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Editor Col David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.) JFQ Forum [email protected] Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D. 2 JFQ Dialogue Supervisory Editor George C. Maerz Production Supervisor Martin J. Peters, Jr. 6 Executive Summary Senior Copy Editor Calvin B. Kelley Russia and the Return of Geopolitics By Milan N. Vego Book Review Editor Lisa M. Yambrick 8 Associate Editors Jennifer C. Veilleux Southeast Asian Security Challenges: America’s Response? Chaim E. Mandelbaum 16 By Marvin C. Ott Design Rebecca J. White and Jamie Harvey U.S. Government Printing Office 22 Chinese Influence on U.S. Operational Access to African Seaports Staff Photographer SSgt D. Myles Cullen, USAF By Gordon S. Magenheim Printed in St. Louis, Missouri by 28 Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea By Patrick J. Paterson

Special Feature NDU Press is the National Defense University’s cross-component, professional, military, and An Interview with Bantz J. Craddock academic publishing house. It publishes books, 33 policy briefs, occasional papers, monographs, and 36 A Blueprint for Change: Transforming NATO Special Operations special reports on national security strategy, defense By James L. Jones policy, national military strategy, regional security affairs, and global strategic problems. NDU Press is part of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, a 41 Toward a Horizon of Hope: Considerations for Long-term Stability in policy research and strategic gaming organization. Postconflict Situations By William E. Ward

Extending the Phase Zero Campaign Mindset: Ensuring Unity of This is the authoritative, official U.S. Department 46 of Defense edition of JFQ. Any copyrighted portions Effort of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted By Thomas P. Galvin without permission of the copyright proprietors. Joint Force Quarterly should be acknowledged whenever 52 The Changing Face of Europe and Africa: material is quoted from or based on its content. The USEUCOM AOR in 25 Years By Thomas P. Galvin

COMMUNICATIONS 58 Improving Military-to-Military Relations with Russia Please visit NDU Press and Joint Force Quarterly By Christopher T. Holinger online at ndupress.ndu.edu for more on upcoming issues, an electronic archive of JFQ articles, and access to many other useful NDU Press publications. Commentary Constructive comments and contributions are important to us. Please direct editorial 62 Trading Places: How and Why National Security Roles Are Changing communications to the link on the NDU Press Web By Joseph A. Gattuso site or write to: A Broader Conceptualization of Islam and Terrorism By J. Keith Akins Editor, Joint Force Quarterly 66 National Defense University Press 300 Fifth Avenue Fort Lesley J. McNair CORRECTION Washington, DC 20319-5066 In JFQ 44 (1st Quarter 2007), Major Stacy Bathrick, USA, Public Affairs Officer for Special Opera- Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 tions Command, Pacific, was not credited for her contribution to Major General David P. Fridovich, FAX: (202) 685-4219/DSN 325 USA, and Lieutenant Colonel Fred T. Krawchuk, USA, “Winning in the Pacific: The Special Opera- Email: [email protected] tions Forces Indirect Approach.” Major Bathrick provided background and research for this article. JFQ online: ndupress.ndu.edu

2d Quarter, April 2007

ISSN 1070-0692

A Profession a l M i l i ta r y a n d S ecurity Journ a l Features PUBLISHER Gen Peter Pace, USMC 74 Obstacles to Effective Joint Targeting By John Patch EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Stephen J. Flanagan, Ph.D. 78 Iraq and the AC–130: Gunships Unleashed By Robert J. Seifert Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies Advisory Committee Adaptive Planning: Not Your Great Grandfather’s Schlieffen Plan 84 LtGen Frances C. Wilson, USMC National Defense University By Robert M. Klein BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) Office of the Chairman MG Byron S. Bagby, USA Joint Forces Staff College 89 Deconflicting Electronic Warfare in Joint Operations Col Jeremiah D. Canty, USMC Marine Corps War College By Arthur F. Huber, Gary Carlberg, Prince Gilliard, and L. David Marquet A. Denis Clift Joint Military Intelligence College ADM Edmund P. Giambastiani, USN The Joint Staff Col Thomas Greenwood, USMC Marine Corps Command 96 Space Strategy: A Call to Arms for the Sea Services By John J. Klein and Staff College MG David H. Huntoon, USA U.S. Army War College 100 Terrorist Use of the Internet: The Real Story Brig Gen Jay H. Lindell, USAF Air Command and Staff College By Irving Lachow and Courtney Richardson Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC The Joint Staff RADM Gerard M. Mauer, Jr., USN Industrial College of the Armed Forces RADM Richard J. Mauldin, USN The Joint Staff The Officer Corps and Profession: Time for a New Model 104 Maj Gen (S) Stephen J. Miller, USAF Air War College By Brian J. Collins BG Mark E. O’Neill, USA U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Maj Gen Teresa M. Peterson, USAF National War College LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA The Joint Staff Recall RADM Jacob L. Shuford, USN Naval War College Col David Smarsh, USAF Naval Postgraduate School 111 Last Flight from Koh Tang: The Mayaguez Incident a Generation Later Editorial Board By David R. Mets Stephen J. Flanagan National Defense University Richard K. Betts Columbia University Stephen D. Chiabotti School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Book Reviews Eliot A. Cohen The Johns Hopkins University Aaron L. Friedberg Princeton University Off the Shelf by Lisa M. Yambrick Alan L. Gropman Industrial College of the Armed Forces 116 Col David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.) National Defense University Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond: The U.S. Marine Corps in the Douglas N. Hime Naval War College 117 Mark H. Jacobsen Marine Corps Command and Staff College Second Iraq War Reviewed by Martin J. Sullivan Daniel T. Kuehl Information Resources Management College Col Anne E. McGee, USAF Industrial College of the Armed Forces 118 Rethinking the Principles of War Reviewed by Gary Sheffield Thomas L. McNaugher The RAND Corporation Kathleen Mahoney-Norris Air Command and Staff College 119 The U.S.-Japan Alliance in the 21st Century: A View of the History and a William H.J. Manthorpe, Jr. Joint Military Intelligence College Rationale for Its Survival Reviewed by Michael J. Green LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) Hudson Institute Col Mark Pizzo, USMC (Ret.) National War College Col Thomas C. Skillman, USAF Air War College 120 Uncomfortable Wars Revisited Reviewed by Walter Ladwig COL Robert E. Smith, USA U.S. Army War College LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) Harvard University

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do CONTRIBUTIONS not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government. Joint Force Quarterly welcomes submission of scholarly, independent research from members of the Armed Forces, security policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists, and civilians from the United States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration About the covers to the address on the opposite page or by email to smothermanj@ ndu.edu “Attention A&R Editor” in the subject line. For further The front cover depicts F–16 taking off from Aviano Air Base, Italy (U.S. Air Force/Isaach L. Free- information see the guidelines on the NDU Press Web site at JO IN T F O RC E QU AR TE RL Y Issue 45, 2d Quarter 2007

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JFQ man); Soldiers conducting antiterrorist training in Bulgaria (U.S. Army Europe/Gary L. Kieffer); ndupress.ndu.edu. coming next in... USS Monterey arriving in Greece to join Standing NATO Maritime Group Two (U.S. Navy/Paul Intelligence and Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Defense University Technology Farley); and C–130 dropping humanitarian aid to flood victims in Kenya (U.S. Navy/Robert U.S. Strategic Palomares).[Background] nighttime view of USEUCOM area of responsibility. The table of contents Press for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the Command plus shows U.S. Marines training with People’s Liberation Army Navy marines in China (U.S. Marine Chairman’s flagship joint military and security studies journal R O F T N I O J U.S. European Aviator Attitudes Toward Command Unmanned Aircraft Systems Corps/Jeremy J. Harper); Sailor training local customs agents in East Timor (U.S. Navy/Don Bray); designed to inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and Intelligence Support for U Q E C Effects-based Approaches

R A th . . . and more in issue 46, L R E T Thai soldiers in urban terrain training, Exercise Cobra Gold 2006 (4 Combat Camera Squadron/ other partners on joint and integrated operations; national security d Y 3 Quarter 2007 of JFQ st Efren Lopez); Indonesian peacekeepers departing for UN Interim Force in Lebanon (1 Combat policy and strategy; efforts to combat terrorism; homeland security; Camera Squadron/John M. Foster). The back cover shows B–2 refueling over Australia during Ex- and developments in training and joint professional military International Security

ISSUE FOR Cooperation Challenges ercise Green Lightning (U.S. Air Force /Shane A. Cuomo); MV–22 making vertical takeoff from USS

JOIN T F O RC E Q U AR TE RL Y TY Obstacles to Effective education to transform America’s military and security apparatus to -FIVE, Joint Targeting A Professional Military and Security Journal Wasp (U.S. Navy/Timothy Bensken); Soldiers securing area near Forward Operating Base Nimir, 2 D Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff QU

by National Defense University Press AR Terrorist Use of Institute for National Strategic Studies TER 2007 the Internet meet tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting freedom today. National Defense University, Washington, DC 1070-0692()45;1-O Iraq, to gather intelligence (U.S. Army/Russell Lee Klika); and USS Carl Vinson being upgraded with A P R OFES SIONAL MILI TA R Y AN D SECU RI TY JOURNA L latest technology while having nuclear fuel replenished (U.S. Navy/Joshua Hammond). ndupress.ndu.edu JFQ Dialogue Strategic Communication in the Department of Defense

Rear Admiral Frank Thorp IV, USN, A Continuous Process is Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Joint Communication). By Frank Thorp IV

he U.S. military is not suf- Concept of Operations a process to integrate and synchronize the ficiently organized, trained, or Not long after this roadmap was DIME effort, affecting the way we work to equipped to analyze, plan, coor- approved and promulgated, a concept of achieve desired effects. T dinate, and integrate the full operations was developed, coordinated with Inside the military, we ensure that our spectrum of capabilities available to promote all applicable parties, approved, and widely roles in the DIME elements are integrated America’s interests. Changes in the global distributed. It establishes a proven construct and synchronized internally and that we are information environment require the Depart- based on operational planning. Whereas the prepared to integrate and synchronize those ment of Defense, in conjunction with other old school of thought placed communica- efforts in the interagency and coalition SC U.S. Government agencies, to implement tion (usually titled public affairs) somewhere process. Through this process, we help the more deliberate and well-developed strategic near the execution phase, the new school of Nation achieve desired effects, either inde- communication (SC) processes. strategic communication planning identifies pendently or in concert with other nations, Effective communication by the those combinations of actions and words that intergovernmental organizations, or nongov- United States must build upon coordinated are most likely to produce the desired under- ernmental organizations. actions and information at all levels of the standing and actions by key audiences. U.S. Government in order to maintain Four-Phase Process credibility and trust. This will be accom- SC Philosophy Research and Analysis. Information plished through an emphasis on accuracy, The strategic communication process can be collected in advance of serious con- consistency, veracity, timeliness, and trans- is continuous and integrated from the begin- templation of action, but research becomes parency in words and deeds. Such credibil- ning of each operational planning cycle. The more deliberate and focused as situational ity is essential to building relationships that SC cycle moves quickly and can repeat itself requirements arise. Research is focused on advance national interests. several times in the course of operational the commander’s intent and desired effects, With the publishing of the 2006 Qua- planning. Strategic communication takes both of which must shape all phases of the drennial Defense Review Strategic Commu- Government policy and consistently applies SC process. During this phase, we attempt to nication Execution Roadmap last September, it to what we say and do. When what we say understand our audiences and their environ- a watershed event occurred: the Deputy and what we do are not synchronized or are ment, how they think, what they believe, and Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the inconsistent with policy, a “Say–Do Gap” is how they routinely receive information upon Joint Chiefs of Staff had agreed to the defini- created, our efforts are not maximized, the which they trust and act—in other words, tion of strategic communication and how it desired effect is perhaps not achieved, and the what it takes for us to create desired effects. is to be integrated into all planning efforts. disconnect adversely affects our credibility as Reachback capabilities may be a key contribu- In essence, they concurred that strategic com- a military force and as a nation. tor toward optimizing the resources required munication is “Focused United States Govern- Previous dialogue about strategic of a combatant command or joint task force to ment processes and efforts to understand and communication focused on the informa- perform the needed research. engage key audiences to create, strengthen, tional element of national power, and most Planning. Desired effects prompt plan- or preserve conditions favorable to advance agreed that this element was the main ners to develop courses of action that meet national interests and objectives through driver toward SC effects. But in true stra- the commander’s intent. Planning includes the use of coordinated information, themes, tegic communication, we acknowledge the branches and sequels that seize opportuni- plans, and actions synchronized with other interdependency of diplomatic, informa- ties and adjust execution as assessments elements of national power.” tional, military, and economic (DIME) ele- deem necessary. Planning can be done both ments. Strategic communication provides within the individual lines of operation and

JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Open Letter to JFQ Readers

Joint Force Quarterly is mindful that many of its readers have experienced multiple tours of duty in one or more theaters in the war on terror. We want to hear your stories, share your practical insights, and improve the way our government secures national security interests in partnership with allies and nongovernmental organizations. Even when manuscripts focus on technical or specialized aspects of security research, JFQ can usually find a way to incorporate the work and sometimes refers an author’s study to outside institutes and centers, such as the Center for Technology and National Security Policy. We ask that authors and research groups continue submitting the broad array of articles and thoughtful critiques unfettered and would also like to solicit manuscripts on specific subject areas in concert with future thematic focuses.

The following are areas of interest that JFQ expects to return to frequently, with no submission deadline:

n orchestrating instruments of national power n coalition operations n employing the economic instrument of power collaboratively between lines of operation; n future of naval power however, it must be integrated and synchro- n humanitarian assistance and disaster relief nized within boards and cells comprising all n industry collaboration for national security participants. This enhances the creation of n integrated operations subsets (new partners, interoperability, a better overall design, intended to produce and transformational approaches) desired effects on target audiences. n joint air and space power Execution. Operations are conducted n Just War theory across lines of operation in an integrated and n defending against surprise attack synchronized manner, in accordance with the n proliferation and weapons of mass destruction plan, to produce desired effects. Not all lines n prosecuting the war on terror within sovereign countries will be involved in every instance, and dif- n military and diplomatic history ferent lines will be more active than others at various times. The following topics are tied to submission deadlines for specific Assessment. This phase begins upon upcoming issues: execution and is continuous throughout. Based on assessment, research, planning, and June 1, 2007 (Issue 47, 4th quarter 2007): December 1, 2008 execution for any follow-on operations can U.S. Pacific Command (Issue 49, 2d quarter 2008): be adjusted or modified in an effort to ensure Focus on China Focus on Air and Space Power that we are producing the commander’s SECDEF and CJCS Essay Contest Winners U.S. Special Operations Command desired effects, goals, and objectives. September 1, 2007 March 1, 2008 (Issue 50, 3d quarter 2008): The Future of SC (Issue 48, 1st quarter 2008): Weapons of Mass Destruction The military element of strategic com- The Long War Stability and Security Operations munication cannot be overemphasized. The Homeland Defense U.S. Central Command military commander’s ability to inform U.S. Northern Command and influence selected audiences in today’s complex environment is a critical element JFQ readers are typically subject matter experts who can take an issue or debate to the to successful operations. While it is encour- next level of application or utility. Quality manuscripts harbor the potential to save money aging to see commanders developing SC and lives. When framing your argument, please focus on the So what? question. That is, processes that are fully nested within higher how does your research, experience, or critical analysis improve the understanding or national-level SC objectives, there remains performance of the reader? Speak to implications from the operational to strategic level of a long road to travel before these processes influence and tailor the message for an interagency readership without using acronyms or are fully integrated into joint planning jargon. Also, write prose, not terse bullets. Even the most prosaic doctrinal debate can be efforts. It would do well for military leaders interesting if presented with care! Visit ndupress.ndu.edu to view our NDU Press Submis- and Defense officials to follow in the path sion Guidelines. Share your professional insights and improve national security. of both the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, who have come to Colonel David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.) understand the vast importance of strategic Editor, Joint Force Quarterly communication. [email protected] ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ Joint Publications Revised (Calendar Year 2006) Joint Doctrine Update JP 4–05, Joint Mobilization Planning JP 1–04, Legal Support JP 3–13, Information Operations JP 3–50, Personnel Recovery Joint Chiefs of Staff J7 Joint Education JP 3–08, Interagency Coordination JP 3–07.3, Peace Operations and Doctrine Division JP 6–0, Joint Communications System JP 3–09, Joint Fire Support JP 3–07.2, Antiterrorism JP 3–13.1, Electronic Warfare he joint doctrine development since the Goldwater-Nichols Department of JP 3–17, Air Mobility Operations (Ch. 1) community (JDDC) revised or Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 occurred JP 3–34, Joint Engineer Operations published an unprecedented 25 during the recent revisions of JP 3–0, Joint JP 4–06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations joint publications in 2006. The Operations, and JP 5–0, Joint Planning. JP 3–0 JP 5–0, Joint Operation Planning T JP 2–01.2, Counter Intelligence and Human efforts of the JDDC, which consists of the introduced a new “range of military opera- Intelligence Support Joint Staff, Services, and the combatant com- tions” to encompass military engagement, JP 2–03, Geospatial Intelligence Support mands, should come as no surprise because it security cooperation, and deterrence; crisis JP 3–13.3, Operations Security has engaged in sustained combat operations response contingencies; and major operations JP 3–01, Countering Air and Missile Threats in support of the war on terror for over 5 and campaigns. Joint operations added three JP 3–13.4, Military Deception years. During this time period, the JDDC has principles (restraint, perseverance, and legiti- JP 3–41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosives revised over 96 percent of the publications in macy) to the principles of war and replaced Consequence Management the hierarchy. the four-phase model with a six-phase one. JP 3–10, Joint Security Operations in Theater The revisions of Capstone Joint Pub- This new phasing model incorporated lessons JP 1–0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations lication (JP) 1, Joint Doctrine of the Armed from recent combat operations to change the JP 3–32, Command and Control for Joint Forces of the United States, and the Keystone “decisive operations” phase to the “dominate” Maritime Operations JP 4–02, Health Service Support publications have been the most significant phase and to replace “transition” with two JP 3–0, Joint Operations achievements. In the past year, the Chairman new phases: “stabilize” and “enable civil approved all of these publications, except authority.” Furthermore, JP 3–0 covered the Joint Publications Revised for JP 2–0, Intelligence Support, and JP 4–0, systems perspective of the operational envi- (2d Quarter Fiscal Year 2007) Logistics, both due to be completely revised in ronment, the effects-based approach to plan- JP 3–05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations summer 2007. JP 1 consolidated the previous ning, and effects assessment. JP 3–07.5, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations versions of JP 1 and JP 0–2, Unified Action JP 5–0 incorporated the joint opera- JP 3–16, Multinational Operations Armed Forces. This publication expanded tional planning process to complement the JP 3–35, Deployment and Redeployment interagency and multinational aspects of joint operational planning and execution JP 3–60, Targeting operations, updated joint force character- system (JOPES). While providing a link to JP 3–27, Homeland Defense JP 3–33, Joint Task Force Headquarters istics, and reflected portions of the 2006 JOPES, it also focuses on military decision- JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Most making and operational design between States notably, JP 1 introduced the term irregular combatant commanders and components or warfare into joint doctrine. subordinate joint forces. Joint Publications Projected for Revision d The introduction of irregular warfare Finally, the JDDC continues to make (3 Quarter Fiscal Year 2007) JP 3–03, Joint Interdiction posed a unique situation as doctrine and significant contributions to the joint force. JP 3–15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare concept were developed nearly simultane- A recent survey of Joint Staff, combatant for Joint Operations ously. The insertion of irregular warfare into command staffs (division and branch heads), JP 3–04.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and joint doctrine will occur through revisions of and joint professional military education Procedures for Shipboard Helicopter various joint publications that must discuss venues found that over 93 percent use joint Operations JP 3–07.4, Joint Counter Drug Operations irregular warfare activities. The parallel doctrine in some aspect of their jobs. Over JP 4–05.1, Manpower Mobilization/Demobilization development of the irregular warfare joint 86 percent reported using joint doctrine at JP 2–0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to operating concept will continue through least monthly. Of that percentage, over half Joint Operations rigorous experimentation. Lessons learned use it weekly. Only 3 percent reported being JP 3–28, Civil Support from experimentation, coupled with capturing dissatisfied with the quality of information.1 JP 4–0, Joint Logistic Support best practices from current operations, will With the number one complaint about joint have significant impacts on future doctrine. doctrine being that it is outdated, the JDDC N ote In addition, U.S. Joint Forces Command will efforts to provide the best possible product 1 assess the need for joint doctrine on counter- will continue in earnest. Joint doctrine survey results brief delivered th insurgency, counterterrorism, and combating For access to joint publications, visit on November 7, 2006, at the 38 Joint Doctrine Working Party. This conference took place at the terrorism. the Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Perhaps the most profound changes to Electronic Information System Web site at Center in Suffolk, Virginia. joint operations and joint planning doctrine https://jdeis.js.mil.

JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Letter to the Editor Iraq, Afghanistan, East Timor, and Bosnia. thought, due to the Crusades, Western impe- To the Editor: Two articles in the last issue The question is why. rialism, or globalisation. of Joint Force Quarterly (Issue 44, 1st quarter Professor Long comments that “there is Many experts, however, would accept 2007), Philip Wasielewski’s “Defining the War an inherent clash of ideologies and not simply that globalisation is an explanatory factor for on Terror” and Jerry Long’s “Confronting an national interests,” but he does not go on to the rise of al Qaeda itself. Professor Michael Army Whose Men Love Death: Osama, Iraq, develop this point fully. Part of this ideologi- Mousseau argues that in the movement from and U.S. Foreign Policy,” are a help in under- cal clash comes from the concept he identi- a nonmarket to a market economy, globalisa- standing the essence of the war on terror, and fies as Jahiliyya, the state of ignorance that tion produced significant disruption in Euro- such an understanding is crucial to winning. prevailed before Islam was established, but pean and now in Islamic and other societies But there are some points made by both he does not attribute this concept, as Colonel commencing in the mid 19th century. Such can authors that need further clarification. Wasielewski does, to the Muslim scholar Ibn and does lead to a support for terror. Professor For instance, Professor Long states, “The Taymiyya (1263–1328). Long correctly attributes the impact of the concern is that the Bush administration’s Based on this concept, Professor Long war in Afghanistan as a factor leading to the doctrine of preemption . . . and its larger war points out that bin Laden considers all rise of al Qaeda. My own research would indi- on terror proceed from a serious misreading Muslim governments illegitimate. He fails, cate that the Sunni/Shia conflict is the fourth of Islamic ideology and that U.S. actions may however, to clarify two important points and final part of the explanation for its rise. not ameliorate the threat but exacerbate it.” here: first, al Qaeda views all current Muslim Based on this more detailed analysis, it Unfortunately, it is Professor Long who has governments—democratic, authoritarian, is clear that the solution to this problem is, as somewhat misread Islamic ideology. His key or highly religious—as totally illegitimate; with the Cold War, primarily the use of soft contention, based on a comment by Osama second, Ibn Taymiyya in the 13th century and power to reverse the relative failure of Islam bin Laden of 80 years of “humiliation and then Sayyid Qutb in the 20th century both and to minimise the impact of globalisation disgrace,” is that “the context for 9/11 is believed that any state that did not put God on Islamic societies. modern Middle East history, beginning with wholly at its center was illegitimate. Qutb, Colonel Wasielewski’s article does look World War I” and that, to many Muslims, probably the most important ideologist for al at the historic sources of al Qaeda’s ideology, Western (particularly U.S.) actions in that Qaeda, believed that the separation of religion while surprisingly ignoring the impact of Saudi region in the last 80 years primarily caused and state was “hideous schizophrenia” and Wahhabism. While he correctly identifies this humiliation. that this secularism of the Republic of Turkey the need to challenge their ideology, I would A more nuanced reading of bin Laden’s was an attempt to “exterminate” Islam. disagree with some of his suggested actions. comment traces the “80 years” reference Secularism, therefore, is a crucial factor Accepting that al Qaeda’s ideology is based on back to the abolition of the Sunni Islamic that makes all current Muslim governments, fringe views, Muslims clearly are the only ones caliphate by the Republic of Turkey in and all other governments in the world today, who can confront this ideology successfully. the early 1920s. This point is confirmed illegitimate (Jahili as Professor Long puts This part of the war on terror must be led by by Professor Long’s own quotation from it) in the eyes of al Qaeda. It is important to Muslim states—particularly the democratic Mullah Mustapha Kreikar: “There is no dif- understand this idea because it shows what states of Indonesia and Turkey. (It is important ference between this [Iraqi] occupation and al Qaeda hates most is what the West is, not to remember here that the majority of Muslims the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. . . . what it does. The numbers of Muslims who live in Asia, not the Middle East and Persian The resistance is not only a reaction to the fully adhere to this ideology are tiny. The vast Gulf.) Some success in this effort is evident American invasion, it is part of the continu- majority of Muslims, as evidenced by numer- already in Indonesia where the majority of ous Islamic struggle since the collapse of the ous opinion polls and by Pew Global Attitude activists in the al Qaeda–related movement caliphate.” Professor Long omitted the next Surveys, oppose what the Vice President of Jemaah Islamiyah have apparently decided to sentence that clarifies what is meant: “All Indonesia, Yusef Kalla, has described as these achieve their aims by nonviolent means. Islamic struggles since then are part of one “fringe ideological views.” Fully understanding the source of organised effort to bring back the caliphate.” An accurate analysis of the source of al Muslim grievances, the ideology that al Qaeda Bin Laden has also commented repeatedly Qaeda is vital to ensuring that the proposed espouses, and the extent to which it is a viru- on the caliphate. methods of dealing with it are effective. lent form of Sunni extremism helps to clarify More importantly, a significant number Most scholars would agree that a key reason the approach to winning the war on terror of statements from bin Laden make clear that for Muslim discontent and a foundational and the crucial importance of Muslim states the timeline he is focused on is not modern explanation for the rise of al Qaeda is their leading that effort, particularly on the key history but a much longer period—1,500 years perception of the failure of Islam, relative ideological front. back to the foundation of Islam. For example, to its illustrious past and relative to other bin Laden has stated, “The struggle between societies currently. Al Qaeda focuses on the —Richard F. Whelan us and them [the West], the confrontation and reestablishment of the caliphate because it Dublin, Ireland clashing began centuries ago and will con- believes only with such a development will tinue until judgement day.” The conclusion Islam recover its past glories. Muslim scholars is clear: the underlying issue for bin Laden is who have studied this situation agree that the Richard F. Whelan is the author of Al-Qaedaism: The the caliphate, not modern events in Palestine, decline commenced in the 12th century due Threat to Islam, The Threat to the World (Ashfield to internal reasons and not, as is frequently Press, 2005). ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ jfq forum force, and persistence. instrumentsall of national power, economy of requiresconflict the orchestrationcareful of so during the course of a long, asymmetric isat difficult the best of times, but doing issues before they become major problems panorama of emergent international security the United States to engage effectively the vast Russia and China, are legion. The ability of points of friction, such as relations with terror threat, but older and more conventional ers to view the world through the prism of the technology,” it is tempting for think military War College that deals with Southeast Asia. contribution from a professor at the National featured in the last issue, inspired a followup Special Operations Command, Pacific, and An excellent article, however, submitted by thewithin USEUCOM area of responsibility. cles that detail international relations issues our original intent was to select Forum arti is U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), terror. Because the topic of our Special Feature concurrent with the prosecution of the war on and demand resources dedicated elsewhere T Executive Summary

In an age of emboldened“barbarism by JFQ / as an imbalance of conventional military power. military conventional of imbalance an as dangerous as bit every is patience demand and sacrifice demand that missions out carry to resolve the or will the lacks States United the that enemies our by conclusion A well. as provocative be can part our on weakness of perception the but provocative, weakness is only not that clear be should Todayit issue developments that bear scrutiny cooperation challenges and present a ofhandful security his Forum’s objective is to 45, 2 d quarter2007 - - capabilities. In capabilities. addition to the recognized mation operations despite its sophisticated a relative ofin disadvantage the realm infor Forqueville. numerous reasons, America is at suchpurpose, as that mentioned by de Toc or patiently a lengthy, complex strategic the United States to pursue either quietly worsened—not improved—the of ability patience. with quences conse their await or secrecy with measures its combine cannot It obstacles. serious of spite in execution its out work and design, fixed a in persevere undertaking, important an of details the regulate difficulty great with only can democracy a But another. to bears people one which relations the over influence indirect an only have that tages advan are these all society: of classes all in law for respect the fortifies and spirit, public promotes comfort, and wealth diffuses it state; a of resources internal the of increase the to favorable is Democracy deficient. is it which in those all almost of use perfect the contrary, the on require, they democracy; a to peculiar are which qualities those of any scarcely demand politics Foreign States as his point of reference: problem in the 19 The information age has arguably Alexis de Tocqueville spoke to this —Donald H. Rumsfeld H. —Donald

th century with the United 1

- - - - job,” and the other is “how long the country is how long it is going to us totake do the he fears there areat two timelines work: “One Conway told at Marines Camp Fallujah that ate those means.” Separately, James General means and the requiredtime actual to gener the ends and the ways—few understand the and means of focusstrategy, on they usually Iraq. When peopleabout talk the ends, ways focus on long-term strategy, but not just for ing to PeterGeneral Schoomaker, “we need to terror and requisite public support. Accord a long-term, coherent for strategy the war on Corps haveMarine spoken to the challenge of the U.S. Army and the ofCommandant the for our enemies.” Both the Chief ofof Staff peopleAmerican are the center of gravity of the Joint “The Chiefs ofasserted, Staff in a democracy.strategy support, the sine qua non for any long-term of a great communicator. At is stake public the Wisdom of Solomon and the charisma long-term interests of the Nation requires lives the ofbest U.S. serving while citizens President of the United States to preserve the and Theantagonistic. responsibility of the fortunity spectator states, both friendly long-term affords strategic oppor conflict consequenceswar, in asymmetric a costly problem of incentive and moral imbalances On October 24, 2006, the Chairman On Octoberthe Chairman 24, 2006, ndupress.ndu.edu - - - EXECUTIVE SUMMARYGURNEY is going to allow us to do the job. And they’re security strategy addressing a pervasive sense the challenges that have inspired a new theater not syncing up.” of Muslim grievance exploited by jihadists. strategy. The interview includes a discussion An important factor influencing the He also argues for a serious treatment of the of NATO, the much anticipated U.S. Africa time and resources dedicated to a strat- Chinese strategic challenge in Southeast Asia. Command, and of course, Afghanistan. egy is opportunity cost. The U.S. Central China features even more prominently Today there are more than 60 countries Command, for obvious reasons, receives a in our third Forum article, which outlines working in Afghanistan to promote stability disproportionate share of forces and resources Sino economic, military, and political activi- and reconstruction. Of these, 26 NATO and 11 that would normally be more evenly dis- ties in Africa—especially in the littorals. At non-NATO countries have military forces on tributed among the geographic combatant a time when the United States is studying the ground. This is a departure from NATO’s commands for other strategic purposes. the requirement for a geographic combatant formative years as a “reactive alliance,” where Estimating the opportunity costs for the command dedicated to Africa, the Chinese are forces were not funded or logistically equipped conduct of a generations-long war on terror forging deep ties with many African nations to operate more than a few hundred miles surely constitutes military art at its most to secure access to markets and the continent’s from home. With more than 50,000 troops hypothetical. How severe is the strategic risk vast natural resources. Colonel Gordon engaged in activities on three continents, of paths not taken in global theater security Magenheim argues that U.S. force projection such as the mission in Afghanistan, member cooperation? Our Forum examines various capabilities are heavily dependent on the nations have reportedly been dismayed by inputs to this difficult calculus, both current availability of modern seaports to accom- attendant costs, which under NATO’s “costs and developing. modate the largest classes of commercial fall where they lie” principle, are not evenly In our first Forum installment, Dr. shipping. He further speculates that African distributed. At the NATO Summit in Prague 4 Milan Vego of the Naval War College surveys seaport operators may be reluctant to invite years ago, it was generally agreed that member Russia from the perspective of one who Chinese ire or risk disrupting normal port nations would contribute a minimum of 2 believes that too many U.S. military profes- operations in favor of U.S. interests in times percent of their gross domestic product to sionals ceased to study that nation seriously of crisis. national security. Today, only seven countries after 1989 and thus are in need of a compre- Our final entry in the Forum also in the Alliance meet that goal, making this hensive update. The illiberal drift of Russia includes a maritime focus, in this case the commitment appear less of a floor and more toward what many consider to be enduring African Gulf of Guinea, which was recently of a ceiling. (or in the case of Winston Churchill, inscru- declared a U.S. strategic national interest. The Shortly after relinquishing command of table) national instincts has received much nations located in this region include Nigeria, U.S. European Command to General Crad- press attention in recent months, and Profes- the largest oil producer in Africa, which sends dock, General James Jones spoke publicly sor Vego’s essay is purposefully broad. The half of its oil to the United States. Within 13 about his experiences as the commander of Army War College Strategic Studies Institute years, Nigerian oil production is expected to USEUCOM and as Supreme Allied Com- recently noted that “a new, improved Russian exceed the total oil output of all Persian Gulf mander, Europe. He noted that the resources military establishment is arising” and that countries. Amid the region’s vast wealth are that our NATO partners invest in national it demands to be taken seriously. Profes- persistent challenges such as disease, cor- defense are shrinking while their political will sor Vego predicts that there will be serious ruption, and the drug trade—all of which to act is increasing. He called this situation tension between Russia and the West in the demand interagency cooperation, not mili- “a train wreck waiting to happen.” Similar future and that a serious conflict is not out of tary solutions. For those challenges that do views were expressed by former Secretary the question. lend themselves to U.S. theater security coop- of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in his farewell The second Forum contribution was eration, Lieutenant Commander Patrick Pat- address on December 15, 2006: “Ours is . . . solicited after National Defense University erson argues that the U.S. Navy’s improved a world of many friends and allies, but sadly, Press published Dr. Marvin Ott’s thought- littoral capabilities seem ideally suited and realistically, friends and allies with declining provoking Strategic Forum No. 222 for the prescient. The Gulf of Guinea is a region that defense investment and declining capabili- Institute for National Strategic Studies (the Americans will become well acquainted with ties, and . . . with increasing vulnerabilities. Strategic Forum series is available for down- in the years to come. All of which require that the United States of load at ndupress.ndu.edu). In the last issue In this issue’s Special Feature section, America invest more.” of JFQ, Major General David Fridovich and we examine the only geographic combat- As an investment of your time, Lieutenant Colonel Fred Krawchuk wrote of ant command with a wholly forward-based we hope that you find this issue of JFQ the need for a comprehensive approach to headquarters. USEUCOM interacts with 92 thought-provoking. We encourage your combating terror in Southeast Asia. Dr. Ott countries, including the 26 members of the feedback, hopefully in the form of manu- was generous in his willingness to comple- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). scripts delineating your lessons learned in ment the U.S. Special Operations Command, Although the USEUCOM footprint in Europe joint, integrated operations. JFQ Pacific, “indirect approach” with an article is smaller than in the past, the scope of its —D.H. Gurney providing additional context to the chal- activities has increased, just as NATO itself is lenge of countering support for terror groups becoming an organization capable of project- N o t e within sovereign countries. The author asserts ing security. General Bantz Craddock leads off 1 that the longstanding U.S. regional presence our examination of his command and area of Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among in Southeast Asia lacks a comprehensive responsibility with an interview focused on Nations (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1993), 160. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ NEW Titles from NDU Press Off the Shelf

s the articles in this issue’s Forum highlight, the Iraq war and the war on terror are only two of myriad regional and functional threats that the United States must keep on its radar screen. The complexity of these threats precludes unilateral U.S. solutions and will require partnership—diplo- 5 2007 January A matic, military, or economic—with allies. The United States and Europe barely had time Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction to recalibrate their relationships to post–Cold War realities before September 11, and its The Future Nuclear Landscape aftermath necessitated another shift (in U.S. eyes, at least). Much of the world stood with the United States on September 12; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) surveil-

by Paul I. Bernstein, John P. Caves, Jr., and lance planes and personnel were dispatched to patrol the east coast of the United States. Yet John F. Reichart a few months later, NATO forces were left on the sidelines as the war against the Taliban aper occasional p in Afghanistan began, and many European and worldwide allies rejected participation in what they considered a war of choice in Iraq. The following book addresses the subject of how relations derailed, seemingly so quickly, and what might be done to reach a new state Center for the Study of of normalcy for a new era. Weapons of Mass Destruction Occasional Paper 5 The Future Nuclear Landscape In important ways, the world is at a nuclear crossroads. The complex and dynamic America and Europe After 9/11 nuclear landscape presents us with chal- and Iraq: The Great Divide lenges along at least four axes: regional by Sarwar A. Kashmeri nuclear proliferation, nuclear terrorism, Westport, CT: Praeger great power nuclear relations, and the Security International, 2006 security implications of increased inter- 128 pp. $44.95 est in nuclear energy. These problems ISBN: 0–275–99301–9 are interrelated in ways that the national ews security community does not fully understand. Strategy and policy frameworks do not address them in sufficiently integrated vi Sarwar Kashmeri, a fellow in the Foreign Policy Association, took up this topic after fashion. New conceptual thinking is attending a conference exploring the European Union’s impact on the transatlantic alliance. e required to develop a more unified under- His approach was to talk with “eminent people with substantial expertise and hands-on standing of and approach to managing the experience in managing various aspects of the alliance and use their expertise to understand risks and opportunities posed by these 21st- better the alliance’s decayed state and to help chart a future for it” (p. xiv). The interlocutors century nuclear challenges. were George H.W. Bush, James A. Baker, Wesley K. Clark, Chuck Hagel, John Major, Hugo k r Institute for National Strategic Studies Paemen, Ana de Palacio, Brent Scowcroft, Paul Volcker, and Caspar Weinberger. Occasional Paper 4 Kashmeri concludes that the current transatlantic rift over the Iraq war is fundamentally China’s Global Activism: different from ones that have occurred (and been overcome) in the past because the foundation of the post–World War II alliance has eroded to such a point that trying to rebuild on oo Strategy, Drivers, and Tools it is futile. One cornerstone of the foundation, Europe itself, has been transformed by the Economic imperatives and strategic b growth and strength of the European Union; unless the United States repositions its align- challenges are leading China to expand ment with this altered European cornerstone, relating to it as an ally rather than a potential its international activities into different geopolitical rival, the foundation for relations will remain unstable. regions of the world. In this paper, Dr. A second source of friction is the role of NATO in a post–Cold War world: “The attempt Phillip C. Saunders analyzes the rationale to remake NATO as a global fighting machine makes the divide worse. . . . It is being forced and drivers for China’s increased global to take on a new mission—operating anywhere in the world—for which it is singularly activism; examines the tools China is unqualified” (p. 44). The close connection between NATO and the United Nations, a tie employing and how they are being used; held in high esteem by Europeans but largely disregarded by Americans, is another area of assesses the empirical evidence about pri- disagreement. orities and patterns in China’s global activ- Kashmeri explains his perceptions of the sources of friction well, deftly interspers- ities; and considers whether these activities ing his interviewees’ comments to bolster his argument (the rather jolting candor of reflect an underlying strategic design. The some comments, considering their sources, is a high point of the book). However, paper concludes with an overview of likely he falls short in recommending actionable ways to recreate the alliance, defaulting future developments and an assessment in several cases to a series of “Why not?” suggestions that are conceptually broad but of the implications for the United States. practically weak (“why not reenergize NATO by using it to forge a consensus on new (Available from NDU Press only) rules of engagement? . . . Who knows where this exercise will take the erstwhile alliance?”) (p. 97). Who knows, indeed. —L. Yambrick Visit the NDU Press Web site for more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu

116 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu book reviews - - 117 - -

JFQ JFQ / quarter 2007 d Researching and writing writing and Researching Thus, despite sparse plan sparse despite Thus, 45, 2 45, prewar strategic assumptions, assumptions, strategic prewar war, of dimensions cultural the and initiatives, transformational dealing for doctrine and concepts insurgencies. with ibility, as immediate and as great great as and immediate as ibility, stabilize to failure of threat the as subsequent In Iraq? secure and Reynolds history, this of versions rapid the whether examine should substantial a of redeployment United the to Marines of number to ability MEF I impacted States contributed and security provide Sunni the of rise the to somehow of expansion the or insurgency militias. Shiite-backed the as viewed be not should history status the validate to exercise an prompt histories well-written quo; for catalysts as act and questions opera Marine Current change. particularly and Iraq, in tions are 2005, and 2004 in those the about questions fueling combat and equipping, training, service. the of organization benevolent his Notwithstanding Iraq, in operations Marine of view by service a provides Reynolds the for context richer a developing surrounding debate continuing ing for SASO as thoroughly as as thoroughly as SASO for ing combat. for would they in missions, postcombat for ning orders received MEF I mid-April opera stability undertake to describes Reynolds Iraq. in tions as SASO of view Marines’ the business. Army’s the strictly to time was it felt leaders Corps “recock” to sandbox” “the leave where But war. next the for go to planning Marines the were the Were “recocked”? they when Iraq in SASO on views Corps’ given credible and legitimate In circumstances? strategic the risks the were region other what higher, security national U.S. to of likelihood the of terms in as Then, consequences? severe to threats other there are now, to or goals, strategic America’s cred international country’s the issue - - - - - the -

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Kingdom. th In my view, the emphasis on century, is worthy of study - - - - - th - - - - campaigns. Some of the articles objective study of past wars and this requiresAll intensive and well as adimension. military surgency requires a political as as that a successful counterin of previous campaigns, such absorbing the hard-won lessons do so. At another level, it involves resources are made available to it, and ensuring that sufficient achieved and how to achieve out what political goal is to be as straightforward as working centuries. At one level, this is have remained constant for as the tion on what we might describe is really needed is a concentra novelty take us very far. What facets. Neither does a search for higher direction of war in itsall as this volume demonstrates, the battles and campaigns, but not, Nichols Nicolas been tightened up— that proofreading could have few annoying errors that suggest a minor complaint, there are a of how this should be done. As in this collection provide models fundamentals of war instead of is the worst. ndupress.ndu.edu Goldwater- JFQ Gold-Water that - - book reviews - - - - 119 -

is an is JFQ / stability JFQ quarter 2007 d I would have liked more atten more liked have would I Vice however, whole, the On Ota ends by speculating on on speculating by ends Ota 45, 2 45, Admiral Ota has provided a read a provided has Ota Admiral usefulcontemporary and able alliance U.S.-Japan the of history and insights important offers that particularly recommendations, States United the in those for Japanese understand to want who criticalthisthinking on strategic relationship. a U.S. shift to China, a crisis over over crisis a China, to shift U.S. a to Japan by failure a or bases, of because crisis a in up measure constraints. legal or constitutional operation specific gives Ota scenarios these how of examples alliance. the damage could action-reac specific the to tion Korean North the of effect tion military China’s or crisis nuclear specifi understand to buildup structural external the how cally alliance shapes environment (since behavior realist a for concept broad awfully liked have also would I use). to since values, to attention more of convergence growing a is there States United the and Japan how and democracy of role the view international the in law of rule Both China. vis-à-vis and system have would elements these of whether only not explain helped survive, should or can alliance the it vibrant and strong how also but be. actually will Defense Forces (JSDF) worked worked (JSDF) Forces Defense trymake and riskthe to share to military reliant U.S. the more realist explanation Japan—a on under would Thucydides that alliancein stand. Smallerstates a face always ones with larger by dilemmaentrapment between abandonment or state larger the enough. cooperate not do theyif the how Otademonstrates makethemselves to strove JSDF in side U.S. the to indispensable within Japan empower to order alliancethe either escape and U.S. in unwillingentrapment abandonment security or policy justifiably is Ota Washington. by proficiency growingthe of proud argumentshis and JSDF, the of growingrealismthe andreveal commanders. its of confidence alliance: the weaken might what issue ------and

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st There was a time, however, however, time, a was There Michael Japan ndupress.ndu.edu 1996, including near-conflict including 1996, work for junior officials at best, at officials junior for work This worst. at burden a as and with allianceended drift the in to 1994 from crises of series a from senior officials on both both on officials senior from saw who Pacific the of sides allianceas the of maintenance ship was plagued by heightened heightened by plagued was ship about confusion friction, trade the of collapse the with missions inattention and Union, Soviet that the United States and Japan Japan and States United the that the In apart. move steadily would relation the mid-1990s, to early strengthening U.S.-Japan secu U.S.-Japan strengthening ties. rity predicted observers most when prime minister, Shinzo Abe, is a is Abe, Shinzo minister, prime clearly has and protégé Koizumi continue to intention his signaled American and coalition partners coalition and American stillcarefully (if dangerous in and Iraq in missions proscribed) new Japan’s Ocean. Indian the has blasted Japan as America’s America’s as Japan blasted has “51 their alongside served have counterparts. The United United The counterparts. closely so are Japan and States on Talks Six-Party the in aligned Jong-Il Kim that Korea North that resembled the close part close the resembled that Presidents American nerships British their with develop often stronger. President George W. W. George President stronger. rela personal a developed Bush Prime Japanese with tionship Koizumi Junichiro Minister M alli U.S. the that acknowledge been never has Japan with ance book reviews 120 Walter security counterinsurgencies feature posi versus subversion. Successful military actions, and actions ing power, the host government’s military actions of the interven actions of the intervening power, support for insurgents, support ment legitimacy, degree of outside are unity of effort, host govern known as the SWORD model, These critical factors, collectively counterinsurgency strategies. sions that are part of successful identify seven strategic dimen power, Fishel and Manwaring insurgencies involving a Western analysis of 43 post–World War II thinking on this timely subject. evolution, encapsulates years of Revisited insurgency. government in overcoming an States can best assist a threatened the means by which the United on internal conflict to identify they have refined their theories and numerous journal articles, ing and writing of 10 books (SWORD), through the research Operations Research Directorate Southern Command’s Small Wars From their early days with U.S. decades studying insurgencies. A of these strategic factors but also not only confirms the importance qualitative research by the authors government legitimacy). Further simultaneously enhancing host- support for the insurgents while (for example, reducing outside tive action in all seven dimensions From a quantitative factor

Ladwig

forces have spent the past two and Max Manwaring uthors John Fishel JFQ , the latest step in that Uncomfortable Wars /

is for issue pursuing

counterinsurgency. 45, 2

a d

PhD quarter2007

- - at - by John T. Fishel and Max G. Manwaring

- - Merton Uncomfortable Wars Revisited Wars Uncomfortable the operational or technological is likely to end poorly, despite these dimensions, a “small war” Without adequate attention to forgotten dimensions of strategy.” Howard famously called “the includes what historian Michael provides a theory of conflict that Uncomfortable Wars Revisited and economic aspects of warfare, the psychological, social, political, By emphasizing the importance of conjunction with military force. instruments of national power, in informational, and economic unified application of diplomatic, Victory is brought about by the engagements with the enemy. of winning a series of military victory is not simply the product current security environment, reminder that, particularly in the the authors provide an important “uncomfortable wars.” Manwaring refer to collectively as operations—which Fishel and terrorism, and counternarcotics such as peacekeeping, combating forms of low-intensity conflict, identifies their relevance to other less, a government’s legitimacy is of effort” plays that role. Neverthe a peacekeeping operation, “unity tors of success or failure, while in power” is one of the best predic “support actions of the intervening counterinsurgency campaign, the of conflict. For example, in a importance depends on the type successful strategy, their relative sions must be accounted for in a that all seven strategic dimen advantages of the state involved.

College, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006 ISBN–10: 0806137118 WALTER LADWIG Through the SWORD model, Although the authors argue 340 pp. $45.00 Reviewed by

Oxford,

where

his

research

focuses - host nation contribute to the main undertaken by Americans and the ensure that all efforts and actions the U.S. Government needs to porting an ally in a small war, Manwaring contend, when sup purposes. As a result, Fishel and exploit for their own nefarious discontent that such groups can security for their population feeds political participation, or basic to provide economic opportunity, weak or incompetent governments right to govern.” The failure of incumbent government’s “moral ists—is a violent challenge to an guerrilla bands, or Islamic extrem rorist groups, narcotics traffickers, nity—whether transnational ter facing the international commu fortable wars. weight across all types of uncom the single factor with the greatest those who believe that an exclusive back in the bottle. Contrary to will not be enough to put the genie reform and development alone evolve into armed rebellion, once discontent and grievance frequently remind readers that neglected. Fishel and Manwaring the SWORD model must not be wars,” the other six factors of role in winning “uncomfortable themselves” (p. 68). state must save themselves from ment of a fragile, failing, or failed long term, the people and govern The authors contend that “in the benevolently bestowing gifts of aid. they already possess rather than “legitimacy” ends with means that helping allied states achieve their States should serve as a facilitator, a strategy, they argue, the United instability. In carrying out such world likely to serve as sources of tent government in regions of the pursuit of responsible and compe that emphasizes the long-term to a pragmatic Wilsonian concept focus on the spread of democracy foreign policy move beyond a mere To this end, they advocate that U.S. tory and people with legitimacy. nation’s ability to govern its terri tenance and expansion of that

on At the core of many threats While legitimacy plays a central

the

training

indigenous ------War, and Italy’s counterterrorism mission in Somalia, the 1990 Gulf the United Nations peacekeeping as the United States in Vietnam, tion to such high-profile cases world view throughout. In addi and examples, taking a broad on drugs through case studies homeland defense, and the war model to peace operations, the applicability of the SWORD Fishel and Manwaring explore counterinsurgency concerns, deadly force” (p. 44). reforms, and carefully applied deeper and more fundamental strategy designed to promulgate organization, a holistic and unified can be defeated only by “a superior strates that violent internal groups fortable Wars Revisited terrorism and insurgency, focus on “root causes” can defeat terror. foreign policy in the global war on conflict, security assistance, or U.S. military strategy, low-intensity bookshelf of anyone interested in able Wars Revisited U.S. military doctrine, for contemporary conflicts and importance of the SWORD model with each reading. Given the times, with new insight gained worthy of being read multiple faced by the United States. It is directly to challenges presently is a significant work that speaks Uncomfortable Wars Revisited ful example of unity of effort. flict) is used to illustrate a success mid-intensity conventional con “small wars,” the 1991 Gulf War (a it seems strange that, in a book on seven strategic dimensions. Also, data that underpins the model’s an independent assessment of the used to derive it; this would allow statistical analyses and case studies enhanced by inclusion of the of the SWORD model could be raised. The basic presentation Revisited and depth of Operation decades-long internal turmoil, and El Salvador and Peru, Colombia’s they examine the insurgencies in campaign of the 1970s and 1980s, Not limiting themselves to These minor points aside, As with any work of the breadth JFQ , some quibbles can be Just Cause Uncomfortable Wars ndupress.ndu.edu belongs on the in Panama. demon Uncomfort Uncom

------New Books from NDU Press

In the Same Light as Slavery: Building a Global Antiterrorist Consensus

Edited by Joseph McMillan In the Same Light as Slavery: Building a Global Antiterrorist Consensus is an attempt to diagnose the reasons for this lack of progress and suggest more productive ways of approaching this complex problem. The volume includes essays by nine leading experts from a variety of disciplines, each approaching the challenge from a different perspective:

n Mark Tessler (University of Michigan) on what the polls actually say about Muslim views on terrorism n Steven Simon (Council on Foreign Relations) on the roots of anti-American attitudes n Christine Fair (U.S. Institute of Peace) on where people in the Islamic world get their information n Caroline Ziemke (Institute for Defense Analyses) on the social factors that foster support for terrorism n Kumar Ramakrishna (Nanyang Technological University, Singapore) on the relationship between educational styles and susceptibility to radicalism n Scott Atran (CNRS Paris) on the way conflicting cultural frameworks complicate the struggle against “In the Same LIght terrorism aS SLavery” n Hady Amr and Peter W. Singer (Brookings Institution) on how America could restore its good name in Building a Global the Islamic world. Antiterrorist Consensus n Joseph McMillan (Institute of National Strategic Studies) on the way ahead

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242 pp. ISBN: 0–16–077537–X Seeing the Elephant: Institute for National Strategic Studies The U.S. Role in Global Security Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2006 by Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler

What is the current state of the global security system, and where is it headed? What challenges and opportunities do we face, and what dangers are emerging? How will various regions of the world be affected? How can the United States best act to help shape the future while protecting its security, interests, and values? How can the United States deal with the threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction?

Seeing the Elephant: The U.S. Role in Global Security, an intellectual history of U.S. national security thinking since the fall of the Soviet Union, is an attempt to see the evolving international security system and America’s role in it through the eyes of more than 50 perceptive authors who have analyzed key aspects of the unfolding post–Cold War drama. These experts include Graham Allison, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Wesley K. Clark, Tommy Franks, Thomas L. Friedman, Francis Fuku- yama, Samuel P. Huntington, Robert D. Kaplan, John Keegan, Paul M. Kennedy, Henry Kissinger, Bernard Lewis, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Michael E. O’Hanlon, Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, and Martin van Creveld. Its premise is that, like the blind men in the Buddhist fable who each feels a different part of an elephant, these authors and their assessments, taken together, can give us a better view of where the world is headed.

Published for the Center for Technology and National Security Policy by National Defense University Press and Potomac Books, Inc. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006 Order online: http://www.potomacbooksinc.com/Books/BookDetail. 319 pp. aspx?product=148989 ISBN–10: 1–59797–099–9 Clothbound $48, Paperback $24 Use code NDUV07 for a 25 percent discount (Expires December 31, 2007) most successful leader since 1917—more suc- Russian President Vladimir Putin cessful, in fact, than Stalin or Brezhnev.1 on nationally televised question- Under Putin, Russian state institutions and-answer session have been reduced to a series of parallel transmission belts. The parliament (Duma) is without much power or authority. Its upper house consists of a collection of nobodies who blindly follow the Kremlin’s instructions. Putin’s party, Unified Russia, has a two-thirds majority in the Duma’s lower house. This ensures that any law proposed by Putin’s government is passed without much debate. The opposition in the Duma is essentially deprived of active participation in the legislative process. In December 2004, Putin’s government passed a law that abolished direct elections for all 89 regional governors, and the Kremlin is now considering doing the same for city AP/Wide Photo (Mikhail Metzel) World Randussia the Return of 2 mayors. All governors and members of the Duma’s upper house are now appointed rather Geopolitics than elected. The governors have to submit their mandates to the Federation Council. Although appointed by Putin, their power is By M i l a n N . V e g o limited because their work is monitored by nonconstitutional representatives. Since 2004, Putin’s government has Russia is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma. —Winston Churchill gradually tightened election rules, practically eliminating the concept of free elections. No new political parties exist or can be started ussia is again the subject of power status. The Russian economy collapsed, unless approved by the Kremlin. It is also no serious concern in the West. and free-market excesses, rampant inflation, longer possible for independent candidates After a steady decline in its and loss of both jobs and the social security to be elected to the Duma.3 The new election R fortunes in the aftermath of net ensued. The era of the first democratically bill envisages a ban on creating a “negative the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and elected Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, left a image” of a political opponent. This, in fact, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Russia is bitter taste in many Russian mouths. means that one cannot criticize incumbents aggressively flexing its economic and politi- In 1999, Vladimir Putin, an obscure without the risk of violating the law. Another cal muscles. Its economy is on the upswing, former KGB agent and chief of that organiza- provision of the bill eliminates the minimum largely due to the steadily rising prices of oil tion’s successor, the Federal Security Service percentage turnout requirements for an elec- and natural gas. Russia’s military is still a (FSB), was appointed as prime minister and tion to be valid.4 shadow of its Soviet predecessor; however, a year later replaced Yeltsin as Russia’s presi- Russia today is ruled by active or former the current military weaknesses will not last dent. Since then, Putin has been highly suc- members of the secret service and military. forever. Sooner, rather than later, Russia will cessful in concentrating all power in himself In essence, the secret service finally took restore its military might. Moscow is already and his office. He has achieved Soviet-style power in a “silent” coup d’état. After Putin trying to restore its power and influence in stability through essentially eliminating or took office, FSB influence and power steadily much of Eurasia. It has moved ever closer to neutralizing all alternative centers of power increased and expanded into many areas. China and to some major European powers to and has sidelined any potential challengers. Putin’s government used the events of Sep- counter what it sees as the “hegemony” of the Putin also broke the influence of the Russian tember 11 in the United States as a pretext to United States. Resurgent Russia will probably oligarchs who dominated the economy under justify many of the unconstitutional measures be neither the friend nor the enemy of the Yeltsin in the 1990s. Despite his clear authori- conducted by the FSB. In 2003, Putin directed West, but a largely independent and highly tarian bent and increasingly undemocratic the secret service to take control of the border unpredictable factor in international politics. actions, Putin is highly popular in Russia. His guard troops. The service also assumed some approval rating is about 70 percent, and some of the powers of the former Federal Agency Putin’s Regime 40 percent of Russians think that Putin is the for Government Communications and Infor- For many Russians, the collapse of the mation, which was responsible for electronic Soviet Union was nothing short of a catastro- phe: the country fragmented and lost its world Dr. Milan N. Vego is Professor of Operations in the Joint Military Operations Department at the Naval War College.

JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Vego eavesdropping. The FSB is involved not only former Soviet nomenklatura. The percentage ists who have tried to report on the Russian in intelligence and counterintelligence but of former secret agents and military in top army’s actions in Chechnya or who attempt to also in counterterrorism, economic crime, decisionmaking positions in the government investigate corruption among state officials or electronic espionage, border control, social grew from 4.8 percent in 1988 to more than 58 organized crime are subject to great physical monitoring, and, probably, the country’s percent in 2002.8 danger. Since 1991, about 260 Russian jour- computerized election system. It Russians can watch foreign nalists have been murdered. Only in 21 cases determines the fitness of minority stations such as CNN, BBC, and have the perpetrators been identified.14 investors in strategic sectors of the the German Deutsche Welle. Russia is more open to the outside world economy.5 In short, the FSB is far Russia today Only about 10 percent of the than the Soviet Union was. However, the old more powerful than the KGB ever electronic media formally belong Soviet-style fears are returning. People who is ruled 9 was. It is also trying to extend secu- by active to the state. However, some 90 question the Kremlin’s policies are increas- rity zones in Russia’s border areas, a percent of the news is essentially ingly targeted for retaliation on a list circu- move reminiscent of Soviet times.6 or former controlled by the government.10 lated on Web sites of shadow ultranationalist members of Formally, censorship of the press groups. In 2006, the Duma passed a law In the first 2 years after the the secret does not exist, yet the government against “political extremism” that is essen- dissolution of the Soviet Union, service and uses far subtler and much more tially directed against human rights activists some 300,000 KGB agents were laid military effective methods of controlling who criticize Putin’s government. off.7 Afterward, many of them went the press than the Soviet censors Freedom of religion is formally guar- into politics, private businesses and ever did. According to Reporters anteed in Russia. Yet the government has banks, media, cultural institutions, Without Borders, in terms of adopted regulations that require religious and private security agencies. Not freedom of the press, Russia today organizations to give local departments of surprisingly, they continued to maintain ties occupies 138th place, just ahead of Belarus, justice annual confirmation of their ongoing with their former colleagues in the FSB. Many Saudi Arabia, and Cuba.11 activities. The Russian Orthodox Church is former secret agents were employed by the apparently favored by Putin’s government; newly rich oligarchs. Some were even hired by The state-controlled oil company, Putin has made several symbolic appearances Russian mafia groups as contract killers. Gazprom, bought some of the country’s with the head of the Orthodox Church and Besides Putin, the current minister of largest newspapers, such as Izvestiya and some other religious leaders. At the same defense, Sergey Ivanov, worked in the KGB Komsomolskaya Pravda.12 It is also the major- time, conditions have deteriorated for minor- and its successor. Ivanov is considered the ity stockholder of the two most important ity religions at the regional and local level in second most powerful official in Putin’s television stations and a former culture radio some areas, and the restrictive law on freedom government and most likely Putin’s succes- station. Smaller papers are routinely harassed of conscience and religion continues to dis- sor. About 150 officials with secret service by the tax police and intimidated by false advantage many minority religious groups backgrounds were in key positions in politics charges of fire protection violations or poor considered “nontraditional.” and the economy in 2006. About 44 percent working conditions.13 Journalist unions are After taking office in 1999, Putin of the people in Putin’s circle are former controlled by the state and Putin himself. announced a so-called dictatorship of the law. secret agents or military. Some 77 percent In today’s Russia, it is hard to find a paper The common sentiment in the West is that of the new state elite were members of the that is truly independent. Russian journal- Putin may have cracked down on freedoms

Pro-Communist Russians in Red Square marking 85th anniversary of Vladimir Lenin’s death

AP/Wide World Photos (Misha Japaridze) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ Return of Geopolitics and democracy and Franklin D. Roosevelt 80 percent of the equipment used by the oil recentralized power in and Winston Churchill. industry is outdated. Some 75 percent of the the Kremlin, but at least There are also efforts to country’s proven reserves of oil and natural he has ensured order and change Volgograd’s name gas are already in production. Moreover, the stability. But the truth to Stalingrad. Both Stalin country’s oil reserves are expected to run dry is that there is far less and Brezhnev are heroes in 25 years.25 law and order in Putin’s AP/Wide Photo (Doug Mills) World on Russian television. Putin’s government embarked on the Russia than existed in The disastrous Soviet process of obtaining control of the main Yeltsin’s “chaotic” and invasion of Afghanistan sectors of the Russian economy. It gave a corrupt regime. is now considered a virtual monopoly to the two largest state The culture of “struggle against terror- companies in the oil sector, Gazprom and illegality prevails in ism.” The Russian state Rosneft.26 The state’s share of total oil produc- Russia. The mafia con- media are full of propa- tion has increased from 16 percent in 2000 trols a sizable chunk of ganda that runs along the to almost 40 percent today. In late November the national economy. President Bush same lines as that of the 2006, the Organization for Economic Co- There are an estimated and President Putin Soviet Union. operation and Development criticized the 100,000 mafiosi, divided addressing press Indeed, Putin’s Russian government for its expansion into key into 8,000 groups, in Slovenia government never came economic sectors and raised concern about organized into about 50 to terms with atrocities of the seemingly insatiable appetite of Gazprom. “brigades,” rooted in Russian territory.15 The the Soviet era. A textbook on Stalin’s purges Also, despite agreements already signed, the mafia is either controlled, infiltrated, or in and his role in the war was banned from Kremlin has selectively applied environmen- secret alliance with former or active members Russian schools. Gradually, all references to tal laws to ease out Western companies from of the secret police. Violent crime is especially the tragic events during the Soviet participating in the development of high. For example, from January to October era have been removed from high new and potentially profitable oil 2006, there were 3,655 murders and attempted school textbooks. fields on the island of Sakhalin.27 murders. Some 500 to 800 contract murders the majority In addition, Putin’s govern- are committed each year in Russia.16 Many of Economic Turnaround of Russians ment has imposed significant limits the victims have been critics of Putin, as was One of the great success seem to to foreign investment in Russia the journalist Anna Politkovskaya, who was stories of today’s Russia is steady have a deep by declaring certain sectors of the brutally gunned down in broad daylight in economic growth. In general, the nostalgia economy, such as energy, aviation, October 2006. Most murder cases are never Russian economy is in good shape: for the finances, and media, to be “stra- solved; reasons for this include the widespread The country is considered a good tegic entities.” The list has been and deep corruption of the Russian authori- financial risk, and there is little Soviet era expanded from 17 to 39 branches of ties and the poor salaries and inadequate chance of a financial crisis in the the economy.28 A foreign company, technical equipment of the police. near future.18 During Putin’s era, for instance, cannot own more than economic growth has averaged 6 percent 50 percent of a Russian company. To obtain Soviet Nostalgia annually, and the average salary has increased a larger share it must have special approval The majority of Russians seem to have a 10 percent each year. For 2005, Russia’s gross from the Kremlin.29 deep nostalgia for the Soviet era. Reportedly, domestic product (GDP) was estimated at about two-thirds of Russians are sorry that the $766 billion.19 In August 2006, Russia paid State of the Military Soviet Union collapsed.17 In April 2005, Putin all its Soviet-era debts early to Western coun- In the 1990s, the extremely poor eco- said that the collapse of the Soviet Union was tries—some $22 billion.20 nomic situation in the country led to a drastic one of the greatest geopolitical catastrophes of The gas and oil sectors combined downsizing of the Russian armed forces. the 20th century. account for 25 percent of Russia’s GDP.21 The situation began its turn for the better Putin’s regime uses a strange mix of Russia is the world’s biggest producer only in the last few years, due to the steady tsarist, Soviet, and post-Soviet symbols. of natural gas (40 percent of the world’s boost in Russia’s economic prospects. In Soldiers dressed in early 19th-century uni- reserves22) and ranks in the top three or four 2004 and 2005, official defense expenditures forms carry the national flag and presidential in terms of oil deposits (estimated at 100 were 418 billion rubles (US$14.93 billion) standard. Putin brought back many imperial billion barrels).23 The 92 percent rise in petro- and 531.06 billion rubles (US$18.96 billion), Russian symbols. He also restored the Soviet- leum prices in the last 3 years has helped the respectively.30 In 2006, Russia’s nominal era national anthem, statues and memorials Kremlin expand its hard currency reserves by military expenditures were estimated at about dedicated to Soviet heroes, the Soviet red flag more than 65 percent, to about $280 billion in 2.5 percent of the country’s GDP. However, (banned by Yeltsin), and traditional military 2006, or more than the reserves of the entire if military-related spending in parts of the medals. The myth of the Great Patriotic War Euro zone.24 However, the Russian energy federal budget other than military expendi- (1941–1945) is back. Stalin is honored as the infrastructure is becoming increasingly tures were included, the spending on defense “great wartime leader.” Volgograd is planning obsolete. For example, half the Russian pipe- amounted to about 4 percent of GDP.31 In to erect a statue of Stalin alongside those of lines are more than 25 years old, and about 2001, approximately 70 percent of the military

10 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Vego budget was assigned to maintenance of the SS–18s/SS–19s from 2,000 to about 760 in draftees. The plan is to replace 50 percent of armed forces and only 30 percent to weapons the next 4 years.39 the current conscript force with professional procurement. Currently, 43 percent of the The sea-based nuclear deterrent force soldiers by 2008.43 budget is spent on weapons procurement. The consists of 14 submarines: 2 Typhoons, 6 The Russian air force was greatly plan is to redress that imbalance in order to Delta-IVs, and 6 Delta-IIIs. These fleet bal- reduced in numbers in the 1990s.44 The air achieve a 50:50 ratio by 2011.32 The Russian listic missile submarines (SSBNs) are deployed forces and air defense troops were merged defense ministry announced that some 237 with the Northern and Pacific Fleets. In con- into a single service in 1998. In 2003, the billion rubles would be spent for developing trast, the Soviets had 62 operational SSBNs in major part of the Russian army’s avia- and producing military equipment in 2006. 1990.40 Three advanced Borey-class SSBNs are tion—mostly helicopters—was transferred to There will be a 30 percent increase for these under construction. The first of these SSBNs the air force. The 180,000-man air force oper- purposes in 2007.33 About 5 trillion rubles will will be delivered in 2008. The third SSBN ates long-range aviation (63 Tu-95, 15 Tu-160 be spent on weapons between 2007 and 2015. is scheduled for completion in 2012. Each nuclear-capable bombers, and 117 Tu-22M The priority in spending will be on strategic Borey-class SSBN is armed with 12 SS–N–27 bombers, plus some tankers and training nuclear forces. Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missiles aircraft), 6 combined frontal aviation armies In 1991, the Soviet armed forces totaled with a range of more than 8,000 kilometers. (370 Su-24 tactical bombers and 255 Su-25 some 3.4 million men, compared to the The Russian SSBNs conducted three deterrent ground attack aircraft) and air defense armies current force of 1.1 million. The plan is to patrols in 2005; two in 2004 and 2003 each; (5 MiG–25, 255 MiG–29, 390 Su-27, and 255 reduce the armed forces to 1 million.34 By and none in 2002. In contrast, they conducted MiG–31 fighter/interceptor aircraft), and then, professional sergeants would exceed 50 61 patrols in 1990. transport aviation.45 The service still suffers percent, or 40 percent of the total strength of Russian strategic aviation has in from a lack of funds, both for procurement the armed forces.35 Currently, only 9 percent service 94 nuclear-armed bombers (14 Tu- and modernization and for pilot training. of Russia’s youth are drafted into service. 160 Blackjacks, 32 Tu-95 MS6 Bear–H6, The number of flight training hours is far The entire army cannot be turned into a 32 Tu-95 MS, and 16 Bear H16). below standard levels: it ranges from professional army because it would cost 4 or 5 These bombers carry 872 cruise 20 to 25 hours annually for fighter percent of GDP. In 2003, available manpower missiles (AS–15a/b LKh-55 air- in 2005, aviation to 60 hours annually for for the armed forces was 36 million. In 2005, launched cruise missiles and plans were transport aviation.46 about 330,000 young men were brought AS–16 short-range air-to-surface announced After the dissolution of the into the army for 2 years via conscription. attack missiles) and/or nuclear to build a Soviet Union, many naval vessels The conscription service will be gradually bombs. Smaller scale production were scrapped or laid up because of reduced, from the current 2 years to 1 year as of the Blackjacks resumed in 2004. class of four the shortage of funds. Since 1991, the of January 1, 2008. This, in turn, will demand The antiballistic missile new aircraft overall strength of the Russian navy more eligible young men out of a population system around Moscow consists carriers in has declined from 450,000 to 155,000 that is rapidly decreasing. mostly of 100 underground inter- 2013–2014 (including 11,000 strategic nuclear Defense spending is focused on stra- ceptors designed to carry 1 nuclear forces, 35,000 naval aviation, and tegic nuclear forces as the prime deterrent warhead each. The system known 9,500 naval infantry).47 The number against a major power. In 2004, the strategic as A–135 consists of 2 layers of of aircraft fell from 1,666 to 556; nuclear forces consisted of about 630 mis- interceptors: an outer ring of 4 launchers submarines from 317 to 61; and surface ships siles with 18,000 nuclear warheads.36 This armed with 32 Gorgon interceptors, each from 967 to 186. Naval bases outside of Russia included about 7,800 operational nuclear carrying a 1-megaton warhead; and an inner were evacuated except for Sevastopol, Crimea. warheads (4,400 strategic warheads and ring of 4 launch complexes with 68 Gazelle Only 66 percent of 170 factories supporting 3,400 nonstrategic warheads).37 Currently, interceptors, each carrying one 10-kiloton naval shipbuilding remained in the Russian there are about 130 SS–19s in service. The warhead. In addition, a considerable number Federation. The supply of spare parts was also Russians announced plans in 2003 to deploy of SA–10 Grumble surface-to-air missiles may disrupted. The lost bases and training facili- tens of additional SS–19 missiles with also have nuclear capability against some bal- ties are difficult or impossible to replace. The hundreds of warheads starting in 2010. The listic missiles. ship construction program was essentially SS–18s will be retained for the next 10 to Ground forces currently comprise some stopped. 15 years. The plan is to keep in service 15 321,000 men (including 190,000 conscripts) The situation began to change for the rail-based SS–24s. The force of SS–25s was or about 30 percent of total forces.41 They better in 2000 when new ships were built for reduced to 312 in 2004. Modest production are organized into 19 infantry divisions, 10 the Russian navy. However, the ships are still of the SS–27 Topol continues.38 Despite the motor-rifle brigades, 5 tank divisions, 4 air- not built in series, as they were in the past. reduced number of intercontinental ballistic borne divisions, 3 airborne brigades, 3 artil- The Russian navy started to build frigates, missiles (ICBMs), the Russians possess a lery divisions, and 11 artillery brigades, plus 9 corvettes, and small ships for the Caspian credible nuclear deterrent. Their Topol-M special forces brigades.42 The army’s greatest Flotilla. There are currently no plans to build ICBMs can reportedly penetrate any missile problem is a shortage of draftees because of destroyers and cruisers. In 2005, however, defense. The plan is to reduce by about 60 the country’s steadily reduced birth rate over plans were announced to build a class of four percent the number of ICBM warheads by the past 20 years. Another problem is the new aircraft carriers in 2013–2014, with initial withdrawing from service the number of poor health and lack of education of many service to begin in 2017.48 ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 11 Return of Geopolitics

Currently, the Russian navy is organized supplies of various types of aircraft muni- rate is currently estimated at 1.28 children per into four fleets: the Baltic Fleet with head- tions.52 The absence of practice munitions in woman, far below that necessary to maintain quarters in Baltiysk; the Pacific Fleet in Vladi- the ground forces greatly complicates person- the current population of about 143 million.61 vostok; the Northern Fleet in Severomorsk; nel combat training.53 Alcohol abuse is the cause of one in three and the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol. In addi- The social status of the Russian military deaths in Russia. If the current trends con- tion, the Kaliningrad special region is subor- is low. The reduced defense spending in the tinue, Russia will lose 50 million inhabitants dinate to the Baltic Fleet. It consists of ground 1990s caused reductions in salaries and severe in the next 50 years.62 and coastal forces, with one motor-rifle shortages of housing and other amenities. Traditionally, Russians prefer strategic division and motor-rifle brigade and a fighter Qualified junior officers are in short supply.54 depth for their security. That has been one aviation regiment.49 The Caspian Flotilla is The morale and motivation of the rank and of the reasons for the continuous expansion based in Astrakhan and Makhachkala. In file are rather low. Some 40 percent of the con- of the Russian Empire since Peter the Great. 2006, the navy’s inventories included—besides tract soldiers are reportedly dismissed after Today’s Russia is the smallest in size since SSBNs—22 nuclear-powered submarines (6 only 4 to 5 months of service. In the first half before the reign of Catherine the Great. nuclear-powered cruise missile attack subma- of 2004, 7,300 servicemen, including 800 offi- Ukraine, which had been the heartland of rines and 16 nuclear attack submarines), 22 cers, were convicted of various crimes.55 There the Russian Empire since the 9th century, is, submarines, 1 aircraft carrier, 2 battle cruis- is widespread draft avoidance. Currently, at least for the time being, lost. After the dis- ers, 5 cruisers, 14 destroyers, 10 frigates, 8 there are an estimated 17,000 draft dodgers.56 solution of the Warsaw Pact, Russia lost the light frigates, and 23 missile corvettes.50 Army efforts to stop abuse and hazing have buffer zone between its westernmost border Rapid economic growth since 2000 has largely failed, due at least in part to the apathy and the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- given Russia a unique opportunity to pursue of poorly paid and housed junior and senior tion (NATO) in central Europe. One of the military reforms. Russia’s military experts officers. Hazing is also a major cause of most painful consequences of the Soviet believe that the country needs mobile forces draft dodging and the significant increase in collapse has been Russia’s much less favor- that are appropriately sized, trained, and suicide rates among draftees.57 There is a lack able access to the Baltic. Russia also lost equipped without burdening the national of sufficient training, resulting in low combat control over Belarus and Moldova, northern economy and increasing reliance on contract readiness.58 Caucasus, and vast stretches of Central Asia. military personnel. The prerequisites for The attempted secessions of Chechnya, and military reform are not only rapid and stable Influence of Geopolitics continuing uncertainties over the Russian economic growth but also accelerated growth Geopolitics came back with a vengeance control in Dagestan and Tatarstan, indicate in high technology and science-intensive after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Unlike that the process of fragmentation may not yet industries. However, the improvements in the the Soviets, the Russians today do not consider be complete.63 Russian economy have not been sufficient to geopolitics a pseudoscience. The enduring Geopolitically, the areas of the greatest meet that objective. The top political leadership and paramount importance of geopolitics in importance for Russia are the western Arctic, apparently cannot decide whether to move the thinking and policies of the Russian elite the Baltic, Ukraine, the Black Sea–Caucasus– toward smaller, conventional, professional, cannot be understood without a geographical, Caspian area, Central Asia, and Siberia. The high-tech expeditionary forces or continue demographic, and historical context. western Arctic region is perhaps one of the with large but conventional forces combined The Russian Federation encompasses a most stable geopolitical spaces from Russia’s with modernized nuclear strategic forces. territory of about 6.5 million square miles. It perspective. Murmansk will become the Despite the drastic reduction in their stretches over 10 time zones. Russia’s borders gateway for crude oil from the Timan-Pechora size since 1991, the Russian armed forces have are 43,500 miles long, while the coastline basins and western Siberia. Siberian hydro- old weapons and equipment. According to stretches for about 23,620 miles. According carbon and offshore drilling are increasingly some reports, only about 10 to 20 percent of to the last census (in 2002), ethnic Russians important and valuable. all weapons in the inventories are modern. comprised 145 million (81.5 percent) of the The Baltic is one of the most critical geo- Funds for upgrading existing and producing population of the Russian Federation. There political regions for Moscow. In the aftermath new weapons and equipment are in are also 100 different ethnic groups.59 of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s short supply. For example, between However, the population trend is access to the Baltic was reduced to only the 2000 and 2004, the Russian the Baltic highly unfavorable for the future of Bay of Kronstadt and Kaliningrad’s enclave. army added only 15 new tanks and Europe’s Russia. Due to the combined effects Access to the Baltic is barred by the string to its inventory of about 23,000.51 of alcohol abuse, poor health services, of essentially unfriendly (for good reason) Production of artillery shells lags northern and a decreasing fertility rate, the Baltic states and Poland. Sweden is politically considerably. There is an acute seas are number of ethnic Russians has been neutral but geostrategically anti-Russian. The shortage of modern munitions becoming reduced by about 900,000 (some Baltic and Europe’s northern seas are becom- in conventional warheads. The a zone of sources say 700,000) per year since ing a zone of serious strategic Russian interest. Russian air force lacks adequate serious 1999. In 2004, the average life expec- Moscow’s policy toward the Baltic states strategic tancy in Russia was 64.9 years (58.9 is essentially to delegitimize their right to Russian Tor–M1 missile years for males and 72.3 for females) be independent. On numerous occasions— launcher vehicle participating Russian compared to 70.1 years in the Soviet despite the historical facts—Russian officials, in training exercise in Russia interest era (in 1987).60 The national fertility including Putin, have disputed that the Baltic

12 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Vego states were occupied by Soviet forces in 1940. motor-rifle brigade, plus more than 100 technical help in extracting their large energy In Moscow’s view, the Baltic states were tanks, 215 armored vehicles, and 7 combat resources and exporting these resources to annexed but not “occupied”; the annexation helicopters.68 Moscow also has issued Europe and other markets. of these three independent states was legal passports to any citizens of Transnistria Kazakhstan is Russia’s most impor- AP/Wide Photo World because it was carried out in accordance with who asked for them.69 The Kremlin has tant strategic partner. Numerous security the formalities of international law that were indicated on many occasions that it has no agreements were signed between Russia and in effect during World War II. Also, Moscow intention of withdrawing its forces from Kazakhstan, and the Russians maintain a constantly threatens the Baltic states for real Transnistria, despite the commitment small contingent of military specialists there. or imaginary repression of Russian minorities Russia gave at the Organization for Secu- In Kyrgyzstan, Russian troops are stationed there.64 In the absence of a strong NATO and rity and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (since October 2003) at Kant, a former Soviet firm U.S. leadership, the fate of all three Baltic meeting in Istanbul in 1999 to do so uncon- base near Bishkek. Their official mission is to states will be uncertain. ditionally. Moscow portrays the Russian struggle against terrorism. Some 50 Russian For both Moscow and the West, a major military presence in Transnistria as peace- ground attack aircraft (probably Sukhoi Su- problem is the future of Ukraine as an inde- keeping.70 Its policy toward Moldova is a 25s) are to be based there.72 Reportedly, there pendent and fully sovereign state. If Russia clear example of the abiding continuities of are plans to create a 10,000-man joint force obtains political control of Ukraine, it would Russia’s imperial policy. in Central Asia with headquarters most likely cease to exist as a traditional nation-state but In the Black Sea region, geostrategic and at Kant.73 would become part of an empire. The major energy aims are intertwined. Russia controls Tajikistan has a long tradition of adverse factor for the future of an independent only part of the Black Sea’s southeastern military cooperation with Russia. After the Ukraine is the rather large Russophile senti- coastline, but most of the energy transporta- country’s independence, the 201st Division ment in the southeastern part of the country.65 tion and distribution network. The Caucasus and about 12,000 Russian troops remained A major source of friction between is an interface between Europe and Asia in Tajikistan. Currently, about 7,000 troops Russia and Ukraine is the presence of Russian where several major powers’ zones of interest of the 201st (including about 130 tanks, 315 forces at the naval base in Sevastopol. The overlap. The Transcaucasus is also a transport armored vehicles, 180 pieces of artillery, and agreement to lease the base for the Russian corridor for energy.71 Moscow’s meddling several combat aircraft) plus 2,000 Russian navy was signed in 1997 after a long political and threats are the principal reasons for the advisors are supervising some 13,000 Tajik and diplomatic dispute between Moscow almost continuous turmoil and crisis in the border troops along the Afghan border. The and Kyiv. The Russian and new Ukrainian Caucasus. Its ultimate aim is to restore its division was recently transformed into a per- navy share facilities at Sevastopol, including power and influence in the area or at least to manent force subordinate to the Volga-Ural headquarters of both the Russian Black Sea cause political and economic difficulties for military district in Yekaterinburg.74 The Rus- Fleet and the Ukrainian navy. The future of Western-leaning countries. sians also operate an air surveillance center at the Russian naval presence in Crimea after Moscow has the most serious problems Nurek base. Tajikistan signed an agreement 2017 is currently uncertain. Putin proposed in its relations with Georgia because of its with Russia in October 2004, which should in October 2006 that Russia should decide support for the secessionist movement in lead to closer economic and security coopera- alone whether it is more advantageous to Abkhazia and southern Ossetia. Russia tion between the two countries. build a new naval base on its territory in the also sided with Armenia in its conflict with Turkmenistan is the least politically area of Novorossiysk or to continue leasing Azerbaijan over the Berg-Karabech enclave connected with Russia of all Central Asian facilities in Sevastopol. However, Ukrainian (13.6 percent of Armenia’s territory). After states. Its relations with Russia were cool and president Viktor Yushchenko recently ruled several years of delaying its commitment to occasionally tense in the 1990s. The relations out any extension of the lease of naval base withdraw its troops from Georgia, Moscow started to improve only after April 2003 Sevastopol.66 Moscow and most Russians are finally signed an agreement with Tbilisi in when both countries signed an agreement on convinced that Crimea will be returned to March 2006 to withdraw some 3,000 Russian security and economic cooperation. Turkmen their control one day. troops from Batumi and Akhalkalaki bases leadership seems to be determined to pursue Russia’s policy toward Moldova is and other installations in Georgia. The its current policy of “eternal neutrality,” which aimed toward exerting continuous lever- Russian forces already vacated the base at seems not to bother the Kremlin. age by keeping it permanently divided Akhalkalaki, and the Batumi base is sched- Prior to 1991, most Soviet nuclear, bio- and subject at all times to the threat of the uled for closure before the end of 2008. Russia logical, and chemical weapons were produced secession of Transnistria (a narrow strip was also obliged under the terms of the OSCE in Uzbekistan. Afterward, Uzbekistan’s rela- of Moldova’s territory east of the Dniester agreement in 1999 to leave the Gudauta base tions with Russia were often tense because of River) backed by Russian arms.67 Transnistria near Tbilisi; however, in the end, the Russians its desire to steer toward a more autonomous declared its independence from Moldova in refused to leave. policy on security issues. This, in turn, greatly 1991. Its population of about 550,000 is about Moscow’s prospects for restoring its angered Moscow. In 1999, Uzbekistan joined a 60 percent Slavic, while Moldovans are ethnic power and influence are the most promising group of Western-oriented countries dubbed Romanians. Transnistria does not have a in Central Asia. This is due to the geostrategic GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, direct land link with Russia. Russia main- isolation of the area, political backwardness Azerbaijan, and Moldova), only to leave that tains a small contingent of troops there, the of the newly independent states, and their organization in 2005. Uzbekistan made a so-called 14th Army, with a 1,000-man almost complete dependence on Russia for drastic change of policy toward Russia in 2001 ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 13 Return of Geopolitics when it joined the Shanghai Cooperation the commonwealth, its obstruction in CIS a policy to restore control over much of the Organization, which is dominated by Russia secessionist conflicts, sudden price increases geopolitical space that Russia lost in the after- and China. Since spring 2005, Uzbekistan has for oil and natural gas, attempts to obtain math of the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991. apparently turned toward building an even controlling share over the energy transporta- Russia’s real concern in opposing closer relationship with Moscow. tion and distribution system in the “near NATO expansion to include the former Soviet Russia’s control of Siberia, a huge and abroad” states, and politically motivated bans republics, specifically Ukraine and Georgia, is resource-rich territory, is potentially tenuous on import of certain goods from these states. not the threat of “invasion,” but the bringing because of the combination of vast distances Hegemony in the commonwealth is consid- of democracy and the rule of law into what and a small population. The distance from ered by Moscow as essential for restoration of Moscow sees as its rightful geopolitical space. Moscow to the easternmost part of Siberia is its dominant position in Eurasia regardless Russia has good reason for objecting to what about 5,600 miles, roughly the same as the of the negative consequences on Russia’s rela- it sees as the encroachment of potentially distance to Sydney, Australia. Russia shares tions with Europe and future integration into unfriendly states on its doorstep or in its a 2,670-mile border with an increasingly a European system. backyard. The West in general should show powerful and affluent China. One day China Russians traditionally prefer a strong more sensitivity in its policies toward Russia might well claim the territories on the Amur leader. Putin’s administration has achieved and the former Soviet republics. The Alliance River that Russia annexed between 1858 and some tangible successes both internally and should reconsider whether Ukraine should 1860; these territories are equal in size to abroad. Due to the steady increase of rev- be admitted as a new member. Some other Germany and France combined. The popula- enues from oil and natural gas, the average security arrangement should be found to tion of Siberia has been steadily declining, Russian’s life is now much better than it was ensure continued independence and territo- from 8 million in 1991 to 6.5 million today. in the 1990s. Also, by centralizing almost all rial integrity of that pivotal state. Likewise, In the 2002 census, out of 155,000 villages in power in his hands, Putin has brought about Georgia should be offered a special relation- Siberia, about 13,000 were simply abandoned much-needed stability. In addition, he has ship with NATO but not full membership. At and 35,000 housed less than 10 inhabitants.75 restored national pride and made Russia a the same time, the United States and its allies In contrast, the total population in 3 adjoining major power again. must make clear to Moscow that it does not Chinese provinces is 107 million. Chinese Since Putin took office, a trend has set have a license to blackmail, pressure, or even traders and laborers are more visible in the in toward an increasingly undemocratic and extinguish the independence and sovereignty Russian cities, and the Siberian population ruthless regime. This should not come as a of Ukraine and the new independent states buys cheap Chinese apparel. Russian business surprise because the Russian government is in the Caucasus. Under no circumstances craves cheap Chinese laborers. essentially in the hands of the former secret should NATO allow Russia’s policy of threats agents and military. The presence of too many to succeed against the Baltic states. Commonwealth of Independent States active and former members of the KGB and its U.S. and Western high officials should Moscow created the Commonwealth successor, the FSB, is the principal reason for not publicly castigate Moscow for its lack of of Independent States (CIS) at Almaty, the steady deterioration of freedom of speech, democratic norms. Such actions are invariably Kazakhstan, in late December 1991. All freedom of religion, and human rights in counterproductive for the cause of democracy former Soviet republics, with the exception Russia. The brutal war in Chechnya is another in Russia. The best way to support Russian of the Baltic states, became members of factor that has led to the worsening of the democracy is through activities of the elected the commonwealth. This organization was human rights situation. The old, deep-seated bodies, such as the U.S. Congress, European established primarily to find a bloodless way Russian nationalism, hatred of foreigners, and parliaments, nongovernmental organizations, of breaking up the Soviet Union. An October outright racisms are on the rise. private volunteer organizations, and Western 2006 summit of CIS leaders wanted to limit Russia’s military still has not recovered media. The United States and its allies should the commonwealth to matters of transport, from the drastic downsizing of the 1990s. It is focus on Moscow’s foreign policies, and espe- migration policy, cross-border criminality, also beset by poor states of combat readiness, cially its politically motivated manipulation and education and culture. Russia and Belarus low motivation, poor discipline, rampant graft of energy prices and supplies against the small opposed these limits because it would lead and corruption, and shortages of modern states in Eurasia. Russia will eventually resort to the breakup of the commonwealth and weapons and equipment. However, this situ- to military threats against these states, unless benefit its enemies. Georgia, Azerbaijan, and ation seems to be changing for the better, as America and Europe make it clear that there Ukraine want to overcome Russia’s foot-drag- more funds are allocated for modernizing and will be serious consequences for mutual rela- ging regarding border demarcation, most improving the social status of military person- tions on a host of issues. The firm and prin- conspicuously with Ukraine. The proposal nel. Sooner or later, Russia’s military power will cipled stand has the best chances of success in is that the final borders should be the same become another powerful tool in the hands of countering the Kremlin’s neo-imperial poli- as the administrative borders in the pre-1991 Moscow in dealing not only with pro-Western cies. Moscow traditionally despises weakness Soviet Union. and independent states in its backyard but also and has repeatedly shown healthy respect for In essence, Russian high officials do possibly in relations with Europe. the strength and determination of those who not accept the current boundaries of the Putin’s policies are clearly aimed toward stand up to its aggressive polices. Russian Federation. The Russian unilateralist increasing influence on both the internal As for the future, it is likely that there approach is evident in its imperial attitude and external policies of the former Soviet will be serious tension between Russia and the and ongoing demands for bases throughout republics. Moscow is obviously embarked on West over myriad issues. The possibility of a

14 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Vego serious conflict should not be excluded. But 26 Steven Lee Myers and Andrew E. Kramer, 49 “Armed Forces of the Russian Fed- the situation will not resemble that of the Cold “Group of 8 Talks, Like So Much These Days, Are eration,” available at . York Times, July 13, 2006, A10. 50 alistic, but it will lack any messianic ideology Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—Russia 27 “Russland—schwieriger partner,” Frankfurter and the CIS, 601. such as Marxism-Leninism. Hence, it will not Allgemeine Zeitung Online, September 28, 2006, 2. 51 “Russia’s Military Strategy: Preparing represent the global and mortal threat to the 28 “Die neue, alte Grossmacht,” 94. for the Wrong War,” Power and Internet News JFQ West that the Soviet Union did. 29 “Russland schottet strategische industrien ab,” Report, April 24, 2006, 1, available at . N o t e s 2006, 2. 52 “RF Armed Forces Beset by Ammunition 30 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—Russia Shortage, Storage Problems,” Nezavisimoye Voyen- 1 “Die neue, alte Grossmacht,” Der Spiegel, July and the CIS, 527. nye Obozreniye (Moscow), October 13, 2006, 1–2, 10, 2006, 90. 31 “Armed Forces of the Russian Fed- accessed at . Washington Post, December 24, 2006, B1. com/topic/armed-forces-of-the-russian-federation>. 53 Ibid., 3. 3 Peter Gumbel, “Russia’s Bitter Chill,” Time, 32 “Russian defence minister on army reform, 54 “Russia’s Military Strategy: Preparing for the December 4, 2006, 27. nonproliferation, North Korea, Georgia,” Vesti Wrong War,” 2. 4 Masha Lipman, “Russia’s Hidden Power (Moscow television), October 10, 2006, accessed 55 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—Russia Struggle,” The Washington Post, December 2, at ; “Russia’s and the CIS, 565. 2006, A15. Ivanov pledges new warships, notes Pacific Fleet 56 Roger McDermott, “Russian Army Remains 5 Peter Finn, “In Russia, A Secretive Force problems,” Itar–TASS (Moscow), August 26, 2006, in Decline,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, April 7, 2005, 1. Widens,” The Washington Post, December 12, accessed at ; 57 “Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.” 2006, A1. “Russia: Details of Planned Military Spending to 58 “Russia’s Military Strategy: Preparing for the 6 Michael Ludwig, “Die neue Macht des 2015 Outlined,” Interfax (Moscow), November 8, Wrong War,” 2. Geheimdienstes,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2006, accessed at . and the CIS, 529. 7 Boris Reitschusteer, Putin Demokratur. Wie 33 “Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.” 60 Carraciolo; Baker, B5. d der Kreml den Westen das Fuerchten lehrt, 2 ed. 34 “Russian defence minister on army reform.” 61 Michael Mainville, “Muslim birth-rate (Berlin: Ullstein, 2006), 47. 35 “Critique of Russian Defense Ministry’s worries Russia,” The Washington Times, November 8 Ibid., 43. Transition to Contract Service,” Nezavisimoye 21, 2006. 9 “Die neue, alte Grossmacht,” 91. Voyennye Obozreniye (Moscow), October 27, 2006, 62 Carraciolo. 10 “Todesurteil aus Moskau,” Der Spiegel, 3, available at . 64 Stephen J. Blank, The NATO-Russia Partner- 11 “Die neue, alte Grossmacht,” 91. 36 Carraciolo. ship: A Marriage of Convenience or a Troubled Rela- 12 “Todesurteil aus Moskau,” 128. 37 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, tionship? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies 13 “Diktatur des Gesetze,” Der Spiegel, October “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2004,” Bulletin of Atomic Institute, November 2006), 16. 16, 2006, 139. Scientists, July-August 2004, 72–74. 65 Carraciolo. 14 Ibid., 138. 38 Ibid. 66 Vladimir Socor, “Putin Testing Ukraine’s 15 Lucio Carraciolo, “The Importance of Being 39 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, Political System with His Black Sea Fleet Proposal,” Russia,” Heartland, available at . Scientists, March-April 2006. 67 Blank, 14. 16 “Todesurteil aus Moskau,” 132. 40 Ibid. 68 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—Russia 17 Baker, B1. 41 “Russia: Interview with CINC Ground and the CIS, 579. 18 Peter Rutland, “Russia’s Oily Economic Troops on Ground Troops Status, Prospects,” 69 Mikhail Martens, “Transnistrische Hebel- Growth,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, August 12, 2005, 2. Krasnaya Zvezda (Moscow), September 30, 2006, 3, wirkung,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Decem- 19 “Die neue, alte Grossmacht,” 87. available at . ber 7, 2006, 10. 20 Paul Dibb, “The Bear Is Back,” The American 42 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—Russia 70 Vladimir Socor, “Russian Forces Begin Interest 2, no. 2 (November-December 2006), 82. and the CIS, 578. Withdrawal from Georgia, Dig Heels in Moldova,” 21 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—Russia 43 Ibid., 582. Eurasia Daily Monitor, August 1, 2005, 2. and the CIS, no. 19 (London: Jane’s Information 44 “Russia: Air Force Chief of Staff Sees Slow 71 Martin Malek, “Der ’russische Faktor’im Group, 2006), 526. Combat Strength,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Suedkaukasus,” Europaeische Sicherheit (November 22 Judy Dempsey, “Problem for Europe: Russia (Moscow), April 13, 2005, 1, accessed at . 72 Markus Brach-von Gruppenberg, “Sowje- November 22, 2006, 7. 45 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—Russia tische Hinterlassenschaft und russische Sicherheit- 23 Dibb, 82; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assess- and the CIS, 592, 594. spolitik in Zentralasien,” Oesterreischische Militae- ment—Russia and the CIS, 526–527. 46 “Russian Air Force,” available at . 557–558. asks how long gusher will last,” International 47 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—Russia 73 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—Russia Herald Tribune, December 1, 2006, 11. and the CIS, 601. and the CIS, 579. 25 Lilia Shevtsova, “Imitation Russia,” The 48 “Russian Navy,” available at . 75 Carraciolo. 2006), 71.

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 15 Ott map (pickup from SF 222)

U.S. Navy and Royal Malaysian Navy sailors take rigid hull inflatable boat while performing boarding exercise during annual Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training

SecuritySoutheast Asian Challenges America’s U.S. and Thai armed forces Response? work together during

Exercise Cobra Gold Lopez) (Efren Combat Camera Squadron th 4

By M a r v i n C . O t t

U.S. Navy (John L. Beeman) Transnational Terrorism It has long been an article of faith that he history of Southeast Asia over But it is a success story that carries with Islam in Southeast Asia has a moderate, toler- the last three decades has been it a cautionary lesson. The financial crisis of ant, live-and-let-live quality that distinguishes a dramatic march to moder- 1997–1998 originated in the region and hit it from more doctrinaire varieties prevalent T nity—economic development, it hard—particularly Indonesia, where the in the Middle East. Prior to 9/11, most experts scientific and technological literacy, and social currency and government collapsed. The eco- would have answered “no” if asked whether stability. In countries such as Malaysia and nomic and societal recovery from that crisis international terrorist organizations would Thailand, per capita incomes have quintupled is substantially complete, but the lesson of find favorable conditions for organizing in in little more than a generation. Lives have vulnerability remains in the regional psyche. Southeast Asia. But the discovery of networks been transformed. Regional institutions, That sense of contingent success is reinforced affiliated with al Qaeda in Singapore, Malay- notably the Association of Southeast Asian by two very different challenges to regional sia, and Indonesia (with advanced planning Nations (ASEAN), have given Southeast Asia security. The first grows out of the emergence for a series of massive bombings in Singapore) a cohesion and identity without precedent. of radical Muslim jihadist networks that seek proved that assessment inaccurate. It soon to overthrow the existing political and social became clear that the region was vulnerable to Marvin C. Ott is a Professor of National Security order. The second is a more subtle external penetration by violent Muslim militants for a Policy in the National War College at the National challenge posed by the growing power and variety of reasons beyond simply the presence Defense University. strategic reach of China. of over 200 million Muslims.

16 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Ott

First, the geography of the Muslim areas, and between JI and the MILF. Further dif- produced a strong critical backlash from Thai with their sprawling archipelagos and unpo- ficulties arise from alleged links between ele- elites who saw the prime minister’s action as liceable borders, created a certain irreducible ments of the Indonesian military and Laskar jeopardizing Thailand’s longstanding alli- exposure. Second, the collapse of the Suharto Jihad and another similar group, the Islamic ance with the United States. Subsequently, regime in Indonesia weakened police, military, Defenders Front. In short, the wiring diagram the Thaksin government affirmed its full and intelligence agencies—the first line of for terrorism in Southeast Asia would depict cooperation in America’s war on terror. At defense against terrorist penetration. Third, interactive networks with multiple agendas. the same time, Thaksin’s autocratic and devout Muslims, particularly in Indonesia and The most important enabling factor in insensitive initiatives in southern Thailand Combat Camera Squadron (Roy A. Santana) Combat Camera Squadron th the Philippines, saw themselves marginalized the growth of these networks is governmen- bear much of the blame for inflaming Muslim 4 by secular (Indonesian) or Christian (Fili- tal weakness in Indonesia. The 32-year rule opinion in that area. pino) governments. This produced a sense of of Suharto precluded the development of a victimization that meshed with the message new generation of politi- China: On the March? from Osama bin Laden and others. Fourth, cal leadership and deeply The People’s Repub- money from the Persian Gulf (particularly corrupted the instruments China’s growth in lic of China is central Saudi Arabia) has flowed into Southeast Asia, of state security—police, power coincides with to any discussion of propagating a strict, doctrinaire version of intelligence, and military. Southeast Asian politics, Islam through schools and mosques. Finally, As a consequence, it has the disappearance of economics, and security. the mujahideen war against Soviet occupa- proven very difficult to the strategic threats China is Asia’s aspirant tion in Afghanistan had a galvanic effect. No establish an effective from Russia and Japan and, to an increasing one knows how many young Muslim men government and security extent, real great power. left Southeast Asia to join the mujahideen; it apparatus in post-Suharto By its geographic central- may have been a few thousand or only a few Indonesia. The Megawati administration ity, population size, and cultural strength and hundred. But those who went received training initially reacted to 9/11 and the arrests in sophistication, Imperial China often exerted in weapons and explosives. They were indoc- Singapore by denying the presence of similar a kind of natural primacy through three mil- trinated into a militant jihadist worldview and al Qaeda–affiliated groups in Indonesia. lennia of East Asian history. After the humili- became part of an international clandestine The October 2002 bombings in Bali forced ation of Western colonial penetration and Jap- network of alumni from that victorious Jakarta to acknowledge the reality and at anese military occupation, China has sought struggle. With the war over, many returned least temporarily silenced overt supporters to reassert its historical prominence. Mao to Southeast Asia ripe for recruitment into of the most militant groups. The subsequent Zedong’s first words on leading his victorious local terrorist organizations dedicated to the police investigation (importantly aided armies into Beijing were: “China has stood destruction of non-Muslim communities, by Australian experts) surprised many by up.” Nevertheless, for most of the following Western influence, and secular governments. producing a quick string of arrests. Bomb- four decades, China was preoccupied with In the period since 9/11, efforts by law ings of the Marriott Hotel and Australian domestic difficulties and disasters (largely enforcement and intelligence organizations embassy in Jakarta and again in Bali in the self-inflicted) and the daunting demands of have revealed much that was previously years since appear to have solidified a view economic development. But with the consoli- unknown about these organizations. They among most Indonesians that JI is a genuine dation of the economic reforms of paramount fall into three types: international terrorist threat—if only because in each case, the vast leader Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, China groups, such as al Qaeda and Jemaah Islami- majority of casualties were Indonesian. finally began its long-delayed and oft-derailed yah (JI), whose agenda includes attacks on Other governments reacted to 9/11 emergence as a modern, powerful state. U.S. interests and the establishment of a pan- in different ways. President Gloria Arroyo, China’s growth in power coincides Islamic “caliphate”; social extremists, such backed by a strong majority of public opinion with the contemporary disappearance of the as Laskar Jihad in Indonesia, that accept the in the Philippines, invited U.S. forces to strategic threats—from Russia in the north existing national state but attack non-Muslim assist (training, intelligence, and civil affairs) and west and Japan in the east—that have elements within it; and traditional Muslim the armed forces of the Philippines in their historically constrained the Middle Kingdom. separatists, such as the Moro Islamic Libera- operations against Abu Sayyaf, a self-declared This has left Beijing with the latitude to assert tion Front (MILF) in the southern Philippines militant Islamic group with some ties histori- its ambition—an ambition that has a natural and the Pattani National Liberation Front cally to al Qaeda but with a record of largely strategic focus. in southern Thailand, that seek a separate criminal activity. Prime Minister Mahathir From China’s perspective, Southeast Muslim state. bin Mohamad in Malaysia seized the oppor- Asia is attractive, vulnerable, and nearby. One of the questions affecting the secu- tunity to rebuild tattered relations with the There are many phrases in Chinese that char- rity future of Southeast Asia is whether the United States, culminating in a cordial visit to acterize the Nanyang (South Seas) as golden predominantly Muslim societies in the region the White House. Both Singapore and Malay- lands of opportunity. For three decades, can find a way to neutralize and absorb the sia cooperated closely through police, intel- Southeast Asia has been a region of rapidly militants into a broader, more moderate body ligence, and customs in counterterrorism with growing wealth, much of it generated and politic. The picture is greatly complicated by U.S. counterparts. By contrast, Thailand’s owned by ethnic Chinese. Even after whole- linkages between groups including JI and al Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra initially sale despoliation of tropical forests and other Qaeda, between Abu Sayyaf and al Qaeda, tried to stake out a position of neutrality. This natural endowments, the physical resources Background: U.S. and Thai soldiers prepare to jump from MC–130H over Lop Buri, Thailand, during Exercise Cobra Gold 2006 ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 17 Southeast Asian Security Challenges

of Southeast Asia remain impressive. Also, the agreement. Bilateral framework agreements China’s ambitious program for harness- world’s busiest sea lanes traverse the region. for cooperation on multiple fronts have been ing and exploiting the Mekong River will With the exception of Indonesia, individual negotiated with every Southeast Asian gov- have the side effect, intended or otherwise, states that comprise the political map of ernment. Political and diplomatic interactions of making downstream states such as Laos, Southeast Asia are only a fraction of China’s at all levels have become a regular, even daily, Cambodia, and Vietnam hostage to Chinese

size. The southern border of China abuts feature of the news. Also, Beijing has made decisions concerning water flow. The Mekong Cichonowizc) P. U.S. Navy (Todd Southeast Asia along the northern borders of clear its desire to extend cooperation into the is as much the economic lifeblood for these Burma, Laos, and Vietnam. security sphere. China has become a primary nations as the Nile is for Egypt. It is an axiom of realpolitik that policy supplier of economic and military assistance The very agreements and linkages that and strategy must be based on, in the first to Burma, Cambodia, and Laos. Meanwhile, Beijing cites as evidence of benign intent can instance, the capabilities of other actors—par- Chinese officials and scholars seek to allay also be seen as a web designed to tie these ticularly rivals and potential adversaries. unease by noting that the traditional tribute states to China. Contemporary Burma comes While any precise measure of China’s national system of China’s imperial past was, by close to fitting the profile of a Chinese client capabilities will be elusive, the trend and the Western standards, quite benign. state. When Singapore’s deputy prime minis- potential are quite clear. China’s capabilities Can Southeast Asia bank on the non- ter visited Taiwan, a semi-official commenta- are multidimensional: economic, military, threatening character of China’s rise? Predic- tor from Beijing promised that Singapore and, increasingly, diplomatic and political. tions are always hazardous, but there are would pay “a huge price” for such temerity. Over the last 15 years or so, China’s several reasons to be cautious. What emerges from this picture is a gross domestic product has grown at annual History strongly suggests that when new multifaceted strategic challenge to Southeast rates of around 9 percent, with a large swath great powers arise, the implications for smaller Asia. Chinese diplomats have worked assidu- of the coast from Hainan to Shanghai produc- or weaker nations on their periphery are ously and successfully to portray that chal- ing rates significantly higher. This in turn seldom pleasant. Examples include Germany lenge as opportunity and not threat. Recent has supported annual and Central Europe, Japan and East Asia, public opinion polling shows clear evidence double-digit increases in Russia and Central Asia and the Caucasus, of their success. China registers favorably military expenditures. and the United States and Latin America. It with publics throughout most of Southeast Chinese Growing budgets have remains to be seen whether China is uniquely Asia. This coincides with a precipitous drop in scholars, writing been broadly committed immune to the temptations of state power. favorable opinions of the United States since with official to a program of military As Maoism and Marxism have lost their the advent of Operation Iraqi Freedom. sanction, modernization and ideological appeal, the Chinese leadership has The durability of these sentiments professionalization, with turned to nationalism to legitimize authori- remains to be seen. What is not in question— characterize a heavy emphasis on tarian rule. This has included a comprehen- or should not be—is that growing Chinese U.S. strategic modern technology and sive program of state-sponsored patriotism power must be at the center of any security intentions personnel sufficiently in schools and mass media nurturing a sense strategy formulated by the Southeast Asian toward China as educated to use it. Expert of Chinese victimization (“a hundred years states—and by the United States. “encirclement” observers foresee a of humiliation”) at the hands of the West. In Recent developments in Southeast and Chinese military capable recent years, these powerful emotions have Asia have created strategic opportunities for of projecting force on a been focused on Taiwan and how the United China. America’s military center of gravity in “strangulation” sustained basis beyond States and Japan have allegedly stolen China’s the region—Clark Air Force Base and Subic China’s coastal periphery national patrimony. Territorial irredentism is Naval Base in the Philippines—has disap- within 10 to 20 years. a potent political force, and there are growing peared. ASEAN, so confident and vibrant The days of rigid, fears that Beijing, against all sane counsel, in the mid-1990s, saw its coherence and ideologically strident Chinese “diplomacy” could actually resort to force against Taiwan. international standing decline precipitously have long since been superseded by a cosmo- In 1992, the Chinese People’s Congress by the end of the decade. The same organiza- politan sophistication that would do Chou codified in legislation Beijing’s claim that the tion that seemed to face China down after the En-lai proud. Finally, for Southeast Asia, South China Sea is rightfully the sovereign 1995 Mischief Reef confrontation was mute Chinese power has an additional potential territory of China. Since the flare-up in the and ineffective when the issue reprised in dimension: the presence of large (and eco- Mischief Reef dispute in the mid-1990s, China 1998. The near collapse of Indonesia created, nomically potent) ethnic Chinese populations has soft-pedaled its claims. But it has not dis- in strategic terms, a void where a cornerstone in almost every major urban center. avowed them and continues to strengthen its once had been. In short, the balance of power Chinese officials have been insistent that outposts in the Spratleys. between China and Southeast Asia had shifted China’s intentions toward Southeast Asia are Chinese scholars, writing with official in Beijing’s favor. Recently, Chinese officials entirely benevolent—nothing other than to sanction, characterize U.S. strategic inten- have been heard on more than one occasion join with the region in a common endeavor tions toward China as “encirclement” and to refer to Southeast Asia (borrowing from of economic development and regional “strangulation.” They identify Southeast Asia Churchill) as “the soft underbelly of Asia.” peace and security. Beijing has energetically as the weak link in this chain and the point USS Kitty Hawk strike group pushed trade and investment ties, includ- where China can break through and defeat in the Philippine Sea during ing a centerpiece China-ASEAN free trade attempted American “containment.” Exercise Valiant Shield 2006

18 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Ott

What Does China Want? strategic interests. Perhaps the closest analogy What exactly does China seek in Asia would be the assertion, in time, of a kind of China expects that Southeast generally and Southeast Asia specifically? No Chinese Monroe Doctrine for Southeast Asia. Asia will be progressively one outside the Chinese leadership can answer Such a strategy would seek to expel any non- subordinated to Beijing’s that question with precision; we do not have Asian (and Japanese) military presence from strategic interests the minutes of the Standing Committee of the the region and create a strategic environment Politburo meetings on this issue. Moreover, in which Southeast Asian governments under- different elements of the Chinese govern- stood that they were not to make any major were notable for their cordiality and an atmo- ment—notably the Ministry of Foreign Affairs decisions affecting Chinese interests or the sphere of high expectations. and the People’s Liberation Army—have often region without first consulting, and obtaining Meanwhile, the most dramatic con- conveyed rather different impressions to the approval of, Beijing. It is with this scenario sequence of the U.S. focus on terrorism has foreign counterparts. To some extent, those in mind that several ASEAN governments been the return of American troops to the differences are no doubt contrived to persuade have watched with concern China’s growing Philippines—to exercise, train, and assist. and obfuscate. But they also may reflect a influence in Burma and to a lesser, but signifi- Most specifically, U.S. Special Forces have genuine lack of consensus in the senior leader- cant, extent in Laos and Cambodia. supported operations by the Philippines ship. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a armed forces against Abu Sayyaf. series of strategic objectives in general terms Whither America? The tsunami disaster of December 2004 with some confidence. The United States is a key, even indis- added an interesting new dimension to the First, China surely prefers a peaceful and pensable, factor in the Southeast Asian secu- security picture. Four countries—the United prosperous Asia, one that will be a continuing rity equation but is in danger of falling short States, Japan, Australia, and India, with Sin- source of the trade and investment that are so of its potential and responsibilities. What gapore serving as a logistics hub—mounted critical to modernization. Moreover, such a is missing is a sophisticated understanding major humanitarian and relief operations benign environment will allow China to avoid of the growing complexities of the security using their primarily military assets. This the trap that the Soviet Union fell into—that environment and a conscious, comprehensive effort was ad hoc, spur-of-the-moment, and is, allowing military expenditures to rise to strategy to deal with them. remarkably well coordinated and effective. the point that they undercut the economic After a long period of post-Vietnam Southeast Asia has never had a true multilat- and political viability of the state. inattention, American security planners eral security mechanism. In this case, four Second, China wants a sharp diminu- have rediscovered Southeast Asia as a second countries from outside the immediate region tion in U.S. influence in Southeast Asia, front in the war on terror. This has produced but with security interests within it demon- especially in terms of its military deploy- a variety of initiatives to strengthen liaison strated that they could work together effec- ments to the region and its encircling (from and cooperation with intelligence, police, and tively. It gave security planners something to Beijing’s perspective) chain of bilateral customs counterparts in Indonesia, Singapore, think about. security arrangements with many of China’s Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. In The other principal role is the primary neighbors. Indonesia, congressional restrictions on coop- one played by U.S. forces over the last several Third, China seeks a Japan that is eration with the Indonesian armed forces, due decades. As the strongest military power in passive, defensive, and strategically neu- to human rights concerns, have diverted much the region, but one with no territorial designs, tered—one that has effectively withdrawn U.S. security assistance to the police. U.S. forces have served to buttress regional from the competition for power and influence The election of retired general Susilo stability—the necessary precondition for eco- in Asia. Almost by definition, such a Japan Yuhoyono as president of Indonesia provides nomic growth. Forward-deployed U.S. forces will resist being an instrument of American Washington with the prospect of a new have been the proverbial gendarmes keeping strategic designs. Indonesian government that can be an effec- the peace by assuring that neighborhood Fourth, China is determined that tive security partner. Washington took the disputes do not flare out Taiwan will come under the sovereign juris- necessary enabling step by ending of control and larger diction of Beijing. (That much is clear; what is longstanding restrictions on mili- less clear is exactly how much real authority, tary cooperation and assistance. The how much actual control, will meet China’s 2006 bilateral security talks between minimum requirements.) U.S. and Indonesian defense Fifth, China aspires to a day when the officials held in Washington South China Sea will become, in effect, a Chinese lake and will be accepted as such internationally. As previously noted, China’s territorial sea law stipulates Chinese sovereignty over the South China Sea—and authorizes the use of force to keep foreign naval and Malaysian paratroopers drive research vessels away.1 assault vehicle from U.S. Navy Sixth, China expects that Southeast Asia LCAC during Cooperative Afloat USS Tortuga (John L. Beeman) Readiness and Training 2006 will be progressively subordinated to Beijing’s ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 19 Southeast Asian Security Challenges neighbors are not tempted to impose their invitations to India, Australia, and can security strategy for Southeast interests. In the process, they have assured New Zealand. Chinese interest Asia—something that does not pres- that sealanes through the region remain open in the conclave, which had been ently exist. to commercial traffic without danger of inter- high, clearly diminished with diction. This broad role will remain vital as the expanded list of invitees. By ASEAN What Should Be Done? the region navigates a period of economic and contrast, India enthusiastically architects The United States has effective political uncertainty and adjusts to growing accepted its invitation to join, look to policies (for example, counterterror- Chinese power. Since the loss of access to in effect, the strategic game in the United ism) and initiatives (tsunami relief) naval and air bases in the Philippines, the Southeast Asia. The architects of States for regarding Southeast Asia, but these U.S. military has relied on negotiated access this emerging strategy look to the do not add up to a security strategy. to facilities in a number of Southeast Asian United States not only for effective soft power The jihadist threat must and countries—most notably in Singapore, where guarantees and counterterrorist initiatives will be managed by Southeast an aircraft carrier pier to accommodate the support but also for a full panoply involving Asian governments and societal Navy has been constructed. of soft power initiatives involv- trade, organizations. Beyond counterter- China and militant Islam pose quite ing trade, investment, public investment, rorism assistance, Washington can different and multidimensional challenges. affairs, education, diplomacy, and public affairs, assist by doing two things: finding China’s geopolitical ambitions in Southeast institution-building. multiple ways to convey respect Asia and its challenge to U.S. security interests Soft power is also key for education, for Islam and Islamic institutions, are not simply, or even primarily, military. dealing with transnational chal- diplomacy, including greatly enhanced avenues They are instead diplomatic, economic, lenges. We should not delude and for contact between Americans institutional, and cultural, buttressed by ourselves into believing we fully institution- and Southeast Asian Muslims, the reality of growing power. Southeast understand the sources of ter- building and building more robust politi- Asian governments such as Singapore and, rorism. Some of it seems to be cal/diplomatic ties with the region increasingly, Indonesia are responding with rooted in societal dislocation and that convey a message of sustained a strategy that seeks to “enmesh” China and economic hardship, particularly American interest and support. the United States, along with other external as both generate large numbers The latter could and should include powers (for example, Japan, Korea, India, of underemployed and poorly U.S. adherence to ASEAN’s found- Russia, and the European Union) in a multi- educated young men who are ing document, the Treaty of Amity faceted web of connections to Southeast Asia ambitious, energetic, Islamic, and and Cooperation,2 and an annual that serve to underwrite the status quo. Insti- frustrated. Some of it derives from U.S.–ASEAN summit. tutional manifestations of this effort include a pervasive sense in Muslim communities The recent signing of a U.S.–ASEAN the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN + 3, and that they are not given the respect by local framework document pledging active efforts Asia-Europe Meeting. authorities or foreign governments (especially to strengthen economic ties and work toward The first East Asia Summit meeting the United States) that is their due. A viable a summit is a useful first step. But what is (D. Myles Cullen) in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005 was U.S. counterterrorism strategy must move needed most of all is a change in Washington’s JFQ instructive. Fearing that the event would be well beyond police, intelligence, and military tone and attitude—less lecturing, less dictat- “captured” by China, ASEAN programs to help countries such as Indonesia ing, more listening, more con- engineered additional tackle the socioeconomic vulnerabilities that sulting, and more respect. provide openings for the jihadists. To be fully effective, all this needs to be knit together into a comprehensive Ameri-

The Chairman meets with Indonesian Commander in Chief of the National Defense Forces on military-to-military relations during the annual Asian security meeting

20 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Ott

that China is not included because it currently lacks such capabilities is fortuitous. n conduct an extended research and analysis effort aimed at understanding the full nature and extent of China’s strategic reach into Southeast Asia. Done properly, this will be a multiyear, perhaps multidecade, effort requiring the development of extensive assets that do not presently exist. For example, Marine Aircraft Wing Marine Aircraft Combat Camera (Kelly R. Chase) d China has apparently put in place an extensive 3 program of schools in a number of Southeast Asian countries (Cambodia is one) that has gone almost entirely unnoticed by Western intelligence agencies. n help think tanks in the region to develop analytical and personnel capabilities. At present, the only Southeast Asian country Commanding general of 3d Marine with a critical mass of world-class security Aircraft Wing talks with Minister strategists is Singapore. Incipient capabilities of Defense of China during visit to exist in Hanoi and Jakarta, and to a degree in Marine Corps Air Station Miramar Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok. Beijing has taken China poses a very different kind of tive prominent statements of the U.S. position effective advantage of the lack of strategic challenge, one that is classically geostrategic. to repair the current ambiguity on the public sophistication in Southeast Asian capitals. It is Washington has been slow to recognize the record. in America’s interest to remedy this situation. significance of that challenge or to take steps n propose/initiate a security dialogue with n reassess policy toward Burma and to meet it. The following are some proposed each of the Southeast Asia countries to be consider the consequences for U.S. security initiatives designed to kickstart a process. In conducted at whatever level the counterpart interests of continued sanctions that effectively general, American strategists should: government prefers. Make this a true dialogue drive the Burmese junta into the arms of in which the United States receives as well as China n systematically think through U.S. inter- transmits. This will be difficult to start with a n assess the strategic implications of ests, goals, and the challenges/threats to them number of governments (for example, Malay- China’s drive to harness and develop the n assess U.S. resources and capabilities sia) and may begin as a secret interchange Mekong. Private contractors working with the (including those that come through leveraging among intelligence professionals. But as this World Bank might be helpful in understand- security partnerships in the region) relative to dialogue becomes established, it will provide ing the full import of what China is doing and interests and threats a vehicle for serious consultations regarding possible U.S. counterinitiatives. n formulate a strategy designed to maxi- regional security issues and potential areas of mize U.S. interests consistent with resource collaboration. The payoff would come with a For most of the three decades since constraints meeting of the minds concerning China. the end of the Vietnam War, U.S. security n judge the degree to which the United n provide the sinews for a new multilat- policy has treated Southeast Asia as if it States is willing to accommodate the growth of eral security arrangement in Southeast Asia. hardly existed. Such benign neglect might Chinese power and influence in the region. The tsunami relief effort rapidly took shape be tolerable if the United States did not face as a four-part operation involving Japan, formidable strategic challenges to its interests Operating from this general back- Australia, India, and the United States. in the region. But it does, and America can ill ground, specific issues will need to be Initial potential missions include maritime afford to sleepwalk through the next decade addressed. U.S. planners security (counterterror- in Southeast Asia. Too much is at stake. JFQ must: ism, counterpiracy, and environmental protec- n clarify U.S. thinking tion) and disaster mitiga- N o t e s regarding sealanes (Malacca tion and prevention. Any 1 Robert G. Sutter, “East Asia: Disputed Islands Straits and South China Sea initiatives would have to the tsunami relief effort and Offshore Claims,” Congressional Research routes) as to their status be carefully vetted with rapidly took shape as Service Report, July 28, 1992, 6. under international law, U.S. the governments of the 2 a four-part operation Treaties of this type are typically misunder- vital interests at stake, and region. These four coun- stood by Americans as primarily legal documents. the circumstances in which involving Japan, tries have demonstrated They are not; instead, they are diplomatic and polit- the United States would act Australia, India, and the the capability to provide ical expressions of solidarity and mutual support. militarily to defend those United States critical security services There is no serious reason for the United States not interests. Provide authorita- to the region. The fact to ratify the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 21 AP/Wide World Photos (Anton Hammerl)

South African president and Chinese president after signing declaration of partnership Chinese

Influenceon U.S. Operational Access to African Seaports

Chinese destroyer Qingdao participating in search and By G ordon S. Magenhei m rescue exercise with USS Shoup

he ability to project American of the world’s fastest growing economies.”1 from developing ideological allies in Africa power, except for a forced-entry This growth continues unabated. Since 2000, to securing access to natural resources, com- scenario, across and through for instance, China’s portion of the global mercial ties, and economic influence.4 From T existing African commercial GDP has been larger than that of the United the perspective of natural resources, the PRC seaports in a time of regional crisis may be States and more than half of the three next is keenly interested in obtaining and securing hampered by the growing economic and largest emerging economies (India, Brazil, long-term access to African oil and gas, as political clout of the People’s Republic of and Russia) combined.2 well as other natural resources, to sustain its China (PRC). American military planners Although the Bush administration holds economic growth. must consider the use of austere seaport sites that the PRC will act as “a responsible stake- Over the last 13 years, this economic at alternative coastal locations as well as the holder in the world community,”3 the admin- growth has moved the PRC from a net use of intermediate staging bases as a means istration and Pentagon planners remain wary exporter of oil to the world’s second-largest of countering this influence. This article illus- of the long-term strategy of the PRC. State- importer. It now relies on foreign sources for trates the extent of China’s influence along ments such as those made in the early 1990s 40 percent of its demand, and this amount is coastal Africa and the potential difficulty that by Deng Xiapong also reinforce this view. likely to rise to 80 percent by 2025 if current this influence might present to U.S. military Known as the 24 Character Strategy, Deng’s projections are correct.5 Because its decade- access to seaports in a time of crisis. guidance to members of China’s foreign and long attempt to diversify energy use through security policy apparatus stated that PRC the introduction of natural gas recently China’s Growth policymakers should “observe calmly; secure failed,6 the PRC sees oil-rich nations in Africa The PRC has made great strides over the our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide as likely candidates to meet these expected last 25 years through a series of 5-year plans our capacities and bide our time; be good at energy requirements, at least in the near term. focused on modernization and economic maintaining a low profile; never claim leader- The PRC is also actively pursuing growth. Since 1978, real gross domestic ship; and make some contributions.” access to other African natural resources product (GDP) has grown “at an average Chinese Objectives in Africa. Follow- such as minerals, metals, and timber. This annual rate of 9.3 percent, making China one ing the end of the Cold War, China shifted pursuit often includes funding and construct- ing infrastructure and selling the heavy Lieutenant Colonel Gordon S. Magenheim, USAR, is an Army Reserve Transportation Corps Officer serving equipment necessary to support current or as the Operations Officer for the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service (Defense Logistics Agency) anticipated requirements. Moreover, the Disposal Remediation Team at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. PRC is interested in developing current and

22 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Magenheim

AP/Wide World Photo (Wang Jianmin) AP/Wide World Photo (Ng Han Guan)

Chinese soldiers training for United China pledged billions of dollars in aid to Africa Nations peacekeeping duty in during Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Democratic Republic of the Congo

on U.S. Operational Access to future African markets for the sale of Chinese are navigable by ocean-going vessels in the African Seaports 13 exports. Taken together, these steps will allow The global strategic positioning concept interior of the continent.” The result is that China to have access to both raw resources is consistent with several priorities of the only a handful of widely separated commer- and export markets. PRC’s foreign policy, such as “economic cial seaports are suitable for large volumes of Globalization and the Core-Gap Model. development; managing security issues maritime traffic. Large-scale and continued In The Pentagon’s New Map, Thomas Barnett around China’s borders; and unfolding plans logistical support for any U.S. military categorizes countries and regions from the for China’s rise to replace the United States as operation would require either these sized perspective of globalization. This classifica- the dominant power in Asia.”10 The PRC “is ports or alternatives. tion is based on the degree to which a nation forging deep economic, political, and mili- (or region) is connected “and can handle the tary ties with most of Africa’s 54 countries” China’s Influence content flows associated with integrating one’s in order to secure access to the continent’s Atlantic and Indian Ocean Coasts. national economy to the global economy.”7 vast natural resources.11 The concept meshes Of the six seaports for the Atlantic and Countries able to handle this increasing well with Barnett’s Core-Gap model. Taken Indian Oceans (see table 1 14),only a single content flow are designated as Functioning together, these theories lay the foundation Atlantic Ocean port (Cape Town, South Core states (or simply Core states); countries for understanding the objectives of the PRC Africa) has sufficient draft for the berthing remaining fundamentally disconnected from in establishing itself as a regional influence of vessels classed as large medium-speed globalization are termed the Non-Integrating across the African continent. roll-on/roll-off (LMSR). On the Indian Gap states (or simply Gap states). Other than South Africa, all of Africa is located within the The Nature of African Seaports region identified as the Non-Integrating Gap. Seaports act as natural gateways and following the Cold War, there Global Strategic Positioning. This concept nodes within international transport net- integrates a nation’s private and governmental works and serve as corridors for materials was a shift from developing assets with foreign countries (or groups of and resources. This especially has been true ideological allies in Africa to countries) for the purpose of expanding its since the advent of modern material handling securing access to natural own influence, accumulating power, and technologies such as bulk terminals, con- resources, commercial ties, 8 acquiring resources. This practice has been tainer ports, and roll-on/roll-off methods of and economic influence common throughout history and has allowed wheeled equipment, which have strengthened predominant powers to extend their regional the relationship between a seaport and its influence through trade, political, and military supporting hinterland. alliances. The PRC follows this concept by Africa is unique in that at least for Ocean, the port of Durban, South Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, there is “an unusual has the largest number (15) of LMSR-sized taking careful, deliberate and well-coordi- shortage of natural ports along the coast- berths. The port of Mombasa, Kenya, is the nated action on a global scale to advance line.”12 Consequently, seaport locations, remaining LMSR-capable seaport (with a relations with strategically positioned coun- where available, become major points of single vessel berthing space) located on the tries possessing both the natural resources access into the African continent for both Indian Ocean. The apparent lack of large and influence to support its ascension in the imported goods and exports such as oil commercial ports with sufficient room for international community and to accelerate and gas, metals, and timber. The general the placement of LMSR-class vessels along the growth of its power and influence on the lack of natural seaports along the coast is both of these coasts is particularly troubling world stage.9 compounded by “the absence of rivers which in that the west coast of Africa is the largest

