of the German working class...that would be impossible if the German bourgeoisie of the pre-war era had possessed an understanding for the German worker.86

This clear attack on the German bourgeoisie also speaks to the culpability of bourgeois pre- and post- war political parties, among them the DNVP. Although Drexler would later serve a central role in the coalition between the DVFP and the NSDAP, the VB

(Volkisch Bloc), this early attack on the DVFP's parent party and others championing bourgeois politics stands as a clear attempt to highlight the NSDAP's commitment to the

German worker.

The intended political audience of the DVFP, and particularly the party's broad appeals to all Germans in its propaganda proves further its differentiation from the

NSDAP and its appeals to workers. The DVFP highlighted its conservative, bourgeoisie origins with its decision to "explicitly [refuse] to direct its appeal to the industrial workers as a class.”87 In refusing to focus its message to the various segments of

86 "Public Meeting in the Burgerbräu," VB, No. 80, 7 October 1922 in Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice, vol. I, 127.

87 Orlow, History of the Nazi Party, 88. 98

Germany's population, the DVFP failed to shed its identity as a Prussian, bourgeois party.

This identity would prove significant for the NSDAP's desire to differentiate between the two parties, particularly in areas where the latter did not have major influence. With the

NSDAP's later attempts of not only distinguishing between the two parties, but attacking the DVFP, it would continuously draw on these bourgeois origins and the lack of appeal to the proletariat as revelatory of the DVFP's materialism.88 The DVFP adopted a variety of völkisch sentiments to establish its own strand of Nazism during the early Weimar period. In doing so, political and ideological boundaries between the DVFP and the

NSDAP were drawn that would only be exacerbated by a variety of political and organizational disputes. I have argued that the DVFP and NSDAP, through divergent paths, amassed distinct constituencies and appealed selectively to specific elements of the

German population. Both due to its Bavarian roots and its pragmatic tactics in building its electorate, the NSDAP was able to direct its calls for support to seemingly all classes of

Germans while upholding its image as the party of the worker. The DVFP began its political life as a party of middle-class conservatives, and while it would seek the support of German workers later on, it could not escape its northern, bourgeois identity. What does this mean for our conception of these parties as fascist? Does a better understanding of their memberships allow for their labeling as fascist? Here we can invoke Paxton's discussion of the recruits of fascist movements.

88 "The Spirit of Hitler in all the German Gaue. A Year of Struggle, the Party's Performance and its Achievements," VB, No. 150, 3 July 1926 in Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice, vol. I, 215. 99

Paxton argues that "fascism would have remained a mere pressure group for veterans and their younger brothers, however, if it had not drawn in many other kinds of recruits."89 Besides being disillusioned by the war, Paxton highlights other common characteristics of those recruited by fascist movements. Fascist recruits, he argues,

"Above all...were young," they also were workers who were not attracted to the socialist community, and to a lesser extent, the unemployed who were not associated with the communists. Fascist parties also appealed to upper-class members, and voters. "It helped" continues Paxton, "if they had a tradition of direct action, and of hostility to parliamentary socialism." Regarding the class origin of their constituencies, Paxton argues that "early fascist parties did not recruit from all classes in the same proportion..."

Most significant to this study is Paxton's conception of how fascist recruitment diverged from previous political parties that he classifies "middle-class." "Unlike the middle-class parties led by 'notables'...the fascist parties swept their membership up into an intense fraternity of emotion and effort." Moreover, he emphasizes that fascist parties were able to "bring together citizens from all social classes."90 Many of these factors are visible in the constituencies of the NSDAP, and only some in those of the DVFP. Using Paxton's conceptualization of fascist recruits, we can more definitively label one, the NSDAP, fascist and the other, the DVFP, 'fascistic.' Although Paxton argues that "what united

89 Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism, 49.

90 Ibid, 50. 100

them [fascists] was, after all, values rather than a social profile" we see that the makeup of both parties' membership also distinguished their status as fascist parties.91

The similarities between both parties' constituencies are most certainly their attractiveness to the "Front Generation," Germany's WWI veterans who returned unwilling to accept the new Weimar Republic and its parliamentary system. Other overlaps in membership include their appeal to German supporters of the völkisch movement who espoused a strong nationalism and anti-Semitism. A significant difference in the attractiveness of each party to the militant, anti-Semitic, hyper- nationalist Freikorps constituent was perhaps the identity of each party as fascist, or fascistic. The NSDAP's continued anti-institutionalism, and embodiment of aggressive, confrontational tactics in their dealings with other parties, as well as the continued existence of a paramilitary arm post-1923, was something that the DVFP did not embrace.92 Yet, most strikingly, the division between the two parties lie in one's pragmatic decision to appear as a "catch-all" party, while the other did not (and could not) remove itself from its Prussian, bourgeois, parliamentary roots. Indeed, the DVFP would only emphasize the broadness of its message to encompass those it had previously neglected to attract after its failed coalition with the NSDAP in 1924-1925. According to

91 Ibid, 52.

92 Though I do not intend to further develop this argument in the present work, we witness a key fault line between the two parties' identities if we invoke social theory movement. Though both emerged from the völkisch movement of early Weimar, the crystallization of the DVFP as a political party (later the party would change its name to German Volkisch Freedom Movement) was contrasted by the NSDAP's organizational identity, especially due to the latter's anti-institutional stance and its embrace of a paramilitary arm to its organization. See: Brian Ault, "Joining the Nazi party before 1930: Material Interests or Identity Politics?," Social Science History vol. 26, number 2 (Summer 2002): 273-310. 101

Michaela D. Richter, the political arena of Weimar Germany was defined by

"crystallised" electoral alignments that produced a "multi-polar structure of party competition." The implications of this party system for the NSDAP and the DVFP meant that they could "firmly anchor [themselves] to one or another camp[s], and become a particularly aggressive advocate of its interests" or, "alternatively, [they] could step outside the prevailing structure of conflict, and rally disaffected voters from all camps."93

The fascist NSDAP was successful in doing so, in comparison to the fascistic DVFP that could not successfully build a diverse coalition of "disaffected" voters on its own.

Conclusion

George L. Mosse has said that while there "were political antagonisms" between the representative parties of the völkisch right, "fundamentally all these men shared a common ideology."94 In this chapter I have attempted to illuminate the fault lines present within the völkisch ideology, as expressed by the NSDAP and DVFP, to show that this movement did not speak with one voice. Moreover, I have argued that while one party, the NSDAP, seemed to fit more clearly scholars' definitions of a fascist group, the other, the DVFP, matched only certain characteristics, leading to my labeling it a 'fascistic'

93 Michaela D. Richter, "Resource Mobilization and Legal Revolution: National Socialist Tactics in Franconia" in The Formation of the Nazi Constituency 1919-1933, Thomas Childres, ed. (Totowa, New Jersey: Barnes & Noble Books, 1986), 110.

94 Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology, 233. 102

party. Although the ideologies of the DVFP and the NSDAP were indeed connected by a thread of nationalism and anti-Semitism, they did not constitute a uniform ideological or political program. The Protestant, conservative, bourgeois roots of the DVFP proved a consistent point of contention with the more extra-parliamentary, paramilitary, Catholic- oriented, Bavarian NSDAP. Politically, the anti-parliamentarism of Hitler and the early

NSDAP was contrasted with the DVFP's pragmatism that recognized the power of coalitions and elections, especially after the failed Beer Hall Putsch of 1923.

Economically, the two shared the rejection of Judeo-Bolshevik international capitalism, yet domestically appealed to Germans based on disparate class associations. Thus, the völkisch movement between 1919-1925 was fragmented and variegated, the voice of

Hitler and the NSDAP being merely one of many, among those of von Graefe, Wulle and

Henning of the DVFP. The programmatic differences show that the völkisch movement, and the parties which constituted it, did not share an ideological disposition. Rather, this chapter has demonstrated that there existed a spectrum of Nazism within the völkisch movement, of which the DVFP represented a singular strand, as did the NSDAP.

CHAPTER 3

An organizational Examination of the DVFP-NSDAP Relationship, 1922-1928

On 8 November, 1923 Adolf Hitler and his NSDAP putschists marched on the

Bürgerbräukeller beer hall in Munich where Bavarian leaders Gustav von Kahr, Hans

Ritter von Seisser, and Otto von Lossow were speaking to a large audience and declared a national revolution. Before condemning the "November Criminals" of the previous year's revolution in front of a supportive audience, Hitler announced to the Bavarian triumvirate his plans to march on Berlin the next day.1 A national revolution failed to materialize as

Hitler and his men were unable to engender a coherent, revolutionary force in Bavaria, and were consequently disbanded and arrested by state police and soldiers.2 The

NSDAP's failure to affect change through extra-parliamentary means marked a significant moment within the history of the völkisch movement. Modeled after

Mussolini's 1922 March on Rome, Hitler's putsch failed as a fascist performance of paramilitarism and revolutionary tactics. The Nazi failure signaled a shift in the identity

1 "Opponents of the Republic...dubbed the republicans who had toppled the Kaiser and surrendered to the Allies, were responsible for Germany's defeat and this shamefully onerous peace treaty." Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich: A New History (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), 48; "...the men who had first stabbed the army in the back, then in November 1918 committed the double crime of overthrowing the Kaiser and signing the Armistice." Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), 75.

