CENTRAL ASIA: WATER AND CONFLICT

30 May 2002

ICG Asia Report No 34 Osh/Brussels

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS...... i

I. INTRODUCTION...... 1

II. BACKGROUND...... 3

A. WATER IN CENTRAL ASIA...... 3 B. WATER AND CONFLICT...... 4 III. REGIONAL WATER MANAGEMENT...... 6

A. SOVIET ERA MANAGEMENT ...... 6 B. MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES ...... 7 C. FLAWS IN THE SYSTEM ...... 8 D. REGIONAL WATER STRATEGIES...... 9 E. INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT...... 10 IV. WATER QUOTAS AND BARTER AGREEMENTS ...... 12

A. WATER QUOTAS ...... 12 B. BARTER AND PAYMENT MECHANISMS ...... 13 C. ENERGY AND WATER: THE SYR-DARYA ...... 14 1. Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan...... 14 2. Kyrgyzstan-Kazakhstan...... 15 3. Kyrgyz Payment Law ...... 16 4. Syr Darya Energy Consortium...... 18 D. DIVIDING THE AMU-DARYA ...... 20 1. Uzbekistan-Tajikistan...... 20 2. Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan...... 21 3. Uzbek Internal Rivalries...... 22 V. FUTURE INFRASTRUCTURE ...... 24

A. ROGUN AND SANGTUDA DAMS...... 24 B. GOLDEN CENTURY LAKE...... 25 C. AFGHANISTAN ...... 26 D. THE SIBERIAN RIVERS SCHEME ...... 27 VI. CONCLUSION...... 28

APPENDICES

A. MAP OF UZBEKISTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA ...... 31 B. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS ...... 32 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ...... 33 D. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS...... 34 E. ICG BOARD MEMBERS ...... 38

ICG Asia Report N° 34 30 May 2002

CENTRAL ASIA: WATER AND CONFLICT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Competition for water is increasing in Central trying to win more control over their resources and Asia at an alarming rate, adding tension to what want to use more water for electricity generation and is already an uneasy region. Agriculture is the farming. mainstay of the region’s economy, and thirsty crops such as cotton and rice require intensive Tensions focus on the two main rivers of the region irrigation. Water use has increased rapidly since that both flow to the Aral Sea – the Syr Darya from the Central Asian states became independent in Kyrgyzstan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and 1991 and is now at an unsustainable level. the Amu Darya from Tajikistan through Uzbekistan Irrigation systems have decayed so severely that and Turkmenistan. The Amu Darya and its half of all water never reaches crops, and several tributaries form part of the border between the years of drought have cut available water by a Central Asian states and Afghanistan. fifth even as demand continues to soar. Efforts to rebuild Afghanistan will now put yet more strain This report identifies four key areas of tension on supplies. among the Central Asia nations:

The problems of increasing demand and lack of coherent water management; declining supplies have been compounded by the failure to abide by or adapt water quotas; failure of the region’s nations to work together. Non-implemented and untimely barter Under the Soviet Union, water and energy agreements and payments; resources were exchanged freely across what uncertainty over future infrastructure plans. were only administrative borders, and Moscow provided the funds and management to build and Water management has suffered from the Soviet maintain infrastructure. Rising nationalism and legacy of top-down control and general rivalries competition among the five Central Asia states between the states. The Interstate Coordinating has meant they have failed to come up with a Water Commission (ICWC) that was set up in 1992 viable regional approach to replace the Soviet has failed to take into account changing political and system of management. Indeed, linked water and economic relations. It is an inter-governmental body energy issues have been second only to Islamic with little transparency that focuses almost extremism as a source of tension in recent years. exclusively on the division of water. There is no representation from agricultural or industrial An annual cycle of disputes has developed consumers, non-governmental organisations or other between the three downstream countries – parties. Management is dominated by officials from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – that Uzbekistan, leading to suspicions that it favours that are all heavy consumers of water for growing country’s national interests. This has contributed to a cotton, and the upstream nations – Kyrgyzstan lack of political commitment by other countries to and Tajikistan. The downstream countries the commission, resulting in a serious shortage of require more water for their growing agricultural funds. In the meantime, the individual countries sectors and rising populations, while the have done little to contribute to the maintenance of economically weaker upstream countries are water systems that benefit the region. Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page ii

Western donors have started to develop other Amu Darya but reconstruction of irrigation systems management systems such as the Global will put additional pressure on the river. Environment Facility (GEF) program, in coordination with the International Fund to Save Tensions over water and energy have contributed to the Aral Sea (IFAS). The UN-backed Special a generally uneasy political climate in Central Asia. Program for the Economies of Central Asia Not only do they tend to provoke hostile rhetoric, (SPECA) is also working on water management. but they have also prompted suggestions that the However, none of these initiatives have made countries are willing to defend their interests by much headway in dealing with the key political force if necessary. Uzbekistan has carried out obstacles, particularly the unwillingness of the exercises that look suspiciously like practice runs at states to cooperate. capturing the Toktogul Reservoir. The gas shortages and winter flooding that Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan Shortly after independence, the five countries have inflicted on each other have a direct and agreed to maintain the Soviet-era quota system, widespread impact on the peoples of those countries but this has become unworkable. The civil war in and have the potential to inflame ethnic tensions in Tajikistan and the decay of Kyrgyzstan’s the Ferghana Valley. Competition for water can only economy has meant that water-monitoring increase, and tensions will rise unless better facilities have fallen into disrepair. Control and mechanisms are put in place to manage the enforcement mechanisms no longer function and problems. the various countries now often accuse each other of exceeding quotas. Turkmenistan is using too A multifaceted regional approach is needed that much water to the detriment of Uzbekistan, addresses energy, agriculture and demographic which in turn has been accused by Kazakhstan of aspects of water use. Thus far, emphasis has been on taking more than its share. Kyrgyzstan and bilateral agreements that lack political weight and Tajikistan say that the three downstream cannot resolve what is a regional problem. countries are all exceeding quotas. Even within Management of water must be reformed to increase Uzbekistan, provinces have accused one another accountability and transparency as currently the of using too much water. public, NGOs and the media have little access to information or the decision-making process. Some of the most serious tensions have centred Efficient water management requires quotas that are around barter agreements and payments. The sustainable and are backed up by enforcement upstream countries trade water to Uzbekistan and mechanisms and sanctions against violators. The Kazakhstan for energy in the form of gas, coal or Central Asia nations still approach the issue purely power. Since energy deliveries have been as an engineering problem rather than one of unreliable, Kyrgyzstan has responded by managing multiple political, social and economic releasing more water through its hydropower dam factors. in winter, which results in downstream flooding and less water for summer irrigation. Attempts by There is considerable scepticism in Central Asia Kyrgyzstan to demand payment for water have about foreign involvement in resolving the water been resisted by the downstream countries. issue. Donors have favoured technical rather than political solutions, and funds have been earmarked As each country has started to view the problem for the repair and replacement of inefficient as a zero-sum game, it has taken steps to increase irrigation installations. Technical solutions will only control over water, often to the detriment of the have a limited impact, however, if not accompanied others. There is increasing uncertainty in Central by political measures. Asia over plans to build new reservoirs and dams or to expand irrigation. There has been little consultation over most of these projects, leading to intensified suspicions between states. Since the fall of the Taliban in November 2001, there has been concern about the implications of efforts to rebuild agriculture in Afghanistan. Currently that country uses very little of the water from the Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page iii

RECOMMENDATIONS the urgent need to improve water productivity in downstream nations. TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF CENTRAL ASIA: 5. Draft national water codes and support the On Water Management: expansion of local water users associations as a way to: 1. Reform the Interstate Coordinating Water Commission (ICWC) by: introduce new technology; reduce consumption; making its decision-making, budgets maintain existing infrastructure; and and policies more transparent and minimise risk of local disputes. accountable; widening participation by including On Quotas: water users associations and NGOs; broadening the mandate from water 6. Revise existing water quotas considering: division to include agricultural and energy issues; current low water supplies; providing it with powers to enforce rising demand in upstream countries; quotas, close facilities and impose the balance of water distribution within sanctions; and countries; and Reforming the management structure the need to tackle pressing to make it more representative of environmental problems. country-members. On Barter Agreements: 2. Enhance the monitoring capacity of the ICWC by: 7. Move ahead with establishment of water and energy consortia as a way to boost regional granting visa-free access to all cooperation. In particular: officials to all member states; expanding funding for monitoring negotiate a new agreement on the Syr- equipment, particularly automated Darya, taking into account infrastructure systems; and issues, and moving towards monetary providing diplomatic status for exchanges; and officials to limit pressures on them negotiate a similar agreement for the from local authorities. Amu-Darya, taking into account the energy needs of Afghanistan and 3. Reform the Basin Water-Management Tajikistan. Authorities (BWAs) for the Amu Darya and Syr Darya by: 8. Boost trust in existing barter agreements by:

giving them authority to enforce working out a schedule to reach quotas; agreements before energy shortages in making them more inclusive; winter cause problems; changing senior management establishing a monitoring and structures to reduce suspicions of adjudication system for barter deals; and Uzbek dominance. improving infrastructure to deliver gas.

4. Negotiate an agreement on payments for 9. Move towards market pricing for water and infrastructure maintenance that takes into energy to allow fairer exchanges, and account: recognise the diverging pace of economic reforms. the burden on upstream countries to maintain dams and reservoirs; and

Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page iv

On Future Infrastructure: establishment of water users associations and monitoring and 10. Stop construction of the Lake of the Golden environmental NGOs; Century in Turkmenistan, the reservoir automated and other monitoring of system in southern Uzbekistan and the water supplies; Rogun Dam in Tajikistan; end speculation water-use reduction programs; over possible diversion of Siberian rivers to local conflict prevention initiatives; and Central Asia. research on local water management.

11. Establish an independent regional 14. Promote regional cooperation by: commission to assess the impact of planned projects, and adopt a planning code of funding projects designed and conduct to reduce tensions. implemented regionally; and pressing governments to drop 12. Use the joint commission to come up with a infrastructure projects that will harm common position on future water use in their neighbours. Afghanistan. 15. Provide technical and financial help to the TO INTERNATIONAL DONORS: Central Asian states and the government in Afghanistan to work out a common position 13. Expand funding for political and technical on future water use from the Amu Darya and activities related to water, including: Panj rivers.

drafting of agreements on quotas, Osh/Brussels, 30 May 2002 barter agreements and infrastructure; support for the formation of water and energy consortia;

ICG Asia Report N° 34 30 May 2002

CENTRAL ASIA: WATER AND CONFLICT

I. INTRODUCTION been a particular focus of tensions. The Amu Darya, which flows from Tajikistan through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also to the Aral Sea, is likely to Central Asia has been consuming water at an become a locus of disputes as governments compete unsustainable rate for decades, but since for its water, and Afghanistan starts to take its independence in 1991 water use has soared yet share.1 further. Although the region has sufficient water to meet its needs, crumbling infrastructure and This report identifies four key sources of tension poor management mean the countries are now both among and within the countries of Central consuming 1.5 times what they should. Asia: Demographic pressures and expanding agriculture have meant more water is being used lack of coherent water management; every year. failure to abide by or adapt water quotas; tension over barter agreements and payments; Since the Nineteenth Century, the focus of and agricultural policy in Central Asia has been on uncertainty over future infrastructure plans. increasing the output of cotton and rice so that Russia, and later the Soviet Union, could reduce These tensions have so far been contained without reliance on imports. Investment in farming and conflict, but all parties have shown a willingness to irrigation was aimed at expanding the cotton area, put their interests first even when this might have disregarding the environmental or social impact. serious consequences for their neighbours. Likewise, rice was expanded even though Central Mechanisms for managing both the technical and Asia is on the edge of the crop’s ecological limit. political aspects of water have seized up as the states have withdrawn their cooperation. Rhetoric has The cash strapped new nations, stripped of their already taken some alarming turns. “Uzbekistan, subsidies from Moscow after independence, have Tajikistan and Kazakhstan will defend themselves increased production further. In Turkmenistan with whatever means necessary” if water supplies and Uzbekistan, cotton is at the heart of a system from the Syr Darya are cut, one Uzbek official told of political and social control that operates in a ICG.2 In 1996 a report suggested that Uzbekistan manner almost unchanged from Soviet days. As would be willing to use military force to seize the cotton is vital for foreign exchange and political Toktogul Dam in Kyrgyzstan if its water security patronage, the sorts of reforms needed to reduce water use – particularly privatisation of farming and realistic pricing of water to encourage conservation – have never got off the ground. 1The Syr Darya takes its course in northern Kyrgyzstan, crosses into Uzbekistan, then on to Tajikistan before re- With the expansion of agriculture, the two major entering Uzbekistan. After crossing southern Kazakhstan, it rivers in Central Asia have become a focus for ends its course in the northern part of the Aral Sea. The Amu Darya makes up the Tajik-Afghan and then the Uzbek- growing competition among the five nations. The Afghan borders, continues into Turkmenistan, then runs Syr Darya, which rises in the mountains of along the Turkmen-Uzbek border before crossing into Kyrgyzstan and flows through Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and ending up at the southern end of the Aral Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to the Aral Sea, has Sea. 2 ICG interview, Tashkent, February 2002. Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 2

was threatened.3 Such rumours are difficult to evaporation.6 Only 28 per cent of irrigation canals confirm, but it would be surprising if were lined to stop filtration in 1994, and since then Uzbekistan’s defence planning did not include the condition of infrastructure has declined.7 The consideration of military action to protect its Central Asian countries lack the funds – up to water supply. Due to their reliance on agriculture, U.S.$16 billion – necessary to modernise irrigation Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan view irrigation as a systems.8 The absence of either private farming or a key security issue. market pricing system for water means there is little incentive for farmers to invest in improved systems. Relations between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan The donor community has been unwilling to provide have always been tense, partly because of the the vast sums necessary for this sort of technical animosity between their presidents, and there solution, which in itself would not work without have been few substantive bilateral talks over much broader reforms of water management and water issues. Water issues were rumoured to be use. behind a military stand-off at the border in 1995, and Uzbekistan seems likely to take a very strong Resolving water problems in Central Asia would line against further unilateral decisions by require a comprehensive program of political, Turkmenistan to increase its water take from the economic and social reform, particularly in Amu-Darya. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. These countries would have to loosen the state’s grip on their people Although Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan account for that cotton facilitates and end the systems of only 20 per cent of the territory of the Aral Sea patronage and corruption paid for by export earnings Basin4, some 80 per cent of the area’s water from the crop. A region-wide plan to adopt low resources are generated on their territory.5 water-use irrigation systems would have to be Kyrgyzstan controls the flow of water along the implemented at considerable cost. Agriculture would Syr Darya through the dam and reservoir at have to be reformed to substantially reduce reliance Toktogul. Tajikistan plans to develop a similarly on thirsty crops, such as cotton and rice. Realistic huge reservoir at Rogun on the Vakhsh river, market water pricing would need to be introduced so which is one of the main tributaries to the Amu that private farmers had a financial incentive to use Darya. To counter this increase in upstream less water and invest in better technology.9 If control, the downstream countries have outlined privatisation were to occur, it would have to be plans to build their own reservoirs, further regulated so that it did not cause new rounds of local complicating the development of a coherent conflicts as it has elsewhere.10 regional system of management.

Repairing or replacing outdated irrigation systems could do much to reduce water use and 6 In Tajikistan, some 70 per cent of irrigation water is lost improve crop yields but such solutions are through evaporation and filtration. ICG interview with expensive. About half of all water used for Tursun Abduzhabarov, Deputy Minister of Reclamation and irrigation is lost en route or through filtration and Water Management, Dushanbe, 13 February 2002. Only 69 to 80 per cent of the water reaches fields in Uzbekistan and less than 50 per cent gets to the crops. Yuri Egorov, “Perspektivy neuteshitelny” [The perspectives are not soothing], Nezavisimaia gazeta, 12 July 2001. 7 Philip Micklin. Managing Water in Central Asia (RIIA. 3 Stuart Horsman, “Water in Central Asia”, Roy Allison, London, 2000), p. 29. Lena Jonson (Eds.), Central Asian Security: The New 8 Estimate by Philip Micklin, based on World Bank studies. International Context. (London. RIIA. 2001), p. 76. Ibid, p. 40. 4 The Aral Basin comprises an area of 1,760,000 square 9 Those users that do pay, only cover a fraction of the true kilometres. See, IFAS Regional Report “Integrated Land cost of the water. A water users association in Syr Darya and Water Management in the Upper Watersheds”, Province (Uzbekistan) was paying 0.11 som a cubic metre International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea, Executive against a cost estimated at 0.9 som. See Karl Wegerich. Committee, Vol. B. Aral Sea Basin Program 6 Water User Associations in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. (Almaty/Bishkek/Dushanbe/Tashkent, 1997), p. 4. Occasional Paper No.32. Water Issues Study Group, School 5 ICG interview with Diushen Mamatkanov, director of of Oriental and African Studies (London. August 2000), p. the Institute of Water Problems and Hydropower of the 14. Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences, Bishkek, 20 February 10 Sandra L. Postel and Aaron T. Wolf, “Dehydrating 2002. See also IFAS Regional Report, p. 6. Conflict”, Foreign Policy, September/October 2001. Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 3

The Central Asia states would have to develop a II. BACKGROUND renewed sense of regional cooperation to pay for renovations to their crumbling infrastructure and build new systems to reduce water loss. They A. WATER IN CENTRAL ASIA would also have to submit to the authority of a supranational system of water management that The agricultural sectors of downstream countries could set quotas and punish countries that did not Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are almost completely stick to them. Decision-making would have to be dependent on water from the Syr Darya and the opened up to those currently excluded from the Amu Darya. Southern Kazakhstan also depends on process including: water users, energy producers the Syr Darya. A majority of the population in all and users and environmental groups. the Central Asian countries except Kazakhstan live in the countryside.11 In Uzbekistan agriculture Given the current state of relations among these accounts for 28 per cent of GDP,12 and irrigation is countries and the slow pace of reform, none of used in the production of 95 per cent of crops.13 the fundamental measures are likely to be More significantly, in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and introduced soon. Realistically, all that can be Tajikistan, one major export crop, cotton, accounts expected is a series of incremental reforms to for a large proportion of hard currency earnings. what is essentially a Soviet-era system of Thus, for both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, water management trying to cope with expanding supply is at the heart of their perceived national demand for water and reduced cooperation security interests. among the states. Between 1995 and 2000 irrigated land increased by Although donor countries should not abandon the 7 per cent throughout Central Asia,14 and all the aim of promoting deeper reforms and broader countries have plans to expand this area further. regional cooperation, they should recognise that Turkmenistan intends to add 450,000 hectares in the resistance runs deep among Central Asian states. coming years,15 Kyrgyzstan to increase land under This report aims instead to focus on ways to irrigation by 230,000 hectares by 2005,16 and reduce tensions inherent in the current system as Tajikistan to add 500,000 hectares of irrigated land a way of reducing one aspect of conflict risk as soon as possible.