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 23 Magenheim table 1

Access to African Seaports

and Zambia to rehabilitate the Tanzania- Table 1. Operational Summary of African Ports and Zambia railway, a 1,153-mile route whose Large Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMSR) Capacities original construction was funded by China. This railroad extends from the seaport of LMSR Berthing Dar Es Salaam in Tanzania to Kapiri Mposa Port Country Equivalent Comments Groups in central Zambia. Although trade between Berths Atlantic Ocean the two countries has been modest, military Lagos Nigeria 13 0 Insuff icient draft; Niger Delta area exchanges and cooperation continue to be an Cape Town South Africa 10 5 Western co ast of South Africa important part of the relationship.21 Indian Ocean The PRC established relations with Durban South Af rica 17 15 Eastern co ast of South Africa Kenya shortly after its independence in 1963. Dar Es Salaam Tanzania 3 0 Insuff icient draft As with Tanzania, the PRC has developed a Mombasa Kenya 10 1 broad range of commercial ventures and proj- Mogadishu Somalia 2 0 Insuff icient draft Gulf of Aden ects. Kenya is the communications gateway Berbera Somalia 1 0 Insuff icient draft to East Africa and a market of keen interest Kismayu Somalia 2 0 Insuff icient draft to the PRC. Recently, the port of Mombasa Djibouti Djibouti 4 0 Insuff icient draft signed an agreement with China for the sale Red Sea of gantry cranes to increase cargo handling Assa b Eritrea 3 0 Insuff icient draft operations. Only recently have both countries Massawa Eritrea 5 0 Insuff icient draft agreed to explore for oil and natural gas. Port Sudan Sudan 6 2 The PRC has provided modest financial Safaga Egypt 1 0 Insuff icient draft support to Somalia, with which it has also had Ad abiya Egypt 4 2 Mediterranean Sea close relationships since 1960. Prior to Soma- El Dekheila Egypt 3 1 lia’s becoming a failed state in 1991, China had Alexandria Egypt 9 2 constructed several commercial and public Port Said Egypt 3 1 facilities across the country. Current involve- Damietta Egypt 3 7 ment has been limited to political support for Benghazi Libya 3 0 Insuff icient draft the reestablishment of the government. Tr ipo li Libya 4 0 Insuff icient draft The role of the PRC in countries with Gabes Tunisia 3 0 Insuff icient draft seaports that border the Indian Ocean is Sfax Tunisia 2 0 Insuff icient draft limited to commercial trade, along with Source: Military Traffic Manageme nt C ommand Trans portation Engineer ing Agenc y (MTMC TEA ), Pam phlet 70 0–2, Logistics military and political/educational exchanges, Ha ndbook for Strategic Mobility Planning (N ew port New s, VA: MTM C TEA, 2002), appendix F, 50–52. Nu mber of LMS R equivalent berths is based on a plan ning len gth of 1,000 feet and a minim um draft of 36 feet. rather than the oil exploration and production activities associated with the Atlantic coastal oil-producing area on the continent, with package. In return, it was rewarded with oil seaports. Nonetheless, the PRC has estab- Nigeria and Angola as the main producers. exploration rights for a block that Angola had lished an early toehold in many of the African Moreover, West Africa is a strategic area for placed on the open market for bids.19 countries along the Indian Ocean. the United States as it provides the Nation Located at the southern tip of the con- Gulf of Aden and Red Sea Coasts. Eight with 15 percent of its oil imports. This figure tinent, South Africa sits astride the major seaports listed in table 1 are located along is expected to grow to as much as 20 to 25 maritime trade route between the Indian and the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea coastlines percent over the coming decade.15 Atlantic Oceans. Although not a key area with of Africa. Based on information contained In oil-rich Nigeria, the PRC has under- regard to petroleum resources, South Africa in this table, there are no ports capable of taken a variety of resource and commercial occupies a strategic location through which receiving LMSR-class vessels along the Gulf projects. These include a recent $800 million a large portion of oil tanker traffic from the of Aden. Two ports, Port Sudan (Sudan) and crude oil sales agreement for the purchase of Middle East to Europe and North America Adabiya (Egypt), are the only seaports located 30,000 barrels of oil per day for 5 years,16 as passes. It also has the largest seaport capac- along the Red Sea coast of Africa that have well as agreements for the construction of a ity of all the countries listed in table 1 and is berths with adequate length and draft to hydropower station and the rebuilding of the easily accessible to both oceans. receive LMSRs. railroad network.17 The effort associated with Along the eastern portion of the conti- Both Djibouti and Eritrea are small rebuilding the railroad is key to expanding nent, well north of the South African seaport countries strategically located along the the transportation network into the neighbor- of Durban, lies the Tanzanian seaport of Dar northeastern corner of the African continent. ing country of Chad, where the PRC is also Es Salaam. Tanzania has been China’s largest The influence of the PRC with Djibouti has seeking exploration and development rights aid recipient in Africa, with formal ties having been minimal and is limited to construction, along the Nigerian-Chad border.18 been established in 1961.20 The PRC has student exchanges, and visits by Chinese The PRC has also expanded its influ- cooperated with the government on a variety medical teams, although both Djibouti and ence in Angola. China recently provided a of non-oil-related projects. Recently, China the PRC have established agreements on $2 billion loan as part of a longer-term aid provided an $11 million loan to Tanzania economic and technical cooperation.22 Trade

24 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Magenheim and political contact between Eritrea and the China’s emphasis in Libya has been on U.S. Strategic Sealift Power PRC are similar to that between Djibouti and developing economic and commercial links Projection Options the PRC, although Eritrea expects China to in a variety of industries, especially those Throughout the 1990s, the United expand its involvement in local industries, to related to oil and gas exploration and produc- States has decreased its overseas military include mining and transportation tion. Unlike Egypt and Sudan, presence through reducing forces and shift- infrastructure. China was not actively engaged ing troops and equipment from bases in Sudan and the PRC have commercially with Libya until Europe and South Korea. With transforma- had a long political association the PRC has 1981. Since that time, the Chinese tion efforts by the Department of Defense since relations were established invested have been involved in a number of under the Bush administration, the reduction in 1959. Over the last decade, a heavily in Libyan infrastructure projects and in an overseas American presence continues, strong economic relationship has a variety of are pursuing additional commercial notwithstanding the effort to establish small also developed between the two domestic opportunities. Both Libyan ports and austere bases and facilities (so-called countries that is focused on petro- projects to listed in table 1 lack the available lily pad bases that allow for the fast, flexible, leum exploration and development, draft necessary for receiving LMSR- and efficient projection of force) in former port construction, and electrical ensure its class vessels. Eastern Bloc and other countries. Rather power generation and transmis- future with Interaction between the than being a forward deployed force, the sion. Sudan provides China with regard to PRC and Tunisia is similar to that U.S. military now requires strategic air- and 7 percent of its imported oil, and Sudanese oil with Djibouti and Eritrea, with sealift to project influence and power over- China controls most of a Darfur exports cooperative agreements dealing seas. Historically, however, approximately 95 oil field (the current site of hostili- with various issues being completed percent of all equipment and supplies reach a ties between Sudanese forces and in 2002. Chinese firms have been theater of operations by sealift.24 Any military Christian rebels in southern Sudan) active in construction planning for operation requiring the projection of a sig- with minority percentage interests in several local infrastructure projects, to include water nificant American presence into Africa will other oil fields. Chinese construction interests supply and sewage projects. As with Libya to require the use of a commercial seaport or associated with the China National Petroleum the east, Tunisia’s two ports listed in table 1 adjacent secondary/austere ports in a theater Corporation participated in the construction are incapable of handling LMSR-sized vessels. of operations. of a 930-mile pipeline from several oil fields to Algeria and China have had extensive Characteristics and Capabilities of U.S. the Red Sea. Separately, Chinese interests are commercial and political dealings since Strategic Sealift Vessels. Four conventional building a $215 million export tanker terminal Algeria’s independence from France in 1958. ship types are used for the deployment and at Port Sudan. Another construction project Both countries entered into a strategic agree- redeployment of unit equipment: planned by China is a $325 million pipeline to ment that focuses on oil and gas production, transport water from the Nile to Port Sudan. infrastructure development, and telecom- n breakbulk vessels, which consist of a Clearly, the PRC has invested heavily in a munications development. This agreement series of separate cargo holds and are self- variety of domestic projects in order to ensure was preceded by contracts signed in 2002 for sustaining using ship’s gear (on-board booms, its future with regard to Sudanese oil exports. the development of a Saharan Desert oil field cranes, and winches) to conduct lift-on/lift-off Notably, this access extends to Port Sudan, one ($525 million) by the China Petroleum and operations of the only seaports along the Gulf of Aden/ Chemical Company and in 2003 for the pur- n container ships, which carry their entire Red Sea coastline capable of berthing LMSR- chase of several Algerian refineries and explo- load in containers that are 20 or 40 feet in class vessels. ration rights by the China National Petroleum length, and are non-self-sustaining (lacking The relationship between the PRC Corporation. China continues to pursue on-board cranes) and Egypt is also a mature one, dating back aggressively additional petroleum exploration, n barge carriers, which carry smaller to 1956. Trade, political, and educational development, and distribution throughout barges that are subsequently unloaded and exchanges are significant. Chinese companies Algeria in order to increase its access to oil ferried by tugs to berths where they are dis- have undertaken a variety of construction and gas supplies.23 charged by shore-based cranes projects and continue to sign numerous con- Beijing follows the same pattern of n roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) vessels, tracts to include oil and gas sector projects. political and economic agreements with which are designed primarily as vehicle Egypt is unique among most African coun- African countries bordering the Mediter- transports that allow the rapid movement tries in that it has large capacity seaports on ranean Sea as it does for other coastal regions. and placement of wheeled and tracked both the Red Sea and Mediterranean coasts. These agreements offer an avenue for Chinese equipment by a series of external and inter- Mediterranean Sea Coast. The African engagement with poorly developed econo- nal ramps between decks.25 coast bordering the Mediterranean Sea has mies. They begin with the offer of humanitar- eight seaports listed in table 1, half of which ian assistance and educational exchanges and Only fast sealift ships (FSSs) and are capable of berthing LMSR-class vessels. are followed with infrastructure development LMSRs are RO/RO vessels that have the All four of these ports are located along the (that is, hospital, water and sewage treatment largest amount of available floor space for Egyptian coast, which makes Egypt a key plants, and road and railway construction) the placement of equipment. Consequently, access point for strategic sealift equipment and the acquisition and export of natural these types are preferred for large-scale unit and materiel into northeastern Africa. resources (principally oil and gas). deployments. Table 2 provides summary ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 25 Mangenheim table 2

Access to African Seaports

money to cultivate political and economic Table 2. Strategic Sealift Vessel Type Cargo Capacities access into most of Africa, particularly the coastal countries. Average Average Usable American military planners must Vessel Type Total TEU Berthing Limitations Space Capacity confront the reality that access for the largest (sq. ft.) class of vessels capable of delivering sizeable Non –Self-Su staining N/A 2,718 610 to 687 foot length (variable); 18 to 20 foot draft amounts of equipment and materiel into Container Ship available African seaports may be denied due Self-Su staining N/A 1,763 610 to 687 foot length (variable); 18 to 20 foot draft Container Ship to conflict with commercial interests at the port for all but a forced-entry scenario. This Breakbulk 48,625 N/A 268 to 605 foot length (variable); 18 to 35 foot draft may be especially the case in those ports that

Not ion al Ro ll-On /Roll- are actively engaged in commercial ventures 117,668 459 540 to 750 foot length (variable); 18 to 35 foo t draft Off with the People’s Republic of China. Seaport operators may be reluctant to allow U.S.- Fast Sealif t Ship 152,774 230 946 foot lengt h; 36 foot draft flagged vessels port access if it would disrupt

LMSR (Conversion) 233,969 279 906 foot lengt h; 34 to 36 foot draft normal port operations or run counter to China’s political goals for the region. JFQ LMSR (New 292,733 353 949 foot lengt h; 35 to 36 foot draft Construction) N o t e s Source: Military Traffic Manageme nt C ommand Trans portation Engineer ing Agenc y (MTMC TEA ), Pam phlet 70 0–2, Logistics Ha ndbook for Strategic Mobility Planning (N ew port New s, VA: MTM C TEA , 2002), table 8 (P lan ning F actors by Ship Type) and table 9 (Vess el C haracteris tics). 1 Wayne M. Morrison, China’s Economic LMSR = La rge Medium-Speed Rol l-On/R oll-Of f Ve ss el; TEU = Twe nty-foot Equivalent U nit Conditions, Report No. IB98014 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2005), 2. planning information regarding the cargo Alternative LMSR/FSS Discharge 2 “Balancing Act: A Survey of China,” The capability of various vessel types. LMSR Options. In the event that access for berth- Economist, March 25, 2006, 3. vessels are capable of transporting a signifi- ing either an LMSR or FSS is unavailable at 3 Ibid., 4. cant amount of equipment—generally four to an existing commercial seaport, alternative 4 David H. Shinn, “China’s Approach to East, six times that of an average breakbulk vessel. vessel discharge options will be needed. Due North and the Horn of Africa,” testimony before FSSs have approximately half of the usable to the deep draft of these vessels, equipment the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review cargo capacity of LMSRs but have average discharge will be required from offshore Commission, China’s Global Influence: Objectives service speeds of 27 knots compared to 24 anchorage locations to smaller, shallower and Strategies, July 21, 2005, 1. 5 knots for LMSRs. draft vessels known as lighters. LMSR/FSS Office of the Secretary of Defense, The Both LMSRs and FSSs are capable of discharge using this method is known as Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing deploying both wheeled and tracked equip- in-the-stream unloading and will increase Office, 2005), 10. ment adjacent to a berthing area, provided vessel discharge times. This method may 6 Shai Oster and Patrick Barta, “About Face: there is sufficient length and draft. Both types be used across bare beach environments, China Stumbles in Attempt to Cut Use of Coal and of vessels have side or stern ramps that are damaged/sabotaged ports, or in austere Oil,” The Wall Street Journal, March 3, 2006, A2. maneuvered into place, allowing equipment ports normally capable of handling smaller 7 Thomas P.M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New to be driven or towed from the interior of the cargo vessels. Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century vessel, across the ramp, and onto the pier for Of note, the Defense Science Board Task (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004), 125. staging and pickup by the owning unit. Force on Mobility has recognized the current 8 Frederick W. Stakelbeck, Jr., “China and the Ready access to pier side unload- lack of a viable method of using austere port Concept of Global Strategic Positioning (GSP),” ing areas is critical for capitalizing on the locations for the rapid discharge of heavy/ The American Thinker, August 19, 2005, 1, avail- strengths of LMSR- and FSS-class vessels medium forces into a theater and has recom- able at . (that is, large cargo capacity, mended a research and develop- 9 Ibid., 1. self-sustaining capabilities, and ment program to determine its 10 Ross Terrell, The New Chinese Empire and in the event 26 quick loading/unloading times). future feasibility. What It Means for the United States (New York: Average discharge times range that berthing Basic Books, 2003), 265. from 24 to 36 hours; similar is unavailable The People’s Republic 11 Karby Leggett, “China Flexes Economic discharge times for LMSRs are at an existing of China has made consider- Muscle Throughout Burgeoning Africa,” The approximately 24 hours. LMSR commercial able political progress and Wall Street Journal, March 29, 2005, 1, avail- vessel discharge rate informa- strong economic inroads with able at . 12 Freedom or Iraqi Freedom is not alternative vessel ticularly those with abundant United Nations Conference on Trade and currently available but should be discharge options natural resources. China has Development (UNCTAD), UNCTAD’s Contribu- tion to the Implementation of the United Nations similar to that of FSS vessels. expended and continues to will be needed New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the expend considerable time and

26 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Magenheim

1990s: African Transport Infrastructure, Trade and 15 Princeton Lyman, “China’s Rising Role in for Competitiveness, Report No. TD/B/46/10, August Africa,” testimony before the U.S.-China Economic CALL 20, 1999, 10, available at . Influence: Objectives and Strategies, July 21, 2005, 2. 13 Ibid. 16 Ibid., 2. 14 Table 1 lists seaports located along the coast 17 Leggett, 1. of Africa and uses information presented in appen- 18 Council on Foreign Affairs, More Than dix F (Worldwide Port Characteristics) of the Humanitarianism: A Strategic U.S. Approach Military Traffic Management Command Trans- Toward Africa, Independent Task Force Report, No. portation Engineering Agency (MTMCTEA), 56 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2005), Pamphlet 700–2, Logistics Handbook for Stra- 44. tegic Mobility Planning (Newport News, VA: 19 Ibid., 43. MTMCTEA, 2002). The number of multiple-vessel 20 Shinn, 6. berthing groups, which vary in length and avail- 21 Ibid. able draft, was obtained directly from appendix F 22 Ibid., 10. for each seaport listed. The number of equivalent 23 Ibid., 12. large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off (LMSR) 24 Department of the Army, Field Manual 55–1, vessel berths represents the number of vessels that Transportation Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. could be accommodated at a single time given Government Printing Office, 1995), 4–5. the limitations of length and draft required for 25 MTMCTEA Pamphlet 700–2, 50–52. an LMSR-sized vessel. For the sake of this article, 26 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for a minimum planning length of 1,000 feet and a Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Defense minimum draft of 36 feet were used to determine Science Board Task Force on Mobility (Washington, The following are areas of interest the number of LMSR-equivalent berths available DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September that JFQ expects to return to frequently, for a given seaport listed in appendix F. 2005), 37–44. with no submission deadline:

ß adaptive planning and execution ß coalition operations

U.S. Navy (Daniel A. Barker) ß employing the economic instrument of power ß theater security cooperation ß humanitarian assistance and disaster relief ß industry collaboration for national security ß integrated operations subsets (new partners, interoperability, and transformational approaches) ß joint air and space power ß Just War theory ß “effects” planning ß proliferation and weapons of mass destruction ß prosecuting the war on terror within sovereign countries ß military and diplomatic history Chinese sailors aboard destroyer Qingdao Visit ndupress.ndu.edu to view our Guide for Contributors. Share your professional insights and improve national security. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 27 U.S. Naval officer from Combined Task Force–67 demonstrates operation of Automated Identification System ship tracker to Ghanaian naval officer

Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea

U.S. Navy (Jason T. Poplin)

By P a t r i c k J . P a t e r s o n

Oil tanker passing AP/Wide World Photo (George Osodi) Port Harcourt, Nigeria, in (DROC) lie just above the southernmost Gulf Gulf of Guinea of Guinea nation, Angola. These nations are notoriously unstable. ecurity conditions are deteriorat- United Nations Humanitarian Relief Direc- ing in one of the most important tor Jan Egeland called the recent conflict energy regions in the world. As in DROC “the world’s worst humanitarian S the United States tries to wean crisis.”1 Angola was famous as the scene of itself from its Middle East oil dependency, Africa’s longest conflict, a 27-year civil war areas such as the Gulf of Guinea off the West that lasted until 2002 and left 500,000 dead. African coast are emerging as potentially Sao Tome and Principe, a small island nation the most important regions on the globe 200 miles from the coast, sits geographi- for access to this diminishing resource. The cally isolated from the other Gulf of Guinea United States has recently declared the Gulf nations. of Guinea an area of strategic national interest The number of waterways along the gulf and thereby one that could require military is enormous. The coastline stretches 1,900 intervention to protect its resources. However, miles from Ghana to Angola, the equivalent it is an area rife with conflict. In fact, the of the distance from Nova Scotia to the Straits challenges of operating there may prove to be of Florida. Additionally, there are numerous dangerous for the U.S. military. river systems such as the Niger, Congo, and The Gulf of Guinea region encompasses Ogooue that provide conveyance for much a dozen African nations. From the north, of the area’s commerce. By itself, the Niger Ghana borders the tumultuous nations of Delta, the lowland area where the Niger and Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Civil Benue Rivers spill into the Gulf of Guinea, wars and ethnic strife in these nations have is estimated to have 2,000 miles of navigable killed approximately 300,000 in the past 10 waterways. The Congo River pours 1.4 million years. Continuing south, the region passes cubic feet of water per second into the Atlantic, through small Togo and Benin, then through second only to the Amazon River in volume. the regional hegemon Nigeria, and into Cam- Its final 220 miles spill out of the Congo eroon and Equatorial Guinea. The Congo Basin, a plateau 1,000 feet above sea level in and the Democratic Republic of the Congo the interior; the drop and volume of water are

Lieutenant Commander Patrick J. Paterson, USN, is a Strategic Planner at U.S. Special Operations Command, Europe.

28 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Paterson

Director of Strategy and Policy, U.S. Naval accidentally ignited, burning most victims Forces Europe, addressing Gulf of Guinea Maritime and Security Conference beyond recognition. An estimated $3 billion in oil is stolen places it fifth among U.S. oil providers behind each year from oil companies. Regional Canada, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, and Venezuela. strongmen and local politicians permit this Nearly half of Nigeria’s oil production goes to behavior in return for kickbacks and protec- the United States. Nigeria is the world’s eighth tion money from the thieves.9 The stolen largest oil exporter.4 funds also provide a source of arms for gangs U.S. Navy (Eric Brown) Nigeria has many problems, however. that operate in the delta. Corruption is endemic and institutionalized. The inhabitants of the Niger River Delta Nigeria is the largest U.S. trade From its independence from Britain in 1960 are fed up with the corruption and complicity. partner on the continent, until its first democratic elections in 1998, In early 2006, Ijaw tribe members there kid- supplying 10 percent of it was ruled nearly continuously by military napped four American citizens and numer- autocrats. During this time, the country’s ous other Western oil company employees, America’s imported oil leaders, including strongman General Sani held them for ransom, and called for better Abacha who remained in power from 1993 distribution of wealth and the liberation of until 1998, stole an estimated $400 billion of the delta from its tyrannical rulers. The hos- so significant that these final 220 miles carry the country’s funds and secreted it away in tages were released after 19 days. One month more hydroelectric potential than all the rivers overseas accounts.5 Despite its enormous oil later, nine foreign contractors working for and lakes in the United States combined.2 wealth, Nigeria has one of the lowest gross Willbros Group of Houston—including three domestic products per capita in the area, Americans and one British citizen—were The New Persian Gulf? just above Angola among the Gulf of Guinea also kidnapped and held for ransom. Three By P a t r i c k J . P a t e r s o n The energy potential for the Gulf of nations, and one of the worst income distribu- of them were held for nearly 5 weeks before Guinea region is astonishing. Experts predict tions in the world: 80 percent of the generated their release was negotiated. Although that by 2020, oil production there will surpass oil revenue wealth accrues to only 1 percent of secrecy shrouds the case, many believe that the total production of the Persian Gulf the population.6 Transparency International the ransom demands were paid by oil com- nations: 25 percent of the global production ranks Nigeria as one of the five most corrupt panies. In more recent violence, on May 10, as compared to 22 percent from the Persian countries in the world, and the Economist 2006, American oil executive Rick Wiginton Gulf. Not surprisingly, multinational compa- Intelligence Unit listed the country’s quality of was murdered while driving through Lagos nies recognized this potential 10 years ago. In life index as the fourth worst. by an assailant who approached his vehicle the late 1990s, oil conglomerates such as Royal The corruption extends from the highest on a motorcycle. American hostage Macon Dutch Shell started expanding their opera- to the lowest points of Nigeria’s government. Hawkins testified to the determination of tions in the area. By 2000, nearly $50 billion The president of the senate was forced to the insurgents on his release: “These people had been invested in oil infrastructure, and resign after taking bribes to pass an inflated are serious, very serious about what they are an estimated 40,000 personnel were employed budget. The inspector general of the police doing. They are going to fight and they are by Western oil companies on rigs and refiner- force was found guilty of stealing $140 going to fight to the death.”10 ies.3 The geopolitical repercussions of this million. He was sentenced to only 6 months One insurgent group, the Movement discovery are just beginning to be felt; heavy in jail. Two admirals were found guilty of for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, has development is expected to continue, espe- stealing and selling oil in the delta and were demanded $1.5 billion in cash, the release of cially in light of the export challenges in Iraq, relieved of their duties.7 In the state of Bayelsa, two of their jailed leaders, and a presidential Iran, and Venezuela. Additionally, China’s which produces 30 percent of the country’s oil, promise to address their needs. Armed with and India’s economies continue to grow in the governor has spent $25 million since 2002 rocket-propelled grenade launchers and leaps and bounds, demanding reliable energy on his state mansion, including $8.5 million automatic weapons, the militants have fre- sources to feed their industrial machines. In for two new houses and nearly $6 million on quently attacked oil company platforms and January 2006, China purchased a $2.3 billion the fence surrounding the buildings.8 barges from speedboats along the numerous share of a Nigerian oil field, its largest invest- Much of the corruption stems from a waterways. Having recently resorted to car ment on the continent to date. criminal practice known as “oil bunkering.” bomb attacks, the groups have also threatened Nigeria is the linchpin in the whole Gulf Illicit or stolen barges pull up alongside an oil to attack international oil tankers operating of Guinea region. An economic giant compared pipeline in an isolated location (often under along West African coastal waters.11 They to its neighbors, its economy is second only to cover of darkness), “hot tap” into the pipeline have vowed to continue the attacks until South Africa in all of sub-Saharan Africa. A by drilling into it and installing a valve, then they have interrupted the country’s daily oil regional hegemon militarily and economically, make off with thousands of barrels that can production by 1 million barrels (20 percent of Nigeria is also the largest oil producer in Africa. be sold on the black market. This reckless Nigeria’s current 2.5 million barrels per day) Ninety-five percent of its economy is generated practice is as dangerous as it is illegal. Within or until their demands are met. The militants from oil revenue. Nigeria is the largest U.S. the last few months, 500 people have died exceeded their own expectations. As a result trade partner on the continent, supplying in separate incidents as the siphoned oil of the violence, Royal Dutch Shell shut down 10 percent of America’s imported oil. That production at terminals and oil fields in 2006,

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 29 Maritime Security thereby closing the spigot on 25 percent of the land, and the Nigerian military forces, fre- of Iraq—in control of vast energy resources. country’s daily oil exports.12 Later that year, quent participants in peacekeeping operations Such a situation could result in U.S. military Royal Dutch Shell and other oil companies in other African nations, have been depleted intervention on a much larger scale than in evacuated their employees and families from by the diseases.14 Iraq.17 the region, citing increased violence. Nigeria’s population of 133 million is Energy security is not the only problem The crippling of the Nigerian oil indus- the largest in Africa, more than all the other in the Gulf of Guinea. Fisheries protection, try could have disastrous results. Energy gulf nations combined; 1 of every 6 Africans drug smuggling, harbor security, and piracy experts estimate that if Nigerian exports were lives there. However, the country is polarized, undermine other commercial interests and completely taken offline, the price of a barrel often violently, between the Muslim north scare away foreign investment. The Interna- of oil could skyrocket much higher than and Christian/Animist south. The Muslims tional Maritime Bureau lists the gulf as the during the 2006 crisis when prices hit $75. count some 65 million (2½ million more than second most violent coastline in the world Without the world’s eighth largest producer— Iraq), making Nigeria the largest Muslim (behind the Somali coastline). Twenty-one acts coupled with additional fears about access population on the continent. An estimated of piracy were reported there in 2005.18 Count- to oil supplies in Venezuela and the Middle 10,000 have died in sectarian violence since less others go unreported. Illegal fishing robs East—prices could quickly reach $110 per 1999,15 and the recent uproar over the prophet an estimated $350 million in revenue from the barrel and over $4.00 per gallon at U.S. service Mohammed cartoons has caused more Gulf of Guinea nations each year.19 stations. The National Intel- deaths in Nigeria than any other ligence Council, in a study of country in the world.16 U.S. Efforts in the Region Africa’s problems, has declared The violence could get The Gulf of Guinea coastline has also the collapse of Nigeria to be “the the National worse before it gets better. become the layover point favored by narcotics most important risk facing the Intelligence President Olusegun Obasanjo, smugglers trying to reach the lucrative markets continent today.”13 Council has a Christian from the south— of Europe. In September 2004, a French In many ways, Nigeria is declared the legally restricted from running warship intercepted a Togolese tugboat, Pitea, a microcosm of the rest of the collapse of for a third term—has lobbied for off the coast of Ghana with more than 2 20 Gulf of Guinea and even the Nigeria to be a constitutional amendment that tons of cocaine worth $50 million. In 2004, African continent itself. Replete would permit him to remain in Spanish officials seized more than 20 tons with abundant resources, its pro- “the most office. That would lead to coun- of cocaine that had originated in the Gulf of ductivity is hindered by corrupt important risk trywide instability promoted Guinea. Nigerians are the most frequently officials, regional warlords who facing the by his political opponents and arrested drug smugglers in Austria (more than put tribal loyalties above national continent today” could provoke open rebellion. double any other nationality) and the second ones, and the escalating violence According to some U.S. officials, most frequently arrested in Spain.21 between religious sects. Foreign the worst-case scenario for Protecting maritime commerce and investment is driven off by fear America would be the emergence the sealanes is becoming a critical effort of the lawlessness and instability of the nation. of a northern Muslim general or politician of the U.S. Navy, particularly those forces Muslim fundamentalists in the north have into the presidency, either democratically serving under U.S. European Command grown weary of the lack of governance, and 12 or through unconstitutional means. The (USEUCOM), headquartered in Stuttgart, states have recently adopted sharia law. Both United States could then find itself facing a Germany. USEUCOM has responsibility for HIV and AIDS are rampant throughout the Muslim population—nearly three times that all American forces operating in Europe, Africa, and parts of Central Asia. General Charles Wald, USAF, the former 4-star Deputy Commander of USEUCOM, noted the importance of the waterways in and around the Gulf of Guinea: “Our single greatest challenge is the cooperation and willingness of African coastal nations to see maritime security as a regional problem and to act on known security issues.”22 USEUCOM’s maritime strategy is based on higher guidance provided in the White House’s National Maritime Security Strategy, which recognizes the need to protect the oceans and international maritime commerce, the latter of which provides conveyance for 80 percent of the world’s exports. According to Cameroon sailors conduct visit, board, this strategy, “The United States, in coopera- search, and seizure drill aboard French tion with its allies, will lead an international

ship Germinal, Exercise RECAMP V Bailey) (Jason T. Combat Camera Squadron st

1 effort to improve monitoring and enforce-

30 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Paterson

U.S. Marine Corps (Donald E. Preston) ment capabilities through enhanced cooperation at the bilateral, regional, and global level.”23 The national guidance clearly applies to USEUCOM’s efforts in the Gulf of Guinea. These sentiments were further emphasized in 2004 when Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Charles Snyder reported, “Improving African capacities to monitor their coastlines is . . . a critical part of our strategy. We . . . will revive the Commander, Coalition Landing Forces Western Africa Training old African coastal security program, which Cruise, meets with Guinean armed helps African security forces protect their forces at Benti Training Area shores as well as their marine resources.”24 This African Coastal Security program was initiated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, International Security Affairs Division, in 1985. Although the program provided necessary equipment, training, and technical advice, it was inadequately funded with only $3 million per year. The program was discontinued in 1995. Maritime domain awareness (MDA) is the centerpiece of the U.S. Navy’s strategy in the Gulf of Guinea. MDA is a broad term ties. Composed of an array of coastal radar be a force in the Gulf of Guinea. But we are that refers to the situational awareness of systems, this system would allow African looking to increase our involvement right anything in a nation’s waters or territorial or coastal nations to detect and track vessels now—not to send ships on patrol but to economic exclusion zone, and anything that out to 25 nautical miles from the sensor in develop partnerships and develop capaci- could affect the nation’s security, safety, eco- all weather conditions. Coupled with a naval ties. If the Navy had more assets, would nomics, or environment. For instance, MDA reaction force, RMAC could impede smug- they send them here? Probably. But our first includes surveillance networks and coastal gling, piracy, or illegal fishing in the host choice is to use what we have to facilitate radars that could help the Gulf of Guinea nation’s waters. training and regional cooperation.27 nations selectively react to illegal activities Establishing cooperative partnerships in their waters. One such MDA system is with African navies is a critical element of the European partners such as the French the Automatic Identification System (AIS), U.S. strategy. The 1,000-ship Navy concept, and British have a long history of investment a commercial shipboard broadcast system a phrase first coined by the U.S. Navy’s Vice and involvement in the region and could con- that functions much like the Identification Admiral John Morgan and Rear Admiral tribute to maritime security efforts. Friend or Foe equipment carried by military Charles Martoglio in Annual exercises and commercial aircraft. AIS is capable of 2005, is an essential such as the West transmitting 4,500 data reports per minute strategy to enlist the maritime domain African Training and updating every 2 seconds. The cost of an assistance of host- awareness is the centerpiece Cruise encourage just AIS unit, about $4,000 for the network, would nation forces and of the U.S. Navy’s strategy in that kind of naval be quickly redeemed from the illegal activity relieve pressure on the Gulf of Guinea cooperation. The it could prevent. The system could enable a U.S. military over- cruise, conducted African coastal naval forces to sort legitimate extended in Iraq and regularly since 1978, maritime commerce from the illicit contacts Afghanistan. The development of partner consists of a series of bilateral interactions (those not “squawking” a signal), thereby navies in the Gulf of Guinea would enable between the U.S. Navy and individual African improving MDA and reducing illegal traf- countries to combat the myriad maritime nations. The 2005 deployment saw the USS ficking and piracy. Admiral Harry Ulrich III, challenges on the high seas and in the litto- Gunston Hall and the USS Swift conduct exer- commander of Naval Forces Europe, explains, rals: piracy, smuggling, narcotics trafficking, cises with navies along the West African and “We do it every day with airplanes and it’s oil bunkering, and fisheries violations.26 Gulf of Guinea coasts. The training included time for us to start thinking about doing the The concept ideally suits the asset- small boat drills, riverine operations, live-fire same thing with ships at sea.”25 limited Naval Forces Europe, the naval com- exercises, and amphibious raids. Another useful surveillance tool is ponent of U.S. European Command. Said a Other Navy ship visits could also help the Regional Maritime Awareness Capabil- strategic planner at its headquarters: to improve the U.S. reputation among Gulf ity (RMAC), which would enable a nascent of Guinea nations. For example, the April African navy to monitor its coastal waters We don’t have the resources to provide 2006 visit of USS Emory S. Land to Ghana, and sortie its forces to interdict illegal activi- maritime security here. We’re not going to Sao Tome and Principe, Gabon, Congo, and ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 31 Maritime Security

6 Jeffrey Tayler, “Worse Than Iraq?” The Militants in Niger Delta area release kidnapped U.S. oil worker Atlantic Monthly (April 2006), 33. 7 Polgreen, “Armed Group.” 8 Lydia Polgreen, “In Nigerian Hall of Shame, a New Low,” International Herald Tribune, November 30, 2005. 9 Austin Ekeinde, “Nigeria ten years on: Injustice and violence haunt the oil Delta,” Reuters, August 22, 2005. 10 Polgreen, “Armed Group.” 11 Polgreen, “Nigerian Militants.” 12 “Nigerian Militants Assault Oil Industry, Abducting Nine Foreigners,” The New York Times, February 19, 2006. 13 Lydia Polgreen, “With Africa in Crisis, Spot- light is on Nigeria,” International Herald Tribune, January 24, 2006, 2. AP/Wide Photo (George Osodi) World 14 Laurie Garrett, HIV and National Security: Angola helped maintain navy-to-navy rela- their efforts to improve maritime security Where Are the Links? (New York: Council on tions by conducting exercises in leadership along their coast. Agreements must be devel- Foreign Relations, 2005), available at . 15 disease prevention. The the Department of into neighboring waters, Princeton Lyman, “The Terrorist Threat in ship’s Sailors refurbished a and use regional facilities Africa,” Foreign Affairs (January-February 2004), 18. high school in Sao Tome, Defense is not equipped to train partner navies 16 Lydia Polgreen, “Religion and Politics a a gesture of goodwill that to stamp out corruption, using U.S. and participat- Deadly Mix in Nigeria,” The New York Times, will advance U.S. interests teach AIDS/HIV ing European navies. February 24, 2006, A2. 17 Tayler, 33. in this island nation.28 prevention, or provide 18 International Maritime Bureau, 2005 Annual The Navy’s new Riv- The channel ahead of malaria medicines Report on Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, erine Command is aptly the U.S. Navy and its allies January 31, 2006. suited to deal with prob- in the Gulf of Guinea is 19 United Nations Food and Agricultural lems in areas such as the narrow and fraught with Organization, The State of World Fisheries and Gulf of Guinea. Commissioned in Little Creek, dangerous cross currents. The investment Aquaculture, July 2005, available at . One (RG–1) will provide a strategic element difficult endeavor. However, senior military 20 A.R.S. Nuno, “The Commanders Respond,” that has not been used by conventional Navy officials are cautiously optimistic. General Proceedings 132, no. 3 (March 2006), 33. 21 forces since the Vietnam era. Developed to James Jones, USMC, former commander of Eric Pape, “West Africa: The New ‘Drug patrol rivers and coasts, conduct interdiction U.S. European Command, stated, “The most Triangle,’” Newsweek, August 29, 2005, 25. 22 Stanley Weiss, “Protecting the World’s operations, and engage enemy naval forces, recent phenomenon is that the United States Economic Arteries,” International Herald Tribune, RG–1 tools include high speed (40 knots plus), now is paying more attention to problems November 24, 2005, 5. shallow draft, and lightly armored boats surrounding Africa. And we believe that 23 The White House, The National Strategy for capable of operating day or night. Although proactive investment is always cheaper than Maritime Security (Washington, DC: The White 29 RG–1’s assets will not be trained, equipped, reactive investment.” House, September 2005), available at . its contribution to a post–Cold War world of N o t e s 24 Charles Snyder, remarks at the American regional conflicts will be critical. Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, April 13, 2004. 1 U.S. efforts to fix the problems in the Bryan Mealer, “Congo’s Daily Blood,” 25 Richard Burgess, “Change of Focus,” Gulf of Guinea will also require an inter- Harpers Magazine (March 2006), 53. USEUCOM Public Affairs Office, April 20, 2006. 2 Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost 26 agency approach. The Department of Defense John G. Morgan and Charles W. Martoglio, (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1999), 17. “The 1,000 Ship Navy: Global Maritime Network,” is not equipped to stamp out corruption, teach 3 Lydia Polgreen, “Armed Group Shuts Down Proceedings 132, no. 11 (November 2005). AIDS/HIV prevention, or provide malaria Part of Nigeria’s Oil Output,” The New York Times, 27 Todd Pitman, “U.S. Eyes West Africa’s medicines. These are tasks better suited for February 25, 2006, 2. Coastline, Oil,” The Washington Times, August elements such as the World Health Organiza- 4 Jad Mouawad, “Violence in Nigeria Sends 11, 2005, 2. tion, U.S. Department of State, or U.S. Agency Oil Higher,” The New York Times, February 21, 28 Rebekah Blowers, “Seabees Rebuild School, for International Development. Regardless, 2006. Make Friends in Sao Tome,” Navy NewsStand, April American efforts in the region may be viewed 5 Lydia Polgreen, “Nigerian Militants Reiterate 25, 2006. with suspicion. Demands as They Show Off American Hostage,” 29 Quoted in Jim Garamone, “NATO, Euro- Likewise, the Gulf of Guinea regional The New York Times, February 20, 2006, 4. pean Command Working in Africa,” American partners must cooperate and collaborate in Forces Press Service, October 28, 2005.

32 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu An Interview with Bantz J. Craddock

What’s changed? I was last here in 2002, and the very nature of the debate over defense versus security has changed, the nature of the expansion of the EUCOM missions that are associated with that mindset, which is collective security. The change is thinking about assistance to cooperation. Security assistance cyber lines, are also important. And then the is an outdated term. I understood this when generation of resources to sustain extremist I was down in SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern movements—by that I mean the trafficking of Command], and I think that security coop- General Bantz J. Craddock, USA, is Supreme Allied drugs, illicit activities, organized crime that eration, building partner-nation capability, is Commander, Europe, and Commander, U.S. European will generate resources for those extremist now more important than ever. The other dif- Command. activities that use terrorist techniques. There ference is that whereas, in the past, to a greater are also unique threats, such as those found extent, the component commands to EUCOM in Africa, such as famine, disease, and natural focused on providing capabilities in the JFQ: What do you see as the greatest disasters, whether floods, mudslides, earth- EUCOM AOR [area of responsibility], now challenges facing U.S. European Command? quakes, things of that nature. Of course, there those capabilities are provided worldwide. So is a terrorist threat in Africa as well. I think that also becomes a significant differ- General Craddock: There are numerous Also, the nature of many of the threats ence from years past. challenges. I would not want to rank order that we face today requires us to work closely them because then it looks like we put some and in coordination with other government JFQ: Could you please tell us about of them at the forefront—but the others at agencies, such as the State Department, EUCOM’s new theater strategy? the end of the list are just as important. As in USAID [U.S. Agency for International Devel- other parts of the world, a major challenge is opment], Health and Human Services, and General Craddock: It’s not yet identifying the threats we face. The nature of the Department of Energy. approved. We’re working through it, we’re security, if you will, has changed. In the past, close to being final, but it’s got to go through particularly at EUCOM, there was a very clear JFQ: What makes EUCOM different a few more wickets. I’m very encouraged. The mission set, which was defense of the trans- from other combatant commands, and how focus is what we call active security, which Atlantic alliance: NATO versus the Warsaw has it changed since the last time you were in is not about fighting wars. Instead, the focus Pact. Those days are over, obviously, and now Europe? is on creating conditions that enhance and there is discussion and debate about defense encourage stable environments. It’s partner- versus security. NATO has transitioned from General Craddock: On a physical basis, ing, it’s building capability, and it’s encourag- a defensive alliance to a security-focused it’s the only one that’s actually headquartered ing our partners for defense reform in those alliance. Obviously, EUCOM has to be an OCONUS [outside the continental United sectors, good governance, and the notion of important part of that. I don’t know if that’s a States]. The other commands are either representative governance. rank order of number one, but it’s pretty high forward-deployed, forward headquarters, or The key is that the strategy acknowledges on the challenge list. in the continental United States. It’s probably equities by the Department of Defense and Beyond this challenge lie the nonstate nuanced, there probably doesn’t appear to by European Command, but it builds upon actors and myriad asymmetrical threats, be much of a difference, but there’s a consid- an understanding and a dependence on the which is probably an overused term, but eration of host-nation laws, regulations, and interagency community, the other government it’s a true term nonetheless. Lines of com- agreements that always play into that. agencies and departments that have to partner munication, whether they be sea lines or not only with us, but also with each other. This is a collective effort to create success in those On January 19, 2007, Col David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.), and Dr. Jeffrey D. types of ventures. The intent is to describe Smotherman of Joint Force Quarterly interviewed General Craddock at his an endstate and then put together a plan that Pentagon liaison office. positions us strategically. This plan should ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 33 Craddock Interview allow us to work together and then to build in Afghanistan across the country, providing meeting expectations. Generally I would say partner-nation capability and to build good security and stability on a daily basis. NATO that’s the case, but obviously there are niche governance where it may not be, to the extent forces work closely with the Afghan govern- areas that would be farther ahead or judged that, one, they’re satisfied with it, or two, that it ment and local leaders to assist in develop- or assessed as being more transformational fits into a regional cooperative effort. ing infrastructure, civil and social services than others. First of all is the notion of a needed by the Afghan people. I believe there collective defense, an alliance for collective JFQ: There has been a lot of discussion is recognition that there is not a military solu- defense, versus today’s alliance for collec- about the possible formation of a new unified tion to correct what ails Afghanistan. The tive security. That’s a fundamental shift in command for Africa. Does this reflect the view solutions are development, construction, and concept. There is now a more comprehensive that Africa has become more important, and if reconstruction. The security that NATO forces view of security issues and the capabilities so, how? bring to Afghanistan helps to set the condi- that flow from that view anywhere in the tions to permit the “solution set” to get started. world. There have been a lot of transforma- General Craddock: The conventional Over the past few years there’s been an tional efforts, and it’s more than just plat- wisdom, the common view out there, at least expansion of their authority, an expansion of forms or systems. The transformation is in in the government, is that Africa is increas- contributing nations, an expansion of capabil- how we think about things and how we think ingly to the forefront in our national security ity, and all that has contributed to an enhanced about capabilities that will be needed and interests. There is enormous potential in security condition in much of the country, a how then to best develop, either collectively Africa, and there are significant challenges sustained security condition in others, and or individually, capabilities to satisfy what we and problems: political instability, ungov- also improved reconstruction and develop- project as the needs of the future. erned or uncontrolled spaces, socioeconomic ment in parts of the country where the secu- Now, the platforms issue and the hard- issues, extremism in its various forms, the rity condition permits that. So there has been a ware are important; NATO is working now on age-old smuggling, illicit trafficking, piracy, significant military contribution. The political some enhancements in strategic lift and doing and then, of course, devastating endemic leadership continues to work to maintain ade- a collective effort there. I think there are 15 disease there, HIV/AIDS among those, which quate troop strength and to convince nations nations now that are consorting to buy some has come to the forefront in strategic lift. The intelligence recent years. So those are chal- fusion cell was recently stood lenges and issues that, maybe up, which is a transforma- in days past, did not appear to tional effort in intelligence, be significant. and now that has a NATO With the recognition look to it. It was a first. I think of a more globally connected it was October 2006 when it world, I think a greater reached initial operational understanding of humanitar- capability. And that uniquely ian issues has come about facilitates collection and that allows developing distribution of military intel- nations to chart their own ligence, which is essential for courses better. These nations NATO operations. can do so not only from a One of the recent security perspective but also GEN Craddock meeting with transformational initiatives Secretary of Defense Robert M. from a governance and social has been the establishing of a Gates at NATO headquarters focus. Combining all these NATO SOF [special operations DOD (Cherie A. Thurlby) perspectives should push force] capability to strengthen Africa to the front in terms of competing to eliminate shortfalls through increased the Alliance’s out-of-area crisis prevention for resources and attention from the U.S. contributions. The last thing is to reduce the and rapid deployment. So partnering with Government. So that’s part of the thinking, constraints on the ability of the commander EUCOM or working also with the Special that there is indeed a renewed emphasis and to accomplish the mission—mainly, to reduce [Operations] Command to see how we might focus on what is happening in Africa. caveats on how NATO troops can participate, structure this into a coordination center to or where they can participate in the theater. build a special operations capability through- JFQ: NATO’s policy is that Afghanistan out the Alliance is important. That’s one that is its number-one priority. Do you believe the JFQ: In our last issue, General Lance Smith has significant potential for the future. Alliance is following through? [USAF] of U.S. Joint Forces Command spoke Probably the most transformational about NATO transformation. What is your take aspect or program that has been started General Craddock: Yes, I do believe on NATO transformation and expansion? Is the recently was the NATO Response Force, NATO is answering the call in Afghanistan. Alliance meeting its own expectations? which reached full operational capability in Many of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams November 2006 just after the Riga NATO are manned and operated by NATO member General Craddock: The Alliance is summit. It’s a significant achievement. In the nations. The Alliance has some 32,000 forces moving forward in transformation and NATO Response Force, there are about 25,000

34 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu U.S. European Command

NATO soldiers—land, air, and sea—that are because we build habitual relationships. And postured, trained, and certified to respond to if we have a paucity or we’ve diminished the a specific set of missions should NATO call. availability of those habitual forces, we ought to look at that and make some assessments JFQ: The ongoing EUCOM transforma- and decide whether or not we have what we tion plans call for a significant reduction in the need to do that in a manner that is, one, most footprint of forward-stationed forces, but some efficient (I’m a taxpayer, so I don’t want to are criticizing them for cutting too deep. In fact, waste one dollar, just like anybody else) and,

JO IN T F O RC E QU AR TE RL Y Issue 45, 1st Quarter 2007 General Jones [General James L. Jones, USMC second, most effective in terms of building Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by National Defense University (Ret.)] spoke of this on C–SPAN in December needed capacities so that others can partner concerning the Army component. Are you reas- with us in any future venture that might call sessing the transformation effort? for either the Alliance or a coalition of some other means. U.S. European Command General Craddock: It’s healthy and helpful to reassess all plans routinely. I have JFQ: If formed, will an Africa Command seen extraordinarily capable, talented plan- disrupt the strategy? ners put together sensational plans in just International Security Cooperation Challenges

Obstacles to Effective about any functional area imaginable. What General Craddock: No, I don’t think so. Joint Targeting Terrorist Use of then occurs is implementation, and the The active security that we’re talking about the Internet plan moves out—and often, the plan may is designed so that it could be extracted, it A P R OFES SIONAL MILI TA R Y AN D SECU RI TY JOURNA L not survive first contact with whoever will could be pulled out of the EUCOM strategy criticize, or derail, or oppose it, whether it’s a document, and the rest is still valid. It’s not wartime or peacetime situation. a house of cards where if one card is pulled, Secondly, the fact is that things change, then the rest are going to fall. It’s a pretty On target. On time. conditions change, and probably more so now in the 21st century than ever before for a variety of reasons. If we compound these Direct situations, the opportunity for plans as constructed to survive over time is diminished To You! significantly. It’s healthy, it’s essential, and it’s an obligation that we routinely go back and ndupress.ndu.edu look at the assumptions made for the plans and challenge those assumptions—Do they still fit in the current situation, the current condition?—and then review what it is that Distribution: JFQ is distributed to the we’ve chartered, what it is that we’ve been field and fleet through Service publications distribution centers. Active, Reserve, National doing, to see if it still makes sense, if it is still GEN Craddock assuming Guard units, individuals, and organizations effective and efficient. position of Supreme Allied supported by the Services can order JFQ Commander, Europe

So that’s a long answer—the answer USEUCOM through the appropriate activity: being “yes”—to a short question. I’m going Army: www.usapa.army.mil (cite Misc. to review, continually reassess, and look at thoughtful document; I was very impressed Pub 71-1). Navy: Defense Distribution Depot external conditions as well as internal oppor- with the presentations I’ve received from the Susquehanna, New Cumberland, Penn- tunities. I know there are discussions that group. They’ve done some good thinking sylvania 17070; call (717) 770-5872, the Army may grow in size; some requests on this, both from theoretical and practical DSN 771-5827, FAX (717) 770-4360 have been made. If that’s the case, there may aspects. If an Africa Command becomes Air Force: www.e-Publishing.af.mil or be opportunities to grow the Army, to have authorized, sourced, and stood up, we merely email [email protected] Marine Corps: Headquarters U.S. Marine that growth reside in the EUCOM AOR. But have to take the strategy document that we’ve Corps (Code ARDE), Federal Building there has to be a reason for it, and that’s what got working down at EUCOM, do some cut- No. 2 (room 1302), Navy Annex, Wash- we’ll look at—we’ll look at the conditions and and-paste, and then buff up the edges. I think ington, DC 20380; FAX (703) 614-2951, problem set that we face. There is value in it will work fine. JFQ DSN 224-2951 forward-deployed forces. There is enormous Subscriptions for individuals value in security cooperation opportunities and nonmilitary organizations: that build this partner-nation capability. It is http://bookstore.gpo.gov/subscriptions very effective to use our forces to partner with, exercise with, and train with other nations so that their capacities can be enhanced. It is effi- Keeping America cient when we have the same forces available Informed ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 35 NATO

A Blueprint for Change Transforming NATO Special operations By J a m e s L . J o n e s

Former Supreme Allied NATO antiterrorist training at Commander Europe and industrial facility in Ukraine Commander, U.S. European Command Gen James L. Jones, USMC, discussing international commitments and deployments

DOD (Robert D. Ward) by USEUCOM, August 17, 2006

he global threats we face pose options to do both. However, our longstand- At the practical level, NATO forces are a looming menace to the ing relationship with the North Atlantic working together in robust, complex and dif- international community. Treaty Organization (NATO) offers a unique ficult missions, but the U.S. lead in military T This is especially true for the and timely opportunity both to improve technology makes working together difficult United States and its European partners. the Alliance’s operational capability and to for deployed forces. At the political level, the The nature of this complex contemporary enhance our collective ability to deal with the desire among Allies to work together is ham- operating environment highlights the neces- new strategic environment. Special Opera- strung by the growing complexity of doing so. sity for operations across a broad strategic tions is one such capability. As President At the strategic level, a growing transatlantic continuum. The old paradigms of static George W. Bush announced at the November divergence in capabilities can perpetuate both deterrence are anachronistic when we are 2006 Riga Summit, there is an opportunity to legitimate grievances and unfair stereotypes faced with a foe that recognizes no national “launch a NATO Special Operations Forces over burden sharing and influence.4 boundaries, shows open contempt for human Initiative that will strengthen the ability of rights, and refutes international rule of law. Special Operations personnel from NATO Even though these observations were However, the United States cannot afford to nations to work together on the battlefield.”2 made in 2002, they remain true today, as act alone against these threats. The continu- NATO continues wrestling with issues such ing march of globalization and its resulting Focusing on NATO as strategic airlift, enhanced expeditionary multitude of economic, political, and resource NATO has proven itself an enduring and capability, command and control integration, linkages means that now, more than any time vital contributor to the security of post–Cold interoperability of communications, informa- in history, there is a need to concentrate on War Europe and, with the recent inclusion tion-sharing, and, at the political level, restric- alliance-building, coalition operations, and of Afghanistan, the community of nations.3 tive national caveats. While there are ongoing strategic partnerships. Despite its contributions, however, shortfalls efforts to transform NATO in order to close This strategic emphasis is clearly and challenges persist that the Alliance must these capability gaps, such as the recent Stra- reflected in the President’s National Security address in order to succeed in this changed tegic Airlift Capability Initiative,5 the pace of Strategy,1 and answering this call for long- strategic environment. As James Appathurai, change is dampened by the rapidly evolving term effect requires us not only to seek oppor- writing in the NATO Review, notes: threats that the Alliance faces in Afghanistan tunities for forging new relationships but also to find ways to enhance present partnerships. General James L. Jones, USMC (Ret.), was Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and Commander, U.S. The U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) European Command, until December 2006. General Jones submitted this article before relinquishing area of responsibility presents multiple command of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe.

36 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Jones and the real potential for NATO deployed capture or kill high-value terrorists and insur- SOF needs a standing entity dedicated to operations elsewhere. gent leaders.7 Meanwhile, they are conducting addressing the integration of SOF solutions Although the majority of Allied opera- multiple foreign internal defense missions, at both the operational and strategic levels. tions have been centered on the conventional working directly with the security forces of Transforming SOF is an essential element to aspects of military power, today’s convergence Afghanistan as an essential element in prepar- expanding this aspect of the Alliance’s combat of multiple unconventional threats across the ing them to assume responsibility for their capability. However, beyond generating effects strategic continuum requires a new focus on own national defense.8 Each of these examples on the battlefield, a SOF transformational transforming the unconventional aspects of illustrates a similar capability found in draft emphasis also has the potential to grow future Alliance military capability. Emphasizing the versions of NATO SOF policy and doctrine. capability and capacity. transformation of NATO Special Operations However, despite having this foundation to NATO SOF offers an opportunity to Forces (SOF) offers several work from, the majority increase military capability both directly and significant opportunities to of SOF contributions in indirectly. An effective transformation of SOF improve current and future today’s convergence Afghanistan have come requires improved interaction between NATO Alliance capabilities. These through non-NATO coali- members’ Special Forces organizations in areas include establishing an of multiple, tion efforts. such as doctrine, training, communications, affordable venue for even unconventional threats While there are a few and interoperable tactics, techniques, and smaller nations to make across the strategic NATO Special Operations procedures (TTPs). This allows nations with a meaningful contributions continuum requires Task Groups (SOTGs) more advanced Special Operations capability to to the Alliance, expanding transforming the working in Afghanistan as enhance other member nations’ SOF, even as it NATO capability in con- unconventional aspects part of the NATO-led Inter- opens the possibility to share certain resources, flicts, and increasing future national Security Assistance such as training facilities, SOF educational capabilities and capacity. of Alliance capability Force (ISAF), their ability opportunities, and lessons learned. The transformation of to make significant gains On a more concrete basis, one essen- SOF presents the ability to has limitations connected tial element of effective interoperability is close some capability gaps at more affordable to ISAF’s conventionally focused design. To communications. Currently, there is no economic and political costs when compared improve ISAF ability to assist the Afghan standardized communications architecture to conventional forces; SOF are, by nature, government in establishing a secure environ- for NATO SOF. While many nations have small in number, easier to deploy quickly, and ment and promoting reconstruction efforts,9 robust communications capabilities, there is have much of the modern equipment required the force is organized into five regional no established reference point to enable all the to foster better interoperability. In addition, commands.10 This regional model establishes SOF partner nations to be fully compatible. SOF units, consisting of mature, highly a straightforward means to concentrate One way to address this problem is to estab- trained, and skilled personnel, are designed to security assistance operations and simplify lish common requirements for compatibility, accept higher risk missions, resulting in less coordination of reconstruction. However, this secure capability, and modularization. These cumbersome caveats. These factors mean that, traditional construct also restricts the ability requirements would be used to develop equip- for many NATO nations, SOF may represent to achieve centralized SOF command and ment specifications for future procurement a more affordable niche contribution, yet one control, limiting freedom of maneuver and and specialized technical training needs. that offers tremendous benefits to succeeding responsiveness for NATO SOTGs to conduct This standardization is important to ensure against the enemies we face today and in the SR, DA, and military assistance (MA) mis- operational security and to develop doctrinal future. sions across Afghanistan as a whole. A con- templates and TTPs for the full spectrum of On the battlefield, SOF units offer a tributing factor to this command and control SOF missions. Transformation would address wide range of options to enhance the joint challenge is the reemergence of the Taliban. this situation by establishing a SOF advocate commander’s ability to influence conflict. Even as the ISAF focus has been on for technical aspects of equipment specifica- From creating synergies with conventional assisting Afghanistan’s security and stabiliza- tions and supported NATO SOF TTPs. force operations, to conducting SOF-specific tion efforts, the fluid security situation caused In the conduct of special reconnaissance missions, to working with indigenous person- by the reemergence of the Taliban has placed a and direct action missions, effective TTPs, nel, SOF bring capabilities that belie their new emphasis on dealing with this immediate facilitated by efficient, secure communica- small numbers. The most recent evidence of threat and the direct risk that it poses to ISAF tions, are essential. Transformation would what they can do on the modern battlefield is personnel. This has left little time and few provide the forum for developing a common best demonstrated in Afghanistan. resources for reexamining the role of NATO reference of such TTPs. These TTPs would As part of Operation Enduring Freedom, SOF and how they might be leveraged for begin with establishing NATO SOF standards SOF continue to make vital strategic and better strategic and operational gains. Addi- and setting minimum requirements for SR operational impacts. Through special recon- tionally, there is no NATO SOF organization and DA missions. For example, SR mission naissance (SR) efforts, SOF teams work to address this situation. baselines would include standard reporting with conventional air and ground units Although the NATO SOTGs in ISAF procedures, day/night observation capability, to disrupt adversaries through facilitating are highly capable, and the joint commands and specific weapons systems and proficiency kinetic attacks.6 In conducting their own do have their own small Special Operations requirements. In a similar vein, standards for direct action (DA) missions, SOF continue to planning staffs, the overall structure of NATO DA missions would outline minimum force ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 37 Transforming NATO Special Operations

If we hope to reap the gains SOF can offer, we must begin now. The NATO Special Opera- tions Forces Transformation Initiative (NSTI) can accomplish this mission.

Transformation Blueprint German armored vehicles As a truly transformational initiative, participating in NATO amphibious exercise the NSTI will provide a complete SOF solution set at all levels: tactical, operational, and strategic. Achieving these objectives will not come without a price, not only because of the inherently small force pool of SOF, but also because of the immense value that these elite forces represent at the national level. Therefore, NSTI will not attempt to develop a standing NATO SOF combat force; instead, it

NATO will focus on such common areas of interest as proper integration of NATO SOF at the stra- requirements and capabilities, driving NATO nificant organizational tegic and operational levels, doctrine devel- SOF TTPs for objective area infiltration and obstacles must be over- the NATO opment and promulgation, interoperability exfiltration, actions on the objective, site come. Unlike NATO’s Special between member nation SOF organizations, exploitation, and after action reporting proce- land, maritime, and air Operations and connectivity with NATO conventional dures for lessons learned. components, SOF have forces and other Alliance agencies. Additional gains can be realized by no standing organiza- Forces To accomplish all of this, NSTI will emphasizing MA programs. By definition, tion that provides the Transformation consist of three parts: an expansion of military assistance is “a broad spectrum of unity of effort, focus Initiative will the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers measures in support of friendly or allied on interoperability, provide a Europe (SHAPE) Special Operations Office forces in peace, crisis, and conflict . . . and and common doctrine complete SOF (SSOO); the creation of a NATO SOF may vary from low-level military training required to trans- solution set Coordination Center (NSCC); and the devel- or material assistance to the active employ- form. As previously opment of a federation of Special Forces ment of indigenous forces in the conduct of noted, even in today’s at all levels: training centers. Perhaps most importantly, combat operations.”11 This characterization ongoing operations, tactical, NSTI will include the appointment of a flag- provides tremendous flexibility in helping to NATO SOF policy and operational, level SOF officer to lead this initiative and train and prepare NATO’s partners rapidly in doctrine are only in and strategic to provide a vital strategic voice for Alliance places such as Afghanistan. An aggressive MA draft form. Further- Special Operations issues. program will not only produce synergies on more, and again unlike While the SSOO has been in place for the battlefield but also increase military capa- the other components, some time, it has been insufficiently manned bility and capacity by building indigenous there is no designated to address the growing number of SOF issues security forces, freeing SOF and conventional NATO SOF voice to guide such an effort. within SHAPE. Expanding this office rep- forces for other missions. There are two main reasons for these resents a significant step in addressing this MA programs may also be used to assist shortfalls. First, the seriousness of the threat shortfall, at the same time providing a more NATO aspirants in developing and improving and the value of SOF as a viable means to robust SHAPE staffing conduit for the center- their own nascent Special Operations capa- address it have been recognized only recently. piece of NSTI, the NSCC. bilities as a potential contribution to future Second, historically, SOF have been retained The NSCC will be the organizational NATO operations. Beyond creating additional by member nations as prized national assets nexus for NSTI, serving as the home of operational capacity, this approach has the under strict national control, in many cases the flag officer assigned as the NATO SOF added benefits of providing on-the-job train- uniquely shaped to address specific national advisor to the Supreme Allied Commander, ing and MA experience for the SOF of current security issues. However, the combination of Europe (SACEUR). As the NSCC direc- Alliance members, helping to refine MA tech- an amorphous, global threat and the often tor, this officer will serve as the direct link niques in preparation for future operations. complex, ambiguous nature of the contem- between SACEUR and Special Forces organi- porary operating environment mandates zations across the Alliance, lending SOF-spe- Challenge and Response changes in this mindset. Despite the ability of cific strategic advice as NATO’s leading SOF Despite the range of opportunities that a SOF to make a difference, it takes significantly advocate. In this role, the director will fulfill NATO SOF transformation offers—from pro- longer to develop Special Forces than it takes responsibilities similar to those of NATO’s viding a niche opportunity for some Alliance the enemy to produce new foot soldiers, even land, maritime, and air component com- members, to increasing operational effects as the enemy becomes more and more capable manders, but without command authority. At and growing capability and capacity—sig- of producing ever-higher levels of destruction. the operational level, the director will work

38 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Jones to ensure that the Alliance has sufficient, immediate Special Operations expertise for using extant facilities offered by the nations for training will the development of operational estimates and leverage in-place resources and national subject matter expertise the conduct of operations. At the same time, the NSCC director will provide flag-officer advice to the three NATO joint commands The NSCC Training and Exercise Divi- Implementing Change and serve as a functional liaison to Alliance sion will concentrate on implementing SOF The essential components in success- nations’ SOF leadership. To accomplish these doctrine through NATO exercises and joint fully realizing the benefits of the NSTI are multiple roles, the NSCC will be organized training opportunities. This division will already in place. With the SSOO manning into three main divisions to address specifi- also collect and disseminate lessons learned. situation now being addressed, the next step cally many of the shortfalls already discussed. A major role will be to develop standard- is the establishment of the NSCC. Success The NSCC Operational Support Divi- ized staff training for a NATO Combined can be found here, too: The United States has sion will play a key part in synchronizing Joint Force Special Operations Component recently offered to be the Framework Nation planning efforts, supporting the development Command. Establishing a universal model for the NSCC, using U.S. Special Opera- of SOF requirements in the force generation for this operational-level SOF headquarters tions Command, Europe, as the nucleus for process,12 and providing assistance to the element is an essential step in increasing implementation. The key is gaining sufficient NATO joint commands. Currently, a small Alliance capacity to provide a predictable support from the nations to make the NSCC a number of SOF staff members within the joint baseline SOF command and control capabil- truly multinational organization. commands generate most SOF inputs to the ity for rapid deployment in such rotational Several nations have already expressed operational planning process. However, the force structures as the NATO Response interest in helping to establish the NSCC complex, rapidly changing environment sug- Force. Going hand-in-glove with building a and being a part of this initiative for the long gests more to gain by establishing an organi- deployable headquarters training regimen term. While there are many details to work zation that the joint commands could turn to is the development of a NATO SOF tactical through, this early enthusiasm bodes well for for more advanced SOF planning advice. This training program. This will be addressed by the future and is in complete accordance with capability would go far in improving support establishing a federation of ongoing operations, such as ISAF, and will of training centers. be critical to emerging operations such as An integral aspect NATO those that may fall to the NATO Response of the NSCC, this Force. Beyond defining SOF operational mis- federation will lever- sions for specific plans, synchronizing such age existing facilities efforts is essential to establish the require- and venues suitable for ments for gaining appropriate operational SOF training. Using capabilities and forces. multiple extant facilities The Strategic Concepts and Interoper- offered by the nations ability Division of the NSCC will be responsi- for periodic training ble for supporting strategic planning at higher will present significant headquarters, producing policy and doctrine, cost savings over a few developing common TTPs, and assisting with dedicated facilities. This NATO education programs. In addition, this approach will leverage division will serve as the interface for NATO’s in-place resources and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) national subject matter on NATO SOF issues. While the primary expertise, providing functions of the NSCC are oriented toward variations in training operational aspects of NATO, a significant and increasing utiliza- amount of effort for this transformational tion of potentially unde- organization will involve close cooperation rutilized facilities. By with ACT. As lead strategic command “for the linking these multiple continuing transformation of NATO’s mili- training centers through tary capabilities and for promoting interoper- NATO’s Web Informa- ability,”13 ACT is responsible for NATO’s Joint tion Services Environ- Warfare Center, education facilities, and most ment, it will be possible experimentation programs. By joining efforts to develop synergies by with appropriate ACT offices, the NSCC synchronizing combined will be better equipped to foster interoper- training opportunities Multinational soldiers ability and will have access to a wide range and fostering communi- make up NATO International of facilities and resources to support training cations across the Alli- Security Assistance Force and exercises. ance SOF community. in Afghanistan ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 39 Transforming NATO Special Operations

the multinational vision of the NSCC. NATO C–130 delivers While the United States will provide humanitarian aid to Pakistan the framework, it will be the Alliance earthquake survivors that will shape the future of NATO’s Special Operations capabilities.