2 See: "The Years of Struggle, 1919-1924" in Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, abridged edition (New York: HarperCollins Publisher, 1971), 30-63.

103

104

of the party as a fascist movement, with its charismatic leader imprisoned, the fragmented party would turn to parliamentarism and political coalitions, undermining its fascist nature. More broadly, the failure of the putsch and the subsequent ban of the NSDAP created a void within the growing völkisch right wing, allowing for other, Nazistic parties to fight for viability.

For the young DVFP, its acceptance of a parliamentary course for achieving political power was legitimized by the failed putsch. It was now clear to the völkisch leaders that significant political change in Germany could not come through paramilitary acts alone.3 "When the extreme right [made] its next bid for power," states Michael

Burleigh, "it would use much more insidious methods, namely a combination of the ballot box and street violence."4 The ballot box, much more than street violence, signaled the transformation of the NSDAP in the sense that the very system the party sought to remove—and failed to do so through paramilitary means alone—would have to be used as a means to an end. Merely a year after its creation, the fascistic DVFP found itself well positioned to usurp the supporters of the banned NSDAP, as the fragmented party was hindered by disputes over future tactics and leadership. For six years, the DVFP represented a legitimate political alternative to the NSDAP. Though the two would form a coalition during Hitler's time in prison, ultimately, the relationship was characterized by competition, fundamental disagreement, and constant tension.

3 Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich, 198.

4 Burleigh, The Third Reich, 60. 105

In this chapter I continue to ground my discussion of the NSDAP and DVFP in notions of regionalism and fascism to examine their organizational history and relationship in the years 1923-1928. I begin with the identity shift of the NSDAP in 1923 from an extra- or anti- parliamentary paramilitary party to one that suffered the loss of its leader and many members after the failed putsch of 1923, which accepted parliamentary participation as a means to an end. I simultaneously chart the continued growth of the

DVFP, which was able to take over the reins as the preeminent voice of the völkisch right wing (particularly in northern Germany) while the Hitler-less NSDAP was finding itself banned in various states and losing membership. Through coalitions with the Ludendorff- led NSDAP, the DVFP was able to exert its full political power in the years 1923-25, showcasing how a unified völkisch movement could attain political power in the Weimar

Republic. Yet, due to countless organizational conflicts, as well as continued ideological differences, the relationship between the two parties disintegrated, both re-emerging as competing entities for the voice of the völkisch movement by 1925. Though neither party produced a great response in the polls, their limited successes represented a growing acceptance of völkisch right wing parties and fascist movements. Ultimately, the same ideological differences that illuminated the fault lines between the two parties' identities, exacerbated by organizational disputes, would lead to the demise of the DVFP, and the rise to power of the NSDAP.

106

Political Landscape 1922-1924

The backdrop to the early relationship between the DVFP and the NSDAP saw both parties attempt to emerge as the voice of a growing völkisch movement throughout

Germany. 1922 marked a year of tremendous growth for the NSDAP, as reported in the

VB on 13 December. Though "the main centre of the Movement in the Reich lies in

Munich, where the number of paid-up members runs into several thousands" exclaimed

H. Esser in a 3 May 1922 speech transcribed in the VB; the NSDAP "established some 45 party branches in the last year and a half" throughout Germany. In regions such as

Rhenish-Westphalia, Hanover, Central Germany (Halle), Saxony,5 Bremen, Wurzburg,

Leipzig, Freiberg, and Worms, new branches were opened, representing the party’s growing regional diversity.6 With the DVFP yet to be formed, the NSDAP had already established a substantial network of branches and significant membership throughout

Germany. The NSDAP would continue to grow throughout the country, while cultivating the movement most carefully in Bavaria where plans for a putsch began in the fall of

1923. Bavaria continued to represent the 'other' to the northern, Prussian-controlled

Weimar government, which to the growing support base of the NSDAP was responsible for shaming and ruining Germany during the early 1920s. The centrality of Bavaria highlighted Hitler's regional thinking as he exclaimed its future role as the savior of the

5 "The Position of the National Socialist Movement in Greater Germany (From a speech given by Pg. H. Esser) VB, No. 35, 3 May 1922" in Detlef Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice: The Völkischer Beobachter, 1920-1933 vol. I, Organization & Development of the Nazi Party (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2004), 65.

6 "New Branches, VB, No. 99, 13 December 1922" in Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice vol. I, 76. 107

Reich. "The task of our Movement is still to-day," as he stated, "not to prepare ourselves for any coming election but to prepare for the coming collapse of the Reich" brought on by the planned Fall putsch. There were only two options facing Germany according to

Hitler: "either Berlin marches and ends up in Munich, or Munich marches and ends up in

Berlin! A Bolshevist North Germany and a Nationalist Bavaria cannot exist side by side, and the greatest influence upon the fortunes of the German Reich will be his who shall restore the Reich."7 November 8, 1923 would represent merely a beginning, a revolution that would inspire a more significant, much more impactful event culminating in the removal of the Weimar government.

Only a year after its establishment in Berlin the DVFP found itself a growing representative of the völkisch movement in northern Germany, "already achiev[ing] considerable prominence in some areas, notably Thuringia and Mecklenburg."8 Though only banned in Bavaria and southern Germany after the failed Beer Hall Putsch, the

NSDAP was already banned in Prussia in November 1922 as a nationalist organization.

The DVFP, emerging in December of that year, benefitted from the lack of competition and cultivated their movement throughout northern Germany.9 The NSDAP, led by

7 Hitler's speech, 1 August 1923, in Norman H. Baynes, The Speeches of Adolf Hitler: April 1922- August 1939, vol. I (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), 78.

8 Dietrich Orlow, The History of the Nazi Party (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1969), 50; In Berlin, the party and its leaders had already made a name for themselves within the völkisch movement. See, for instance, the discussion regarding antagonisms between various northern völkisch groups and the DVFP, 14 December 1923. BAL R 8034II/6182, 24.

9 It would not be until the DVFP signed a pact with the NSDAP in early March that the party would find itself banned in Prussia alongside other ultra-nationalist parties, though Wulle, Henning and von Graefe, as members of the Reichstag possessed immunity from the ban. Jablonsky, Nazi Party in Dissolution, 10f. See also "Der preußische Innenminister Severing über das Verbot der Deutschvölkischen Freiheitspartei" as document 3 in Wulff, Die Deutschvölkische Freiheitspartei, 1922-1928, 288-289. 108

Hitler, saw itself as the forerunner of the German extreme right and from the outset acknowledged the problems facing a growing, yet fragmented völkisch movement.

According to Hitler, this growing movement "became the breeding-ground of well- meaning, but even more dangerous fools." Only months prior to the establishment of the

DVFP, Hitler exclaimed that "as long as the völkisch movement is totally divided into grouplets and groups, and basically not held together by anything more than fantasy, so long it will not be dangerous to the Jews.'"10 The creation and growth of the DVFP in the north would reinforce Hitler's plans for a coalition, since by the Spring of 1923 both parties had become the most powerful representatives of the völkisch movement in their respective regions. With his focus on Bavaria, cognizant of the absence of his own party north of the Main River, Hitler felt compelled "to make a temporary pact with Graefe in

March 1923 which allowed the DVFP to dominate North Germany as its operational area while South Germany was reserved for the NSDAP."11

Announced in the VB on March 13, 1923, the leadership of the two movements agreed "to work together to solve the great tasks still facing the German struggle for freedom," permitting those "who have joined the DVFP [in the north], to remain in this movement until such time when the lifting of the ban allows the re-emergence of the

10 "General Membership Meeting and Party Conference of the National Socialist German Workers' Party on 29 and 31 January 1922 in Munich, VB, No. 7, 25 January 1922" in Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice vol. I, 63.

11 David Jablonsky, The Nazi Party in Dissolution: Hitler and the Verbotzeit 1923-1925 (Totowa, New Jersey: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1989),10. 109

National Socialist organization..."12 Following the agreement, the DVFP saw its membership grow and influence expand throughout northern Germany demonstrated most visibly in Lower Saxony where members of the NSDAP migrated to the new organization.13 Less than a year after the formation of their party, von Graefe, Henning and Wulle could claim 30,000 registered members throughout northern Germany.14

Moreover, the party was assisted by Hitler's emphasis on Bavaria's role in the imminent revolution, somewhat neglecting tensions outside it. Continued antagonisms between northern National Socialists and members of the DVFP were neglected by the Munich headquarters of the NSDAP, eventually culminating in a re-affirmation of the March agreement between the two parties regarding cooperation on 24 October 1923.15

Only weeks after re-affirming his commitment to cooperate with the DVFP in northern Germany, Hitler led the infamous 8 November putsch in Munich that was meant to incite a national revolution. Von Graefe joined Hitler and Ludendorff on the front lines of the march, upholding the organizational and perhaps, the ideological commitment of both parties as representatives of a larger völkisch movement.16 The putsch failed as

12 "The German Freedom Movement in the North and South, VB, No. 39, 13 March 1923" in Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice vol. I, 94.

13 Jablonsky, The Nazi Party in Dissolution, 10.

14 Bernhard Sauer, "DVFP und der Fall Grütte," 1. In comparison, the NSDAP could claim only 15,000 members, according to Halperin, leading up to the Beer Hall Putsch in Fall 1923. S. William Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy: A Political History of the Reich from 1918 to 1933 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company Inc., 1965), 226.