11 In 1987, 42 per cent of the Kazakh population, 52 per cent of the Turkmen population, 58 per cent of the Uzbek population, 60 per cent of the Kyrgyz population and 67 per cent of the Tajik population lived in the countryside. See Tsentralnaia Azia: novye tendentsii v ekonomike, RAN (Moskva, 1998). [Central Asia: New Economic Tendencies, Russian Academy of Sciences], p. 21. The rural proportion of the population in all these countries has increased since the collapse of the USSR as the industrial sector has shrunk. 12 Human Development Report, UNDP (Tashkent. 2000), p. 15. 13 Philip Micklin. Managing Water in Central Asia, p. 55. 14 Iskandar Abdullayev, “Water Management and Prospects of Water Division in Central Asia”, The Times of Central Asia, 3 November 2000, at http://www.times.kg. 15 ICG interview with Diushen Mamatkanov, Director, Institute of Water Problems and Hydropower of the Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences, Bishkek, 20 February 2002. 16 All this land is located in the Syr Darya basin – i.e. in Osh, Jalalabad, Batken and Naryn Provinces. Each hectare requires an average 10,000 cubic metres of water for irrigation. ICG interview with Kadyrbek Beshekeev, First Deputy General Director, Department of Water Management. Ministry of Agriculture and Water Management. Bishkek, 21 February 2002. Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 4

by 2005.17 If projects like this are implemented, have devoted even more land to the crop and have pressure on limited water resources will increase intensified use of water and fertilisers.23 massively. The ground water table is also likely to rise as a result of irrigation, making land unfit There is enough water to go around in Central Asia, for agriculture elsewhere.18 and with good management of systems, the tensions over distribution would diminish. But massive and Rapid population growth19 has raised demand for rising overuse and inter- and intra-state tensions land, and the problem has been compounded by over distribution, will ensure that water remains a the collapse in industry that has forced many cause of competition rather than cooperation. people back to farming. Although Uzbekistan and other downstream countries have emphasised food self-sufficiency in agricultural programs, the B. WATER AND CONFLICT pressure to grow cotton remains high. It is a key foreign currency earner but is also a particularly Water is one of the most politicised of all resources, thirsty crop that requires heavy irrigation.20 a factor in at least 42 violent conflicts world wide Turkmenistan plans to triple cotton production by since the start of the last century, according to one 24 2010. Other countries are also expected to expand scholar. As countries push against the limits of cultivation,21 meaning an enormous rise in water water availability and experience unprecedented use and wastage.22 Privatisation of agriculture has levels of water stress, there is rising concern that not reduced cotton growing in southern conflicts could erupt over the resource. From UN Kazakhstan. High prices have meant farmers Secretary General Kofi Annan to the U.S. National Intelligence Council, numerous leaders and reports have warned of this emerging problem.25

In this context, Central Asia is a focus of concern for 17 ICG interview with Ahad Akhrorov, Chief Hydraulic a number of reasons: Engineer, Ministry of Reclamation and Water Management of the Republic of Tajikistan, Dushanbe, 16 Regional water systems were closely woven February 2002. 18 Kyrgyzstan has expanded irrigated agriculture in the together by Soviet design and management. South, causing problems in Rishtan District in Now they must be managed by five often Uzbekistan’s Ferghana Province as the water table there fractious countries with little willingness to has risen. cooperate. 19 Annual population growth in Tajikistan is 3 per cent. Uzbekistan’s population grows by 2 per cent a year. Central Asian economies are highly dependent Kyrgyzstan’s is lower at 1.5 per cent, but is higher in the on irrigation for much of their economic southern regions where pressure on land and water is greatest. output. Irrigated crops provide the elites with 20 According to UN figures, rice uses an average of 30,000 cubic metres per hectare, cotton 12,000, and wheat just 5,000. See Karl Wegerich. “Not a Simple Path: A Sustainable Future for Central Asia”, Occasional 23 ICG interview with Bakhyt Ramankulov, deputy head of Paper No.28, Water Issues Study Group, School of the South Kazakhstan Province Department of Agriculture, Oriental and African Studies (London. February 2001), Shimkent, 1 March 2002. p. 2. Although cotton prices are falling, it is still more 24 Peter Gleick, “Water Conflict Chronology 2000”, Pacific profitable to produce that crop than grain. The price of Institute for Studies in Development, Environment and one ton of cotton equals five to six tons of grain. ICG Security, 2000. However, Gleick’s chronology includes the interview with Makhmud Hamidov, Director, BWA Syr use of water as a means of waging war such as bombing Darya, Tashkent, 1 February 2002. dams or poisoning wells. It is harder to find a case of two 21 National Development Plan 2010, quoted in Human countries going to war over water; indeed the last time this Development Repor, UNDP (Tashkent. 2000), p. 9. occurred may have been 4,500 years ago when the 22 To illustrate this problem, it may be useful to look at Mesopotamian cities of Lagash and Umma fought. On the water use in Uzbekistan: an average of 55 cubic other hand between 805 AD and 1984, governments signed kilometres for irrigation. Only 38 to 44 cubic kilometres, more than 3,600 agreements on water. See Sandra L. Postel however, reach the fields. And only 25 to 26 cubic and Aaron T. Wolf, “Dehydrating Conflict”, Foreign Policy, kilometres reach the crops for which they were intended. September/October 2001, who argue that “the history of Yuri Egorov, Perspektivy neuteshitelny [The cooperation, creativity and ingenuity [over water] is Perspectives are not Soothing], Nezavisimaia gazeta, 12 infinitely more rich than that of acute conflict”. July 2001. 25 Postel and Wolf, “Dehydrating Conflict”, op. cit. Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 5

the money and control of patronage that states are hindering economic development, fuelling keep them in power. extremism and occasionally resulting in violence. Degradation of agricultural land and shortages of Poor water management and massive over water also mean many young men have few use has left the area vulnerable to droughts economic opportunities, making them more likely to and the sort of catastrophic environmental join militias or extremist groups. damage already seen around the Aral Sea. Water and energy disputes have already had an Central Asian countries are increasingly impact on large numbers of people, particularly in adopting “zero-sum” positions on sensitive areas like the Ferghana Valley where resources and other issues while stepping Uzbeks have endured winter floods and summer up consumption at unsustainable rates. droughts due to Kyrgyzstan’s release of dam water for electricity generation. The Kyrgyz in turn have The downstream countries are more shivered through winters when Uzbekistan failed to powerful militarily and economically than deliver gas due in exchange for irrigation water. the upstream countries, an imbalance that has been present in most water conflicts. On a local level, water disputes have been on the rise and have resulted in violence. There have been The interdependency and high reliance on water frequent tensions between Kyrgyz and Tajik that flows across borders also means, however, villagers on the border between the two countries that countries have a lot to lose by fighting over over access to contested water supplies. Disputes supplies. Going to war is a very expensive way of over resources risk provoking wider ethnic conflict controlling resources, and most governments as happened when land disputes led to inter-ethnic prefer agreements. “The tendency … even where riots in Kyrgyzstan in 1990 that left hundreds dead. water conflicts have been deemed an imminent Rising costs, poorly maintained water systems and risk is to trade water for peace and structural privatisation of utilities will only add to strains in changes in water use”, writes one specialist. “The local water systems. Water affects the poorest emerging consensus is well summarised as ‘water sectors of societies, which end up paying the largest is a trigger for conflict but a reason to make proportion of their income for the resource. peace’”. 26 Problems with irrigation, drinking water, floods and declining soil quality are additional burdens to Water plays a key role also in internal conflict. people already coping with economic turmoil and Indeed, one expert on the subject argues that the rapid social change. risk of violence becomes more intense the smaller the scale of the dispute, an idea supported in Central Asia where local conflicts have been more serious than wider ones.27 Water is contributing to a broad sense of unease across the region. Concerns over water are one strand of a complex web of tensions including drugs, Islamist extremism, ethnic rivalries and border disputes.28 None of these issues may have led to all out war but problems among the Central Asian

26 Leif Ohlsson, “Water Scarcity and Conflict”, in Security Challenges of the 21st Century ( Bern/Frankfurt, 1999). 27 Ibid. 28 See ICG Asia Report No. 14, Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, 1 March 2001 (Osh/Brussels); ICG Asia Report No. 25, Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict, 26 November 2001 (Osh/Brussels); and ICG Asia Report 33, Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential, 4 April 2002 (Osh/Brussels). Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 6

III. REGIONAL WATER poisonous dust from the exposed sea bed are carried MANAGEMENT on the wind and have made large areas unfit for agriculture.30 The salt has also caused serious health problems and is even believed to have had a Independence came as something of a shock to dramatic impact on the region’s climate, which is the five Central Asian Republics. There was little becoming hotter and dryer. domestic pressure for them to leave the Soviet Union and no real history as independent nations Even Soviet attempts to save the Aral Sea were within their current borders. There was little shift controversial. One scheme planned to divert water in their rulers – in four of the five countries from the Ob and Irtysh Rivers in Siberia to Central former Communist Party chiefs continued in Asia. This project, however, had to be abandoned in power under a different political guise. Although the late 1980s due to fierce opposition from newly now five sovereign states, they were closely empowered scientists, writers and 31 woven together economically; indeed there is a environmentalists. Another scheme called for widespread belief that Soviet planners nuclear weapons to be used to melt glaciers in deliberately divided resources and investment Central Asia that would then refill the lake. among them so none would be self-sufficient. Under the Soviet model it did not matter as the Such ideas reflect Soviet views of nature as borders were nothing more than boundary something to be marshalled and directed by markers, and most important economic decisions elaborate engineering. Moscow spent billions of were taken in Moscow. rubles building dams and canals across Central Asia without considering the views of those who would Immediately after independence, the five nations use them. The bias was also towards increasing the had little choice but to continue with many of the area of irrigated land, even if it meant environmental management systems put in place by Moscow. damage. In some cases just one crop was grown This did not account, however, for the divergence before farmers had to abandon the land due to 32 of economic interests and political views that salination. accompanied growing nationalism. Disputes were no longer settled by ministries in Moscow but Although water was delivered in a wasteful manner there was little willingness to find local solutions. with little consideration for long term environmental Although the leaders of these countries were impacts, the system did work within its own logic. willing to mouth the rhetoric of regional Quotas were set and followed under the firm cooperation, they rarely followed up with action. guidance of the Ministry of Land Reclamation and What was left was a system that was Soviet in its Water Management in Moscow – in close ambitions, scale and mentality but unable to coordination with the Ministry of Energy. adapt to Central Asia’s evolving political and economic systems. The centralised nature of Soviet water management, however, paved the way for the water disputes that

A. SOVIET ERA MANAGEMENT

30 The basic problem was a growing lack of water since the The shrunken Aral Sea is the starkest legacy of 1960s owing to over-irrigation upstream. The Aral Sea is at the Soviet Union’s management of water the lower end of the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya. Most of resources. What was once the world’s fourth the water from these rivers is used upstream for irrigation. largest lake is now the sixth largest and half its Little water, therefore, reaches the Aral Sea zone and the former size. Since the 1960s the level of water water that does has a very high salt-content, causing has dropped between 13 and 18 metres. Some secondary salinisation of the land and a decrease in agricultural output. Philip Micklin. Managing Water in 400,000 square kilometres of land around the Central Asia, p. 18. lake, home to four million people, have become a 31 The idea was resurrected by some circles in Russia and toxic wasteland.29 The salinity of the water is Uzbekistan in 2001. See below. now eight times the level in 1960. Salt and 32 Report to the 16th Plenary Sessions of the Uzbekistan Communist Party Central Committee, quoted in Iwao Kobori and Michael H. Glantz (Eds.), Central Eurasian Water Crisis: Caspian, Aral and Dead Seas, (United 29 Philip Micklin, Managing Water in Central Asia, p. 7. Nations University, Tokyo), 1998. Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 7

have emerged among Central Asian countries. with the signing of the Almaty Agreement.36 The Water quotas fixed by Moscow favoured the Interstate Coordinating Water Commission, downstream cotton-producers – Uzbekistan, (ICWC),37 was established to facilitate the Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan – at the expense of implementation of quotas, with decisions on key mountainous and less developed Kyrgyzstan and issues to be made by consensus of the five member Tajikistan. Restrictions were imposed on irrigated states.38 The ICWC also runs a Scientific agriculture in the latter two to maximise cotton Information Centre (SIC)39 and trains water officials, output in their neighbours.33 organises courses and round-tables, and operates a comprehensive database that can be accessed by its Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which have only member countries. limited gas and coal deposits, were keen to develop their hydropower potential. This, The ICWC sets quotas, and its executive bodies – however, was not compatible with ensuring that the Basin Water-Management Association (BWA) sufficient water was available downstream for Amu Darya and the BWA Syr Darya40 – monitor the irrigation during spring and summer, which their implementation. The associations also have the required that the reservoirs on the Syr Darya and right to adjust the quotas up or down by as much as Amu Darya be allowed to fill up in autumn and 15 per cent. All these bodies are located in winter – when electricity demand peaks in Uzbekistan – the ICWC and BWA Syr Darya in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Tashkent and BWA Amu Darya in Urgench. The SIC is also in Tashkent, although the rather weak To satisfy domestic energy consumption, ICWC secretariat is based in Khojand (Tajikistan). Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan received huge amounts of Turkmen and Uzbek gas as well as To address the problems of the Aral Sea and to coal and mazut (a heavy fuel oil made from provide social, economic and other assistance to refinery residues) from Kazakhstan. In return for people living in the area, an Interstate Council for the electricity they produced to power irrigation the Aral Sea Basin (ICAB) and the International pumps in summer, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan Fund to Save the Aral Sea (IFAS) were set up in also received electricity from their neighbours 1993 and then merged in 1997. IFAS is during the winter months.34 Moscow covered the headquartered in Tashkent, although its executive costs of operating and maintaining the dams, committee rotates around the Central Asian reservoirs, canals and irrigation pumps.35 countries and in 2002 was in Dushanbe.41 Each country has two representatives on the executive committee that implements IFAS Board decisions B. MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES

On 12 October 1991, the water ministers of the Central Asian states agreed that they would stick 36 Soglashenie o sotrudnichestve v upravlenii ispolzovania i with the Soviet allocations of water, an okhrany vodnykh resursov iz mezhgosudarstvennykh agreement that was formalised in February 1992 istochnikov [Agreement on Cooperation in the Management of the Use and Protection of Water Resources from Interstate Sources]. 37Interstate Coordinating Water Commission, ICWC 33 ICG interview with Diushen Mamatkanov, Director, [Mezhgosudarstvennaia Institute of Water Problems and Hydropower of the Koordinatsionnaya Vodokhoziaistvennaia Komissia, Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences, Bishkek, 20 February MKVK]. 2002. 38 The ICWC has five members – one from each country – 34 During the Soviet period, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and meets on a quarterly basis. Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the five southern provinces 39 For a more detailed description of its tasks, see the of Kazakhstan (the northern provinces of Kazakhstan information leaflet NITS MKVK, which can be obtained were part of the Russian energy grid) were all part of the from the ICWC. United Central Asian Energy System, which was 40 The Basin Water-Management Association (BWA) Amu managed by the USSR Ministry of Energy. ICG Darya (Basseinovoe Vodnoe Obedinenie Amu Darya) and interview with Iskandar Ametov, Chief Dispatcher for the BWA Syr Darya (Basseinovoe Vodnoe Obedinenie Syr “Energy”, United Dispatch Center of the Central Asian Darya). Power Systems, Tashkent, 31 January 2002. 41 Prior to moving to Dushanbe, the Executive Committee 35 ICG Interview with Nabi Nazirov. Chairman of the was headquartered first in Tashkent, then in Almaty and SIC ICWC Tajikistan, Dushanbe, 17 February 2002. more recently in Ashgabat. Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 8