In today’s dynamic environment of increasingly challenging threats— violent extremist networks, global terrorism, and failing states—it is more critical than ever to work with our allies and friends. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization continues to be a most valued partner in these struggles. However, the Alliance faces its own unique problem set as it endeavors to transform to become an even more relevant player in this new reality. A key consideration in assessing the Alliance’s transformational options is the need to balance the “three-legged milk stool” of acceptable economic and political costs, environmental fit of proposed NATO solutions, and ability to make rapid 2002 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Mili- impact in the operational environment. The N o t e s tary History, 2004). transformation of Allied Special Operations 7 1 The National Security Strategy of the United Interview with Brigadier General Frank capability is an ideal opportunity to achieve States of America (Washington, DC: The White Kearney, USA, “SOCCENT Warrior—Leading this balance while making an appreciable House, March 2006), 8–13. the Fight in the Hot Spots: Iraq, Afghanistan and and formative difference in the capabilities 2 George W. Bush, remarks in Riga, Latvia, the Horn of Africa,” Special Operations Technol- of the Alliance. The price in both manpower November 28, 2006. ogy, online edition, March 14, 2006, available at and resources will not be inconsequential. 3 George W. Bush, remarks at the Presenta- . 8 ing our collective ability to defeat the global November 12, 2003. During this event, President Ibid. 9 threats of today and tomorrow. JFQ Bush highlighted NATO as “the most successful NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Public alliance in history.” Diplomacy Division, 2006), 155. 4 James Appathurai, “Closing the Capabili- 10 “History of the International Security ties Gap,” NATO Review, no. 3 Assistance Force,” NATO International Security (Autumn 2002), available at Assistance Force, November 21, 2006, available at . html>. 11 Draft NATO Military Committee 437/1, 5 Jaap De Hoop Scheffer, Military Committee Special Operations Policy press conference in regard to (Mons, Belgium: Supreme Headquarters Allied NATO’s moving to acquire Powers Europe, May 12, 2006), 4–5. C–17 Strategic Airlift Aircraft, 12 “The Defence Planning Process: What Does NATO Headquarters, Brussels, It Mean in Practice?” NATO Topics, July 19, 2005, Belgium, September 12, 2006. available at . As defined by NATO, “Force generation is Learning Large Lessons: The the process by which Allies indicate what forces Evolving Roles of Ground Power and capabilities they will make available, for what and Air Power in the Post–Cold period of time, against a list of requirements that War Era (Santa Monica, CA: the military authorities have elaborated for a par- RAND, 2006), available at ticular operation, in the light of an operation plan,

NATO graphs/2006/RAND_MG405. Response Force.” Meeting of NATO Military pdf>. See also Richard W. 13 NATO Handbook, 21. Committee Chiefs of Staff session Stewart, Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001–March

40 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu North Carolina Air National Guard (Brian E. Christiansen) Air National Guard North Carolina

Toward a Horizon of Hope Considerations for Long-term Stability in Postconflict Situations

By W i l l i a m E . W a r d

he 2006 National Security the expenditure of money and manpower established. This framework is applicable to Strategy of the United States toward a new conflict will be difficult. History most global postconflict situations. of America clearly states our shows that we have to be prepared to inter- I start by illustrating three personal T national intent for dealing with vene early, with clear goals, authorities, and examples where our success in instilling that regional conflicts through three levels of responsibilities understood by the parties to hope varied greatly. These examples include engagement: “conflict prevention and resolu- the conflict and among the international and my deployments to Somalia as a brigade com- tion; conflict intervention; and post-conflict interagency partners involved. Building those mander in 1992 and to Bosnia as commander stabilization and reconstruction.”1 These capabilities with minimal resources requires of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in 2002, and levels are necessary to prevent “failed states, a new way of approaching postconflict sce- my assignment as the U.S. Security Coordi- humanitarian disasters, and ungoverned narios—a way that takes the perspective of the nator to Israel and the Palestinian Authority areas that can become safe havens for terror- conflict’s many victims and determines how in 2005. I show how the common elements of ists.” The strategy also states that “even if the to address their needs, both immediately and these situations led to the development of a United States does not have a direct stake in in the longer term. The goal is to provide for framework that permits better international a particular conflict, our interests are likely them a Horizon of Hope, the prospect that and interagency coordination for influencing to be affected over time.” The example given tomorrow will be better than today. From that outcomes of future conflicts. Employing such is al Qaeda’s exploitation of the civil war in prospect comes a framework from which we a framework improves our ability not only Afghanistan.2 can develop plans and capabilities to address to respond when necessary but also to secure In today’s resource-constrained envi- the conditions we want to exist as conflicts are the aftermath of the conflict so the prospects ronment, however, allocating and prioritizing resolved and stable institutions of society are for lasting stability are enhanced.

General William E. Ward, USA, is Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command.

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 41 Stability in Postconflict Situations

Somalia Bosnia and Herzegovina had conducted or mosque. They were resentful that the In the early 1990s, along with many several rounds of national elections without church or mosque was a higher priority than others, I was shocked by the images of the ter- incident, made huge strides in disarming the adequate shelter for their families. I found rible Somali famine prior to Operation Restore populace through amnesty programs such such situations throughout the country. Not Hope, much the same way I was shocked by as Operation Harvest, and maintained a safe only were these efforts wasteful of the images of ethnic cleansing in the former and secure environment with no possibility time and money, but they also Yugoslavia. The images did not prepare me for of renewed hostilities. SFOR implemented the ate away at the credibility of the what I saw in person as a brigade commander. military provisions of the accords with a force international community. Seeing the victims of the famine gave me stark representing over a hundred nations. SFOR made an honest reminders of why we were deployed there: to The Stabilization Force also partici- attempt at fostering unity of provide security to allow the international pated as a Principal along with the numerous effort by developing the Multi- relief efforts to happen. Indeed, Restore Hope international organizations implementing Year Road Map (MYRM) in 2000. was the appropriate name for the operation; at the Dayton Accords’ civil provisions under The MYRM was a strategic commu- the time, there was no hope, no one standing the auspices of the Office of the High Rep- nications tool that established benchmarks forward and leading the way to peace. We resentative. Other Principals included the toward the full implementation of Dayton’s provided that hope. People by the thousands Organization for Security and Cooperation in civil and military provisions. It identified were fed and given medical treatment. Europe, World Bank, International Monetary several lines of operation relating to economic But providing security was far from Fund, and various United Nations (UN) development, establishment of good gover- enough. The necessary political reforms agencies, such as the Mission in Bosnia and nance, and reorganization of Bosnia’s military and institution-building did not happen, High Commissioner for Refugees. The force and security forces. It proved highly success- leaving the country embroiled in chaos with was successful in that it provided the safe and ful in driving SFOR’s activities. thugs and warlords controlling the streets secure environment called for in the accords. But the MYRM never fully succeeded in and hampering international relief efforts. Consequently, it gradually reduced its size creating unity of effort because the road map Consequently, rather than the economic and and eventually transferred the mission to the was developed long after the Dayton Accords’ political foundations for a new Somalia being European Union in 2004. ratification. A road map implemented by laid, the thugs became the entrenched politi- Synchronizing the efforts of the Prin- the Principals right after Dayton could have cal entities. By the time Operation Continue cipals was difficult, with the Office of the established the necessary authorities and Hope began, we had forfeited the advantage, High Representative often challenged in responsibilities to prevent the spread of illegal with the mission coming to an end after the leading them to achieve a shared vision. Each economic activities and blunt the effects of infamous Battle of Mogadishu. agency had its own agenda and mandate, corruption. Therefore, while Bosnia remains More than a dozen years later, Somalia and each had its own problems securing at peace, it continues to have difficulties estab- continues to struggle in search of a way to adequate resources for its mission, so the civil lishing a solid economic foundation, and its maintain a transitional government. The reconstruction effort fell short. Demining the political institutions remain less mature than environment is far from safe, and there is little Inter-Entity Boundary Line that separated they should be. incentive for foreign investment. the former warring factions was slow, leaving the region extremely dangerous. Meanwhile, Palestine Bosnia billions of dollars in economic aid were Meanwhile, the difficulties in Palestine The story in Bosnia moves in a more misdirected through corruption, allowing a continue to confound any efforts toward a positive direction but is still not fully satis- host of illegal economic activities to spawn. lasting peace. By all accounts, it should not factory. As commander of SFOR, I had the From Dayton through my tenure as SFOR have gone this way. The Middle East Road privilege of participating in one of the more commander, Bosnia’s economy suffered from Map, the performance-based plan for the successful peacekeeping efforts in history. rampant human trafficking, drugs, piracy establishment of the Palestinian state, was to From 1992 to 1995, Bosnia was embroiled in a of intellectual property, illegal logging and have resolved the Israeli-Palestine conflict war that included genocide and ethnic cleans- smuggling, and extreme levels of corruption by now. At its inception in mid-2003, the ing, killing a hundred thousand and displac- that robbed the state of needed revenues. road map offered tremendous promise to the ing hundreds of thousands more. Fortunately, But what bothered me most was that the Palestinian people through political reforms, the war ended with the General Framework aid that reached the people often missed the establishment of state institutions such as the Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herze- mark. It reflected what the donors thought security forces, and fair and open elections. govina (the Dayton Accords), which provided was important, and not what the people These were to be founded on the publication a base upon which a lasting peace and a new needed. One farmer had his home rebuilt and ratification of a constitution, followed by country could be built, including the estab- through donations after the war. The house appointment of state leaders with appropri- lishment of political institutions, economic was beautiful but did not include access to ate authorities. Just as important was the recovery, and an international security force water. The nearest well was driving distance continued encouragement of donor economic that transitioned into SFOR. away, and the farmer could not afford a car. support to build a peaceful economy, develop The Dayton Accords made Bosnia’s He had to beg for rides to get water. There the private sector, and foster a civil society. recovery from the war possible. By the time were also villages where the people still lived The road map was supported by a ready and I took command of SFOR in the fall of 2002, in squalor, yet they had a brand new church willing interagency and international process

42 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Ward with resources at its disposal. However, national community. They only want answers the ways and means for creating it, and how pursuing the road map required Palestinian to basic questions: “What will happen to me? do we know when we must employ it? We renunciation of violence against Israel. The Where will I get food and medical help? How can start by describing how it differs from long history of conflict would have made this will we care for our children, our sick, and our traditional military planning. Most of the difficult under any circumstances, but the injured? Who will lead us? Will they help us assigned resources for postconflict situations Palestinian Authority’s failure to rein in ter- or try to steal what little we have? What about deal with those conflicts that we either initi- rorist activity was only one factor in its inabil- tomorrow? The day after?” If we take too long ate or participate in, the so-called Phase Four ity to achieve the road map’s goals. and allow others to answer those questions, style of application. In these cases, we already During my nearly year-long tenure we lose the initiative. have the initiative. Our mission is to establish as the U.S. Security Coordinator to Israel When initiative is lost, the results are peace in the form of our choosing after we and the Palestinian Authority in 2005, the always bad. In Somalia, for instance, the have unseated an undesirable politico-mili- greatest challenge was the inability of the warlords took over the political landscape. In tary structure or condition. In theory, we have Palestinian population to establish its own Bosnia, the thugs and criminals became the already assessed the requirements to establish civil norms. The Palestinians were generally economic leaders. In Palestine, institutions a lasting peace and build the foundations for unsuccessful at building effective institu- of good governance, progressive economic secure and stable governance, allowing for tions or instilling the rule of law in daily life. activity, and rule of law were lacking. Presi- the eventual transition to a (hopefully) demo- In June of that year, I reported to the Senate dent Abbas’ vision of “one law—one gun” was cratic government. We have already learned Foreign Relations Committee that there were never realized. If we quickly provide solutions from Operation Iraqi Freedom how difficult roughly 58,000 Palestinians holding jobs in to the problems facing the people, backed by Phase Four operations can be. the state’s disparate security forces, yet only the right resources, the people will lose their Consider cases such as Somalia, Bosnia, a third of them ever showed up for work. fear and embrace hope for peace and security. and Palestine. Creating the Horizon of Hope The judicial system, comprising the courts, That is what establishing a Horizon would have occurred from a cold start, in lawyers, and judges, was undergoing slow of Hope is about. The United States and the the absence of any established war plans. reform. There was limited confidence that international community must take the ini- Merely subsuming these types of scenarios criminals would be punished for their deeds tiative to influence and rectify postconflict in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) rather than released back to the streets. The situations before they become new fronts in process will not work. First, JSCP is a Defense Palestinian Authority’s leader, President the war on terror. It is having the resources at Department tool, while postconflict sce- Mahmoud Abbas, was working to coalesce the ready, much the way we do now for other narios of interest require a deeply embedded the disparate factions under him into a cohe- humanitarian assistance missions and disas- interagency process to create the necessary sive and effective central government. But ter relief operations. It is having the processes, national unity of effort. Second, the JSCP that was a hard task confounded by several authorities, and responsibilities prearranged is designed for developing deliberate and rogue elements seeking to prevent peaceful to coordinate and deliver adequate aid, secu- contingency plans specific to an expected sce- coexistence with Israel. rity, and reconstruction capabilities in the nario or range of scenarios. It requires signifi- critical early moments after the war. But most cant manpower and time to produce a single Losing the Initiative importantly, it is instilling hope in the minds plan. The range of potential scenarios that fall Although the situations in Somalia, of victims by providing answers to basic ques- under the horizon umbrella is too great and Bosnia, and Palestine were very different in tions of survival. dynamic. A catastrophic war could flare up their history and their impact on the global We want to give victims something and dissipate quickly in a location that we did environment, their stories reflect common seemingly miraculous: a long-term view. not anticipate. In the war on terror, these wars threads. We, as national security profession- This is why it is called a Horizon of Hope; matter as they provide potential seedbeds of als, will often default to the strategic view. the people have a sense of direction, and they terrorism directed at the United States or its That is, we recognize that no country can believe the peace and stability we initiate are friends. Third, the resulting plans are neces- rebuild itself alone after experiencing total permanent. Clearly visible on the horizon sarily reactive, as they require significant conflict. The international community must is a future secure from further conflict, of formal authorization from either the execu- infuse cash, manpower, and other resources to economic recovery and promise, and of a gov- tive or legislative branches before operations render aid and build the foundations for the ernment responsive to their needs. There lies can begin. For the postconflict situations country’s rebirth. We also often assert that a the next generation of the rebuilt country’s addressed here, that process already cedes the country must take responsibility for its own citizens: a generation that embraces the rule of initiative to the enemies of peace. We need reconstruction. We rightfully respect a nation’s law, takes care of its own people, participates a much more flexible and dynamic tool for sovereignty and therefore often must trust that in the processes of good governance, and these scenarios. its provisional postconflict leaders will use most importantly rejects terrorism and its donated resources for the common good. associated ideologies. Of course, obstacles will The Road Map But the above three situations show that litter the path to that horizon, but a hopeful The good news is that such a tool we must look at the micro-level, the perspec- populace will overcome them, knowing that conceptually exists. Road maps, such as tive of the individual victim. Whenever a the journey is worth it. the MYRM in Bosnia and the Middle East war ends, these victims care little about our So how can we accomplish this? The Road Map, establish sequences of conditions national strategic aims or those of the inter- horizon is our strategic endstate. What are of progress along a range of functions and ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 43 Stability in Postconflict Situations activities that lead to the desired endstates and securing the border, including airports that corrupt practices and illegal economic for the assisted nations. Unlike war plans and seaports. Success during initiation instills activities do not take root. At the end of the that direct our own activities to achieve an a sense in the people’s minds that the security implementation phase, the nation’s economy objective, road maps recommend activities forces will not tolerate criminal activity and is sufficiently self-sustaining that it can seek of the supported nation. Thus, they provide that streets, marketplaces, and business areas any further economic assistance on its own war-torn nations with plans and a direction are safe. Dominating the implementation through standard international channels. that they themselves should embark upon. phase is the effort to build the indigenous The societal line of operation is the Its mechanism is reward-based. Initially, the military and police forces to provide for the most complex and situation-specific. It nation receives significant aid and assistance nation’s own security. This includes establish- encompasses the necessary activities to in providing for its people and permits a high ing the military under civilian control and establish good governance and a stable and degree of external involvement in its affairs. providing mechanisms to prevent corruption self-sustaining populace free from the threats As the nation progresses, the external com- within the police, especially reprisal activities of renewed conflict. The complexity arises in munity transfers responsibilities and authori- related to the war. The implementation phase that the society itself will define its own end- ties to it. The rewards are greater autonomy is complete when international forces no state, which may or may not be inimical to the for the nation and greater stability, economic longer actively provide security. desires of the international community pro- development, and security for the people. The economic line of operation involves viding relief. External actors will take the lead Road maps are also useful in informing the those activities and agencies that ensure the at initiation but must step back at implemen- reconstruction effort of the types of external basic needs of the people are met and that tation and play a supporting role to minimize assistance required without being too specific prepare the society to provide those needs the risk of creating a dependent or resentful or inflexible. This permissiveness allows tai- for itself while establishing the foundations society. There will be points of conflict that loring the relief effort to meet the needs of the of its own economy. At initiation, relief agen- must be addressed head on in open forums people as the complexities of the postconflict cies focus on providing crucial supplies and between the society and relief effort. That will scenario play out, while encouraging interna- services such as food, water, clothing, and be difficult, just as it was in Somalia, Bosnia, tional and nongovernmental organizations to shelter. Also, agencies secure the critical and Palestine. But governing this line of participate in a coordinated fashion. surviving infrastructure such as power grids, operation throughout is expectation manage- We can readily develop a generalized set transportation networks, farmland, manufac- ment. So long as we give the people hope early, of road maps because the goals of postconflict turing, and other elements vital to the early then let them act on that hope in concert with reconstruction do not vary much. In fact, they reconstruction of the economy. Initiation us, the society will progress—and we will get tend to contain three basic lines of opera- further establishes the mechanisms to solicit, the job done as a team. tion—security, economic, and societal—along receive, and distribute donated resources which the Horizon of Hope must be estab- with a primary objective of preventing the War’s Lingering Hazards lished. Lasting progress requires balanced introduction or empowerment of corrupt The societal line has several com- and fully synchronized efforts. Progress along elements within the populace. The implemen- ponents at initiation, each involving close the lines will vary, so they should be kept as tation phase involves activities that build the interaction between us and the nation we simple as possible. institutions and infrastructure, permitting are helping. The first is the political, with Postconflict reconstruction will gener- the nation to feed and care for its own people the overarching goal of establishing good ally have two distinct phases: initiation and and provide the conditions under which leadership for the people and eliminating the implementation. The initiation phase covers they can clothe and shelter themselves. The bad, such as apprehending war criminals. the international community’s first responses nation also establishes the means to ensure The challenge is differentiating the two while to the situation, such as providing basic needs Iraqi soldier and judge informing to the people and restoring order. This is the locals about election process, critical phase in which the Horizon of Hope Operation Iraqi Freedom is established. The more situation-dependent implementation phase follows with the deliberate efforts to stabilize, reconstruct, and rebuild the country, concluding with the transition to an effective and stable society. The following describes the three lines of operation by phase. The security line of operation involves those activities and agencies that provide external and internal security to the nation. These include the military, border patrols, customs services, police, and the judicial system (the courts, lawyers, judges, and prisons). During the initiation phase, the focus is on immediately providing law and order Pacific (Michael Larson) Fleet Combat Camera Group,

44 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Ward avoiding undesirable power vacuums or cre- ity to provide the necessary capa- ambiguity suggest attempts to control the ating confusion in the minds of the people. bilities, leading to the assembly of a and lack relief effort centrally but rather to However, a clearly defined and communi- standing postconflict interagency of clarity encourage greater coordination and cable standard of good governance, backed task force ready to conduct the ini- communication. It helps us express by force if necessary, will ensure that those tiation phase on a moment’s notice. of purpose our intent and ensure we generate exercising leadership abide by the rule of law. Second, we can modularize drive away the right capabilities to stabilize and The second component is environmen- the functions along each line of potential reconstruct the nation according to tal. War is damaging to the environment. operation to facilitate the distribu- donors of its needs. Lacking a common lan- From pollution to unexploded ordnance to tion of responsibilities among forces and guage and approach guarantees that damaged infrastructure, war zones create international agencies and nongov- resources no such coordination will occur and lingering hazards that have a depressing effect ernmental organizations. Modular- that the mission will suffer. on the public. Cleaning and resetting the ization permits the establishment The third concern is the environment is important for reestablishing a of different road maps based on potential for “sticker shock.” The sense of normalcy in the populace and reduc- classes of scenarios. Examples include size up-front costs of conducting initiation phase ing health risks. (differentiating future events on the scale of operations will appear disproportionately The third component is health, including an Iraq versus a Liberia, for example), politi- high, especially in comparison to the up-front caring for the sick and injured and preventing cal nature (permissive environment versus costs of interventions in Bosnia and Somalia. the spread of disease. It also includes the digni- nonpermissive, such as an active insurgency However, we have already seen what happened fied handling of those in need. Visions of over- or presence of potential legitimate govern- in the long run, that cutting corners early crowded and understaffed treatment centers ment elements versus predominance of war meant far longer and more expensive opera- reflect poorly on the relief effort as chaotic criminals or other undesirables), economic tions than originally planned. Modularizing and uncaring. Conversely, an adequately nature (landlocked country versus maritime, road map functions leads to efficiencies that resourced and efficient treatment center paints available critical natural resources, such as reduce the overall cost of operations. a powerful and hopeful picture in the minds of nuclear materials, versus purely agricultural everyone, internally and externally. This point versus drug-oriented), and specific threats to Whatever solution comes about, it must cannot be overemphasized. stability (pandemic disease, weapons of mass address postwar situations from the perspec- Finally, there is the informational destruction, human trafficking). tive of those who have just lost everything to component, where the international com- Third, we will be better poised to a terrible conflict. It is in our national interest munity and the people of the nation establish address scenario-specific issues, such as rules to ensure that they are cared for by the right common understandings of expectations, of engagement, national and organizational people. If that does not happen, someone else needs, and the way ahead. This is where the caveats, and other limitations and constraints will do it, and the results may not be to our citizens establish their expectations and voice on the response force. Fourth, it permits the liking. If we are to win the war on terror, we their needs, which the international com- development of effective coordination tools, must take on the challenge of postconflict munity translates into action. It is also where such as road maps, that empower the effort situations head on and provide the Horizon of the people establish a renewed sense of culture to communicate progress internally and Hope that will convince people in strife that and identity, followed by openness toward externally and to tailor the effort in ways most there is indeed a path to lasting peace. After reconciliation. This encourages the locals, meaningful to the people. all, these are the same people we will eventu- particularly those formerly on opposite sides Some may have concerns about estab- ally want as partners. JFQ of the conflict, to work together. lishing such a framework and developing the In the implementation phase, the associated capabilities. First is the fear that N o t e s people form their own society, guided by the if we lean forward too far, we will assume international community, and determine how responsibility for an undue percentage of 1 they want to choose their leaders, maintain these missions as they arise. We would expend The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White their environment, care for their sick, create extraordinary amounts of our own resources House, March 2006), 16. their own societal norms, and establish edu- and not realize burdensharing. That is a 2 Ibid., 14. cational, cultural, and other institutions. We patently false assumption. The international should guide the society to choose norms con- community will be more likely to sign up for sonant with international law, but otherwise postconflict operations with the clear goals, support their intentions. capability requirements, and lines of coordination that the framework would provide. Advantages and Concerns Ambiguity and lack of clarity of purpose drive Contributors: Lieutenant Colonel This framework for handling postcon- away potential donors of forces and resources. Thomas P. Galvin, USA, James C. flict scenarios offers tremendous advantages. Second is the concern that many McNaughton, Commander Michael First, the requirements of the initiation phase volunteer relief organizations are fiercely Cashman, USN, Major Christopher are fairly standard regardless of the situation. independent and will refuse to participate in T. Holinger, USAF, and Lieutenant Consequently, there is the potential to assign any centralized mechanism that coordinates Colonel Robert Mallets, USAF. to U.S. Government agencies the responsibil- relief activities. This framework does not ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 45 Flags of some African role as part of an interagency process led by countries participating in the Department of State that seeks not only Exercise RECAMP V with to prevent armed conflict, but also to help U.S. units in Cameroon nations provide for their own people through good governance and providing basic needs and services. The United States achieves its national interests through unity of effort that ties policy with execution, especially in the political-military arena of interest to the Department of Defense (DOD). If only things were so simple. Unfor- tunately, that unity of effort suffers due to a number of factors, many of them internal to the U.S. Government. On one level, the challenges are bureaucratic in nature, including budgetary restrictions, lack of interagency transparency, mismatched authorities and responsibilities, slow responsiveness, and outmoded legislation. The results can include poorly coordinated bilateral efforts that cause the target nations to seek assistance elsewhere

Combat Camera Squadron (Jason T. Bailey) (Jason T. Combat Camera Squadron or, worse, contribute to its instability. There st 1 have been numerous instances where our own well-intentioned laws and bureaucratic processes interfered with our ability to engage E x t e n d i n g other nations, especially the same developing nations whose assistance we seek to cultivate in the war on terror. While the formation of the Phase Zero these laws and processes was driven by legitimate concerns, the unintended consequences have had a deleterious effect on U.S. ability to Campaign Mindset meet fundamental objectives of establishing enduring partnerships. Some of the particular Ensuring Unity of Effort legal or bureaucratic problems have already been repaired, while others are in the process of being fixed. By T h o m a s P . G a l v i n On a second level is the problem of the overall cultural mindset that relegates TSC and other noncampaign activities—collec- Proactive peacetime engagement activities AOR as a whole. For example, ungoverned tively referred to as Phase Zero—to secondary reassure allies and partners, promote and misgoverned areas in Africa are provid- status behind traditional military require- stability and mitigate the conditions that ing safe havens for transnational terrorists ments, such as training, equipping, maintain- lead to conflict. We base our strategies and organized criminal elements seeking to ing, mobilizing, and employing the force. The on the principle that it is much more cost attack U.S. properties and interests.2 Armed mindset extends across the U.S. Government, effective to prevent conflict than it is to stop conflict is severely destabilizing, and often it but not without reason. After all, the bread one once it has started. arises from factors such as poor governance and butter of the military is combat. We —USEUCOM Posture Statement 20061 and struggles for power, endemic corruption, remind ourselves of that fact daily as a nation limited economic opportunities, longstanding and military at war, and we expect that our he above statement succinctly practices and traditions that violate human fighting forces are fully equipped and ready. explains the central purpose dignity, and humanitarian problems such as This is not to say that anyone considers Phase behind Theater Security Coop- drugs, pandemic disease, HIV/AIDS, severe Zero unimportant. Quite the opposite is true. T eration (TSC) programs. In drought, or famine. The National Security Strategy of the United the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) Consequently, the geographic combat- States of America (NSS) makes it clear that area of responsibility (AOR) alone, there ant commanders (GCCs) play an important “addressing regional conflicts includes three reside dozens of nations whose stability is in serious question and whose problems affect Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Galvin, USA, is Director of the Deputy Commander’s Action Group, U.S. European not only surrounding nations but also the Command.

46 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Galvin levels of engagement: conflict prevention and How the GCC determines which TSC plans, but the lack of corresponding authori- resolution, conflict intervention, and post- efforts to operationalize is a straightforward ties incurs extensive requirements to request conflict stabilization and reconstruction.”3 process. TSC provides the ways and means and justify resources with an agency whose However, there is a default tendency to equate applied against national requirements to priorities may differ. If the GCC had a peer the military to warfighting, misbalancing engage with a particular country to meet regional authority in State, they could discuss the resources needed for the military’s role U.S. interests in accordance with the NSS. and resolve disputes, but no such regional in prevention, stabilization, and reconstruc- The Department of State establishes national authority exists. Instead, State allocates tion. Thus, it is difficult to resource the total policy toward that nation and promulgates resources nationally, which greatly slows the Phase Zero campaign; impacts allocation process and is less flexible on Phase Zero considerations there is a default tendency to equate the military than needed. are underrepresented as laws This situation is problem- and policies are proposed and with warfighting, misbalancing the resources atic within USEUCOM, which is established. What should be needed for the military’s role in prevention, responsible for TSC with 92 different fairly small and simple opera- stabilization, and reconstruction countries. Given authorities to match tions to build partnerships and responsibilities, USEUCOM can military capabilities to support effectively employ the interagency U.S. interests become more difficult and it through the Embassy country team, an process to shift resources in response to crises complex than necessary. interagency group. DOD performs its role or changes in the strategic environment while Perceptions are key during Phase Zero. as the political-military coordinator for ensuring compliance with national policy We may be the world’s lone superpower, but bilateral military-to-military activities, objectives. The additional steps required to from the perspective of our target nations, coalition-building, or helping build regional secure (and sometimes resecure) and redirect we can appear sluggish and difficult to work security organizations in support of the poli- previously budgeted resources severely inhibits with. That sends the wrong message not only cies promulgated by State. The GCCs are the USEUCOM responsiveness and disrupts TSC to longstanding allies, but also to emerging DOD agents for those nations within their plans and operations, without particular gain. partners, who are just as likely to seek assis- assigned areas of responsibility. Geographic The second challenge is the competi- tance from another nation instead. combatant commands manage their political- tion for Title 10 resources within DOD. This military activities using security cooperation includes not only seeking adequate resources Phase Zero Now guidance from the Secretary of Defense and on an annual fiscal-year basis through the In the 4th Quarter 2006 issue of Joint a GCC Phase Zero plan that includes country National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Force Quarterly, General Charles Wald, campaign plans (CCPs). These plans establish but also securing forces for specific activities USAF (Ret.), did an excellent job describ- objectives and measures of effectiveness to through the Global Force Management (GFM) ing the value and importance of Phase Zero guide engagement activities.5 process. GFM is the current DOD process of activities at the GCC level, going so far as As defined, the division of responsibili- assigning, allocating, and apportioning forces to describe Phase Zero as a campaign unto ties appears clear; however, the fact is that to combatant commanders for conducting itself.4 He defined the phase as encompassing the GCC responsibilities do not match their d “all activities prior to the beginning of Phase authorities. There are three reasons for this. 982 Combat Camera Company (Michael Casteel) I [traditional joint campaign]—that is, every- First and foremost is an interagency conflict. thing that can be done to prevent conflicts While GCCs are responsible for conducting from developing in the first place. . . . [T]he the Phase Zero campaign, State controls most preventative focus of Phase Zero is less costly of the resources under Title 22 through the (both in blood and in treasure) than a reac- Foreign Assistance Act. Geographic combat- tive approach to a crisis.” He described Phase ant commands may have perfectly sound Zero as “operationalized TSC,” a convergence of TSC activities with information operations and traditional military operations that drives the campaign toward achieving a set of desired strategic effects.

Soldiers provide security for children waiting for medical attention from Cooperative Medical Assistance Team, Combined Joint Task Force–76, in Afghanistan

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 47 Extending the Phase Zero Mindset

military operations. It takes the total avail- offer International Military Education and process on top of the existing bureaucracy able forces and capabilities and applies them Training (IMET) programs to key partners to centralize Phase Zero and traditional against current and anticipated requirements.6 in the war on terror. If it had only prohibited campaign plan management. The other is to While Global Force Management was a signif- activities that would place Servicemembers at work within the existing system and fix what icant improvement over previous processes, it risk of arrest and prosecution, the GCC would is possible quickly. We must consider that the has a downside in that the Services ultimately have retained a range of options to continue processes in place that support Phase Zero control the distribution of resources with the engagement. are not completely broken. Some reforms geographic combatant commands lacking While all three challenges highlight have already been instituted that will better direct influence in their allocation.7 Hence, the inherent difficulties that geographic facilitate and resource Phase Zero activities, while the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan combatant commands face in meeting their so it seems counterintuitive that a new level directs GCCs to develop TSC plans, the com- responsibilities, they also highlight the of national bureaucracy would improve effi- mands do not have the authorities or resources disjointedness of the interagency approach ciency or effectiveness rather than complicate to execute them. As with State, the geographic to Phase Zero. Because Phase Zero effects matters further. It is better to focus on fixing combatant commands and Services may differ can only be achieved through the concerted what is broken and changing the mindset in greatly in priorities of allocating resources, efforts of all elements of national power, it order to ensure that Phase Zero impacts are potentially resulting in the commands’ needs requires a strongly synchronized interagency considered in the course of doing business. not being met. effort. Instead, it is currently a military-led Before recommending fixes, it is best to The third problem is legislative in effort that often seems a square peg stuffed recap what the Phase Zero campaign means nature, as the unintended second- and third- into a round hole, with TSC activities cultur- and where its requirements are derived. The order effects of standing laws or statutes inter- ally viewed as second priority for the military. NSS contains numerous references to the need fere with Phase Zero planning and execution. It should not be assumed that elevating Phase for working with other nations to address One example is a provision in Title 10 that Zero activities would automatically take U.S. common security threats. Consequently, the restricts the use of U.S. funds to transport forces out of the fight in current operations. National Defense Strategy identifies four stra- foreign forces from one AOR to another.8 Instead, it would improve the calculus of the tegic objectives for the defense establishment While this enforces the responsibility for Government’s efforts to meet the NSS, ensur- to support the NSS: GCCs to execute TSC within their AORs, it ing that the laws, authorities, responsibilities, also restricts the ability to offer, for example, and allocation of resources to prevent conflict n securing the United States from direct the use of the Grafenwoehr Training Area in and build the military capacities of our part- attack Germany for a combined exercise involving ners are as effective and efficient as those that n securing strategic access and retaining militaries from the U.S. Southern Command, mobilize, train, equip, and deploy our own global freedom of action U.S. Central Command, or U.S. Pacific Com- forces for combat. It would ensure that all n strengthening alliances and partnerships mand’s AORs. Another example was the legal elements of national power are focused, syn- n establishing favorable security prohibition against all use of Federal funds for chronized, and participating in unison. As a conditions. nations who were signatories to the Interna- Center for Strategic and International Studies tional Criminal Court but who did not sign a report states, “strategic and operational plan- The first objective focuses internally bilateral Article 98 exemption with the United ning should be done on an interagency basis” and is achieved largely through the establish- States. The prohibition was clearly established to ensure unity of effort.9 ment of sufficient U.S. military capability through the lens of traditional military opera- to defeat our enemies, then employing them tions as a means of protecting Servicemem- Phase Zero Campaign Basis in such a manner to dissuade and deter our bers during combat, training, and exercises, There are two paths reform could take. enemies from attacking us. The other three, but did not consider Phase Zero implications. One is to institute a thorough interagency however, are externally focused and describe Between its enactment in January 2003 until its removal in the 2007 NDAA, this restric- tion took a great deal of flexibility away from U.S. Navy (Rosa Larson) the GCCs due to its blanket Joint Task Force Lebanon advisors meeting nature. For example, geographic aboard amphibious command ship USS combatant commands could not Mount Whitney in Bay of Gaeta, Italy

the geographic combatant commands and the Services may differ greatly in priorities of allocating resources U.S. Air Force personnel unload medical supplies at health center in Ghana U.S. Air Force (Kim Allain) U.S. Air Force

48 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Galvin what we hope to gain from our rela- A second problem with the tionships with other nations. pursuing political-military relationships often JIACG is that it serves an advisory As a companion document, requires time, trust, and persistence role primarily,13 with limited deci- the DOD releases security coop- sion or execution authorities. To be eration guidance that directs the effective, our interagency partners GCCs’ planning and execution of Theater undue influence of the diplomatic situation must empower JIACG members to make Security Cooperation within their AORs. on TSC execution, causing the appearance of decisions and coordinate regional interagency The roles of these documents were suc- unreliability. Furthermore, the unintended security cooperation activities in a fashion cinctly described in the 2005 testimony of consequences of U.S. laws and regulations similar to how Offices of Defense Coopera- General James Jones, USMC, to the Senate create inequities that cause us to treat certain tion and Defense Attachés operate within U.S. Foreign Relations Committee: countries differently from others. They inhibit Embassies. the ability to procure resources under certain Mature the Interagency Process to the DOD’s Security Cooperation is an impor- circumstances that should have no impact Regional Level. Interagency plans and activi- tant instrument for executing U.S. defense on military activities. For TSC strategies to ties will be more efficient and effective as strategy by building defense relationships support our national objectives, geographic current initiatives infuse a regional approach that promote specific U.S. security inter- combatant commands require the flexibility to security cooperation, as opposed to strictly ests, develop allied and friendly military to apply the right resources where and when bilateral cooperation. This will allow TSC capabilities for self-defense and coalition they are needed and the capability to work efforts to focus on common interests and operations, and provide U.S. forces with for the long term to ensure the solidity of our threats among nations in a region, acknowl- peacetime and contingency access and en important military-to-military relationships. edging that national borders are of little con- route infrastructure. Theater Security Coop- sequence to historical tribal loyalties, regional eration, an element of DOD Security Coop- Recommendations pandemics and humanitarian conditions, and eration, involves those activities undertaken Below is a specific list of reforms aimed transnational issues such as terrorism. It will by the [GCCs] to implement this guidance.10 at improving Phase Zero. Most lie at the also facilitate the development of longer-term interagency level within the executive branch engagement plans of 5 to 10 years that would By nature, pursuing political-military or as legislative reforms. While a couple of inform the GCC 1- to 2-year focus on CCPs. relationships often requires time, trust, and the recommendations are internal to DOD, it These should use an effects-based deliberate persistence. Developing new military capa- must be noted that Defense has already taken planning process with concrete measures of bilities within the United States is difficult aggressive action to support this campaign, effectiveness to facilitate multilateral TSC enough, and encouraging such development such as pushing through Phase Zero–related events and encourage regional security solu- in other nations can be tough, particularly funding efforts in the 2007 NDAA. However, tions among less-governed areas. in postconflict situations or among poorer more work needs to be done. The State Department, which previ- or weakly governed nations. Time is needed Expand the Scope and Authorities of the ously worked almost exclusively in a bilateral to ensure that capabilities are developed JIACG. The most important organizational fashion, is also taking a more regional properly and employed in ways consistent reform relates to the primary interagency approach in its transformational diplomacy with our interests. Also, absent a crisis, access vehicle available to the geographic combatant initiative for much the same reasons in order to another nation’s infrastructure usually commands, the Joint Interagency Coordina- to deal with challenges that are “transnational comes only after our relationship with it has tion Group (JIACG). Joint Publication (JP) and regional in nature,” and using regional matured. The decision to provide us with 3–08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organi- “collaborations . . . [to] facilitate a more effec- such access often comes at a political price to zations, and Nongovernmental Organizations tive approach to building democracy and the national leader. Hence, the United States Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. I, prosperity, fighting terrorism, disease, and must demonstrate sufficient commitment to defines a JIACG as “an interagency staff group human trafficking.” Clearly, this has potential that nation to prove that opening access is in that establishes regular, timely, and collabora- to enhance the mutual accomplishment of its interests as well as ours. Thus, while TSC tive working relationships between civilian our respective missions in support of national strategies and their subordinate CCPs are and military operational planners.”11 JP 3–08 objectives. The challenge is to converge the influenced by dynamic diplomatic, informa- identifies the JIACG’s main purpose as to par- GCC’s efforts with those of State’s emerging tional, and economic relationships between ticipate in “deliberate, crisis, and transition regional mechanisms, along with the efforts the United States and other nations, achieving planning”12 but does not mention a role in of other interagency processes. the goals and objectives of any TSC strategy Theater Security Cooperation. Consequently, Tie Country Funding Levels to Regional requires a degree of consistency and reliabil- JIACGs are designed to handle the reactive Goals. As Theater Security Cooperation ity. It is important that other militaries get the side of the spectrum and not to facilitate should have a regional focus, so too should message that when the U.S. military commits proactive conflict-prevention tasks. JIACGs the resource allocation processes. The to an activity, it follows through unless the need the skill sets for both operational plan- current structure built on priority countries political situation becomes prohibitive. ning and TSC, as they are the perfect forum may not achieve the desired regional effects, Here is where the bureaucratic and to help coordinate TSC activities between the but funding processes that support regional legislative hurdles become problems. The mis- geographic combatant commands and other contexts will definitely support our bilateral match of responsibilities to authorities places governmental agencies. interests. A new model that directs funds to ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 49 Extending the Phase Zero Mindset regions and countries in support of regional and Title 22 to fund certain types or similar authorities should cover objectives will strengthen the overall region- of operations while preserving the global trends a broader range of TSC activities alized interagency process and achieve overall authorities of the respective are blending that support these other vital goals. better results. departments and informed con- the areas of Also, despite the extension, Section Increase GCC Budgetary Influence and gressional oversight. responsibility 1206 is still viewed as a temporary Authority. Geographic combatant commands Continue to Expand Section together, such program, while the intended have insufficient influence over the vast 1206 Authorities. Beginning in effects require a long-term com- majority of security cooperation funding and 2006, Section 1206 of the NDAA that even mitment to the target nations. have limited discretionary authority. In fiscal gave the Department of Defense developing Consonant with other budget year 2005, the State Department controlled 70 the authority to spend up to $200 nations have authority recommendations above, percent of TSC (Titles 10 and 22) funding in million in programs intended interests in Section 1206 should become a per- the USEUCOM AOR. The USEUCOM com- to build the capacity of foreign manent part of the NDAA. 15 other parts of mander, who is accountable for TSC execu- military forces worldwide. That the world Eliminate Restrictions on tion in his AOR, controlled only 3 percent of year, the section only granted that Cross–Combatant Command discretionary TSC funding.14 Expanding the authority for two specific purposes: Funding. Title 10, Section 1051, JIACG or other interagency vehicles is not to “conduct counterterrorist opera- paragraph (b)(1) expressly limits sufficient to give the flexibility necessary to tions” and to “participate in or support mili- the use of GCC funds to support a “develop- the GCC to initiate Foreign Military Financ- tary and stability operations in which the U.S. ing country’s” participation in a TSC activity ing, IMET, and Section 1206 funding require- Armed Forces are a participant.” Although “only in connection with travel within a ments with new or emerging partner nations the fiscal year 2007 act includes extensions to unified combatant command’s area of respon- or to address emerging requirements as they Section 1206 authorities through fiscal year sibility in which the developing country is arise. The geographic combatant commander 2008 with the annual authorization raised located or in connection with travel to Canada needs expanded discretionary funding to $300 million, the purposes for which the or Mexico.”17 The purpose was to enforce the authority to create efficiencies to accomplish funds can be used did not change.16 This unified command plan boundaries to reduce his mandated political-military requirements excludes many proactive conflict-prevention the potential for redundant activities. That in his area of responsibility more effectively. activities that seek to enhance internal stabil- was acceptable when the AORs were clearly The transformational diplomacy initia- ity of partner nations by inculcating values defined and distinct in their orientation. tive currently under way in the State Depart- such as civilian control over the military. Modern global trends are blending the AORs ment offers great opportunities to correct this Supporting good governance, build- together, such that even developing nations problem. By taking a regional approach, State ing strong democratic institutions, and have interests in other parts of the world. will operate from a perspective similar to the developing future capacity for employment We have interests in ensuring that all our GCCs, which should facilitate handing over on operations as a U.S. partner are what a desired partner militaries have at least the discretionary funding authority to the geo- developing nation needs most. Section 1206 opportunity to train and grow together, even graphic combatant commands to meet State if it means offering to send a unit from regional policy objectives. But we need not Fleet Combat Camera, Pacific (Martin Anton Edgil) a drug-ridden sub-Saharan African wait for those relationships to build. or Central Asian nation to a worthy With the right authorities, GCCs counterdrug/counterterrorism exercise would make significant progress by in South America. Our prohibition executing their existing CCPs. on actions such as this makes abso- Add Flexibility to Title 10 and lutely no sense from the perspective Title 22. While there should be a of our partner, who has no reason for divide between Titles 10 and 22 that concern about our unified command reflects the proper authorities of the plan. Combatant commanders must Departments of Defense and State, be able to execute TSC plans across the total lack of flexibility compli- GCC boundaries seamlessly. Doing so cates Phase Zero efforts, hamstring- requires adjusting this section to provide ing the allocation of the right amount the necessary spending authorities. of resources to fund activities that Strengthen Phase Zero Language blur traditional military operations within the UJTL. The Universal Joint Task and TSC. We need to look at this List (UJTL) includes a number of strategic problem from the perspective of our tasks and subtasks that are Phase Zero in target countries. They see only one nature. However, many of the task names source of assistance: the U.S. Govern- Liaison officer and descriptors could be more strongly ment. Our processes should preserve for U.S. State linked to their purpose. For example, over- that perspective. The U.S. Govern- Department arching Strategic National Task 8 is called ment must find ways to allow Title 10 training Iraqi “Foster Multinational and Interagency to fund foreign assistance activities police Relations.” This name does not reflect what

50 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Galvin its subtasks require joint headquarters to do, ability, and responsibilities of the GCCs and 6 Donna Miles, Joint Forces Command Brings such as supporting or conducting activities the emerging regional interagency entities. Efficiency to Deployment Cycles, American Forces that seek to prevent conflict and build the The Phase Zero campaign has already Press Service, April 14, 2006, available at . 7 Clark A. Murdock et al., Beyond Goldwater- Multinational and Interagency Cooperation.” forces. Actionable intelligence, basing and Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for Stronger Phase Zero language in the UJTL infrastructure, sustainment capabilities, and a New Strategic Era, Phase 1 Report (Washington, would result in better Phase Zero language coalition force commitments come from DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, in the combatant command’s Joint Mission strong relationships between the United States 2004), 8. Essential Task Lists and therefore better inte- and its partners. These relationships do not 8 U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 1051, gration of Phase Zero purpose and require- come about quickly but are built over time paragraph (b)(1), available at . Other Intra-DOD Reforms. Significant ports accomplishment of the key objectives in 9 Clark A. Murdock et al., Beyond Goldwater- progress has been made to reform DOD the NSS. The challenge now is to fix that which Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for internal business practices to integrate myriad inhibits the geographic combatant commands a New Strategic Era, Phase 2 Report (Washington, TSC strategies, but there is still more to be and build the foundations for successful Phase DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005), 20. done. For example, regional centers, such as Zero accomplishment in the future. 10 General James L. Jones, USMC, statement the Africa Center for Strategic Studies and before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the George C. Marshall Center, report to the In the current dynamic global security September 28, 2005, available at . their policy direction from the Under Secre- afford to ignore. If we want to bring other 11 Joint Publication 3–08, Interagency, tary of Defense for Policy and their funding nations on board as our partners, we have to Intergovernmental Organizations, and Nongovern- from the Defense Security Cooperation provide the geographic combatant command- mental Organizations Coordination During Joint Agency. The regional centers would operate ers with the flexible and responsive resources Operations, Vol. I (Norfolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces far more efficiently and effectively if the with which to do so efficiently, without undue Command, March 17, 2006), xii, II–14. 12 geographic combatant commands managed bureaucratic delays. Otherwise, we may miss Ibid., II–20. 13 all aspects of operations and resourcing under opportunities, and could risk having to later Ibid. 14 The funding for Theater Security Coopera- policy guidance from the policy Under Secre- expend far greater resources to clean up tion activities in the USEUCOM area of respon- tary. Other initiatives such as the Global Force another regional conflict or another emerging sibility for fiscal year 2005 was $484.2 million. JFQ Management Board are still new, and their threat to U.S. security. Department of State programs including Foreign roles in supporting the TSC needs of GCCs Military Financing (FMF), IMET, peacekeeping are as yet unclear. operations, and international narcotics and law N o t e s enforcement totaled $348 million, or approximately The Vision 70 percent of the total. Twenty-seven percent, or 1 These and other individual reforms General James L. Jones, USMC, statement $130.2 million, was for DOD programs already will only achieve the full effect of establishing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, earmarked, including the budgets of the Regional March 7, 2006, available at . of how the interagency plans, conducts, and ism Fellowship Program, humanitarian assistance 2 George J. Tenet, “The Worldwide Threat programs, the Counter Narco Terrorist Program, manages the Phase Zero campaign. Once in 2003: Evolving Dangers in a Complex World,” and various joint combined exercises. This left 3 operationalized into a standing interagency statement before the Senate Select Committee on percent, or $15.9 million, for the GCC’s discretion- Phase Zero Campaign Plan, it will become Intelligence, February 11, 2003. ary use. USEUCOM’s State Partnership Program easier to translate the NSS into a series of 3 The National Security Strategy of the United is a key TSC effort that receives 90 percent of its specific objectives geared toward preventing States of America (Washington, DC: The White budget from these funds. These figures do not conflict while facilitating DOD responsibilities House, March 2006), 13, available at . 15 Public Law 109–163, National Defense 4 The campaign plan would establish a common Charles F. Wald, “New Thinking at Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, 322–324, language for the desired strategic effects USEUCOM: The Phase Zero Campaign,” Joint available at . Force Quarterly 43 (October 2006), 72–75, available 16 from Phase Zero activities and help facilitate Public Law 109–364, National Defense at . able at . that future legislation is harmonious with 5 Jefferson P. Marquis et al., Assessing the 17 U.S. Code, Title 10, Sect. 1051. Phase Zero objectives. It would provide a long- Value of U.S. Army International Activities (Santa term solution to aligning authorities, account- Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 5–8.

Contributors: Colonel Cheryl L. Smart, USA, Philip M. Roman, Commander Ty W. Rinoski, USN, Commander Douglas A. Edson, USN, Christopher S. Crowley, Colonel James G. Welton, USAF, Commander Jeffrey H. Armstrong, USN, Major Pamela A.Q. Cook, USAF, Brigadier General Melvin K. Spiese, USMC, Major Christopher T. Holinger, USAF, Commander T. Michael Cashman, USN, and Lieutenant Colonel Robert Mallets, USAF.

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 51 The Changing Face of Europe and Africa The USEUCOM AOR in 25 Years IT Stock International

Roman Coliseum at night Local residents at dedication of school in Kenya built with assistance By T h o m a s P . G a l v i n from Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa

U.S. Navy (Eric A. Clement)

hat comes to mind first but vibrant villages still dot the landscape. out of the towns and into the cities for eco- when you hear the word The Swiss still maintain a large number of nomic opportunities and vibrancy. They European? Perhaps it is separate languages among their townspeople. are being joined by significant and growing W one of the great landmarks Finally, the overall culture is strongly based minority populations of Asians, Middle East- located on the continent, such as the Roman on Christianity, with churches the center- erners, and especially Africans, with Muslim Coliseum or Parthenon in Athens. Maybe piece of many cities and towns, and religious communities growing the fastest. it is the beautiful mountain scenery of the tradition deeply ingrained despite modern One reason Europe is changing is that Alps that inspired The Sound of Music or the secularism. Africa is changing. Overall, Africa is experi- flatlands dotted with windmills and dikes But there is no denying that Europe is encing a population boom unlike anything in Holland. Or perhaps it is the people of the changing. The foundations of the continent’s seen in modern history due to the successful continent and the varied societies they have sociopolitical structures and culture will still efforts by the international community to built over the past 500 years. The skin tones exist in 2030, but a number of trends from reduce infant and child mortality. This is differ from Ireland to Spain, but the people the past few decades point to a continent that producing a large youth population that, at are largely Caucasian. The societies are mostly is becoming heavily urbanized, modernized, current rates, will cause the population of sub- law-abiding and orderly, although a drive and blended. Young Europeans are moving Saharan Africa to increase by half by 2025, through Copenhagen does not compare to a drive through Naples. There is a balance Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Galvin, USA, is Director of the Deputy Commander’s Action Group, U.S. European between city dwellers and rural sites. Quaint Command.

