THE KPD AND THE NSDAP: A STTJDY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL EXTREMES IN WEIMAR GERMANY, 1923-1933 BY DAVIS WILLIAM DAYCOCK A thesis submitted for the degree of Ph.D. The London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London 1980 1 ABSTRACT The German Communist Party's response to the rise of the Nazis was conditioned by its complicated political environment which included the influence of Soviet foreign policy requirements, the party's Marxist-Leninist outlook, its organizational structure and the democratic society of Weimar. Relying on the Communist press and theoretical journals, documentary collections drawn from several German archives, as well as interview material, and Nazi, Communist opposition and Social Democratic sources, this study traces the development of the KPD's tactical orientation towards the Nazis for the period 1923-1933. In so doing it complements the existing literature both by its extension of the chronological scope of enquiry and by its attention to the tactical requirements of the relationship as viewed from the perspective of the KPD. It concludes that for the whole of the period, KPD tactics were ambiguous and reflected the tensions between the various competing factors which shaped the party's policies. 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE abbreviations 4 INTRODUCTION 7 CHAPTER I THE CONSTRAINTS ON CONFLICT 24 CHAPTER II 1923: THE FORMATIVE YEAR 67 CHAPTER III VARIATIONS ON THE SCHLAGETER THEME: THE CONTINUITIES IN COMMUNIST POLICY 1924-1928 124 CHAPTER IV COMMUNIST TACTICS AND THE NAZI ADVANCE, 1928-1932: THE RESPONSE TO NEW THREATS 166 CHAPTER V COMMUNIST TACTICS, 1928-1932: THE RESPONSE TO NEW OPPORTUNITIES 223 CHAPTER VI FLUCTUATIONS IN COMMUNIST TACTICS DURING 1932: DOUBTS IN THE ELEVENTH HOUR 273 CONCLUSIONS 307 APPENDIX I VOTING ALIGNMENTS IN THE REICHSTAG 1924-1932 333 APPENDIX II INTERVIEWS 335 BIBLIOGRAPHY 341 4 ABBREVIATIONS 1. Political Parties and Organizations ADGB Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund ASPD Altsozialdemokratischepartei Deutschlands BVG Berliner Verkehrs-Gesellschaft CPSU CPSU(B) Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik) DNVP Deutschnationale Volkspartei DVFP Deutschvölkische Freiheitspartei DVP Deutsche Volkspartei EKKI Exekutivkomitee der Kommunistischen Internationale EVMB Einheitsverband der Metallarbeiter Gestapo Geheime Staatspolizei HJ Hitlerjugend IAH Internationale Arbeiterhilfe KAPD Kommunistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands KgdF Kampfbund gegen den Faschismus KGRNS Kampfgemeinschaft Revolutionärer National­ sozialisten KJD KJVD Kommunistischer Jugendverband Deutschlands KPD Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands KPO Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Opposition) NSBO Nationalsozialistische Betriebszellenorganisation NSDAP Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei RFB Roter Frontkämpferbund 5 RGI Rote Gewerkschafts-Internationale RGO Revolutionärer Gewerkschaftsopposition SA Sturm-Abteilung der NSDAP SAJ Sozialistische Arbeiter-Jugend SAP Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands SS Schutz-Staffel der NSDAP USDP Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands ZK Zentralkomitee 2. Sources (a) Archives AA Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes APA Akten der Politische Abteilung BHA Bundeshauptarchiv BHSA Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv BRM Büro des Reichsminister HSA Duss. Hauptstaatsarchiv Düsseldorf 1.1.\r.S. G. Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale GeschJedenis Lgb Lagebericht NSSA Niedersächsisches Staatsarchiv KP Kommunistische Personalien M München NNF Nurnberg/Furth PA Politische Akten Pd Polizeidirektion. 6 Pp Polizeipräsidium RDP RP Regierung Düsseldorf-Polizei EMI Reichsminister des Innern R. ko. Reichskommissar für die Überwachung der öffentlichen Ordnung (b) Newspapers and Journals AF Antifaschistische Front AP Arbeiterpolitik BZG Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung GdS Gegen den Strom I Die Internationale INGPK Internationale Gewerkschafts-Presskorrespondenz Inprekorr Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz KI Die Kommunistische Internationale RA Der Rote Aufbau RF Die Rote Fahne RGI Die Rote Gewerkschafts Internationale RSD RSD-Mitteilungsblatt der Russischen Sozial Demokratie SDPK Sozialdemokratische Partei-Korrespondenz SR Sozialistische Republik VB Völkischer Beobachter 7 INTRODUCTION This study examines the relationship which developed between the German Communist Party (KPD) and the German National Socialist Workers' Party (NSDAP). The focus is on the KPD and the strategic and tactical perspectives which were evolved between 1923 and 1933 to govern the party's relations with the Nazis. The argument establishes that these relations were complicated; that they