42 through national branches. The major task of lack of reliable data on the flow of water in IFAS is to generate funding for and implement an the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya;45 action program43 endorsed by the Central Asian 44 leaders in Nukus in January 1994. the ICWC’s lack of transparency and the non- involvement of NGOs, Water Users’ All these bodies coordinate their activities closely Associations (WUAs) and other interested with the ministries responsible for water parties in its decision-making process;46 management in each Central Asian country – the Water Resources Committee of the Ministry of the ICWC’s narrow focus, with emphasis very Natural Resources and Environmental Protection much on water division, to the exclusion of (Kazakhstan), the Ministry of Reclamation and agriculture and energy – the major users of Water Management (Tajikistan), the Ministry of water; Water Management and Agriculture (Uzbekistan), the Ministry of Water Management the institutional structure of the IFAS and the and Agriculture (Kyrgyzstan) and the Ministry of ICWC, in which decisions are made by Reclamation and Water Management consensus, resulting in paralysis as the (Turkmenistan). interests of the countries have diverged;

location of the IFAS and ICWC, which has C. FLAWS IN THE SYSTEM raised concerns that Uzbekistan is favoured;47

Imposing a half-hearted version of Soviet central lack of political commitment to the planning on the fractious Central Asian states has organisations by the member states and the not proved a recipe for success. Indeed, the accompanying shortage of funds (only two current management system has failed to deal countries keep up their payments);48 and with rising tensions over resources. The most significant reasons for its failure have been:

inability to recognise that the new nations 45 The average annual flow of water in the Amu Darya is 75 would not necessarily be satisfied with the cubic kilometres. The Syr Darya has an average flow of 36 economic roles previously assigned to them cubic kilometres. The water flow varies significantly from by Moscow, and the Soviet-era water year to year. Due to the civil war in Tajikistan and a lack of quotas that went with them; funds in both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, hydrological posts have either disappeared or fallen into disarray. It is therefore very difficult for hydrologists to produce precise predictions on water flow. The General Director of the Kazakh Kazhydromet put it as follows: “the ICWC distributes water not knowing how much water there is to distribute”. ICG interview with Dr. Tursynbek Kudekov, Director-General of Kazhydromet, Almaty, 26 February 2002. 46 The Soviet vertical ICWC-Ministry of Agriculture and 42 For a description of IFAS activities, see Action Water Management-Provincial Water Management Program on the Regional Water Partnership Department – District Water Management Department has Organisation in Central Asia, ICWC. not been replaced. In an interview with ICG, one water 43 Programma konkretnikh deistvii po uluchsheniu expert described the ICWC as a “club for water officials” ekologicheskoi obstanovki v basseine Aralskogo moria that makes no real decisions. na blizhaishie 3-5 let s uchetom sotsialno- 47 As most of them are Tashkent based, the Kyrgyz, Tajiks ekologicheskogo razvitia regiona [Program of Concrete and to some extent Kazakhs have accused the ICWC and the Actions to Improve the Ecological Situation in the Aral IFAS of serving the interests of Uzbekistan. ICG interviews Sea Basin over the next 3-5 Years in Conjunction with with Sirodjidin Aslov, Transboundary Water Monitoring the Socio-Ecological Development of the Region]. Component Director, IFAS, GEF-project, Tashkent, 21 44 All the legal acts and agreements related to interstate January 2002, and Diushen Mamatkanov, Director of the water management in Central Asia can be found in NITs Institute of Water Problems and Hydroenergy of the Kyrgyz MKVK. Polozhenia i ustavy mezhgosudarstvennykh Academy of Sciences, Bishkek, 20 February 2002. organizatsii basseina Aralskogo moria. Iuridicheskii 48 According to the SIC ICWC, only Turkmenistan and sbornik N3 [Charters and Statutes of the Interstate Uzbekistan keep up their payments to the two bodies. The Organisations of the Aral Sea Basin. Legal Digest No 3] IFAS receives only limited funds from the member states, (Tashkent, NITs MKVK, 1998). and international funding has not been forthcoming on the Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 9

exceed water quotas when we are not present. It is failure to recognise the need for difficult for me to say by how much. This is collaborative maintenance arrangements: happening not through the fault of our staff. They maintenance of the Toktogul Reservoir cost are the victims”.52 U.S.$25 million a year in the early 1990s, a sum Kyrgyzstan could ill-afford, yet it But the greatest problem is the inability of states to received no help from the downstream agree on workable bilateral or regional water beneficiaries.49 management structures. If the terms under which the BWAs are working are not accepted politically by Although it is the task of the BWAs to monitor upstream countries, it will be impossible for them to the use of water across the region, this has proven work as multilateral institutions for the interests of difficult. An Uzbek water expert, for instance, the whole river basin rather than for national accused the Kyrgyz Ministry of Energy of interests. Hence the need for an overarching strategy undermining the work of the BWA Syr Darya, that includes all countries of the region and saying that as the Kyrgyz Ministry of Energy represents compromise between the aspirations of regulates Toktogul water reservoir by itself “what upstream and downstream states. is there then left for the BWA to do?”50

The Associations face a number of technical and D. REGIONAL WATER STRATEGIES administrative problems including: So far none of the Central Asian states has lack of unfettered access to all countries; developed a national water strategy, though work although they have staff everywhere, some has begun in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and countries require visas for visits by senior Tajikistan. Regional strategies have also lagged, officials, which prevents surprise mainly because of political differences and an inspections; approach to water resources based largely on national interest. lack of funding and equipment for monitoring; and Despite problems reaching functioning inter-state agreements, the Central Asian countries realise that lack of powers to close facilities or impose it is in their interests to achieve reach some kind of fines when quotas are exceeded.51 understanding on the Syr Darya and Amu Darya. As a result of the failure to pass water quotas acceptable Field staff are vulnerable to pressures from local to all, a number of bilateral and multilateral authorities. Staff at the BWA Syr Darya are often agreements regulating the water flow have been pressured by the police and tax officials into signed – most notably the 1998 agreement among exceeding the water quotas fixed by the ICWC. Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. This was According to a BWA official, “Our people for a period of five years, with exact terms negotiated annually. It provides for the exchange of water from Kyrgyzstan for gas from Uzbekistan and coal and mazut from Kazakhstan. scale anticipated at the time of its establishment. ICG Interview, SIC officials, Tashkent, 31 January 2002. 49 Since 1993, Kyrgyzstan has several times demanded Further multilateral initiatives included an that Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, which benefit from the agreement on measuring water flows and one on water at Toktogul, share the cost of maintaining the joint operation of energy systems, signed in June reservoir. The demands have been turned down by 1999. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan signed bilateral Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in the past, although there agreements in 1996 to divide water from the Amu was some hope of an agreement in 2002. ICG interview Darya below Karshi in southern Uzbekistan equally. with Saidazim Mirzaev, Chief, Water and Land Resources Main Department, State Committee for Nature Protection of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan signed a deal in January Tashkent, 16 January 2002. 2000 on water use from the Chu and Talas Rivers in 50 ICG confidential interview, Tashkent, February 2002. 51 ICG interview with Yusup Kamalov, Chairman, Union for the Defence of the Aral Sea and the Amu Darya, Nukus, 23 January 2002. 52 ICG interview, Tashkent, 1 February 2002. Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 10

northern Kyrgyzstan. They are also negotiating to was cheap, they were unconcerned about wasting establish a consortium on the Syr Darya that it.54 would implement regional water and energy programs. There has been some talk of a similar Efforts to tackle water from a political perspective consortium for the Amu Darya. have been fraught with problems. A lack of willingness of the Central Asian states to cooperate There are also agreements, renewed annually, has killed numerous regional initiatives. Others have linking water and energy use, particularly been signed with pomp and ceremony but not left between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, but many of the drawing board. An effort by the Organisation for these have been implemented poorly. Much Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to continues to be done informally rather than on the organise a regional conference on water came to basis of legal documents and open agreement. Far nothing in 2000 when Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan more accords are signed than implemented and said they preferred to work bilaterally. Austrian even the best plans in the region have been Foreign Minister Benita Ferrero-Waldner – then stymied by national interests. chairwoman of the OSCE – was unable to build support for the conference on a tour of the region. Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov brushed off E. INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT offers of outside assistance by saying that his country had handled the issue for more than a 53 Water has been a favourite issue for donors. thousand years on its own.55 The emphasis of projects has been on technical rather than political or economic solutions. Given Nevertheless, several major initiatives to resolve the the inefficiency of water management in Central water problems in Central Asia have been launched Asia and the poor condition of infrastructure, this since 1991. One is being developed by the Global approach has reaped some results, particularly in Environment Facility (GEF),56 a world-wide small projects. However, unless technological financing body for environmental projects, in solutions take account of local conditions, they cooperation with IFAS, with most money coming often have little impact. An Israeli scheme to from the World Bank. The three-year Water and introduce low water irrigation sprinklers to Environmental Management Project, due for Uzbekistan in 1996 failed because farmers found completion at the end of 2002, is designed to it was expensive to pay for maintenance and develop a new system of cooperation and to prepare energy. Since the heavily subsidised water supply inter-state agreements.57

The GEF program was essentially a follow-up to the earlier World Bank Aral Sea Basin Program, a 53 Donor-funded projects have tended to focus on: U.S.$17 million project that achieved hardly any improving water management at the Syr Darya and tangible results. IFAS and other bodies involved the Amu Darya; irrigation efficiency; creating water users organisations (WUAs); 54 enhancing reservoir safety; Karl Wegerich, “Not a Simple Path: A Sustainable Future rectifying the environmental, social and economic for Central Asia”. Occasional Paper No. 28. Water Issues damage caused by the Aral Sea shrinkage; and Studies Group. School of Oriental and African Studies, provision of drinking water. London (February 2001). Several projects at the regional level are designed to 55 Roland Eggleston, “OSCE Seeks Agreement on Central improve water management. These have usually been Asia Water”, Eurasianet, 6 July 2000. collaborative efforts. Major projects include: 56 See the GEF’s website for more information Water and Environmental Management Project www.gefweb.org. (GEF/IFAS with funding from the World Bank, the 57 For further details, see Proekt upravlenie vodnimi Netherlands, Sweden and the EU); resursami i okruzhaiushei sredoi. Podkomponent A1. Water Resources Management and Agricultural Upravlenie vodnimi resursami i soliami na natsionalnikh i Production – WARMAP (EU-TACIS with SIC regionalnikh urovniakh, Regionalnii otchet No 2, Otchet po ICWC); faze III. Reziume. 15.II.01. [Project for the Management of Natural Resource Management Project – NRMP Water Resources and the Environment. Subcomponent A1. (USAID); and The Management of Water Resources and Salts at the Regional Hydrometerological Collaboration (Swiss National and Regional Levels, Regional Report No 2. Aral Sea Mission/Regional Centre for Hydrology). Report on Phase III. Summary]. Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 11

were managed by the old guard of water officials, therefore, whether its water and energy program will who had little vision of how to affect change. The ever be implemented.61 GEF program has also been beset by problems. Two years into the project, some parts seem to One international project that did produce some real have achieved moderate success, but one expert benefits was the USAID-funded program that helped close to a key component covering modelling for to bring about the 1998 Syr-Darya agreement on basin rivers suggested to ICG that “no useful water and energy. In 1996 USAID staff assisted results are in sight from this project”.58 initiation of a round-table of water officials from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. It resulted Part of the problem is the domination of water in an agreement in March 1998 that has helped structures by a small group of Soviet-era lower tensions around the Syr-Darya. Consideration officials, who are seldom open to new ideas or of a similar scheme for the Amu-Darya, also alternative opinions. This top-down management attracting Afghanistan to the round-table, would be a approach does not engender the atmosphere for timely follow-up. open exchange of information that the project needs.

Although GEF involves all five Central Asian states, there is little support in upstream countries because it is seen as focusing too much on agriculture and the interests of the downstream countries.59 They have preferred a similar project launched in 1998 as part of the Special Program for the Economies of Central Asia (SPECA) – a scheme developed by Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in collaboration with the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) and the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP).

SPECA’s aim is to “support the Central Asian States in developing their cooperation, creating incentives for economic cooperation and integration into the economies of Europe and Asia”. The program contains four components,60 with each country having the main responsibility for one. One of these components, “rational and effective use of energy and water resources in Central Asia”, is being carried out by a working group attached to the Kyrgyz Energy Agency. But again tangible results are hard to find. Turkmenistan is not a party to SPECA, and Uzbekistan boycotts its meetings. It is doubtful,

58 Personal communication to ICG, Dr Daene C. McKinney, Associate Professor, Department of Civil Engineering, University of Texas, May 2002. 59 ICG interview with Diushen Mamatkanov, Director, Institute of Water Problems and Hydropower of the Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences, Bishkek, 20 February 2002. 60 For further details, see www.unece.org/speca/ 61 Kazakh Commercial Television, Almaty, 20 February tashkent.htm. 2002, 11:30 am. Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 12

IV. WATER QUOTAS AND BARTER upstream and downstream countries, uneven water AGREEMENTS distribution also strains relations between provinces within countries. In Uzbekistan, for instance, the downstream Khorezm and the autonomous republic There are two key areas of conflict between and of Karakalpakstan have blamed the upstream within the Central Asian states over water. One is provinces of Surkhandarya and Bukhara for how the water of the Aral Sea basin should be worsening their serious water shortages. Should divided, both among and within countries. The Afghanistan demand more water from the Panj-Amu 63 second is the functioning of various barter and Darya, the problem would be further aggravated. payment procedures that bundle water and energy together to provide upstream countries with the Both adverse weather and seasonal use for energy latter, and downstream countries with the former. have had a major impact on the amount of water These issues – water quotas and barter available in rivers. The levels of the Syr Darya and agreements – will be at the heart of any new the Amu Darya have dropped sharply as a result of 64 international agreement in the Aral Sea basin. four years of severe drought. An increase in the production of electricity on the Syr Darya in Kyrgyzstan has also reduced the water available for A. WATER QUOTAS irrigation in the summer in addition to causing severe flooding in Uzbekistan during the winter. The 1992 Almaty Agreement set quotas for water Water quotas, however, have not been adjusted use that were close to those established under the properly to reflect these changes. Soviet Union. Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan – the three richer Central Asia Attempts at fixing water quotas that satisfy all nations – received the largest quotas from the countries in the region have so far failed. Uzbekistan Amu Darya and the Syr Darya. The upstream uses 51 per cent and Kazakhstan 37 per cent of the countries were given much smaller quotas, water from the Syr-Darya65 whereas most Amu- reflecting their smaller populations, low cotton Darya water is consumed by Uzbekistan and production and the Soviet era decision that Turkmenistan.66 Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are agriculture would not be intensively developed in politically and economically much more powerful these republics. than Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. They also have much more to lose by reducing or putting an upper That division almost immediately caused intense limit on their water quotas. Downstream countries grievances. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan wished to have shown little understanding of demands by expand irrigated agriculture but at the same time upstream countries to expand their water use. the downstream countries were expanding their farming sectors dramatically to compensate for a sharp industrial decline. This led to rapid expansion in water use in the 1990s. As noted, the Central Asian countries now use 1.5 times more water than recommended by water experts.62

Water quotas are frequently exceeded due to inadequate monitoring, leading to shortages at the 63 According to an agreement signed between the USSR and lower reaches of the Syr Darya and the Amu Afghanistan in 1946, Afghanistan is entitled to use nine Darya. In addition to causing tension between the cubic kilometres (50 per cent) of water from the Panj River. At present, it only uses two cubic kilometres. 64 Over the last two years, the amount of water in the Panj river – a major tributary to the Amu Darya – has dropped by 20 per cent as a result of drought. ICG interview with 62 ICG interviews with Yusup Kamalov, Chairman of the Tursun Abduzhabarov, Deputy Minister of Reclamation and Union for the Defence of the Aral Sea and the Amu Water Management, Dushanbe, 13 February 2002. Darya, Nukus, 23 January 2002, and Ernazar 65 IFAS Executive Committee. Integrated Land and Water Makhmudov, Director, Institute of Water Problems of Management in the Upper Watersheds. Regional Repor,. the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, Tashkent, 21 January Vol. B. Aral Sea Basin Program 6, 1997, p. 14. 2002. 66 Ibid, p. 13. Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 13

B. BARTER AND PAYMENT purchase gas for domestic consumption from 68 MECHANISMS Uzbekistan.

The barter agreements have only been a limited In the Soviet system, the Central Asia republics 69 exchanged water and energy under complex success for a number of reasons: barter deals orchestrated by Moscow. As with the quota system, the barter system has come under Timing, since they usually are only ready in the spring when the Uzbek and Kazakh fields serious strain in recent years and has probably 70 provoked more ill feeling than any other aspect of are in dire need of water; water management. At various times, most of the countries have reneged on barter agreements, lack of trust as a result of practical problems often causing serious problems for large numbers that prevent the parties from keeping their of the population. Those who have become commitments in full; victims of alternating floods and droughts in Uzbekistan and citizens of Kyrgyzstan sitting lack of control mechanisms; without power in the winter months have begun to nurture grudges over the behaviour of the other failure to help Kyrgyzstan with the costs for country. maintenance and operation of Toktogul; and