52 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Galvin

despite the numbers that will succumb to make a particular impact on the changing particularly steep.6 In the next 10 years alone, AIDS.1 However, sub-Saharan Africa does not face of Europe and Africa—demographics, 40 African cities will rise above the half- have the economy to maintain such growth, so resources, and effects of globalization—and million barrier, 10 of those breaking 1 million. The Changing Face these youths are moving about the continent the implications these areas have for the U.S. Much of the population growth will occur in and across to Europe, seeking better lives. military. less developed countries that are not prepared As these peoples congregate in increas- Of the three areas, demographic trends to handle it. Nigeria (25 percent increase in ingly concentrated areas, the cultures on both carry the greatest impact. Immigration is population by 2015), the Democratic Repub- of Europe and Africa continents change. Much of this can happen a hot issue on both sides of the Atlantic. It lic of the Congo (35 percent), and Uganda peacefully, though tensions and occasional affects the United States and Europe differ- (45 percent) are three examples of poorly flare-ups of violence may be unavoidable. But ently, though neither is happy with illegal governed or conflict torn nations that will by 2030, these changes could alter the entire movements. Our culture of assimilation in the experience such growth.7 Meanwhile, African security landscape of the pursuit of the American dream has fostered nations lag behind the Europeans in provid- U.S. European Command a wide range of immigrant success stories. ing access to the global information infra- one reason (USEUCOM) area of Moreover, numerous ethnic minority com- structure and therefore the ability to join the responsibility (AOR). munities are generally satisfied with their lot world economic community. Europe’s already Europe is While there appears to be and therefore do not cause trouble. Finally, densely populated cities will see an increase changing is consensus on the broad there are essentially no restrictions to moving from the current 72 percent to 78 percent of its that Africa is nature of the threats, how about within the United States. total population by 2030.8 changing these people will blend In Europe, the situation is more compli- Some parts of the AOR will see sharp and assimilate against the cated. Migrant movements, both inter- and reductions in indigenous populations over backdrop of a quarter- intracontinental, stand against the desire of the next generation. Two regions that seem century of globalization many indigenous Europeans to maintain their particularly vulnerable are Central and will best determine what capabilities the national and cultural identities. Their minor- Eastern Europe and southern Africa. Decline United States will need to deal with them. ity communities, including an intra-European in the former is due primarily to low birth diaspora, do not have the same opportuni- rates. Of the 10 nations with the lowest birth Where the Trends Lead ties to assimilate. Americans have a greater rates in the world, 8 are in this region. Many Much work is being done to look into tendency to intermarry among ethnic groups, of these countries are landlocked, such as the future, but more is needed. For example, while minorities in Europe are more likely to Belarus, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) has marry within their own ethnicity, including Moldova. The region also includes the almost- maintained a marvelous living document that arranged marriages, thus reinforcing separa- landlocked countries of Bosnia-Herzegovina describes the 2030 joint operating environ- tion from the majority. This is particularly and Slovenia, as well as Poland and Ukraine. ment from a global perspective. However, true of some sectors of Europe’s fast-growing Compounding the problem for these nations because it is focused on a world view, it does Muslim population.3 This leaves some rel- are their roles as sources of emigrants to not go into great detail about the future of the egated to a second-class status, subject to Western European countries, particularly USEUCOM AOR. Instead, it uses individual xenophobic backlash from their neighbors, Ukraine, which further hastens the overall data points from Europe and Africa to illus- and quietly becoming an angry group. Yet the population decline. Though its birth rates are trate global trends, and its conclusions and migrants still emigrate because of the eco- higher, Russia is also experiencing long-term implications for our national military strategy nomic opportunities. population decline, especially outside its most are global as well. Indeed, the migrants are coming, and populous regions in the southwest.9 This trend The document focuses rightfully on Europe is not in a good position to stop them. is countered by increases in Chinese immigra- future characteristics of military operations Europeans need the migrants to keep their tion, both legal and illegal, into production and therefore the capabilities that the U.S. economies going despite their own declining areas east of the Urals.10 The overall result is defense establishment requires to win future birth rates, and Africa has the young popula- that the future rural landscapes of Europe wars. However, it pays little or no attention to tion to provide the labor. Africa’s overall popu- may be filled with ghost towns. requirements for theater security cooperation lation is expected to double from 2000’s figure Southern Africa, on the other hand, and other preventative Phase Zero activities by 2025, compared with Europe’s indigenous will see its population growth reduced due to that involve the interagency community.2 This population, which will decrease slightly. This a more destructive cause: AIDS. Currently, is an unfortunate flaw in the document, as is fueling a major migration across the Medi- percentages of adults aged 15 to 45 infected security cooperation activities ranging from terranean, from northern Africa to southern with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus military-to-military cooperation, education Europe.4 While some are migrating legally to range from almost 19 percent to 33 percent and training, humanitarian assistance, disas- escape chaos, corruption, or criminal activities among Africa’s six southernmost nations.11 ter relief, and others are important in main- back home, increasing numbers are migrating The raw numbers are staggering now: 24.5 taining what it assumes away: U.S. leadership illegally as the result of human trafficking.5 million infected in sub-Saharan Africa in the world. Both continents are rapidly urbanizing, compared with 14.1 million in the rest of the While the joint operating environment following a global trend that will see over world.12 Awareness of AIDS and its detrimen- document discusses an exhaustive range of three-fifths of the world’s populations living tal impacts on African societies will fuel the trends, this article focuses on three areas that in cities by 2030, but the growth in Africa is pursuit of a cure, but short of finding one,

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 53 USEUCOM AOR in 25 Years

Right: Navy hospital supplies. Many developing global economy and facilitate greater global corpsmen examining nations, especially in Africa, social interaction, they also provide a tremen- woman during medical civic action program do not have the political or dous conduit for criminal activity, such as in Djibouti, Combined social structures to manage identity theft, intellectual property infringe- Joint Task Force–Horn their river systems and ments, encouragement of illicit sexual or of Africa ground water sources, par- violent behaviors, and hacking or other forms ticularly as their populations of information warfare. The criminal justice 13 Below: Marine grow. At least one estimate systems of developed countries are already instructing members of suggests that half of the poorly equipped to deal with this domain of Djibouti National Police world’s population in 2025 crime, the scope of which can be devastating on basic weapons will not have adequate safe to legitimate business. The Internet as a tool procedures and 14 room clearing, Camp drinking water. Meanwhile, of free speech also has its downfalls. Transna- Lemonier, Djibouti waste and pollution are tional terrorist groups such as al Qaeda have

U.S. Navy (Eric A. Clement) already significant urban been effective in using it to spread their ideol- Combat Camera Squadron (Joseph McLean) Combat Camera Squadron st

1 problems that population ogy, plan training and operations, recruit, and increases will exacerbate. communicate with the public while avoiding Modern cities throughout the AOR will physical detection. The problems are too also face infrastructural and economic chal- pervasive for governments to intervene via lenges as they cope with this growth. Lack controls or censorship, and security technolo- of adequate housing, a shortage of education gies are hard pressed to keep up. programs for the young, inadequate health Globalization will cause shifts in the care services and providers, and insufficient political landscape, as the number of signifi- transportation networks will be among the cant political and economic entities that are problems these cities will face.15 Health care not nation-states is increasing. These include will be the greatest problem, as now there is transnational corporations (TNCs), nongov- a deficiency of 4 million health care workers, ernmental organizations (NGOs),18 and big and the existing care population is improperly cities. Some TNCs are already extremely pow- distributed against the demand. This gap in erful entities. For example, if Wal-Mart were services will widen.16 a nation-state, it would have the 22d largest Access to global information technolo- gross domestic product in the world, roughly gies that might provide economic opportuni- that of Austria.19 As TNCs grow rapidly and ties for the young and disadvantaged will also invest in the developing world, they can cata- remain unequal. While those in developed lyze development and stability where nation- and developing areas will have more oppor- state–based programs do not succeed. But tunities to gain regular access to modern and while TNCs will engage in social issues and future information technologies, significant other acts of so-called corporate citizenship,20 parts of the population (including those the bottom line will still drive their deci- within developed areas) will be shut out. This sions. Thus, social concerns left wanting by is more likely to aggravate current economic nation-states will fall in the domain of NGOs, disparities than create new ones.17 As a result which will have the resources, manpower, and of these and other factors, the denizens of will to tackle the world’s toughest problems many of the infected may remain sequestered underdeveloped locations will probably through the charity of the global commu- from the global society at large and be left to define progress as things getting worse rather nity. However, not all NGO activities will be die in place. than better. welcome, as shown in examples of Islamic The changes in demographics will The third area of interest, impacts of charities funding terrorist groups. cause equally dramatic shifts in the demands globalization, concerns a broad range of func- The growing size and power of cities for fundamental resources: food, water, and tions under which the societies of the future in Europe and Africa will disrupt the pre- waste management, among others. While the will operate. Two trends that will shape the dominant order of nation-states. Large cities amount of food produced globally is theoreti- security environment in Europe and Africa from different nations will forge greater cally sufficient to prevent starvation now, are the misuse of information technology and peer-to-peer cooperation to address common by 2030 land degradation, soil erosion, and the rise of key entities that rival the powers of economic, political, and security threats desertification will reduce arable land. Hastily the nation-state. that differ vastly from the problems found developing locations in the USEUCOM AOR Technology should continue to advance elsewhere in their respective countries. This moving toward modernized agriculture are at in leaps and bounds, with the Internet and its teamwork can extend to providing resources risk. Potable water is a different matter. The related technologies taking ever-broader roles for disaster relief, such as that given by New competition for water for human consump- in the daily activities of ordinary citizens. York City to New Orleans after Hurricane tion and agriculture is outstripping natural However, while these technologies benefit the Katrina. The downside is further reinforce-

54 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Galvin ment of the separation between the cities and make them unable to cope and thus prone that can be dealt with using current military other areas. In countries whose capital is also to violent action. Moreover, latent racism or and law enforcement capabilities. the lone large metropolis, governments will other prejudices might lead some to believe The other two, however, require contend with perceptions of paying attention that certain ethnicities or followers of certain responses with new or transformed capabili- exclusively to the capital, where TNCs and religions are driven to violence. However, the ties. The greatest threat comes from the rejec- NGOs are most likely to reside, and none above five conditions will not discriminate. tionists, who will actively seek to destroy or to rural areas. Security and other services They will cut across all classes, races, and overthrow the political system and supplant such as police, fire, medical care, customs, religions. The dwindling majorities will be it with their own ideological form. Currently, immigration, border patrol, consequence just as uneasy and fearful as the marginal- there is one clear and present instance of this management, and emergency command and ized minorities. Why and how they will band variety, the caliphatist threat of a transna- control will be heavily concentrated in the together and act are the key questions that tional movement to establish global domina- capital, with rural areas getting reduced ser- will lead us to the best approaches to securing tion under an Islamist regime. Its adherence vices. Ungoverned or misgoverned areas may and maintaining peace. to a jihadist ideology and the strict application expand rather than contract, leading to poorly The adversary will want to act against of sharia law make this movement unappeas- patrolled borders and inviting even greater those who imposed the undesirable condi- able and unconcerned with the use of exces- mass migration. Transnational criminal and tions upon them, real or perceived. Hence, sive violence, such as employment of weapons insurgent groups will seek safe havens in conventional avenues such as joining the of mass destruction or wanton killing of abandoned rural areas to establish operations national armed forces will not resonate innocents. Because al Qaeda has successfully for moving drugs, trafficking humans, or because even when the evils are being blamed conducted attacks and effectively employed preparing for terrorist activities. on a distant nation-state (such as the United the Internet to pursue its ideology, attract recruits, and enable operations, it is Nexus of Instability conceivable that other rejectionist How will this play out in the terrorism will continue to be the movements may arise that use similar USEUCOM AOR? It will differ tactic of choice, although the motivations methods to pursue an alternative greatly by region, but overall, and methods will differ greatly ideology. nation-states will experience The fifth group is the nihilists. greater pressure to do more to These will be the most unpredictable provide stability, security, and the basic needs States), it is the symbolic local manifestations and are growing increasingly dangerous. of their people. Western Europe will likely of that state that will draw attention (such Under the hardened conditions of 2030, cope, as will parts of Eurasia and Africa, but as nearby American TNCs or Embassies). individual actors will be more prevalent, the stresses of an urbanized environment will Unconventional, surreptitious activities are reacting when provoked, and occasionally create conditions in 2030 that will generate also easier for conventional adversaries to combining to form mass disturbances. Many threats to peace. These threats will increas- perform, so terrorism will continue to be the will be otherwise peaceful members of the ingly be unconventional as urban areas facili- tactic of choice, although the motivations and society who simply become overwhelmed and tate hard-to-detect, small-scale, terrorist-style methods will differ greatly. act out their hostility. Others will be oppor- activities at far lower cost and effort than There are at least five different groups of tunists who will use the cover of ongoing generating conventional threats, although the actors that pose a threat to security, and each disturbances to steal or vandalize. Small latter will remain. The following five condi- interacts differently with the external world. groups could serve as provocateurs or form tions could spark urban conflict in the future: The first three have been part of the strategic alliances with other groups such as rejection- environment for some time. Anarchists use ists. But nihilists may not initially be part of n increased competition for critical violence against political targets in response any movement. By definition, they just want resources, especially water to real or perceived injustice. State-sponsored to commit violence. Yet once they have acted n difficult conditions within emerging terrorist groups advance a national political without consequence, they will find it easy to metropolises agenda or assert national power. Tradition- join larger violent groups or movements. n potential for mass panic, particularly ally employed by states against other states, Available to these actors in the global from terrorism and disease this form of terrorism may prove attractive environment of 2030 will be a wide range of n growing ungoverned or misgoverned for some states to check the power of med- strategic enablers that will help them plan and areas as populations shift dling TNCs and NGOs, even if they are not conduct operations, recruit and train, and n general stress from dense populations. present within the state. Separatist groups will communicate with the public. At the root of endeavor to create geographically separate these enablers lies the general condition of The Adversary in 2030 entities such as new ethnically or ideologically governance under stress that creates a permis- It is easy to cast people driven to vio- pure states. Some will pursue their goals by sive environment for the actors. This environ- lence as a result of tough living conditions force, but others will be nonviolent groups ment permits holes and seams in national in a mold because there is an expectation in desiring to create and enforce protective or local security such as weakened borders, civil society that they should overcome their enclaves within a society. Pressure by the state under-resourced police forces, or bureaucratic challenges. Individual actors are dismissed to conform could spark violence. These three infighting over authorities and responsibili- as having mental or emotional illnesses that types of groups are well-understood threats ties. It generates corruption that permits the ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 55 USEUCOM AOR in 25 Years growth of illegal economic activities and Consequently, the U.S. military will convergence of military and law enforcement organized crime from drugs to arms to traf- see even greater emphasis on theater security capabilities, the laws of war and authorities ficking in people. It allows TNCs, NGOs, and cooperation activities to achieve the objectives to engage, handling of violent juveniles, etc., other major entities to engage in illegal or of conflict prevention and conventional train- will be important subjects of debate, from unethical practices (such as financing terror- ing and readiness. Other nations will need both the legal and cultural perspectives. These ism) unchecked. Finally, it allows problems to the capacity to conduct urban operations, also represent seams that our adversaries fester just below the level of societal response. supported by highly responsive intelligence. will exploit. These seams must be closed, so Each of these enablers provides ways, means, Regional organizations will need similar that our security forces have the authorities and opportunities for terrorist groups of capacities to mobilize when nation-states and responsibilities to vigorously pursue the all sorts to operate, along with access to the require assistance. Roles and responsibilities enemies of peace while upholding the rules of populations of potential recruits. among nation-states, TNCs, and NGOs must law and civil society. be consistent and actionable. Interoperability Finally, transparency and strong infor- Needed Capabilities among all these efforts is vital and is fostered mation operations are necessary to win the Winning a global campaign for good through direct personal contact among campaign of good governance. These are not governance requires combating the nexus peers. Thus, activities that build relationships confined to nation-states, as it is also in the of rejectionist ideologies, the harsh condi- between U.S. Servicemembers and those of best interests of TNCs, NGOs, and other enti- tions that spawn nihilists, and the array of other nations or entities will be important in ties that have stakes in maintaining long-term enablers in the strategic environment. To do building a unified response capability against global stability. To check the threat of nihilist so requires all elements of national power threats to peace. violence, populaces must remain convinced working together proactively on several fronts The U.S. military will need to devote that there are avenues to resolve grievances to achieve several goals. One front is accelerat- considerable resources toward consequence other than breaking the order of civil society. ing growth of civil society under the rule of management capabilities. The concentration The rule of law must remain supreme. In the law to counter the effects of exploding popula- of European and African populaces in the information-heavy environment of the future, tion growth, mass migration, values and ethics will be crucial and socioeconomic issues. the concentration of European and African to maintaining civil society, Another is developing broader building trust between the avenues to apply elements of populaces in the cities brings the potential for people and their governmental national power beyond the national collapse as the result of a disaster institutions, and diffusing the nation-state apparatus, which sparks of conflict. The U.S. mili- includes all political actors such tary is well suited for this role as TNCs, NGOs, cities, and others, to resolve cities brings with it the potential for national as an example of good citizenship and good issues that contribute to the flashpoints that collapse as the result of a disaster. Stabilizing stewardship of the public trust. the rejectionists exploit (such as distribu- a situation and providing humanitarian assis- tion of key resources). Achieving these goals tance rapidly will be increasingly important to Looking into the future, especially requires the right grand strategy, operational- prevent situational deterioration due to panic beyond a whole generation, is hard busi- ized through the interagency process in which and opportunism. Hybrid military and police ness. Applying the conclusions is equally the U.S. military will play an active role. capabilities, perhaps similar to the gendarmes difficult when one is attempting to develop One grand strategic idea that appears of other nations, would be useful in instilling requirements and capabilities to address that consistent with these goals is the Cooperative order quickly in such chaotic situations. Tech- future. While the USJFCOM joint operating Security approach.21 This method describes nological advancements such as robots that environment document builds a framework an interdependent world order that rec- can decontaminate areas affected by chemical, for explaining a range of threats and defining ognizes how globalized problems require biological, or radiological weapons will be the requisite future combat capabilities for the globalized solutions. American interests important. Scanners capable of diagnosing U.S. military, it does not address the whole are transnational. Conflict prevention and life-threatening injuries in victims instanta- story of Europe and Africa in 2030. That intervention serve to contain unrest to a neously will greatly assist doctors in providing story will be a battle for good governance over localized area and keep it from sparking con- care during mass casualty situations. Making highly concentrated populations that will not flict elsewhere. Counterproliferation of arms these and other capabilities portable in brief- resemble today’s Europeans and Africans. In and WMD is important. But rather than cases and distributing them widely around Europe particularly, there will be tremendous deferring national interests to international the AOR will go a long way toward establish- stresses and strains on these societies that will organizations, collective security could be ing goodwill and building confidence within challenge governmental ability to maintain achieved through a network of partnerships nervous societies. stability. Getting the answers right requires among the United States and the North A crucial part of the campaign will putting aside what the people of these two Atlantic Treaty Organization, European surround the process of developing rules of continents look like now and understanding Union, African Union, and other key regional engagement that address the new realities. how the faces of Europe and Africa will look organizations. International organizations What is permissible and what is forbidden then. JFQ such as the United Nations would play a role in terms of intelligence gathering, protec- where others fail. tions of privacy, relationships between or

56 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Galvin

Left: Marine checks French assault rifle during desert survival training led by French army in Djibouti

Below: Coastguardsmen discussing boarding tactics with members of Djibouti navy aboard USCGC Midgett, Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa Fleet Combat Camera, Atlantic (Roger S. Duncan)

N o t e s

1 The 2006 Population Reference Bureau, 2006 41, available at World Population Data Sheet, 6, available at , predicts publications/WUP2005/2005WUP_ that sub-Saharan Africa will grow from 767 million DataTables.pdf>. to 1.151 billion people between 2005 and 2025. 9 Julie DaVanza, Olga Oliker, 2 See U.S. Joint Forces Command and Clifford Grammich, “Too Few (USJFCOM), Joint Operating Environment 2006 Good Men: The Security Implica- U.S. Coast Guard, Pacific Area (Mariana O’Leary) Pacific Area U.S. Coast Guard, (Norfolk, VA: USJFCOM, September 2006), 46, tions of Russian Demographics,” 15 available at : “The United States aversion 2 (Summer/Fall 2003), 17–26, available at . in Youth Explosion in Developing World Cities: in the new American Way of War. In some ways, 10 Vilya Gelbras, “Chinese Migration in Approaches to Reducing Poverty and Conflict in an emphasis on interagency operations, maneuver Russia,” Russia in Global Affairs, no. 2 (April- Urban Age, ed. Blair A. Ruble et al. (Washington, warfare, rapid decision, [information operations], June 2005), available at . Scholars, 2003), 91–106, available at . 16 3 Esther Pan, Europe: Integrating Islam (Wash- AIDS (UNAIDS), A Global View of the HIV Epi- World Health Organization, The 2006 World ington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, July 13, demic (Geneva, Switzerland: UNAIDS), available at Health Report (Geneva, Switzerland: World Health 2005), available at . PrevalenceMap_en.pdf>. Jan Van Dijk, The Deepening Divide: 4 International Center for Migration Policy 12 UNAIDS, 2006 Report on the Global AIDS Inequality in the Information Society (London: Development, The Mediterranean Transit Migration Epidemic (Geneva, Switzerland: UNAIDS), 505, SAGE Publications, 2005), 2–5. 18 Dialogue, June 2005, available at . port/2006/2006_GR_ANN2_en.pdf>. International Organizations in Global Politics,” 5 Nasiru L. Abubakar, “Africa: How Africans 13 Ruth Meinzen-Dick and Paul P. Appasamy, in Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction d are Trading Lives for Europe,” AllAfrica.com, “Urbanization and Intersectoral Competition to International Relations, 2 ed., ed. John Baylis October 22, 2006, available at . F. Warner, “Exploring the Population/Water 357–383. 19 6 Center for Strategic and International Resources Nexus in the Developing World,” CSIS, “Revolution 7: Governance,” in 7 Revo- Studies (CSIS), “Revolution 1: Population,” in 7 both in Finding the Source: The Linkages lutions (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2006), available at Revolutions (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2006), avail- Between Population and Water (Washington, <7revs.csis.org/pdf/governance.pdf>. 20 able at <7revs.csis.org/pdf/population.pdf>. DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Ibid. 21 7 United Nations Population Division, Scholars, 2001), available at . Security 21, no. 3 (Winter 1997), 6. un.org/unup/>. 14 CSIS, “Revolution 2: Resources,” in 7 Revolu- 8 United Nations Population tions (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2006), available at Division, World Urbanization Prospects, table A.2, <7revs.csis.org/pdf/resource.pdf>.

Contributors: Captain Joseph B. Hoeing, USN, James Q. Roberts, Major Christopher Holinger, USAF, Commander Michael Cashman, USN, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Mallets, USAF, Lieutenant Colonel Larry R. Lenkeit, USA, Commander Gregory R. Griffitt, USN, Lieutenant Commander James Logsdon, USN, Kevin V. Wright, Major Pamela Q. Cook, USAF, Lieutenant Colonel Andrew I. Green, USA, Major Kevin W. Massa, USAF, and Tod A. Roy.

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 57 Russian honor guard in Moscow performs during Chairman’s visit (D. Myles Cullen) Improving JFQ Military-to-Relations with RMilitaryussia

By C h r i s t o p h e r T . H o l i n g e r

uring the Cold War, the sight Grafenwoehr for similar familiarization with successes, most of the early ones spearheaded of soldiers wearing the uniform American weapons and vehicles. USS Elrod by USAREUR. In 1994, the first bilateral of the Red Army marching recently completed a port call in Novoros- peacekeeping exercise involving U.S. and D through the fields near Grafen- siysk, and in February and April 2006, USS Russian forces was held in Totskoye, Russia. woehr, Germany, would have been most Porter cruised the Black Sea, conducting Exercise Peacekeeper ’94 included Soldiers and unsettling for members of the U.S. Army’s port calls and engagement with the navies of vehicles from the 3d Infantry Division (then 1st Armored Division. In 1988, if you had several Black Sea nations. still based in Germany) deploying to Russia suggested to a sergeant in U.S. Army Europe Despite frequent political ups and to train with the 27th Guards Motorized Rifle that he could ride in a Russian infantry fight- downs between the United States and Russia, Division. From that exercise, a tactics, tech- ing vehicle in exchange for giving a Russian U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) niques, and procedures guide was produced soldier a ride in a Bradley, he would have remains on the lookout for new opportunities that enabled the integration of Russian forces reported you to counterintelligence officers for cooperation. Indeed, developing a robust into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the closest military police unit. No 6th mil-to-mil relationship will make it easier for (NATO) Stabilization Force in Bosnia. Fleet Sailor in the late 1980s would have ever our forces to operate together in the tactical However, any relationship between expected to see the inside of the Soviet navy arena of the war on terror. Also, it should lead two former rivals is fraught with difficulty, base at Novorossiysk or to spend much time in to better cooperation in the political realm and there were plenty of bumps in the road. the Soviet lake that is the Black Sea. as strategic leaders in the security services During Operation Allied Force, when NATO Fortunately, times have changed, and of both countries begin to see more areas of aircraft waged a bombing campaign against the military-to-military (mil-to-mil) rela- convergent national interests. Serbia to expel Serb forces from Kosovo, the tionship between the United States and the Russians announced that their forces in Bosnia Russian Federation has grown to the point Relations Since 1991 would no longer take orders from the U.S. where all of the events mentioned have either U.S.-Russian mil-to-mil contacts started commanders in the region; they cut off several happened or are scheduled to happen soon. simply in the early years following the collapse other military contacts and even expelled a In Exercise Torgau ’05, U.S. Army Europe of the Soviet Union. Initial efforts focused number of U.S. diplomats from Moscow.1 In (USAREUR) Soldiers traveled to a Russian on building individual relationships and the endgame of Allied Force, as NATO troops training facility in the Moscow military transparency, overcoming the barriers to trust entered Kosovo, the political and military district and enjoyed nearly a week of staff and that had built up over years of staring at each maneuvering over the Pristina airfield and small unit tactical training, to include vehicle other across the Fulda Gap. There were many Russian efforts to establish their own sector and weapons familiarization. Then the whole exercise moved to the U.S. training area at Major Christopher T. Holinger, USAF, is Special Assistant to the Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command.

58 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Holinger

led General Wesley Clark, USA, to remark, To place our relationship with Russia with USCENTCOM. Annual TSC conferences “NATO has been deceived or misled by about in its proper regional and global context, we hosted by each of the combatant commands everyone in the Russian government,”2 which must pay significant attention to the former with reciprocal invitations between the staffs nearly led to a military confrontation between Soviet republics that are now independent help to eliminate the seams and to ensure that NATO and Russian troops. U.S. mil-to-mil activities with Despite these epi- all the states that border Russia sodes, there have been U.S.–Russian mil-to-mil contacts focused on are coordinated to some many instances of mil-to- overcoming the barriers to trust that had built up over degree, or at least that every- mil cooperation, and our years of staring at each other across the Fulda Gap one is aware of what is going efforts have slowly grown on elsewhere. beyond mere transparency Representatives from and relationship-building to developing states surrounding the Russian Federation. other combatant commands and the Joint true interoperability. Army events such as USEUCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR) Staff also participate in USEUCOM’s discus- Exercise Torgau ’05 (named for the city on includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, sions with the Russian Federation to work out the Elbe River where U.S. and Soviet forces Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Outside the the U.S.-Russia Interoperability Work Plan, linked up late in World War II) have built USEUCOM AOR, but certainly within its area the annual agreement on mil-to-mil activities Improving on the success of the Peacekeeper series of interest, are the Central Asian republics of between the two countries. By involving all of exercises in the 1990s to develop a true Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turk- the combatant commands whose AORs touch cooperative operational capability between menistan, and Uzbekistan. When combined Russia and the Joint Staff in developing this Military-to-Military the U.S. and Russian armies, and the addi- with China, another of Russia’s neighbors crucial plan, we are better able to eliminate tion in recent years of naval exercises such with significant influence both globally and seams in Department of Defense efforts. as Northern Eagle has expanded this success regionally, we see one of the major challenges There are two other important aspects beyond just land forces.3 to successful engagement with Russia: these of USEUCOM’s actions in the Eurasia region Even though recent events have led to a states with significant regional stakes are scat- that have a profound impact on the U.S. mil- few setbacks, such as the postponement of the tered among three regional combatant com- to-mil relationship with Russia: Euro-Atlantic 2006 iteration of the Torgau exercises to allow mands: USEUCOM, U.S. Central Command integration (via NATO and Partnership for for passage of Russian legislation consistent (USCENTCOM), and U.S. Pacific Command Peace), and capacity-building activities within with Russian and U.S. policies regarding such (USPACOM). the former Soviet republics. Several of the large events, the USEUCOM staff continues How to overcome this challenge is clear, former Soviet republics in USEUCOM’s AOR to strive for momentum in the mil-to-mil although not easy, and it is the first important are NATO aspirants, and by helping with arena with Russia’s armed forces, in support element of the operational-level application of defense reform9 and other aspects of Indi- of overall U.S. Government policy regarding concepts articulated in the NSS: the combat- vidual Partnership Action Plans, USEUCOM engagement with Russia. Such relationships ant command staffs must eliminate the seams can facilitate countries such as Ukraine and are difficult to start, and if momentum is lost, among them through regular and frequent Georgia eventually joining the Alliance. they are even more difficult to restart. collaboration and coordination. USEUCOM’s Capacity-building activities with nations such bilateral mil-to-mil activities with the Eurasian as Georgia also bring the countries closer to Current Strategic Guidance republics represent a major Theater Security NATO, and they demonstrate their desire to The National Security Strategy of the Cooperation (TSC) priority, and issues such cooperate with the United States and NATO United States of America (NSS) identifies as security cooperation in the Caspian Basin by sending troops to participate in coalition Russia as one of the “main centers of global lead to the right kind of regular cooperation efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. power,”4 the only individual country identi- These activities frequently put Russian Armed Forces General Staff fied in this way. Several principles drive Chief greets Chairman during visit to us at odds with what the Russians our national strategy in dealing with these Defense Ministry in Moscow see as their interests in the region, centers. The NSS states that these relations and USEUCOM seeks to diffuse this “must be set in their proper context”5 (that tension through the use of multilateral is, regionally/globally) and “supported by events to bring the Russians together appropriate institutions,”6 whether they with their neighbors in search of exist already or need to be created. The NSS common ground. Partnership for also states that our interests with nations in Peace and “in the spirit of Partnership these centers of global power are influenced for Peace” exercises are a large part of “by states’ treatment of their own citizens this effort, with events such as Baltic . . . [since] states that are governed well are Operations and Combined Endeavor most inclined to behave well.”7 Finally, the bringing the Russians together with NSS adds that we should “seek to influence new NATO members and aspirants to the calculations”8 by which other states work on areas of common interest, such make their choices, even while we do not as maritime security and command seek to dictate choices to them. and control modernization. (D. Myles Cullen) JFQ ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 59 Military-to-Military Relations with Russia

By helping forces from all over the region n engaging multi- develop the ability to laterally (in addition to cooperate on small bilaterally) tactical issues, we hope n continuing efforts via to assure Russia that the work plan the Alliance’s expan- n searching for areas of sion eastward is not convergence. threatening, and it gives Moscow the chance to As stated earlier, assure the Western- multilateral activities will leaning former Soviet allow us to assure both republics that Russia Russia and its neighbors respects their status as that they have common independent nations interests and dissuade Russian honor guard passing and partners in regional in review at Tomb of the them from provoking security. Ultimately, Unknown Soldier in Moscow each other. By engaging in Russia’s reaction to the JFQ (D. Myles Cullen) tactical-level exchanges increased Euro-Atlantic across a wide range of integration of former multilateral activities will allow us to assure both Russia military disciplines, we Soviet republics, to those and its neighbors that they have common interests and can enhance the capabili- republics’ increased dissuade them from provoking each other ties of both nations’ mili- capacity for independent tary forces and improve military action, or to their ability to operate increased U.S. presence and access to these (NCOs) have graduated from the Warrior together. Improved cooperation at the tacti- countries’ territories is a political issue, but Leader Course at the Joint Multinational cal and operational levels will provide our any positive mil-to-mil event has the potential Training Center NCO Academy in Grafen- civilian leadership more options for dealing to make a positive impact on the underlying woehr. In 2006, a U.S. Army major spent a with common threats, which hopefully will political climate. year training in Russia, culminating with improve our strategic relationship and make The NSS makes it clear that U.S. rela- his graduation from the Mechanized/Tank us more able to deter and, if necessary, defeat tions with other nations are influenced by Battalion Commander’s course at the Russian common enemies. the way those nations treat their own citizens Combined Arms Academy. The U.S.-Russia Interoperability Work and that we seek to influence how they make When Russian and American officers Plan is the primary vehicle for collaboration decisions without trying to dictate specific and NCOs live, work, and study side by side between the U.S. and Russian militaries. The decisions to them. At first glance, these two for weeks and even months, they form rela- plan is a list of specific bilateral mil-to-mil principles might appear more political than tionships that will last a lifetime. These rela- activities intended to “enhance our ability to military, but mil-to-mil engagement can have tionships lead to the key second-order effect work together and coordinate our military an impact on how Russia treats its citizens that could have lasting impact on our relation- activities.”11 All events are agreed upon by and makes decisions, albeit only over the long ship with Russia and on Russia’s relationship both nations through a series of planning term. People are at the heart of any mil-to-mil with its neighbors: the NCOs who went to the workshops, and the final document is signed exchange or exercise. At the end of the day, academy at Grafenwoehr, the officers, cadets, by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff after the mission is complete, people talk. and soldiers who participated in Torgau ’05, and the Chief of the Russian General Staff. Pilots “shoot their watches.” Soldiers trade and the sailors who have done cross-deck At the recent signing ceremony for the 2007 insignia and talk about the quality (or lack exchanges will all have attitudes about the work plan in Moscow, General Peter Pace thereof) of field rations. Sailors compare United States and its military that have been stated, “I am anxious for military-to-military liberty stories. Generals and admirals (espe- shaped by their personal interaction with cooperation to show through its transparency cially those who used to be adversaries) talk Americans. These positive experiences could the potential for our two nations to walk into about how much things have changed. lead to long-term improvement in relations the future hand in hand.”12 While the primary goal of an event between the two militaries if some of these The work plan includes tactical- and such as Torgau ’05 was improving the ability individuals rise through the ranks, carrying operational-level training events that will to execute operations together at the tactical their positive impressions of America. enable the two militaries to execute combined level, a second-order effect can be summed operations in the future. These events are up in a comment by a Russian participant: “I Moving Forward the stimulus for a cycle that can become self- found some real friends among the American The way ahead in USEUCOM’s mil-to- sustaining: individual events and visits bring soldiers.”10 This effect can be even more pro- mil relationship with Russia is complicated, Russian and American leaders together, famil- nounced in school exchanges. In recent years, but the keys to success can be summed up in iarizing them with each other and with their several Russian noncommissioned officers three points: units, weapons systems, and other assets. This

60 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Holinger access and information exchange breed trans- land than does the United States. In the SSR anchor points or to find other areas where parency and trust, which promote coordina- arena, Russia has capacity far beyond many our interests converge. tion and ultimately cooperation. Cooperation other nations. Where and when the political If these anchor points serve as the foun- leads to success in both exercises and opera- situation is conducive, the United States and dation for NATO’s growth and transformation tions, and success, in turn, creates a desire for Russia could bring considerable resources and also help to guide the U.S. relationship more exchanges, exercises, and operational to bear to help a nation struggling to emerge with Russia, we will find ourselves with cooperation. Reinforcing success has long been from a conflict. Critical infrastructure is a more opportunities for military cooperation part of both U.S. and Russian doctrine. national issue when the infrastructure in between NATO, Russia, and Russia’s neigh- While our components execute the tacti- question lies entirely within a nation’s borders, bors. This could have a positive impact on cal-level events of the work plan, USEUCOM but international cooperation is beneficial in our broader political relationship with Russia, must look for areas of convergence with safeguarding trade via international land, sea, which has been trending somewhat negatively Russia. Simultaneously, we must help Moscow and air lines of communication. of late. A healthy mil-to-mil relationship and its neighbors find similar shared national Energy security (ensuring the flow could go a long way in reversing this trend and security interests. The best place to start of energy resources from the source to the helping us avoid a larger conflict later. JFQ searching for these commonalities is the five consumer) is a combination of infrastructure anchor points for NATO left by General James security and diversity of sources, and, as a N o t e s Jones, USMC (Ret.), former USEUCOM Com- major producer/exporter of energy, it is in 1 mander and Supreme Allied Commander, Russia’s interest to ensure that its exported Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War (Cam- Europe (SACEUR). During his final year as products reach customers safely. Finally, bridge, MA: Public Affairs, 2001), 226. 2 Ibid., 392. SACEUR, General Jones regularly espoused stopping nonstate actors or rogue states from 3 General James L. Jones, USMC, Commander, these anchor points as issues that could help obtaining weapons of mass destruction and U.S. European Command, statement before the move NATO from common defense to col- preparing to deal with the consequences if Senate Armed Services Committee, March 1, st lective security in the 21 century. They are they use them are clearly in the interests of 2005, available at . gence between the United States and Russia: has already been a great deal of cooperation 4 The National Security Strategy of the United between Moscow and Washington in the States of America (Washington, DC: The White n transnational terrorism (and the conver- counterproliferation arena, and these actions House, March 2006), 36. gence of this threat with organized crime) have also involved many of the former Soviet 5 Ibid. 6 n security, stability, and reconstruction republics—a regional success story if ever Ibid. 7 (SSR) in postconflict environments there was one. Ibid. 8 Ibid. n critical infrastructure security Regional security cooperation talks 9 Jones, statement. n energy security could be a useful vehicle for USEUCOM, 10 Karl Weisel and Dave Melancon, “U.S., n weapons of mass destruction prolifera- along with the other combatant commands Russian Soldiers Renew 60-Year-Old Bonds at 13 tion and consequence management. that border Russia, to seek areas of con- Torgau ’05,” EURARMY 1, no. 1 (Summer 2005), vergence first with Russia’s neighbors and 2–7, available at . a unique set of opportunities for mil-to-mil done with some success in the Caspian Sea 11 Mark Karas, quoted in Corey Barker, “U.S. cooperation. Counterterrorism is an obvious and Black Sea regions, USEUCOM can bring and Russian Senior Officers Discuss Way Ahead,” area for convergence. The 2002 Moscow the security services of several nations in July 1, 2006, . 12 attack show that Russia faces an even more solutions to problems related to any of the General Peter Pace, USMC, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, quoted in “Russian, U.S. immediate threat from terrorism in its home- Military Chiefs Ink Pact,” The Associ- USS Chosin and RFN Marshal U.S. Navy (Patrick Dille) ated Press, October 30, 2006, available at Shaposhnikov sail in formation in a joint Guam 0,4670,RussiaUSMilitary,00.html>. 13 General James L. Jones, USMC, Commander, U.S. European Command, quoted in Steven Donald Smith, “NATO ‘Reinventing’ Itself, General Says,” American Foreign Press Service, March 9, 2006, available at . receiving tour of USS Blue Ridge in U.S. Navy (Nathanael T. Miller) Vladivostok

Contributors: Brigadier General Daniel R. Eagle, USAF, Colonel Richard Greene, USA (Ret.), Colonel Timothy C. Shea, USA, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Galvin, USA, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Karas, USA, and Lieutenant Colonel Ken Chance, USA.

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 61 Blackwater Security helicopter aids in securing area struck by car bomb at Iraqi police station

Trading Places Combat Camera Squadron (Michael E. Best) Combat Camera Squadron st and 1 NationalHow Why Security Roles

A bite dog pursues contractor in protective gear to tackle and hold the subject until his handler gives release Are Changing command, Operation Iraqi Freedom By J o s e p h A . G a t t u s o

the national security arena. The work on diligent application of these qualities in of public sector leadership is changing, their people, programs, and policies. and America’s continued predominance In a world where most of the work must st 1 Combat Camera Squadron (Stacy L. Pearsall) depends on the ability of U.S. public be done with market-based solutions, it is sector leadership to comprehend Amer- the private sector that will carry the burden he public sector is served by ica’s fundamental strategic and constitu- of ensuring that the substance of our society individuals with superb strategic tional changes and adjust to them rapidly. does not degenerate to a set of characteristics vision, extensive experience, and The work of public sector leadership in that only encompass economic concerns. Life T a desire to serve the Nation. Yet the future will be to design, create, and, with is not comprised solely of the single-minded it finds itself unable to actualize the vision; wisdom, constrain market spaces in which pursuit of economic security. The private it is frustratingly unable to execute strategic the work of the world will be accomplished. sector must live this truth; the public sector plans tactically, due primarily to the increas- National security issues are being decided must ensure that they do. ingly complex international environment, the in the private arena. The public sector must speed with which information is disseminated realize that, for all but the largest regional or Emerging Nature of Governance (thus diffusing power), and the rapid deterio- global conflicts, the private sector will prob- The state has been changing its nature ration of historical factors that have tradition- ably be better suited as the operative agent for throughout history. Each type of state forms ally legitimized nations, such as the ability tactical execution of national security policy. around a particular legitimizing basis—an to control national capital and culture and to This article also applies to private sector idea that it uses as a rule set to retain secure the homeland. leadership—that is, to those responsible for legitimacy in the eyes of those it governs. Conditions are such that the private shaping strategies, cultures, and directions Legitimate authority comes from the ability sector is, in many respects, better suited of private sector firms now operating in of that government’s constitutional structure to respond to emerging national security market spaces that support national security to execute the tasks that spring from that requirements than the public sector. While efforts. The scope of responsibility for private legitimizing concept. Doing so fulfills the this assertion causes consternation in many sector leadership is broadening, and the truly expectations of the governed. areas of the public sector, there are compel- responsible private institution will be con- An earlier form of governance was the ling practical reasons why the public sector cerned with more than bottom-line corporate state-nation (1770–1870), which had as its should leverage the strengths of the private profits. The responsible corporation will legitimating paradigm the idea that the state side to solve increasingly intractable national recognize that intangible but essential public would both unite and subordinate a particu- security issues. goods—compassion, empathy, justice, truth, lar nationality or ethnic group to serve the What follows is particularly perti- and the concept of self-sacrifice—will only be purpose of the state. This form of governance nent for U.S. public sector leadership in sustained in our society through an insistence was replaced with the nation-state (1860– 1990), which had as its legitimizing basis Commander Joseph A. Gattuso, USN (Ret.), works for a private company dedicated to improving U.S. and the idea that the state would provide for the international security.

62 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Gattuso

While the market-state is more adept at centered in and having to do with quality of welfare of every individual. This is the form handling transnational problems, it cannot life in the private sector—specifically, their of governance with which most are familiar. produce those intangible public goods—such portion of the private sector. In the nation-state, a collection of individuals as social qualities of compassion, justice, love This new concept of national security, gives the governing entity power to govern; in of truth, empathy, selflessness, and honor coupled with the changing nature of the inter- turn, the governing entity agrees to ensure the associated with sacrificing for the public national environment, has rendered the public material well-being of the governed. good—necessary for community and the sector entities responsible for national security As did the state-nation before it, the proper development of human virtue. When almost incapable of directly addressing the nation-state form of governance is rapidly there is no intangible idea to which humans pressing national security issues. losing its legitimacy because it can no longer can attach beyond that of simply increased Because of computers, communications, execute its fundamental purpose: to assure material gain or opportunity to obtain better and weapons of mass destruction, the enemies the material well-being and security of those material conditions (translate both to power), of our civilization live in the private sector. it governs. then society and the people shrivel, waste They express their anger and frustration in There are many reasons for this erosion away, and die—or become monsters. the private sector, against private citizens, and of the nation-state’s ability to keep its people But make no mistake—what we should against our civil infrastructure, most of which either safe or prosperous: the ubiquitous or should not have is, at the moment, not the is now in the hands of the private sector. By J o s e p h A . G a t t u s o nature of information; the ease with which question. This is the way the world is moving, When attacking those in the public sector— money, culture, and disease cross national due to forces beyond any individual or any for instance, attacks against coalition soldiers borders; the increase in transnational threats nation’s control. The market-state is emerg- in Iraq—they attack while swimming in Mao’s such as famine, migration, environmental ing, and what remains is only to determine private sector sea. They do not attack on a problems, and weapons of mass destruction; ways to ensure we have the public goods that conventional battlefield in ranks with tanks; a globalized economy eroding middle-tier will enable society to function without losing they shoot from houses, rooftops, or alleys, or wages; and the concept that human rights the richness of life and the knowledge of what they fire mortars from the midst of martyr- transcend a nation’s sovereignty and that it means to be essentially human. At the same minded women and children, all within the human values are best determined by the cal- time, however, market-state public sector private sector. If Iran or North Korea attacks culus of apportioned economic advantage. The leaders must ensure that society possesses the us, do we seriously think they will attack our nation-state form of governance is disappear- ability to deal with emerging national security military? National security has been removed ing, and a new form is emerging. Civilian contractor training from the unambiguous, ordered This new kind of gover- Iraqi police recruits realm of governments and nance is known as a market-state, thrown squarely into the bitter, described fully in Philip Bobbitt’s bloody, goldfish-bowl arena of The Shield of Achilles: War, the private sector. Peace, and the Course of History.1 For example, within hours Where the nation-state derived its of a surgical Israeli airstrike, legitimacy from an agreement to Hezbollah knows which families provide for the material well-being need blankets, food, power, of its constituents, the market- water, or medical attention and state derives its legitimacy from an supplies. Hezbollah faithful are agreement that it will maximize on the ground immediately, opportunity for its citizens. distributing $100 bills to families While both forms of the (in the private sector) who have

state strive for material well- Pacific (Katrina Beeler) Fleet Combat Camera Group, suffered loss or damage. Hezbol- being, the nation-state did so by lah will race in with dead bodies regulating morality via policy and law. The issues more successfully than did the defunct of women and children in an ambulance, market-state, on the other hand, attempts nation-state form of governance. demolish the structure to make it appear as to enable material well-being by ensuring though there was wanton destruction, remove the appropriate incentives are in place—an Emerging Nature of National Security the bodies from the ambulance, place them approach devoid of any effort to regulate There is a new definition for national dramatically in the rubble, invite the media in social mores. The market-state is ideal when security. Since any idea or awareness of to film the scene, and then gather their grisly multiculturalism is essential; it does well in a national identity has been subsumed largely props and race to another media opportunity. society seeking relativistic morality, operating by a creeping obsession with material wealth, The world gasps. with economically based ethics. Moreover, any concern for the security of some outdated The logic is inescapable. If the fight for the market-state solves problems by creat- concept once known as “a nation” has long national security has been displaced into the ing markets that are specifically designed to since vanished. Today, the populace equates private sector arena, then government must extrude needed solutions. national security directly with individual ensure that it has the capability to fight in that The shift to a market-state form of economic prosperity and personal safety. arena. Yet how does the ungainly public sector governance has serious implications, however. Americans view national security as primarily

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 63 National Security Roles

become nimble enough to fight in the private procedures, and regulations established by agency rules and regulations, subject to the sector arena? Congress and their appointed government laws of the United States? In the market-state, With significant hesitation, most representatives and executive agents. the difference is very little. The root of the market-state nations, the United States and Market-state entities are operating problem is how some people view the role of Britain as the main examples, have decided according to their (new) nature. Elected repre- the public sector; they expect it to function that they will conduct a proxy fight, using sentatives of the people have made a market in as a nation-state while the public sector itself private sector elements to outsource the fight which solutions to national security issues are is discovering that to survive it must operate against their private sector enemies. Times the products, and an enterprising, entrepre- with market-state principles, products, time- have changed: assuring national security neurial, ambitious, patriotic private sector has lines, and efficiencies. requires fighting for it in the private sector, responded to provide those products and ser- There is also the issue of motivation. with the force most suited to that battlespace. vices. This, too, is in accordance with today’s When the uniformed Soldier goes home for There are two main issues with the new type of governance. So why the problem? the day and takes off his uniform, does he private sector: accountability and motivation. The problem is one of context: no one suddenly become a private citizen? Are Sol- Under what authority are these private sector appears to be uneasy with a Department of diers any less defenders of liberty when they firms conducting their activities? Who or Defense uniformed warrior using armed force wear civilian clothes? what gives these companies the right to arbi- at the clear and specific direction of the U.S. Some claim that Soldiers wearing the trate elements of national policy when those Government. Yet if the warrior is employed Nation’s uniform are not fighting for money. elements involve armed force? Who voted for by a private company, great consternation is Be assured, every Soldier is paid a salary, with these corporations? The answer is straightfor- evoked. This comes from thinking that the medical benefits and a good retirement plan. ward: The American people, via their elected public sector must still function with the But it is true that they are not fighting for representatives, directed the Departments of nation-state model. money, if one considers more deeply the Sol- Defense, State, or Homeland Security to create What is the difference between the dier’s motivations. The warrior’s motivations a market space in which national security warrior in a uniform getting paid by Uncle do not spring from, nor are they attached to, requirements of the people of the United Sam, subject to the rules of engagement, and the source of a warrior’s paycheck. Typically, States (as determined by those same elected a host of U.S. Government agency rules and those whose primary motivation is money representatives) could best be addressed by regulations, subject to the laws of the United do not decide to endure physical, mental, and private sector firms in an open, competitive States, and the contractor who is getting paid emotional privation; the possibility of violent, market arena. The provision of these services by Uncle Sam, subject to the rules for the random, explosive death, or dismember- is to be in accordance with the laws, policies, use of force, and a host of U.S. Government ment; or the smoking enmity of thousands

Army snipers and member Combat Camera Company (Alfred Johnson) Combat Camera Company (Alfred

th of private security firm 55 preparing weapons placements for training on long-range firing

64 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Gattuso of people on a daily basis. The critical point not attached to the uniform—maybe it is To answer these questions, the public is that warriors’ motivations—which are something that does not disappear when the sector must craft well-designed national elemental parts of the warrior nature—do not warrior steps across a thin border into civil- security market spaces in which private sector change when they transfer from the public to ian life. Maybe that which motivates warriors organizations can function to create market the private sector. to do what they do has little to do with the successes, which are also solutions to complex A great concern to public sector leader- size or source of their paycheck and every- national security problems. The public sector ship in the market-state era is who will fight thing to do with the ultimate purpose and must also insist on adherence to the values, the wars of the market-state. When there is characteristics of their activity. Consider that morality, and ethics that it wants upheld as a no national identity, when there is no uniting maybe the true warriors—the professional, condition of operation in these markets. Left social concept of nationhood, when the altruistically motivated warriors for whom to itself, the market will ignore these essential uniform does not mean what it meant in the the profession of battling evil is a calling—are social elements. nation-state era, then who will defend the warriors regardless of the sector in which The public sector, then, still has a crucial markets, the malls, the businesses, and the they serve. If what they do is altruistic, if role to play in the future—not only in support way of life Americans have come to expect? it serves or benefits their fellow man, if it of national security, but in maintaining and Can public sector leadership afford to disre- defends the defenseless, protects the innocent, nourishing the qualities that make and keep gard a body of warriors with the appropriate and pursues and punishes the guilty, then it us human. motivation ready to defend the public’s way will be an acceptable occupation. The public The public sector must recognize that of life, adept at living, working, and moving sector must find ways to leverage this national the nature and scope of governance have in the private sector arena—that same arena resource, regardless of the sector in which changed; that the level of expectations held where the preponderance of the Nation’s these warriors serve. by those governed has changed; and that the enemies live? If men and women no longer have quality and quantity of public goods must a concept of a nation, then the only other somehow be maintained even in a market- Shift in National Security Roles honorable mindset capable of sustaining the state era. The public sector must work more The market-state will use different tools necessary moral force to endure the privation closely with the private sector to accomplish to solve its problems, survive, and flourish. of conflict is this idea of righteous opposition key national security priorities. The public This is why the market-state needs to utilize to injustice and evil. The difference is motiva- sector should act with speed and resolve to the private sector now in ways that it did not tion—the difference is in the heart. hold its private sector partners to account and when we had a nation-state. The market-state will need private to insist that they operate within clearly out- We know that the increasing complexi- sector warriors to survive. It is motivation that lined and specific guidelines, with appropriate ties of our world are generating national secu- should define those in whose hands we place and edifying motivations. The public sector rity problems ideally suited for market-based the responsibility for our national security. It must not abdicate its role as society’s guiding solutions. We also know that the hand in the age of markets. emerging form of governance is ori- The private sector, acting in ented toward market-based solutions, support of national security, must main- which emerge from specifically crafted the market-state will need private sector tain the strictest measures of account- market spaces with unique design warriors to survive ability, uphold the highest standards of constraints. And, finally, we know integrity, and embody the value systems, that the market-state will be unable mores, and ethics required to sustain to secure the public goods so essential the welfare of the nation. The private for humanity. The fundamental ques- sector must act with more than simply tion then becomes how might public sector should be a main role of public sector leader- a concern for the bottom line. It must act leadership structure national security market ship to design ways to ascertain private sector with a greater degree of morality and ethics spaces to produce solutions to national secu- motivations and then ensure accountability to than ever before, because the public sector rity problems, while at the same time ensuring those motivational principles. As we see how structures that were once in place to ensure society maintains a high degree of essential much more effective the private sector will that society maintained these key elements are public goods. be in today’s conflicts, a national priority for rapidly dissipating. The private sector must be Maybe the answer is for public sector public sector leadership should be to ensure the last bastion of values, ethics, and morals. leadership to pay more attention to ensuring that those working in key private sector areas Private sector warriors who support national that its private sector surrogates have the possess the morality, ethics, value systems, security must embody the characteristics that proper motivation. In the days when national and requisite motivation the Nation wants comprise a good society. JFQ identities still existed, warriors fought for and needs in its society and citizens. nations; their uniforms represented the nation for which they fought, and when the war was What are our responsibilities? What are N o t e over they set aside the uniform and once again our imperatives? What must we accomplish to 1 became productive citizens. adjust to this new form of governance, these Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Consider that the warrior in this new new national securities, this shift in national Peace, and the Course of History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003). era may be motivated by something that is security roles? ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 65 A Broader Muslim women Conceptualization and children leaving mosque in London of Islam and Terrorism

By J . k e i t h a k i n S

slamist terrorism has received a great ficult to define.1 While clear, objective defini- deal of scrutiny recently, but many tions of terrorism are easy to develop, simple researchers have failed to include the definitions get complicated by two main I historical and theological dimen- factors. First, every terrorist commits his sions of Islam in their analyses. This has led actions in support of a cause that many others to counterterrorism policies that focus on also support, and people find it difficult to specific groups, such as al Qaeda, rather than acknowledge that actions taken in support of on the sociocultural phenomenon of jihad. their pet cause could be terrorist acts. Second, If America had followed a similar policy governments and media outlets consistently AP/Wide Photo (Remy De La Mauviniere) World in December 1941, the Nation would have apply, misapply, or refuse to apply the term Islamist terrorism as a distinct division.4 Sim- declared war on Vice Admiral Nagumo’s Pearl terrorism based on political factors. ilarly, David Rapoport argues that modern Harbor Striking Force rather than on the Bruce Hoffman defines terrorism as “the terrorism has gone through evolutionary imperial government of Japan. deliberate creation and exploitation of fear phases and that the Iranian revolution of To wage America’s war on terror through violence or the threat of violence in 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan effectively, Islamist terrorism must be recon- the pursuit of political change. . . . Terrorism in 1989 initiated a “fourth wave” of terrorism ceptualized as part of a worldwide move- is specially designed to have far-reaching based on religion. He emphasizes that “Islam ment of jihad—a phenomenon that Western psychological effects beyond the immediate produced the most active and potentially governments and scholars failed or refused to victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack.”2 appealing religious groups.”5 acknowledge until the attacks of September The Department of Defense defines terrorism According to Bard O’Neill, “The essence 11. Jihad has evolved into new forms as war as “the unlawful use or threatened use of force of guerrilla warfare is highly mobile hit-and- itself has changed. Jihad has become the or violence against individuals or property to run attacks by lightly to moderately armed epitome of fourth-generation warfare (4GW), coerce or intimidate governments or societies, groups that seek to harass the enemy and a point on the spectrum of war that includes often to achieve political, religious, or ideo- gradually erode his will.”6 One thing that dis- terrorism, propaganda, infiltration and sabo- logical objectives.”3 tinguishes guerrilla warfare from terrorism is tage, guerrilla war, insurgency, and conven- Both of these definitions share critical that “its primary targets are the government’s tional warfare. elements, including the use or threatened armed forces, police, or their superior units, Jihad is a global movement occurring use of force; attacks against primary targets and in some cases, key economic targets, everywhere there are Muslim populations. It with the intent of causing fear in secondary rather than unarmed civilians.”7 According has been present through all of Islamic history. targets; and a goal of changing government or to Hoffman, guerrilla soldiers “operate as a Islamist terrorism is merely one part of jihad, government policies. Terrorism is a tactic, a military unit, attack enemy forces, and seize or struggle, to bring the entire world under method of applying violence. It is one of many and hold territory (even if only ephemerally the dominion of Islamic law and to restore the methods of using violence to change behavior, during daylight hours), while also exercising Islamic Caliphate. some of which are legal and some of which some form of sovereignty either over territory are not. or population.”8 Martha Crenshaw explains Definitions Various attempts have been made to the difference as one of legitimacy: if the A review of the literature concerning develop typologies of terrorism, and Reuven perpetrators use military methods, or attack terrorism reveals that terrorism itself is dif- Paz argues that any typology must include military targets, or have a realistic chance of military success, they are not terrorists.9 Dr. J. Keith Akins is a College Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice at New Mexico State University. Guerrilla warfare is one type of asymmetric

66 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Akins warfare. It is also closely related to, and often body of people. If one group is modern and the development of modern communications, confused with, insurgency warfare. industrial with a professional military and transportation, and weapons technologies.16 An insurgency is “a struggle between a the other is not, they are fighting asymmet- nonruling group and the ruling authorities ric warfare. Global Jihad in which the nonruling groups consciously Fourth-generation warfare occurs when Various authors have discussed the use political resources and violence to a militarily disadvantaged belligerent seeks existence of a global jihad movement. destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis “to convince enemy political leaders that their Quintan Wiktorowicz, for example, argues of legitimacy of one or more aspects of strategic goals are either unachievable or too for the reality of a global Salafist jihad but politics.”10 Insurgency is typically an asym- costly for the perceived benefit. The funda- fails to extend his analysis to other Islamic metric conflict because of the distribution mental concept is that superior political will, sects.17 Fidel Sendagorta expands on this of resources between the ruling powers and when properly employed, can defeat great idea, contending that “we face not a string their opposition. But this is not always the economic and military power.”12 Fourth- of isolated small groups but a transnational case. Insurgencies can include guerrilla generation warfare is designed to “ensure community of activists indoctrinated via operations, terrorism, electoral mobiliza- political rather than military success.”13 the Internet, whose leaders are intent on tion, passive resistance, or, occasionally, Another new development is that in 4GW, Islam’s ideological hegemony worldwide—in conventional warfare. Guerrilla conflict is “fighting will not be limited to nation-state other words, a global-scale insurgency that insurgency, but insurgency is not necessarily relationships. Rather, opposing factions will uses religious resources to serve a political guerrilla conflict. be divided by race, religion, or class.”14 strategy.”18 Like Wiktorowicz, however, he Asymmetric warfare “describes a Fourth-generation warfare and asym- limits the players by referring to “three main military situation in which two belliger- metric warfare are similar and overlapping groups . . . linked to state Islam, which is ents of unequal strength interact and take concepts. Fourth-generation warfare is asym- controlled by government in the countries advantage of their respective strengths and metric, but asymmetric warfare is not neces- of origin; salafists; and movements operat- weaknesses.”11 The essence of asymmetric sarily fourth generation.15 Asymmetric warfare ing under the influence of the Muslim warfare is that there are two unequal groups has existed since the first band of Homo Brotherhood.”19 Crenshaw also describes a in conflict. They can be nations, ethnic erectus made clubs with which to strike those worldwide “civil war,” or reaction to Ameri- groups, tribes, or any other recognizable without them, but 4GW began to evolve with can foreign policy, but fails to address the

Fleet Combat Camera Group, Pacific (Edward G. Martens)

Damage from suicide bomber in Musayib, Iraq, that killed 60 civilians and destroyed several vehicles and shops

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 67 Islam and Terrorism theological underpinnings of this movement. The existence of a global jihadist movement using 4GW to spread Islam around the world can be demonstrated by examining the:

n continuum of conflict in Islam n theological basis of jihad n omnipresence of jihad n concatenation of Islamist organizations.

Continuum of Conflict in Islam. The U.S. Army conceptual- izes warfare as part of a spectrum of violence.20 As part of this spectrum, war includes conventional war, guerrilla war,21 terrorism,22 infiltration and sabotage,23 and media war, or propaganda.24 Members of Islamic Jihad Fourth-generation warfare incor- marching in funeral procession porates all of these forms of con- for leader killed by flict, as does the global jihad. Israeli missile strike AP/Wide Photo (Khalil Hamra) World Muslim armies have fought those of non-Muslims in modern During the Gulf War of 1991, leaders of Union withdrew its troops. In the eyes of the times, most notably in World War I, the both Iraq and Kuwait declared jihad against mujahideen, or holy warriors, they had not Sinai Campaign of 1956, the Six-Day War of the other.26 When U.S. and coalition troops only driven the superpower out of Afghani- 1967, the Yom Kippur War of 1973, and the prepared to drive the Iraqi occupiers from stan but also directly caused the breakup of Gulf War of 1991. Muslim leaders took their Kuwait, Saddam Hussein called for jihad to the Soviet Union.30 people to war for standard economic and rid Saudi Arabia of the American infidel.27 In 2003, American forces again rolled political reasons, but how did they motivate Osama bin Laden would echo the call to jihad over the Iraqi army. Only 41 days elapsed their troops? Why did individual Muslim for the same reasons a decade later. When the between America’s invasion of Iraqi territory soldiers fight? coalition attacked, however, the Iraqi military and President George W. Bush’s declaration In November 1913, the last Caliph of (the fourth-largest in the world) was driven of an “end to major combat operations.”31 Islam “proclaimed a jihad, or Holy War, into submission almost instantly. Now, after 3 years of insurgent warfare calling on all Muslims in British, Russian, The lesson of these conflicts is clear: and over 3,000 dead U.S. troops, American and French territories to rise up and smite modern Muslim armies are incapable of com- citizens are beginning to question the ability the Infidel.” The Khedive of Egypt imme- peting with Western armies on a conventional to defeat the subsequent insurgency. One of diately backed the Caliph, calling on all battlefield. The reasons for this inability are the main goals of 4GW is to cause the enemy Egyptians to rebel against British rule in the less clear and involve questions of education, to doubt its ability to win.32 It is also worth name of Allah.25 These calls to jihad ulti- authority, motivation, economics, and cor- noting that another goal of insurgency is to mately led to the complete destruction of the ruption, but there are few Western military cause political leaders to weigh the impact of Ottoman Empire by Western armies and an leaders today who consider Muslim con- war on their careers.33 end to the almost 1,300-year-old Caliphate. ventional forces a viable threat. Conflicts in Sabotage is an element of almost all The story of the Arab-Israeli wars of Afghanistan and Iraq, however, have demon- forms of warfare but is particularly connected 1956, 1967, and 1973 is one of repeated and strated the ability of Muslim societies to field with various subsets of asymmetric war.34 stunningly complete defeats of Muslim armies effective guerrilla and insurgent forces. Infiltration is the act of covertly moving indi- on conventional battlefields. Arab nations After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan viduals or small units into enemy-controlled were incapable of producing modern weap- in 1979, the call for jihad went out around territory or even into the enemy’s military, onry, so their leaders either purchased arms or the world. Muslims from every continent which opens “widened possibilities for . . . were supplied with arms as foreign aid. These responded, sending money and young men attack by saboteurs, terrorists, and special same leaders incited their peoples with calls to Pakistan28 and then on to Afghanistan to forces units, given easier transport and more to jihad. Muslim nations combined forces so fight.29 For 10 long years, peasants on foot or effective, compact weapons, even if they do that multiple armies simultaneously attacked on horseback fought against the largest and not possess weapons of mass destruction.”35 Israel, yet despite their numerical advantages most heavily equipped army in the world, and Examples of jihadist infiltration they proved incapable of achieving victory. eventually emerged victorious as the Soviet and sabotage can be found in both law

68 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Akins

enforcement and military organizations. For a U.S. district court of actively recruiting The primary textual source of authority example, FBI special agent Gamal Abdel- Muslims to travel to Afghanistan, join the in Islam is the Koran, the revealed messages Hafiz refused to record secret conversations Taliban, and wage war against the United from Allah to Mohammed. Additional with a suspect under investigation in a ter- States. Witnesses testified that on September authority is derived from various Hadiths, rorism case in 1998 and was accused of doing 16, 2001, he held a meeting in his home where or stories written about Mohammed and the so again in another terrorism investigation he disconnected his telephone and closed the founding of Islam by his immediate follow- in 2002, telling his superiors that “a Muslim blinds on every window and told his followers. Mohammed’s life is of particular inter- does not record another Muslim.”36 Sergeant ers how to get to Afghanistan. The Muslim est to Muslims because he is viewed as the Hasan Akbar, USA, was deployed with his American Society Freedom Foundation’s perfect man, and all Muslims are encouraged unit in early 2003, and on the eve of battle executive director “said that Timimi’s convic- to follow his example. Clerics in Islam are against Iraq destroyed his camp’s power tion ‘bodes ill’ for the First Amendment” and rigorously trained in Koranic literature and generator, threw three fragmentation gre- that “the bar for what constitutes free speech interpretations and are authorized to issue nades into tents occupied by his officers, and has shifted since the September 11 attacks. . . . fatwas, or judgments, about the meanings then fired into tents occupied by his fellow Timimi was a victim of that change.” The of various passages. An examination of the Soldiers. He killed 1 and wounded 15. He executive director of the Shaker El Sayed Koran and Hadiths, the life of Mohammed, stated at the time, “You guys are coming into Mosque said, “Ali never opened a weapon or and the edicts of Islamic clerics both past and our countries, and you’re going to rape our fired a shot. . . . What kind of country are we present reveals the centrality of war and jihad women and kill our children.”37 turning the United States into today?”41 to Islam. These are but two of a far larger number The ultimate goal of Islamist propa- The Koran was “revealed” to Moham- of incidents in which Muslims have placed ganda, of course, is to convince the West that med by Allah over a period of years and their loyalty to Islam above their loyalty to there is no global contains numerous America and have sabotaged legal or military jihad movement, contradictions. For efforts to oppose Islamic jihad.38 there is no “holy jihadist propaganda is designed to example, parts of Propaganda is a carefully calculated and war” in Islam, and convince Westerners that jihad has the Koran instruct designed series of messages “that attempts to Islam is inherently nothing to do with war Muslims to honor change the target’s perceptions, cognition, and a peaceful religion. Jews and Chris- behavior in ways that further the objective of The violence per- tians as “People of the propagandist.”39 Jihadist propaganda is petrated daily wherever there are Muslims is the Book,” and in fact Muslims were initially designed to convince Westerners that: purely coincidental and completely unrelated required to pray facing Jerusalem in honor of to Islam, and even to mention such things is their alleged shared heritage. During the years n Jihad has nothing to do with war. an example of prejudice against Muslims. that these passages were written, Moham- n Any Muslim arrested on terrorism Theological Basis of Jihad. A particularly med was attempting to convert three tribes of charges is a victim of unconstitutional profil- troubling aspect of Islam that most people Medina Jews to Islam. When the tribes refused ing and is not guilty. raised in Western secular society have great to follow him, Mohammed forced two of them n All religions produce terrorism, so Islam difficulty accepting is that, unlike other major into exile and ordered the massacre of the is no different from Christianity. religions, Islam not only approves of but also third. Passages in the Koran written during n There is a moral equivalence between requires war. We find this hard to accept this period are markedly different from the the deliberate targeting of children and mili- largely because of an arrogant form of ethno- earlier ones: “Fight those who believe not in tary operations against enemy forces. centrism that makes us believe that everyone Allah, nor in the Last Day, who do not forbid n All antiterrorism efforts are unconstitu- in the world wants to be a middle-class that which Allah and His Messenger have for- tional or racist. American. We assume that everyone wants bidden, nor follow the Religion of Truth, out of freedom, democracy, peace, and dialogue, that those who have been given the Book, until they The primary jihadist propagandists in everyone is willing to negotiate and compro- pay the tax in acknowledgement of superiority the United States are the Council on Ameri- mise, and that everyone believes in religious and they are in a state of subjection” (9:29). can Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the Muslim freedom. We are in many ways reliving the How do Muslims reconcile such Public Affairs Council (MPAC). Most of their days of Kipling’s “White Man’s Burden” and obvious contradictions? They do so through propaganda falls under the Islamic strategy find it almost incomprehensible that there are the concept of abrogation. Allah’s plan for of Taqqiya, or “deception” (Hadith Sahih millions of people in the world who, if given Mohammed and humanity was revealed grad- Bukhari, Book 52:267–270). Many other forms a free election, would vote for a totalitarian ually, in steps, so anything that contradicts an of propaganda are taken directly from the al theocratic regime. earlier message was sent to replace that earlier Qaeda manual.40 Yet both history and current events tell message. When two passages differ, the latter An example of the propaganda issued us that this is exactly what we are facing. In is to be obeyed (2:106). by Islamist organizations when a jihadist is Islamic cosmology, all the Earth is divided into How should a Muslim treat non- arrested, convicted, or deported over terror- two regions, the House of Islam and the House Muslims? “O Prophet, fight hard against ism charges can be found in the case of Ali al of War. The House of Islam includes all lands the disbelievers and the hypocrites and Timimi. In April 2005, al Timimi, a native- ruled by sharia, or Islamic law; the House of be firm against them. And their abode is born American citizen, was found guilty in War includes those lands yet to be subdued.42 hell, and evil is their destination” (9:73). ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 69 Islam and Terrorism

