sign in sign up
<<
Home , Aral Sea, Northern Dvina, Water export

REPORT TO NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARC H

TITLE : SOVIET RIVER DIVERSION PROJECTS : PROBLEMS AND PROSPECT S

AUTHOR : Philip P, Micklin Western Michigan University

CONTRACTOR : Western Michigan University

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : Philip P . Micklin

COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER : 802-09

DATE : June 1988

The work leading to this report was supported by funds provided b y the National Council for Soviet and East European Research . Th e analysis and interpretations contained in the report are those o f the author . NOTE

This report is an incidental product of the Council research contrac t identified on the face page, the Final Report from which will b e distributed separately at a later date . Soviet River Diversion Projects : Problems and Prospect s

Dr . Micklin, Philip P ., Western Michigan Universit y

Department of Geography Western Michigan Universit y Kalamazoo, Michigan 4900 8 USA

ABSTRACT

Transfer of from north to south of the Soviet Unio n has been proposed for over 100 years . During the 1970s , designs were worked out for diversions in both the Europea n and Siberian parts of the USSR . Construction on the Euro- pean project began in 1985 . All implementation work o n water transfers was halted in 1986 . The Gorbachev regim e considers the projects a poor investment and believes othe r means are available to resolve southern water problems . Basic economic and ecological research on the transfe r schemes has been directed to continue . Southern wate r supply problems are serious, particularly in Central Asi a where the Aral is drying rapidly . If alternative mean s of resolving the water situation do not meet expectations , a strong possibility, north-south diversion schemes may b e resurrected before 2000 .

INTRODUCTIO N

Average annual river flow on the territory of the Sovie t Union is estimated at over 4700 km', second after Brazil . Unfortunately, distribution of the resource does not cor- respond with the distribution of population, agriculture , and industry (Fig . 1) . Eighty four percent of river flo w crosses sparsely inhabited, economically underdeveloped , and agriculturally limited northern and eastern . Only 16% is found in southern and western portions of th e country, accounting for 75% of the population, 80% o f economic activity, and over 80% of cropland (Micklin , 1987a) . Thus, there has been long-standing interest i n diverting a portion of river flow from the drainag e basin to the arid south .

Several other features make such a redistribution of wate r resources attractive . The headwaters of major northern and

A . Percentage of USSR's territory with river dischar g e into specifie d sea and basins . B . Percentage of USSR's average annual rive r discharge accounted for by rivers flowing into specified sea and ocea n basins . Numbers in boxes A and B indicate : 1- Basin ; 2 - Basin ; 3-Black and Azov sea basins ; 4- Basin ; 5-Caspian and basins .

Figure 1 . Mean annual flow of USSR rivers (km 3 ) southern flowing rivers in European are proximat e and separated by a water divide of no more than 160 m . I n Western , a structural trough with a maximum eleva- tion of 120 m links the arctic and Aral Sea drainag e basins . These favorable natural conditions simplify th e engineering and improve the economics of interbasin wate r transfers . Finally, diversions would be intranational a s opposed to international, easing but certainly not elimi- nating political problems .

DIVERSION SCHEME S

Large-scale redistribution of from th e north to the south of Russia was proposed as early as 187 1 (Micklin, 1987a) . Since the 1930s, Soviet engineers an d water development planners have formulated detailed scheme s for this purpose (Micklin, 1986) . In the late 1950s an d early 1960s, a proposal to channel 40 km 3 /yr from norther n into the wa s seriously contemplated . However, opposition to this schem e by water management and resource analysis experts on th e grounds that it would do great ecological and economi c damage to regions of led to its reappraisa l and abandonment . However, research and design work on north-south wate r transfers continued . The water supply situation in th e south was worsening . Rapid expansion of and th e filling of giant substantially reduced rive r flow, inducing environmental degradation, particularly i n the large southern of the USSR (Caspian, Aral, and Azov) . Interbasin diversions were viewed as a primar y means of alleviating these problems . In designing wate r transfer plans greater stress was to be placed on mini- mizing associated environmental damage .