Immediately after the collapse of the USSR, failure to account for diverging economic Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan introduced world systems as countries reform at different paces. prices for their gas, coal and mazut. Kyrgyzstan could ill afford to pay and, therefore, increased electricity production at Toktogul during the winter to compensate for its lack of fuel. The country also saw a surge in demand for power. According to the state utility, Kyrgyzenergo, electricity demand in 2000 was 20 per cent higher than in 1991, mainly because of the decrease in gas provision, particularly in the South.67

68 Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan equally share on average 6.5 The increased electricity production at Toktogul cubic kilometres of water released from Toktogul. About caused considerable problems for Uzbekistan and four cu km are used to generate Kyrgyz domestic summer Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan not only disrupted the electricity needs, leaving 2.5 cu km, which generates 1-1.1 flow of water in the Syr Darya but also reduced billion kWh for each country from Kyrgyzstan from May to the water available to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan August. Uzbekistan pays 3.4 U.S. cents per kWh of for irrigation during spring and summer. This led electricity, whereas Kazakhstan pays one cent. Payment for the electricity is not made in cash, but by supplying to serious tensions in 1997 when drought further Kyrgyzstan with gas, coal and mazut. In 2001, Uzbekistan limited summer irrigation water available provided some one billion cubic metres of gas, whereas downstream. Kazakhstan supplied some 500,000 tons of coal from the Karaganda coal field and roughly 10,000 tons of mazut. ICG All countries realised the need for a solution, and interview with Iskander Ametov, Chief Dispatcher, a framework agreement was negotiated in 1998. “Energy” United Dispatch Center of Central Asia Power Detailed barter agreements are now concluded on Systems, Tashkent, 31 January 2002. Additional information provided by Dr Daene C. McKinney, Associate Professor, an annual basis. These provide Kyrgyzstan with Department of Civil Engineering, University of Texas, May gas from Uzbekistan and coal from Kazakhstan 2002. for its thermal power stations in Bishkek and 69 According to Iskander Ametov, Chief Dispatcher of the Osh, in return for water for irrigation during “Energy” United Dispatch Center of the Central Asia Power spring and summer. Kyrgyzstan still has to Systems, the barter agreement has only been properly implemented once – in the spring of 2001. ICG interview, Tashkent, 31 January 2002. 70 If the barter agreements were ready before 1 January, 67 AO Kyrgyzenergo. Energeticheskie proekty na Kyrgyzstan would have an incentive not to produce so much Velikom shelkovom puti [Energy Projects along the Great electricity during the winter months. Consequently there Silk Road] (Bishkek, 2000), p. 9. would be more water available for irrigation during summer. Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 14

Experts in Uzbekistan estimate that gas fields currently in production could supply energy for C. ENERGY AND WATER: THE SYR- another 30 years. Although several new gas deposits DARYA have been identified, most contain gas condensate, which requires expensive technology to exploit. The Syr-Darya unites Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan Most new deposits are in remote areas with limited and Uzbekistan in a complex array of barter or no infrastructure.73 Developing them will require agreements involving water use and energy substantial financing, which is unlikely to be provision. For the most part, these have been forthcoming given the economic climate in the flouted, leading to tension among these states. A country and the reluctance of foreign investors. reappraisal of the agreements, possibly within a new Syr-Darya energy consortium, and a Some Kyrgyz officials allege that Uzbekistan has determination to make them stick, would used Kyrgyzstan’s dependence on its gas to pressure significantly diminish tension around the key it into concessions on political issues. Such pressure resources of the river. has in turn forced Kyrgyzstan to produce more electricity to cover increased demand at home – in 1. Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan turn leaving less water for irrigation in Uzbekistan in the summer.74 Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have had the most controversial history over water and energy. The A major problem with the barter agreements is that barter agreement of 1998 has been broken by they are usually delayed until the late spring or even both sides. early summer – the very time when the downstream countries need water for irrigation. Had the Uzbekistan’s economy is still heavily state agreements been ready before the turn of the year, controlled, and it has thus had few problems Kyrgyzstan would have had an incentive to produce getting energy suppliers to comply with its barter less electricity. As it happens, Kyrgyzstan is not arrangements. Nevertheless the country still convinced that enough coal and mazut will be frequently fails to provide Kyrgyzstan with the provided and so protects itself by producing negotiated amount of gas for other technical and electricity – thus triggering a vicious circle. political reasons. The regulation of the Syr Darya has intensified Gas pipelines in Uzbekistan are in urgent need of problems caused by the Kyrgyz run-off of water in repair, and, therefore, transfers around the the winter. Soviet engineers diverted the river in country and to neighbours are often disrupted. In several areas, and parts of the previous banks and 2001 problems emerged in the gas line along the river-bed were used for farming, housing and route Tashkent-Bishkek-Almaty. As a result, gas factories. If more than 480-500 cubic metres per supplies to Kyrgyzstan were cut for one and a second is released from Toktogul, there is flooding half months.71 Uzbekistan also produces very downstream, which is exacerbated in winter by the poor quality “wet” gas with a high water content. freezing of the river.75 Two reservoirs located below During the winter, the water can freeze, clogging the gas pipes. Although Uzbekistan has committed to providing gas to Kyrgyzstan, it actually does not have enough to meet its own 73 ICG interview with Utkur A. Tadzhiev, Institute of Power 72 domestic demand. Engineering and Automation of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, 22 January 2002. 74 The barter agreement only supplies Kyrgyzstan with gas for its thermal power stations in Bishkek and Osh. Gas for domestic consumption is purchased by Kyrgyzgaz from Uztransgaz. Due to the debts accumulated by Kyrgyzgaz, 71 Saparbek Balkibekov, Head of Fuel & Energy, Uztransgaz has on numerous occasions turned off the gas. Infrastructure and Communications Department, Office Kyrgyzgaz settled its debts in full in February 2002. ICG of the Prime Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic, Bishkek, interview with Avtandil Sydykov, General Director, JSC 21 February 2002. Kyrgyzgaz, Bishkek, 20 February 2002. 72 ICG interview with Aleksei Nikolaevich Silantiev, 75 As a result of Toktogul, the water released downstream Vice President of Barqi Tojik [Tajik Electricity], has been sharply reduced. The lower parts of the Syr Darya Dushanbe, 13 February 2002. are covered in ice during winter, thus facilitating flooding. Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 15

Toktogul can take only some of the excess suggested that it might be possible to establish a water.76 Kazakhstan is reluctant to release water permanent commission to adjudicate such downstream from the Chardara Reservoir in the problems.83 winter and, therefore, releases excess water into the Arnesai Lake complex77 in Uzbekistan. As a Kyrgyzstan’s position is that Uzbekistan and result, none of this water reaches the Aral Sea. Kazakhstan are themselves to blame as they have developed the river-bed and changed the course of Some Kazakhstani officials believe Uzbekistan the river. Otherwise, the Syr Darya would not flood benefits from water released in the winter as it as a result of the water released from Toktogul, and can be used for irrigation during summer.78 the lower part of the river would not freeze.84 According to Uzbek water experts, however, the salt level in the Arnesai is very high – in Tushan Bishkek has also accused Tashkent of effectively it is currently seven grams per litre and for the causing the flooding as it does not stick to its part of lake as such, 2.5-3.0 grams per litre. Though the the barter agreement – either by providing less gas water released from Toktogul is clean, it cannot than agreed, or by cutting supplies altogether. Still, be used for irrigation once it has flowed into the when Uzbekistan in January 2002 requested that Arnesai.79 Kyrgyzstan reduce the amount of water released from Toktogul, Kyrgyzstan complied.85 The large amounts of water released also cause the lakes to flood. Up to 350,000 hectares of land 2. Kyrgyzstan-Kazakhstan in Navoi and Jizzak Provinces have been flooded, and farms in Namangan Province are under Several problems have emerged between threat.80 Roads and electricity lines have been Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan as a result of the barter badly hit by floods. The total damage inflicted deals. Kazakhstan has privatised its coalmines and upon Uzbekistan is estimated by officials there at can no longer order them to provide Kyrgyzstan U.S.$770 million.81 with free coal. Kazakh officials say this is the major reason why the country has failed to keep its part of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have indicated that the agreement.86 Kyrgyzstan is currently exploring they will ask Kyrgyzstan to foot the bill for the the possibility of developing its own existing mines damage already caused.82 The head of the Uzbek at Jergalan, Akbula and Kara-Keche as well as new Association of International Law, R. Hakimov, coal resources to lessen its dependence on said that if the problem is not resolved, Uzbekistan could take the case to the International Court of Justice. However, he also 83 Uzbek Television, Channel 1, Akhborot. 13 February 2002, 15:30 pm. 84 ICG interview with Diushen Mamatkanov, Director, 76 The Kairakkum Reservoir in northern Tajikistan and Institute of Water Problems and Hydropower of the Kyrgyz the Chardara Reservoir in Kazakhstan. Academy of Sciences, Bishkek, 20 February 2002. 77 The three lakes – Tushan, Adar and Arnesai – 85 In the winter of 2001-2002 the Kyrgyz released some 650 currently contain some 30 cubic kilometres of water and to 700 cubic metres of water per second compared to the have, due to the large amounts redirected from usual 480 to 500 cubic metres per second, according to Kazakhstan, merged. Uzbek Television (Channel 1, 23 January 2002). Kyrgyz 78 ICG interview with Bakhyt Ramankulov, deputy head Radio reported that after 24 January the amount of water of the South Kazakhstan Province department of released from Toktogul was reduced from 700 cubic metres agriculture, Shimkent, 1 March 2002. of water per second (the average amount is 600 cubic metres 79 ICG interview with Ernazar Makhmudov, Director, per second) to 480 to 500 cubic metres per second. (First Institute of Water Problems and Hydropower of the Programme, 22 February 2002 at 14:00 pm). Uzbek Academy of Sciences, Tashkent, 21 January 86 In 2001 Kazakhstan provided Kyrgyzstan with 470,000 2002. tons of coal and 10,000 tons of mazut in return for 750 80 ICG interview with Zokir Jorayev, Deputy Chairman million kWh of electricity. ICG interview with Nesipkul of the Uzbek Water Industry Republican Water Bertizbaev, Director, Department of Electricity and Solid Inspectorate (Ozsuvsanoat), February 2002. Fuel. Kazakh Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, 81 Uzbek Television, Channel 1, 23 January 2002, 03:00 Astana, 27 February 2002. According to the agreement, am. however, Kazakhstan was to deliver 618,000 tons of coal 82 Kazakh Commercial Television, 19 February 2002, that year. KTR, Program 1, Bishkek, 5 October 2002 at 11:30 am. 11:00 am. Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 16

Kazakhstan. However, the quality of the coal is Reservoir. The cost of maintaining the reservoir is poor and production costs are high. estimated at between U.S.$15 million and U.S.$27 million per year – a price Kyrgyzstan is not willing The two Kazakh provinces that depend on water or able to pay. An Uzbek water expert told ICG that from Toktogul for irrigation – South Kazakhstan in his view Uzbekistan, by turning down and Kzyl Orda – have to purchase electricity Kyrgyzstan’s request, missed an opportunity at from Kyrgyzstan as part of the barter agreement. reaching a settlement and increasing control over its As electricity from Ekibastus in Northern water supply.92 Kazakhstan is up to 30-40 per cent cheaper,87 the two provinces are reluctant to do so. The Kazakh On 29 June 2001 the Kyrgyz parliament (Jogorku authorities have not been willing to cover the Kenesh) passed the “Law on the Interstate Use of difference in price88 for businesses forced to Water Objects, Water Resources and Water purchase the Kyrgyz electricity. To ensure that Management Installations”. It asserts that water has the Kyrgyz electricity is purchased, the province its own economic value and is owned by the state. authorities provide local enterprises with Water resources created on Kyrgyz territory are the quotas.89 property of the country, and neighbours should, therefore, pay for it. The law also contains a clause, The problem is likely to cause further disruptions which states that neighbouring countries receiving in 2002 as Kyrgyzstan has signalled that it plans water from Kyrgyz reservoirs and canals should pay to more than triple the price of electricity from for their upkeep.93 one U.S. cent per kWh to 3.36 U.S. cents. The Kazakh side has refused to accept the increase,90 Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan immediately criticised and the Ministry of Energy has said that the law. All parties cite international law in support Kazakhstan does not need Kyrgyz electricity.91 of their positions.94 The issue is highly emotional. Kyrgyz summer electricity is probably more “Why should we pay? Because they get more snow disruptive to the Kazakh grid than useful, and any than we do?’ asked a senior water analyst in future agreement will need to find new markets Uzbekistan.95 Others indicated that Uzbekistan may for summer electricity excess. – in response to the Kyrgyz law - demand that

Kazakhstan has requested that the exchanges shift from barter to normal purchases at market prices. However, before the introduction of the barter 92 ICG interview, Tashkent, January 2002. scheme, Kazakhstan purchased Kyrgyz electricity 93 with cash. During this time (1995-97), Article Three, Zakon Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki o mezhgosudarstvennom ispolzovanii vodnykh obektov, Kazakhstan ran up a debt of US$17.5 million. vodnykh resursov i vodokhoziaistvennykh sooruzhenii Kyrgyzstan is unlikely to agree to switch to cash Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki [The Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on purchases until this debt has been settled. the Interstate Use of Water Objects, Water Resources and Water Istallations of the Kyrgyz Republic], 29 June 2001. 94 3. Kyrgyz Payment Law Excerpts from international laws and agreements referred to by the Kyrgyz in support of their own law can be found in In the early 1990s, Kyrgyzstan tried to persuade T. U. Usubaliev. Zakon Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki o mezhgosudarstvennom ispolzovanii vodnykh obektov, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to share the costs of vodnykh resursov i vodokhoziaistvennykh sooruzhenii maintaining and operating the Toktogul Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki. Kyrgystanu, vsei Tsentralnoi Azii grozit globalnoe zagriaznenie radioaktivnymi otkhodami [The Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on the Interstate Use of Water Objects, Water Resources and Water Istallations of 87 ICG interview with Altynbek M. Meldebekov, Deputy the Kyrgyz Republic. Kyrgyzstan and the Entire Central Executive Director, International Aral Sea Rehabilitation Asia are threatened by Global Pollution of Radioactive Fund Executive Board, Almaty, 25 February 2002. Waste] (Bishkek, Sham. 2002). Saule Seitembetova of the 88 20 tin per kWh. Nesipkul Bertizbaev, Director, Kazakh Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that her ministry Department of Electricity and Solid Fuel, Kazakh consulted with UN lawyers, who unanimously agreed that Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Astana, 27 the Kyrgyz law violates international water legislation. ICG February 2002. interview, Astana, 27 February 2002. 89 Ibid. 95 ICG interview with Ernazar Makhmudov, Director, 90 Ibid. Institute of Water Problems of the Uzbek Academy of 91 Ibid. Sciences, Tashkent, 21 January 2002. Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 17

Kyrgyzstan compensate it for releasing water Kazakhstan has responded positively to the latest downstream during winter. Kyrgyz move. The director of Kazgidromet, Dr. Tursynbek Kudekov, welcomed the change of Tajikistan, on the other hand, has been less language: “We should not pay for water but for the critical of the Kyrgyz law. Officially, Tajik services rendered – i.e. for the use of the Kyrgyz representatives and water experts argue that it water engineering system”.100 As of 7 March 2002, violates international legislation on Kazakhstan pays Kyrgyzstan for use of the interstate transboundary rivers. In private, however, they water facilities on the Chui and Talas Rivers.101 say that Tajikistan is following events carefully, According to the OSCE in Almaty, the Kazakhs hoping that Kyrgyzstan succeeds in introducing have agreed to pay Kyrgyzstan some US$100,000 a payments for its water as this would allow year for the maintenance of these facilities.102 If a Tajikistan to follow.96 They are not too hopeful similar agreement could be reached also on the Syr that Bishkek will succeed, however. As one Darya, a major obstacle to securing regular flow official put it: “The Kyrgyz want to sell water from the river would be removed. and live in paradise. This will never happen”.97 Unlike the Kazakhs, the Uzbek response was Kyrgyzstan is a small country with limited initially hostile. However, in late March 2002 the political influence in the region, and its leaders Kabar News Agency reported that an agreement had understand that it is in no position to force been reached between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to pay for water. on the maintenance of the Toktogul Reservoir. They also know that Kyrgyzstan cannot stop the Uzbekistan agreed to cover some costs in return for flow of the Syr Darya for long. It seems likely a guarantee that it would receive water for that the law was passed in order to push the irrigation.103 If implemented, this agreement will neighbouring countries into negotiations mark a major step forward in resolving water regarding the costs of maintaining the Toktogul disputes in the region. It appears unlikely, however, and other reservoirs. The law has been written, as that the agreement will work unless more attention is Uzbek parliamentary deputy Iskandar Kalandarov given to signing barter agreements on time and points out, in such a way as to leave the door ensuring their provisions are properly implemented. open for negotiations.98 Kyrgyzstan has indicated that it is willing to cease It is worth noting that Kyrgyzstan has backed producing electricity at Toktogul during the winter if down from its original position. Whereas initially Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan compensate its losses.104 it demanded that Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan pay 99 for all water they receive, it now insists that they pay only for the water passing through 100 ICG interview, Almaty, 26 February 2002. Kyrgyz reservoirs and canals – in other words, 101 Kazakh National Television, Channel 1, Astana. share maintenance costs. 7 March 2002, 15:30 pm. 102 ICG interview with Armands Pupols, Economic and Environmental Officer, OSCE, Almaty, 25 February 2002. 103 Kabar News Agency, Bishkek, 29 March 2002. 104 The Institute for Water Problems of the Kyrgyz Academy 96 Kyrgyzstan has more bargaining power than the Tajiks of Sciences – in collaboration with the Kyrgyz National on this issue, however, as it to some extent controls the Centre for the Development of Mountainous Regions and Syr Darya through the Toktogul Reservoir. As the Amu the International Institute of Mountains – has already Darya is less regulated, Tajikistan is not in a position to elaborated a mechanism for how these losses could be cut water supplies to the downstream countries for very calculated. See A.T.Asanbekov, D.M. Mamatkanov, K.I. long. ICG interview with Alikhon Latifi, Regional Shavva and A.K. Shapar, Ekonomicheskii mechanism Environmental Centre (Tajikistan Branch), Dushanbe, 18 upravlenia transgranichnimi vodnymi resursami i osnovnye February 2002. polozhenia strategii mezhgosudarstvennogo vododelenia 97 ICG interview, Dushanbe, February 2002. [An Economic Mecdhanim for the Management of 98 ICG interview, Tashkent, 22 January 2002. Transboundary Water Resources and the Major Premises of 99 According to the law, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and the Strategy of Interstate Water Division] (Bishkek: Uzbekistan would have to pay a total of U.S.$14.8 Natsionalny Tsentr Razvitia gornykh raionov Kyrgyzskoi million per year for the water consumed. A. Respubliki, Mezhdunarodny Institut Gor, Institut Vodnykh Mukhambedyarova, “Water becoming a Commodity in Problem i Gidroenergetiki Natsionalnoi Akademii Nauk Central Asia”, The Times of Central Asia, 11 October Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki, 2002). Similar work has been 2001. undertaken by a national commission under the auspices of Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 18