15 Jablonsky, The Nazi party in Dissolution, 20-22.

16 Douglas G. Morris, Justice Imperiled: The Anti-Nazi Lawyer Max Hirschberg in Weimar Germany (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2005), 255. 110

Hitler and the NSDAP neglected to take into account the allegiance of the army to the state; this resulted in the arrests and deaths of party members, and a state-wide ban of the party issued the following day.17 At this point, according to Evans Hitler had "realize[d] that toppling the Weimar 'system' would require more than a few ill-directed gunshots, even in a year of supreme crisis such as 1923. Coming to power clearly required collaboration from key elements in the establishment..." which Hitler lacked in 1923.18 In the period that would follow, labeled the Verbotzeit (time of ban), spanning from 9

November 1923 to 16 February 1925, the Bavarian state banned the NSDAP (the party was also banned in other states and regions), and sent Hitler to Landsberg prison his party fragmented into numerous leaderless factions throughout Germany.19 It was during the

Verbotzeit that the Berlin-based DVFP found itself able to "make the running in völkisch-

Nazi circles in central and northern Germany" according to Mühlberger.20 The DVFP, led by von Graefe, "used Hitler’s time in jail to work with Erich Ludendorff to strengthen the

DVFP at the Nazi Party’s expense."21 Ludendorff's emergence as the interim voice of the

17 Just as Ludendorff would later stand trial for his involvement in the putsch, von Graefe's involvement was questioned during a cabinet meeting in the Reichstag. Accused of being a traitor, von Graefe's involvement in the putsch was considered a national, rather than a "Bavarian question." See: Reichstag cabinet discussion of 3 December 1923, "Outside the Agenda: High Treason Trial Against Members of the Headquarters of the Communist Party." Accessed 31 January 2012 http://www.bundesarchiv.de/aktenreichskanzlei/1919- 1933/0000/ma1/ma11p/kap1_2/kap2_4/para3_6.html?highlight=true&search=&stemming=true&pnd=&sta rt=27&end=27&field=all#highlightedTerm

18 Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich, 199.

19 Jablonsky, The Nazi Party in Dissolution, 1.

20 Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice vol. I, 103.

21 Morris, Justice Imperiled, 255. 111

NSDAP, and particularly his positive stance on the question of taking part in the electoral process, were significant for von Graefe and the DVFP whose political agenda was from the outset based on parliamentary participation.22 The DVFP's leadership became intent on "taking advantage of the NSDAP's leaderless status" for their own political purposes.

Lacking the leadership abilities of Hitler, Ludendorff was unable to organize the NSDAP and garner respect from the various local and regional leaders which emerged after the putsch, allowing for the DVFP to begin work towards an agreement between the two parties with the goal of establishing their own party's supremacy.23

With Hitler's imprisonment in December 1923, the bourgeoning NSDAP lost its charismatic leader and was faced with regionally-based organizational disputes. Those who supported the 1923 putsch, according to Mühlberger, "were fracturing into rival groupings, all seemingly headed by little Hitlers desirous to carve out their own spheres of power and influence..." reinforcing "the existence of various strands of Nazism."24

These disputes centered on the reorganization of the party's leadership following the failed putsch, particularly marked by tensions between the leadership of the SA

(Sturmabteilung, the NSDAP's paramilitary arm) and a variety of local National Socialist

22 Though the DVFP was to officially be dissolved as a political party after the Reichstag decree against radical right and left wing groups, issued after the failed putsch, the leaders of the party remained members of the Reichstag and continued their work with the factionalized NSDAP throughout Germany. See: Reichstag cabinet discussion of 11 January 1924 on the potential removal of the ban and the potential consequences of a "civil war." Accessed 31 January 2012 http://www.bundesarchiv.de/aktenreichskanzlei/1919- 1933/0000/ma1/ma11p/kap1_2/kap2_58/para3_1.html?highlight=true&search=&stemming=true&pnd=&st art=230&end=230&field=all#highlightedTerm

23 Jablonsky, The Nazi Party in Dissolution, 58; Kershaw, Hitler, 227.

24 Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice vol. I, 101. 112

groups. Multiple voices therefore arose from the now defunct NSDAP. Hitler "had rather casually appointed Alfred Rosenberg as his deputy, even though Rosenberg was completely lacking in the practical political and organizational skills necessary to hold the party together." Rosenberg, alongside Hermann Esser and Julius Streicher, went on to found the Greater German People's Community as an interim organization.25 Others, such as Christian Mergenthaler of Württemberg, SA commander Walter Buch, and Ludolf

Haase of Göttingen, advanced their own agendas and subscribed to a unique disposition, particularly on the question of parliamentarism and cooperation with the DVFP.26 Yet, as showcased by their inability to bring together the various factions of the defunct NSDAP, these men were not "little Hitlers." Those like Rosenberg and Ludendorff who claimed leadership positions after the failed putsch were unable to fulfill the leadership role Hitler had come to represent even by 1923. Perhaps hindered by their personality shortcomings or political ideologies, these leaders, particularly Ludendorff, sought to establish a political coalition, a völkisch party that would minimize its fascist nature and work together with others to attain power through legal means.

Although he had "welcomed the DVFP’s presence" outside Bavaria prior to his imprisonment, evidenced most strongly by a March 1923 pact27 that agreed with "the

DVFP’s proposal to assign geographic areas to one party or the other to prevent

25 Hans Mommsen, Elborg Forster and Larry Eugene Jones, trans. The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 319.

26 Robert Wistrich, Who's Who in Nazi Germany (New York: Macmillan Publishing co., inc., 1982), 33; Jablonsky, The Nazi Party in Dissolution, 58.

27 Jablonsky, The Nazi Party in Dissolution 10. 113

duplication of organizational efforts," Hitler's time in prison was marked by an ambivalent attitude on the matter of unification.28 Outside of Bavaria, the NSDAP’s efforts to expand and operate in northern Germany were undermined by the crossing over of party members to the much larger DVFP. The attitudes of the NSDAP’s high command regarding this problem were ambivalent, ranging "from accommodation with the DVFP at worst, to a noncommittal silence at best."29 In a secret directive addressed to the district leader of the NSDAP in Bavaria, the undersigned, Rolf Eidhalt (the pseudonym used by Nazi leaders during the ban of the party),30 emphasizes that the agreement between von Graefe and Hitler regarding NSDAP-DVFP cooperation outside

Bavaria was to be upheld, while no other "commitments with other organizations [were] to be entered."31 At this juncture, with Hitler imprisoned and the failure of the party to incite a national revolution, cooperation with völkisch groups appears to have been a tremendously divisive topic within the Nazi ranks. While some viewed cooperation as a testament to the weakness of the NSDAP, others, particularly Ludendorff, saw this as an opportunity to establish an electoral coalition on the right, representing a völkisch-Nazi movement set on gaining votes and seats in parliament. Led by Ludendorff, the NSDAP took on a new course of action, neglecting the party's anti-parliamentary foundation and

28 Orlow, History of the Nazi Party, 50.

29 Jablonsky, The Nazi Party in Dissolution, 52.

30 Accessed 14 January, 2012 http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/buchner1.htm

31 "Die Partei lebt!" document 22a in Albrecht Tyrell, Fuhrer Befiehl...Selbstzeugnisse aus der "Kampfzeit" der NSDAP: Dokumentation und Analyse, 8 Bildtafeln (Dusseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1969), 72- 73. 114

adopting the tactics of its former rival DVFP. The DVFP was now undoubtedly on the rise, finding itself well positioned to overtake the NSDAP as the leading voice of the völkisch movement.

Attempts at Cooperation

Drawing from his substantial experience as a leader, both during the Great War and the subsequent rise of the NSDAP, General Ludendorff seized the reins of the party with Hitler's imprisonment in 1923.32 Unlike Hitler, Ludendorff's political agenda acknowledged, and was even centered on, a parliamentary achievement of power and influence on the part of the NSDAP. Though he was arrested alongside Nazi conspirators in the putsch and stood trial for treason, Ludendorff was shortly thereafter acquitted of the charges. Acknowledging the disorganized state of the NSDAP after the putsch,

"Ludendorff, advised by Hitler’s former lieutenant Gregor Straβer, now wanted to amalgamate the party" with the DVFP and to bring all of the völkisch movement's different parts "together into a unified group" headed by "a ruling triumvirate consisting of him, Hitler and Albrecht von Graefe, the leader of the DVFP."33 Faced by no major opposition by the likes of Rosenberg or former NSDAP leaders, Ludendorff assumed this political course based on unification and sought Hitler's approval from prison. "On 6

32 Wistrich, Who's Who in Nazi Germany, 199

33 F. L. Carsten, The Rise of Fascism, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 121-122 ; Jablonksy, The Nazi Party in Dissolution, 53. 115

May, Ludendorff and Rosenberg visited Hitler at Landsberg" recommending to the incarcerated leader "a merger of the party factions of the NSDAP and the DVFP in the

Reichstag."34 Although agreeing with Ludendorff's proposition initially, Hitler would later reveal that he did not want to pursue a course of coalition, alluding to his pragmatism and intention to avoid any possible political tensions while imprisoned. In regards to Ludendorff’s proposal of synthesizing both parties, to which he had originally agreed, Hitler later commented that he [Ludendorff] is "merely an ex-general with a

'unification craze' who, by attempting to mobilize völkisch groups like divisions and brigades, had 'spoiled things beyond repair.'"35 Hitler's disposition regarding unification, although positive and pragmatic on the surface, was thus contrasted with an internalized ideological aversion to any type of unification. Moreover, party leaders and members showcased a similar aversion to unification when "in August the National Socialists held a conference at Weimar which led to open clashes between the rival factions…some of the leaders favoured a union with the Deutschfolkische Freiheitspartei, while some hotly opposed it, and still others only advocated it provided that Hitler remained the undisputed leader." 36 The subsequent year, with Hitler in prison and Ludendorff set on unification, proved crucial in the history of the völkisch movement in Weimar Germany.