“Muhammad is God’s Apostle. Those who Allah anywhere by any means. You can’t do By the latter half of the 9th century, follow him are ruthless to the unbelievers it by a nuclear weapon, you have to do it by Muslim rule had extended well into India in the but merciful to one another” (48:29). kitchen knife, no other solution. You can’t do east and south down the coast of east Africa.50 “And fight them until there is no more it by chemical weapons, you have to do it by In the 11th century, Muslim armies took control disbelief, and the worship will all be for Allah poison,” and that “every court is a target.”44 of parts of China, captured territory from the alone” (8:39). “When the Sacred Months have At the 2006 pilgrimage to Mount Arafat Byzantines, and extended their control south passed, then kill the unbelievers wherever in Saudi Arabia, the grand mufti Sheik Abdul- and west over most of the Saharan tribes in you find them, and capture them and besiege Aziz al-Sheik told the pilgrims from all over Africa and north into Bulgaria.51 them, and lie in wait for them in each and the world that “there is a war against our By the 16th century, Muslim armies every ambush” (9:5). “Let not the believers creed, against our culture under the pretext of finally took Constantinople and established take the disbelievers for friends rather than fighting terrorism. We should stand firm and the Ottoman Empire, capturing what would believers. And whoever does this has no con- united in protecting our religion. . . . Islam’s become Bosnia and Serbia in the process.52 nection with Allah” (3:28). The invasion of Europe from the What about a Muslim’s fellow east was stopped by force “at the monotheists, Christians and Jews? Allah’s plan for humanity was revealed in steps, gates of Vienna.” At first they were treated well, but so anything that contradicts an earlier message But what about today? Have when they did not convert to Islam was sent to replace that earlier message the days of Muslim military con- en masse Mohammad’s opinion quest ended? Certainly, the days of them severely changed: “Abase- of huge Islamic armies spilling out ment will be their lot wherever they are found, enemies want to empty our religion from its of Arabia are over, but only because Muslim except under a covenant with Allah and a contents and its meaning. But the soldiers of societies lack the cultural, technological, and covenant with men, and they shall incur the Allah will be victorious!”45 What about clerics’ industrial sophistication to equip such armies. wrath of Allah, and humiliation will be made thoughts on killing civilians? Dr. Hani al- Muslim militancy continues, however, in to cling to them. This is because they disbe- Siba’I, the director of the Al-Magreze Center ever-evolving forms. Examples of 4GW are lieved in the messages of Allah” (3:112). “Hast for Historical Studies, argues that “the term found everywhere Muslims live in proximity thou not seen those to whom a portion of the ‘civilians’ does not exist in Islamic religious to non-Muslims. There is no need to examine Book was given? . . . Those are they whom law. There is no such term as ‘civilians’ in the events in the Middle East or Kashmir to see Allah has cursed” (5:51–52). And yet one modern Western sense. People are either of examples of the global jihad. more: “They desire that you should disbelieve Dar al-Harb (House of War) or not.”46 For example, jihad is waged on many as they have disbelieved, so that you might Omnipresence of Islam. The story of 4GW fronts in Canada. Canadian and British be [all] alike; therefore take not from among Islam is a tale of war, from the first days police recently arrested Mohammad Momin them friends until they fly their homes in of Mohammed through expansion across Khawaja, a Canadian citizen of Pakistani Allah’s way; but if they turn back, then seize North Africa, the subcontinent, and even heritage, for training Muslims in bomb- them and kill them wherever you find them, into Europe from both east and west. Islamic building, money laundering, and smuggling and take not from among them a friend or a military expansion is not simply an historic so they could conduct terrorism operations helper” (4:89). tale, however, but continues today on every in Britain.53 In 1999, Ahmed Ressam, an The Hadiths are even clearer: “Allah’s populated continent and in every nation with Algerian who had resided in Canada for 5 Messenger said, ‘You will fight with the Jews a substantial Muslim population. years and served as an al Qaeda bombmaker till some of them will hide behind stones. The Less than a year after Mohammed’s and forger, was arrested while attempting to stones will (betray them) saying, O Muslim! death, his successor Abu Bakr began military smuggle explosives into the United States to There is a Jew hiding behind me, come and expansion: “At the battle of al-Aqraba the blow up Los Angeles International Airport on kill him’” (Hadith Sahih Bukhari 4:52:176). Muslims defeated a rival tribal confedera- the eve of the “millennium.”54 When Muslims are not talking to non- tion and extended their power over eastern In South America, the notorious tri- Muslims, though, what do Muslim scholars Arabia.”47 Shortly thereafter, Muslim armies border area of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay and their followers say to each other? The burst forth onto the world scene. Within 20 has become a haven for Islamic militants, Al-Azhar University is Islam’s highest seat years they had conquered Persia and most of providing security, training, and access to of learning. One of its graduates, Yusuf North Africa and threatened the Byzantines.48 weaponry.55 The Israeli embassy and a Jewish Qaradawi, has become one of the most Despite the false but generally accepted community center in Buenos Aires were influential Sunni clerics today. According to assertion that the Crusades were Europe’s first attacked by Muslims in 1992 and 1994.56 Qaradawi, “Islam will return to Europe as a conflict with Islam, the reality is that in 714 The British have their share of Islamic conqueror and a victor after being expelled Muslim armies invaded, conquering most of jihad as well. In July 2005, Muslim terror- from it twice,” and Islam should recapture its Spain by the 730s and pushing into the Frank- ists conducted a multiple bombing attack “former Islamic colonies in Spain, southern ish Kingdom until their defeat at the Battle in London57 and attempted another 2 Italy, Sicily, the Balkans, and the Mediter- of Tours in 732.49 In the east, Muslim armies weeks later.58 The second attack failed only ranean Islands.”43 A leading Muslim cleric captured Afghanistan, the southern half of because the terrorists did not build effective in England, Abu Hamza, told his followers the Caspian Sea, and the eastern side of the detonators for their explosives.59 London that “We ask Muslims to bleed the enemies of Aral Sea. has also been recognized as a major center

70 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Akins for recruiting for al Qaeda and other terror- a nuclear power plant66 and assassinate the population. Muslim jihadists are killing non- ist organizations in Europe60 and is home Australian prime minister.67 Muslims and even Muslims of differing sects to imams who live on British welfare while The bombing of a nightclub in Bali in everywhere they are capable of launching preaching the violent overthrow of British 2002 brought the jihad of Abu Bakar Bashir attacks. Even China has experienced over 250 society.61 and his Jemaah Islamiyah to the world’s atten- Islamic terror attacks since the mid-1980s.75 The 2004 murder of filmmaker Theo tion. Jemaah Islamiyah, however, is but one Concatenation of Islamist Organiza- van Gogh in the Netherlands exposed the of several jihadist organizations operating in tions. Perhaps the biggest mistake of most surprising extent of jihad there. Van Gogh Indonesia; others include the Front Pembela analysts when examining jihadists is to focus made a film about the oppression of women Islam (or Defenders of Islam) and the Laskar on individual organizations such as al Qaeda, in Islam and was stabbed and shot to death Jihad (Holy Warriors) Islamic militia.68 Most Islamic Jihad, Hamas, or Hezbollah—thus on a public street by a Muslim.62 Since then of Southeast Asia, in fact, has become a battle- missing the larger movement from which there have been hundreds of death threats ground between Muslims and non-Muslims.69 the groups spring. While these are separate and several attacks against newspaper editors, Russia, too, has had ongoing conflict and distinct organizations, their leaders politicians, artists, and anyone willing to with Muslim jihadists. In Moscow, Muslim frequently cooperate and their rank-and-file speak publicly against terrorism. Police terrorists took more than 800 theatergoers often drift from group to group as opportuni- have foiled terrorist attacks and uncovered hostage in a standoff that eventually left 150 ties arise. The concatenation of the organi- multiple links between Dutch Muslims and al dead.70 In Beslan, Muslims captured a school zations within the jihadist movement can Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah.63 and wired it with explosives, eventually killing be observed in the intricate, transnational Muslims in Sydney, Australia, have been almost 350, including 186 children.71 networks that demonstrate the pan-Islamic joining the ranks of al Qaeda and traveling In Africa, Muslims are slaughtering and global nature of jihad. to Iraq to wage jihad.64 In December 2005, Animists by the thousands in Darfur,72 Sudan For example, one of CAIR’s senior Muslims incited riots, assaults, and massive provided Osama bin Laden a safe haven for employees, Ismail Royer, pleaded guilty to vandalism near the beaches. A prominent Aus- years,73 and Somalia has been submerged in aiding and abetting the Kashmir terrorist tralian imam, Wassim Doureihri, is on record anarchy because of infighting between jihad- group Lashkar e-Taiba, helping Muslims stating that he is “a Muslim first and an Aus- ist militias and Muslim warlords.74 attend a terrorist training facility in Pakistan, tralian second” and that the goal of his organi- Jihad is thus a worldwide phenomenon, and participating in the so-called Virginian zation is to establish a worldwide Caliphate.65 striking on every continent except Antarctica jihad group. He was sentenced to 20 years Australian Muslims have attempted to attack and in every nation with a substantial Muslim in prison. His attorney, Stanley Cohen,

French police rush past burning truck during riot by young

Muslims near Paris AP/Wide Photo (Christophe Ena) World ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 71 Islam and Terrorism

AP/Wide World Photo (B.K. Bangash) As the new century begins, Islam’s 5 David C. Rapoport, “The Fourth Wave: war against the West continues. This September 11 in the History of Terrorism,” Current conflict, a fourth-generation form of History 100, no. 650 (December 2001), 419–424. 6 Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: war, is different from all others in the Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (Herndon, American experience. Somewhere in the VA: Brassey’s, 1990), 25. world today, Muslims are conducting 7 Ibid., 26. each and every form of 4GW. In doing 8 Hoffman, 41. so they are not falling prey to “hijackers” 9 Martha Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism, Legiti- of Islam or a small minority of extrem- macy, and Power (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan ists; they are obeying the central tenets University Press, 1983). of their religion as laid down in the 10 O’Neill, 13. Koran and the Hadiths and practiced by 11 “Asymmetric Warfare,” available at . 12 ing a tradition of nearly 14 centuries Thomas X. Hammes, Insurgency: Modern Supporter of radical Muslim Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation, Strategic and are doing so on every populated groups arrested in Pakistan Forum No. 214 (Washington, DC: National Defense continent on Earth. The orthodox wage University Press, January 2005), 1. also represents Hamas. CAIR’s director of jihad, and it is the small minority who seek, at 13 Ibid. community relations, Bassem Khafagi, was great personal risk, to reform and modernize 14 Walter M. Herd, Current Unconventional arrested on terrorism financing charges, their religion and their cultures. Warfare Capability Versus Future War Require- pleaded guilty to visa and bank fraud, and The carnage caused by suicide ments (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War was deported to Egypt. A business partner bombers should not distract counterterror- College, 2002), 5. of Khafagi’s, Rafil Dhafir, was convicted in ism professionals and policymakers from 15 Vincent J. Goulding, Jr., “Back to the Future 2005 of illegally sending money to support the entire movement. America is engaged in with Asymmetric Warfare,” Parameters 30, no. 4 the Iraqi insurgency.76 A cofounder of CAIR’s a war against an enemy with no recogniz- (Winter 2000–2001), 21. 16 Texas chapter, Ghassan Elashi, was also on the able government or territory, a war initiated William S. Lind et al., “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” Marine Corps board of directors of the Holy Land Founda- centuries ago, and a war that has taken on Gazette, October 1989, 24, available at . JFQ was convicted of making false statements on of warfare continues. 17 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “The New Global export declarations, dealing in the property of Threat: Transnational Salafis and Jihad,” Middle a terrorist organization, conspiracy, East Policy 8, no. 4 (December 2001), and money laundering.77 18–38. 18 Such intricate networks can Islam’s war against the West continues, a Fidel Sendagorta, “Jihad in Europe: be seen in other areas as well. For The Wider Context,” Survival 47, no. 3 example, al Qaeda–linked organiza- fourth-generation form of war different from (Autumn 2005), 65. 19 tions are operating in the United all others in the American experience Ibid., 67. 20 States, the Philippines,78 Spain, White, 13. 21 Anthony James Joes, Resisting Germany, Malaysia, Singapore, Rebellion: The History and Politics of Indonesia,79 Egypt, Uzbekistan, India, Algeria, Counterinsurgency (Lexington: The University 80 81 Jordan, Tunisia, and Gaza. Everywhere N o t e S Press of Kentucky, 2004), 1–2. one examines a “militant” Islamist group, one 22 O’Neill, 24. 1 Fathali M. Moghaddam and Anthony J. finds links to others, which are linked with 23 Loren B. Thompson, Low-Intensity Conflict: Marsella, Understanding Terrorism: Psychosocial still others. Some organizations have become The Pattern of Warfare in the Modern World (New Roots, Consequences, and Interventions (Wash- so interconnected that they are almost York: Lexington Books, 1989), 5. ington, DC: American Psychological Association, indistinguishable. 24 O’Neill, 21–22. 2004), 4–5; Michael R. Ronczkowski, Terrorism 25 Alan Palmer, The Decline and Fall of the and Organized Hate Crime: Intelligence Gathering, Ottoman Empire (New York: Barnes & Noble, To fight today’s international terror- Analysis, and Investigations (Boca Raton, FL: CRC 1992), 226. ism, we must fight jihad. To fight jihad, we Press, 2004), 18–21; and Jonathon R. White, Terror- 26 Paul Fregosi, Jihad in the West (Amherst, must understand Islam, and to understand ism and Homeland Security, 5th ed. (Belmont, CA: NY: Prometheus Books, 1998), 410. Islam, we must first put away our own Thomson/Wadsworth, 2006), 3–8. 27 Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political 2 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: ethnocentric view of religion and values Islam (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard Columbia University Press, 1998), 43. and try to comprehend a culture in which University, 2002), 206–208. 3 “What Is Terrorism?” available at . can become suicide bombers and kill Jews.82 America and International Terrorism (London: 4 Reuven Paz, “Is There an ‘Islamic Terror- We must also recognize that Islamist ter- Pluto Press, 1999), 4. ism’?” (Herzlia, Israel: Institute for Counter-Ter- rorism is more accurately understood as the 29 Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the rorism, 1998), available at . product of the history of terrorism. Free Press, 2001), 48–49.

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30 Yoram Schweitzer and Shaul Shay, The 47 Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, australian-second-so-leave-us-alone/2005/07/24/11 Globalization of Terror: The Challenge of Al-Qaida 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 22143730108.html?oneclick=true>. and the Response of the International Community 2002), 32. 66 “Outback jihadists ‘had nuclear reactor (London: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 25. 48 David Nicolle, Historical Atlas of the Islamic in their sights,’” The Mail and Guardian Online 31 Karl Penhaul et al., “Bush calls end to ‘major World (New York: Checkmark Books, 2003), 36. (Johannesburg, South Africa), November 15, 2005, combat,’” May 2, 2003, available at . 50 Nicolle, 84. rticleid=256540&area=/breaking_news/break- 32 Hammes, 1. 51 Ibid., 108. ing_news__international_news/>. 33 Robert Taber, War of the Flea: The Classic 52 Ibid., 120. 67 “Two men facing terrorism charges threat- Study of Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Brassey’s, 53 Colin Freeze, “New terror charges laid ened to kill prime minister, court told,” Associated 2002), 15. against Ottawa man,” The Globe and Mail Press, December 16, 2005, available at . ing a Population’s Neutrality to Defeat an Insur- 54 Hal Bernton et al., “The Terrorist Within: 68 Bill Guerin, “Indonesia: The Enemy Within,” gency,” Parameters 35, no. 2 (Summer 2005), 53. The Story of One Man’s Holy War Against Asia Times Online, October 15, 2002, available 35 Nader Elhefnawy, “National Mobilization: America,” The Seattle Times, June 23–July 7, at . 3 (Autumn 2004), 124–125. com/news/nation-world/terroristwithin/>. 69 Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast 36 Harvey Kushner and Bart Davis, Holy 55 David Meir-Levi, “Connecting the South Asia (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 231. War on the Home Front: The Secret Islamic Terror American Terror Dots,” August 9, 2004, available 70 Johanna McGeary and Paul Quinn-Judge, Network in the United States (New York: Sentinel, at . able at . and Subversives Have Penetrated Washington fied,’” November 10, 2005, available at . “Defenseless Targets,” Time, September 5, 2004, 38 Stephen Emerson, American Jihad: The 57 Pierre Thomas, “Sources: July 7 Bomb Plot available at . Press, 2002), 55–57; Kushner and Davis, 52–53; Tonight, July 27, 2005, available at . Killing Fields,” September 10, 2004, available at (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), 147; Sperry, 58 Glenn Frankel, “London Hit Again with . 39 Thomas S. Bateman, Tomoaki Sakano, and 2005, A1, available at Fox News, available at . foxnews.com/story/0,2933,134544,00.html>. Leadership,” Journal of Applied Psychology 77, no. 5 59 Paul Tumelty, “Reassessing the July 21 74 Andrew Cawthorne, “New al Qaeda–Linked (October 1992), 768. London Bombings,” available at . 10, 2005, available at . teen_LESSON.htm>. threat to America from ‘Londonistan,’” The 75 Mark Magnier, “China Puts Focus on Secu- 41 Timothy Dwyer, “Prosecution Called ‘Over- Guardian Unlimited (London), July 12, 2005, rity in Muslim Region,” The Los Angeles Times, zealous,’” The Washington Post, April 26, 2005, available at . 76 “CRC Highlight: The Council on American- content/article/2005/04/26/AR2005042601548. 61 Irwin M. Stelzer, “Letter from Londonistan,” Islamic Relations,” available at . The Weekly Standard, August 1, 2005, available search.org/news/news.asp?ID=331>. 42 Bat Ye’or, The Decline of Eastern Christianity at . tions for Elashi Brothers and Infocom Corporation NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1996), 40. 62 Theodore Dalrymple, “Why Theo Van Gogh at Second Trial,” U.S. Department of Justice Press 43 Rachel Ehrenfeld, “Hamas Targets Spain,” Was Murdered,” City Journal, November 15, 2004, Release, April 14, 2005, available at . com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=20726>. eon_11_15_04td.html>. 78 Schweitzer and Shay, 168. 44 Sean O’Neill, “Abu Hamza’s video ‘call to 63 Albert Benschop, “Chronicle of a Political 79 Ibid., 195. arms,’” The Times (London), January 13, 2006, Murder Foretold: Jihad in the Netherlands,” avail- 80 Ibid., 61. available at . 81 “Israel says al-Qaeda active in Gaza,” Friendly/0,,1-2-1982804-2,00.html>. 64 Tom Allard, “Terrorists recruiting for Iraq December 5, 2002, available at . ciated Press, January 9, 2006, available at . terrorists-recruit-for-iraq/2006/01/06/11363876280 mother,” The Sunday Times (London), January 46 Middle East Media Research Institute, 36.html>. 15, 2006, available at ; Wilf available at . Sydney Morning Herald, July 25, 2005, available at to Palestinian Parliament,” ABC News, .

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 73 to strategic targeting vulnerabilities that military and policy leaders would do well to appreciate. Indeed, to succeed in joint warfare, commanders and staff must understand both the critical need for effective joint targeting and its inherent limitations. Notwithstanding the most precise and capable weaponry ever, any targeting effort absent coherent strategy or executed outside the art and rules of war can spell campaign defeat—even amidst tactical successes. Marines fire howitzer at targets In analyzing Operation Iraqi Freedom,

Marine Division (Jacob Brewer) near western Baghdad d

2 Operation Enduring Freedom, and the war on terror, the varied methodologies employed across Services, components, headquarters, Obstacles to Effective and intelligence centers demonstrate several challenging obstacles to achieving the aims of Joint Targeting joint targeting: efficiency, effectiveness, and strategic success.1

Doctrinal Problems Ample joint and Service targeting/fires doctrine currently exists, but no single document or compendium establishes universal standards or integrates proven concepts and methods across Services or at the dif- 2 Sea Sparrow missile launches ferent levels of warfare. In addition, not all from USS Bataan after locking warfighters follow or are even aware of joint US Navy (John Taucher) onto target during exercise doctrine (ostensibly the U.S. military bench- mark), and Joint Staff directives do not neces- By J o h n P a t c h sarily shape combatant command targeting efforts. Joint doctrine also focuses almost exclusively on air-to-ground munitions,

U.S. Army (Gary Kieffer) while Service publications concentrate on indigenous weapons systems, platforms, and tactics/techniques/procedures (TTPs). Army targeting doctrine, for instance, centers on field artillery and establishes a methodology dissimilar to the joint targeting cycle. Similarly, terminology differences across Services and between operators and intelligence analysts create confusion: high-value Soldiers fire FGM–148 Javelin target means completely different things in antitank missile different targeting/fires publications. Extant doctrine also fails to address adequately the argeting in the good old days was bination of complex weapon systems, amor- post-9/11 lessons, such as the limitations of relatively simple. Physical, tech- phous nonstate adversaries, restrictive rules U.S. heavy weapons in urban warfare—dem- nological, and informational lim- of engagement, and the real-time impact of onstrated vividly in Army and Marine opera- T itations meant that most bombs ubiquitous press coverage. The contemporary tions in Najaf and Fallujah. missed their targets. Warfighters shrugged potential strategic impact of a single errant The myriad publications spend far too off inevitable misses, and the media did not munition simply was not a factor. little time emphasizing the most important play up unintended civilian deaths. Even as Indeed, no foe can beat the modern-day aspects of the targeting cycle, the crucial first recently as Operation Desert Storm, warriors American military machine in combined and last phases. Excessive focus on weapon and statesmen did not confront today’s com- arms warfare, yet this machine is subject selection, mission planning, and execution occurs while target categories, critical nodes, Commander John Patch, USN, is a Naval Intelligence Officer currently assigned to the Office of Naval and individual targets are developed often Intelligence. before strategic objectives are even identified.

74 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Patch

If distilling the varied Service and mensuration joint TTPs. While sway over targeting and fires. Moreover, the joint targeting doctrine becomes publications the Joint Staff provides targeting Air Force closely guards its ground-based link too hard, then it will not be spend too oversight, it does not have true to air support via the Joint Terminal Air Con- followed, especially in the high- little time enforcement powers, the authority troller (JTAC) cadre, ensuring that nuances tempo combat environment. to set standards outside DOD, or of airpower remain an arcane art to most Doctrine must balance emphasizing the personnel to staff a contingency Soldiers. Service legacies exacerbate compet- change and continuity as the most joint targeting organization.6 The ing joint priorities and rivalries—at extremes dynamic warfare environments important semiannual Joint Staff Military manifested by motivation for sole Service emerge.3 In the end, applied aspects of the Targeting Committee is not recognition. Repeat general/flag officer allega- operational art (not doctrine targeting cycle, enough. tions of divergent component targeting/fires alone) must stress the critical the crucial first priorities amid combat operations provide importance of asking the two Targeting Mission Creep historical examples. Subjective postconflict key questions associated with and last phases Traditional targeteer trade- munitions effectiveness assessments due to the first and last steps: Is this a craft revolves around a narrow Service biases are another. valid target in keeping with the area of expertise: kinetic ordnance, commander’s intent, U.S. national security typically delivered by aircraft. Since 9/11, Few Qualified Targeteers strategy, and American values? Was the some Service/joint task force staffs morphed Some personnel serve in targets billets desired effect achieved, and did it contribute targeting/fires cells into effects-based (EB) without essential training and operational to the strategy? entities simply by expanding missions and experience, becoming targeteers overnight. requirements outside kinetics, often without Targeting itself also means different things Minimal Joint TTPs the requisite training or capabilities. While to different Services and warfare communi- The various Services and warfare com- nonkinetic fires and other EB efforts are ties. A Special Forces targeteer may be an munities develop and use different targeting important developments within defense trans- expert at fixed-wing gunship fire support, systems and TTPs and do not train enough formation and a critical component of any wall breaching, and time-sensitive targeting toward joint operations, which occasionally strategy, attempting to turn targeteers into “EB during small-scale operations but may have translates into ineffective and inefficient tar- warriors” is inherently unwise. It is like asking zero ability to develop and employ a target- geting/fires in combat. Furthermore, Service a psychiatrist to conduct dental work. ing strategy against an adversary integrated and joint “train and equip” headquarters do Furthermore, EB organization leaders air defense system. Similarly, JTACs may be not effectively incorporate real world lessons often have not attended basic targeting and qualified to call in precision weapons from into predeployment training and force struc- fires training alongside other EB curricula. Air Force aircraft to support troops in contact ture/equipping.4 No military or civilian body The JDAM is but one tool in the effects but may have little understanding of joint tar- at a level above the Department of Defense arsenal, but expert advice on delivering one geting principles or may not have ever accom- (DOD) enforces targeting TTP standards. For efficiently and effectively is inherently the plished a collateral damage estimate. instance, the Joint Targeting School (JTS), targeteers’ responsibility. Foisting nascent and Warfighters at all levels should apply while an ideal forum for reinforcing common arcane mission areas on targeteers will only scrutiny to those calling themselves targe- doctrine and TTPs, is not truly joint. Despite distract them from their already complex and teers. A true targeteer should ideally have the “purple” JTS staff, Navy and Marine specialized work. attended JTS (or the Air Force equiva- personnel are the main attendees. Some lent), have a proven operational targeting Army fires personnel do attend, but Air Force Service Legacies record, and demonstrate proficiency in targeting instruction focuses on a separate Almost 20 years after Goldwater- joint/Service targeting systems/software curriculum across the country—attended by Nichols, pervasive Service legacies that hinder applications and weaponeering fundamen- few, if any, Army, Navy, or Marine personnel. efficient and effective targeting endure.7 Sepa- tals. Targeting cell leaders should also have Another example is the inconsistent use rate procurement, development, and fielding completed joint professional military edu- of the modernized integrated database (MIDB) of target acquisition systems and munitions— cation and be able leaders and managers of across the Services, combatant commands, some of which are incompatible with other large organizations under real world crisis and interagency community. U.S. Central Services8—remain a barrier to successful joint operational tempos. The art and science of Command (USCENTCOM), for instance, uses targeting. Furthermore, dissimilar aircraft, targeting revolves around mastery of highly MIDB as the authoritative source of registered weapons, targeting systems, and predeploy- specialized areas, such as the law of armed mensurated aim points, whereas other comment training result in operational forces conflict, weapons physics/delivery param- batant commands do not. The Services also learning about inter-Service dichotomies only eters and fusing, statistics, target develop- use at least three separate systems to derive amidst the melee of real world combat. ment/nodal analysis, all-source intelligence mensurated coordinates5—each with separate Legacy single-Service targeting practices fusion, and geodesy. Of note, an especially funding, training, and hardware/software. promote parochialisms that inhibit joint fires. dire shortage of qualified battle damage One need only imagine the result of imprecise In components where one Service is predomi- assessment (BDA) analysts exists; BDA coordinates for a 2,000-pound joint direct nant (such as the Air Force at the Coalition efforts are often doomed to failure, and few attack munition (JDAM) in an urban center Forces Air Component Command [CFACC]), targeteers seek to specialize in it. Finally, a to emphasize the importance of common Service legacy systems and perspectives hold weaponeer is not a targeteer, whereas tar- ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 75 Joint Targeting geteers typically master the fundamentals dangerous when considering the potential of weaponeering. True targeteers are rare, consequences of a bad drop. high-demand, low-density assets. Many operators are surprised at the expansive tar- Poor Operations-Intelligence geteer training and qualifications; it truly Integration is, and should remain, a career specialty. Joint planners cannot effectively perform the intelligence/targeting cycle steps Airmen using Joint Precision Air Drop Overreliance on Technology when operations centers fail to integrate tar- System during mission over Afghanistan Quantum leap technological advances geteers. While targeteers are sometimes guilty (Brian Ferguson) U.S. Air Force have vastly improved the fidelity and rapidity of stovepiped analysis behind the “green Poor Interagency Cooperation of target prosecution. Compressed timelines door,” operators also occasionally exclude Notwithstanding the post-9/11 national associated with fleeting high-value targets, targeteers from planning/decision circles and mandate for better collaboration and coop- however, drastically reduce the ability to make risk uninformed decisions. A recurring real eration, stovepipes and enmities persist objective assessments of all data for informed world example is the “broken” combat assess- between DOD and the interagency com- recommendations to commanders. A pilot, ment phase of campaign targeting, when munity. Even the accidental 1999 Chinese for example, identifies an antiaircraft artillery coherent BDA becomes impossible because embassy bombing in Belgrade has not served piece via a targeting pod and seeks permission the next weapon release typically receives the to institute procedures to prevent strategi- to drop immediately, deeming the piece a weight of intelligence and operational effort, cally significant targeting errors. Currently, threat to friendly aircraft. Current electro- not the last one(s). While the warrior ethos interagency coordination is occurring most optical/infrared targeting pods allow aircrew clearly has a place in combat units, ignoring optimally at the operational level via Joint to discern potential targets not identifiable targeting recommendations because of a lack Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs)10 only a few years ago; headquarters can even of understanding or respect for the impor- and tactically at deployed task forces (JIATFs). receive still images of the “threat.” Suddenly, tance of this often inglorious, detailed target- Yet these entities have proven transitory, the commander himself is virtually on the ing “nug-work” can chance collateral damage, with a relatively narrow mission focus; the trigger, more empowered to grant prompt fratricide, or even mission failure. Dropping a larger targeting/fires communities have not weapons release. weapon is tactical; targeting is not. adopted effective JIACG/JIATF joint TTPs. What is sometimes missing, however, Warfighters obviously direct target- Furthermore, the alphabet soup of target- is the targeteer, who can pinpoint target ing/fires cells, but few can actually claim ing-related agencies serves different masters location, give a confidence level to target themselves to be qualified targeteers. Many and suffers from the typical bureaucratic ills identification, and provide situational context have pulled the trigger or released countless that limit collaboration.11 Multiple, disparate (that is, assess threat, collateral damage weapons in combat, but few seem to appreci- interagency/DOD targeting cells have differ- estimate, military advantage, and probability ate the nuances and rigors of a targeting ent roles, missions, and levels of operational of destruction based on weapon/delivery cycle properly applied at all levels of warfare. expertise. Repeat postconflict lessons learned platform). If an antiaircraft artillery piece was Targeting truly has esoteric aspects typically since Operation Desert Storm continue to within a civilian neighborhood and the only absent from most general and flag officer highlight this obstacle. weapon available was a 2,000-pound JDAM, career paths or specialties. Take, for example, Unfortunately, because of the preced- or if target data came from a pilot who is aim point mensuration: few warfighters ing factors, what typically happens with the unfamiliar with the terrain and threat from fully understood the fact that JTAC-derived standup of a new JTF staff (and even standing a single pass at 20,000 feet at 500 knots, what coordinates may work effectively in Iraq but task force staff rotations) is that well-inten- might the consequences be? Visual data, no would put weapons far off target at elevation tioned initiatives drive targeting/fires cell matter how obtained, is still “single source” in Afghanistan. TTPs, not institutional expertise. Wasted information. A sufficiently informed com- When nontargeteers advise general and resources and redundant efforts to reinvent mander might deem the threat not so dire that flag officers on targeting, a recipe for opera- targeting with operational ad hocery are the munitions should be employed without due tional miscalculation exists. Sadly, it is rare to result.12 In fairness, warriors run targeting/ diligence. Herein lies the critical value-added witness staff challenging flawed general/flag fires cells, and they answer to other warriors input of the targeteer. officer targeting assumptions or related with stars. Task force staffs, however, typically Other advances in targeting operational decisions. Careerism and either do not have a core of fully qualified targeteers/ command control, such as the Automated intimidation from, or loyalty to, seniors joint fires personnel and recurring head- Deep Operations Coordination System9 should not be the guiding force behind quarters/unit rotations simply overextend and secure voice over Internet protocol operational targeting and fires: neither noble the small joint targeteer cadre. The ad hoc telephony, vastly enhance connectivity intent nor “asking forgiveness vice permis- approach might also involve adopting conven- and awareness among joint headquarters sion” represents targeting due diligence. The tional targeting and fires doctrine/TTPs (that and the interagency community, but best targeteers are sometimes those willing to is, those needed during the combat phase of more knowledge available to more people disagree ardently with the boss. Neither rank operations) at a point in the conflict when it does not necessarily translate into more nor combat experience inherently conveys a is neither effective nor appropriate. (Phase informed decisionmaking. Targeting tech- complete understanding of targeting. Hubris IV operations in Iraqi Freedom and Enduring nology absent the targeteer is inherently is a dangerous alternative to sound targeting. Freedom are good examples.)

76 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Patch 28th Test Squadron (Michael Ammons)

F–16CJ drops 2,000- Force Quarterly 38 (July 2005), 14–19, available at pound JDAM during . test mission 5 That is, generated aim point coordinates that are sufficiently accurate for weapons guided by global positioning systems. 6 U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) is From this championing the development of a standing joint discussion, several recom- force contingency headquarters, but the extent of mendations are obvious; a few have been targeting/fires systems capability and personnel reflected in some fashion in every lessons operational success accomplished at an accept- expertise is limited. learned assessment since Operation Desert able cost, while maintaining the integrity of 7 Jeffrey K. Gruetzmacher, Michelle Holtery, Storm. Naval, joint, and policy decisionmak- Western humanitarian and warfare principles. and Jonathan Putney, “Fratricide: The Ultimate ers should consider them in the post-9/11 Efficient and effective joint targeting supports Cost of Joint Interoperability Failure,” Joint Forces strategic environment: strategic success, which is achievable with the Staff College, Joint/Combined Staff Officer School, requisite emphasis. As weapons system capa- June 11, 2002, available at . courses at JTS under U.S. Joint Forces would do well to ensure that joint targeting 8 A 2004 Government Accountability Office Command (USJFCOM). cadre, systems, and joint TTPs are established (GAO) assessment cited this as one of four n Establish a rigorous qualification and sustained. The art and science of targeting key barriers to joint targeting improvement. process with Joint Staff oversight for all joint as a discipline has four key goals: hitting the See “Military Operations: Recent Campaigns targeting/fires cadre; adopt USCENTCOM right target for the right reason, at the right time Benefited from Improved Communications and best practices as the model and mandate and place, with the right weapon. This implicitly Technology, but Barriers to Continued Progress targeting personnel qualification standards brings human intellectual judgment into the Remain,” GAO Report GAO-04-547 (Washing- across all combatant commands and Services. equation, a critical element within the contem- ton, DC: GAO, June 2004), available at . 9 intact under larger EB umbrella staffs. Automated Deep Operations Coordination System is a joint mission management software n Establish or maintain existing Service Targeteers fundamentally appreciate application with tools and interfaces for hori- targeting and fires career specialties, with that ordnance and hardware alone will not zontal and vertical integration across battlespace requisite promotion potential to O–6/E–9; win wars—that “weapons on target” is not an functional areas, such as joint time-sensitive vouchsafe the targeting specialty. end in itself. DOD must address the obstacles targeting. See . with a focus on real-world targeting errors become integral to the American way of war. 10 Matthew F. Bogdanos, “Joint Interagency and consequences. America could wield its military supremacy Cooperation: The First Step,” Joint Force Quarterly n Combine relevant joint and Service for naught absent coherent, enlightened strat- 37 (April 2005), 10–18, available at . 11 tions applicable to each level of warfare and manders are better left in the armory. JFQ For example, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Director of Central Intelligence, J2T, Joint sufficient attention to BDA. Technical Coordinating Group–Munitions Effec- n Establish a National Targeting and tiveness, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Joint 13 NOTES Fires Center under Joint Staff auspices to Warfare Analysis Center, among others. consolidate and enforce targeting/fires joint 1 Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani, Jr., USN, 12 Charles E. Kirkpatrick, “Joint Fires as They TTPs, with authoritative representation from testimony before the House Armed Services Com- Were Meant to Be: V Corps and the 4th Air Support the joint operations, intelligence, legal, and mittee, October 2, 2003, available at . Warfare, Paper No. 48 (Arlington, VA: Institute of standards enforcement authority.14 2 David Deptula, Gary Crowder, and George Land Warfare, October 2004), 2. On the V Corps n Consolidate the best aspects of Service Stamper, Jr., “Direct Attack Enhancing Counter- drive to Baghdad in 2003, staff essentially devel- legacy targeting systems into a single target- land Doctrine and Joint Air-Ground Operations,” oped ad hoc procedures to handle fast-paced close ing systems package, such as the Joint Target- Air & Space Power Chronicles 17, no. 4 (Winter air support and deeper direct attack requirements. 2003), available at . Dillard, “Why We Need a National Joint Targeting enforce inter-Service standardization. 3 David Jablonsky, “U.S. Military Doctrine and Center,” Air & Space Power Chronicles, January 6, n Establish and monitor predeployment the Revolution in Military Affairs,” Parameters 24 2000, available at . under USJFCOM. www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/1994/jablonsk. 14 The recent USJFCOM establishment of n Establish Joint Staff oversight of a career htm accessed>. the Joint Fires Integration and Interoperability joint combat assessment specialty designation 4 Headquarters USMC, “Concepts and Pro- Team is a step in the right direction, but neither and mandatory Service quotas.Naturally, grams 2005, Chapter 4: Current Operations and incorporates all aspects of targeting nor possesses strategic success entails achievement of clearly Lessons Learned,” 222. See also Chuck Harrison, enforcement powers. articulated political-military objectives and “How Joint Are We and Can We Be Better?” Joint ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 77 Iraq and the AC–130 Gunships Unleashed

By R o b e r t J . S e i f e r t Robert J. Seifert

layer 74, an AC–130U side-firing ing accomplices at all houses and a suspicious Cockpit of AC–130U gunship, was en route to Fallujah, coffin-sized box at one. Iraq, on October 5, 2003, to work With a flight of Army OH–58 with a joint terminal air control- Kiowa helicopters, two A–10s, and S d ler (JTAC) from the 82 Airborne Division on a Joint Surveillance Target Attack a routine countermortar mission. Approxi- Radar System (JSTARS) assisting, the mately 5 minutes from Fallujah, the pilot, gunship crew kept a simultaneous equipped with night-vision goggles, noticed watch on the four houses and two surface-to-surface fire through the small vehicles as they waited approximately window by his left foot. He immediately rolled 2 hours for the quick-reaction force into a 20-degree left bank and talked his to be formed, briefed, and driven to infrared and all low light level television (TV) the first two insurgent compounds. sensor operators onto the tracers. In less than Wanting maximum time on station for 30 seconds, they had identified stationary the compound assaults, the gunship AC–130U 40mm cannon Robert J. Seifert U.S. military vehicles and several suspicious departed for aerial refueling, leaving individuals fleeing the area. the A–10s and OH–58s on scene. Returning force. More importantly, it provoked the Already in contact with the JTAC for in less than 30 minutes from the KC–135 and AC–130 pilot, the present author, to begin the upcoming mission, the gunship navigator now with 4 hours of playtime, Slayer provided questioning what Carl von Clausewitz would notified him of the likely insurgent attack, armed escort to the two quick-reaction forces likely call the “routine methods” of gunship the precise coordinates of the attack, and the and covered the armed assault of the four employment at the highest level.2 fact that the gunship was tracking the fleeing insurgent houses over the next 3 hours. Those The purpose of this paper is to save individuals in an unpopulated area. Within 2 assaults resulted in 15 insurgents captured, 4 American lives and improve the chances minutes, an attack was confirmed on friendly anticoalition houses identified and exploited, of a successful outcome in Iraq. Costly and forces at the location passed by the gunship, and 12 rocket-propelled grenades and AK–47s demoralizing attacks continue unabated and Slayer was cleared to engage the enemy recovered from the suspicious box that Slayer against coalition and Iraqi ground forces. force. Only seconds away from being hit with witnessed the insurgents burying. The infra- Working hard to support these forces are AC– a 105-millimeter (mm) warhead, the fleeing red operator actually walked the troopers to 130 gunships and crews. They fly every night insurgents joined several personnel and the location of the box and told them where to in Iraq but rarely identify a single insurgent their vehicle, prompting a request for further start digging.1 due to the inefficient manner in which they guidance from the JTAC. The JTAC Army Although a relatively minor setback are requested by the Army and employed by commander said to hold fire and to track the to the insurgent cause in Iraq, this defeat at the Air Force. This article shows how a simple car while he assembled both a helicopter and the hands of the AC–130 was undoubtedly yet fundamental change in AC–130 employ- ground quick-reaction force. With 3 hours devastating in the psychological effect of an ment can kill or capture more insurgents, of loiter time, the infrared and TV operators apparently all-knowing American force able save friendly lives, and improve prospects for patiently tracked the insurgents as they drove to strike with speed, precision, and minimum coalition success. off. The car traveled to a house where some of the insurgents got into a second vehicle and Major Robert J. Seifert, USAFA, is Chief of Exercises for the 47th Flying Training Wing and a T–6 Texan II then proceeded to three other houses, deposit- Instructor Pilot at Laughlin Air Force Base, Texas.

78 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Seifert Iraq and the AC–130 Gunships Unleashed

AC–130U Spooky gunship U.S. Air Force

AC–130U gunner scans ground for threats or SOF team. While well intentioned, this sortie sent the author to support a ground method of employment does not fully exploit unit in Al Hayy for approximately 5 hours, the great potential of the AC–130 to hunt with an aerial refueling in the middle. The and kill insurgents, nor does it benefit from second uprising of the Mahdi militia was lessons learned in aerial conflict over the past in full swing in southern Iraq, and the crew 60 years. was optimistic that an opportunity to engage

U.S. Air Force (Denise Boyd) U.S. Air Force Field Manual 100–20. In North Africa, insurgents would present itself. Unfortunately, in the early months of World War II, ground 15 minutes after arrival on station, it was commanders insisted on dedicated defen- obvious to the crew that the chance of engag- defeat at the hands of the sive umbrellas, which Airmen derisively ing insurgents in Al Hayy was slim to none. AC–130 was undoubtedly labeled as “penny packets.” This misuse of The two visual sensors and pilots (equipped devastating in the offensive-minded Airmen and their aircraft with night-vision goggles) had searched the psychological effect of an was partially responsible for the significant town for activity, located the friendly posi- apparently all-knowing Allied losses at the Kasserine Pass in Tunisia tions, and received a situation report from the American force able to strike in 1943 and contributed to the publication of JTAC that revealed an absence of observed War Department Field Manual (FM) 100–20, insurgent activity and no plans for friendly with speed, precision, and Command and Employment of Air Power. offensive operations. With no option but minimum force Signed into doctrine by General of the Army to stay and wait for the scheduled tanker George C. Marshall, it has been called the rendezvous time, the infrared and TV sensor most striking policy statement in Air Force operators repeatedly searched the town for Present Employment history. Besides stating that ground and air anything remotely interesting that could be Close air support is the present mission forces were coequal, this doctrinal watershed passed from the navigator to the local tactical of the AC–130 in Iraq.3 Night after night, at demanded the centralized command of air air controller. least one AC–130 launches to fulfill one or forces, which has been accepted by ground The trip to the tanker and the subse- more air support requests (ASRs). The ASRs and air forces after years of rigorous debate.4 quent aerial refueling were uneventful until are prioritized and approved by the Joint Today’s AC–130 defensive umbrella of the return leg to Al Hayy, which happened to Special Operations Air Component, which is individual ground units resembles the penny pass just north of the city of Najaf. Najaf was the air component of the Combined Forces packets of the North African desert. Present the location and inspiration of the August Special Operations Component commander gunship employment methods require indi- uprising but was without a gunship due to who exercises operational control of the vidual ground units to submit an ASR that either a failure to submit a support request or AC–130. The organizations supported are details the time, location, and reason for the a determination that the Najaf ground force often individual Special Operations Forces requested support. If approved, the gunship commander’s need was not as compelling as (SOF) units with the remainder of AC–130 shows up on time for the appointed duration. those units in Al Hayy and Fallujah. Be that as support going to conventional Army, Marine, It is a convenient way to employ the gunship, it may, the crew swung into action when the and coalition regiments and brigades. The but a comparison of the highly effective sortie copilot spotted significant surface-to-surface SOF teams usually have a defined operation at the beginning of this article and the inef- fire in the city, which surely indicated that the for the AC–130 to support, and the conven- fective sortie synopsis that follows should help Marines in Najaf were under attack. tional units usually have the AC–130 search- to explain the need for a review of present Having worked with the Marines there ing for insurgents in its individual brigade gunship employment. previously, it took less than a minute to get or regiment area of operations. A typical Tasked to Al Hayy. Ten months after their JTAC on the radio and inform him of mission has the AC–130 supporting a single finding and helping to capture the 15 insur- the gunship crew’s situational awareness and brigade’s ASRs followed by aerial refueling gents and their weapons cache while en nearby location. The JTAC confirmed that he and another 2 hours with another brigade route to their assigned mission, a subsequent had troops in contact and asked for immediate

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 79 Gunships Unleashed assistance. Unfortunately, the aircraft com- call for whichever outpost needed them most. are fleeting and difficult-to-kill targets, yet mander had to notify him of his inability to Every outpost was in contact with higher the earliest version of the AC–130 excelled at assist due to assignment to another unit. The headquarters, and as soon as an outpost killing trucks and their drivers. It did so in a aircraft commander told the JTAC to make a was attacked, an AC–47 was diverted to its disproportionate manner to any other asset request immediately to the Air Support Opera- position.6 To guarantee a particular outpost and could do the same against the insurgents tions Center (ASOC) and told him that he was never attacked would have required a in Iraq. The AC–130s that killed over 10,000 would also call to try and get released from his dedicated gunship all night, but necessity trucks on the Ho Chi Minh Trail were not Al Hayy tasking. detailed it to a centralized location, on call for tied to one Army unit but rather were tasked Unaware as to how quiet Al Hayy had any unit experiencing an insurgent attack (an to kill trucks. Task the present-day and much been, and probably due to the fact that the employment more in line with the intent of improved AC–130 to hunt insurgents rather Marines’ request for help had to travel from FM 100–20). than provide 2-hour blocks of individual unit the ASOC to the Combined Air Operations Lieutenant General Julian Ewell, USA, overwatch, and one can expect the same awe- Center to the Special Operations Liaison commander of II Field Force, Vietnam, inspiring results as the Vietnam-era gunships. Element to the Joint Special Operations Air between April 1969 and April 1970, stressed General Henry “Hap” Arnold’s words are as Component and then to the Air Force Special the morale effects that the gunships had for an relevant to the gunships over Iraq as they were Operations Detachment, the decision was infantryman: “It gave him a lot of assurance to the B–17s, P–47s, and P–51s of World War made for the gunship already tasked to the and security to know that if he got in a tight II: “Offense is the essence of airpower.”9 town of Al Hayy to complete its assigned spot, a gunship would be there in fifteen or Time-sensitive Targeting of Insurgents. mission. The gunship assigned to Fallujah, 30 twenty minutes and start hosing off the coun- There are more recent examples of AC–130s minutes away, would be diverted to support tryside.” General Ewell did not say that the being used flexibly versus the present the Marines as it was almost complete with gunship was reassuring overhead, but rather inefficient overwatch of individual ground its current mission. The author kept the fre- that it was reassuring knowing quency open with the Marines, hoping for a that it could be there in “15 or 20 change in tasking, but the last call heard was minutes”7 if needed. The infan- the same JTAC clearing medical evacuation tryman in Iraq does not have helicopters into his airspace to pick up the the same assurance because the very Marines that the pilot and copilot had AC–130 is trammeled to a single witnessed being attacked. ground unit for a prescribed Due to the continued lack of insurgent period that is usually determined activity at Al Hayy, the gunship was ordered the day prior—a fundamental Airman uses weapons control home and landed with 3 hours of fuel in the violation of the doctrine of cen- booth onboard AC–130U Spooky gunship to target tanks. Adding to the frustration was the fact tralized control. and fire 105mm howitzer on that this sortie was the fourth night in a row The Ho Chi Minh Trail. practice range

“supporting” quiescent ASRs. The crew did As the Vietnam War progressed L. Davis) (Greg U.S. Air Force not engage a single insurgent on any of the and the unique and effective abilities of the units for prescribed periods. The Air Force five sorties, even though August 2004 was one gunship became apparent, the Air Force realized its lack of success in preventing of the most violent months of the insurgency. created the more capable AC–130 gunship Scud attacks on Israeli population centers in and began to use it in the interdiction role. the first Gulf War and created a combined Past Employments AC–130s were specifically used to roam the air and ground force to neutralize the Scud Gunships on Call. History supports Ho Chi Minh Trail hunting for trucks under threat in the second Gulf War. Both air and the consideration of a different employment the thick jungle canopy that were carrying ground forces had assigned areas to search technique for Iraq’s gunships. Early in the supplies needed by the guerrillas in the South. and were ready to execute highly refined and Vietnam War and before the AC–130 was To show the effectiveness of the AC–130 com- practiced procedures designed to kill Scuds born, the AC–47 gunship arrived in-theater pared to conventional attack aircraft, one only quickly, along with their support equipment with what was then the 4th Air Commando has to look at the number of truck kills per and personnel. All air and ground assets Squadron. Within the first year of operation sortie. Trucks moved most easily in the winter were focused on preventing Scud launches, in South Vietnam, “Spooky” had defended months, and in the winter of 1971–1972, AC– and there was a prioritized list of targets, 500 outposts and in a single 90-day period 130s killed or damaged 8.3 trucks per sortie with a raised Scud (that is, ready to launch) claimed to have broken up 166 enemy night compared to fighter-bombers, which averaged at the top of the list. Whether detected by attacks.5 Allegedly, the enemy was so afraid of 0.29 trucks killed or damaged per sortie.8 ground, air, or space platforms, the nearest the first gunships that they were ordered not Allegedly, North Vietnamese truck drivers attack aircraft was immediately pushed by to fire at what they thought was a fire-breath- were actually handcuffed to their vehicles to command and control from its assigned ing beast that might become even angrier. keep them from abandoning their trucks at the search area to destroy the target. The gunships in 1966 did not accom- first sign of an AC–130. The Air Force conducted three exercises plish this feat or earn this reputation by being So what does killing trucks in the at Nellis Air Force Base before the war to prac- tethered to a single ground unit and waiting jungles of Vietnam have to do with killing tice these procedures and helped ensure zero for it to be attacked, but rather by being on insurgents in Iraq? Both trucks and insurgents Scud attacks on Israel.10 The Sunni Triangle is

80 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Seifert U.S. Air Force (Susan Foreman) U.S. Air Force AC–130H preparing for takeoff

much smaller than the western Iraqi fighters. The high speed of the commander. It can do this because of its desert, and the continuing attacks this proposed fighters and their ability to capture precise fire, low-yield munitions and ability and loss of lives in Iraq are having change would insurgents with their sensor suite to communicate and confer simultaneously a strategic impact. Taking a similar put one of would ensure a response time with every level of theater Army, Air Force, plan and a comparable focus in stop- two nightly within minutes, even when the Marine, and SOF command and control. ping insurgent attacks is definitely a gunships no gunship has simultaneous insur- While immediate fire on the insurgents course of action long overdue. more than gent point-outs. The AC–130 can is often preferred, certain situations will use its remaining radios to talk require further analysis and preparation. Proposed Employment 20 minutes directly to those units engaged The AC–130, with 4 hours of loiter time Gunships on Call Again. from every with the enemy. With seven radios, and the ability to refuel in air, can wait for Today’s AC–130 is far more effective coalition the gunship crew has no problem a ground or heliborne quick-reaction force than the AC–47s of yesteryear. Able soldier in the monitoring the many command to be mustered to assist with the situation. to hunt, cover the critical minutes of Sunni Triangle and control agencies with radios to These forces should be ready to move imme- offensive operations, and simultane- spare for those actually in contact. diately, knowing the well-practiced ability of ously be on call, only two gunships The result of this proposed the AC–130 to vector small ground units to would be required each night in the change would put one of two the target area quickly and safely. Once on Sunni Triangle. Helping to find the insurgents nightly gunships no more than 20 minutes scene, the quick-reaction force uses the situ- are the JTACs, who should be in near contact from every coalition soldier in the Sunni ational awareness and precise firepower of with every one of their ground units and Triangle. A gunship-assigned fighter cuts the gunship to help assess the situation and in constant contact with either the gunship the sensor-on-scene time to no more than 10 neutralize the enemy, if required. or the Air Support Operations Center. At a minutes. Every JTAC in the Triangle would minimum, the AC–130 checks in with each talk to an AC–130 crew several times per Out of Our OODA Loop brigade JTAC on the AC–130 frequency as night versus several times per month. Presently, the insurgents are deep in our it sequentially passes through each brigade’s Finding the Insurgents. Coalition OODA loop (observe, orient, decide, act)— area of operations during the course of an ground forces must create a list of insurgent that is, our decision cycle—which helps to evening. It passes on any interesting informa- hot spots and request that gunships fly over explain our lack of success in defeating them. tion and requests the latest intelligence. With these locations as often as possible. The list Their civilian dress allows them to observe the range of the gunship radio, the aircraft is should include coalition bases, convoys, police us at will and orient themselves to ensure in continuous contact with several brigades at stations, roadways infested with improvised maximum chance of success. They decide to once. This allows near-immediate targeting explosive devices, patrols, and infrastructure. attack when coalition forces are most vulner- of insurgents as they make contact with coali- Individual Army and Marine units should able and usually depart before any coalition tion forces. This nightly patrol and single fre- include this information on their ASRs to the advantage in firepower or personnel can be quency also allow both SOF and conventional ASOC, which would generate new and more brought to bear. Thus, it is just as the insur- units to count on gunship coverage for time- useful mission assignments for the AC–130 gent OODA loop is complete that coalition sensitive raids requiring immediate execution. crews. These crews would then plan their route forces begin to run their loop: “Did anyone Present employment methods require several of flight using the latest intelligence on insur- observe where that fire came from? Will there hours notice to guarantee gunship coverage of gent activity to improve the chances of finding be more? Should we orient ourselves offen- a SOF or conventional raid. insurgents in the act. This author stumbled on sively or defensively? Do we decide to stay or For those units out of gunship radio 3 insurgent ambushes during his most recent run? Do we request an Army quick-reaction range, the ASOC would take their insurgent 25 sorties while en route to his mission assign- force or Air Force close air support, or can “point-outs” as they can now, but under the ments. The odds of finding insurgents every we attack the enemy ourselves?” Again, this author’s plan, they would always pass them to night in Iraq would be rather high if crews all occurs after the insurgent OODA loop is the gunship on either the dedicated gunship were actually tasked to hunt for them. complete, and their goal of yet another brazen frequency or a dedicated long-range fre- Neutralizing the Insurgents. Whether attack on coalition forces has been met. quency. The Air Support Operations Center is the AC–130 finds insurgents on its optimized The proposed tactics would change the responsible for assigning the sensor-equipped flight plan or rushes to the aid of a friendly coalition OODA loop in the following manner: fighters to work in conjunction with the two ground force, it has the ability to attack the We have observed the enemy and know he AC–130s as they patrol the Triangle, increas- insurgents nearly instantaneously when often strikes anywhere in the Triangle—and ing the effectiveness of both gunships and cleared by the JTAC and his ground force the attack will be quick. Let us orient two

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 81 Gunships Unleashed gunships on flight paths optimized for search and communications connectivity and decide a simple yet fundamental change in AC–130 tactics is before the attack occurs that the gunship will needed and could start immediately with be pushed immediately to attack or investigate zero increase in aircraft and personnel any insurgents who might be caught in the act. Now 75 percent complete with their OODA zero increase in aircraft and personnel. The afternoon. This type of schedule ensures that loop, coalition forces eagerly wait for an attack change required can be easily explained by well-rested crews are not forced to exceed to counter with their own attack. In many highlighting what the ground and air forces their monthly flying hours limit, as they cases, the AC–130 will observe the enemy first must do, respectively. routinely do now. and actually complete its OODA loop before Ground Forces. The ground forces must Infrastructure, Command, and Control. the insurgents even know they have been stop demanding dedicated coverage of indi- The infrastructure already exists for those acquired. Also in favor of the coalition is that vidual units for specified periods, except for the units out of touch with the AC–130 but their attack will be executed with an airborne most unusual circumstances. Rather, they must wanting to point out insurgents. The ASOC is artillery platform that is capable of com- ask for two AC–130s on patrol and on call for in place and already tasked to support ground municating simultaneously with soldiers in the night and ensure that every brigade JTAC forces needing help from air forces. The only the field, JTACs in their headquarters, and all is on frequency with the forces under him. difference would be how much more often command and control agencies upstream. JTACs must also pass updated enemy activity the ground forces call and how rapidly the and anticipated friendly operations to allow air forces respond. Command and control is Center of Gravity the gunship crews to optimize their routing also already in place, and personnel at some Strategists yearn for a center of gravity in order to be overhead as much as possible. locations could be reduced by eliminating the to attack in order to crush the insurgency, When attacked by insurgents, ground forces prioritization of preplanned and immediate and many claim there is none. They fail to should continue to react as they have been ASRs every night. Unlike the present system, see that the center of gravity is the individual trained, but with one small exception: Troops the proposed command and control plan is insurgent and the location of his attack. For in contact must report the insurgent activity simple, flexible, and fast reacting. The aircraft it is at that location alone, and only for a brief whether they believe they can handle the situ- commander and crew determine their effec- time, that the insurgent we struggle to define ation or not. Finally, ground forces must have a tiveness at each target location and decide is an irrefutable enemy and a definable target. standing helicopter and ground quick-reaction how long to stay by comparing the effective- Strategists and tacticians both must look at force ready to respond to situations where the ness of what they are presently doing versus each insurgent attack in the same light as our culpability of insurgents is in doubt and where hunting for insurgents, maneuvering friendly grandfathers looked at Germany’s war indus- collateral damage is a concern. ground forces overhead, or responding to an try. Unlike during World War II, there are only Air Forces. The Air Force must focus insurgent point out from the ASOC or indi- minutes to plan and strike, requiring that a on finding and neutralizing insurgents in vidual unit JTACs. plan already be in place. Focus the same effort conjunction with the ground forces. Com- The final justification for implementa- in striking this fleeting center of gravity as was miting two AC–130s and available fighters tion of this AC–130 plan is that it could start used on the centers of gravity in World War II and unmanned aerial systems to hunt for tomorrow. ASRs could provide the callsign and coalition results are sure to improve. insurgents each night on a scheduled gunship and location of every brigade and regimental When discussing centers of gravity in an frequency ensures that the majority of JTAC and would include their list of likely insurgency, the civilian population is rightly invaluable and limited AC–130 time is spent insurgent locations and offensive operations considered one as well. Unlike other centers, hunting, checking in with JTACs, and killing for the evening. All ASRs would be sup- though, it must be struck with legitimacy. The and capturing insurgents. Presently, gunships ported with the amount of time and effort AC–130 tasked to strike insurgents in the act spend the majority of their time in transit to determined by present enemy activity and with individual 40mm rounds does a much the Triangle and flying over a relatively small offensive operations in progress better job of this than some of the present number of individual units for periods much versus yesterday’s enemy activity tactics that often hurt more than help the longer than required or effective. As AC–130 and anticipated operations. coalition cause. crews and aircraft are limited, the Air Force All JTACs would be on a must ensure that each crew has a maximum single frequency, and as Implementation 12-hour crew day, which allows it to fly every the gunship checks The Air Force, and specifically the other night and show at the same time each in with each, AC–130, is working hard in Iraq but has yet to reach its full potential in helping to defeat the insurgency. Whether we measure insurgents killed per sortie flown or jet fuel burned, the Air Force will run out of sorties and fuel before Iraq runs out of insurgents, if present tactics are continued. A simple yet fundamental change in AC–130 tactics AC–47 flies mission is needed and could start immediately with over South Vietnam U.S. Air Force

82 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Seifert the crew could emphasize the importance of CALL for immediate notification of any insurgent activity and the readiness of their unit’s quick-reac- Entries tion force to respond. Finally, we should challenge aircrews to find as much insurgent activity as possible The 2007 and strive to set a record for how many and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff how often each JTAC can be contacted in a single sortie. The lethality of the process Strategic Essay Competition is easily measured and improved first by measuring how fast the gunship gets word of insurgent activity and second by how fast it or over a quarter of a century, the Chairman has challenged arrives on scene. Finally, we should measure students at the Nation’s senior war colleges to think and AC–130 success by insurgents killed and write creatively about national security issues in the Chair- captured rather than ASRs supported, and we man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition. National F th should not stop improving the process until Defense University (NDU) Press will host the 26 annual competition the last American warfighter leaves a free and on May 22–23, 2007, and judges from the participating colleges will stable Iraq. JFQ select the winning essays—“the best of the best.” This year’s competition is open to joint professional military educa- N otes tion students from all intermediate, advanced, and senior Service and joint schools, plus the Joint Forces Staff College. There are two categories: 1 The author flew all AC–130U sorties refer- research essay and strategy article. enced in this article. 2 James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, Winners Published in JFQ Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and NDU Press will publish the 2007 winners as a Special Feature in the Terrorists (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, th 2003), 274. 4 Quarter issue of Joint Force Quarterly (October 2007). 3 The author flew his first Iraq AC–130 combat In addition, competition essays have made the grade in their own mission on March 21, 2003, and his final one on colleges, and NDU Press will consider all entries for publication in future August 30, 2004. He has approximately 45 combat issues of the journal. sorties in support of ground forces in Iraq. Much of the background information in this article For detailed information, visit comes from personal experience in 7 years of flying www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/NDUPress_CSEC.htm. AC–130s and from conversations with other crewmembers returning from the Iraqi theater. Because the war in Iraq is ongoing, it must be realized that AC–130 tactics, techniques, and procedures there are evolving, and some information in this article might be outdated. 4 Daniel R. Mortensen, Airpower and Ground Armies (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Univer- sity Press, 1998), 93–140. 5 Benjamin Franklin Cooling, ed., Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support (Washing- ton, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1990), 444. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Eduard Mark, Aerial Interdiction: Air Power and the Land Battle in Three American Wars (Washington, DC: Center for Air Force History, 1994), 352. 9 Charles M. Westenhoff, Military Air Power: The Cadre Digest of Air Power Opinions and Thoughts (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Univer- sity Press, 1990), 110. 10 The author participated in one of the exer- The Chairman’s Strategic Essay Contest is conducted by NDU Press with the generous financial support of the NDU Foundation. The NDU Foundation is a nonprofit cises at Nellis Air Force Base in January 2004 and 501 (c)(3) organization established in 1982 to support and enhance the mission and flew several AC–130 combat missions searching for goals of National Defense University, America’s preeminent institution for military, Scuds in western Iraq in the first weeks of Operation civilian, and diplomatic national security education, research, outreach, and strategic Iraqi Freedom. studies. The main campus is located at Fort Lesley J. McNair in Washington, DC.