The 1970s was a period of intensive development of wate r redistribution plans (Micklin, 1986) . By the end of th e decade, detailed designs had been formulated for both th e European and Siberian parts of the country (Fig . 2 ; Tabl e 1) . The lead design agency (Soyuzgiprovodkhoz = All-unio n institute for water management planning and design fo r diversion and redistribution of the of northern an d Siberian Rivers) and head organization for environmenta l validation (the Institute of Water Problems) contended tha t the schemes would not cause unacceptable environmenta l harm . This claim was largely based on the results o f impact assessment studies conducted between 1976-80 by mor e than 120 agencies . The basic designs underwent scrutiny b y a Government commission during the early 1980s and thi s resulted in some minor revisions . By the end of 1984 , construction on the first stage of first phase Europea n diversions (5 .8 km3/yr) received governmental approval an d work began on infrastructure facilities (access roads . concrete plants, workers' housing, etc .) . First phase Si- berian transfers (27 .2 km3 /yr) were undergoing detailed engineering design ; their implementation appeared but a fe w years away .

CANCELLATION AND ITS AFTERMAT H

However, after Michael Gorbachev assumed Soviet leadershi p in early 1985, the fortunes of the diversion projects wane d rapidly . The transfers had been periodically attacked dur- ing the 1970s and early 1980s by scientists, writers, an d others from northern areas of proposed water export wh o alleged they would cause severe ecological, economic, an d socio-cultural damage to their regions (Micklin, 1986 , 1987a) . But expressions of public doubt had been dis- couraged for several years as the projects moved closer t o implementation . By summer 1985, public criticism was agai n permissible and probably officially encouraged .

Subsequently, the schemes were bitterly attacked in th e Soviet popular media by a group of Russian national writer s and a number of prominent scientists, including severa l academicians (Zaligin, 1985 ; Lemeshev, 1985 ; Aganbegyan e t al ., 1986) . In August 1986, a decree of the Communis t Party and Soviet Government ordered a cessation of planning A . European Diversions : 1 . First stage, first phase ( Lacha, Vozhe, and Kuben a plus the upper River) . 2 . Second stage, first phase ( ) 3 . Thir d stage, first phase (Upper River) .4 . First stage, second phase (lower Sukhona an d Malaya Northern Dvina rivers) . S. Second stage, second phase (Onega Gulf ) . B. Siberian Diversions: 6. First phase ( plus middle and upper ' rivers) . 7 . Second phase (middle and upper Ob' plus rivers) . C . Main Diversion Canal (Sibaral)

Figure 2 . USSR river diversion project s and construction on the European project and a halt t o further design refinement for the Siberian undertaking (" V tsentral'nom .. .," 1986 ; Pravda, 1986) . However, researc h on the scientific problems associated with interbasin wate r redistribution, stressing ecological and economic concerns , the employment of contemporary economic-mathematical meth- ods, and the analysis of both domestic and foreign exper- ience in the water transfer field, was directed to con- tinue .

Why the sudden reversal of policy? Excessive costs com- pared to expected benefits was the dominant factor (Mick- lin, 1987a) . Gorbachev and his advisors, with thei r strong orientation to efficiency, view the projects as a misuse of scarce resources . In their view, cheaper, sim -

Table 1 . Characteristics of Soviet river diversion project s ------Stage/phas e Water Average annua l (number s source diversio n Note s refer t o (cubic-km . ) Figure 2) EUROPEAN SCHEME S

1st stage , a . lakes Lach a 1. Construction begu n 1st phase (1) & Vozhe 1 . 8 on 1st phase in 198 5 b . Lake & with completion b y upper Sukhona R . 4 . 0 2005 . Project halte d 1st stage total 5 . 8 in 1986 . Furthe r design and construc- 2nd stage , tion postponed indef - 1st phase (2) Lake Onega 3 . 5 initely . Ecologica l and economic re-evalu- 3rd stage , ation ordered . Projec t 1st phase (3) upper Pechora R . 9 . 8 and proponents bit- terly denounced i n 2nd and 3rd stage total 13 . 3 popular media .

First phase total 19 . 1

1st stage , Lower Sukhon a 2. Construction orig- 2nd phase (4) & Malaya Norther n inally set for earl y Dvina rivers 10 . 2 21st century . Post- poned (note 1) .