In the period that would follow until Hitler's release from prison in December

1924, multiple agreements between the DVFP and representatives of the defunct NSDAP

34 Jablonsky, The Nazi Party in Dissolution, 86.

35 Ibid, 111.

36 Carsten, The Rise of Fascism, 121-122. 116

came to fruition. The proliferation of splinter groups and factions of the NSDAP after the failed putsch was matched with the expansion of local and regional strongholds of the

DVFP throughout Germany. With Hitler's absence from the political scene, Ludendorff,

Rosenberg, and von Graefe were able to pursue their political agendas. For Ludendorff, this meant the unification of the völkisch parties in a coalition, while for von Graefe and

Rosenberg, respectively, an opportunity arose for greater influence as leaders. In a party conference in Berlin, the DVFP embraced Ludendorff's view on the future: "Germany was to be völkisch, or it was not to be."37 On 24 February the two parties signed a new agreement that established the following: both parties were free to build their local organizations throughout Germany while upholding a level of cooperation; small groups would work for whatever party was strongest at the state level in its region; and most significantly, Nazi provincial groups would continue to receive their political guidance from Munich, while groups aligned with the DVFP would receive theirs from Berlin.38

Based on Hitler's insistence, the agreement would be temporary, lasting only six months.

The two parties came together under the banner of the Volkisch Social Bloc (VSB), representing the largest völkisch coalition out of 26 others, and prepared to enter into the numerous Landtag elections of the upcoming year.39 In Thuringia, the coalition garnered

9.3% and in Mecklenburg-Schwerin, 19.3%. Success would also follow in Bavaria where

37 "Das Bekenntnis zur volkischen freiheitsbewegung," BAL R 8034II/6183, 120A.

38 "NSDAP-DVFP 24 February 1924 Agreement" published as a primary source in Jablonsky, The Nazi Party in Dissolution, 175.

39 BAL R 8034II/6182, 17v. 117

the combined list of the DVFP and NSDAP came in third with 17.1% of the vote; the

VSB was encouraged to replicate its victories throughout Germany.40

On the surface, the success in the Bavarian Landtag elections for the NSDAP-

DVFP coalition signaled perhaps the ability of a Hitler-less group to come together for purposes of attaining political power. Yet, beneath the veneer of multiple agreements, organizational and ideological tensions continued to undermine a unified völkisch movement. One of the biggest obstacles in the way of a successful coalition between the two parties was the proliferation of regional leaders and lack of firm and clear communication between the variety of factions. Incapacitated as a leader by his own trial for treason in February, Ludendorff was unable to fulfill the post of universal leader.

Factions and new groups that were formed after the failed putsch, including the GVG

(Großdeutsche Volksgemeinschaft) and the North German National Socialists disallowed for a smooth coalition of both parties. In the north, Ludolf Haase who had emerged as a regional leader in Hannover during the splintering of the party, showcased the difficulty of bringing the two parties together in areas where local tensions were high. Described by

Goebbels as "'a consistent, radical intellectual" and "a man not to love but to respect,"

Haase was a "firm opponent of electoral participation" and believed that the DVFP "was corrupted by 'the influence of the parliamentary air [Parlamentsluft] in Berlin.'"41 When the agreement between the two parties was signed in late February, Haase opposed the

40 Stefan Breuer, Die Völkischen in Deutschland: Kaiserreich und Weimarer Republik (Darmstadt: WBG, 2008), 197.

41 Ibid, 58. 118

idea that the DVFP's leadership in northern Germany could control his local faction, aligning himself with Munich rather than Berlin.42 Tensions within the movement were perhaps most vivid in Hesse, where a successor organization to the NSDAP, the German

Party (DP) rejected a coalition with the bourgeois DVFP. On 4 April, with the DVFP's

Reinhold Wulle set to address an audience of VSB members, a fight broke out on the floor when a DP deputy, also slated to speak, sharply attacked the coalition. Rosenberg, who had assumed a position of leadership with the creation of the GVG, failed to bring the DP into the fold under the banner of the VSB, and the organization [DP] continued to operate as a separate strand of Nazism.43 Regional divisions, particularly the north-south divide between the DVFP and NSDAP were thus exacerbated by the signing of agreements between the two parties that in effect, allowed for continued regional disputes and competition by allowing regional factions and splinter groups to operate independently (with only minimal supervision from Munich and Berlin).

As it came to the surface in numerous regions where splinter groups were directed to work together, in-fighting and continued disagreements signaled the importance of

Hitler as a charismatic leader. Though Ludendorff was able to take over the administrative reins of the fractionalized NSDAP, his leadership was characterized by pragmatic alliances and political maneuverings rather than enthusiastic, reassuring, and compelling speeches and public pronouncements that had come to characterize Hitler by

42 Ibid, 59-60.

43 Ibid, 83-84. 119

1923. Moreover, Ludendorff's deference to von Graefe as his "'political representative in

North Germany'" continued an unofficial contest for ultimate power within the völkisch movement with Hitler's absence.44 The opportunistic von Graefe, joined by Henning and

Wulle, saw this as an opportunity to grow the constituency of their own party while avoiding competition from their largest rival, the NSDAP. Meanwhile, Rosenberg, who headed the GVG was joined by a variety of regional and local leaders vying for their own legitimacy and only serving to complicate even further the ability of a continued successful coalition of the völkisch movement. A universal, charismatic figure that had come to characterize the NSDAP as a fascist movement was thus absent.

Central to Paxton's conceptualization of a fascist movement is the role of a universal leader. These movements, argues Paxton, generally display a "need for authority by natural chiefs (always male), culminating in a national chieftain who alone is capable of incarnating the group's historical destiny" and whose instincts prevail "over abstract and universal reason."45 As the coalition's most visible leaders, Ludendorff and von Graefe were unable, and perhaps, uninterested in filling the role of Hitler's substitute while the leader was imprisoned. An April 9 1924 letter addressed to Hitler, written by von Graefe, highlights the centrality of Hitler to the völkisch movement even as the leader served his prison sentence at Landsberg. In the letter, the tensions between the

DVFP faction, and the leadership of the NSDAP faction come to the forefront. Von

44 Ibid, 63.

45 Robert O. Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 219. 120

Graefe, respectfully, writes directly about the leadership tensions within the coalition and his personal relationship with Hitler. In his visits, von Graefe writes, he felt like a

"stranger," and that Hitler's silence on political matters was detrimental to his own position within the movement and for the movement as a whole. Yet, a trepidation is visible from the language used by von Graefe, and constant affirmation of the coalition between the two party's highlights, perhaps, the significance and power of Hitler as leader to the Nazi-völkisch movement.46 With the Reichstag elections of May 4 1924 on the horizon, the Nazi-völkisch movement was for the first time led by a coalition of fascistic leaders rather than a 'national chieftain.' Moreover, no real attempt was put forth by one of these leaders to assume the leadership position vacated by Hitler after the failed putsch. The acceptance of coalition, and the lack of a singular, charismatic leader highlighted a shift in the NSDAP's identity which would not be reversed until Hitler's return from prison.

The elections of May 1924 proved to be the most successful for the völkisch movement under the NSDAP-DVFP coalition (VSB) as the VSB garnered 6.5 percent of the vote and secured 32 Reichstag deputies, ten of which were National Socialists.47 The regional success of the NSDAP in the south was combined with the success of the DVFP and its coalition with the National Socialists in the north to gain almost two million votes,

46 "Brief Albrecht von Graefes an Adolf Hilter vom 9.4.1924" as document 7 in Wulff, DVFP, 292- 297.

47 Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice vol. I, 103-104. 121

proving Nazism's increased appeal within Germany.48 Ludendorff and von Graefe set the

VSB on a successful electoral course, engendering further coalition between the defunct

NSDAP and the DVFP. Following the election, Ludendorff and Rosenberg, assured of the value of a coalition between the NSDAP and DVFP, visited Hitler at Landsberg. The two "suggested the organization of not only a united Reichstag faction, but a united party as well" to which Hitler agreed, perhaps merely to avoid his own involvement in any possible negotiations or future tensions. Subsequently, a meeting in Berlin took place on

24 May, where it was agreed and announced that a merger of the two parties was to take place. The new party was named the National Socialist Freedom Party (NSFP) and von

Graefe was elected chairman.49

The agreement, and the continued cooperation between the two parties engendered celebratory reactions such as an editorial, published in the Mecklenburger

Warte on 9 July 1924. The editorial extolled the coming together of the northern (DVFP) and southern (NSDAP) paths of the völkisch movement, representing a "new organic whole." The coalition of the two parties, was to be "consummated" and celebrated in a large rally July 15-17 in Weimar.50 Further negotiations and talks culminated in the agreement to form a new movement during a conference held in Weimar from 15-17

August. Acting as Hitler's representative, the Reichstag representative for the VSB

48 Thomas Childers, The Nazi Voter: The Social Foundations of Fascism in Germany, 1919-1933 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 58.