Part of the reason for this is that the Toktogul opted out, but Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are still Reservoir cannot sustain the production of talking.107 If established, Tajikistan may join the electricity during the winter for long. Water consortium in the future levels have dropped sharply over the last few years, and water experts – in Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyzstan believes Kazakhstan should share the Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan – fear that unless the cost of maintaining and developing hydro- production of electricity is reduced, water levels engineering facilities in Kyrgyzstan from which it will drop below the critical level in 2002 or 2003. benefits.108 Kazakhstan insists that these facilities – This would lead to suspension of Kyrgyzstan’s including Toktogul – be jointly managed if the cost hydroelectric generation, and also of the is shared.109 Kyrgyzstan would also have to provide agreements on summer water release. However, Kazakhstan with a guarantee that the water reservoir in May 2002 the general director of the to be built would be seasonal.110. Kyrgyzenergo joint-stock company, Bakiritdin Sartkaziyev, announced that heavy rainfall had The consortium would provide funds for the raised the level of Toktogul from the minimum construction of Kumbarata I and II – a hydropower permissible – 7.4 billion cubic metres – to 8.4 complex to be located above the Toktogul Reservoir. billion cubic metres and that summer irrigation These hydropower stations would allow Kyrgyzstan water of 2.5 billion cubic metres would be to produce electricity during winter, while at the supplied to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, as same time collecting water in Toktogul for irrigation planned under the barter agreement.105 But the in the summer.111 Kambarata I alone would cost an unusually heavy rainfall of spring 2002 is estimated U.S.$1 billion. The hydropower complex unlikely to be repeated in subsequent years, and would produce twice as much power annually as the contradiction between winter power needs Toktogul112 and potentially allow exports to China and summer irrigation requirements will return and Pakistan.113 unless a new agreement can be reached.

4. Syr Darya Energy Consortium 107 On 15 and 16 December 2001 Kyrgyz President Akaev visited Kazakhstan and signed a preliminary agreement on Poor implementation the 1998 Agreement on the joint funding for the project. ICG interview with Chingiz A. Use of the Syr Darya has been not only disruptive Igemberdiev, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz to agriculture and industry in the region, but also Republic, Bishkek, 21 February 2002. highly costly. The construction of water 108The idea to set up a consortium was Kazakhstan’s. ICG reservoirs in the Uzbek part of the Ferghana interview with Saparbek Balkibekov, Head of the Fuel & Valley and on the southern plains of Kazakhstan Energy, Infrastructure and Communications Department, Office of the Prime Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic, are also likely to have a detrimental effect on the Bishkek, 21 February 2002. environment. It makes little economic sense for 109ICG interview with Anatoly D. Ryabtsev, Chairman. Kyrgyzstan to extract low-quality coal and National Coordinator of Water Sector Projects, Committee exploit limited amounts of high-cost gas. of Water Resources of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection of the Republic of For these reasons the countries along the Syr Kazakhstan, Astana, 27 February 2002; ICG interview with Darya have been debating whether to establish a Nesipkul Bertisbaev, Director, Department of Electrical 106 Energy and Solid Fuel. Ministry of Energy and Mineral water and energy consortium. Uzbekistan has Resources of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Astana, 27 February 2002. 110 ICG interview with Nesipkul Bertisbaev, Director, Department of Electrical Energy and Solid Fuel, Ministry of the Kyrgyz Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ICG interview Energy and Mineral Resources of the Republic of with Chingiz Igemberdiev, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kazakhstan, Astana, 27 February 2002. of the Kyrgyz Republic, Bishkek. 21 February 2002. 111 Uzbek experts have also suggested that Kambarata II 105 “Kyrgyzstan to supply enough irrigation water to could be the only way in which Toktogul may revert to an Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan in 2002”, Kazakhstan Today irrigation regime. ICG interview with Iskander Ametov, news agency web site, 13 May 2002, BBC Monitoring Chief Dispatcher, “Energy” United Dispatch Center of Global Newsline 14 May 2002. Central Asia Power Systems, Tashkent, 31 January 2002. 106 This idea was originally put forward by Kazakhstan. 112 The total capacity of the hydropower station would be ICG interview with Ismail Dairov, Environmental Policy 2,300,000 kWh. ICG interview with Diushen Mamatkanov, Manager, The Regional Environmental Centre for Director, Institute of Water Problems and Hydroenergy of Central Asia, Almaty, 26 February 2002. the Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences, Bishkek, 20 February Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 19

Given the difficulties surrounding irrigation Kyrgyzstan’s enthusiasm for new power generation water and Kyrgyzstan’s need for electricity, the capacity is understandable. There is little doubt that Kambarata project would seem to make sense. its energy sector is in crisis. Frequent Uzbek gas cuts However, there has been no real assessment of its and irregular supplies of coal and mazut from possible environmental impact, and it faces Kazakhstan have forced Kyrgyzstan to increase serious problems in achieving financial viability. electricity production by some 20 per cent since As noted above, Kyrgyz production of surplus independence. The Kyrgyz electricity grid needs electricity in summer is hardly welcomed by its repair, however, and Kyrgyzenergo apparently has neighbours. Building Kambarata I would no money for this purpose. Frequent electricity cuts exacerbate this.114 Plans to export electricity to have, therefore, become a reality for most Kyrgyz Pakistan and China could resolve the problem except those living in Bishkek. The southern parts of and make the project commercially viable, but it Kyrgyzstan also experience problems with domestic is extremely doubtful whether they can be gas supplies. realised. Pakistan has apparently halted any discussion of purchasing electricity from To improve the state of the electricity grid, the Tajikistan in the near future, and it is safe to Kyrgyz authorities in early March 2002 announced assume that it will also not offer a major market that electricity prices would be raised by 25 per cent for Kyrgyz electricity.115 Building a transmission as of 15 March 2002.116 Such price hikes put serious system to China or further afield would be pressure on pensioners and poor people, and in an difficult given the terrain and high altitudes and attempt to calm the population, it was also would be very expensive. announced that social allowances would be increased by some 20 per cent and benefits raised Kazakhstan’s initiative to establish a Syr Darya for the poorest. Kyrgyz people have on numerous Water and Energy Consortium should be occasions taken to the streets to protest electricity welcomed but serious questions have to be asked price hikes and cut-offs. It thus appears that the about the viability of the Kambarata I project. timing of the price rise had been carefully Any international feasibility studies should be considered in advance: during spring and summer sceptical about planned electricity exports, and people use less electricity than during the autumn the environmental impact also needs to be and winter. The authorities probably hope that they seriously discussed. A scaled-down Kambarata I will get used to the new prices before the cold or Kambarata II on its own could alleviate some weather, and that they will have enough time to problems, but financing would still have to be introduce pension and benefit increases and thus solved. prevent any major protests.

Given Kyrgyzstan’s dependence on electricity produced at Toktogul, the socio-economic 2002. According to Dr Daene McKinney, of the consequences – were its capacity to be overstretched University of Texas, Kambarata I would produce 150 per – could be disastrous. Once the water level at cent of the present power generation at Toktogul, while Toktogul reaches a critical level, Kyrgyzstan will Kambarata II would produce 30 per cent. Personal communication to ICG, May 2002. neither be in a position to cover domestic demand 113 ICG interview with Kubanychbek Ismailov, head of for electricity during the winter, nor to provide the Foreign Affairs Unit, Elektricheskaia Set, Bishkek, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan with water for irrigation 21 February 2002. If the Consortium fails to materialise, during spring and summer. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan will look for funding elsewhere. Officials Kazakhstan would, therefore, not provide claim that Pakistan and India have promised to help, and Kyrgyzstan with gas, coal and mazut during winter talks are being undertaken with China. Diushen and as a result, Kyrgyz would freeze. Social unrest Mamatkanov, Director, Institute of Water Problems and Hydropower of the Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences, would most likely ensue. Although Toktogul is a Bishkek, 20 February 2002. As noted above, these plans useful bargaining card for Kyrgyzstan when are unlikely to be fulfilled. 114 ICG correspondence with Dr Daene C. McKinney, Associate Professor, Department of Civil Engineering, University of Texas, May 2002, who has conducted 116 In fact, a new calculation system means many people will significant research on the project. face hikes of up to 100 per cent, but this has not been 115 ICG interview, May 2002. highlighted by the authorities. Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 20

negotiating with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, its irrigation.120 Although the latter would allow for utility cannot be stretched. Unless handled irrigation of high-quality soil, it would be very carefully, it could cause not only its neighbours expensive.121 It could also cause serious disputes but also Kyrgyzstan considerable damage. with Uzbekistan, which uses 95 per cent of the river flow.122 If implemented, the supply to the city of Samarkand in Uzbekistan would be seriously D. DIVIDING THE AMU-DARYA impaired.

The Amu-Darya is much less regulated than the It is unlikely that Tajikistan could raise the required Syr-Darya, with fewer dams and hydro plants to money, as donors are not keen on the project. cause potential problems with downstream flow. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdunabi So far it has not caused the same tensions either Sattorzoda holds the view that this project will not but there is considerable discontent along the be implemented without Uzbekistan’s consent,123 length of the river, as each downstream province which is unlikely to be given. Tajikistan cannot or country accuses its upstream neighbour of afford to ignore Uzbekistan on water issues, as its taking more than a fair share of the water. economy is dependent on its neighbour for many imports. Trade has shrunk by half in recent years, 1. Uzbekistan-Tajikistan and Tajikistan is desperate to reverse that trend.124

The average annual flow of the Amu Darya is 75 On the other hand, increasing the water diverted cubic kilometres. According to the 1992 from the Amu Darya is relatively easy and requires agreement on water quotas, Tajikistan is entitled only limited investment. As the Amu Darya starts its 117 to nine of these – or 12 per cent – a figure that course in Tajikistan, its neighbours can do very little 118 Dushanbe regards as far too low. Agriculture to prevent Dushanbe from increasing its water quota. was under-developed during the Soviet period, The downstream countries complain that Tajikistan leaving the country vulnerable to food shortages. already takes more water than it is allocated by the It also has one of the highest population growth 1992 agreement, although Tajikistan denies this. rates in the region at more than 3 per cent. The country needs to provide for these people and Monitoring Tajikistan’s water use is very difficult as 119 says it intends to expand agricultural output. much of the equipment was either destroyed or fell Tajikistan’s irrigation system is either completely into disrepair during the civil war. Besides, staff derelict or in urgent need of repairs. As the from the BWA Amu Darya lack the resources to country lacks funds to raise irrigation efficiency, carry out frequent and unannounced inspections. the only way to increase output is by using more They also have to apply for entry visas. Four years water. of severe drought has reduced the level of the Amu Darya. Even if Tajikistan were to increase its share Tajikistan plans to achieve this either by increasing its quota of water from the Amu Darya or by diverting the Zarafshan River for 120 Diverting the Zarafshan would allow Tajikistan to use 100,000 hectares of land for agricultural purposes. So far, Tajikistan has some 720,000 hectares of irrigated land. 117 ICG interview with Oleg Grigorevich Lyssenko, head Another 800,000 hectares or so could be freed for irrigation. of the Department of the Management of Water To provide its population with normal food supplies, Resources, BWA Amu Darya, Urgench, 28 January Tajikistan needs to free some 500,000 hectares of land by 2002. 2005. ICG interview with Ahad Akhrorov, Chief Hydraulic 118 According to the head of the department of water Engineer, Ministry of Reclamation and Water Management management of the BWA Amu Darya, Oleg Grigorevich of the Republic of Tajikistan, Dushanbe, 16 February 2002. Lysenko, Tajikistan has requested that its quota be 121 ICG interview with Viktor Boltov, First Deputy Minister, increased from nine cubic kilometres to eleven to twelve Ministry of Economy and Trade of the Republic of cubic kilometres per year. ICG interview, Urgench, 28 Tajikistan, Dushanbe, 19 February 2002. January 2002. 122 Personal communication to ICG, Dr Daene McKinney, 119 The problem is all the more urgent as five years of University of Texas, May 2002. civil war (1992-97) took a heavy toll on the country’s 123 ICG interview, Dushanbe, 19 February 2002. infrastructure and industry. A majority of the population 124 ICG interview with Abdurakhim Tuzhuraev, Economic is, therefore, engaged in agriculture and self-subsistence Officer, Embassy of the Republic of Tajikistan in farming. Uzbekistan, Tashkent, 17 January 2002. Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 21

of the water only modestly, it would have an immediate impact on agriculture downstream. Further, the Tajik electricity grid is in a poor state, resulting in frequent accidents during winter. In Tajikistan’s water resources give it considerable most districts and villages electricity is rationed: hydropower potential. Currently the country from six to eight a.m. and from six to nine p.m. produces fifteen billion kWh of electricity According to the deputy director of Barqi Tojik, annually.125 Some 80 per cent – twelve billion people understand why gas from Uzbekistan is kWh – is produced by the Nurek hydropower sometimes cut but they are much less understanding station on the Vakhsh River.126 This is not about the shortage of electricity.129 This decline in enough to cover domestic demand,127 and power infrastructure not only promotes social Tajikistan depends, therefore, on imports of discontent but also is a serious obstacle to the kind electricity and gas from Uzbekistan in winter. of economic growth that Tajikistan requires if it is to Uzbek gas supplies are unreliable,128 and improve living standards as needed to promote problems with the implementation of the Uzbek- political and social stability. Tajik electricity swap program have led to power rationing in many parts of Tajikistan. Tajikistan is keen to develop its hydropower resources to break dependence on Uzbekistan and to No power grid line connects Northern Tajikistan export electricity to neighbouring countries.130 Its (Sughd Province) with the central and southern own energy needs could easily be met by increased parts of the country, where most of its electricity hydroelectric generation but this would not only is produced by the Nurek hydro plant. Uzbekistan require major investment, it would also have a provides Sughd Province with electricity, and in negative impact on downstream access to seasonal return Tajikistan provides power to Uzbekistan’s water supplies and so create further potential discord southern provinces. The electricity exchanged is among the Amu-Darya states. not enough to give consumers electricity 24 hours a day. Tajikistan, therefore, often requests that 2. Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan Uzbekistan switch off electricity supplies to Sughd Province to ensure that imports are kept Some eighteen million people in Uzbekistan and within the agreed limit. If Tajikistan exceeds its Turkmenistan live off the water of the Amu Darya. limit, it pays a higher price. The two nations signed an agreement in 1996 to divide this equally. Officially Uzbek and Turkmen

representatives say they are happy with 131 125 implementation. However, Uzbek water experts Information provided by IFAS, Tashkent, 21 January and politicians in Khorezm Province and the 2002. 126 Approximately five billion kWh are used by the autonomous republic of Karakalpakstan complain Tursunzade aluminium factory alone. ICG interview that Turkmenistan takes too much. with Aleksei Nikolaevich Silantiev, Vice-President, Barqi Tojik [Tajik Electricity], Dushanbe, 13 February Uzbek experts maintain that it is unfair to divide the 2002. 127 water of the Amu Darya equally since fourteen The vice-president of Barqi Tojik, Aleksei million people depend on it in their country Nikolaevich Silantiev, told ICG that domestic electricity production during the Soviet period covered 12 per cent of the country’s energy needs, whereas currently it covers 38 per cent. People are more dependent on hydropower now than before because many small 129 ICG interview with Aleksei Nikolaevich Silantiev, Vice- heating plants have been privatised, dismantled and sold. President. Barqi Tojik, Dushanbe, 13 February 2002. ICG interview, Dushanbe, 13 February 2002. 130 According to Tajik officials, Tajikistan ranks second in 128 Uzbekistan has on several occasions cut gas supplies the world after Russia in potential hydropower resources. to Tajikistan due to the latter’s inability to pay. Supplies Only 12 per cent of these resources are being used at the have also suffered from low pressure in the pipes used to moment. ICG interview with Aleksei Nikolaevich Silantiev, export the Uzbek gas. The pressure has dropped from Vice-President, Barqi Tojik, Dushanbe, 13 February 2002. five to 0.9-1 atmosphere, which is not enough to 131 ICG interviews with Iskandar Kalandarovi, Chairman of facilitate the normal flow. Huge transit taxes levied on the Committee on Agriculture, Water Management and Turkmen gas by Uzbekistan has prevented Tajikistan Food Production, Oliy Majlisi, Tashkent, 22 January 2002, from swapping gas suppliers. ICG interview with and with Kurban B. Ballyev, Representative of Aleksei Nikolaevich Silantiev, Vice-President, Barqi Turkmenistan, Member of the Executive, IFAS, Tashkent, Tojik, Dushanbe, 13 February 2002. 15 January 2002. Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 22