2nd stage , Onega Gul f 3. Construction poss- 2nd phase (5) reservoir 37 . 7 ible in 21st centur y (note 1) . Second phase total 47 . 9

European diversions total 67 .0

SIBERIAN SCHEME S

1st phase (6) a . Irtysh Rive r 4. Design work o n at Tobol'sk 17 . 0 1st phase nearly com- b . Ob' River a t pleted by 1986 . Con- Belogor'ye 10 . 2 struction seemed im- First phase total 27 . 2 minent . Project halte d in 1986 for re-evalu- 2nd phase (7) Ob' Rive r ation (note 1) . Owin g at Belogor'y e to severe water prob- (with possibl e lems in Central , compensation fro m local people are plea- Yenisey River) 32 .8 ing for its restor- ation . 2nd phase per- Siberian diversions total 60 . 0 haps for next century . ------pier, and shorter term measures are available to reach th e goal of diversions : improvement of water supplies an d agricultural production in southern regions . A major cam- paign to reduce water waste, primarily in irrigated agri- culture but also in industry and the municipal sector, i s underway ("V tsentral'nom .. .," 1986) . It is contended tha t water use efficiency can be raised sufficiently, for exam- ple through reconstruction of irrigation facilities, mor e finely tuned applications of water to crops, and institu- tion of a meaningful water pricing structure, to "free " sufficient water to meet legitimate needs (Macklin 1987b ; Lemeshev 1985) . Dry farming techniques (e .g . fertility enhancement, erosion control, snow retention, crop rota- tion, and shelterbelt planting) are also being promoted a s means of improving agriculture in the arid south withou t irrigation (Aganbegyan et al ., 1986) .

Another argument against the projects is the allegatio n that Soyuzgiprovodkhoz and the Institute of Water Problems were thoroughly biased toward implementation and even en - gaged in collusion and falsification of data to promote th e projects (Leybovskiy, 1987 ; "Ecology . Economics . Morality, " 1987) . Purportedly, costs were underestimated and benefit s exaggerated, criticism from outside experts ignored, an d efforts made to prevent outside review and to stifle publi c debate . For example, cost of the first phase of the large r Siberian transfer, was estimated by Soyuzgiprovodkhoz at 3 1 billion rubles (Micklin, 1987a) . Critics claim it would b e at least 45 and likely closer to 100 billion ruble s (Reymers, 1987) . Although such procedures were standar d practice in the past, in the era of glasnost' (openness) , they have become unacceptable .

Concern that the potential negative environmental, econ- omic, and socio-cultural consequences of the projects hav e not been adequately studied has also been given as a majo r reason for stopping implementation (Micklin, 1987a ; "Ecol- ogy . Economics . Morality," 1987) . The August 1986 decre e cited the need for further study of the economic an d ecological consequences of the projects as a prime reaso n for their suspension ("V tsentral'nom .. .," 1986) . How - ever, it must be remembered that a major research effor t was made between 1976-80 to forecast potential significan t environmental impacts . Apparently serious and credibl e studies revealed that there would be perceptible negativ e consequences from first phase European and Siberian diver- sions, mainly confined to northern regions of water expor t (Macklin, 1986) . The contention was that these effects , overwhelmingly, would be of a local or regional an d that national or international consequences would be non- existant or trivial . There would, of course, be sub- stantial positive effects in southern regions of wate r import . Table 2 provides a listing and classification o f major potential impacts .