49 Jablonsky, The Nazi Party in Dissolution, 87.

50 "Die volkische Interpretation" as document 29a in Tyrell, Fuhrer Befiehl, 78-9. 122

Gregor Straβer, by then having gained a key position within the völkisch movement,

"agreed to the formation of a leadership consortium consisting of Ludendorff, von

Graefe, and himself..." to represent the new movement, a unified delegation calling itself the National Socialist Freedom Movement (Nationalsozialistische Freiheitsbewegung)."51

With talks led mainly by Ludendorff, the central goal of the new movement was agreed upon to be "the National Socialist revolution."52

The electoral success of the NSDAP-DVFP coalition was undermined soon after its strong results in the May election by future elections as well as the impending return of Hitler to the political scene. Though the trajectory of the coalition between the NSDAP and DVFP continued to point upwards after the May elections, by the end of the year, the fragility of the entire concept of such a coalition, from an organizational perspective, was on display. The Reichstag delegation of the newly formed NSFB, led by Ludendorff,

Straβer and von Graefe, extolled the work done by its delegates in the Reichstag, pursuing a policy that rejected the Dawes Act, and legislation that was thought to endanger Germany. The organization also reaffirmed its commitment to continue work as a coalition, and called on "all existing organizations" and "like-minded friends to come together" under the banner of the Nationalsozialistische Freiheitsbewegung, recognizing the Reichstag as well as Gaue (districts) leadership.53 Reichstag elections were held again

51 Mommsen, The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy, 320.

52 Jablonsky, The Nazi Party in Dissolution, 118.

53 "Drei Aufrufe der Nationalsozialistischen Freiheitsbewegung vom 21.10.24" as document 8 in Wulff, DVFP, 297-303. 123

on 7 December 1924, representing a second opportunity for the Nazi-völkisch movement to prove the efficacy of its electoral course. The successes of the May 1924 elections, however, would not be duplicated. The peak experienced by the coalition in the previous election cycle would prove to be, according to Stefan Breuer, their zenith.54 The combined völkisch movement lost more than half of its supporters, garnering only 3 percent of the vote in the election. Numerous factors may have contributed to the decline in votes for the völkisch coalition. Jablonsky proposes that perhaps it was "the improved economic situation" or the "squabbling which had marked the völkisch movement since the spring elections," while an editorial in the Völkischer Kurier highlighted the "NSFB's inadequate organization."55 Nevertheless, the decline represented a shift in the German political arena, from a growing support of the extreme right to the resurfacing of support for more established political parties, particularly the Nationalists (DNVP). It appeared that "the radical völkisch right had [now] assumed a position on the fringes of German electoral politics."56 As such, combined with the failed election Hitler's release from prison, also in December, further problematized the possibility of an electorally successful coalition of the völkisch right. With his release imminent, "...Hitler, like the

North German National Socialists, was apparently pleased with the elections. For one thing, the results emphasized the impossibility of völkisch 'unity' without his charismatic

54 Breuer, Die Völkischen in Deutschland, 199.

55 Jablonsky, The Nazi Party in Dissolution, 150-1.

56 Childers, The Nazi Voter, 60. 124

presence and leadership."57 The failure of the Nazi-völkisch coalition in the December

1924 elections represented the last effort of the NSDAP and DVFP to join forces for purposes of achieving political power. From this juncture onwards, the relationship between the two parties returned to its competitive and contentious origins.

Disintegration

The electoral failure of the combined völkisch and National Socialist coalition led by Ludendorff and von Graefe reinforced Hitler's and some of his followers' commitment to the principle of a strictly National Socialist party, led solely by Hitler.58 The political and ideological fault lines between the DVFP and the NSDAP, once suppressed, were brought to the forefront with Hitler's release from prison. Leaving Landsberg in 1924,

Hitler refused to join the leadership of the Nazi-völkisch coalition, "expos[ing] the fragility of the loose Nazi-völkisch coalition."59 While in prison, Hitler had already made it clear that he would not participate in the political and organizational deliberations of the DVFP-NSDAP coalition, drafting up a press statement that was released in mid-June

57 Jablonsky, The Nazi Party in Dissolution, 152.

58 A growing 'cult of personality' around Hitler was already forming in the early 1920s, and was only exacerbated after the failed putsch and Hitler's trial, one which he had had already signaled his importance to the success of the NSDAP. According to Kershaw, "The theme of personality and leadership, little emphasized before 1923, was a central thread of Hitler's speeches and writings in the mid- and later 1920s. The people, he said, formed a pyramid. At its apex was 'the genius, the great man'...The cult of the leader was thus built up as the integrating mechanism of the movement." Ian Kershaw, Hitler, 1889-1936: Hubris (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 289.

59 Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice vol. I, 105. 125

1924 exclaiming his 'withdrawal' from all political involvement.60 Hitler's decision was significant, as it illuminated both the uncertainty of his relationship with the DVFP and, particularly von Graefe, as well his doubt of a successful future DVFP-NSDAP coalition.

Now, ready to take up the leadership position he was forced to vacate, Hitler "wanted, above all, to emphasize the dividing line, to make his movement the dominant factor among the welter of völkisch and extreme right-wing groups and parties, and to push his rivals to the wall" according to Kershaw. The leadership of the DVFP—realizing the inevitable competition between the NSDAP and their own party for the voice of the völkisch movement—sought immediately to undermine Hitler.

The DVFP and the NSDAP were shortly reconstituted in 1925 after the ban was lifted by the Bavarian government on the NSDAP, yet a future coalition between the two seemed out of reach as in-fighting and disagreements over leadership came to the forefront. The DVFP, led by von Graefe and Wulle changed the party's name to the

German Völkisch Freedom Movement (Deutschvölkische Freiheitsbewegung, DVFB), while Hitler reconstituted the NSDAP and its newspaper the VB. The inevitable end of attempts to unify the völkisch movement was marked by a meeting of the NSFP in Berlin on January 17. Both Wulle and Henning expressed doubt regarding Hitler's leadership abilities upon his release from prison. Wulle "accused Hitler of being worn-out through his imprisonment and of giving in to the international power of the Catholic Church,"

60 Kershaw, Hitler, 232. 126

while Henning "was even plainer. Hitler was 'perhaps the drummer, but no politician.'"61

A more significant blow to any possible future cooperation of the NSDAP and a völkisch movement was dealt with the presidential elections of 1925. Hitler's choice to back

Ludendorff, rather than Karl Jarres, a former interior minister62 and the candidate backed by a majority of völkisch groups, "forced every NSDAP member to choose between loyalty to the larger [völkisch] movement and loyalty and obedience to Hitler."63

The 1925 presidential election proved the last point of contention between the

NSDAP and the DVFP prior to the dissolution of their coalition. What followed was pragmatic political maneuvering on the part of Hitler as the election approached.

According to Hans Mommsen, "Hitler strongly urged his followers to participate in the elections and enjoined them to vote for Ludendorff as the candidate of the 'national opposition' in spite of the fact that Hitler's hard-core supporters in Munich had been particularly vicious in their attacks on the general."64 Only eight days before the election was to be held, the VB published an "instruction" to all members that the NSDAP would enter the presidential election campaign and that it was giving its vote to the candidate of the National Opposition, Ludendorff. On the other hand, the DVFP decided to spare

Ludendorff the embarrassment of a completely hopeless first-round candidacy by picking

61 Ibid, 263.

62 Otto Friedrich, Before the Deluge: A Portrait of Berlin in the 1920s (New York: HarperCollins Perennial, 1995), 184.

63 Orlow, The Nazi Party: A Complete History, 44.

64 Mommsen, The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy, 321. 127

Jarres. Hitler, however, persuaded Ludendorff to run.65 According to Mühlberger, it was clear at the time that the NSDAP had "neither the financial nor organisational means to give much assistance to Ludendorff's campaign," perhaps highlighting the disingenuous nature of Hitler's backing of Ludendorff. In result, Ludendorff received only 280,000 votes, or 1.1 per cent of the vote,66 rendering him, according to Mommsen, "politically dead." 67 The former General's low result at the polls left the way "clear for Hitler to secure total control over the NSDAP without the 'Ludendorff factor' complicating matters over time, given that Ludendorff was at the outset of 1925 quite popular with Nazi- völkisch elements in some parts of Germany."68 The DVFP, having lost its most important political leader, one who allowed the party to continue its growth and avoid continuous tensions with the NSDAP in the north, "abandoned its leadership cult since it could find no other symbolic figure to take Ludendorff's place. The road to Hitler's second takeover of the National Socialist movement had thus been cleared, yet the DVFP remained as the NSDAP's völkisch rival."69

After Hitler's release from prison, the NSDAP's central objective became reclaiming the large membership ranks it had built before the failed putsch. On 16

February 1925, the Bavarian government, swayed perhaps by the failed elections of

65 "Instruction of the Reichsleitung of the National Socialist German Workers' Party!, VB, No. 4, 21 March 1925" in Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice vol. I, 145.

66 Compared to the 7.8 million won by Jarres. Friedrich, Before the Deluge, 184.

67 Mommsen, The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy, 321.

68 Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice vol. I, 111-2.