compared to four million in Turkmenistan. the Aral Sea in the Autonomous Republic of Besides, Uzbekistan has more land to irrigate, Karakalpakstan. and water has to be transported over longer distances.132 In their view, demography, total area Water experts, agronomists and politicians in of irrigated land as well as water losses should be Khorezm and Karakalpakstan say that the provinces taken into account when fixing water quotas. further upstream – Surkhandarya, Navoi and Bukhara – take more water than they are entitled to. Uzbekistan also claims that the Turkmens are This is confirmed by official statistics, which show exceeding their quotas. Turkmenistan and that upstream provinces regularly received 50-60 per Uzbekistan are each entitled to use some 22 cubic cent of their allotted quotas. In comparison, kilometres of water.133 In reality, however, Khorezm received only 6 to 8 per cent and Turkmenistan is thought to use as much as 30 Karakalpakstan no more than 7 per cent.136 Nine of cubic kilometres.134 Its use per capita is about fifteen districts in Karakalpakstan have not received twice Uzbekistan’s due to very poor water any water for the last two years.137 administration. The Karakum Canal – the main water flow from the Amu-Darya to irrigated The consequences have been very serious. Only Turkmen lands – carries twice as much water as 173,000 hectares of land were farmed in 2001 in in Soviet times135 but is poorly maintained, Karakalpakstan, compared to 395,000 hectares in gradually silting up and becoming increasingly 1999, a drop of 44 per cent. The planting of rice, inefficient in terms of water loss and delivery. traditionally one of the major crops of This can only be tackled in two ways: by Karakalpakstan and which requires considerable implementing expensive rehabilitation work on water, was reduced by almost 95 per cent, from the canal; or by drawing off increasing amounts 86,000 hectares in 1999 to 4,800 in 2001. The output from the Amu-Darya. So far, the latter approach of grain dropped by almost 80 per cent.138 has prevailed. In conjunction with potential Afghan demands for more Amu-Darya water and An official from the BWA Syr Darya told ICG that Turkmenistan’s future reservoir plans, it seems Uzbekistan, not Turkmenistan, is to blame for the likely that Uzbek-Turkmen relations over water country’s water shortages: “poor planning [and can only worsen. management] are the major culprits, and to do away with the problem, the provinces must coordinate 139 3. Uzbek Internal Rivalries planning in the water sector”. A Karakalpakstan official put the blame on fellow officials from The Uzbek water quota is divided into smaller Uzbekistan: “Some of our officials have a couldn’t- quotas for each province. The Amu Darya runs care-less attitude. This is causing anarchy in water through three Uzbek provinces – Surkhandarya, supplies: one province receives 60 per cent of its Bukhara and Khorezm – and finishes its course at

132 ICG interviews with officials, Chembai, Karakalpakstan, 24 January 2002. Uzbekistan has 136 Analiz vodozabora za period mezhvegetatsii pod urozhai 4,300,000 ha of irrigated land, whereas Turkmenistan 2002 g. po basseinu reki Amu Dary na 21 ianvaria 2002 has just over 2,000,000 ha. ICG interviews with Iskandar [Analysis of the Water Extraction for the Intervegetation Kalandarov, Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture, Period for the Year 2002 for the Amu Darya basin as of 21 Water Management and Food Products, Oliy Mailisi, January 2002]. The document is signed by the Deputy Tashkent, 22 January 2002, and with Sirodjidin Aslov, Minister of Agriculture and Water Management of the Transboundary Water Monitoring Component Director, Republic of Karakalpakstan, U. Kalmuratov. GEF Project, IFAS, Tashkent, 21 January 2002. 137 ICG interview with Bekberian Bekturdiev, First Vice 133 ICG interview with Oleg Grigorevich Lysenko, Head Premier of the Republic of Karakalpakstan, Nukus, 24 of the Department of Water Resource Management, January 2002. BWA Amu Darya, Urgench, 28 January 2002. 138 Selskoe khoziaistvo Respubliki Karakalpakstan za 1999- 134 ICG interviews, IFAS, Tashkent, January 2002. 2001 gody. Minekonomstat Respubliki Karakalpakstan [The 135 Stefan Klötzli. The Water and Soil Crisis in Central Agriculture of the Republic of Karakalpakstan from 1999 to Asia - a Source for Future Conflicts? ENCOP 2001. Ministry of Economics and Statistics. Republic of Occasional Paper No. 11. Center for Security Policy and Karakalpakstan]. Conflict Research Zurich/ Swiss Peace Foundation Bern 139 ICG interviews with BWA Syr Darya, Tashkent, (Zurich/Bern, May 1994). February 2002. Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 23

quota, whereas another province receives only 20 caused by the Aral Sea disaster, however, per cent”.140 microcredits are unlikely to have much impact. More wide-ranging measures are required as many In January 2002, nine NGOs in Karakalpakstan peoples survive only on humanitarian aid. sent a petition to President Islam Karimov urging him to look into the matter. They suggested that When asked whether Karakalpakstan residents either Turkmenistan was exceeding its quota or might take to the streets to protest, the deputy the southern provinces were taking more than hakim of Chembai, Berdakh Aitmuratov, said that their entitlement. The petition acknowledged that is not likely as “they are patient and put their hope Karakalpakstan accounts for a very small part of in God and the President”.143 Those who could, the Uzbek population and that its economic however, have left Karakalpakstan for significance is limited. As the NGOs had no Kazakhstan, Russia or other parts of Uzbekistan. means to influence the upstream provinces Those not able to leave have sold their cattle and directly, they appealed to the president to 141 somehow managed to get by on these earnings. intervene on their behalf. Several local people suggested that social tensions are likely to increase in 2002, as people have The presidential administration passed the nothing more to sell and the money they receive petition to IFAS, and the signatories later from Tashkent is insufficient to cover their basic received a reply from the director of GEF-IFAS, 144 Rim Ginniatullin, who did not respond directly to needs. their points. Instead he referred to a report on Central Asian water issues prepared for the Global Water Forum at a conference in Almaty in late February 2002. Yusup Kamalov of the Union for the Defence of the Aral Sea and Amu-Darya took this as an endorsement of the views expressed in the petition. In his view “[Ginniatullin] agrees [with us] but can do nothing to change the situation”.142

IFAS and other organisations have tried to introduce microcredits to the area. Money for this purpose has been allocated by Tashkent, and local IFAS branches in Nukus and Chembai are responsible for implementing the scheme. As many people who bought cattle with microcredits have been forced to sell their herds to survive, Tashkent has extended the deadline for repayment. Given the lack of water, the poor condition of soil and numerous health problems

140 ICG interview, Nukus, Karakalpakstan, January 2002. 141 Prezidentu Respubliki Uzbekistan Karimovu, Islamu Abduganievichu [To the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Karimov, Islam Abduganievich]. The document is dated 7 September 2001, though it was not sent until January 2002. It was signed by the following NGOs: The Union for the Protection of the Aral and Amu Darya, the Fund for Charity and Health, Khaial khem Shanyrak, Eko-Klub “Sapar”, Eko-Priaralie, Eko- Klub “Semurg”, the Association of Women Leaders, the Centre for Public Enlightenment and the Golden Heritage of the Aral [Sea]. 142 ICG email exchange with Yusup Kamalov, 12 April 143 ICG interview, Chembai, 25 January 2002. 2002. 144 ICG interviews, Chembai, Nukus, January 2002. Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 24

V. FUTURE INFRASTRUCTURE station – Sangtuda – below Nurek, with a capacity of 670 MW.145

Tensions over quotas and barter deals have Uzbekistan has responded favourably to plans for pushed Central Asian states into developing plans Sangtuda but is adamantly opposed to Rogun. for more infrastructure that they believe will Tajikistan already controls some 40 per cent of the increase their control over resources. This reflects flow of the Amu Darya through the reservoir at the Soviet legacy of mega-projects and a rising Nurek. Rogun would put it firmly in control of the sense of frustration over the possibilities of river, allowing it to control the flow of water to regional solutions. Each project has raised Uzbekistan’s Surkhandarya and Kashkadarya considerable anxieties among neighbours, who Provinces146 while expanding irrigation at home.147 are uncertain of the impact on their supplies. The Uzbek attitude has not escaped the notice of Tajik officials, who talked of Rogun forcing Among the key areas causing concern are: Tashkent to take a new political stance toward their 148 country. the Rogun and Sangtuda hydroplants that would give Tajikistan almost complete To complete Rogun, Tajikistan would have to raise control over the Amu Darya; U.S.$700 million to U.S.$1 billion, amounting to 149 about 7 to 10 per cent of GDP. In 2001 work Golden Century Lake, a vast artificial lake restarted at Rogun with funds from the state budget. fed by agricultural run-off in the middle of Donor interest has been limited – donors nowadays the Karakum Desert in Turkmenistan; run scared of dams, and the investment needed is vast. The Ministry of Economy and Trade maintains Afghanistan, plans for the renovation of that Rogun is economically viable and could be 150 whose irrigation and agriculture have completed in three to four years. raised worries across Central Asia as it is entitled to draw much more water from the Uzbekistan is concerned that Rogun would allow Amu Darya and Panj Rivers than it now Tajikistan to cut off water to its key agricultural does; and areas. Tajikistan’s Minister of Economy and Trade, Viktor Boltov, on the other hand, told ICG that the diverting Siberian rivers, a huge Soviet-era plan scrapped in the 1980s but recently

resurrected by Russia and Uzbekistan, that 145ICG interview with Muzaffar Usmanov, Mission Advisor would divert water from the Irtysh and Ob Tajikistan, EBRD, in Dushanbe. 15 February 2002. Rivers to Uzbekistan. 146 ICG interview with Ziyoradzho Ashurov, Director, Rogun hydropower station, Dushanbe, 15 February 2002. 147 Some 100,000 to 120,000 ha of land in the Dangara A. ROGUN AND SANGTUDA DAMS District of Kuliab Province are irrigated with water from the Nurek Reservoir. ICG interviews with Ahad Akhrorov, For the past decade Tajikistan has sought to Chief Hydraulic Engineer, Ministry of Reclamation and Water Resources of the Republic of Tajikistan, Dushanbe, attract foreign investment to complete the Rogun 16 February 2002, and Aleksei Nikolaevich Silantiev, Vice- hydropower station on the Vakhsh River. This President, Barqi Tojik, Dushanbe, 13 February 2002. The giant complex was first begun in the 1980s but Nurek Reservoir is designed to contain 10.5 cubic halted when the Soviet Union collapsed and the kilometres of water. Of these up to 4.5 cubic kilometres may Tajik civil war began. A massive flood in 1993 be released downstream. In comparison, the Rogun destroyed most of what had been already built. Reservoir – if completed – would contain 13.6 cubic The 335-meter high dam – the highest in the kilometres of water, nine of which could be released downstream. ICG interview with Aleksei Nikolaevich world – would produce 3,600 MW of energy. Silantiev, Vice-President, Barci Tojik, Dushanbe, 13 Tajikistan is also planning to build a hydropower February 2002. 148 ICG interview, Dushanbe, February 2002. 149 ICG interview with Aleksei Nikolaevich Silantiev, Vice- President, Barqi Tochik, Dushanbe, 13 February 2002. 150 ICG interview with Viktor Boltov, First Deputy Minister, Ministry of Economy and Trade of the Republic of Tajikistan, Dushanbe, 19 February 2002. Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 25

Tajiks see Rogun as benefiting the region as a sustain its level.154 Drainage water has turned large whole. Tajikistan could supply Uzbekistan, areas into swampland that, once the lake is Turkmenistan and Afghanistan with even completed, will in turn be drained and used for supplies of water every year as Rogun would agriculture. Some lake water may be used for contain enough to compensate for dry years. This irrigation.155 There are rumours that a nuclear power official view argues that the project should be station will be built nearby to use the lake as a regional in scale and jointly funded by major cooling pond. Construction is to be completed investors such as the World Bank, the Asian within ten years. Development Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).151 The Lake of the Golden Century has raised concerns in Uzbekistan that water will be drained from the In fact, most IFIs are extremely reluctant to put Amu Darya to maintain its level.156 According to the any money into Rogun, claiming that it would Uzbeks, the lake cannot be sustained by drainage cost far more than any benefit it might offer. water only. Extreme heat in the Turkmen desert They are also aware that it would seriously strain during summer will cause much evaporation. As the relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.152 A drainage water has a high salt content, the lake will smaller plan, which would mainly generate gradually dry out and create a second Aral Sea electricity for the Tursunzade aluminium plant, is unless supplemented by water from the Amu Darya. potentially more feasible. In any case, it seems An estimated ten cubic kilometres of water will have inconceivable that Tajikistan could complete the to be diverted to the lake from the Amu Darya each Rogun and Sangtuda hydropower stations year simply to compensate for evaporation and without prior Uzbek consent. The director of the filtration.157 Sharq independent research institute, Muzzafar Olimov, believes that Tashkent is lobbying Most international experts seem to support the donors to dissuade them from funding Rogun.153 Uzbek view that the lake will not be sustainable But even without Uzbekistan’s attitude, it is solely from drainage water, and that eventually it increasingly unlikely that Rogun will be funded by the international community, forcing the government to rethink its energy and water policy and concentrate on more realistic, lower-cost alternatives that would gain wider regional 154 Once full the lake would contain some five to six cubic support. kilometres of water and would irrigate an estimated 700,000 to 1,000,000 hectares of pasture. ICG interview with Turkmen officials, February 2002. 155 B. GOLDEN CENTURY LAKE Plans to build this lake were made in the late 1940s under Stalin. ICG interview with Kurban B. Ballyev, Representative of Turkmenistan, Member of the Executive, In October 2000, Turkmenistan began work on a IFAS, Tashkent, 15 January 2002. If completed, the lake huge artificial lake in the Karakum Desert, the would cover an area of 34,000 square kilometres. ICG Lake of the Golden Century. Turkmenistan has interview with Sirodjidin Aslov, Transboundary Water maintained that it is being built to collect Monitoring Component Director, GEF Project, IFAS, Tashkent, 21 January 2002. drainage and run-off water from fields and that 156 no water from the Amu Darya will be required to The Lake of the Golden Century (Ozero Zolotogo Veka) is being built in a natural depression in the north-western part of the Karakum Desert. The depression covers 3,500 to 4,000 square kilometres and has a maximum depth of between 70 and 100 metres. Once completed, the lake would contain some 132 to 150 cubic kilometres of water. 151 ICG interview, Dushanbe, 19 February 2002. The Drainage water is to be diverted to the lake from five EBRD’s office in Tajikistan has expressed interest in provinces as well as the Uzbek province of Khorezm Rogun but argues that the risks involved in such an through two major collector-canals. Construction work expensive project are still too high for the bank to started on 20 October 2000 and is projected to be completed provide funds. ICG interview with Muzzafar Usmanov, in ten years. The cost of the project is estimated at U.S.$6 Mission Adviser, Tajikistan, EBRD, Dushanbe, 15 billion. Official information from Turkmenistan given to the February 2002. ICG from a confidential source. 152 ICG interviews, Dushanbe, February 2002, May 157 ICG interview with Yusup Kamalov, Chairman of the 2002. Union for the Defence of the Aral Sea and the Amu Darya, 153 ICG interview, Dushanbe, 18 February 2002. Nukus, 23 January 2002. Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 26