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 83 Adaptive Planning Not Your Great Grandfather’s

Soldiers conduct combined arms rehearsal in Schlieffen Plan Afghanistan to establish plan of action for next BG Mark T. day’s mission Kimmitt, USA, chief military spokesman for the Coalition Provisional Authority, and Dan Senor, Coalition Information Center director, brief U.S. Army (Michael Zuk) press on handover of responsibilities to the Iraqi By R o b e r t M . K l e i n government

U.S. Air Force (Jacob N. Bailey)

Background: Demolished Iraqi vehicles line roadway in Euphrates River Valley after Operation Desert Storm

n December 13, 2005, Secretary of Defense form Donald Rumsfeld approved the backbone of a joint O the Adaptive Planning (AP) adaptive system supporting the development Roadmap and directed its “expeditious and execution of plans, preserving the best advances in firepower and implementation.”1 This act represented a characteristics of present-day contingency the lethality of warfare between 1870 and significant shift in the way the Department and crisis planning with a common process. 1914. Named for its author, Alfred Graf von of Defense (DOD) thinks about military The need to overhaul the DOD planning Schlieffen, the plan called for rapid mobiliza- planning. The impetus for change was a and execution system becomes more evident tion and the swift defeat of France with a recognition that the accelerating pace and when it is viewed against the backdrop of holding action against Russia. complexity of military operations require history. Planning today is a late 19th-century But the plan’s key assumption, that that the President, Secretary of Defense, and concept born out of the German general staff Germany could mobilize before France or combatant commanders have the ability system. It thus seems fitting that a discussion Russia, proved its fatal flaw. Mobilization was to respond quickly to new threats and about transforming the planning process tied to such precise timetables that once the challenges. begins with the history of the Schlieffen Plan. trains began to roll, any attempt to stop them Adaptive Planning is the joint capability would cause mass disruption—a potentially to create and revise plans rapidly and system- A Fatal Assumption lethal decision if the corresponding enemy atically, as circumstances require. It occurs From a strategic and military perspec- troop trains continued to the frontiers. in a networked, collaborative environment, tive, the Schlieffen Plan represented an Contingent on Germany’s ability to requires the regular involvement of senior imaginative solution to Germany’s strategic mobilize quickly, the plan backed political leaders, and results in plans containing a challenge of being sandwiched between a decisionmakers into a corner by limiting range of viable options that can be adapted vengeful France and a hostile Russia. More- options and time to negotiate. Moreover, the to defeat or deter an adversary to achieve over, it offered the real prospect of using stra- event of either French or Russian mobilization

DOD (Dean Wagner) national objectives. At full maturity, AP will tegic maneuver to overcome technological was tantamount to a German declaration of war on both nations. The Schlieffen Plan and Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Klein, USA, is a War Planner in the Joint Operational War Plans Division (J7) at equivalent schemes of the other great powers the Joint Staff. comprised a classic example of game theory,

84 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Robert Klein

in which all players try to maximize returns. outlined Operations Plan (OPLAN) 1003, the process into a capability suited to rapidly To a large measure, the rulers of Europe, who invasion of Iraq. Secretary Rumsfeld found changing conditions. bungled their way to war in August 1914, the existing plan frustrating. Essentially a Simply put, the 24-month contingency became victims of their own planning.2 replay of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, it planning cycle was too slow and inflexible Following World War I, the U.S. military called for a slow, massive logistic buildup to to keep up with fast-paced world events and began to formalize a planning process, and the support an invasion force of 500,000. The altered planning considerations. As Operation result was the elaborate series of procedures methodical scheme with its months-long Iraqi Freedom demonstrated, off-the-shelf known as the Colored Plans. These arrange- timeline did not square with the Secretary’s plans were static, difficult to adapt, and often ments provided the basis for strategy, as well ideas for a transformed military. The plan had based on outdated assumptions, assessments, as joint and combined operations, in World been on the shelf since its approval in 1996 forces, and circumstances. Since no formal War II.3 Planning improvements in the second and was updated in 1998, but its assumptions, mechanisms existed to ensure early and half of the 20th century included the Joint as Secretary Rumsfeld quickly pointed out, frequent consultation between civilian and Operational Planning and Execution System were woefully out of date and did not reflect military leadership during plan development, current intelligence. political leaders entering the cycle at the end Figure 1. The Schlieffen Plan In a meeting were presented with a fait accompli—a single n Single option n n Great plan for original assumptions Defensive option n n Detailed movement tables and Original assumptions, mobilization timelines built to Figure 2. assessments, forces not relevant support single option to actual situation n n Not adaptive to changing Policymakers wanted multiple circumstances and strategic options, to include offensive option n decision dynamics Planning process and technology n Mobilization and movement made it difficult to modify plan and timelines backed policymakers put into execution quickly n into strategic corner Required extraordinary effort to adapt plan successfully to rapidly changing strategic circumstances “The outbreak of war in 1914 is the most tragic example of government’s helpless n The 1003V planning effort provides dependence on the planning of strategists that history has ever seen.” the conceptual baseline for the —Gerhard Ritter, author of The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth Adaptive Planning initiative

“Today’s environment demands a system that quickly produces high- quality plans that are adaptive to changing circumstances.” —Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, AP Roadmap, December 13, 2005

and its codification in joint doctrine, policies, and instructions by the mid- 1990s. Despite these and other institutional on December 4, Rumsfeld improvements (in areas such as mobilization demanded alternatives and out-of-the-box and transportation planning), modern plan- thinking. How would the plan be executed military option that bound ners failed to address the dilemmas that had on short notice versus an extended timeline? political decisionmaking in time-constrained plagued all contingency plans since the incep- What was the shortest period required to situations. tion of the Schlieffen Plan. Most critically, deliver enough forces to accomplish the This setting was disturbingly similar contingency planning remained a flawed, mission? What if the President was willing to what happened with the Schlieffen Plan in time-consuming process, bound by the origi- to accept more risk? Despite obvious flaws, 1914 (see figures 1 and 2). Clearly, contingency nal assumptions and largely unresponsive to OPLAN 1003 was the only one on the shelf if plans needed to incorporate more and better the demands of political decisionmakers who the President decided to go to war with Iraq options and sufficient branches and sequels required more options. This reality was never immediately. A complete rewrite of a contin- that readily lent themselves to rapid and more evident than in the events leading up to gency plan would take months.4 regular updating to support crisis planning the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. and execution.5 On November 26, 2001, Secretary The Mandate Compounding the problem, joint plan- Rumsfeld flew to Tampa to see General From the months-long planning prior ning has been largely sequential, requiring Tommy Franks, commander, U.S. Central to Operation Iraqi Freedom, it became evident iterative collocation of planners from senior Command. In a private session (Rumsfeld that a complete overhaul would be required to and subordinate organizations. Because insisted that they be alone), General Franks transform the DOD industrial age planning authoritative data have been compartmented

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 85 Adaptive Planning

and are not readily accessible for planning, Current and Adaptive Planning Processes course of action development remains a pro- longed process, necessitating requirements Up to 24 Months or More for Deliberate Planning identification and feasibility analyses (opera- Phase II Phase II Phase I Phase III Phase IV Phase V tional, logistic, and transportation) late in the Initiation Concept Concept Plan Plan Supporting Development Review Development Review Plans planning process, causing time-consuming

adjustments and extending development time- Phase I Phase II Phase III Situation Planning Execution lines even further. Current Process Awareness Also, interagency involvement generally Months to Days for Crisis Planning occurs late in plan development. Operation Plans Annex V, which addresses interagency coordination, is typically written after AP Process Months to Days for Planning approval of the base plan. Despite advances

in information technology, joint planners IPRs IPRs IPRs IPRs th Function Function Function Function remained stuck in the 20 century, having Strategic Concept Plan Plan Guidance Development Development Assessment few tools to enable work in parallel across Figure 3. echelons in a virtual environment with access to key planning data. n integrated intelligence planning Adaptive Planning reviews represent At the direction of the Secretary of n embedded options a departure from the previous planning Defense, the Principal Deputy Under Secre- n living plans processes, both in frequency and form. tary of Defense for Policy tasked the Deputy n parallel planning in a network-centric, The intent is senior leader involvement Assistant Secretary of Defense for Resources collaborative environment. throughout the process, including periodic and Plans in August 2003 to work with the reviews once the plan is complete. The initial Joint Staff to create a successor to current The end result is that Adaptive Planning IPRs focus largely on solidifying guidance, planning processes. Specifically, he sought an for any single strategy implies that resource agreeing on the framework assumptions and approach that would considerably shorten the requirements are dynamically allocated and planning factors, establishing a common time it takes to produce plans and to create risk is continuously balanced against other understanding of the adversary and his inten- plans that can be adapted to a constantly plans and operations. tion, and producing an approved combatant changing strategic landscape.6 The result was Clear Strategic Guidance and Iterative commander mission statement. Adaptive Planning. Dialogue. AP combines the best character- Subsequent IPRs may revisit, refine, istics of contingency, crisis action planning, modify, or amend these outcomes as required. Adaptive Planning Vision and execution into a single integrated process. Additionally, they will address risks, courses The 2005 Contingency Planning Guid- Strategic guidance is the first step in the four- of action, implementing actions, and other ance directed combatant commanders to stage planning process, which also includes key factors. Timely reviews and IPRs ensure develop designated, priority contingency concept development, plan development, and that the plan remains relevant to the situation plans using the AP approach. Transforming plan assessment. Each step includes as many and the Secretary’s intent as plans are rapidly contingency planning requires modernizing in-progress reviews (IPRs) by the Secretary modified throughout development and the way DOD thinks about and develops its as necessary to complete the plan. Although execution. Figure 3 illustrates how IPRs are processes, products, people, and technology these steps are generally sequential, they may integrated throughout the AP process. 7

Desert Storm for planning. This transformation does not overlap in the interest of accelerating the Under AP, planning will be expedited entail complete elimination of current pro- overall process. by guidance that specifies the level of detail cesses. Rather, it requires a mixture of new AP speeds the procedure by providing required for each situation. The amount of and existing capabilities. The Department of more detailed and focused initial guidance in detail needed is tied to the plan’s importance Defense must preserve the best characteristics the DOD planning documents: contingency and likelihood of execution. This helps of current processes and systems and apply planning guidance, joint strategic capabili- combatant commanders manage planning them in unprecedented ways. ties plan, and strategic guidance statements. in the near term. There are four levels of AP allows combatant commanders to Strategic guidance also includes interagency plans under AP. Level 1 requires the least produce plans more quickly and adaptively guidance, intelligence assessments, and other detail, level 4 the most. Strategic guidance in and of higher quality. Rapid planning and direction from the Secretary during IPRs. the contingency planning guidance and the greater efficiency are achieved through com- At the combatant command level, planning joint strategic capabilities plan will identify bining multiple stovepiped processes into one begins with the receipt of strategic guidance the level to produce. However, the Secretary common AP process that includes: and lasts through final plan approval into may increase or decrease the level of detail a continuous plan-assessment cycle. Ulti- required in response to changed circum- Line of Bradley Fighting Vehicles used in Operation Line of Bradley Fighting Vehicles n clear strategic guidance and iterative mately, AP envisions streamlined strategic stances, changes in a plan’s assumptions, or dialogue guidance that feeds war planning through a combatant commander’s recommendation. n integrated interagency and coalition regular updates over a network-centric, col- The Secretary and the combatant com-

Background: Background: planning laborative environment. mander confer during IPRs on the nature and

86 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Robert Klein detail of planning needed, including branches achieve the combatant commander’s desired require review at least every 6 months. As a and options to be developed. effects of the operational objectives. Addition- result, living plans provide a solid foundation Integrated Interagency and Coalition ally, the process will focus on developing the for transition to crisis planning. Additionally, Planning. The past decade of complex opera- intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance military and political leaders are better able to tions, from Somalia to Iraq, has demon- strategy and synchronize the requisite intel- gauge and mitigate risk across multiple plans

strated that strategic success requires unity ligence support. Because the intelligence cam- and better comprehend the collateral impacts Butterworth) U.S. Army (Gary W. of effort not only from the military but also paign plan is directly linked to contingency of execution and changed circumstances. from the U.S. Government and coalition planning, changes in the global strategic envi- Parallel Planning in a Network-Centric, partners. Time and again, the United States ronment continually feed plan development Collaborative Environment. The development and its partners have come short of fully and assessment. of a network-centric information architecture integrating the diplomatic, informational, Embedded Options. AP features an provides an opportunity to modernize the military, economic, and other dimensions increased number of options, as well as contingency planning process. Plans, plan- of power into a coherent strategy. One factor branches and sequels (along with associ- ning tools, and pertinent databases will be that has contributed to this poor perfor- ated decision points and decision criteria), linked in a network-centric environment, mance is lack of a unified approach to plan- in order to provide the President, Secretary, whose architecture will enable collabora- ning. AP recognizes that interagency and and combatant commanders with increased tion among widely separated planners at all coalition considerations are intrinsic rather execution flexibility that anticipates and command echelons, promoting a better grasp than optional and need to be integrated rapidly adapts. Such embedded options make of the operational environment and more early in the process rather than as an after- plans more dynamic. effective parallel planning. Authoritative thought once the military plan is complete. The term embedded options conveys internal and external databases will be linked To this end, the combatant commander the idea that branches and sequels, in at least to promote the timely exchange of informa- may seek approval and guidance from the outline fashion, are identified and developed tion based on appropriate access rules. New Secretary to conduct interagency and coali- as an integral part of the base plan courses planning tools will be developed to allow this. tion planning and coordination. The goal of action. Branches and sequels traditionally Adaptive Planning for any single plan is to ensure that interagency and coalition have been developed toward the end of the implies a mission-based readiness system capabilities, objectives, and endstates are con- process, often after the base plan is completed. and dynamic force management and logistic sidered up front in the process. This holistic Under AP, embedded branches and sequels systems integrated by a common suite of effects-based approach to planning ensures that will form an integral part of base plan design automated planning tools. This requires correct national or coalition instruments are and development. As AP matures, technology that the defense readiness and Global Force employed to match the desired ends. As part will enable combatant command planners to Management processes operate across of the planning process, and with approval develop an extensive menu of such branches multiple plans and operations to allocate of the Secretary, the combatant commander and options rapidly, well beyond what has resources and balance risk. may present his plan’s Annex V (Interagency previously been practicable. Base plans may Both identifying and sourcing require- Coordination) to the Office of the Secretary eventually become a “menu of options” to ments are necessary to determine force, trans- of Defense/Joint Staff Annex V Working execute based on exigent circumstances. portation, and logistic feasibility. Approved Group for transmittal to the National Security Living Plans. What distinguishes current courses of action must often be adapted to Council for managed interagency staffing and planning from AP is that the latter does render them feasible, causing delays in the plan development. In advance of authorization not allow ideas to sit on the shelf. The final process. Automated collaborative tools will for formal transmittal of Annex V, the com- step, plan assessment, represents a “living” allow planners to develop these options, deter- mander may request interagency consulta- environment in which plans are refined, mine their feasibility, and incorporate them tion on approved Annex V elements by the adapted, terminated, or executed (referred to into the concept of the operation, rather than Office of the Secretary of Defense/Joint Staff as RATE-ing a plan). At full maturity, AP will developing them after the base plan and select Working Group. Concurrently, the combatant produce network-centric living plans. A living annexes are completed. Analysis includes commander may present his plan for multina- plan is maintained within a collaborative, wargaming, operational modeling, and initial tional involvement. virtual environment and is updated routinely feasibility assessments. Joint wargaming Integrated Intelligence Planning. Intel- to reflect changes in intelligence assess- tools will allow planners to visualize the plan ligence campaign planning provides a meth- ments, readiness, Global Force Management, to analyze the operational feasibility, risk, odology for synchronizing, integrating, and transportation availability, guidance, assump- and sustainability of courses of action. In managing all available combatant command tions, and the strategic environment. Both AP, feasibility analysis occurs much earlier and national intelligence capabilities with automatic and manually evaluated triggers in the process than previously possible. The combatant command planning and opera- linked to real-time sources will alert leaders capabilities to conduct detailed assessments tions. Throughout the planning process, the and planners to changes in combatant command J2, in coordination with critical conditions that warrant a the Joint Staff J2 and U.S. Strategic Command, revaluation of a plan’s relevancy, both identifying and sourcing requirements will continue leading DOD through the intel- feasibility, and risk. Top-priority are necessary to determine force, ligence campaign planning process, which plans and ideas designated in the transportation, and logistic feasibility develops the intelligence tasks required to contingency planning guidance ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 87 Adaptive Planning

in a matter of days rather than months are a from multiple, viable options adaptable to a significant leap forward. variety of circumstances. Gone are the days NDU Topical Symposium By leveraging emerging technologies of outdated, single option, off-the-shelf plans and developing initiatives, DOD can create of the Schlieffen and OPLAN 1003 variety. As an integrated planning architecture in which the fluid strategic situation unfolds, emplaced data is shared seamlessly among users, triggers will alert planners to the need for applications, and platforms. At present, the modifications or revisions to keep plans combatant commands and Services use a relevant based on further strategic guidance, variety of tools for planning that have near- continuous intelligence assessment of threat term utility in supporting AP. Tools that could assumptions, rapid force/logistic manage- be rapidly developed and acquired constitute ment processes, and mission-based readiness an area of special interest. The result will be systems. The confluence of these capabilities a compressed decisionmaking cycle with an represents a quantum leap that will finally enhanced understanding of how decisions allow the planning community to break the affect campaigns. bounds of the Schlieffen Plan and enter the As part of spiral development, combat- 21st century. JFQ ant commands are currently using the AP process to build several of the Nation’s highest N otes priority war plans. Nevertheless, at full matu- 1 rity, Adaptive Planning envisions transpar- This article borrows heavily from the Adap- ency between contingency and crisis action tive Planning Roadmap (December 13, 2005). 2 See Adam Gropnik, “The Big One,” The New planning enabled by integrating readiness Yorker (August 23, 2004), available at . dynamically allocate resources and balance 3 See Henry G. Gole, The Road to Rainbow: Applying risks across multiple plans and operations. Army Planning for Global War, 1934–1940 (Annap- The implementation of Adaptive Planning olis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002). Spacepower requires spiral development through three 4 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: stages: initiation, implementation, and integra- Simon and Schuster, 2004), 35–44. tion. This approach will enable the Depart- 5 Branches and sequels provide the commander ment of Defense to begin Adaptive Planning with alternatives and follow-on options beyond the immediately for selected priority plans, learn basic plan and should similarly have entry and exit from that, and evolve to a mature process. criteria. 6 Ryan Henry, Adaptive Planning memoran- Requirements for every successive stage—each dum, August 26, 2003. providing planners with a more sophisticated 7 Adaptive Planning has combined seven Save capability—will depend on stakeholder feed- categories—doctrine, organization, training, mate- back and technology maturation. rial, leadership, personnel, and facilities—into four: the Date. . . processes, products, people, and technology. For a relatively modest investment, April 25–26, 2007 Adaptive Planning may have a significant strategic impact, creating situations in which NDU is hosting this capstone the President, Secretary of Defense, and other senior leaders play a central role by selecting conference following a year-long project assessing the uses of space.

Experts will present proposals for Marine uses large sand applying space as an element of table to brief troops on war plans and positions national power across the civil, during Operation commercial, military, and intel- Enduring Freedom ligence sectors.

Contact: [email protected] or visit the NDU Web site (www.ndu.edu) for information on the agenda and registration DOD (Andrew P. Roufs) P. DOD (Andrew

88 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Adaptive Planning Communications Squadron (Teresa M. Pumphrey) (Teresa Communications Squadron th 100

Airman from 488th Intelligence Squadron operating field Deconflicting Electronic exportable training system Warfare in Joint Operations

By a R t h u r F . H u b e r , G a r y C a r l b e rg , P r ince Gillia r d , and L . D a v i d M a r q u e t

s in combat involving weapons (EM) spectrum better if EW is to remain professional crews. Although this example whose lethal effects can result a weapon that warfighters can wield with comes from Operation Desert Storm, the in friendly casualties, elec- acceptable confidence to yield desired effects. problem has recently become highlighted tronic warfare (EW) is no less through the experiences of warfighters in A The “Cocktail of Electromagnetic immune to the deleterious effects of fratricide. Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi While the problem of fratricide involv- Confusion”2 Freedom. According to Lieutenant General ing projectile weapons continues to plague On one occasion I was on orbit conduct- Walter Buchanan, former chief of Ninth Air modern armies due to advances in velocity ing jamming operations, and we knew an Force and U.S. Central Command Air Forces, and lethality, it is becoming a growing issue EC–130E Commando Solo aircraft was in the “This is the first time that you and I have for those who conduct EW. More and more area putting out [psychological operations] seen electronic fratricide reach the point that systems—both weapons and purely com- broadcasts to Iraqi troops. But we didn’t know it has. . . . When you take a look at data links mercial devices—are vying for their place in the frequencies or the times when it was operat- and the number of jammers in place and all an increasingly crowded frequency spectrum. ing. A linguist misidentified a broadcast, we the radios we have out there, [deconflicting] There is growing pressure to transfer previ- targeted it and we ended up jamming it. We becomes a very difficult problem.”4 ously reserved military frequency bands to the discovered the mistake only after we landed. To help understand the extent and public domain1 and low tolerance for interfer- —Chris Bakke, EC–130H Compass Call seriousness of this issue, we explore two of ence of any kind outside of assigned operating crewmember in Operation Desert Storm3 the primary characteristics driving current bands. Exacerbating this situation is the rush problems: management of the electronic to field emitters of various kinds without As evidenced in the anecdote above, spectrum and emitter proliferation in a proper vetting through the spectrum certifica- the problem of EW fratricide is one that dynamic battlespace. tion process. Something must be done soon exists even in operations involving the Management of the Spectrum. The EM to manage and deconflict the electromagnetic most modern equipment and well-trained, spectrum stretches from a frequency of 0 for Colonel Arthur F. Huber II, USAF, is Commander, Arnold Engineering Development Center, Arnold Air Force direct electrical current to 1,022 hertz char- Base; Colonel Gary Carlberg, USA, is Deputy Chief of Staff, Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element acteristic of cosmic rays. The radio frequency Alpha, U.S. Joint Forces Command; Colonel Prince Gilliard, USAF, is Deputy, Component Acquisition Executive, (RF) portion of the spectrum extends from Defense Information Systems Agency; and Captain L. David Marquet, USN, is Executive Assistant to the Chief about 3 kilohertz to 300 gigahertz. Those who of Naval Personnel/Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education). wish to operate within the RF spectrum must

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U.S. frequency allocations within the radio frequency spectrum are not necessarily mirrored around the globe Computer displays stream data and video from ScanEagle unmanned aerial system over training range U.S. Air Force (Michael P. Snody) (Michael P. U.S. Air Force obtain frequency certifications from sanc- on the RF spectrum, many others do and all cordless phones.12 U.S. countermeasures tioned national and international authorities. have elicited a massive effort on the part of the have had some success at neutralizing radio- Unfortunately, when it comes to spectrum United States to counter them. This effort was controlled IEDs by inhibiting detonation or allocations and management, “the United funded at over $3 billion in fiscal year 2006,9 causing premature detonation. The problem States is unique among nations in that it and approximately $378 million has been is that with so many IEDs employed by the lacks a national spectrum policy.” Thus, U.S. spent on the purchase of electronic jammers enemy, on occasion these countermeasures interests are not pursued in a coherent and to counter IEDs since 2003.10 Despite our best inadvertently have been responsible for harmonious manner.5 efforts, progress has been limited. The follow- instances of fratricide resulting in death and Moreover, U.S. frequency allocations ing excerpt from Newsweek provides some injuries to friendly personnel. Addition- within the RF spectrum are not necessarily insight into this problem: ally, the very proliferation of the jammers mirrored around the globe.6 This has led to themselves has compounded the problem many difficulties, including refusal to allow The Warlock is a jamming device used to of EW coordination and deconfliction. some U.S. systems to operate within foreign hunt up and down radio frequencies search- Systems such as Electronic Jammer Against national borders.7 Lastly, while the frequency ing for signals that could detonate a bomb. Bombs developed by Israel and procured for certification process provides the first line The Army has worked heroically with the Poland’s forces in Iraq further demonstrate of defense in deconflicting users of the RF makers to upgrade the short range and that the problem is complicated by the need spectrum, in the rush to field new systems, it limited capability of the Warlock. But in the for interoperability with coalition systems.13 frequently happens that insufficient attention field, competing technologies kept getting The introduction of airborne assets, such as is given to this requirement. This can result in the way. The Army uses a radio (called the EC–130H Compass Call14 and EA–6B in systems that either are incompatible with SINCGARS) that also hops around frequen- Prowler,15 can exacerbate the problem other systems already fielded or lack the flex- cies. The radio frequently interfered with the by operating at altitudes where jamming ibility to permit negotiation in and around Warlock jammer. Unable to communicate, signals are dispersed over wide areas.16 a crowded spectrum. This incompatibility troops began turning off their jammers— In concert with the proliferation of emit- manifests itself in inadvertent infringement thereby exposing themselves to IEDs.11 ters on the battlefield has been the changing on authorized users and in restrictions that dynamics of the battlespace itself. Operations preclude parallel operations.8 The difficulties confronting jamming are now more rapid in tempo and nonlinear Threat Ubiquity and the Dynamic systems such as the Warlock start with the in nature. Coupled with this acceleration is Battlespace. Perhaps no single current cir- variety and ubiquity of radio-controlled the fact that combat entails a contest between cumstance highlights the difficulties of EW IEDs. These devices have used command two thinking entities that adapt to evolving deconfliction more than U.S. activities to detonation mechanisms adapted from circumstances. The result is a battlespace negate the threat of improvised explosive remote control toys, electronic keychains, whose dynamics put a premium on the devices (IEDs). While some IEDs employ garage door openers, radios, walkie-talkies, ability to observe, orient, decide, and act, as triggering mechanisms that do not depend cell phones, satellite phones, and long-range portrayed in Colonel John Boyd’s classic loop

90 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Huber et al. concept. Deconflicting electronic warfare the EWO normally works closely with the fire list through the IO cell to the Joint Targeting operations is subject to this premium as much support coordinator to integrate EW efforts Coordination Board, a group formed by the as, if not more than, other systems because its with other supporting fire missions. Addi- joint force commander to accomplish broad effects are transmitted at the speed of light. tional responsibilities range from supervising targeting oversight functions.18 To address this reality, a comprehensive EW EW planning efforts and the preparation deconfliction process must be well networked of EW appendices in operations plans to Freeing Up the Jam and standardized, operated by well-trained monitoring the execution of EW in ongoing We now consider various ideas to and qualified personnel, and must afford activities. address the EW deconfliction problem. spectrum diagnostic and management capa- A number of tools and organizational These improvements can be grouped into bilities to the tactical level. entities have been created to assist the elec- five major categories: tronic warfare officer, such as databases, Deconfliction by the Book planning process aids, and visualization n developing a national spectrum policy Having outlined the issues with EW models. In terms of support organizations, n applying the joint strategic planning deconfliction, we now move to how warfight- the Joint Spectrum Center (JSC) is perhaps process to spectrum management ers manage it in accordance with doctrine.17 the most important insofar as its mission is n adhering with greater discipline to As described by Joint Publication 3–51, Joint “to ensure the Department of Defense’s. . . doctrine and being more creative within its Doctrine for Electronic Warfare, frequency effective use of the EM spectrum in support confines management is normally accomplished for a of national security and military objectives.” n inserting relevant technological geographic combatant command by a Joint This organization “serves as the [Defense improvements Frequency Management Office (JFMO). Department] center of excellence for EM n holding acquisition efforts accountable Through this office, the supported combat- spectrum management matters in support of for fulfilling frequency certification require- ant commander establishes procedures, the combatant commands, Military Depart- ments and conducting proper systems testing. authorizes frequency use, and controls ments, and Defense agencies in planning, spectrum resources by military forces under acquisition, training, and operations.” In Develop a National Policy. A national his command. The spectrum management this capacity, the JSC manages the Joint policy for spectrum management would serve process accomplished by the JFMO staff Spectrum Interference Resolution program foremost to balance U.S. security and safety includes such tasks as developing and dis- that addresses those interference incidents requirements better with new commercial tributing spectrum-use plans, preparing and that cannot be resolved at the unified, sub- uses of the frequency spectrum. It would updating the joint restricted fre- work to ensure that the military’s quency list (JRFL), exercising fre- spectrum interests are advanced quency allotment and assignment in order to meet the burgeoning authority, anticipating and resolv- a national policy for spectrum management requirements stemming from the ing potential or actual spectrum would account for both domestic and imperative to achieve information interference and conflicts, and international environments, as well as dominance in modern combat. It coordinating military spectrum use government and commercial considerations would account for both domestic with international and host-nation and international environments, as authorities. well as government and commercial Doctrinally, EW is catego- considerations. Primarily, this rized as an integral part of infor- will require new mechanisms to mation operations (IO), so EW planners are ordinate unified, joint task force (JTF), and promote unity of effort between the Depart- normally assigned to an IO cell. This cell is component levels. ment of State (responsible for international responsible for developing and implement- The EWO responsibility of managing spectrum allocation negotiations), the ing strategies that exploit the full value of IO deconfliction extends to consideration of Commerce Department’s National Telecom- resources when integrated and synchronized effects on third parties (for example, inter- munications and Information Administra- properly. The EW officer (EWO) is the prin- agency partners and neutrals). One of the tion (charged with Federal Government cipal staff EW planner and is critical to the main tools used to manage the spectrum allocations), and the Federal Communica- planning and coordination of the frequency in this regard is the JRFL, and the EWO tions Commission (which administers non– spectrum. Typically assigned to the opera- is normally delegated the responsibility to Federal Government and civil/commercial tions staff or IO cell, the EWO is responsible coordinate preparation of this document. The uses). It will also require a single, articulate, for planning, synchronizing, coordinating, JRFL is a geographically and time-oriented and consistent voice at international forums, and deconflicting EW actions. The EWO’s listing of those functions, networks, and such as the International Telecommunica- influence is primarily exercised through frequencies that must not be jammed or oth- tions Union and World Radiocommunication the EW Coordination Center, an ad hoc erwise interfered with by friendly forces. The Conference, that govern international spec- staff coordination element often formed to EWO identifies conflicts between the JRFL trum allocations. facilitate the EW coordination function. Fur- and friendly electronic attack operations and Apply the Joint Planning Process. A thermore, as electronic warfare is considered requests changes. After sorting out conflicts, critical shortcoming in the U.S. approach a form of fire (that is, weapons employment), the EWO recommends a joint force EW target to managing spectrum, including its use for ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 91 Deconflicting Electronic Warfare

EW, is that we do not treat it as a resource of the equation, the changes could be pro- components since it could potentially include that needs to be subjected to the same found. Assuming a proper matching of forces multiple systems at the level of the individual extensive planning, direction, and guidance to spectrum requirements, some of these Soldier, never mind those embedded in all as other constrained resources in our joint changes might include: platforms across the entire battlespace. Fur- strategic planning process. To understand thermore, it would have to address a much this assertion, we must first describe how n proactive identification of potential and more dynamic environment in terms of the spectrum support is provided today. War actual theater spectrum conflicts that stem number of changes likely required during fighting staffs currently assign frequen- from differing national frequency allocations both planning and operations execution. In cies and deconflict operations, relying within a combatant commander’s area of principle, these challenges could be overcome, heavily on spectrum management support responsibility but we recognize a great deal of work must be provided by the JSC, which resides under n preconflict reservation of spectrum done to assess all the requirements, develop the Defense Information Systems Agency. blocks for selected systems, thereby motivating accompanying compatible processes across a The JSC enjoys an excellent reputation for other systems to be reprogrammed ahead of diverse joint force, and design workable solu- the support that it provides to warfighters time for deconfliction tions that are cost-effective and user-friendly. and has a good history of responsiveness n detailed planning for spectrum order The multidimensional nature of the require- to combat needs. In essence, the JSC pro- of battle (in time and space as a function of ment (for example, number of emitters, their vides a service analogous to the Defense battlefield evolution and adversary responses) capabilities, mission cycle times, associated Logistics Agency insofar as the JSC delivers n institution of a frequency tasking order processes at differing echelons) clearly makes a commodity—that is, workable frequency (FTO) to enable enhanced situational aware- development and implementation of the FTO assignments—much as the logistics agency ness and tracking of spectrum use in order to a complex challenge. provides parts and supplies. manage frequency assignments dynamically Adhere with Discipline and Creativity to If the military were to change its outlook for individual emitters Doctrine. The third proposal essentially calls regarding spectrum management and to view n better identification of shortfalls for trans- for disciplined adherence to doctrinal precepts it less as a logistics commodity and more as a lation into acquisition requirements by the com- for frequency management. Regrettably, force resource, it could improve management batant commanders through their integrated the record reflects flawed and inconsistent by giving spectrum the required priority and priority lists and mission need statements. application of these precepts. Lapses have visibility. From this perspective, spectrum occurred in the coordination among the would be treated not as a spare or consumable Of all the changes noted above, perhaps entities that implement the frequency manage- but more like equipment and personnel. If none gives moment for pause as much as the ment process, from planning phases through the joint strategic planning process embraced idea for development of an FTO. Were it actu- frequency assignment and operations. There spectrum as such, then it could be managed ally implemented, it would appear to lend itself are instances in which JRFLs were violated or assertively in all types of planning, execu- to automated frequency conflict identification ignored. In some cases, analyses made of the tion, and across all phases of military efforts. and possibly a great measure of automated EW environment were incorrect because they Accordingly, the joint planning system might deconfliction as well. The immediate challenge relied on incomplete or obsolete data.19 evolve along the following lines: in any such proposal would be addressing Other lapses include neglect of the the sheer volume of emitters across all force standup and continued manning of EW n Assign spectrum to the geographic Officers confer about incorporating Joint Integration combatant commands for use during and Interoperability of Special Operations products in peacetime through the “Forces for Unified U.S. European Command Commands” memorandum, issued by the Secretary of Defense. n Apportion spectrum to the geographic (Devin Fisher) U.S. Air Force combatant commands for use in developing operational plans through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. n Allocate spectrum to the geographic combatant commands for use in actual operations.

To round out this perspective, it is important to note the Services would retain their traditional functions to “organize, train, and equip,” so the force planning portion of the strategic planning process would remain essentially the same. However, on the operations planning and force employment sides

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Coordination Centers on combatant com- Forces Air Component Commander. This is an ongoing task that requires rigor and mander and task force staffs. Sometimes places the coordination authority role in a timeliness. The requirement for rigor those assigned to conduct EW planning were single functional commander for the first comes into play with regard to the constant inadequately trained or lacked sufficient time. The concept also creates the new staff efforts necessary to add new emitters to expertise in the EW profession. Rotation office of the Combined Theater EW Coordi- databases of the frequency environment policies have also served to aggravate the nation Cell, which is charged to coordinate and to ensure that parametrics properly problem. Short rotation periods have inhib- with combatant commanders and joint task describe emission characteristics. The ited development of tactical proficiency, while forces to determine, integrate, and satisfy EW requirement for timeliness is perhaps even extended tours have burned out personnel. requirements for preplanned operations. The more relevant in today’s circumstances Failures to ensure that replacements were objective of the cell is to develop a coherent insofar as it may not be a lack of knowledge put in place in a timely manner meant that and synchronized plan to employ EW assets of the emitter population that inhibits there was no effective hand-off of duties, to achieve theater objectives. Mitigating frat- deconfliction, as much as it is knowing and as a result spin-up times were length- ricide issues is explicitly enumerated among who is actually up and transmitting at any ened. A classic example of this problem was its responsibilities. given point in space and time. Thus, while recently experienced in Enduring Freedom Another creative organizational and it may be possible to know that two types by Combined Joint Task Force–76 (CJTF–76). process innovation implemented in the of emitters may interfere with each other, Although the CJTF–76 had developed a USCENTCOM area of responsibility was in principle these emitters could be decon- highly effective Joint Fires Board (JFB) that mentioned earlier: the Joint Fires Board flicted in time or space if one knew when was able to deconflict EW, when the EWO instituted by CJTF–76 in Afghanistan in 2005. and where they are or will be transmitting rotated out and new counter-IED systems The purpose of the JFB is to “ensure unity of and then account for the transmission were introduced into the operational area, effort and synchronize . . . fires within the in operational planning and execution. there was no longer an experienced expert combined joint operations area.”20 The fire Accordingly, enhancing such databases and able to engage a process to associated tools to implement deconflict EW activities. just-in-time deconfliction The unfortunate result was one action would be to ensure the Electronic Warfare could assist significantly in EW fratricide involving Coordination Center is formed and manned prior to avoiding fratricide events. Blue Force Tracker systems, and during all phases of a campaign Those involved today in vehicle-to-vehicle convoy the management of the fre- radios, ground-based and quency spectrum—including mobile counter-IED equip- deconfliction processes—rely ment, and civilian airport operations. support officer in the Joint Operations Center on a number of standard tools. A key tool is Of all our proposals, preventing lapses runs this board to coordinate the efforts SPECTRUM XXI.22 While capable, one of the in adherence to proven processes would of various task force staff offices and cells limitations of SPECTRUM XXI is that it does appear the first order of business. One action charged with responsibilities that depend or not permit making frequency assignments for would be to ensure the EW Coordination impinge upon one another. Electronic warfare time slots shorter than 24 hours. To achieve Center is formed and manned prior to and is given due consideration when fires support this capability, EW staff officers and operators during all phases of a campaign. Further- and deconfliction are reviewed. The success need networked access to the global informa- more, emphasis should be placed on delin- of this innovation was captured by some of its tion grid to give them timely information eating and training personnel on how the participants who said: and support analyses to assure deconfliction. coordination center morphs in character and While improved spectrum support to crisis function as a campaign proceeds. Another During the past year, deconfliction of EW planning is required, electronic warfare offi- role would be to reinforce guidance to combat missions has gone from being a difficult cers and operators are more concerned with forces that the JRFL is to be consulted and challenge to a manageable part of the joint the real-time provision of tactical level data honored. Training of personnel and manning fires daily battle rhythm. This is largely due and coordination. Such a requirement implies of geographic combatant command billets to efforts to increase knowledge of EW at “spectrum on demand” capability enabling for EW and spectrum management functions the CJTF level and below as well as regular dynamic frequency reassignment. should also be given higher priority. discussions on EW at the regional command A replacement for SPECTRUM XXI Disciplined adherence should not, and TF levels.21 under consideration is the Global Electro- however, be perceived as precluding other magnetic Spectrum Information System creative actions that innovate within doc- Reportedly, this JFB success has been (GEMSIS). This system promises “full integra- trinally based processes. In this vein, the noted and was a consideration in the develop- tion of network and spectrum management staff at U.S. Central Command has recently ment of the EW concept of operations. Lessons on the global information grid to provide published and implemented a concept of learned will likely be incorporated into future complete spectrum situational awareness.”23 operations for EW spectrum management updates of staff EW planning guides. Plans are to assess the potential for this tool in that more precisely delineates objectives and Insert Technology. Key to the decon- a joint capability technology demonstration responsibilities including delegation of EW fliction process is a suitable characteriza- entitled the Coalition Joint Spectrum Man- coordination authority to the Combined tion of the operating environment. This agement Planning Tool.24 If GEMSIS or a tool ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 93 Deconflicting Electronic Warfare similar to it eventually does become available premium on geolocation of targeted receivers, made in signal generation precision and for and is properly networked, it could provide it does serve to limit inadvertent interference little thought to be given to securing spectrum the foundation for a capability to deconflict with other friendly systems. certification. When the potential for unin- EW operations in real time. Account for Frequency Certification tended interference is consciously assessed as Advancements in electronic system and Conduct Testing. The fifth and last an acceptable risk, compared to the advantages capabilities—such as expanded transmission proposal is another imperative for process brought to the fight by the new combat capa- bands, frequency agility, programmability, discipline. The acquisition enterprise bility, this may be a worthwhile tradeoff. That and “precision”—also promise to bolster normally follows a prescribed set of steps said, product designers should still anticipate the ability to deconflict EW operations. A involving a series of gated reviews and fratricide issues and design the capability to straightforward example is to enable a radio approvals to ensure development programs upgrade the system later (for example, through to transmit across a wider range of spectrum result in products that meet warfighter reprogramming) when there is more time to improve the likelihood that a subset of fre- needs, are cost-effective, and can be sus- to account for all such effects. Furthermore, quencies that it can operate over will be clear tained. Unfortunately, the record shows product testing should strive as much as pos- and available for assignment. Such approaches some developmental and upgrade programs sible within time constraints to characterize are constrained in several respects to include fail properly to apply for and receive certi- system operation and interference potential so cost, packaging, and spectrum availabilty, so fication for the frequency bands in which that the system can be fielded with appropriate alternatives beyond frequency bandwidth and they design their systems to operate— caveats and warnings. operating region have become important. resulting in systems that interfere with One advanced feature is programmabil- those already fielded. For example, a 1998 A Resolute Way Ahead ity, both user-selectable and software-based. Defense Inspector General audit report Since World War II, when electronic In the world of radio-controlled IED jammers, counted almost 90 systems deployed to warfare first saw widespread use in combat, for example, the Bombjammer family of various theaters without proper frequency great strides have been made to infuse EW systems offers a model permitting operator certification and host-nation approval.26 into the arsenals of contemporary militar- selection of the desired jamming frequencies, The process that should be followed is one ies. As recent conflicts have demonstrated, dwell time, frequency windows, and output that is dictated by Federal and Defense advanced electronic systems have proven power. Software reprogramming was once Department regulations, is facilitated themselves as force multipliers on the restricted to mission data files that solely through the Defense Spectrum Office and modern battlefield. However, these benefits reflected the most current intel- have come with a price: the ligence on threat system paramet- warfighters’ growing reliance rics, but now enables changing on these spectrum-dependent operating frequencies (once fixed a 1998 audit report counted almost 90 systems systems. Part of the challenge by hardware), varying modula- deployed to various theaters without proper in attaining the full value that tion types, and controlling power frequency certification and host-nation approval EW systems offer is to ensure transmission levels (which affect that we do not introduce range). The advent of digitally interference or confusion modulated waveforms permits within our own operations— multi-user access within the same frequency associated Service agencies, and is overseen hence, the imperative to deconflict. range and channel sharing via multiplexing. by Defense Acquisition Boards and mile- We have seen in the trends of the last “Smart” systems can now “sniff” the spectrum stone authorities. Negotiating the process few decades that modern combat is becoming for open frequencies and dynamically control can take years depending on a number of more complex, networked, and integrated frequency assignment.25 factors, including the complexity of the through systems of systems. In the arena Just as precision-guided munitions have envisioned system, portion of the frequency of electronic warfare, our response has evi- helped limit fratricide and collateral damage, spectrum desired for operation, and extent denced enough sophistication to recognize precision EW can do likewise. Precision EW of required international coordination. these trends and to take measures to address takes on several forms to include very “clean” Accordingly, the process must start early in them. We organize ourselves to manage signals (that is, waveforms distinguished by the development phase and be monitored warfighting as efficiently and as presciently few, if any, unintended spurious characteris- and enforced throughout the acquisition as possible. We conceptualize and codify tics) and transmissions at exact frequencies lifecycle, including during test and evalua- doctrine to guide our planning and execution (that is, with little bleed into adjacent bands). tion as a compliance check.27 of combat operations. We push technology to Another form of precision EW has become Typical examples of this failure in the give us better management tools and better possible with the introduction of advanced acquisition process have been products that performing weapons. But where we often fail electronically steered arrays possessing trans- were developed in an “urgent and compelling” is in consistent and universal followthrough. mit antenna patterns exhibiting highly direc- manner to meet immediate combat needs. If we are to slay the demon of EW tional “pencil” beams. Such designs enable New counter-IED equipment being developed fratricide—that is, stop being our own elec- placing jamming energy precisely where and introduced by U.S. and coalition forces is tronic enemy—we must not only understand desired (that is, into targeted receivers) with a good case in point. In the rush to field urgent these trends and develop answers to them, little energy dispersion. Although this puts a capabilities, it is typical for compromises to be but also be ruthless in our followthrough.

94 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Huber et al. Titles 8 NEW When we know from doctrine and experi- Captain Mike Murphy, USN, Joint Spectrum ence that instituting a EW Coordination Center briefing, “Spectrum: Critical to the War- from NDU Press Center or Joint Fires Board enables and fighter,” May 24, 2006, slide 12. 9 Michael Goldfarb, “Improvised Explosive optimizes deconfliction, it is not acceptable ION SCHOOL FOR NA EXECUTIVE EDUC AT TIONAL SECURITY TIONAL SECURITY EXECUTIVE EDUC Disaster,” The Weekly Standard, May 4, 2006, ATION SCHOOL FOR NA ION SCHOOL FOR NA EXECUTIVE EDUC AT TIONAL SECURITY EXECUTIVE TIONAL SECURITY EXECUTIVETIONAL EDUC SECURITY ATION SCHOOL FOR NA ION SCHOOL FOR to allow such entities to be stood down or EXECUTIVE EDUC EXECUTIVE EDUC AT TIONAL SECURITY TIONAL2007 March SECURITY TION SCHOOL FOR NA TIONAL SECURITY ION SCHOOL FOR NA ATION SCHOOL FOR NA EXECUTIVE EDUC AT accessed at . TIONAL SECURITY EXECUTIVE EDUC ATION SCHOOL FOR NA TIONAL TIONAL SECURITY EXECUTIVESchool EDUC for NationalEXECUTIVE Security yEDUC Execut ATION SCHOOL FOR NA TIONALNational SECURITY Defense Universit EXECUTIVE EDUC ION SCHOOL FOR NA TION SCHOOL FOR NA TIONAL SECURITY EXECUTIVE EDUC AT sions at risk. When we have proven through 10 ATION SCHOOL FOR NA TIONAL SECURITY Clay Wilson, “Improvised Explosive Devices TIONAL SECURITY EXECUTIVE EDUC ATION SCHOOL FOR NA hard lessons learned and creative innovation TIONAL SECURITY EXECUTIVE EDUC (IEDs) in Iraq: Effects and Countermeasures,” Counterintelligence and which processes work and which do not, we Congressional Research Report (RS22330), Febru- National Strategy cannot fail to institute best practices. When ary 10, 2006, 6, accessed at . a premium on the timely prosecution of the 11 John Barry et al., “Iraq’s Real WMD,” News- kill chain and we do not likewise transform week, March 27, 2006, 24–29. 12 the supporting structures that enable us to Rupert Pengelley, “Curbing the Roadside School for National Security manage the very spectrum such a force is Bomber,” Jane’s International Defense Review, no. Executive Education paper 39 (January 2006), 39–45; Wilson, 2. founded upon, then we have evidenced a lack Counterintelligence and 13 Michael Fiszer, “Polish Troops in Iraq of resolution. National Strategy Getting Counter-IED Devices,” Journal of Elec- The problem of electronic warfare Countering foreign intelligence threats is a tronic Defense 29, no. 3 (March 2006), 18. compelling national security mission, but fratricide is a growing issue. Proliferating 14 David Pugliese, “The Hidden Enemy,” The the history of U.S. counterintelligence (CI) systems, rapidly procured and fielded, are Ottawa Citizen, February 18, 2006, B1. has been one of disparate threat-driven 15 making for an increasingly crowded spec- Michael Sirak, “U.S. ‘Needs to Do Better’ activities, fragmentation, and a lack of stra- trum. Our freedom to operate is jeopardized. with EW Assets,” Jane’s Defense Weekly 42, no. 44 tegic coherence. A strategic reorientation As our adversaries learn to get the most (November 2, 2005), 11. of the U.S. CI enterprise was brought about 16 from their asymmetric strategies and close Fulghum, 32. by the 2005 National Counterintelligence 17 the gap with us technologically, our edge in The following discussion is a summary Strategy, which gave the CI community new combat will increasingly rely on our singular of salient points and includes passages from policy imperatives to integrate its insights Joint Publication 3–51, Joint Doctrine for competencies in integration and operational into national security objectives and, at the Electronic Warfare, available at . author argues that if national counterintel- development to maintain these trump cards 18 Joint Publication 3–09, Doctrine for Joint Fire ligence is to assume the strategic mission as asymmetries of our own. Let us not prove Support, May 12, 1998, GL–8, available at . imperative: revalidating and empowering JFQ 19 take advantage of them. “Spectrum Planning in EW,” slides 8, 23, 25. the National Counterintelligence Executive 20 Daniel C. DiNicola, Leo F. Brennan III, and function; consolidating the program and N otes Bruce J. Carter, “Afghanistan: CJTF–76 Joint Fires budget authorities, currently dispersed Board in OEF 04–06,” Field Artillery, March-April among departments and agencies; and 1 Katherine McIntire Peters, “The Battle 2006 (HQDA PB6–06–2), 35, available at . the operational and analytic activities 21 features/0801/0801s5s1.htm>. Ibid., 37. across the CI community to strategic effect. 2 22 David A. Fulghum, a writer with Aviation Joint Publication 3–51, B–7. (Available from NDU Press only) Week & Space Technology, coined this phrase. 23 Alion Science & Technology, 2004 Annual 3 Alfred Price, The History of U.S. Electronic Report, 10, available at . Can Deterrence Be Tailored? Old Crows, 2000), 432. 24 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Deterrence, the hallmark of Cold War–era 4 David A. Fulghum, “Jamming Jam-Up,” Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation security, needs to be adapted to fit the Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 7, Budget Project Justification (R2a Exhibit) PE more volatile security environment of the st 2005, 32. 0603648D8Z—Joint Capability Technology Dem- 21 century. The Bush administration has 5 Report of the Defense Science Board (DSB) onstration, February 2006; Murphy, slides 15, 16. outlined a concept for tailored deterrence Task Force on Department of Defense Frequency 25 Report of the DSB Task Force, slides 18, 20, 21. to address the distinctive challenges posed Spectrum Issues, “Coping with Change: Managing 26 Department of Defense, Office of the Inspec- by advanced military competitors, regional RF Spectrum to Meet DoD Needs,” November 2000, tor General, “Coordination of Electromagnetic powers armed with weapons of mass slide 24, accessed at . munications Agreements,” Report No. 99–009, networks—while assuring allies and dis- 6 Peters, 56. October 9, 1998. suading potential competitors. 7 “Spectrum Planning in EW,” briefing by the 27 Report of the DSB Task Force, slides 5, 7, 9, (Available from NDU Press only) Defense Information Systems Agency, Joint Spec- 43, 44. trum Center/J3, March 28, 2006, slide 27. Visit the NDU Press Web site for more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 95 uch of today’s innovation NASA in warfare involves space- enabled technologies, such M as precision weapons using global positioning system information, missile defense systems designed to engage enemy missiles in the lowest regions of outer space, and information operations utilizing orbiting satellites. Indeed, space-enabled technologies play a pivotal role within U.S. national security strategy, which has led some to conclude that the United States is more dependent on space than any other nation.1 As executive agent for space issues within the Department of Defense, the U.S. Air Force is responsible for overseeing military space operations and requirements.2 Choosing the Air Force for this role seems reasonable; for decades, space systems have been declared “high-flying air forces.”3 Unfor- tunately, many professionals within the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard have long assumed that the sea Services have little to contribute regarding the formulation of space strategy. Yet nothing could be further from the truth. The sea Services already support the warfighter through space-enabled technologies. This support includes the activities and

US Navy (John Stone)

Space Strategy: A Call to Arms for the Sea Services VADM Lewis W. Crenshaw, Jr., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Requirements, and Assessments, tours By John J. Klein Johnson Space Center

NASA launching Spitzer Space Telescope Commander John J. Klein, USN, is the Commanding Officer of the Sea Control Weapons School in Jacksonville, Florida.

96 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu John Klein organizations of the Space and Naval Warfare hubs along dispersed lines of communica- space-reliant nations may protect and defend Systems Command, Naval Network and Space tion. Because the national interests within the their interests in space, and this may include Operations Command, Naval Center for maritime and space domains are strikingly the use of force. Space Technology, Space Research and Design similar, the strategic-level considerations for Furthermore, one’s access to and use Center at the Naval Postgraduate School, and operating at sea and in space will be similar of space are enabled by celestial lines of Coast Guard Navigation Center.4 While these too. As a result, the sea Services have centuries communication.8 Generally stated, celestial contributions are noteworthy, the sea Services’ of maritime experience for considering and lines of communication are those from, into, contribution toward the development of mili- shaping future space strategy. and through space. Since a space-faring tary space strategy has been scant to date. nation’s access to and use of space are vital, This situation is understandable. Mari- Lessons from the Sea Services the primary objective of space strategy is to time and space operations seem to have little Although the national interests within protect and defend one’s own lines, while in common at the tactical level of war, while the maritime and space domains are remark- limiting the enemy’s ability to use his. As with the similarities between air and space opera- ably similar, space is not the sea. These radi- maritime communications, lines of com- tions are readily apparent to even the novice cally different environments—along with munication in space often run parallel to an military tactician. Air and space are adjoining the required technology to operate within adversary’s and may at times even be shared environments, and, consequently, they share them—dictate that the tactics, techniques, with him. Because of this, an adversary’s many of the same required technologies for and procedures in each medium of warfare space communications frequently cannot operation. These similarities in technologies will be distinctly different. Therefore, a mari- be attacked without affecting one’s own. are especially apparent between very high, time-inspired space strategy merely serves as By ensuring access to “lines of passage and fast-flying aircraft and current spacecraft. a strategic springboard for considering those communication” in space, a nation can better The environment of operations and available military operations enabled by space technol- protect its various diplomatic, informational, technology shape military tactics; therefore, ogies or those from, into, and through space. military, and economic endeavors.9 air and space operations are comparable at the Nevertheless, maritime strategy can provide A Balanced Space Strategy. Since force tactical level of war. But the story is different specific insights into topics such as the value is a legitimate option for protecting national when it comes to the strategic level. of space, a balanced approach to space strat- interests in space, space strategy must help As with tactics, military strategy is egy, and the nature of space warfare. determine the proper method of using it. As influenced by the environment in which oper- Value of Space. Space-based assets are with maritime strategy, space strategy must ations are conducted, yet it is also shaped by inextricably linked to today’s global economy. always directly support a nation’s overall those national interests within the operational International conglomerates provide world- military strategy. Consequently, space systems environment.5 Therefore, to formulate space wide telecommunication services, and and assets must operate in concert with other strategy properly, it is necessary to understand orbiting satellites are used extensively for military forces on land, at sea, and in the air. both the environment of operations and the commercial transactions between financial While space systems may engage a hostile national interests within it. The environment institutions and small businesses. Because enemy to achieve solely military ends, they of outer space encompasses distant “bases,” space is used for economic gain, many coun- can also achieve economic ends that impact or hubs of operations, separated along lines of tries view such space-reliant commerce as a an adversary’s long-term warfighting capabil- communication, as exemplified by satellites means of enhancing national power. Toward ity. Such economic actions can negatively in orbit and communication relay stations this end, various space powers have employed impact those revenues gained through space- on Earth continually passing data and infor- international agreements and diplomatic reliant commerce and trade, which otherwise mation back and forth. The list of national haranguing to advocate their own agendas for might have been used to fund future military interests for a space-faring nation includes using and accessing space. These advocating operations. Contrary to the popular senti- using space for economic gain; promoting efforts have ranged from altruistically ensur- ment of some “space power” advocates—yet peace and security; ensuring access to lines ing the equitable use of space by all nations based on centuries of naval warfare experi- of communication that may be shared with to selfishly gaining the most advantageous ence—military space operations alone can a potential adversary; impacting an enemy’s orbital locations or operating frequencies. seldom determine a war’s outcome.10 Thus, economic, commercial, or military interests; Since space affects national power, space strat- most successful military strategies require the maintaining forward presence; projecting egy must correctly discern the value of space combined and effective employment of land, power; deterring an aggressor through offen- and the preferred methods of protecting one’s sea, air, and space assets. sive or defensive means; and working with interests in it. When the use of force is warranted and all the military Services to achieve common Based on the precedent of maritime decisive action is called for, space strategy national objectives. strategy, the inherent value of space is as a must address the best method of achieving To those in the sea Services, this list of means of communication.6 Space communi- either political or military ends, while also strategy-shaping national interests should cations include the movement of personnel, ensuring one’s access to celestial lines of look familiar, for they are also the list of spacecraft, equipment, military effects, data, communication. To achieve these goals, a strategic interests pertaining to the maritime and information, and maintaining such access proper space strategy demands a balanced domain. Broadly considered, even the opera- and use is paramount.7 If a potential adversary approach to both offensive and defensive tional environments of space and the sea have is able to deny one’s access to space, economic strategies. From the time-honored strategies similarities, since both deal with bases and or military disaster could result. Consequently, of land and naval warfare, it is recognized that ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 97 Space Strategy offensive strategy is the more “effective” form also to protect vulnerable and potentially that provide self-defense against offensive of warfare and defensive strategy is the “stron- shared lines of communication at the same attack, harden space systems against electro- ger” form.11 Since both offensive and defensive time. Therefore, both offensive and defensive magnetic damage, or incorporate redundant strategies have inherent strengths and weak- strategies are necessary ingredients in any systems are all suitable methods of supporting nesses, the strategic planner must effectively sound space strategy. this strategy of ensuring access to and use and efficiently integrate these two strategies Nature of Space Warfare. Centuries of of space. Unlike the common interpretation into an overall war plan. maritime experience provide lessons regard- of current space power strategy, defensive Offensive space strategy is called for ing modern warfare using space technologies. strategy is just as effective as offensive strategy when political or military objectives necessi- Since the primary purpose of space strategy in protecting one’s ability to use space, and, tate wresting or acquiring something from the is to ensure one’s access to the celestial lines in some instances, defensive methods may adversary. This may include gaining access to of communication most vital to national be even more effective. The lesson learned is contested lines of communication or achiev- interests, those nations that can ensure access that defensive strategy can confer a similar ing a strategic advantage. Since offensive are able to exercise command of space. For degree of space superiority, as compared to strategy is the more effective form of warfare, those less capable nations who are denied that degree normally attained through offen- it should usually be attempted by a stronger access to lines of communication in space or sive means. As a result, any purported space space power against a less capable one. A force whose technological capability is insufficient strategy having an inordinate focus on the executing an offensive strategy and looking to launch space vehicles into orbit, outer space application of force or the role of weapons is an for a decisive victory, however, will likely not effectively becomes an obstacle. A historical unbalanced and ill-considered strategy. find it because an adversary will usually move understanding of maritime strategy reveals Since space strategy is intended to assets or take defensive measures when attack that by making space a barrier to an adver- ensure access to and use of celestial lines is imminent. A purely offensive strategy does sary, a nation can better control the escalation of communication, a means of doing so is not guarantee eventual success, and a hap- of hostilities and minimize the most devas- needed. In maritime strategy, this is the job of hazard application of offensive strategy often tating enemy counterattacks from, into, or the naval cruiser, which in the classical sense leads to military disaster.12 through space. is a vessel of sufficient range and endurance On the other hand, defensive strategy Moreover, the experience of the sea Ser- to protect distant and dispersed sea lines of is called for when objectives necessitate vices hints at the true nature of space warfare. communication. Because maritime and space preventing the enemy from acquiring some- Some advocates have claimed that employing operations share similar strategic interests, a thing and often enables an inferior force to space-based systems in modern warfare obvi- functional equivalent to the naval cruiser is achieve notable results. If this same inferior ates the need for those defensive strategies needed to protect and defend one’s interests force undertook offensive operations in space. As in the maritime domain, against a superior foe, it would likely the experience of the sea Services hints at vital lines of communication in space meet its own destruction. For this are dispersed in some locations but are reason, the sophomoric adage “the the true nature of space warfare concentrated in others. Consequently, best defense is a good offense” is in space strategy demands the protection fact the strategy of the foolhardy. of the most expansive celestial lines of Defensive strategy incorporates an attitude meant to handle friction and uncertainty. This communication and also the most congested, of alert expectation and does so from a posi- view, however, is incorrect. History has shown such as those at chokepoints.13 tion with strategic advantage. For less capable that ambiguity, miscalculation, incompetence, The key to properly understanding space powers, adopting a defensive strategy and chance are all ingredients during hostili- space strategy is realizing that celestial lines will help protect national interests, ensure ties. It should not be expected that warfare of communication include users and systems access to vital celestial lines of communica- employing space-based technologies would be on land, at sea, and in the air. For this reason, tion, and achieve modest political objectives. any different in this regard. Despite the many a sound space strategy must also incorporate Ultimately, however, offensive and advantages of space-based systems and assets, land, sea, and air assets to protect a nation’s defensive strategies mutually support one such technology will not eliminate friction and access to space. Both space-based and ter- another. Offensive operations are frequently uncertainty, but may at times only reduce it. restrial-based assets should, therefore, be needed to make positive gains and bring With the technological advancement of one employed when executing either offensive or about the enemy’s eventual capitulation. belligerent, the other belligerent is likely to defensive space strategies. Since space strategy Yet defensive operations protect the very find a counter to such advancement. This is must address protecting and defending access lines of communication that make offensive the natural progression of warfare. to and use of space, space-based weapons operations possible. Furthermore, defensive systems that perform purely offensive mis- strategies frequently require fewer forces and Implications sions, while failing to protect one’s access to assets when compared to offensive strategy, A maritime-inspired space strategy has space, are only of secondary importance. so defensive operations in some regions facili- lessons for both warfighters and policymakers. Perhaps the most immediate need is for tate the concentration of forces or effects to As indicated, the primary purpose of space naval professionals to appreciate the fact that support offensive operations in other regions. strategy is to ensure one’s access to celestial their Services’ maritime experience provides The goal of space strategy is not only to defeat lines of communication during times of peace insight into warfare employing space technol- a hostile enemy through offensive means but or war. Therefore, strategies and measures ogies. What was old is new again. Therefore,

98 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu John Klein

Far Left: ADM James D. Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations, speaks at commissioning of U.S. Naval Space Command, 1983

Left: Gen James Cartwright, USMC, Commander, USSTRATCOM, addressing 341st Space Wing at Malmstrom AFB Communications Squadron (Roger M. Dey) Communications Squadron st 341 U.S. Navy (Jay McIntosh) those in the sea Services must embrace and This is not to diminish the contribu- Mission Support (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval study naval history to learn practical lessons tions of the Air Force to date. The United Analyses, March 19, 2002). 5 for the future and make valuable contribu- States is currently the premier space power, A proper strategy necessitates balancing ends tions in formulating today’s military strategy.14 mostly due to the efforts of that Service. Yet with means. The environment of operations— including the strategic positions within it—affects This necessitates a general appreciation of the designation of the Air Force as executive means. See Wolfgang Wegener, The Naval Strategy formal education opportunities, such as those agent for space issues within the Department of the World War (Berlin: E.S. Mittler and Sohn, provided at the war colleges. While naval pro- of Defense does not preclude the sea Services 1929; reprint, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute fessionals do in fact learn through operational from participating in the space strategy Press, 1989), 36, 82, 129. deployments, when it comes to formulating debate. In fact, the same policy designating 6 Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime strategy and discerning the principles of war, the Air Force as executive agent also directs Strategy (London: Longmans, Green, 1911; reprint, only careful study and thoughtful delibera- each of the Services to make valuable contri- Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988), 91–93. tions bring strategic enlightenment. butions in formulating space strategy. 7 Alfred T. Mahan, The Problem of Asia and Its Because the U.S. Navy has the largest There is plenty of room at the space Effect Upon International Policies (Boston: Little, proportional share of personnel among the strategy table for the sea Services. It is time that Brown, 1900), 125. 8 sea Services, it needs to be more proactive they own up to their naval heritage and realize Colonel Peter Zwack, USA, first defined the term celestial lines of communication while con- in defining and shaping space strategy. In that they have a duty to help shape future space ducting research as a Mahan Scholar at the Naval particular, the Navy should stand up a dedi- strategy. For those in the sea Services, now is the War College in 2003. JFQ cated center at its Naval War College to study, time to speak up and be heard. 9 The term lines of passage and communication develop, and debate future U.S. space strategy. is used by Corbett to describe lines of communica- While the Navy provides valuable input into tions at sea. See Corbett, 316. space system requirements, its role in formu- N otes 10 “Space power” was adapted from the “air lating space strategy has been minimal so far. power” strategy of air warfare, whose early dogma 1 Thus, the sea Services need a dedicated center U.S. Commission to Assess United States claimed the nation that wins the opening air of study for thinking about our nation’s naval National Security Space Management and Orga- war is “practically certain to win the whole war.” nization, Report of the Commission to Assess history and discerning the implications for See William “Billy” Mitchell, Our Air Force: The United States National Security Space Manage- the future of space-enabled warfare. Keystone of National Defense (New York: Dutton, ment and Organization (Washington, DC: 1921), xix. See also S.W. Roskill, The Strategy of Sea January 11, 2001), 18. Power: Its Development and Application (London: Call to Arms 2 Paul D. Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Collins, 1962), 20: “[R]arely, if ever, have [wars] It should never be assumed that since Defense, Department of Defense (DOD) Directive been decided by sea power alone.” space strategy is a relatively new concept, the 5101.2, “DOD Executive Agent for Space” (Wash- 11 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. rules and lessons of the past do not apply. ington, DC: DOD, June 3, 2003). Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Space is just another medium to be exploited 3 Thomas D. White, “Air and Space are Indivis- Princeton University Press, 1989), 97, 358; Corbett, for military advantage, not a panacea for ible,” Air Force 4, no. 3 (March 1958), 40–41. 31–33, 310–311. 4 achieving a quick and easy victory. Because The Department of the Navy, however, has 12 Corbett writes that caution must be used space strategy has striking similarities to been repeatedly criticized for not providing ample when deciding in favor of offensive operations; resources—both manpower and funding—to maritime strategy, it can glean lessons from otherwise, naval assets may be thrown away on “ill- ensure its space requirements are adequately hundreds of years of Navy, Marine Corps, and considered offensives.” Corbett, xxviii. determined, articulated, and addressed. Commit- 13 Chokepoints pertaining to space commu- Coast Guard experience to apply to activities tee on the Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing nications include those hubs or systems used as from, into, and through space. Based on a rich Future Capabilities, The Navy’s Needs in Space for uplinks, downlinks, and crosslinks. heritage of defending those same strategic Providing Future Capabilities (Washington, DC: 14 J.K. Laughton, “The Scientific Study of Naval interests that we currently have in space, the National Academies Press, 2005), 4–12; Panel to History,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institu- sea Services are eminently qualified both to Review Naval Space, Report of the Panel to Review tion, vol. 18 (1875), 508–509. consider and develop space strategy. Naval Space: Assured Space Capabilities for Critical ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 99 Terrorist Use of the Internet

using instant messaging or Web forums. The Real Story Instructions, intelligence information, and even funds can be sent and received in seconds via email. Second, Internet use is a low-cost proposition. Terrorist organizations can now affordably duplicate many of the By i R v i n g L a c h o w capabilities needed by modern militaries, governmental organizations, and businesses: and C o u r t n e y R i c h a r d s o n a communications infrastructure, intelligence-gathering operation, training system, and media-savvy public Abu Musab al-Zarqawi used streaming media on Web sites terrorist organizations promoting terrorism can now affordably duplicate many capabilities needed by modern militaries, governmental organizations, and