69 Mommsen, The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy, 321. 128

December 1924 that "tended to quiet somewhat the apprehensions of the authorities concerning renewed agitation by Hitler" upheld their promise to the leader contingent on his good behavior to lift the ban on the NSDAP.70 In "Call to the Former Members of the

National Socialist German Workers' Party," published by the party's newspaper in

February 1925 Hitler directly addressed the political struggle of the NSDAP during his time in prison, calling on those who had left the party during the time of its ban "to join the new Movement...once more to be brothers in a great fighting community and stand together loyally shoulder to shoulder as before."71 Surprisingly, "Hitler announced the refounding of the NSDAP under his leadership without so much as mentioning

Ludendorff." 72 Returning to his role as the singular leader of the NSDAP, it was now

Hitler "who called for unity in the völkisch camp, whereas the German Racist [völkisch]

Freedom Party was fostering discord."73 Hitler exclaimed in an editorial published in the

VB, "I demand from the supporters of the Movement that from now onwards they direct all their fighting strength outwards and do not weaken themselves in a fratricidal struggle." The success of the Nazi movement would not be measured by "the number of

Reichstag or Landtag seats secured, but by the extent to which Marxism is destroyed and

70 Jablonsky, The Nazi Party in Dissolution, 152, 158.

71 "Call To the Former Members of the National Socialist German Workers' Party, VB, No. 1, 26 February 1925" in Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice vol. I, 119-120.

72 Mommsen, The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy, 322.

73 Ibid. 129

by the extent of the enlightenment about its originator, the Jew."74 Influenced by Hitler's return and the reaffirmation of the party's goal, those groups that were established during the leader's imprisonment at Landsberg now saw their leadership and membership begin the process of the changing allegiances. In a report published in the VB on 7 March 1925, it was maintained that sections of the GVG from across Germany were positioning themselves within the ranks of the newly refounded NSDAP, under Hitler's uncontested leadership. The Reich Leadership of the DVFP rejected this mass change of allegiances and remained representatives of the DVFP rather than members of the NSDAP.75 Finally, in May 1925, a directive prohibiting further organizational cooperation between the

NSDAP and other völkisch groups marked an end to the DVFP-NSDAP coalition.76

Though Hitler's return marked a turning-point in the continued fragmentation of the NSDAP, regionally-based organizational and leadership tensions continued to impede the full reconstitution of the party. The organizational splintering that had come to characterize the Verbotzeit, "caused many regional subordinate leaders to take on more responsibilities and become more independent..." according to Jablonsky.77 In

Württemberg, the Mergenthaler-Steeger regional organization continued to pose problems for the now Hitler-led NSDAP, as "Mergenthaler was determined to continue

74 "On the Renewal of Our Movement! (By Adolf Hitler), VB, No. 1, 26 February 1925" in Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice vol. I, 121-3.

75 "From the Movement, VB, No. 2, 7 March 1925" in Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice vol. I, 127-9.

76 Orlow, History of the Nazi Party, 61.

77 Jablonsky, The Nazi Party in Dissolution, 173. 130

the NSFB, despite the resignation of its Reich Leadership and the re-emergence of the

NSDAP..." 78 Hitler delivered a speech in Stuttgart on 14 July 1925, a month after in a regional meeting a motion to support Hitler unconditionally and join the Munich NSDAP organizationally was rejected. Hitler enthusiastically rejected the Mergenthaler-led faction as "a separate organisation," influencing "eighty new membership applications and a change of allegiance of diverse branches, which left (Mergenthaler's) regional organisation..."79 Berlin, as the base of the northern DVFP continued to pose problems for the newly reconstituted NSDAP. The DVFP continued to dominate the region, and the creation of a northern National Socialist organization during Hitler's time at

Landsberg further complicated the recently-released leader's attempts at centralizing power in Munich. In "The Spirit of Hitler in all the German Gaue. A Year of Struggle, the

Party's Performance and its Achievements" published 3 July 1926 in the VB, the NSDAP charted the growth and progress of the movement through the achievements of its numerous branches. The report on Greater Berlin stands out as it signaled the regional difficulties faced by the NSDAP in the north, particularly in Prussia. Authored by Ernst

Schlange, Gauleiter of Berlin at the time, it began with an admission, "currently we are facing significant difficulties [in Berlin]." It continued:

All those who in earlier times turned deliberately or instinctively to the swastika have experienced disappointments, which makes them reluctant to rejoin our ranks. I remember the many organisations and associations, most of which were doomed to failure from the start, which were founded by people who could not

78 Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice vol. II, 111.

79 "Adolf Hitler in Wurttemberg, VB, No. 89, 14 July 1925" in Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice vol. I, 142. 131

subordinate themselves to other organistations because they themselves wanted to be leader, and by that alone demonstrated their incompetence since he who cannot obey, cannot command ... Beyond that I knew that my public separation from the Freedom Party in 1924 would unleash a violent struggle against me, in the face of which I was completely defenceless, and that through this the trust of the people, who believed in my honesty, would be completely shattered. I realised that taking on the task would bring a really overwhelming responsibility. My unshakeable belief in the truthfulness of National Socialism and its guaranteed final victory, and especially my belief in Adolf Hitler, gave me the courage to take on the tasks.80

Organizational rivalries between the factions of the völkisch movement represented an immediate obstacle to Hitler with his release in late 1924, and the period which followed the reconstitution of the NSDAP. Returning to the political arena, Hitler's central objective became a "resolve to allow no organizational structure to stand between the central leadership of the new party and the Ortsgruppen [local groups]."81 Having severed any remaining connections to the DVFP, and working towards gradually regaining the confidence and trust of regional leaders of Nazi splinter groups, Hitler now was in a position to reshape the völkisch movement with his party at its forefront.

The DVFP now stood alone as merely one voice, among many within a völkisch movement that saw the NSDAP resurrect itself with Hitler's release from Landsberg.

Moreover, the DVFP now witnessed the emergence of Hitler as the hero of the NSDAP, and "as a personality cult began to fashion around Hitler, there was 'left no room for other

80 "The Spirit of Hitler in all the German Gaue. A Year of Struggle, the Party's Performance and its Achievements", VB, No. 150, 3 July 1926" in Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice vol. I, 201.

81 Jablonsky, The Nazi Party in Dissolution, 173. 132

völkisch heroes.'"82 Though the party remained active in Bavaria and especially in Berlin, by 1927 it was noticeably on a path of decline.83 Authoring an editorial in early 1927,

Wulle discussed the question of the DVFP's support and future as a party. The lack of support from fellow Germans, which the DVFP measured by the readership and purchase of central völkisch publications such as the Deutsch Tageblatt, proved 1927 to be a significant year for the party. Wulle exclaimed, "it is up to ourselves, whether the year

1927 will be a year of ascent or decline. We want the ascent."84 Yet, only a month after

Wulle's call on the völkische to support the party, the migration of DVFP members to the resurgent NSDAP began with founding member Count Graf zu Reventlow marking a path of decline. "As one of the most prominent members of the DVFP…whose social revolutionary position had brought him into increasing conflict with the more conservative German nationalist leadership around Graefe and Wulle," Reventlow's decision to leave would prove significant and encouraging for others.85 Others such as former DNVP General Secretary and DVFP convert, Wilhelm Kube,86 and Christian

82 Ibid, 62.

83 For the party's continued operation in Bavaria, see for instance the DVFB's announcement of a weekly gathering of members at the Bavarian headquarters. BAL N S26/841, 3VS.

84BAL R 8034II/6185, 109

85 Kershaw, Hitler, 297.

86 Richard Steigmann-Gall, The Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919-1945 (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 70. According to Stachura, Kube was attracted to the NSDAP by the "...concept of a nationalist, anti-capitalist socialism" most visibly advocated by Gregor Straβer. Peter D. Stachura, Gregor Strasser and the Rise of Nazism (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 109. 133

Mergenthaler, Reichstag member for the NSFB,87 joined Reventlow in deserting the

DVFP and "were welcomed with open arms.”88 From the Eastern Saxony branch came a call to National Socialists "to ensure that the subversive activities of those who do not want to be–and cannot be—National Socialists comes to nothing." Moreover, "those who like to see Adolf Hitler simply as a 'drummer', whose path has to be 'controlled', should keep away from us!" (the 'drummer' line perhaps invoking Henning's earlier criticism of

Hitler).89 In Silesia, on the day after Hitler's birthday—which had by now found its way back into the calendar of the NSDAP as a national celebration—the members of the then-

NSFB pledged their allegiance to Hitler, in effect dissolving the NSFB constituency in

Silesia.90 In a motion passed unanimously, the "leaders present at the dissolution of the

National Socialist Freedom Movement declare[d] their entry into the NSDAP and place[d] themselves unconditionally behind Adolf Hitler in order to assist in the reconstruction of the NSDAP in Mid-Silesia."91 In Württemberg, a year after Hitler delivered a speech against the Mergenthaler faction that refused to join with the NSDAP,

Mergenthaler, now a member, "spoke about race, settlement and National Socialism in

Hohenheim. Numerous former members of the German Volkisch Freedom Party and

87 Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice vol. II, 111.

88 Orlow, History of the Nazi Party, 96-97

89 "News from Bavaria and the Reich, VB, No. 3, 14 March 1925" in Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice vol. I, 129.

90 Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice Vol. I, 108.