will either disappear or draw on the Amu- C. AFGHANISTAN Darya.158 Just as Kyrgyzstan’s Toktogul Reservoir is a key security issue for Uzbekistan, In 1946 the Soviet Union and Afghanistan signed an so the Lake of the Golden Century risks agreement on the Amu Darya, according to which becoming a source of conflict with Turkmenistan. the latter was entitled to use up to nine cubic There is also an ethnic dimension to the project – kilometres of water from the Panj River.162 At the an estimated one million ethnic Uzbeks living in moment, Afghanistan uses only about two cubic the Dashkhovuz Province of Turkmenistan are to kilometres163 The Panj contains an annual flow of be resettled to the Karakum Desert once the lake 159 nineteen cubic kilometres, and experts warn that full has been completed. use of Afghanistan’s quota would radically change the water flow along the Amu Darya.164 If Turkmenistan were to increase its use of water from the Amu Darya, the consequences for During the Soviet period, Afghanistan was rarely Uzbekistan would be serious. Downstream consulted on matters related to the Amu Darya and Urgench Province and Karakalpakstan would see the Aral Sea. Moscow also sought to keep Afghan their shortages worsen. “If the Lake of the use of water from the Panj River to a minimum. This Golden Century is built, we will be left without was done by assisting Afghanistan in developing any water”, said Berdakh Aitmuratov, the deputy 160 irrigated agriculture in the South. The amount of hakim of Chembai, in Karakalpakstan. The land used for irrigated agriculture in the North is consequences would also be disastrous for the modest, in part because it is so mountainous. Aral Sea: in 2000 and 2001, the sea received no water from the Amu Darya and given the Since independence, the Central Asian countries shortages in the area and increasing pressures on have sought closer relations with Afghanistan on the the existing resources, it appears unlikely to Amu Darya. When the International Fund to Save receive any in 2002. the Aral Sea (IFAS) was established in 1993, it was suggested that Afghanistan be invited to join.165 Turkmenistan also plans to put another 450,000 Although it did not do so, information on the work hectares of land under irrigation over the next 161 of IFAS was sent to Kabul regularly. At its three years, which is causing considerable February 2002 meeting, SPECA agreed that anxiety among Uzbeks. Tashkent has similar Afghanistan should be considered an equal member plans, and as the Amu Darya is already used to of Central Asia’s single economic space.166 capacity, it is difficult to say where the water will come from. Following the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, discussions soon surfaced on how to reconstruct the country. In January 2002, the Japanese Global Infrastructure Fund announced that it considered it 158 Dr Daniel Linette, “Water resources management in impossible to save the Aral Sea. Therefore, it Central Asia: Addressing new challenges and risks”, suggested, efforts should be made to maximise the Central Asia and Caucasus Analyst, 15 August 2001, www.cacianalyst.org. benefit to agriculture from Syr Darya and Amu 159 ICG interview, Tashkent, 18 January 2002. People in Khorezm Province told ICG that ethnic Uzbeks living in Turkmenistan are discriminated against. Only people who can prove that they have lived in Turkmenistan for several generations can hold higher posts. This works 162 ICG interview with Makhmud Hamidov, Director, BWA against the Uzbeks as Dashkhovuz Province was earlier a Syr Darya, Tashkent, 31 January 2002. part of the Khiva Khanate. According to sources in 163 ICG interview with Anatoly Krutov, Operations Officer, Urgench, some ethnic Uzbek citizens of Turkmenistan Water and Environmental Management, World Bank, wish to secede from that country and join Uzbekistan. Tashkent, 1 February 2002. This may be a reason why President Niyazov is planning 164 ICG interview with Altynbek Meldebekov, Deputy to resettle them to the Karakum Desert. Executive Director, IFAS Executive Board, Almaty, 25 160 ICG interview, Chembai, Karakalpakstan, 25 January February 2002. 2002. 165 ICG interview with Rim Ginniatullin, member of the 161 ICG interview with Diushen Mamatkanov, Director, IFAS Board, head of the IFAS Agency, Minister of the Institute of Water Problems and Hydropower of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Tashkent, 30 January 2002. Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences, Bishkek, 20 February 166 Kazakh Commercial Television, Almaty, 20 February 2002. 2002 at 11:30 am. Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 27

Darya water, with an emphasis on Afghanistan.167 account of Afghanistan’s possible demands. The This issue was debated at the international donor best way of accommodating them is through truly conference on Afghanistan in Tokyo in February regional negotiations including all Amu-Darya 2002 although no decisions were announced. states.

Tajik Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdunabi Sattorzoda had a relaxed attitude D. THE SIBERIAN RIVERS SCHEME towards the statement, arguing that the international community would not be willing to A much celebrated scheme to divert water from the divert the rivers for Afghanistan due to the high Ob and Irtysh Rivers in Siberia to Central Asia was cost.168 In downstream Uzbekistan, however, the abandoned in the late 1980s due to fierce opposition idea met with astonishment. One expert referred from scientists, writers and environmentalists but to it as “politically irresponsible”, while the has crept back onto the agenda in 2002 as director of the BWA Syr Darya warned that any Uzbekistan seeks what seems to be an easy way out decision to increase Afghanistan’s use of water of its water dilemmas, and Russia looks for further would further worsen the situation in Khorezm levers of political control in the region. and Karakalpakstan. “When helping Afghanistan, the international community must not forget In theory the idea – to build a canal from Siberia us”.169 The first deputy chairman of Khorezm’s across Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan – would solve the reclamation and water management department problem of limited water resources in Uzbekistan. In said he feared the consequences for his province: reality, it would probably prove ecologically “God forbid that we should give water also to destructive, have a negative impact on the Afghanistan. What will then become of us”?170 geopolitical situation and prove more expensive than any benefit could justify. It seems unlikely that donors would assist Afghanistan to sharply increase its use of water In the late 1980s, much opposition was based on from the Panj given the enormous resources Russian nationalist objections to rerouting Russian required and the political and economic impact rivers to help the Asian republics of the USSR. But on Central Asia. However, it would be naïve to there were also good scientific objections think that Afghanistan can rehabilitate its concerning the significant impact on the ecology of agriculture without increasing its intake from the the Siberian river basins. Although these rivers Amu Darya. frequently flood and thus give Russia some interest in reducing water flow along them, it is not clear It is, therefore, important that the Afghan that their flooding is a long-term problem or whether authorities, in collaboration with the donor water diversion would reach levels that would have community, seek solutions to maximise a negative impact on the lower reaches of the rivers. efficiency and minimise the additional intake from the Panj. This would lessen the negative In March 2002, the Russian Deputy Minister of impact on downstream countries and prevent Natural Resources, Valerii Roshchupkin, tension between Central Asian states and acknowledged the Central Asian interest in rerouting Afghanistan. Future water management excess water from the Ob and Irtysh to the South, initiatives in Central Asia will have to take but cited need to study the possible environmental impact and said the project would be very costly. It is surprising that Moscow has any interest at all but some Russians will see the scheme as a potential 167 Vechernie Novosty, 21 January 2002, 20:00 pm, sent geopolitical gain. It could ensure significant to ICG by email from Yusup Kamalov, Chairman, dependence in Uzbekistan and possibly Kazakhstan Union for the Defence of the Aral Sea and the Amu on Russian water and would immediately grant Darya, Nukus, 26 January 2002. 168 ICG interview, Dushanbe, 19 February 2002. Moscow a new lever of influence. The potential 169 ICG interview with Makhmud Hamidov, Director, disputes around any such scheme would add further BWA Syr Darya, Tashkent, 1 February 2002. fuel to an already difficult international 170 ICG interview with K. Babajanov, First Deputy environment. Chairman, Khorezm Province Department of Reclamation and Water Resources, Urgench, 28 January 2002. Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 28

The expense would also be impossible to justify. VI. CONCLUSION It is almost inconceivable that international institutions would pay, and none of the involved states have sufficient funds. Uzbekistan should Water will probably not lead to war in the near instead seek realistic ways out of its water crisis future in Central Asia. But it is an increasingly through difficult but necessary negotiations with important factor in the strained relations among the neighbours and changes to its own agricultural, five states and an important contributor to local water use and economic policies. conflicts. Shortages are already inhibiting economic growth and limiting opportunities in rural areas. Without a greater effort to manage and use their water more efficiently, the Central Asia states will find themselves struggling to improve their economies.

A broad long-term program to reform the economy, agriculture, political participation, land tenure and water use will be needed to overcome the legacies of Soviet water management and state-controlled agriculture. Given that the pace of economic reforms has slowed across the region, it is unlikely that governments will take the bold steps necessary. Given the water available in the region, there is no long-term reason why it should present any problems. Countries such as Israel run relatively efficient industrial and agricultural sectors on far less of the resource. Advanced technology can help but only when grounded in good resource management.

The basic principles that need to be followed are clear. In managing their relations among themselves the states need to:

work out an equitable sharing of water; do no appreciable harm to others; protect ecosystems and minimise pollution; create inclusive systems of decision-making; disclose all planning decisions; and abide by a dispute resolution systems.

In establishing their domestic water regimes – which inevitably intersect with international systems in this region – they need to:

establish participatory management structures such as water users associations; establish suitable monitoring; involve farmers, urban water users, industry, energy producers and environmental groups in the planning process; expand investment in maintenance; move towards full cost pricing; establish mediation mechanisms; and Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 29

establish mechanisms for review and they could travel freely and be protected from appeal of decisions. intimidation by local authorities.

Given the performance to date, it is unlikely Water quotas set under Soviet management have not much of this will be achieved soon but existing been revised since 1991. A lack of reliable data water management structures could be improved makes it difficult to predict annual changes in the in a way that would reduce tensions between flow of the region’s rivers so quotas are not properly states. The Interstate Coordinating Water adjusted. Control mechanisms are inadequate, and Commission needs an overhaul to broaden its the Central Asian states frequently exceed their mandate, increase its powers of enforcement and quotas to cover an increasing demand for water. open up its workings to greater scrutiny. It needs Quotas must be revised to take into account to develop a voice in a wider range of subjects by demography, agriculture, industry, energy and bringing in discussion of agriculture, energy and environmental sustainability. industry. Barter agreements that currently dominate Beside greater inclusion, the organisation needs exchanges of energy and water need to be reformed to be more transparent, not least to dispel rising to have regard for different levels of economic anxieties around the region that it acts mostly in development and the difficulty in providing some the interests of Uzbekistan. The International resources. Ultimately all the countries need to move Fund for the Aral Sea (IFAS) has a similar towards a market system and financial exchanges reputation and does not enjoy the trust of donors, that would facilitate the free movement of resources. who have generally preferred to carry out The current hybrid of market forces and central projects independently. IFAS and the planning is probably unworkable but could be international community should begin improved in the short-term by working out contracts discussions to rebuild trust and look into earlier to avoid problems with winter energy possibilities of jointly funded projects. IFAS shortages, setting up mechanisms to deal with member countries must increase its budget to disputes and improving infrastructure for the allow it to raise its profile and start projects that delivery of gas and coal. could have an impact. But IFAS needs to change management structures and approach to attract As each Central Asian nation tries to assert outside funding. The World Bank should make independent control over its resources, there has further financing of the IFAS/GEF program been a rash of plans for elaborate and potentially contingent on real management changes and dangerous water projects. Most projects are likely to improved accountability and transparency. be costly, environmentally damaging and potentially destabilising and thus offer only short-term relief. The Central Asian states could improve water Turkmenistan should stop construction of the Lake management by upgrading the status and of the Golden Century, a pharonic effort to build a functions of the BWA Syr Darya and BWA Amu vast man-made lake in a desert where most water Darya. Both associations are currently headed by will simply evaporate. Uzbekistan should also give directors from Uzbekistan. Trust would be up its plans to build four reservoirs on the Syr enhanced by replacing the current system with a Darya. Plans in Tajikistan for the giant Rogun Dam rotating directorship or a co-directorship that also should be shelved, as the country cannot afford would dilute suspicions management does not act the project. And ideas to resurrect a plan to divert in the interests of all the countries. water from Russian rivers to Central Asia should be immediately shelved as environmentally dubious, The associations must also be given power to hugely expensive and merely delaying much needed implement sanctions against countries, provinces reform of the present system. and districts exceeding water quotas. Finally, water monitoring must be made more efficient. The international community, for its part, should This could be done by introducing automated take a more pro-active approach to resolving water monitoring and by providing the associations problems in Central Asia at the regional political with high-quality technical equipment to make level. So far the focus has very much been on the monitoring and unannounced inspections easier. national level and on technical rather than political They should also be given diplomatic status so solutions. Western standing has increased following Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 30

the intervention in Afghanistan in 2001. The then be designed in such a way that organisations West – and the United States in particular – is, would be responsible for one particular component. therefore, in a position to use more influence on To the extent possible, such components should be this issue. made independent to prevent the project from falling apart if a single organisation pulls out. In 1998, USAID provided technical and other assistance during the preparation of a five-year Attempts to establish regional water and energy agreement between Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and consortia should be encouraged with political Kyrgyzstan on the Syr Darya. Although the support, technical help and funding. Such consortia agreement has been criticised, most observers would aid in the development of regional solutions agree that it has had a stabilising effect in the to water problems and reduce the risk of narrow region. The international community should national projects that cost more, can damage the encourage and actively support the signing of a environment and heighten tensions. If successful, the new agreement. Similar initiatives should be water and energy consortia could reduce tension by taken on the Amu Darya. To the extent possible, expanding economic collaboration and integration. the Central Asian states should be encouraged to The donor community and Western governments address the problems of the Syr Darya and the should support such consortia by earmarking funds Amu Darya in a complex fashion – that is, for projects carried out within their framework. This addressing not only water quotas, but also the would provide the latter with an incentive to pursue technical maintenance of water-engineering regional rather than national projects. facilities, energy issues and agriculture. Although there is still substantial political disagreement on When giving financial and technical assistance to water use in the region, a number of agreements Afghanistan, donors should take care to support signed recently give reason for some optimism. solutions that would not have a detrimental impact on the Central Asian states. Water projects in Scientists argue that Central Asia has enough northern Afghanistan and Central Asia should be water to cover its needs. Up to 50 per cent of the seen in a regional rather than national context and water diverted for irrigation never reaches the proper coordination provided. The Central Asian crops for which it was intended, however. countries should seek to integrate Afghanistan in Improving the efficiency of irrigation in Central regional water management schemes. Asia could release some of the pressure on limited resources and thus also reduce political Without tackling water, there will be few long-term tension. The major international donors all prospects for development in Central Asia. operate projects aimed at promoting more Alleviating rural poverty, reviving industrial efficient water use. Most of these are small, production, reversing decades of environmental however, and have limited funding. damage and reducing tensions will depend on the ability of these nations to work together. Without As international donors have different mandates flexible, open, regional systems of management, and time frames for their projects, it is often there will be no way to achieve the levels of trust difficult to pool resources in support of larger and cooperation necessary to reintegrate the water projects. Still, donors should work towards networks of Central Asia. establishing priorities and carrying out cooperative projects. Regional projects could Osh/Brussels, TK May 2002

Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 31

APPENDIX A

MAP OF UZBEKISTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA

Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 32

APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ACTED Agency for Technical Cooperation and NRMP Natural Resources Management Project Development REC Regional Environmental Centre ADB Asian Development Bank RFE/RL Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty AKDN Aga Khan Development Network RIIA Royal Institute of International Affairs BWA Basin Water-Management Association SIC Scientific Information Centre ECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe SPECA Special Program for the Economies of Central Asia ESCAP United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific TACIS The European Union’s Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of GEF Global Environment Facility Independent States (former Soviet Union). GDP Gross Domestic Product WARMAP Water Resources Management and ICWC Interstate Co-ordinating Water Agricultural Production Commission WB World Bank IDB International Development Bank WUA Water Users’ Association IFAS International Fund to Save the Aral Sea UNDP United Nations Development Program kWh kilo-watt hour USAID United States Assistance for MW Mega-watt International Development NGO Non-Governmental Organisation USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 33

APPENDIX C

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (ICG) is a private, ICG’s international headquarters are at Brussels, multinational organisation committed to with advocacy offices in Washington DC, New strengthening the capacity of the international York and Paris and a media liaison office in community to anticipate, understand and act to London. The organisation currently operates prevent and contain conflict. eleven field offices with analysts working in nearly 30 crisis-affected countries and territories and ICG’s approach is grounded in field research. across four continents. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or In Africa, those locations include Burundi, recurrence of violent conflict. Based on Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, information and assessments from the field, ICG Sierra Leone-Liberia-Guinea, Somalia, Sudan and produces regular analytical reports containing Zimbabwe; in Asia, Indonesia, Myanmar, practical recommendations targeted at key Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan and international decision-takers. Afghanistan; in Europe, Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia; in the Middle ICG’s reports and briefing papers are distributed Eas,t Algeria and the whole region from Egypt to widely by email and printed copy to officials in Iran; and in Latin America, Colombia. foreign ministries and international organisations and made generally available at the same time via ICG raises funds from governments, charitable the organisation's Internet site, www.crisisweb.org. foundations, companies and individual donors. The ICG works closely with governments and those following governments currently provide funding: who influence them, including the media, to Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, for its policy prescriptions. Norway, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The ICG Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, Foundation and private sector donors include The business and the media – is directly involved in Ansary Foundation, The Atlantic Philanthropies, helping to bring ICG reports and recommendations Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Carnegie to the attention of senior policy-makers around the Corporation of New York, Charles Stewart Mott world. ICG is chaired by former Finnish President Foundation, Ford Foundation, John D. and Martti Ahtisaari; and its President and Chief Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, John Merck Executive since January 2000 has been former Fund, Open Society Institute, Ploughshares Fund, Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. Ruben and Elisabeth Rausing Trust, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, and William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.

