JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected)
JMSDF STAFF COLLEGE REVIEW
JAPAN MARITIME SELF-DEFENSE FORCE STAFF COLLEGE REVIEW
Volume1 Number2 English Version (Selected) MAY 2012
Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief
: Through the Great East Japan Earthquake
Foreword YAMAMOTO Toshihiro 2
Japan-U.S. Joint Operation in the Great East Japan Earthquake
: New Aspects of the Japan-U.S. Alliance SHIMODAIRA Takuya 3
Disaster Relief Operations by the Imperial Japanese Navy and the US Navy in the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake : Focusing on the activities of the on-site commanders KURATANI Masashi 30 of the Imperial Japanese Navy and the US Navy
Contributors From the Editors
Cover: Disaster Reief Operation by LCAC in the Great East Japan Earthquake
1 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected)
JMSDF Staff College Review
Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) Foreword
It is one year on that Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Staff College Review was published in last May. Thanks to the supports and encouragements by the readers in and out of the college, we successfully published this fourth volume with a special number. It is true that we received many supports and appreciation from not only Japan but also overseas. Now that HA/DR mission has been widely acknowledged as military operation in international society, it is quite meaningful for us who have been through the Great East Japan Earthquake to provide research sources with international society. Therefore, we have selected two papers from Volume 1 Number 2, featuring HA/DR and published as an English version. SHIMODAIRA’s paper is a report from on-site Japan-U.S. joint operation in response to the unprecedented disaster. He attempts to coincide with theory and practice which is one of the pursuits of Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Staff College Review while describing the Japan-U.S. dynamic cooperation. KURATANI delves into the activities of both Japan Imperial Navy and the US Navy during the Great Kanto Earthquake (1923) which have not long been known until today. Even long time ago, it was natural that military organizations made all possible efforts when disaster occurred. Although the military theory and the international circumstance are totally different from those in the time when the Great Kanto Earthquake occurred, you will find that activities by military personnel may indicate some suggestions or ideas to solve an invisible future of civil-military relations.
YAMAMOTO Toshihiro
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Japan-U.S. Joint Operation in the Great East Japan Earthquake : New Aspects of the Japan-U.S. Alliance
SHIMODAIRA Takuya
Foreword
The Great East Japan Earthquake occurred at 14:46 on March 11, 2011, with an epicenter offshore of Sanriku. The enormous earthquake had a magnitude of 9.0 and the subsequent huge tsunami brought on the biggest disaster seen since the end of the World War II. In response to this event, the Self Defense Force (SDF) quickly went into action, preparing for deployment of 40 naval vessels and about 300 aircraft.1 Early the following morning, the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) units reached a position offshore Miyagi Prefecture and started search and rescue activities. The first Joint Task Force (JTF) was formed on March 14, the SDF having mobilized over 100,000 personnel until their dissolution on July 1. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy’s response also was prompt on receipt of a request of assistance. It deployed eight naval vessels including USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) immediately. They arrived at the offshore Miyagi Prefecture before dawn on March 13 and started “Operation Tomodachi.”2 For this operation, the U.S. deployed approximately 20 naval vessels including an aircraft carrier, approximately 160 aircraft and over 20,000 personnel at its peak.3 The significance of this deployment, unprecedented in scale, is particularly worthy of being described. The Defense Minister Yoshimi Kitazawa evaluated it as a symbol of the “deepening of the
1 Ministry of Defense, “Extra Press Conference by the Defense Minister,” 23:30 March 11, 2011, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/kisha/2011/03/11.html, accessed on February 6, 2012. 2 U.S. 7th Fleet, “Navy Units Prepare to Support Tsunami-Damaged Areas,” March 12, 2011, http://www.c7f.navy.mil/news/2011/03-march/020.htm, accessed on February 6, 2012. 3 Emergency Headquarters for Response to Disaster, “Regarding Off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake (the Great East Japan Earthquake),” May 10, 2011, p.87.