Web site showing nuclear attack businesses on large city

affairs presence. Third, the ubiquity of the Internet means that small terrorist groups can have a global cyber presence yberterrorism conjures images of and well coordinated, all of which make them that rivals that of much larger organizations. infrastructure failures, economic harder to stop.1 Furthermore, these groups Terrorists not only can communicate with disasters, and even large-scale loss have become expert at using the Internet to each other from almost anywhere in the C of life. It also receives a great deal manipulate both public opinion and media world, but they also can create a Web site that of coverage in the press. While the threat of coverage in ways that undermine American is viewed by millions and possibly even exam- cyberterrorism is real, the hype surrounding interests. In short, rather than attacking the ined daily by media outlets for news stories. the issue often outpaces the magnitude of the Internet, terrorists are using it to survive and Fourth, the growth in bandwidth combined threat. In addition, the term itself deflects thrive. with development of new software has enabled attention from a more mundane but equally This article examines why the Internet unsophisticated users to develop and dissemi- serious problem: terrorist organizations effec- is so useful for terrorist organizations. It then nate complex information via the Internet. tively using the Internet to stymie U.S. efforts considers how terrorists use the Internet for For example, in December 2004, “a militant to win the Long War. strategic advantage and why the threat of Islamic chat room posted a twenty-six- The Internet enables terrorist groups to cyberterrorism may be overstated in many minute video clip with instructions on how operate as either highly decentralized fran- cases. The article concludes with a set of to assemble a suicide bomb vest, along with a chises or freelancers. Similar to information observations and recommendations. taped demonstration of its use on a model of a age businesses, these groups use the Internet bus filled with passengers.”2 Finally, modern to create a brand image, market themselves, Why the Internet? encryption technologies allow Internet users recruit followers, raise capital, identify part- The Internet has five characteristics that to surf the Web, transfer funds, and com- ners and suppliers, provide training materials, make it an ideal tool for terrorist organiza- municate anonymously—a serious (though and even manage operations. As a result, these tions. First, it enables rapid communications. not insurmountable) impediment to intel- groups have become more numerous, agile, People can hold conversations in real time ligence and law enforcement organizations trying to find, track, and catch terrorists. To Dr. Irving Lachow is a Senior Research Professor in the Information Resources Management College at the achieve anonymity, terrorists can download National Defense University (NDU). Courtney Richardson is a Research Associate in the Center for Technology various types of easy-to-use computer security and National Security Policy at NDU. software (some of which is commercial and

100 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Lachow and Richardson

some of which is freely available) or register words of one expert, “it is the strategic—not horrific physical effects via cyber means. The for anonymous email accounts from providers operational—objectives of the jihadi move- most likely scenario of this type is an attack Terrorist Use of the Internet such as Yahoo! or Hotmail. ment’s use of technology that engenders the on the control systems that manage parts most enduring and lethal threat to the United of the Nation’s infrastructure (for example, Internet as Strategic Tool States over the long term.”7 dams, trains, and powerplants). The con- The combination of characteristics sequences of an attack of this kind would described above makes the Internet a valued Cyberterrorism? be serious, so this threat deserves attention. strategic asset for terrorists. In fact, one could It is evident that terrorist groups are However, the actual likelihood of such an argue that the Internet, along with other extremely effective in using the Internet to attack is unknown; different analyses have modern communications technologies, is a further their missions. Are they also using, or reached different conclusions.10 sine qua non of the modern global extremist planning to use, the Internet to launch a major Two things are certain: successfully movements. Successful terrorism requires cyber attack on the United States? We do not launching such an attack would not be easy, the transformation of interested outsiders know, but there are a number of factors that and the consequences are difficult to predict into dedicated insiders.3 Once someone has suggest the answer to this question is no. Ter- due to the incredible complexity and inter- become an insider, less intense but still con- rorism, by definition, is focused on obtaining dependence of critical infrastructures. Given tinuous interactions are required to maintain desired political or social outcomes through a choice of conducting either a cyber attack the needed level of commitment to the cause. the use of tactics that instill fear and horror in whose consequences are unknown (and which target populations. Cyber- may not have the desired effect terror can be defined as: even if it does work) or a physical attack that is almost certain to a computer based attack cause graphic deaths that will or threat of attack create fear, it is understand- intended to intimidate able why terrorists have (so far) or coerce governments chosen the latter. or societies in pursuit of goals that are political, Observations religious, or ideological. Terrorists use the Internet The attack should be suf- Islamic Web site to harm U.S. national security, Subtitle on militant Web site stating “the crime which indicated a complete ficiently destructive or disruptive to generate but not by attacking infrastructure or military abandonment of human values” fear comparable to that from physical acts assets directly. Instead, terrorists use the of terrorism. Attacks that lead to death or Internet to improve their operational effec- Before the advent of advanced com- bodily injury, extended power outages, plane tiveness while simultaneously undermining munications technologies, this process was crashes, water contamination, or major eco- our military and diplomatic efforts to win the entirely based on face-to-face interactions, nomic losses would be examples. . . . Attacks war of ideas. There is little doubt that they are which limited the scope of a given group. that disrupt nonessential services or that are doing both things well. While there is a possi- However, the Internet allows groups to create mainly a costly nuisance would not.8 bility that they may use the Internet to launch and identify dedicated insiders—and to a cyberterror attack against American targets, maintain fervor in those already dedicated to History shows that the vast majority of this threat falls under the broad umbrella of the cause—on a global scale.4 Advanced tech- cyber attacks, even viruses that cause billions critical infrastructure protection—a topic that nologies also allow the extremists to deliver of dollars of damage to an economy, are not is getting a great deal of attention at all levels well-coordinated propaganda campaigns going to cause the levels of fear desired by of government.11 This issue is not addressed that increase the levels of support among the most terrorists. In comparison, using physical here. Rather, the focus rests on the other two general public, which in turn allows terror- means to create terror is fairly easy and quite uses of the Internet—issues that are equally ists to operate freely in these societies. For effective. Put in these terms, it is not surpris- important but often receive comparatively less example, one of al Qaeda’s goals is to use the ing that terrorists prefer to inflict damage focus, energy, and resources. Internet to create “resistance blockades” in with physical means and then use the Internet Terrorist Operational Effectiveness. The order to prevent Western ideas from “further to magnify the results of their handiwork. Internet enables terrorist organizations to corrupting Islamic institutions, organiza- Indeed, while there is clear evidence that operate as virtual transnational organizations, and ideas.”5 One technique they use is terrorists have used the Internet to gather tions. They can use it to raise funds, recruit, to distribute Internet browsers that have been intelligence and coordinate efforts to launch train, command and control, gather intel- designed to filter out content from undesir- physical attacks against various infrastructure ligence, and share information. Clearly, it able sources (for example, Western media) targets, there has not been a single docu- is in the U.S. interest to either disrupt or without the users’ knowledge.6 mented incidence of cyberterrorism against undermine these activities. The good news is In summary, the development and pro- the U.S. Government.9 that relying on the Internet is a double-edged liferation of the Internet have enabled the rise One could argue that terrorists would sword for terrorist organizations: despite of loose, decentralized networks of terrorists use the Internet to attack cyber assets that the many benefits associated with using the all working toward a common goal. In the control physical systems, thereby creating Internet as their main intelligence, command

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 101 Terrorist Use of the Internet and control, and communications system, net to propagate their ideological agenda. This be done for such examples to become the rule this approach carries a few liabilities. Ter- problem is part of the much broader war of rather than the exception. rorist reliance on Web sites and discussion ideas against the extremist Islamic movement. A related point is that the Nation must forums allows outsiders to monitor their Efforts to date have not proven successful, as view the war of ideas as equal in importance methods and track trends. For example, there evidenced by the following statement from to the military and law enforcement aspects are groups such as the SITE Institute that former Secretary of Defense Donald Rums- of the war on terror. The war-of-ideas aspect focus on monitoring terrorist Web sites and feld: “If I were grading I would say we prob- of any decision involving the Long War must providing information to a wide range of ably deserve a ‘D’ or a ‘D-plus’ as a country as be considered at the highest levels of U.S. interested parties, including elements within to how well we’re doing in the battle of ideas policymaking. That emphasis must then be the U.S. Government.12 Reliance on the Inter- that’s taking place in the world today.”15 This communicated down the chain so that all net also creates the opportunity for outsiders is a complex issue that does not lend itself to players understand the importance of message to pose as insiders in order to provide misin- easy answers. in this war. Strategic communications cannot formation or simply to create doubt among be seen as an afterthought of a military opera- the terrorists about whom they can trust. Recommendations tion or as the sole responsibility of an office To that end, the United States should U.S. efforts to influence must be tied to buried within the State Department. The make every effort to infiltrate extremist virtual real-world actions. While it is easy to focus recent announcement that the Office of the communities in order to gather intelligence on the principles of effective communications Secretary of Defense is creating a new office strategies, our words focused on strategic com- will ring hollow if they munications is a move in the are not related to the right direction. Similarly, realities experienced information operations by the target audience. cannot be viewed simply as Thus, it goes without a set of activities done by a saying that what the local commander in support United States does is as of tactical objectives. It is important, if not more clear from past experience so, as what it says. To that such approaches are not that end, diplomatic effective in the long run if Fatah commander in Lebanon with and military influence Islamic Media Center Web site listing they are not tied to strategic ties to al Qaeda using Internet operations must ensure Web sites promoting terrorism considerations. that target audiences are Countering terrorist use of and begin planting the seeds of mistrust that aware of the positive actions undertaken by the Internet to further ideological agendas can disable terrorist cells. We presume that the United States in the Muslim world, while will require a strategic, government-wide governmental activities of this kind are under simultaneously highlighting the negative (interagency) approach to designing and way. Surprisingly, nongovernmental organiza- actions of our enemies. implementing policies to win the war of tions appear to contribute to these efforts as The corollary to this point is that the ideas. For example, to counter terrorist influ- well. For example, individual citizens have United States must effectively get its story ence operations, all Federal agencies should infiltrated terrorist networks via chat rooms out before the terrorists or insurgents can use use the same specific and accurate language and then worked with governmental agencies the Internet to spin events in their favor. It is when referring to Salafist extremists. It is to bring about several arrests.13 much harder to respond to or discredit initial of the utmost importance that American The bad news is that terrorists are doing stories, even ones that are untrue, than to policymakers set their terms of the debate. their best to minimize the liabilities associated establish the baseline facts or perceptions in Expressions such as jihad and mujahideen are with heavy reliance on the Internet. They are the first place. There are certainly elements of part of the popular lexicon describing antiter- quick to learn from mistakes and to dissemi- the U.S. Government making heroic efforts rorist operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and nate best practices on how to defeat the tactics in this area. For example, the Department of elsewhere. However, such terms disempower used by intelligence and law enforcement State maintains a Web site in a number of lan- the United States. Jihad literally means “striv- agencies.14 Terrorist groups are adept at quickly guages (including Arabic, Farsi, and French) ing” and is frequently used to describe every moving their Web sites from host to host, that is devoted to countering false stories that Muslim’s responsibility to strive in the path which makes them difficult to track and shut appear in extremist sources. It also focuses on of God. Mujahideen is closely translated to down (trusted members of these groups use countering disinformation likely to end up in mean “holy warriors.” Such a term may have chat rooms, email, and other forums to share the mainstream media. U.S. Embassies have worked to U.S. advantage in Afghanistan information about the new location of a moved used this resource to counter disinformation against the Soviet Union—however, terms site). They also like to masquerade some activi- in extremist print publications in Pakistan such as these now pit the United States as the ties as legitimate business operations. and elsewhere. There are also military units enemy against holy warriors in a holy war. Terrorist Influence Operations. One of deployed overseas that are exhibiting best Rather, terms such as hirabah (“unholy war”) the most difficult challenges facing the United practices in operational level influence opera- and irhabists (“terrorists”) should become States is countering terrorist use of the Inter- tions.16 Unfortunately, much work remains to part of the popular lexicon.17

102 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Lachow and Richardson

As important as it is for the United States ideology, manipulate the public and media, 10 For differing perspectives on this issue, see to improve its own communications efforts, a recruit and train new terrorists, raise funds, James Lewis, “Cyber Terror: Missing in Action,” key part of countering extremist misinforma- gather information on potential targets, and Knowledge, Technology & Policy 16, no. 2 (Summer 2003), 34–41; and Dan Verton, Black-Ice: The tion and propaganda is to have messages come control operations. If these activities can be Invisible Threat of Cyber-Terrorism (New York: from a variety of sources—preferably some of curtailed, then the viability of the terrorist McGraw-Hill/Osborne, 2003). them local. For example, it is critical for the groups themselves may be put into question. 11 See, for example, The White House, The United States to promote the views of well- To that end, the United States needs to focus National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, February respected Muslim clerics, who counter the more resources into two areas: countering 2003; and Department of Homeland Security, claims made by Islamic terrorists and extrem- the operational effectiveness associated with National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2006. ists. Such efforts have been undertaken by the terrorist use of the Internet, and undermining 12 See Benjamin Wallace-Wells, “Private Jihad,” government of Saudi Arabia, but American Internet-based terrorist influence operations. The New Yorker, May 29, 2006. efforts in this area have been lacking.18 In If it can successfully meet these two chal- 13 For example, see Blaine Harden, “In effect, the Nation should do everything pos- lenges, the United States will make significant Montana, Casting a Web for Terrorists,” The Wash- sible to enable moderate Muslims to develop progress toward winning the Long War. JFQ ington Post, June 4, 2006, A3. 14 For example, see Abdul Hameed Bakier, “The a strong, vibrant, and responsive Internet and Evolution of Jihadi Electronic Counter-Measures,” media presence of their own. N otes Terrorism Monitor 4, no. 17 (September 8, 2006). 15 See . described in Marc Sageman, Understanding 16 An excellent example is found in Colonel Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Penn- Last but not least, resources must be Ralph O. Baker, USA, “The Decisive Weapon: A sylvania Press, 2004), 158–161. made available to support all of these efforts, Brigade Combat Team Commander’s Perspective 4 The recruiting process is usually not entirely plus others that are not mentioned here on Information Operations,” Military Review done in cyberspace. At some point, face-to-face (May-June 2006), 13–32. This article should be but are equally important, such as training meetings are used to assess the level of commitment required reading for everyone in the U.S. Govern- and education to improve understanding of potential members. See Sageman, 163. ment remotely involved in the Long War, and of Muslim cultures and languages spoken 5 Jarret M. Brachman, “High-Tech Terror: especially for Active duty forces heading to Iraq and within these cultures. Current U.S. resources Al-Qaeda’s Use of New Technology,” The Afghanistan. Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 30, no. 2 dedicated to strategic communications, public 17 For more detail, see Douglas E. Streusand (Summer 2006), 160. diplomacy, and information operations are and Harry C. Tunnell, “Choosing Words Carefully: 19 6 Matthew Kovner, “Jihadist Web Browser,” woefully inadequate. On the military side, Language to Help Fight Islamic Terrorism,” Center Terror Web Watch, Terrorism Research Center, the lack of training and education in infor- for Strategic Communications, National Defense February 3, 2006, available at . See mation operations at all levels—strategic, University, available at ; and Jim Guirard, “Hirabah versus Jihad: 7 Brachman, 150. Emphasis in original. commanders to learn on the job and build Rescuing Jihad from the al Qaeda Blasphemy,” 8 Dorothy E. Denning, “Is Cyber Terror Next?” 20 The American Muslim, July 6, 2003, available at information operations teams “out of hide.” in Understanding September 11, ed. Craig Calhoun, . for success in a complex, media-heavy war 9 Evidence of the former is cited in Stephen 18 For more details, see Robert Spencer, “Losing Ulph, “Internet Mujahideen Intensify Research against adversaries who are highly adept at the War of Ideas,” FrontPageMagazine.com, Febru- on U.S. Economic Targets,” Terrorism Focus 3, conducting their own influence operations. ary 5, 2004. no. 2 (January 18, 2006). The latter observa- 19 See, for example, Office of the Under Secre- tion comes from several sources, including Terrorists use the Internet to harm U.S. tary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Weimann, 149; and Joshua Green, “The Myth national security interests, but not by conduct- Logistics, Report of the Defense Science Board Task of Cyber-Terrorism,” Washington Monthly, ing large-scale cyber attacks. Instead, they use Force on Strategic Communication (Washington, November 2002, available at . 20 plan and conduct physical attacks, spread their Baker, 20. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 103 The Officer Corps and Profession By b R i a n J . C o l l i n s

uch has changed in the the concept of fighting in cyberspace to its with Congress, the Department of Defense M 50 years since Samuel mission statement in December 2005. bureaucracy, and contentious issues of inter- Huntington wrote The Soldier and the State: It is important to have a working model Service rivalry, the focus of officership is The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Rela- of profession for the officer corps because war: preparing for war, conducting war, and tions. The prospect of a large standing army neither society nor the officer corps is enam- making life and death decisions under battle in peacetime is no longer viewed as an aberra- ored with the implications of the alternatives. conditions. The officer corps sees itself as a tion but as the normal state of affairs. Further- Modern states monopolize organized violence profession, not a bureaucracy. It is a calling. more, this force is no longer conscript-based, and delegate this function to restricted groups. Officers do not join the military for personal but totally professional; Soldiers, Sailors, Since these groups perform a vital function gain or to amass political power, and their Airmen, and Marines are all volunteers, and must remain obedient to the state, using tenures in senior leadership positions are too adequately paid, and many serve full careers bureaucratic politics or business models to short to enable them to wield any power that through retirement. explain or normalize their behavior runs the they might gain. Instead, many would say Despite the shift away from a man- risk of indicating that bureaucratic or business that officers are part of the traditional profes- power system based on civilian-soldiers grounds might be sufficient justification to sion of arms, whose members have taken on serving short enlistments, the officer corps alter this subordination to the state and/or the obligation of defending the Nation. is not viewed as a threat to society. In fact, society. The professional perspective, on the That profession develops new fields the military is frequently listed as one of the other hand, reinforces the contractual nature of expertise to maintain its relevancy in the most trustworthy institutions in the country. between the profession and society. face of the changing character and nature of Although this is the product of the officer Furthermore, studies of the military warfare, and the officer corps’ composition corps’ and society’s acceptance of Hunting- based on bureaucratic perspectives meet changes as its expertise changes. The primary ton’s argument, his model remains trapped with minimal acceptance in military circles. motivations for these changes are the respon- in time; it does not allow for adaptation of the For example, Air Force officers do not see sibilities inherent in the officer corps as the world changes. In addi- themselves as bureaucrats engaged in daily tion, Huntington’s model does not account for struggles to gain a bit more political power or Service differences and inter-Service rivalry resources here, while defending against Army since it treats the Services as monolithic. It or Navy encroachments there. Although also does not explain why the Air Force added some higher-level staff jobs certainly deal

Colonel Brian J. Collins, USAF, is a Professor of Strategy in the National War College at the National Defense University.

104 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu collins The Officer Corps and Profession Time for a New Model

profession’s contract with society. The general the evolution, or transformation, within the the various levels of professional military edu- public perceives itself to have a stake in the individual Service officer corps, inter-Service cation. No American military officer would officer corps’ composition, and this is more competition, as well as changing concepts of disagree with Huntington’s statement that than an abstract or passing interest. A failure war and combatants. “the modern officer corps is a professional of the officer corps to defend the state would body, and the modern military officer is a have major repercussions. Consequently, Samuel Huntington professional man.”1 major adjustments in professional expertise The Soldier and the State is the classic Huntington’s three points provide require society’s acceptance in the form of an beginning for discussions on the issue of pro- a good structural basis for the descriptive award of jurisdiction over a specific compe- fession and the post–World War II military. model on officership as a profession. Exper- tency to one or more professions. Huntington’s book was first published in 1957, tise is the profession’s peculiar knowledge We begin with the traditional works 10 years into the history of the independent and skill. It is what the profession knows, on concepts of profession within the mili- Air Force. It would not be a stretch to say that teaches, and thinks that it can do. Responsi- tary—Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and all officers are familiar with Huntington’s bility captures both a sense of higher calling the State and Morris Janowitz’s The Profes- definition of a profession involving expertise, in the rather nebulous ideal of defending the sional Soldier—to establish the foundation responsibility, and corporateness, and that Nation by forfeiting one’s life if necessary as of military officership as a profession. We the military’s expertise is the management of well as an agreement of sorts to provide that then turn to Andrew Abbott’s The System of violence. The division of profession into three service if called upon. It is why the profession Professions, paying particular attention to his points appears almost tailor-made to match does what it does. Corporateness concerns major concept that professions are dynamic, traditional military briefing techniques used who makes up the profession and how the competitive, and evolving in a world of at places such as the Service academies and in member and profession as a whole are regu- changing jurisdictions. The resulting descriptive model of profession provides a new perspective for studying

A Predator UAS takes off at Balad Air Force base in iraq U.S. Air Force (Andrew Oquendo) (Andrew U.S. Air Force

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 105 The Officer Corps and Profession

Air Force officer prepares Figure 1. Huntington as the Basis of the launch of Atlas launch vehicle at Cape Canaveral Descriptive Model Air Force Station

the model. First, he presents two officer archetypes that Expertise exemplify the divide he sees growing in the

Corporateness officer corps. In addition, he works through several support- Responsibility ing hypotheses with examples that often illustrate large differences between the individual Services’ officer corps. In the end, it is clear that Janowitz’s overarching premise is that the change in the social and political makeup of military officers is changing the nature of the Figure 2. Janowitz-Type Modiﬁcationsprofession. The profession is not static, but in Added to the Descriptiveflux. Model U.S. Air Force (Jack Braden) The essence of Janowitz’s argument is visionary heroic lated. Finally, although adaptation of Huntington forward to see what manifest in his characterization of officers Huntington treats each insights a study of Janowitz might add. as Struggleone of overthree expertise types: the heroic leader, who point in isolation and in embodies “traditionalism and glory”; the the seemingly static early Morris Janowitz military manager, who is “concerned with

Cold War situation, there In The Professional Soldier: A Social and the scientificExpertise and rational conduct of war”; must be significant interplay Political Portrait, Janowitz analyzesStruggle over social membership and and the military technologist, or technical 2 between the three concepts. political changes in the U.S. Army’s and the specialist. However,visionary Janowitz also writes that Modifying one surely affects Department of the Navy’s highest-ranking the “military technologist is not a scientist, heroic Corporateness the others. career officers over roughly the first half of or for that matter an engineer; basically he is For example, society the 20th century. He also includes Air Force a military manager, with a fund of technical might say that it wants the mili- officers as a group of interest, but a large part knowledge and a quality for dramatizing the Responsibility tary not only to manage violence of that Service’s history is still entwined with need for technological progress.”3 This means abroad but also to provide a the Army during the period of his study. that Janowitz actually only has two arche- disaster relief profession. Doing Janowitz uses the concept of professionvisionary as a types—theheroic heroic leader and the military so would entail a renegotiation tool to analyze changes in the U.S. military manager. of the existing contract of social officer corps. He does not provide a three- Janowitz admits that his distinction responsibility, a broadening of bullet-point definition of profession and, in between heroic leaders and military managers military expertise, and potentially fact, treats it more as a way to categorize offi- is harder to discern in the Air Force than in a modification of its personnel and cers as a specific group of interest. Janowitz the other Services since the new technology procedures to accommodate the new focuses on the changing social makeup of the of the airplane can arguably be placed under area of expertise. Consequently, as officer corps, specifically its evolution from both categories. On the one hand, at least in figure 1 shows, the simple and static a homogenous, somewhat aloof and pseudo- the first half of the 20th century, only a heroic Huntington three-bullet briefing aristocratic social group to a diverse collec- type would dare take wing in a flimsy flying slide transforms into a more complex tion that is more representative of American machine, facing death by accident as much as picture. Expertise, responsibility, and society. In fact, the Air Force leads the other by enemy action. On the other hand, embrac- corporateness are all parts of the Services in terms of the transition to this new ing the airplane as a technological innovation same thing—the profession—and officer corps. Figure 3. Completed Descriptivethat Model, brings new efficiencies to industrial-age the demands of each interact with Janowitz is primarily concernedIncorporating with Abbottwarfare is clearly managerial by Janowitz’s the others within the profession. what he sees as clear implications for civil- description. As far as flying airplanes, Janow- The light blue arrows symbolize military relations in this evolution, andvisionary he heroicitz casts his lot under heroic leadership. He this interaction. We now take this makes several points that are relevant to Strugglethen asserts over expertise that the Air Force has the highest

106 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Expertise Struggle over membership visionary

heroic Corporateness

Responsibility Struggle for Jurisdiction

visionary heroic collins concentrations of heroic leaders in uses two different but overlap- Janowitz’s prophecy has not come to the general officer ranks. Further- Janowitz’s ping systems for organization and pass. Military engineers do not exist as a more, without explanation, he states overarching leadership/management, the terms separate archetype in the Air Force. They are that this heroic style is most appar- premise is leader, manager, command, and subsumed into the prevailing heroic warrior ent in bombers, which also has the that the command and control can quickly and visionary warrior archetypes. The focus highest prestige in that Service. Air change in become hopelessly confused. of the officer corps remains war, not air- Force military managers are more Finally, in the Air Force, vision, planes and technology, and the contentious associated with tactical air forces the social as evidenced by both pilots and issues are how that war should be conducted and air transport, both of which are and political other officers, is the counter to and by what types of people. Consequently, heavily involved in joint operations.4 makeup the heroic traditionalist, although the officer corps was not shunted off into a Janowitz’s main emphasis in of military both were critical to the Air Force’s technical track that could only support mili- 1960 was that the military manager officers is independence. tary courses of action determined by more was on the ascendancy, and the changing the By the time the Air Force broadly minded Army and naval officers. heroic leader was fast disappearing. became independent in 1947, its It is important to note that the arche- The Air Force bomber pilot was nature of the primary justification—indepen- types are just that. They are representations a last bastion of the heroic leader, profession dent, massed, and heroic strategic of particular characteristics and points of but he, too, was no doubt destined bombing raids—was already a view, used as tools to clarify different posi- to transition to civilian style man- piece of history, or at best a prac- tions in the analysis of the changing nature agement techniques. This article borrows tice whose days were plainly numbered in of the Air Force officer corps. Pilots are prob- Janowitz’s idea of the competition between the the face of atomic bombs, long-range ballistic ably more likely to take on the mantel of the two prototypes but modifies the archetypes missiles, radar, and other technologies and heroic warrior archetype, but it is not meant slightly. Today, the case can be made that the innovations. As Janowitz noted: as exclusive of other career fields, nor is it archetypical heroic leader lives on in the form meant to be all-inclusive of every pilot. Pilots, of the combat pilot. Despite the ascendance of air power, the as well as officers in other career fields, also However, the Air Force heroic warrior typical Air Force colonel or general had fall under the visionary warrior rubric. In archetype is not particularly authoritarian, the least consistent self-image. Air Force reality, many officers probably exhibit char- aristocratic, or against technology. He is also traditions are not powerful enough to acteristics of both archetypes at times. For not automatically a “leader.” He is, however, offset the realization that, in the not too this study, however, the heroic and visionary tradition-bound in the sense that he would distant future, heroic fighters and military archetypes struggle to define just who is in stand by the axiom, “The job of the Air Force managers will be outnumbered by military the Air Force officership profession (corpo- is to fly and fight, and don’t you forget it!” He engineers. Air Force officers were fully rateness) and what work (expertise) exactly has a sense of responsibility to the Nation, but aware, but reluctant to admit, that more of encompasses the profession’s self-concept; this ethos is flavored by his perceptions of the a “leadership” role would reside in the Army this forms the basis of claims for jurisdic- Air Force officer corps’ expertise and sense of and in the Navy.5 tional competence. corporateness. To him, the Air Force officer’s expertise is the delivery of weapons from manned aircraft. This formulation already shows a separation from the Air Force’s initial Air Force captain and Airman basis of independence, strategic bombing, and each operate a Predator UAS at an acceptance of technological innovation Balad Air Force base in Iraq on the part of the heroic warrior. In addition, he naturally sees the composition of the Air Force officer corps as paralleling the expertise. He expects pilots to predominate in both quantity and quality in terms of manning senior, key, and combat-critical positions. Janowitz contrasted the heroic warrior with the military manager. However, this study uses the terms visionary and warrior instead of manager for a variety of reasons. First of all, within the military profession, manager has negative connotations. Whereas officers lead people, a storekeeper manages his inventory, the organizational man manages various undifferentiated projects, and a bureaucrat manages a robotic bureaucracy.

Second, because the Air Force simultaneously (Cohen Young) U.S. Air Force ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 107 Figure 1. Huntington as the Basis of the Descriptive Model

Expertise

Corporateness

Responsibility

The Officer Corps and Profession

Figure 2. Janowitz-Type Modiﬁcations the focus of the study of professions from the become quite Added to the Descriptive Model analysis of organizational structures of exist- complex because definitions of the work itself, ing professions to an analysis of the work the jurisdiction, and who or what actually visionary heroic that the professions actually do. This forms the profession itself are in flux. In addi- Struggle over expertise shift leads to different perspectives tion, professions may arrive at compromises on how professions are created, and share jurisdiction, as occurs between exist, evolve, and sometimes psychiatrists and psychologists.

Expertise decline. Through the examina- Although Abbott does not delve at any Struggle over membership tion of professions’ work, it length into the military as a profession, his visionary quickly becomes evident that work provides a catalyst for further explora- many professions are actually tion of the military profession. Although he heroic Corporateness doing similar things. In fact, sometimes treats the military in toto as a they are often competing profession, he does imply at points that each with each other in a particu- Service is an individual profession. Abbott Responsibility lar line of work. In Abbott’s opens the possibility of acknowledging that terms, they are contending for the equipment, training, and doctrine differ visionary heroic jurisdiction. greatly from Service to Service, which results Society does not come up with in different perspectives on war and how to the labels and then create professions wage it. Each Service has its own sense of to handle them. As knowledge, technol- corporateness, with uniforms, traditions, ogy, and culture change, professions develop promotions, education systems, bases, and so Consequently, the descriptive model or move to cover the emerging voids. Voids forth. Although there is a joint Department now looks similar to figure 2. The newly may also develop when a profession moves to of Defense umbrella over all the Services, added outer ring depicts the two archetypes cover a new jurisdiction and either leaves its it does make sense to use Abbott’s work on of heroic warrior (teal blue) and visionary old jurisdiction, or is no longer in a position competition between professions to explore warrior (purple), broken out into each of to control it.6 Professions may also create the differences between the Services. After all, Huntington’s pillars. The red arrows in the perception that there is a void. There is obvi- they are in competition for funding, recruits, outer ring indicate the tension between the ously a strong similarity to business market- status, and perspectives on how best to heroic warrior and visionary warrior arche- ing concepts. In any case, professions play defend the Nation. The Services have specific typesFigure in 3.the Completed areas of expertise Descriptive and corporate Model,- a role in the labeling process, which in turn competencies or missions, which are essen- ness. ExpertiseIncorporating tends to be dominatedAbbott by the affects which profession gets to handle the tially jurisdictions that they try to monopo- visionary archetype, as illustrated by the long- problem. This is a key part of Abbott’s concept lize. Consequently, the model herein treats standing involvementvisionary with a varietyheroic of missile of jurisdiction: the Air Force officer corps as a profession in types, the growing influence of commandStruggle over and expertise its own right. control systems in the profession, the recent But to perform skilled acts and justify them Abbott uses “the very loose definition introduction of unmanned combat aircraft, cognitively is not yet to hold jurisdiction. that professions are exclusive occupational and the addition of cyberspace to theExpertise mission In claiming jurisdiction, a profession asks groups applying somewhat abstract knowl- 8 statement.Struggle Technology over membership has a large impact on society to recognize its cognitive structure edge to particular cases.” The term abstract expertise. The concept of corporateness is through exclusive rights; jurisdiction has not knowledge mirrors Huntington’s concept of visionary most heavily dominated by the heroic arche- only a culture, but also a social structure. professional knowledge. The skill required of heroic Corporateness type since a range of things—from uniforms These claimed rights may include absolute a professional is more than a simple physical and pilot wings, to education, promotions, monopoly of practices and of public pay- ability or a routinized process. It involves and discussions as to whether ments, rights of self-discipline thinking and applying the professional non-pilots are really membersResponsibility Struggleand forof unconstrainedJurisdiction employ- knowledge to new situations. A surgeon of the profession or are fit to the Services ment, control of professional requires some hand-eye coordination, but command—fall visionaryin this bailiwick. heroichave specific training, of recruitment, and what makes medicine a profession is the Responsibility is depicted as equal competencies of licensing, to mention only a ability to use medical knowledge and skills in between the archetypes since both or missions, few. . . . The claims also depend reaching a diagnosis and treating the patient see the obligation in similar terms; which are on the profession’s own desires; and modifying the diagnosis or treatment if there is no struggle over the pillar not all professions aim for domi- needed. As the use of computer-assisted lasers of responsibility. essentially nation of practice in all their and robotics increases, the doctor’s knowledge jurisdictions jurisdictions.7 and skill are still recognized as what merits Andrew Abbott that they try professional status. Therefore, in Huntington’s Andrew Abbott, in The to monopolize This simple example indi- terms, Abbott includes corporateness and System of Professions, changes cates that the competition can expertise in his definition, but he completely

108 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Figure 1. Huntington as the Basis of the Descriptive Model

Expertise

Corporateness

collins

Responsibility

Air Force lieutenant plans intelligence mission with Royal Thai air force flight leader excludes ideas of social during Exercise Cope Tiger responsibility. He ignores responsibility because by making the work his emphasis, occupations such as the auto mechanic and the medical doctor turn out Figure to be 2.quite Janowitz-Type similar at a certain Modiﬁcations level of abstraction Added in terms to the of diagnosing,Descriptive Model inferring, and treating a problem. Most people wouldvisionary reject the heroic comparison’s implication that mechanStruggle- over expertise ics are a profession with the same status as medical doctors. They would quickly run through a structure similar to Expertise Huntington’s and point out that mechan- Struggle over membership ics lack a broad-based education, have a visionary minimal sense of corporateness, and no social heroic responsibility. The Corporatenesscounters are that a doctor’s broad-based education does not contribute to (Keith Brown) U.S. Air Force most diagnoses and that the medical corpo- essentially create economic monopolies over cannot be met; it may then lose its jurisdic- rateness has been used to Responsibilitycreate the illusion of specific services that tend to be beyond state tion. In such a profession, however, the only social responsibility in the doctor’s case. The or market controls. ways to increase output are to lower the entry doctor has professional status partly because Abbott points out that the concept standards or let subordinate professions visionary heroic traditional professions are associated with of professions can become twisted in the grow to take up the slack. However, Abbott higher socioeconomic levels of society. As workplace. If a professional is incompetent, cautions that this has only been successful in Abbott and many others who study profes- or there is too much professional work in an the medical arena. Elsewhere, the profession sions point out, there is a darker version of organization, the organizational imperative does not adapt or cannot quickly modify its profession. That is, it can be argued that, first, may require a nonprofessional to pick up the requirements, so other professions or formerly professions actually define social needs that slack. Workplace assimilation occurs when subordinate professions jump into the void match their services; second, the leadership of nonprofessionals pick up an abridged version and win jurisdiction.9 a professional organization can dominate the of the profession’s knowledge system through The Army Air Corps’ heavy reliance membership instead of relying on a collegial on-the-job experience or training. The mili- on the Aviation Cadet Program is arguably a organizational style; and, third, professions tary offers numerous examples, especially successful case of lowering entry standards to with the overlap of senior noncommissioned increase output, and the Air Force’s eventual officers and junior officers. In fact, the case independence from the Army could be por- Figure 3. Completed Descriptive Model, can be made that noncommissioned officers trayed as a case of a subordinate profession Incorporating Abbott are part of the profession. growing to take up the slack. In addition, the Finally, Abbott points out that profes- historically increasing percentages of non- visionary heroic sions often set high barriers to entry, pilot Air Force officers and general officers requiring extensive education and can be portrayed as the changing of Air Force Struggle over expertise exams, for example. This tends to officer corps entry standards in order to meet keep the profession small in terms increased demand for its professional work. of members but higher in terms In the end, Abbott’s concept unveils Expertise of quality standards. In addi- jurisdictional struggles between professions Struggle over membership tion, it keeps the profession and is a useful addition to the model. The visionary monopolistic. However, such a completed descriptive model is shown in heroic Corporateness profession runs into prob- figure 3. The dark blue arrow indicates the lems when demand struggle between the Air Force officer corps for its work and outside groups for jurisdiction in areas in Responsibility Struggle for Jurisdiction which the officer corps believes it has or wants to have expertise or jurisdiction. In areas that the officer corps believes it has expertise but visionary heroic no jurisdiction, it is seeking jurisdiction or attempting to create public awareness that a new jurisdiction has been created that it ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 109 The Officer Corps and Profession

Secretary of the Air tics but on a conviction that the Air forms of warfare were born out of airpower Force Michael W. Force officer corps’ visionary sense but break out of the currently medium- Wynne announces of its particular expertise is the defined box of jurisdictions and go beyond creation of Air best way to win wars and defend airpower and incorporate space, the electronic Force Cyberspace Command the Nation. The Air Force officer ether, counter–command and control, and corps has had difficulty articulat- cyber and information warfare—hence the ing this point of view because it is Air Force’s incorporation of cyberspace in its trapped to an extent in the concep- mission statement in December 2005. tion that the military profession Transformation in technology also led is a single, static, multi-Service to a transformation of the officer corps. As entity. This model eliminates that technology reduced the required workforce problem and yields interesting and shifted the locus of decisionmaking perspectives. authority to higher, more centralized levels, it On a broader scale, this became clear that the old way of doing busi- model of profession explains ness was fast coming to a close and that new the transformation of the career paths would be needed for the new Air Force officer corps, its decisionmakers. Consequently, the Air Force expertise, and potentially its has instituted a new officer career develop- jurisdiction. As new technolo- ment plan. However, pilots remain overrepre- U.S. Air Force (Cohen Young) U.S. Air Force gies emerged and world events sented in the general officer ranks because of should fill. If the officer corps unfolded, the Air Force’s mis- past structural factors that stem largely from already has jurisdiction in an sions and the officer corps’ expertise began strategies that the officer corps employed in area, it must defend that claim to change. The concept of airpower began its struggle to establish itself as a new profes- against competitors. For sim- to shift from an airplane-centric view as it sion, independent of the Army officer corps. plicity, the diagram does not absorbed tertiary supporting areas. New tech- In fact, this has masked the dramatic changes show the outside groups, but nologies for aircraft and weapons meant fewer in the Air Force officer corps’ expertise, com- they would be represented as aircraft were needed to accomplish more position, and jurisdiction. In the meantime, other spheres in a three-dimen- tasks. Aircraft and weapons technology also the Air Force officer corps reassures society sional space. As soap bubbles, as began to shift the locus of decisionmaking out that the profession is continuing to meet its the professions compete, the per- of the cockpit. As quality began to substitute obligation to defend the Nation with airpower, sonnel and missions at the periph- for quantity, it became more important to while simultaneously seeking a grant of eries may become entwined, and have centralized control over these fewer monopolistic jurisdiction over C2, communi- the dominant profession may aircraft. In addition, targeting and planning cations systems, ISR, and visionary forms of totally absorb the other. Con- required more intelligence support. Further- warfare, as in cyberspace. Communications versely, as was the case with the more, the growth of command and control systems, C2, and ISR are important because Air Force officer corps, a bubble systems led to the need to counter enemy they form the backbone of all Air Force opera- might develop within an existing command and control. tions today—nothing can be done without profession’s bubble, and then pop off, Matters such as the use of space for them—and visionary forms of warfare are forming its own bubble. It is also pos- communications, navigation, and reconnais- important because they may replace manned sible for the bubbles to remain intact sance, electronic warfare, information, and flying operations tomorrow. JFQ and share a jurisdiction or for a new cyber warfare, that were initially developed to profession’s bubble to seemingly pop manage, lead, assist, or protect aircraft per- N otes out of nowhere—that is, to come from forming airpower missions, began to eclipse a nonprofession, with personnel and aircraft in importance. The term airpower was 1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the expertise to fill a new jurisdiction. contorted in all sorts of ways and no longer State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Rela- fits. The Air Force officer corps is still very tions (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1985), 7. Why Does It Matter? much about flying and airpower, but that is 2 Ibid., 21. 3 The Air Force officer corps, like no longer its primary focus. Over time, it has Ibid., 164. 4 each of the Service officer corps, con- developed command and control (C2); com- Ibid., 161. 5 siders itself a special breed within the munications systems; and intelligence, sur- Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, military profession. In the Air Force veillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in order 1971), 228. case, the culture is that of Airmen to support and manage the organization’s 6 Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions: and airpower, which is believed to be application of violence, while simultaneously An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (Chicago: beyond the capacities of mere earth- opening the door to further visionary forms University of Chicago Press, 1988), 3. bound mortals to understand or to of warfare, such as cyber and information 7 Ibid., 59. participate in. This dichotomy is not warfare and effects-based operations. Com- 8 Ibid., 8. based in a sense of bureaucratic poli- munications systems, C2, ISR, and visionary 9 Ibid., 84.

110 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu Last Flight from Koh Tang The Mayaguez Incident a Generation Later U.S. Air Force (Hans Deffner) U.S. Air Force

The SS Mayaguez By D avid R. Met s before its capture

A–7 acquired intelligence on Koh Tang and SS Mayaguez after its capture

OV–10 provided air support

Richard Nixon resigned in the face of what seemed certain impeachment. President Gerald Ford had assumed the office without being elected. Many thought the rest of the

U.S. Navy (Douglas Tesner) world was wallowing in the notion that America, defeated and humiliated by a third- he night was clear and the air us. I knew that we would obliterate it with rate power, had become a helpless giant. stable. We could see the SS May- the first shot from our 105mm Howitzer. Our It was just at that moment, on the after- aguez resting barely a mile to the navigator was desperately begging Cricket1 for noon of May 12, 1975, that the communist T north. We were at 7,500 feet in permission to open fire. Cambodians, exuberant in the wake of their a lazy orbit to the left in an old 573, a trusty recent victory over their U.S.-sponsored AC–130H. She was in fine shape; none of her The Context enemies, grabbed the SS Mayaguez. This complex systems was at less-than-optimum In the spring of 1975, the United States merchant ship was proceeding through interna- condition. The copilot was holding the speed had suffered some of the most humiliating tional waters, carrying exchange merchandise. perfectly, and the autopilot was maintaining experiences in its existence. Only months It was headed northwestward toward a destina- altitude. It was a piece of cake to keep the before, our prisoners had been released in tion in southern Thailand. The Mayaguez was plane on geometry (that is, to keep the aircraft North Vietnam. Our forces had withdrawn, not a big ship, but it was under the American in coordinated flight with the guns pointed and just a couple of weeks before the Maya- flag with a crew of 39 people of various nation- directly at the target). All the guns were ready, guez was captured by the Khmer Rouge, both alities, including American citizens. and our crew was eager to shoot. I gazed Saigon and Phnom Penh had fallen to com- The Mayaguez managed to get off an sideways through my heads-up display and munist forces. Only months earlier, President SOS before being captured, but the Khmers could see the muzzle flashes of the gun below. Located on the northeastern beach at Koh Dr. David R. Mets is a Military Defense Analyst at the Air University College of Air and Space Doctrine, Tang, the gun’s tracers were arcing far beneath Research, and Education. Dr. Mets is a former AC–130 pilot and squadron commander.

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 111 The Mayaguez Incident a Generation Later

U.S. Air Force AC–130H provided air support during rescue operation for SS Mayaguez

from took Okinawa to U-Tapao the ship without via Air Force C–141s, and B–52s at any casualties and brought it to anchor near the boat in the haze. Jets were monitoring the Guam went on alert. The Air Force units in Puolo Wai Island. The SOS was relayed to situation at Koh Tang during the day with the Thailand hurried down to Koh Tang to keep Washington in short order, and that evening a help of tankers, and the 388th TFW AC–130s track of the situation. Helicopters from all over U.S. Navy P–3 Orion located the Mayaguez at with their radars, low-light televisions, and Thailand converged to muster at U-Tapao. the island. On Tuesday, May 13, the ship was infrared sensors continued the work through The USS Coral Sea, an attack carrier, was near reported under way, presumably headed for the night of May 13. Australia. The carrier changed course for the the Cambodian mainland port of Kompong Gulf of Siam and steamed toward the trouble Som about 90 miles to the northeast. This The Planning as fast as possible. The amphibious carrier aggravated fears in Washington because it The work continued after dawn on USS Hancock, in port at Subic Bay in the recalled the experience of the USS Pueblo May 14 while deliberations were going on Philippines, likewise set out with its Marines 7 years earlier. The latter had been brought in Washington, Hawaii, and Thailand. As and helicopters with all possible haste. The into a North Korean port before forces could always, information was in short supply, and surface warships USS Holt and USS Wilson be marshaled to stop it. Once taken to the the planners had to fill gaps in their knowl- were closer to the action and sped on without interior, the chances of rescuing a crew with edge with assumptions. Unhappily, perhaps, delay. Twelve Sailors and merchant mariners military force were much diminished. there were more planners than information. also flew out of Subic for U-Tapao in case their Captain Charles Miller, skipper of the The President, National Security Council, and expertise was necessary to sail the Mayaguez Mayaguez, managed to dissuade the Khmers Joint Chiefs of Staff were working in Wash- away after recovery. The State Department from going into Kompong Som with the claim ington. The authority in Thailand was the attempted to contact the Cambodians through that his radar was out and that he could not U.S. Support Activities Group (USSAG/7AF) the Chinese and to make approaches to the safely bring the ship in without it. Thus, the commander, Lieutenant General John J. United Nations for assistance.2 Khmers decided to bring it to anchor off the Burns, USAF, at Nakhon Phanom. He sent During this time, I was the operations north end of Koh Tang, an island closer to the the commander of the subordinate 17th Air officer of the 16th Special Operations Squad- mainland but still well outside 12 miles and Division to the coastal base at U-Tapao to ron (SOS) equipped with the AC–130s. Our under disputed ownership. serve as the on-scene commander there. He job was to be ready to maintain surveillance There were still three U.S. Air Force also tried to get authority to go directly to and halt waterborne traffic through the fighter wings in Thailand, and on May 13, the National Military Command Center in night—with no idea how many nights might they were ordered to monitor the Mayaguez Washington for orders, bypassing the regional be involved. The squadron commander flew and attempt to prevent further movement of commander at U.S. Pacific Command down to Koh Tang through Tuesday night, the ship and the crew. This included direction (USPACOM) in Hawaii. But the USPACOM so I was left in charge of assuring that we to stop waterborne traffic both ways between commander would have none of that. Thus, had enough rested crews on alert and ready the mainland and the island. They managed the USSAG commander had no Army, Navy, airplanes to maintain watch all night, every this well, sinking three Cambodian gunboats or Marine units under his command. Neither night. It took over an hour to fly down to Koh and damaging four others. However, they the C–141s all over the Pacific, nor the B–52s Tang, and each aircraft could remain on the could not stop a captive Thai fishing boat at Guam, nor the KC–135 tankers there or at scene for about 4 hours before coming back. from moving to Kompong Som on that same U-Tapao were under his direction. However, None of our latest airplanes was equipped day. A 388th Tactical Fighter Wing the long distance communications with external tanks. Neither the AC–130A (TFW) A–7 pilot reported seeing then had advanced to the point nor AC–130H was capable of aerial refueling. Caucasians on its deck during once taken to where he could instantly speak with Moreover, the older AC–130A did not have low passes. Many shots were fired the interior, USPACOM or the National Military the endurance of the AC–130H, even when across the bow, and riot control the chances Command Center. configured with external tanks. The gunship agents were dropped. The Thai of rescuing Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs was, therefore, a limited resource and would crew was in favor of returning to a crew with of Staff under General David Jones, have to be conserved if it was to be the sole Koh Tang, but the Khmer guards USAF, were getting forces rolling source of surveillance and firepower in the persisted. Aircraft followed the military force well before the plan took shape. hours of darkness. boat, but the rules of engagement were much The Navy was ordered to find and On Wednesday, I knew, or thought I prohibited going inside 12 miles of diminished monitor the ship with its patrol knew, from the intelligence brought back by the coast, so the pilots lost track of aircraft. A thousand Marines flew our A–7 pilot that the Mayaguez crew was

112 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu METS not on Koh Tang. But this was not so clear and 5 crewmembers, so there were only 11 wave of landings on Koh Tang. The landing back in Washington. There, the thought had operational choppers left. Three of these were force of eight helicopters was not so fortunate. arisen that only a part of the crew was gone to be used for a Mayaguez boarding party. The insertion began on both eastern and and the rest might still be on the The remaining eight would simul- western beaches at 0609 on May 15. Accord- 3 island. Also, there were wildly the option of taneously land the first wave of ing to Captain Miller of the Mayaguez, at varying estimates as to the Khmer Marines on Koh Tang. The Coral about the same time that day, 0620, and many strength there. The landing bombing the Sea by then was to be close enough miles away, he and his crew, along with the Marines thought they would meet mainland with to launch an attack wave to bomb Thai captive crewmen, were put back aboard only token resistance. The com- B–52s was the airfield at Kompong Som just the fishing boat for the trip back to their own munications between the higher rejected as as the Marines were landing. No ship—without Khmer escorts. commands and the Marines at overkill prelanding bombardment was The guns on the eastern beach had a U-Tapao were not adequate, and permitted for fear that part of better shot at the low-level inbound helicop- some of the things known to the Mayaguez crew was still on ters than they had at old 573 the night before. USSAG were not passed on to the island. Air Force assets were Almost immediately, two of the choppers were them. Lieutenant Colonel Randall Austin, to be overhead, however, to deliver close air shot down on the approach. Fifteen Airmen, USMC, was designated to command the support after the Marines were ashore. They Marines, and Sailors died at that point. Some landing force. He commandeered an Army could not be used for operations against the did survive, however, and they struggled out U–21 to fly down to Koh Tang for visual mainland because that would be a violation of of the water and headed for the tree line to get reconnaissance but was not allowed to go Thai national sovereignty, which was stressed some cover from the heavy fire. Unhappily, below 6,000 feet, so he could learn little. In enough with the operations at U-Tapao.6 their standard radios for controlling close air Washington, there was urgency about it all. support were lost in the surf, and it was not Some have said it was because of the memory The Execution easy to organize air support without them. of the Pueblo capture; others have argued that I never did get to fire a shot on that Soon, though, some communication with President Ford and Secretary of State Henry Wednesday night. Enemy fire was consistently the aircraft above was set up using a survival Kissinger had the need to show the rest of the coming up at us from the beach at the north- radio on guard frequency. world that the United States was not a paper eastern cove of Koh Tang. Cricket refused The landings on the western beach tiger—that the Nation still could be relied permission to return fire and ordered us to were not as bad but still were no picnic. The upon as a formidable partner. Moreover, the leave the area. So old 573 sped off northward opposition was so fierce that Colonel Austin’s argument went, Kim Il-Sung in North Korea to spread the alarm about the antiaircraft fire command group was not landed on the needed to be sent a message; some were afraid coming up at Koh Tang’s northeastern cove. proper beach but many yards to the south that he would take advantage of our tempo- There had been no surface traffic during our and out of contact with the main group. After rary weakness by aggressive moves in the midnight watch, but we informed the debrief- several approaches, the choppers were able to Korean Peninsula.4 ing intelligence officer of the exact location offload their Marines safely. Another helicop- The option of bombing the mainland of the enemy gun and wearily went to bed ter was lost in this operation. It took heavy fire with B–52s was soon rejected as overkill.5 during the early hours of Thursday morning. but was able to fly away from the beach a bit, Gradually, a plan was maturing to land By 0600, I was back in the squadron trying and the pilot ditched the helicopter at sea. Part Marines on Koh Tang to rescue the prisoners to make sure that we had crews and aircraft of the crew was rescued. No one at Koh Tang while at the same time bombing Kompong lined up for the midnight rides of May 15. had any knowledge that the Mayaguez crew Som with tactical airpower from carriers. The three choppers taking Marines to had already been released. Austin still thought The political leadership wanted to know if it the USS Holt quickly did their jobs. They then that his mission was to sweep the island to could be done on Wednesday, May 14. But returned to U-Tapao to prepare for the second find the crew, but his isolated position and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were strongly against this plan as being too hasty. Later, some in the media claimed that the administration was unwilling to give diplomacy a chance because it might deprive it of a fleeting opportunity to prove that the United States was not weak. But the military leaders argued that they could not be ready that early—in fact, they wanted to delay the landings and the bombing until Friday, May 16. The resulting compromise was that the helicopters gathered at U-Tapao would carry the Marines to Koh Tang at first light on Thursday, May 15. One of the special

Marines return from Koh Tang rescue U.S. Navy (R. L. Stora) operations helicopters from Nakon Phanom operation to USS Coral Sea had crashed, killing 18 security policemen ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 113 The Mayaguez Incident a Generation Later the fierce opposition rest, the operations went prevented him from there were so few choppers it appeared the landing force on as normal. At first, reuniting the three might have to stay on the beach until the next day in the exuberance of the fragments of his force. moment, the word that Meanwhile, came down from on high the Cambodians had stay on the beach until the next day—which was that everyone who made a radio broadcast in their own language would mean that the 16th SOS would have to flew in the episode would get an air medal, at about the time of the initial landings.7 They supply an air umbrella of its AC–130s over and those who fired their weapons a distin- had declared that they were going to release them through yet another complete night. guished flying cross. Still using typewriters, the ship (with no mention of the crew). Not During the morning, Cricket had ordered one that kept a bunch of folks out of trouble for 3 long after, there were air reports of the fishing of its gunships to tarry in the area and then weeks; there were 14 members on each crew boat proceeding toward the island with white to go into U-Tapao for refueling and return to and the total mounted up. But the chest- flags flying. The Coral Sea was still some Koh Tang. It did vital work supplying precise thumping quickly disappeared. As soon as the miles away but close enough to be launching close air support when the enemy was so word came down that a General Accounting its first wave of attacks. The uncertainties close to the Marines that bombs could not be Office team was to visit us and the other air made President Ford put a temporary hold used. However, there were no fresh crews at units in Thailand on an investigation of the on the mainland attacks, but by the time U-Tapao, and the delay in the return of the incident, all those medal recommendations he decided to go ahead, the Navy aircraft airplane and crew so disrupted the flow that were junked and only air medals were to go to were so low on fuel that they had to jettison we would have been hard pressed to keep up the crews who fired their weapons. their bombs into the sea and return to their constant air cover through the night of May What caused the Khmers to release the ship. The second attack wave was launched 15. Happily, that was not necessary because of crew? That is still unresolved. It could have and hit targets as ordered, as did the third the timely arrival of the USS Coral Sea. been their intention all along, as with the wave—both after the Mayaguez crew had The presence of the ship eliminated the crews of other ships that they had detained been released. time-consuming round trip to U-Tapao for in the preceding days. It might have been Once President Ford had confirmed that the H–53s and even provided the maintenance because the local commander at sea acted both ship and crew had been recovered safely, and refueling help to keep them in commis- without orders, and he was countermanded he ordered the withdrawal. Only three flyable sion. One chopper had a fuel line shot out, and as soon as the senior leadership in Cambodia helicopters had made it back to U-Tapao, the aircraft crew, assisted by ship’s personnel, learned what he had done. It might have been but two more had come out of maintenance jury-rigged a repair out of rubber hose. On that the Khmer leaders were properly dis- in the interim. They all loaded up Marines another extraction, an Air Force junior officer suaded by the sinking of the gunboats and the and quickly turned around for Koh Tang. decided that the trip to the Coral Sea was display of airpower prior to the Marine land- En route, after President Ford ordered the too far, so he decided to offload his Marines ings. Because the Cambodians announced withdrawal, those five choppers were ordered through the front door while hovering, as the their intention to release at the time of the back to U-Tapao with their Marines. However, USS Holt helipad was too small for an H–53 landings, which was done within the next 20 when Colonel Austin discovered this, he landing. In so doing, though, he was able to minutes, they could not yet have known of protested and asked that the second wave be shorten the turnaround to save more lives. On the assault. Thus, they were not coerced by delivered as planned. He still did not know the very last extraction, while his pilot was the landings. As the crew was released long the Mayaguez crew had been recovered and hovering with the tail ramp over the beach, before the first bomb fell on Kompong Som, believed that he had to sweep the island. By an Air Force technical sergeant, Wayne Fisk, the attacks on the mainland could not have the time the second wave arrived, the close air decided on one last sweep on foot around the persuaded them. It is highly unlikely that support was working a bit better, and though western beach in search of any Marines who they knew of the B–52s on alert at Guam, so the opposition was still fierce, they were able might be still there. He found two, and the last it is equally unlikely that they were the cause to get their Marines ashore without loss of men seen on the island scampered back aboard of the release. Moreover, the decisionmakers more aircraft or men. It was only at this time the last flight from Koh Tang. It was over. probably did not know of the inbound USS that Austin discovered from the incoming Unhappily, a Marine machinegun Hancock with its impressive load of Marines, wave that his mission was canceled and that crew had been isolated to the south of the rotary-wing gunships, and additional troop- the task now was to make a safe withdrawal. lodgment and three of them were indeed left carrying choppers. However, maybe they did behind—all three killed by the Khmers, and realize that they had stung a giant and that The Withdrawal their names are the last ones entered on the dire things would be possible if they did not Gradually, the Marines, now with some- Vietnam Memorial in Washington.8 act quickly. what better air support directed by forward air controllers in OV–10s, were able to con- The Aftermath Did U.S. action properly impress the solidate their forces on the western beach and Some Thais, especially the political rest of the world as to the Nation’s capabil- to set up some reasonable defenses. However, leaders, were unhappy with the United States.9 ity and will? There were many declarations the outbound trip was not promising. There There was no delaying the redeployment of in the media that said so, but most of them were so few choppers left for the work that our older AC–130As. That we got them all were in America. Even at the time, many it appeared the landing force might have to out on time was a minor miracle. For the overseas reporters scoffed. As always, there

114 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu METS were arguments on both sides among foreign between Nakhom Phanom and Washington (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing nations. That the United States was able to without the knowledge of the ground com- Office, 1975), 104. 4 marshal such forces on such short notice may manders at the scene. Michael J. Hamm, “The Pueblo and Mayaguez Incidents,” Asian Survey, no. 28 (June have impressed some as to the dangers of The AC–130s had frequently trained 1977), 554; “Uncle Sam’s Schooldays,” Far Eastern being an adversary and the benefits of friend- with the HH–53s and A–7s in simulated Economic Review (May 30, 1975), 9; “Machismo ship. Others also argued that the United States rescue exercises, practicing on-scene Diplomacy,” The Nation (May 31, 1975), 643. is irrationally quick on the trigger, and that command and control and close air support. 5 Gerald R. Ford, The Autobiography of Gerald may have induced caution in potential adver- However, there had been no training at all R. Ford: A Time to Heal (New York: Berkley, 1979), saries.10 Some sympathized with Cambodia in conjunction with the Marines, nor any 272, claimed that he rejected the B–52 attacks in on the territorial waters claims.11 practice of assault landing operations. Nor favor of carrier bombing because he thought the Since President Ford was not elected, had there been any training with the Navy. latter would be more surgical and proportionate to there was a good deal of domestic discontent Because all the personnel in the air units desired results. 6 at the time, and some were arguing that he in Thailand had been on 1-year tours, such “Uncle Sam’s Schooldays,” 9; Cecile Men- was insufficiently “Presidential” to manage experience and training were highly perish- etrey-Monchau, “The Mayaguez Incident as an Epilogue to the Vietnam War and Its Reflection of the affairs of a great country.12 After the initial able. This was also the case with the Marines the Post-Vietnam Political Equilibrium in South- euphoria, the opposition soon began to find on Okinawa, who were on tours of limited east Asia,” Cold War History, no. 5 (August 2005), fault. They argued that the whole thing was an duration. 349–350; John F. Guilmartin, A Very Short War overreaction for the purpose of political cam- As the Bay of Pigs, the Son Tay Raids, (College Station: Texas A&M, 1995), 149. paigning. Also, when the victims in the heli- and the Pueblo crisis before the Mayaguez 7 Christopher J. Lamb, “Belief Systems and copter crash were added to the 18 who died on suggested, if something can go wrong, it will— Decision Making in the Mayaguez Crisis,” Political Koh Tang, the total came to 41—more than even when there is time for detailed planning Science Quarterly, no. 99 (Winter 1984–1985), 682. the number of people who had been rescued. and rehearsal. Five years after the Mayaguez 8 Those lost were PFC Gary L. Hall, USMC, Henry Kissinger had been criticized as saying incident, Desert One went down in the attempt Lance Corporal Joseph N. Hargrove, USMC, and that the lives of the Mayaguez crewmembers to rescue the Iranian hostages. It did not do Private Danny G. Marshall, USMC. 9 were secondary considerations, which raised a any more than the Mayaguez case to recom- Norman Peagam, “Thailand’s Turn to Protest,” Far Eastern Economic Review (May 30, storm of protest.13 The argument went that he mend the efficiency of U.S. joint operations. 1975), 12. was so power hungry that impressing foreign It was not really in the same category because 10 Hamm, 551. adversaries was more important than life it was a preplanned event, but like President 11 Michael Morrow, “Ford: Fastest Gun in the itself. It was soon known that General Jones Ford, President Jimmy Carter was to pay the East,” Far Eastern Economic Review (May 30, 1975), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been arguing political price for the shortfalls. Both events 10; “Machismo Diplomacy,” 642. for a delay until Friday. That added force to were factors in the genesis of the Goldwater- 12 William Shawcross, “Making the Most of the argument that haste makes waste and that Nichols legislation, and subsequent joint Mayaguez,” Far Eastern Economic Review, no. 88 lives would not have been lost at all on Koh operations do seem to have improved. JFQ (May 30, 1975), 10; Lloyd C. Gardner, “Foreign Tang had that advice been accepted. To claim Policy in IV Acts,” The Nation (July 19, 1975), 41; that President Ford lost the election of 1976 N otes Menetrey-Monchau, 338. 13 because of the incident would certainly be an Shawcross, 687. 1 oversimplification, as there were many other Cricket was the call sign for an airborne factors involved. command and control center built into a C–130 that could loiter in a battle area for long periods, provid- At that stage of the game, strategic ing direction and control for the lethal aircraft. when the victims in communications had advanced to the point 2 U.S. Comptroller General, “The Seizure of the helicopter crash where micromanagement was a real problem. the Mayaguez—A Case Study of Crisis Manage-

were added to the Fleet Combat Camera (Brien Aho) Cricket could communicate directly with the ment,” a report to the Subcommittee on Interna- Pentagon and USPACOM, passing informational Political and Military Affairs, House Com- 18 who died on tion to them from old 573, but there was a mittee on International Relations, 94th Congress, 2d Koh Tang, the total breakdown in local communications in that sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing came to more than Marine Corps commanders on scene were Office, 1976), 58. the number rescued often out of touch with higher headquarters, 3 Thomas Des Birsay, Fourteen Hours at Koh even those at U-Tapao. Tang, Southeast Asia Monograph Series No. 5 The command and control relationships were not well defined in advance, and decisions were often made at the higher levels

H–53 was used to carry Marines to Koh Tang during rescue operation ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 115