contained tensions as between the KPD's overall objectives and the exigencies of its life as a party under Weimar. The tension was expressed as tactical ambiguity and for the various reasons which are explored in the pages which follow, the KPD's response to the NSDAP contained elements of co-operation as well as competition. As it is developed below, this argument is sufficiently distinct in its emphasis, scope and conclusions to Justify the separate treatment. However modest its aims, no enquiry into Weimar politics and history can entirely free itself from the profound general problems of interpretation which the subject raises. The need to assign a more certain place to the 1933 disaster in German and Western history is still compelling. If only by implication, therefore, general questions concerning the reasons for the collapse of Weimar are bound to impinge upon a study of the relationship between the two parties which were the most visible and active antagonists of constitutional government. Even if the scope of enquiry could be 8 reduced to the barest account of tactical questions, the larger issues would remain. This would be so because, for the citizen of Weimar, the violent element in the relationship — the frequent and bloody clashes in the streets — expressed the central truth of the Republic's failure to provide a basis for order and security. In another sense, too, the relationship touches on central problems. In a way the shared hostility to Weimar meant that Communists and Nazis could be seen as allies; yet it was an alliance which could never be complete and could never be fully acknowledged by either side. Despite themselves, the Communists were bound to the same rationalist tradition in politics which found its expression in the Weimar constitution. The KPD's oppositionist stance, therefore, proceeded from an entirely different conception than that of the Nazis. Nazi opposition was more fundamental; it expressed a dark, atavistic and complete rejection of rational discourse as the appropriate basis for political life. In 1933, the Communists found that more had been involved in Hitler's rise to power than the mere replacement of one form of "bourgeois" government by another. A whole universe of rational discourse had disappeared. Everyone, including the Communists, who had found a place in that universe shared in the general defeat. It was the special and ironic tragedy of the KPD that it more than most of Hitler's victims only dimly comprehended this simple truth. There was irony because, of all the Weimar parties, it was the KPD which was most firmly wedded 9 to its rationalist outlook; that is, to an outlook which uncompromisingly stressed the preponderant importance of a rational calculation of interest as the determinate of political behaviour. So unyielding were their categories, and so blindly applied, that the Communists were led to misunderstand the nature of the threats which faced them. There was madness in such stubbornness; the other side, so to speak, of Nazi madness and the intelligent, completely cynical, manipulation of an irrational political appeal. If the general problems are tenacious, a direct approach to them must still be avoided in a study such as this. As far as is possible the questions which fall outside of a restricted range of considerations which bear directly on the relationship between the two parties are avoided. This means that important dimensions of Communist behaviour and tactics are, by necessity, not considered. Although in practice it was sometimes difficult to establish boundaries, it is obvious that not everything which needs to be said about the KPD can be contained within an examination of its response to the Nazis. In this connection, a special difficulty was raised by the Social Democrats. In order to make the KPD's priorities clear, considerable attention had always to be directed at questions which arose out of the KPD's relations with the SPD. Nevertheless, despite the unavoidable attention given to such important contextual considerations, this is not a comprehensive treatment of the KPD under Weimar; still less is it an account of Weimar's failure. If a little more light is thrown on one of the 10 more shadowy corners of Weimar's political history and something new is revealed of the KPD's attitudes and behaviour, then the argument will have met its purposes. The very real problem of restricting the scale of the enterprise could have been met in other ways. The most efficient of these would have involved confining the research to some more narrowly defined period. The case for doing so seems strong. The Nazis, after all, only made their appearance as a serious factor in Weimar politics after their electoral breakthrough in September 1930 and so they could only have been a serious problem for the KPD during the last years. While this is largely