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Japan-U.S. alliance.”4 Moreover, according to a policy think-tank, the PHP Research Institute, “Operation Tomodachi” made the Japanese people feel the ties and importance of alliance. Interoperability and communications between the SDF and the U.S. Forces posed no problems, and in addition, it was demonstrated domestically and internationally that both organizations had the capabilities to carry out large-scale joint operation in an emergency.5 In an interview with the Yomiuri Shimbun on May 4, JTF Commander Lieutenant General Eiji Kimizuka told reporters that in respect to Japan-U.S. joint operations “the U.S. Forces were united with a determination to relief Japan from the flag level officers to the sailors or soldiers in entire organization. However, there were also problems. Initially, we were unable to figure out what they could do and what they could not do. The fact that we had no means of taking advantage of the U.S. Forces’ capabilities amid the disaster is a problem that must be considered in the future. It also was a considerable dilemma for the U.S., although finally yielding results in the recovery of Sendai Airport, isolated islands, railroads and schools after subsequent coordination.”6 Although Japan and the U.S. expeditiously deployed to the disaster site in full strength almost immediately after the disaster, what was it that made it so difficult to take advantage of the capabilities of the U.S. Forces quickly? The author personally carried out Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) activities on board JS Hyuga (DDH 181) for most of “Operation Tomodachi” in cooperation with the U.S. Navy, as Chief of Staff of JMSDF Escort Flotilla 1. In this role the author was responsible for Japan-U.S. coordination adjacent to the site. This document analyses the HA/DR activities actually implemented at the site by the U.S. Navy and how these compare to pre-existing HA/DR manuals. Specific operational points of the U.S. Navy will be taken into
4 Ministry of Defense, “Press Conference by the Defense Minister,” April 5, 2011, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/kisha/2011/04/05.html, acccessed on February 6, 2012. 5 PHP Research Institute, Proposal of Grand Strategy of Progressive Stabilizing Power – Japan 2011, p.29. 6 Yomiuri Shimbun, May 4, 2011.
4 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) account. Finally, the problems in initial actions for HA/DR activities and directions for resolution of this shall be clarified by extracting and analyzing the lessons learned from the actual scene of the Great East Japan Earthquake.
1 Activity of the U.S. Navy in the Great East Japan Earthquake
On the night of March 11, the Government of Japan made an official request to the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, the Honorable John Roos for assistance by the U.S. Forces Japan. In response to this, the U.S. President Barack H. Obama promptly announced, “First and foremost, our thoughts and our prayers are with the people of Japan. I offered our Japanese friends whatever assistance is needed.”7 In response to the President’s direction, the U.S. Navy promptly started HA/DR preparations. While the entire U.S. Forces’ HA/DR activities during “Operation Tomodachi” cover a broad area, I focus on activities carried out by the Carrier Strike Group 7 (CSG7) comprised of USS Ronald Reagan and others, which deployed soon after the occurrence of the disaster, and the Essex Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) comprised of the U.S. amphibious assault ship USS Essex (LHD 2) and others.
(1) Carrier Strike Group 7 The rapidity and mobility of USS Ronald Reagan were thoroughly demonstrated by its immediate dispatch to the disaster afflicted area. In particular, programmed and systematic operations by helicopters were implemented to great effect. Upon arriving at the scene, they started search and rescue for the missing. Each vessel increased watch standards and conducted search and rescue of the missing by utilizing every equipped sensors including helicopters to the maximum extent as well as sharing information between Japan and the U.S. in the situation in the afflicted
7 The White House, “News Conference by the President,” March 11, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/11/news-conference-president, accessed on February 6, 2012.
5 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) areas. At the same time, transportation of relief supplies such as water, food and blankets were also carried out by on board helicopters. On the afternoon of March 13, helicopters of USS Ronald Reagan and helicopters of the JMSDF transported 30,000 emergency cans of food from the supply vessel JS Tokiwa (AOE 423), which was deployed off the coast of Miyagi Prefecture, to playgrounds and other places in Kesennuma City, Miyagi Prefecture.8 CSG7 comprehensively analyzed and assessed information the helicopters collected along with satellite information, in addition to information obtained from the JMSDF Escort Flotilla 1, setting focal points to be supported and updating them on a daily basis as they continued with their operations. From March 15 onward, transport of relief supplies by helicopters increased greatly in scale and intensity. Helicopters of USS Ronald Reagan, in cooperation with the JMSDF helicopters, delivered 25 tons of water and food to the afflicted areas.9 However not just food and water was delivered. On March 19, the crews of USS Ronald Reagan raised donations for sufferers and collected more than 100 blankets, 237 pants, 450 shirts, 311 jackets and sweaters, 748 pairs of socks, 154 towels, 57 pairs of shoes, 166 undergarments, 76 hats, 8 scarves and 34 pairs of gloves in the first few hours.10 USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) and others also raised similar donations.11 These donations included boxes filled with toys and teddy bears bought by the crews for their own families at various ports of call, making them into virtual treasure boxes.
8 “U.S. carrier arrived off the coast of Miyagi Prefecture: Seemed worried about radiation exposure to nuclear power plant, suspended ferry rescue activities,” Asahi Shimbun, March 13, 2011, http://www.asahi.com/special/10005/TKY201103130191.html, accessed on February 6, 2012. 9 “Water and 25 tons of food transported to afflicted areas by helicopter, U.S. Operation Tomodachi,” Asahi Shimbun, March 16, 2011, http://www.asahi.com/national/update/0316/TKY201103160085.html, accessed on February 6, 2012. 10 U.S. 7th Fleet, “Ronald Reagan Crews Donate Personal Items to People of Japan,” March 20, 2011, http://www.c7f.navy.mil/news/2011/03-march/050.htm, accessed on February 6, 2012. 11 USS Curtiss Wilbur (DDG 54), USS John S. McCain (DDG 56), USS McCampbell (DDG 85), and USS Mustin (DDG 89) also operated together.