May 2002

Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 34

APPENDIX D

ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS

AFRICA RWANDA

ALGERIA International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Justice Delayed, Africa Report N°30, 7 June 2001 (also available in French) The Algerian Crisis: Not Over Yet, Africa Report N°24, 20 October 2000 (also available in French) “Consensual Democracy” in Post Genocide Rwanda: Evaluating the March 2001 District Elections, Africa Report The Civil Concord: A Peace Initiative Wasted, Africa Report N°34, 9 October 2001 N°31, 9 July 2001 (also available in French) Rwanda/Uganda: a Dangerous War of Nerves Africa Algeria’s Economy: A Vicious Circle of Oil and Violence, Briefing, 21 December 2001 Africa Report N° 36, 26 October 2001 (also available in French) SIERRA LEONE BURUNDI Sierra Leone: Time for a New Military and Political Strategy, Africa Report N°28, 11 April 2001 Burundi Peace Process: Tough Challenges Ahead, Africa Briefing, 27 August 2000 Sierra Leone: Managing Uncertainty, Africa Report N°35, 24 October 2001 Burundi: Neither War, nor Peace, Africa Report N°25, 1 December 2000 (also available in French) Sierra Leone: Ripe For Elections? Africa Briefing, 19 December 2001 Burundi: Breaking the Deadlock, The Urgent Need for a New Negotiating Framework, Africa Report N°29, 14 May 2001 (also available in French) SOMALIA Burundi: 100 Days to put the Peace Process back on Track, Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State, Africa Africa Report N°33, 14 August 2001 (also available in Report N° 45, 23 May 2002 French) Burundi: After Six Months of Transition: Continuing the SUDAN War or Winning the Peace, Africa Report N° 46, 24 May 2002 (also available in French) God, Oil & Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan, Africa Report N°39, 28 January 2002 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO Capturing the Moment: Sudan's Peace Process in the Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War, Africa Balance, Africa Report N° 42, 3 April 2002 Report N°26, 20 December 2000 (also available in French) ZIMBABWE From Kabila to Kabila: Prospects for Peace in the Congo, Africa Report N°27, 16 March 2001 Zimbabwe: Three Months after the Elections, Africa Disarmament in the Congo: Investing in Conflict Briefing, 25 September 2000 Prevention, Africa Briefing, 12 June 2001 Zimbabwe in Crisis: Finding a way Forward, Africa Report Le dialogue intercongolais: Poker menteur ou négociation N°32, 13 July 2001 politique ? Africa Report N° 37, 16 November 2001 (also available in English) Zimbabwe: Time for International Action, Africa Briefing, 12 October 2001 Disarmament in the Congo: Jump-Starting DDRRR to Prevent Further War, Africa Report N° 38, 14 Zimbabwe’s Election: The Stakes for Southern Africa, December 2001 Africa Briefing, 11 January 2002 Storm Clouds over Sun City: The Urgent need to Recast the Congolese Peace Process, Africa Report N° 44, 14 May 2002 All Bark and No Bite: The International Response to Zimbabwe’s Crisis, Africa Report N°40, 25 January 2002

LIBERIA Zimbabwe at the Crossroads: Transition or Conflict? Africa Report N° 41, 22 March 2002 Liberia: The Key to Ending Regional Instability, Africa Report N° 43 24 April 2002

* Released since January 2000

These reports may be downloaded from the ICG website: www.crisisweb.org Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 35

ASIA Bad Debt: The Politics of Financial Reform in Indonesia, Asia Report N°15, 13 March 2001 Indonesia’s Presidential Crisis: The Second Round, CAMBODIA Indonesia Briefing, 21 May 2001 Aceh: Why Military Force Won’t Bring Lasting Peace, Asia Cambodia: The Elusive Peace Dividend, Asia Report N°8, Report N°17, 12 June 2001 (Also available in Indonesian) 11 August 2000 Aceh: Can Autonomy Stem the Conflict? Asia Report N°18, 27 June 2001 CENTRAL ASIA Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons from Kalimantan, Asia Report N°19, 27 June 2001 Central Asia: Crisis Conditions in Three States, Asia Report Indonesian-U.S. Military Ties: Indonesia Briefing, 18 July N°7, 7 August 2000 (also available in Russian) 2001 Recent Violence in Central Asia: Causes and Consequences, The Megawati Presidency, Indonesia Briefing, 10 September Central Asia Briefing, 18 October 2000 2001 Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, Asia Report Indonesia: Ending Repression in Irian Jaya, Asia Report N°14, 1 March 2001 (also available in Russian) N°23, 20 September 2001 Incubators of Conflict: Central Asia’s Localised Poverty Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims, Indonesia and Social Unrest, Asia Report N°16, 8 June 2001 Briefing, 10 October 2001 Central Asia: Fault Lines in the New Security Map, Asia Indonesia: Next Steps in Military Reform, Asia Report Report N°20, 4 July 2001 N°24, 11 October 2001 Uzbekistan at Ten – Repression and Instability, Asia Report Indonesia: Natural Resources and Law Enforcement, Asia N°21, 21 August 2001 Report N° 29, 20 December 2001 Indonesia: The Search for Peace in Maluku, Asia Report Kyrgyzstan at Ten: Trouble in the “Island of Democracy”, Asia Report N°22, 28 August 2001 N°31, 8 February 2002 Aceh: Slim Chance for Peace, Indonesia Briefing, 27 March Central Asian Perspectives on the 11 September and the 2002 Afghan Crisis, Central Asia Briefing, 28 September 2001 Indonesia: The Implications of the Timor Trials, , Indonesia (also available in French) Briefing, 8 May 2002 Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict, Asia Report N° 25, 26 Resuming U.S.-Indonesia Military Ties, Indonesia Briefing, November 2001 21 May 2002 Afghanistan and Central Asia: Priorities for Reconstruction and Development, Asia Report N° 26, 27 November 2001 MYANMAR Tajikistan: An Uncertain Peace, Asia Report N° 30, 24 Burma/Myanmar: How Strong is the Military Regime? Asia December 2001 Report N°11, 21 December 2000 The IMU and the Hizb-ut-Tahrir: Implications of the Afghanistan Campaign, Central Asia Briefing, 30 January Myanmar: The Role of Civil Society, Asia Report N°27, 6 2002 December 2001 Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential, Asia Myanmar: The Military Regime’s View of the World, Asia Report N° 33, 4 April 2002 Report N°28, 7 December 2001 Myanmar: The Politics of Humanitarian Aid, Asia Report INDONESIA N° 32, 2 April 2002 Indonesia’s Crisis: Chronic but not Acute, Asia Report N°6, Myanmar: The HIV/AIDS Crisis, Myanmar Briefing, 2 April 31 May 2000 2002 Indonesia’s Maluku Crisis: The Issues, Indonesia Briefing, 19 July 2000 PAKISTAN/AFGHANISTAN

Indonesia: Keeping the Military Under Control, Asia Report Pakistan: The Dangers of Conventional Wisdom, Pakistan N°9, 5 September 2000 Briefing, 12 March 2002 Aceh: Escalating Tension, Indonesia Briefing, 7 December Securing Afghanistan: The Need for More International 2000 Action, Afghanistan Briefing, 15 March 2002 Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku, Asia The Loya Jirga: One Small Step Forward?, , Afghanistan & Report N°10, 19 December 2000 Pakistan Briefing, 16 May 2002 Indonesia: Impunity Versus Accountability for Gross Human Rights Violations, Asia Report N°12, 2 February 2001 Indonesia: National Police Reform, Asia Report N°13, 20 February 2001 (Also available in Indonesian) Indonesia's Presidential Crisis, Indonesia Briefing, 21 February 2001

These reports may be downloaded from the ICG website: www.crisisweb.org Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 36

BALKANS KOSOVO

ALBANIA Kosovo Albanians in Serbian Prisons: Kosovo’s Unfinished Business, Balkans Report N°85, 26 January 2000 Albania: State of the Nation, Balkans Report N°87, 1 March 2000 What Happened to the KLA? Balkans Report N°88, 3 March Albania’s Local Elections, A test of Stability and 2000 Democracy, Balkans Briefing 25 August 2000 Kosovo’s Linchpin: Overcoming Division in Mitrovica, Albania: The State of the Nation 2001, Balkans Report Balkans Report N°96, 31 May 2000 Nº111, 25 May 2001 Reality Demands: Documenting Violations of International Albania’s Parliamentary Elections 2001, Balkans Briefing, 3 Humanitarian Law in Kosovo 1999, Balkans Report, 27 June August 2001 2000 Elections in Kosovo: Moving Toward Democracy? Balkans BOSNIA Report N°97, 7 July 2000 Kosovo Report Card, Balkans Report N°100, 28 August 2000 Denied Justice: Individuals Lost in a Legal Maze, Balkans Report N°86, 23 February 2000 Reaction in Kosovo to Kostunica’s Victory, Balkans Briefing, 10 October 2000 European Vs. Bosnian Human Rights Standards, Handbook Overview, 14 April 2000 Religion in Kosovo, Balkans Report N°105, 31 January 2001 Reunifying Mostar: Opportunities for Progress, Balkans Kosovo: Landmark Election, Balkans Report N°120, 21 Report N°90, 19 April 2000 November 2001 (Also available in Serbo-Croatian) Bosnia’s Municipal Elections 2000: Winners and Losers, Kosovo: A Strategy for Economic Development: Balkans Balkans Report N°91, 28 April 2000 Report N° 123, 19 December 2001 Bosnia’s Refugee Logjam Breaks: Is the International A Kosovo Roadmap: I. Addressing Final Status, Balkans Community Ready? Balkans Report N°95, 31 May 2000 Report N° 124, 28 February 2002 A Kosovo Roadmap: II. Internal Benchmarks, Balkans War Criminals in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, Balkans Report No. 125, 1 March 2002 Report N°103, 02 November 2000 Bosnia’s November Elections: Dayton Stumbles, Balkans MACEDONIA Report N°104, 18 December 2000 Turning Strife to Advantage: A Blueprint to Integrate the Macedonia’s Ethnic Albanians: Bridging the Gulf, Balkans Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Balkans Report N°106, Report N°98, 2 August 2000 15 March 2001 Macedonia Government Expects Setback in Local Elections, No Early Exit: NATO’s Continuing Challenge in Bosnia, Balkans Briefing, 4 September 2000 Balkans Report N°110, 22 May 2001 The Macedonian Question: Reform or Rebellion, Balkans Bosnia's Precarious Economy: Still Not Open For Report N°109, 5 April 2001 Business; Balkans Report N°115, 7 August 2001 (also Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace, Balkans Report available in Serbo-Croatian) N°113, 20 June 2001 The Wages of Sin: Confronting Bosnia’s Republika Srpska: Macedonia: Still Sliding, Balkans Briefing, 27 July 2001 Balkans Report N°118, 8 October 2001 (Also available in Serbo-Croatian) Macedonia: War on Hold, Balkans Briefing, 15 August 2001 Bosnia: Reshaping the International Machinery, Balkans Macedonia: Filling the Security Vacuum, Balkans Briefing, Report N°121, 29 November 2001* 8 September 2001 Courting Disaster: The Misrule of Law in Bosnia & Macedonia’s Name: Why the Dispute Matters and How Herzegovina, Balkans Report N° 127, 26 March 2002 to Resolve It, Balkans Report N° 122, 10 December 2001 Implementing Equality: The "Constituent Peoples" Decision in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Balkans Report N° 128, MONTENEGRO 16 April 2002 Montenegro: In the Shadow of the Volcano, Balkans Report Policing the Police in Bosnia: A Further Reform Agenda, N°89, 21 March 2000 Balkans Report N° 130, 10 May 2002 Montenegro’s Socialist People’s Party: A Loyal Opposition? Balkans Report N°92, 28 April 2000 CROATIA Montenegro’s Local Elections: Testing the National Facing Up to War Crimes, Balkans Briefing, 16 October Temperature, Background Briefing, 26 May 2000 2001 Montenegro’s Local Elections: More of the Same, Balkans Briefing, 23 June 2000

These reports may be downloaded from the ICG website: www.crisisweb.org Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 37

Montenegro: Which way Next? Balkans Briefing, 30 LATIN AMERICA November 2000 Montenegro: Settling for Independence? Balkans Report Colombia's Elusive Quest for Peace, Latin America Report N°107, 28 March 2001 N° 1, 26 March 2002 Montenegro: Time to Decide, a pre-election Briefing, 18 The 10 March 2002 Parliamentary Elections in Colombia, April 2001 Latin America Briefing, 17 April 2002 Montenegro: Resolving the Independence Deadlock, The Stakes in the Presidential Election in Colombia, Latin Balkans Report N°114, 1 August 2001 America Briefing, 22 May 2002 Still Buying Time: Montenegro, Serbia and the European

Union, Balkans Report N° 129, 7 May 2002 MIDDLE EAST SERBIA A Time to Lead: The International Community and the Serbia’s Embattled Opposition, Balkans Report N°94, 30 Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Middle East Report N° 1, 10 May 2000 April 2002 Serbia’s Grain Trade: Milosevic’s Hidden Cash Crop, Balkans Report N°93, 5 June 2000 Serbia: The Milosevic Regime on the Eve of the September ISSUES REPORTS Elections, Balkans Report N°99, 17 August 2000 Current Legal Status of the Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue, Issues Report N°1, 19 June and of Serbia and Montenegro, Balkans Report N°101, 19 2001 September 2000 The European Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO): Crisis Yugoslavia’s Presidential Election: The Serbian People’s Response in the Grey Lane, Issues Briefing Paper, 26 June Moment of Truth, Balkans Report N°102, 19 September 2001 2000 EU Crisis Response Capability: Institutions and Processes for Conflict Prevention and Management, Issues Report Sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, N°2, 26 June 2001 Balkans Briefing, 10 October 2000 EU Crisis Response Capability:An Update, Issues Briefing Serbia on the Eve of the December Elections, Balkans Paper, 29 April 2002 Briefing, 20 December 2000 A Fair Exchange: Aid to Yugoslavia for Regional Stability, Balkans Report N°112, 15 June 2001 Peace in Presevo: Quick Fix or Long-Term Solution? Balkans Report N°116, 10 August 2001 Serbia’s Transition: Reforms Under Siege, Balkans Report N°117, 21 September 2001 (also available in Serbo-Croatian) Belgrade’s Lagging Reform: Cause for International Concern, Balkans Report N°126, 7 March 2002 Serbia : Military Intervention Threatens Democratic Reform, Balkans Briefing, 28 March 2002

REGIONAL REPORTS

After Milosevic: A Practical Agenda for Lasting Balkans Peace, Balkans Report N°108, 26 April 2001 Milosevic in The Hague: What it Means for Yugoslavia and the Region, Balkans Briefing, 6 July 2001

Bin Laden and the Balkans: The Politics of Anti-Terrorism, Balkans Report N°119, 9 November 2001

These reports may be downloaded from the ICG website: www.crisisweb.org Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 38

APPENDIX E

ICG BOARD MEMBERS

Martti Ahtisaari, Chairman Bronislaw Geremek Former President of Finland Former Foreign Minister of Poland Maria Livanos Cattaui, Vice-Chairman I.K.Gujral Secretary-General, International Chamber of Commerce Former Prime Minister of India Stephen Solarz, Vice-Chairman Han Sung-Joo Former U.S. Congressman Former Foreign Minister of Korea Gareth Evans, President El Hassan bin Talal Former Foreign Minister of Australia Chairman, Arab Thought Forum, Jordan Marianne Heiberg Morton Abramowitz Senior Researcher, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State; former U.S. Elliott F Kulick Ambassador to Turkey Chairman, Pegasus International, US Kenneth Adelman Joanne Leedom-Ackerman Former U.S. Ambassador and Director of the Arms Control and Novelist and journalist, U.S. Disarmament Agency Richard Allen Todung Mulya Lubis Human rights lawyer and author, Indonesia Former Head of U.S. National Security Council and National Security Advisor to the President Allan J MacEachen Hushang Ansary Former Deputy Prime Minister of Canada Former Iranian Minister and Ambassador; Chairman, Parman Barbara McDougall Group, Houston Former Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada Louise Arbour Matthew McHugh Supreme Court Judge, Canada; Former Chief Prosecutor, Counsellor to the President, The World Bank, U.S. International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia Mo Mowlam Oscar Arias Sanchez Former British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Former President of Costa Rica; Nobel Peace Prize, 1987 Christine Ockrent Ersin Arioglu Journalist, France Chairman, Yapi Merkezi, Turkey Wayne Owens Alan Blinken President, Center for Middle East Peace and Economic Co- Former U.S. Ambassador to Belgium operation, U.S. Emma Bonino Cyril Ramaphosa Member of the European Parliament; former European Former Secretary-General, African National Congress; Commissioner, Italy Chairman, New Africa Investments Ltd, South Africa Wesley Clark Fidel Ramos Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Former President of the Philippines Jacques Delors Michel Rocard Former President of the European Commission Member of the European Parliament; former Prime Minister of Uffe Ellemann-Jensen France Former Foreign Minister of Denmark Volker Rühe Gernot Erler Vice-President, Christian Democrats, German Bundestag; former German Defence Minister Vice-President, Social Democratic Party, German Bundestag Mark Eyskens Mohamed Sahnoun Special Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General Former Prime Minister of Belgium Yoichi Funabashi William Shawcross Journalist and author, U.K. Journalist and author, Japan Michael Sohlman Executive Director of the Nobel Foundation, Sweden

Central Asia: Water and Conflict ICG Asia Report N° 34, 30 May 2002 Page 39

George Soros Ed van Thijn Chairman, Open Society Institute Former Minister of Interior, The Netherlands; former Mayor of Eduardo Stein Amsterdam Former Foreign Minister of Guatemala Simone Veil Former Member of the European Parliament; former French Pär Stenbäck Minister for Health Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Finland Shirley Williams Thorvald Stoltenberg Former Secretary of State for Education and Science; Member Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway House of Lords William O Taylor Grigory Yavlinsky Chairman Emeritus, The Boston Globe Head of Yabloko (Liberal Democrat), Russian Duma