The "official" public position of the Soviet governmen t until the policy reversal was that potential negativ e consequences were not of sufficient magnitude to foreg o implementation of the projects . Indeed, specters of diver- sions causing global weather changes invoked by Wester n writers were rejected by Soviet experts as absurd . Re- cently, the very same contention has been made by commen- tators in the popular Soviet media as a primary reason fo r the projects' cancellation (Micklin, 1987a)! . Certainly , the potential adverse consequences are not inconsequentia l and deserve careful attention . A case can be made that th e seriousness of environmental concerns was earlier under - stated whereas some key economic and socio-cultural prob- Table 2 : Potential impacts of Soviet river diversion project s ------A . NORTHERN REGIONS OF WATER EXPORT (mainly negative effects) <1 > 1. Flooding of, and raising of levels under, agricultura l lands and forests by reservoirs [N,MI,L ] 2. Flooding of areas with fossil fuel extraction potential (N,I ) 3. Fishery damage from hydrobiologic alteration of rivers and thei r estuaries downstream from points of diversion (N,MI,L ) 4. Alterations in permafrost (mainly in Siberia) (IM,L ) 5. Improved drainage leading to reduction of swamps and waterloggin g (chiefly in ) (P,I,L ] 6. Damage to archeological, historical, and cultural resources fro m construction, flooding, and raising of groundwater levels (chiefly i n European north) [N,I,L,C] 7. Disruption of traditional ways of life and cultures because of influ x of tens-of-thousands of construction workers into lightly populate d areas (N,MI,S ] 8. New employment opportunities for local residents during constructio n phase (P,MI,S ] 9. Climatic changes in coastal zones of large reservoirs [N,I,L ] 10. Ice cover and associated climatic changes in estuaries of larg e arctic rivers affected by diversions (from reduced liquid an d thermal inflow and altered flow regimes) (N,I,L ] B . SOUTHERN REGIONS OF WATER IMPORT (mainly postive effects) <1 > 1. Improved water supplies for irrigated agriculture, industry, an d urban centers (particularly in ) [P,MI,L ] 2. Improvement of water and salt balance and biological condition o f large southern seas (Aral, Caspian, Azov) (P,MI,L ] 3. Potential introduction of harmful aquatic species and diseases owin g to connection of northern and southern drainage basins [N,MI,L ] 4. Preservation of traditional lifestyles among native Central Asian s (rural, agricultural, large families) [P,MI,L ] 5. Net stimulus to economic development and growth [P,MI,L ] C . NATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS <1 > 1. Projects would require huge capital investment (minimum 50-60 billo n rubles?) which might be used more productively elsewhere (IM,MI,L,C ) 2. Improvement of water and salt balance and biological condition o f southern seas (particularly Aral) which could outweigh ecologica l damage from projects in northern regions [P,MI,L,C ] 3. Preservation of Central Asian political, economic, social, an d cultural stability, much more likely with than without diversions , may outweigh damage from Siberian project [P,MI,L,C ] D . INTERNATIONAL EFFECT S 1. Degradation of some fish species with international significanc e (e .g . Atlantic salmon) (N,I,L] <1 > 2. Effect on Caspian hydrology, , and biology from Europea n diversions has implications for [U,L] <1 > 3. Very large diversions (200-300 km3/yr), discussed for next century , from arctic draining rivers could alter the ice pack in the margina l arctic seas (especially the ) sufficiently to induce climati c changes that would reach beyond Soviet borders [N,MI,L,C ] ------<1> Assumes implementation of only first phase European [19 .1 km3/yr] an d Siberian [27 .1 km3/yr] transfers .

N• negative impact ; P = postive impact ; MI = major impact ; I m impact ; IM = indeterminate or mixed impact (i .e . both positive and negative) ; C = controversial impact (i .e . major dispute as to severity) ; L = long ter m impact ; S = short-term impac t lems were largely ignored . However, it now appears envi- ronmental and other potential difficulties are being exag- gerated, perhaps to lend further credence to the funda- mentally investment based decision to stop implementation .

The campaign against river diversion schemes and did no t end with their official suspension in August 1986 . Indeed , attacks in the press and other popular media intensified

during 1987 ("Ecology . Economics . Morality," 1987 ; Ley- bovskiy, 1987 ; Zaligin, 1987) . The Institute of Wate r Problems, its director G .V . Voropayev, and staff scientist s directly and indirectly connected with the proposed diver- sions were particularly singled-out for criticism . Th e most vociferous "anti-diversionists" have attempted t o force the Soviet Academy of Sciences to replace Voropayev , accusing him and other scientists at the Institute o f incompetence, willful misrepresentation, and even of at - tempting to perpetrate "ecological crimes ." The leaders o f these efforts are the Russian national writers (e .g . Za- ligin, Bondarev, Belov) and some highly placed scientist s (e .g . Lemeshev ; Academicians Yanshin and Golitsyn) . The writers are adamantly opposed to the projects primaril y because of the damage they foresee to the churches, cath- edrals, monasteries, and medieval towns of the Europea n north, the hearth of Russian culture . Clearly, opponent s of the schemes fear they could be revived and are strivin g to put an end to even the modest basic research effort tha t is permitted under the 1986 decree . Their views, interpre- tations, and opinions related to the water transfer contro- versy are presented as the Gospel truth in the popula r media .

Sadly, these critics have engaged in insulting persona l attacks, gross exaggeration and misrepresentation, and th e use of highly misleading and inaccurate information . Th e leading spokesman of the group opposed to water transfer s is the reclamationist-turned-writer Sergey Zaligin, edito r of the widely read literary journal Novyy mir . He ha s played particularly fast and loose with the truth in orde r to strengthen the opposition's case (Zaligin, 1987) . Among other errors, he grossly overstated the size of the planne d first stage of European diversions, made completely un- founded accusations as to the mathematical validity o f forecasts of the Caspian Sea's level made by experts at th e Institute of Water Problems, and cited figures on th e availability of water resources in a certain o f southern European Russia (Kuban river basin) that ar e physically impossible . Voropayev and others have attempte d to set the record straight on these obvious distortions o f fact but have had no success in obtaining corrections o r retractions and little impact on the general public' s perception of the situation (Voropayev, 1987 ; "Wh o made .. .," 1987) .