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CSG7 also carried out transport of victims who had lost their homes as well as relief materials to designated materials collection sites. Search and rescue for the missing was also conducted prior to handing its mission over to USS Essex on April 4 as it left the site waters. Relief materials transported amounted to 300,000 lbs (about 135 tons) through activities from March 13 to April 4. Mr. Kazuhiko Togo, Director of the World Problems Research Institute of Kyoto Sangyo University, gave high praise to the activities of USS Ronald Reagan, saying “the deployment of USS Ronald Reagan to the offshore waters of Sanriku can be a new symbol of the Japan-U.S. Alliance after March 11.”12
(2) Essex Amphibious Ready Group Landing capability of large amounts of materials and personnel rapidly by the ARG was demonstrated and appreciated. Despite major landing crafts being present overseas, the preparations to support “Operation Tomodachi” were expeditious. USS Essex and the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), which had just arrived in Malaysia at the time of the earthquake, started preparations almost immediately to leave the port in order to rapidly reach waters around Japan. The dock landing ship USS Harpers Ferry (LSD 49) and the dock landing ship USS Germantown (LSD 42) stationed off Indonesia, also started preparations for departure on the evening of March 11. USS Essex medical department has the capability to expand to a 600-bed hospital with a 14-bed intensive care unit and 46-bed inpatient ward, the largest at-sea medical capacity of any U.S. Navy ship with the exception of hospital ships. The ship’s medical facilities also contain six operating rooms, three triage stations, X-ray facilities, a blood bank and a laboratory. The 31st MEU is also capable of providing 45,000 meals ready to eat, fresh water and bilingual personnel to assist in communication between U.S. service members and Japanese citizens.13 USS Tortuga (LSD 46), a dock landing ship that carries helicopters and
12 Mainichi Shimbun, May 4, 2011. 13 U.S. 7th Fleet, “Essex ARG Ready to Provide Assistance to Japan,” March 15, 2011, http://www.c7f.navy.mil/news/2011/03-march/028.htm, accessed on February 6, 2012.
7 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) landing craft to support amphibious operations, left its forward deployed port of Sasebo in Southern Japan on the evening of March 11 to embark MH-53 heavy lift helicopters.14 On the morning of March 15, it loaded 90 vehicles including jeeps, trailers and 300 Japan Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) personnel at the port of Tomakomai, Hokkaido to carry out transport assistance for Ominato, Aomori Prefecture.15 On March 20, after ten days had passed since the earthquake and the needs of the afflicted areas were shifting to livelihood support, no sooner had ships of Essex ARG and embarked the 31st MEU arrived off the coast of Hachinohe, Aomori Prefecture than they started to provide HA/DR in support of Operation Tomodachi.16 As Col. Andrew MacMannis of the 31st MEU described it, “We have aviation and amphibious platforms capable of rapid delivery of relief supplies, medical assistance, transportation assets and engineer equipment to an affected area, which could be of great assistance to those in need right now.”17 The capabilities of the ARG were proven to have excelled in HA/DR activities. What particularly exercised the capabilities of the ARG and showcased its abilities at home and abroad were the operations in Oshima and Kesennuma, Miyagi Prefecture. Oshima had been cut off due to the loss of a large number of ferries which were its only means of communication. When the Essex ARG arrived on March 27, the 31st MEU landed there using a
14 U.S. 7th Fleet, “Navy Units Prepare to Support Tsunami-Damaged Area,” March 12, 2011, http://www.c7f.navy.mil/news/2011/03-march/020.htm, accessed on February 6, 2012. USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19), the U.S. 7th Fleet command flagship, had arrived in Singapore for a port visit, but immediately changed its focus to loading humanitarian assistance/disaster relief equipment and preparing to return to Japan to provide support as directed. 15 U.S. 7th Fleet, “USS Tortuga Loads Japan Ground Defense Force Vehicles,” March 16, 2011, http://www.c7f.navy.mil/news/2011/03-march/032.htm, accessed on February 6, 2012. 16 U.S. 7th Fleet, “Essex Amphibious Ready Group, 31st MEU Support Relief Efforts Off the Coast of Hachinohe,” March 22, 2011, http://www.c7f.navy.mil/news/2011/03-march/056.htm, accessed on February 6, 2012. 17 U.S. 7th Fleet, “31st Marine Expeditionary Unit Arrives Off the Western Coast of Japan,” March 19, 2011, http://www.c7f.navy.mil/news/2011/03-march/044.htm, accessed on February 6, 2012.