91 "News from Bavaria and the Reich, VB, No. 20, 21 April 1925" in Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice vol. I, 133. 134

guests listened to the speech with rapt attention. Following the splendid talk all those at the meeting joined the National Socialist German Workers' Party."92 The NSDAP saw its membership grow as those who deserted the party after the failed putsch were won back with Hitler's re-emergence.

The change of allegiance of Count Reventlow symbolizes most vividly, perhaps, the decaying DVFP's ability to compete with the NSDAP and represent a viable organizational option under the banner of a Nazistic ideology. As he charts the reasons for his departure published as "The Change of Allegiance of Count Reventlow" in the

VB, Reventlow sheds light on the political and organizational differences between the

DVFP and the NSDAP, emphasizing the inevitable failure of his previous party and the success of the new:

As one of the founders of the German Volkisch Freedom League—out of which the DVFP emerged a few months later – I had already made my position clear at the first meeting, which laid the basis for the formation of the League, in the autumn of 1922 in Kassel, namely that this League and the Movement, which it was to lead, had to have a radical social emphasis in a specifically German sense if it was to have a claim to the right to exist. From the beginning it was clear to me that it was especially on this point that there were to be the greatest difficulties within the party, given that the three Reichstag members, the gentlemen von Graefe, Wulle, Henning, who had come with their following from the DNVP and formed – and were intent on forming – the bulk of the leadership of the Freedom Movement, had probably not left the DNVP due to social ideas.93

92 "Our Work in Wurttemberg, VB, No. 300, 29 December 1927" in Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice Vol. I, 262.

93 "The Change of Allegiance of Count Reventlow, VB, No. 35, 12 February 1927" in Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice Vol. I, 239-240, (original emphasis). The article provides a full transcription of Reventlow's article which was published in his own newspaper, the Reichswart. 135

Two significant points emerge from Reventlow's account of his departure. First, the leadership of the DVFP is implicated by Reventlow as the source of the difficulties it had faced in attaining support. Specifically, the national-conservative roots of von Graefe,

Wulle, and Henning are presented by Reventlow as problematic and conflicting with the cause of the Nazi-völkisch movement. "Social issues," argues Reventlow, were not the basis for the triumvirate's secession from the DNVP, signaling that the party remained closely affiliated with the DNVP's worldview. Second, undermining the cohesiveness of the DVFP's membership through emphasizing the diversity of its leadership, Reventlow presents the NSDAP as a unified party on the "right road" possessing "unbroken and unbreakable social-revolutionary energy" provided especially by its leader, Adolf

Hitler.94 The observations of Count Reventlow show that political disparities between the

DVFP and the NSDAP, underlined and emphasized by divergent ideological dispositions, marked the difficulties in establishing a unified, coherent group as the representative voice of the völkisch movement.

A response to Reventlow's article was published in the Mecklenburger Warte, a newspaper that had proven to be sympathetic to the DVFP. In it, Reventlow's assertions regarding the DVFP and the völkisch movement were called into question by the author,

Karl Graf Bernstroff. Though, ultimately, Bernstroff's intention was to showcase the fault lines between the DNVP and DVFP, the article focused on the false and unsubstantiated claims Reventlow made upon leaving the DVFP. Reventlow was accused of having

94 "The Change of Allegiance of Count Reventlow, VB, No. 35, 12 February 1927" in Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice, 239-240. 136

given the impression that he was in full agreement with the worldview of the DVFP. The accusations put forth by Reventlow regarding the DVFP's leadership—most centrally that these men did not disassociate themselves and their ideology completely from their

DNVP roots—was also called into question by the author. Bernstroff argued that

Reventlow made these accusations only because he had himself disagreed with the

DVFP's social objectives. Yet, painting Reventlow as an opportunistic, disingenuous individual who had merely joined the DVFP for purposes of political relevance did not assuage the visible decline of the DVFP.95

The migration of key DVFP leaders and members to the refounded and surging

NSDAP spurred on by Count Reventlow's decision to defect marks an end-point in the history of the DVFP. 1928 brought with it a new cycle of Reichstag elections that posed a final test of the DVFB's relevance and ability to continue as a political party. In a manifesto published before the May elections, the group, describing itself as a völkisch- national opposition coalition, agreed on the following guidelines: upholding the fight against the Weimar government's policy of fulfillment; restoring Germany as a nation with a capable military and a society devoid of class struggle; "liberation of the working people" from their exploitation; and fighting for "cultural freedom" and "true

Christianity" in Germany. It ended with, "whatever their status, whatever their profession, every freedom-loving German will be our friend and fellow traveler in our

95 BAL R 8034II/6182, 122. 137

front."96 Both the DVFB and NSDAP approached the 1928 elections as a test to their political relevance, the DVFB, as a party facing collapse, while the NSDAP, as a resurgent party. Though a "vigorous election campaign [was] waged by the Nazi Party in

April and May 1928, the results secured, both at the national and Lander level, were generally poor,"97 the party receiving only 2.6 per cent of the vote.98 Yet, the party would still claim success, for "the elimination of the DVFB as a serious völkisch rival..." was crucial.99 The DVFB received even less votes than its völkisch rival, securing only one seat in the Reichstag.100 After the election, Hitler emphasized the elimination of the

DVFB as a positive outcome of a largely failed electoral effort. The "fact that from now on there is and will only be one völkisch movement, the National Socialist German

Workers' Party..." was exclaimed by Hitler, while calling on the party's membership to put forth a stronger electoral effort in the coming future.101 Following the election, an editorial on the DVFB was published by the Reichswart newspaper, written by the party's former co-founder and recent convert to the NSDAP's ranks, Count Reventlow. In what appears as an obituary for the DVFB, Count Reventlow respectfully discussed the efforts

96 "Wahlaufruf des Völkisch-Nationalen Blocks für die Maiwahlen 1928" as document 12, in Wulff, DVFP, 308-9.

97 Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice vol. I, 237-8.

98 Childers, The Nazi Voter, 125.

99 Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice vol. I, 237-8.

100 Breuer, Die Völkischen in Deutschland, 205.

101 "Onward to New Struggle, VB, No. 118, 22 May 1928" in Mühlberger, Hitler's Voice Vol. I, 279, (original emphasis). 138

of his former party to establish its political relevance while reflecting on the NSDAP's electoral performance. While the efforts of the DVFB were valiant, the only way to continue fighting for the cause of freedom, admitted Reventlow, was to join the Nazi party. Though the DVFP-NSDAP coalition of 1924 represented a "temporary swelling" in a "völkisch inflation" in the spring of 1924, the "national opposition may [now] be represented solely by the National Socialist German Workers' Party."102 Reventlow's former party saw its status change from the leading voice of the völkisch movement, to, by 1928, an insignificant splinter party that would fold altogether by 1929.103

Conclusion

"We are the forerunners of a new era" stated Alfred Rosenberg in his "Idea of a

Folkish State" published in 1925.104 The existence of the DVFP as a significant rival to the NSDAP within the völkisch movement served to question the veracity of Rosenberg's statement. Taking advantage of the dissolution of the NSDAP and the arrest of its leader after the failed Beer Hall Putsch of 1923, the DVFP was able to grow its own strand of

Nazism throughout Germany, one characterized by a 'fascistic' identity. With the absence of an undisputable leader, the fractionalized NSDAP shifted its course from anti-

102 "Beurteilung des Ergebnisses der Reichstagswahlen vom 20.5.1928 durch Graf Ernst zu Reventlow" as document 13 in Wulff, DVFP, 309-11.

103 Mommsen, The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy, 322.

104 Barbara Miller Lane and Leila J. Rupp, eds., Nazi Ideology before 1933: A Documentation (Austin & London: University of Texas Press, 1978), 65. 139

parliamentarism to a reliance on the electoral process to attain political power. During the period that saw the two parties come together as a völkisch coalition, the DVFP experienced the height of its success as a political party. Yet, the re-emergence of Hitler on the political scene, assured of his place as the NSDAP's chieftain and of his party's destiny as a fascist party that would not cooperate with other organizations, highlighted the DVFP's inability to outgrow its identity as a Prussian, bourgeois, fascistic, splinter party. By 1928, with the migration of the majority of DVFP leaders to the NSDAP,

Alfred Rosenberg's claim for the NSDAP's role as the 'forerunners' of the völkisch movement was finally realized. The departure of DVFP members, spurred by Count

Reventlow, however, should not be viewed as representative of a lack of deep seated ideological or programmatic differences between the two parties. Rather, their migration to the NSDAP illuminates the political pragmatism of the DVFP's leaders and members.

George Mosse has quite incorrectly stated that while there "were political antagonisms" between the representative parties of the völkisch right, "fundamentally all these men shared a common ideology."105 In this chapter I have charted the origin of these political antagonisms, as they arose during the period 1923-1928. Stemming from ideological disparities which I illuminated in chapter 2, the organizational relationship between the two parties was characterized by—and ultimately broken down because of—political opportunism, personal ambitions, and regional disparities, allowing for the NSDAP to

105 George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York: The Universal Library Grosset & Dunlap, 1964), 233. 140

emerge as the leading voice of the völkisch movement, while relegating the DVFP into political obscurity.