THE FUTURE

Currently, Soviet river diversion projects are suspende d with no plans for implementation in the foreseeable future . The continuing campaign against them, however, attest t o the fear of opponents that they may well be revived . Thi s concern is justified . Although too early to draw defin- itive conclusions, various water efficiency measures bein g instituted in the southern portion of the USSR will prob- ably fall well short of their goals (savings of 15-20% o f withdrawals during the current 5-Year plan and more ove r the longer term )("V tsentral'nom .. .," 1986 ; Mickli n 1987b ; 1988) . Additionally, a comprehensive program wil l be very costly ; modernization of irrigation systems alon e may easily run 95 billion rubles (Reymers, 1987) . Furthermore, the is facing a desperate wate r crisis in Central Asia (Micklin, 1987b ; 1988) . Largel y desert but with a rapidly growing population (around 4 0 million in 1988), the region has an economy dependent o n irrigated agriculture . However, huge consumptive withdraw- als have exhausted local water resources . To make matters worse, the Aral Sea, a giant saline lake, is drying at a rapid pace owing to anthropogenic reduction of its inflo w to near zero . The negative environmental impacts of thi s desiccation are numerous and severe . There is much loca l water waste and attempts are underway to correct this . But it is extremely doubtful regional water resources ar e sufficient to meet future economic and social needs and preserve the Aral Sea, no matter how carefully used . Central Asian writers and water management experts, silen t for several years after the suspension of diversions, ar e again claiming the Siberian project is an absolute neces- sity to "save" the region from a catastrophe . Thus, th e Soviet government may be forced to resurrect the scheme i n the 1990s not only for water management but political and social reasons . Even in the European USSR, where the water situation i s much less strained, diversions again may be looked upon favorably . The Caspian sea, which consistently decline d between the 1930s and late 1970s, has risen over a mete r since, removing a primary argument for water transfers . However, the inevitable return of the Caspian to a reces- sionary phase could renew calls for supplementation of it s water balance from . ACKNOWLEDGEMENT S Work leading to this paper was supported from funds pro- vided by the National Council for Soviet and East Europea n Research, which, however, is not responsible for its con - tent or findings, the National Academy of Sciences whic h funded a three month research exchange in the USSR durin g fall 1987, and the Lucia Harrison Fund of the Department o f Geography, Western Michigan University . REFERENCE S

Aganbegyan, A . et al . (1986) . "Land - the chie f natural resource ." Pravda, February 12, 3 .

"Does Central Asia need Siberian water?" (1987) . Zvezda vostoka, 6, 3-14 .

"Ecology . Economics . Morality" (1987) . Nash sovrem- menik, 1, 113-167 .

Lemeshev, M . (1985) . "Against the current ." Sovet- skaya Rossiya, December 20, 3 .

Leybovskiy, Vadim (1987) . "Irrevocable ." Ogonek, 40 , 24-27 .

Micklin, Philip P . (1986) . "The Status of the Sovie t Union's North-South Water Transfer Projects Before Thei r Abandonment in 1985-86 ." Soviet Geography, 5, 287-329 .

Micklin, Philip P . (1987a) . "The Fate of 'Sibaral' : Soviet in the Gorbachev Era ." Central Asia n Survey, 2, 67-88 .

Micklin, Philip P . (1987b) . "Irrigation and Its Fu- ture in : A Preliminary Analysis ." I n Soviet Geography Studies in Our Time . The University o f Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 229-260 .

Micklin, Philip P . (1988) . "The Aral Sea Problem : Anatomy of a Water Management Disaster ." A paper presente d at the annual meeting of the Association of America n Geographers, Phoenix, Arizona, April 6-10, 1988 .

Pravda (1986) . August 20, 1 .

Reymers, N . (1987) . "People, rivers, deserts ." Trud , December 1, 4 .

Voropayev, G . (1987) . "To the writer S .P . Zaligin . " Zvezda vostoka, 6, 6-10 .

"Who made the request?" (1987) . Izvestiya, April 20 , 4 .

Zaligin, Sergey (1985) . "Planning, scientific valid- ity, and responsibility ." Kommunist, 13 (September), 63-73 .

Zaligin, Sergy (1987) . "Turning point : lessons of on e discussion ." Novyy mir, 1, 1-18 .