8 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) landing craft utility (LCU), unloading cranes and construction vehicles of the electric power company to restore some of the power sources in the island in addition to transporting relief materials such as water and food.18 From April 1 to 6, the 31st MEU started “Operation Field Day” to carry out the removal of debris and road reopening work. They disembarked humvees, dump trucks, water and fuel trucks, disaster aid and relief supplies from USS Essex via LCU with approximately 170 Marines and Sailors, and carried out a cleanup of debris which had remained in place since the tsunami.19 Besides the activities listed above, the U.S. Navy, in cooperation with the SDF, Japan Coast Guard, National Police Agency, and Fire Authorities, participated in three intensive searches in the coastal areas of Iwate Prefecture, Miyagi Prefecture, and Fukushima Prefecture. Here the JTF, while searching for the missing, retrieved 272 bodies in total.20 To express appreciation for these efforts by the U.S. Navy, the Defense Minister Kitazawa visited USS Ronald Reagan together with the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, the Honorable John Roos and Joint Task Force Commander; Admiral Patrick M. Walsh and conveyed Japan’s gratitude. Relaying a message from Prime Minister Kan, he stated, “Japan and the U.S. are true friends (“Tomodachi”), I have never felt such a strong feeling of friendship with the U.S.,” and expressed his resolution for the restoration of Japan. Subsequently, on behalf of the U.S. government, the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, the Honorable Roos stated, “It is that fabric of friendship between our two countries, represented by each one of you here today that brings our two countries together. Today we stand together -Japan and the U.S.- side-by-side on the deck of USS Ronald Reagan as friends who have worked together, day and night, to uplift this great country.” He expressed the U.S. friendship for Japan.
18 Asahi Shimbun, March 27, 2011. 19 U.S. 7th Fleet, “31st MEU aids isolated island of Oshima,” April 3, 2011, http://www.c7f.navy.mil/news/2011/04-april/004.htm, accessed on February 6, 2012. 20 Asagumo Shimbun, April 7, 14 and 28, 2011.
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In response to this, the Defense Minister Kitazawa said, “I want to express my heartfelt appreciation and admiration to each and every U.S. service member that came to the aid of the victims of the disaster. Your warm help will be cherished and engrained in the hearts and souls of the Japanese people.”21 The U.S. Forces assigned to “Operation Tomodachi” shipped about 280 tons of food, 7.7 million liters of water, 45,000 liters of fuel and transported approximately 3,100 tons of other items.22 The U.S., after making enormous contribution, terminated the operation while maintaining a quick reaction capability.23 Moreover, as a JTF, it controlled at the maximum five divisions and four brigades (about 45,000 ground personnel), 50 vessels and 172 aircrafts (about 14,000 maritime personnel) and 240 aircrafts (about 21,000 air personnel). The results of its activities over the three months were: 11,699 lives saved, 9,496 remains found, medical assistance to 21,009, food-service assistance for 4,413,632 meals, water-supply assistance of 30,196 tons, bathing assistance to 936,695 and other points including removal of debris from public facilities, as well as carrying out bridge construction and the building of temporary housing.24
2 Operation procedures of the U.S. Navy in HA/DR
(1) Development of TACMEMO formulation What factors contributed to the U.S. Navy’s rapid and systematic measures? I would like to examine this against the backdrop of the U.S. Navy’s situation.
21 U.S. 7th Fleet, “Japanese, U.S. Dignitaries, Senior Military Leaders Thank Ronald Reagan,” April 6, 2011, http://www.c7f.navy.mil/news/2011/04-april/010.htm, accessed on February 6, 2012. 22 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Assistance for the Great East Japan Earthquake by the U.S. Forces (Operation Tomodachi),” http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/saigai/pdfs/operation_tomodachi.pdf, accessed on February 6, 2012. 23 Jiji Press, May 1, 2011. 24 “Joint Task Force for Disaster-Relief (JTF-TH) Instruction by JTF-TH Commander in disbanding,” July 1, 2011.
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A similar large-scale disaster to the current Great East Japan Earthquake was the Sumatra Earthquake and Tsunami, which brought huge damage to South and Southeast Asia, and occurred on December 26, 2004. 2004 to 2005 was a big turnaround for the U.S. Forces in respect to non-military activities including HA/DR activities. Other than HA/DR activities during the Sumatra Earthquake and Tsunami, Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations (SROs) such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq have started to draw attention.25 In November 2005, the Department of Defense Directive DcDD3000.05 “Military Assistance for Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations” was issued and the Stabilization operations were made a core task for the U.S. Forces.26 Moreover, in December of the same year, George W. Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive NSPD 44, instituting an initiative for harmony between the military and the private sector.27 Under these circumstances, the necessity of the military to cooperate in non-military activities as part of its roles has been rising. The New Maritime Strategy was officially announced with the joint signature by the Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the United States Marine Corps and the Coast Guard Commander on October 2007. In its contents, six articles, “Forward Presence,” “Deterrence,” “Sea Control,” “Power Projection,” “Maritime Security,” “Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Response (HA/DR)” are listed, and of those, “Marine Security” and “HA/DR” are newly stipulated.28 Furthermore, the Naval Operations Concept 2010, which stipulated concepts as to when, where and how HA/DR shall be carried out, was similarly announced with a joint signature. HA/DR was upgraded from 6th to 4th in rating regarding naval strength capable of
25 Robert Hoekstra and Charles E. Tucker, JR, “Adjusting to Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations,” PRISM 1, No.2, pp.13-26. 26 U. S. Department of Defense, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Washington D. C. : November 28, 2005. 27 The White House, “National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44 Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,” December 7, 2005. 28 “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” October 17, 2007, http://www.navy.mil/maritime/Maritimestrategy.pdf, accessed on February 6, 2012.