CONCLUSION

This study has added to the continued scholarly rethinking of the rise of Nazism in Germany as having constituted a unique phenomenon during the Weimar period. The relationship between the northern DVFP and the southern NSDAP has operated in this study as a lens—revealing fully that the rise of the NSDAP to the forefront of the völkisch movement at the expense of its most legitimate rival was a highly contingent affair. I have argued that the sheen of uniqueness that has continued to characterize the

NSDAP within the historiography—particularly during its infancy (1919-1928)—breaks down when we take a more careful look at the party’s development. The DVFP and its development as the NSDAP's foremost rival in the völkisch ranks challenges the notion that the Nazi worldview was one that was unique to the NSDAP, showcasing rather that it was shared by a variety of others on the right. Moreover, I have shown that the existence of 'Nazistic' parties such as the DVFP adds to the continued challenge of the view that

Nazism was an aberration, a break from Germany's political development.

Having emerged in Munich in 1919 as a small, extra-parliamentary party, the

NSDAP represented a new direction for the German right post-1918. The emergence of a mass German electorate during the early years of the twentieth century dramatically changed the country’s political development. Particularly on the right, the influence of a rising völkisch movement meant that Pan-Germanism and anti-Semitism were ideas to be taken seriously and incorporated into a 'new' German rightist platform. 1918 marked a

141

142

point of transition in the radicalization of the German right as the per-war conservative parties coalesced into a 'catchall-party,' a new voice for the German right, the DNVP.

This party, while significantly more völkisch and populist than its pre-war predecessors reflected a phase, rather than an end-point in the radicalization of the right. Extra- parliamentary groups emerged at an unprecedented level after the defeat in war, especially on the right. The emergence of the DAP in 1919 continued a trend that had begun almost two decades before. The Munich-based party was merely one of a variety of groups that advocated for the dissolution of the newly created Weimar Republic, reflecting a reactionary worldview, underscored by a populist, fascist message. The rise of the DVFP in 1922 reflected perhaps a final radicalization of the right during the 1920s.

The Berlin-based party emerged out of the DNVP camp as a hybrid group, espousing a worldview that was rooted in Prussian-conservatism yet having a visibly völkisch, anti-

Semitic, fascistic tint. The Nazistic worldview of the DVFP illuminated its familial tie to the NSDAP, the two, by 1923, reflecting the plurality of Nazisms that existed in the early

Weimar era.

By the early Weimar period, the voice of the völkisch movement was largely becoming a Nazistic voice. The proliferation of what I have labeled a 'Nazistic' worldview throughout the völkisch right meant that it was not merely the NSDAP that spoke with such a voice. We have seen that this Nazistic worldview was not a monolithic one. Rather, through its embrace by parties such as the DVFP, a variety of Nazisms had developed. Though a familial tie was visible between the worldviews of the NSDAP and the DVFP—as both were nationalist, anti-parliamentary, anti-Semitic, völkisch groups— 143

the brand of Nazism embraced by the DVFP was markedly different than that of the

NSDAP. In chapter 2 I delineated the lines of disparity between the ideologies of the

NSDAP and DVFP, highlighting central variations such as the parties' attitude towards

Germany's new system of parliament under Weimar; their stance on the confessional divide; and their demographic appeal. These variations suggest that the Nazi-völkisch movement did not speak with one voice, and that Nazism as an ideology had a variety of strands that proliferated post-1918 and represented a phenomenon that was not limited to a single group, or individual.

The formative years of the NSDAP in general, and its attempts at seizing power in particular were complicated by the existence of a familial rival in the DVFP. The political development of both the NSDAP and DVFP was highly contingent on the two parties' interactions with one another, be they cooperative or competitive in nature. I have attempted to fill an historical gap that is largely associated with studies of the early Nazi party by charting its development pre-1928 as a contingent affair. In other words, by emphasizing the political context behind the NSDAP's development before 1928—which centered on its rivalry with the DVFP—I have argued that the party's rise to power in

1933 was not an inevitable result of its early development. Rather, the NSDAP's formative years were characterized by continued tensions—both within its own ranks and with its rival the DVFP—that were grounded in leadership disputes, regional disparities, and disagreements over tactics which disallowed for a successful coalition of the two parties. Ultimately, the NSDAP's rise to the forefront of the völkisch movement by 1928 was as much a result of its own doing, as it was due to the failure of the DVFP. I have 144

further argued that the failure of the DVFP to rise to the forefront of the völkisch movement was grounded in the party's identity and ideology as well as in its political missteps as relating to its relationship with the NSDAP. This failure, and the reasons behind it, however, deserve further explanation.

According to Hitler, "the phenomenon of the DVFP was 'similar to that of the 80s and 90s and, just as in those days, control over it was acquired by entirely honourable but fantastically naive scholars, professors, Land-, Studien- and Justizräte, in short middle- class idealists.'" Its failure, he claimed, was due to its lack of a "warm breath of youthful energy. The impetuous drive of enthusiastic hotheads was rejected as demagogy. As a resolve the new movement was a völkisch but not a popular movement.'"1 This thesis has presented a variety of direct and indirect causes behind such a failure, associated both with the DVFP's organization as well as its worldview. Specifically, I have emphasized the following reasons: the party and its leaders' inability, or indifference to overcoming its Prussian, bourgeois, 'old' right identity; the lack of a central, charismatic leader; a continued embrace of anti-Catholic sentiment; and an environment in Berlin that was less hospitable to radical völkisch groups. These reasons, some more operative than others, can best be viewed as cultural or functional in nature. That is to say, some of the reasons behind the DVFP's failure were unavoidable, such as its regional origin and the political development of its leaders pre-1918. Other reasons, however, were the result of conscious choices made by the leaders of the party.

1 Geoff Eley, Reshaping the German Right: Radical Nationalism and Political Change after Bismarck. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 360. 145

The Prussian roots of the DVFP limited the party's radicalization both in terms of the Prussian state serving as a less hospitable locale for the existence of right wing extremists (in contrast with Bavaria) and as the political tradition of the state ultimately influenced the path chosen by von Graefe, Wulle and Henning. Having served in parliament as members of the DNVP the leaders of the DVFP emerged in 1922 as proponents of a völkisch worldview that was colored with a noticeable 'old' right tint. As I showcased in chapter 3, the leaders of the DVFP chose a political path towards the destruction of the Weimar system that was far less revolutionary than that of the NSDAP.

In contrast to the tactics employed by the fascist NSDAP the DVFP did not seek to march on Berlin and seize power through a paramilitary revolution. This was a result of a conscious choice made by the DVFP's leaders to pursue parliamentary means of achieving power even before their party was banned in Prussia in 1923. Though functional terms perhaps explain the inability of a radical, paramilitary party to emerge in

Prussia after 1919, the development of the DVFP as an anti-parliamentary party that saw parliamentary participation as a means to an end, was an intentional choice. Thus, the

DVFP's inability to overcome its identity as an 'old' right party was a result of its actions, as opposed to its rhetoric. Furthermore, the DVFP's inability to overcome the confessional divide disallowed for the party to gain much support in the Catholic south and can be viewed as an intentional choice. Though the tradition of anti-Catholic sentiment was prevalent in Prussia after Bismarck's Kulturkampf, the DVFP, unlike the

NSDAP, did not actively attempt to overcome the confessional disparities that existed in

Germany. Anti-Catholic rhetoric severely limited the growth of the DVFP's membership, 146

particularly in regions where the NSDAP had a stronghold (southern states). The lack of a single, charismatic leader within the ranks of the DVFP may be explained in functional terms. The triumvirate of von Graefe, Wulle and Henning remained intact throughout the party's existence. Though von Graefe at times emerged as the leading voice of the party, and Ludendorff took over its reigns during Hitler's time in prison, the party never developed a leader that could duplicate the role Hitler came to play in the NSDAP by

1923. A single reason for the failure of the DVFP does not exist. Rather, it was a combination of factors, some avoidable while others immutable that spelled the failure of the DVFP.

This examination of the DVFP is by no means an exhaustive one. As an institutional rival to the NSDAP, the role of the DVFP and its leaders post-1928 remains a topic that requires further research. Though the party itself fractured and ultimately disappeared by 1928, the leaders and influential members of the party remained involved in Germany’s political arena. For instance, with Count Reventlow’s defection to the

NSDAP in 1927, many other DVFP leaders and influential members left the party. The role of these defectors post-1928 requires further research, particularly as certain members—such as Walther Darré—had come to occupy an influential role under the

Nazi administration post-1933. Moreover, the DVFP’s triumvirate of von Graefe, Wulle and Henning continued to play a role in right-wing politics, though none of the men would enjoy much success with the Nazi rise to power. An additional avenue for further research is a deeper study of the DVFP from a perspective that emphasizes regionalism.

Though this work has emphasized the role of region in the development of the DVFP, the 147

question of which regions gave the DVFP most of its electoral and otherwise, support remains to be explored. More generally, both the historiographies of the Weimar

Republic and the Nazi phenomenon would benefit greatly from a deeper study of the

DVFP as a leading opponent of the Weimar system from the right, and as a familial rival to the NSDAP. The role of the DVFP in German history is far more significant than it appears at first. Though the party's history stretches merely from 1922-1928, these six years were instrumental in shaping the future of Germany after Weimar. The development of the NSDAP, as I have argued in this thesis, cannot be explained without a careful examination of its relationship with the DVFP. A relationship that was first characterized by cooperation and then by a deep rivalry, it was the interaction—both direct and indirect—between the NSDAP and DVFP that influenced the development of each party and its worldview, and more significantly, contributed to the growth of

Nazism as a viable substitute to the Weimar system.

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