11 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) playing a major role, based on the actual results of 366 operations involving HA/DR from 1970 to 2000.29 From the standpoint of implementing this HA/DR activities more effectively, the U.S. Navy reassessed measures on the tactical level. Regarding the measures for the Sumatra offshore earthquake as one of the most complicated operations, the NWDC (Navy Warfare Development Command) played the main role in formulating a manual in respect to HA/DR in the form of a TACMEMO (Tactical Memorandum) in August 2005.30 The NWDC is an agency in which specialists from various sectors formulate concepts and doctrines by carrying out modeling and simulations to look into every level of future marine operations, ranging from tactics to strategy and basing this on an enormous number of lessons. This TACMEMO indicates guidelines for commanders and staff to formulate plans and action policies when they prepare and implement HA/DR activities. It naturally does not cover all matters perfectly, however, it has a substantial meaning in providing a tentative action plan and alternatives to contribute to prompt responses. The total structure is comprised of nine chapters: Chapter 1 – Introduction; Chapter 2 – Initial Considerations in Operations Planning (Generic); Chapter 3 – Commander’s Principal Concerns and Decision; Chapter 4 – External Relations; Chapter 5 – Information and Situation Awareness; Chapter 6 – Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I); Chapter 7 – Logistics; Chapter 8 – Health Service Support (HSS); Chapter 9 – Personnel, Skills and Capabilities. Regarding “Operation Tomodachi,” the U.S. Navy can be said to have carried out its operations exactly in accordance with the TACMEMO, when viewed from the scene level. In its initial actions after the occurrence of the disaster, in JMSDF Escort Flotilla 1, responsible for coordination between Japan and the U.S. at the actual scene, no stress and anxieties were felt at
29 “Naval Operations Concept 2010,” May 24, 2010, p.46, http://www.navy.mil/maritime/noc/NOC2010.pdf, accessed on February 6, 2012. 30 Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) TACMEMO 3-07.6-05 Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) Operations Planning, August 2005.
12 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) all due to the similarity with usual Japan-U.S. joint exercises. Admiral Robert F. Willard, Commander U.S. Pacific Command also emphasizes the results of the regular Japan-U.S. joint operations, saying they were “a good fit,”31 in a Kyodo News interview. In the following article, I will examine the strategic points actually implemented by the U.S. Navy according to the articles in the TACMEMO, after narrowing down the TACMEMO to three central matters including Initial Considerations in Operations Planning (Generic),” “Commander’s Principal Concerns and Decision” and “Logistics.”
(2) “Operation Tomodachi” from the point of view of TACMEMO a) Matters of initial consideration in operations planning (generic) First of all, review superior commander’s guidance and direction: After arriving at the site, a coordination conference onboard was executed before starting “Operation Tomodachi” and VTC (video teleconference) was also held every day in order to unify each commander’s recognition of his duties and basic policies. Then, we decided the distribution of forces and the command relationships. After this, we clarified duties, operational objectives and desired results based on the unit’s organization, composition and the rear infrastructure in the case where units’ ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) capabilities were integrated. Secondly, the priority of the operations was decided through the analysis of missions. At the same time, intelligence (information) was prepared and the lessons of the past were confirmed. The operation started in accordance with a determined cycle called battle rhythm. It is not an exaggeration to say that “Operation Tomodachi” was an information-oriented operation and that operations and information were fully integrated. Intelligence was involved in almost all aspects of the operation such as the on-site hearings, onboard sensors of E-2C and helicopters and comprehensive analysis of satellite information. The timing
31 U.S. 7th Fleet, “Pacific Commander Briefs Media on Humanitarian Relief Operations in Japan,” March 18, 2011, http://www.c7f.navy.mil/news/2011/03-march/042.htm, accessed on February 6, 2012.
13 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) and rotation of assets to be supported and the content of the support were all determined by intelligence on the situations in the afflicted area. In order to increase the efficiency of the operation, the lessons of the past were utilized. It was possible to collect lessons during the operation so that they could be reorganized and contribute to future operations. Although I could not confirm that this happened during this operation, it is prescribed in the TACMEMO that analysts of CNA (Center for Naval Analyses) and an NLL (Navy Lessons Learned) lesson collection team should be on aboard a vessel in large-scale operations where necessary. As I have explained, the U.S. Navy has accumulated valuable records both of actual operations and exercises in its database and was ready to output such records rapidly. b) Determination of commander’s principle concerns The civil-military relationship and the relationship between the supported force and the supporting force (Supported/Supporting) are determined after missions and the command relationship are clarified. In order to do so effectively, situational awareness is of critical importance. It is also necessary to give consideration to the establishment of rear area systems, the redeployment of forces and the transition to the civilian sector. Regarding the Supported/Supporting, a commander who plays a central role in an operation and commanders who assist him are designated depending on a change in the operating environment and in this way, it is expected that their responsibilities and division of roles are clarified. What notable here is that the naval strength is effective as a first response in HA/DR activities. Swiftness is essential for such a response and this is particularly important until infrastructure is developed by JTF. Also, it is prescribed that the involvement of the military in operations should be limited to a short period of time in emergency situations to the extent possible. The points for collecting lessons, the necessity of having liaison officers (LNO), matters to consider in respect to communications such as satellite systems, chat and VTC and matters to consider in implementing the battle rhythm are also mentioned in order to improve the efficiency of operations. LNO should be dispatched as early as possible in order to enhance
14 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) communications among commanders. Indeed this time, LNOs were mutually exchanged prior to “Operation Tomodachi”. Especially with the U.S. Destroyer Squadron 15 that operated along with USS Ronald Reagan, the deputy commanders (O-6 and next expected commanders) and Unit-level Commander class officers have been exchanged normally on exercises such as Japan-U.S. joint exercise, so the operation progressed smoothly without any stress. It is prescribed that the battle rhythm should be set including conferences, various reports and major events in order to coordinate operations effectively and unite the recognition of each commander. To this end, current situational awareness was unified and needs in the afflicted areas were confirmed with each other in accordance with a situational changes. This was done in order to clarify current situations, unclear points and problems relating to coordination, and decisions were made on how to solve these problems and future policies. The core of the battle rhythm is VTC. Each Japanese and U.S. commander on the scene held VTC systematically together with satellite chats. VTC is a process of making decisions on action policies in which each commander confirms facial expressions and tone face to face based on such materials as prepared slides. In this process, LNOs complement questions and confirm unclear points with each other and help us to overcome the language barrier. This demonstrates the importance of establishing a relationship of trust through regular joint exercises. c) Logistics Logistics means wide range of various matters and it includes relief materials, the importance of the needs of the scene, matters of the vessels and aircrafts, fuels, forward dispatched team, coordination of each unit, protection of units, contracts, legal restraints, communications, and personnel administration. In this section, I examine the initial response after the disaster occurred from the aspect of relief supplies and the relationship with outside which was prominent on the scene. Regarding relief supplies, survival bags with water, food, blanket, vinyl sheet, water purification tablets are to be provided. It is prescribed that
15 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) water is of extreme importance among relief supplies and that the maximum effort should be made to provide it. In fact, at the time of the disaster, the type and quantity of water was sufficient, such as 10-gallon water containers, water tanks and reverse osmosis water purification units in addition to a large volume of pet bottles. Needs for relief supplies in the afflicted areas changed as the time passed after the disaster and such daily essentials as diapers and sanitary goods became insufficient. Therefore, it is necessary to precisely grasp needs in the afflicted areas in detail. As for fuel, it is difficult to procure it in the afflicted areas owing to contract and transportation difficulties. Therefore, it is prescribed that it is important to allocate helicopters to an appropriate place. In this operation, the demand for gasoline for vehicles was very high. But it was not possible to transport it by helicopters because the flash point of gasoline is low and it is highly dangerous to be transported by helicopter. Therefore, the transportation was limited to small boats. On the other hand, light oil was possible to be transported using helicopters systematically. Regarding food, a large quantity of MRE (Meal Ready to Eat) was transported expeditiously. However, when we asked the afflicted people a few days after the distribution, most of them did not even open MRE. Therefore, we gave instructions on how to eat using exhibitions and distributed a pamphlet for explanation in Japanese. It is important to confirm after the distribution in respect to relief supplies. Concerning relationship with outside, the cooperation with the forces of other countries, the relationship with the local government and in particular the relationship with NGOs (Non Governmental Organization), these are described in detail. As shown in the case of the 2004 Sumatra Earthquake in which more than 109 NGOs were in operation in Indonesia about three weeks after the disaster, a number of NGOs participate in HA/DR activities. The coordination among NGOs tends to be difficult due to the differences in each NGO’s policies, organization and budget. Moreover, it is pointed out as a reminder that NGOs tend to concentrate on their own organization and depend on provisional methods and networks. Also, they tend to exaggerate the current situations in order to lead own activities to
16 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) their advantage. In addition, it is mentioned that close coordination with media is required in order to widely transmit information obtained by the military, and the content of activities in operation and to share the recognition on situations with each organization. After the Great East Japan Earthquake, the speed of recovering the land infrastructure was rapid and each prefecture’s headquarters for disaster countermeasures took charge of coordinating with NGOs in each prefecture so that we did not see any problem related to NGOs. It is necessary, however, to deeply deliberate on the utilization of NGOs that have a variety of knowledge and experiences and determine the possible points of collaboration. The actual activities of the U.S. Navy explained above were in accordance with TACMEMO. I would like to add that there was no large discrepancy in recognition of priorities between Japan and the U.S. in terms of the operation. What was difficult for us was to accurately grasp the change of needs in the afflicted areas and share information, and how to assign duties to the two countries in a flexible and effective way.
3 Lessons Learned and Consideration Observed from the Afflicted Areas in Initial Actions after the Large-Scale Earthquake
There remain a number of issues related to the response “post disaster,” not “post war,” such as what type of support can be provided now by the JMSDF and the U.S. Navy and what type of support should be provided next from a long-term point of view.32 Escort Flotilla 1 coordinated Japan and the U.S. on the scene during most of the “Operation Tomodachi,” which lasted about one and a half months, and even after the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Coordination Center was established, involved in as a point of contact for Japan-U.S. joint operation in the afflicted areas. Based on that experience, I would like to comprehensively summarize and examine lessons learned from the tactical, operational and strategic levels. In this section, I will
32 Yomiuri Shimbun, March 24, 2011. Takashi Mikuriya, Professor of University of Tokyo, argued that the time has changed from “post war” to “post disaster” due to the impact of the Great East Japan Earthquake.
17 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) deliberate mainly on the tactical level as seen from the scene, with additional points as viewed from the operational level and strategic level.
(1) Tactical level I would like to mention four points, the necessity of a Japan-U.S. joint manual, the effectiveness of a sea base, a common operation cycle for disaster countermeasures and information superiority. a) Necessity of a Japan-U.S. joint manual The capabilities of the U.S. Navy including the aircraft carrier and the ARG were outstanding, as shown in the performance during “Operation Tomodachi.” However, Robert D. Eldridge, Associate Professor at the School of International Public Policy, Osaka University then, who investigated the lessons learned from the Sumatra Earthquake, pointed out that “Japan does not have any provision on the use of the U.S. Forces Japan in the case of any disaster that exceeds the capabilities of Japan to respond nor recognize its necessity.”33 Till today, Japan continues to have this problem. TACMEMO pertaining to HA/DR currently used by the U.S. Navy is based on the lessons learned from the 2004 Sumatra Earthquake. It was designed taking into account places with poor infrastructures. There is no problem with following the TACMEMO immediately after any disaster. However, in the case of Japan, despite the fact that there was a little of disorder immediately after the disaster, the recovery of infrastructure was swift and some parts of the TACMEMO became inapplicable. Moreover, the involvement of civil forces increases as time passes and thus more detailed coordination and consultations with local governments become essential. Additionally, the contents of the TACMEMO itself are somewhat general and do not account for a Japan-U.S. joint operation. Therefore, it is necessary for us together with local governments, to formulate a manual based on the TACMEMO, making a common
33 Robert. D. Eldridge, et al., “Recommendation for the Use of the U.S. Forces Japan in the Event of a Large-Scale Natural Disaster,” International Public Policy Study, Volume 11, No.1, September 2006, p.145. Mr. Eldridge is now a General Director of the Foreign Policy Department of the U.S. Marine Corps Base in Japan.
18 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) understanding of the lessons learned, and taking into account the geographical features, weather, climate and culture of Japan. b) Effectiveness of a Sea Base What is required immediately after any disaster is to devote all the efforts to search and rescue of the missing. It is also necessary to understand the situation of the afflicted area in detail in order to foster the transportation of relief supplies. Taking the characteristics of naval power into consideration, the effectiveness of access from the sea is expected to achieve great results, particularly in the initial actions after any disaster when search and rescue of the missing are being prioritized. The difference between the operations after the Great East Japan Earthquake when compared with the Chuetsu Earthquake in Niigata Prefecture34 was that the target support area was along the extensive coastal line, and the degree of damage and type of support required varied according to the disaster stricken area. The large volume of floating debris in coastal areas made it difficult to approach the coast, and caused confusion beyond our imagination. The response to such a situation requires comprehensiveness. Therefore, access from the sea using helicopters and LCAC is extremely effective to isolated coastal areas hit by particularly large tsunamis, such as the tips of peninsula and isolated islands where the land access is limited. Rear Admiral Richard B. Landolt, Commander Task Force 76 (CTF 76) who commands the 7th Fleet Amphibious Force emphasized the importance of helicopters based on his experience from typhoon Morakot in 2009, saying “HM 14’s heavy lift capabilities have been essential in past disaster response efforts in the region. They can take engineering equipment and large amounts of cargo to places they would otherwise not be able to go.”35
34 National Land Traffic Planning Office, “Damage of the Chuetsu Earthquake in Niigata Prefecture and Reconstruction from it,” Research and Information, No.467, February 15, 2005. 35 U.S. 7th Fleet, “USS Tortuga Embarks Heavy Lifts Helo for Disaster Response in Japan,” March 14, 2011, http://www.c7f.navy.mil/news/2011/03-march/023.htm, accessed on February 6, 2012. Typhoon No.8 (Morakot) caused the worst disaster in the past 50 years on August 8, 2009 and villages were destroyed by mudflows in southern Taiwan. According to Rear Adm. Landolt, Helicopter Mine Countermeasure
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In addition, Thomas B. Fargo, former Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, also commented that the U.S. Forces played a very extensive role in the response to the disaster caused by Hurricane Katrina and said, “It is not important whether it has been called until recently a nonconventional military activity, but what is important is how effective we can react in those activities for providing the international community with peace and security.” and “The example of this tsunami showed that it was necessary for the military that has various functions to respond to the crisis. (Snip) The utilization of helicopters was of particular importance.”36 This idea of a Sea Base is also called GFS (Global Fleet Station). This is a sea base created because of the necessity to maintain functioning so-called stability operation, in particular, a platform for HA/DR. In the U.S. Navy, initial GFS was established in the Gulf of Guinea in October 2007.37 The base of this concept is already prescribed in the joint doctrine and it points out that the necessity of the civil-military cooperation tends to increase.38 What is new since 9/11 is an increasing urgency for the Defense Department to engage in peacetime operations traditionally considered nonmilitary.39 Therefore, the marines that operate at the front line in each operation now deliberate on the points for coordination with local governments, international organizations, and NGOs.40 The JMSDF is able to effectively provide such a sea base. It is necessary to deploy at the target site, collectively coordinate activities of the JGSDF and Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF), and effectively utilize the capabilities of the U.S. Navy. Also, coordination needs to take the relationship with the Japan Coast Guard, the Police and prefectural headquarters for disaster countermeasures into consideration. The
Squadron (HM) 14 flew 55 sorties and lifted more than 260,000 pounds of gear, including excavators and engineering support equipment. 36 Thomas B. Fargo, “Leadership in Multilateral Cooperation and Integration,” Defense Studies, Vol.5, November 2011, pp.59-61. 37 Kathi A. Sohn, “The Global Fleet Station - A Powerful Tool for Preventing Conflict,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 67, No. 1, Winter 2009, p.45. 38 U. S. Department of Defense, Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations, JP-3-08, Washington, D. C.: Joint Staff, October 9, 1996. 39 Sohn, “The Global Fleet Station,” p.48. 40 U. S. Marine Corps, “Global Fleet Stations Concept,” July 30, 2007.
20 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) command and control center function and the air base function of JS Hyuga, a precious asset of Japan, should be fully utilized. Naval forces have high capabilities in searching isolated afflicted areas in detail, collecting information, searching and rescuing at sea, transporting relief supplies to a wide area, and analyzing and evaluating to select the type of support required taking into account the extent of damage. In doing so, it is necessary to accurately grasp needs in the afflicted areas, always keeping in mind the need to maintain the effective operation of forces and discern a content of support required. c) Common operation cycle for disaster countermeasures The response of the U.S. Navy was extremely swift. Within three days after the disaster, the U.S. Navy put forces at the afflicted areas, designed a detailed operation plan and executed it. We were able to see throughout the operation their cordial and sympathetic activities. Their operation cycle was the same as the usual operation cycle. The cycle of HA/DR to “find disaster victims at an early stage and provide supplies that meet the needs in the afflicted areas” is the same as the cycle of battle to “find a target and effectively attack it.” The initial action after any disaster is the most important factor in the operation cycle. In the Sumatra Earthquake, we still remember that the U.S. Navy played a central role in coordination at the disaster stricken area. The U.S. Navy thoroughly exercised its strength, particularly in search and rescue immediately after the disaster occurred and the coordination of the civil-military relationship.41 The U.S. Navy including USS Ronald Reagan also exploited its characteristics such as the swiftness and mobility in the initial action after the Great East Japan Earthquake occurred. At the same time as the occurrence of the disaster, both of the U.S. Navy and the Government of Japan swiftly made preparations for collecting information and responded at full power. This is basically the same as any combat military operation. The needs in the afflicted areas change. “Search and rescue” of the
41 Department of the Navy, TACMEMO 3-07.6-05 Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), A-1.
21 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) missing are prioritized for about three days after the occurrence of disaster. The transportation of relief supplies is prioritized about three days or one week after the occurrence of disaster, and then the priority shifts particularly to the recovery of lifelines and “life support” for isolated victims. Furthermore, the priority shifts to efforts for “reconstruction assistance” one week after the occurrence of disaster and to “assistance to efforts toward full-blown reconstruction” when about two weeks have passed. It is of utmost importance to discern the timing of change in needs. In “Operation Tomodachi,” when the U.S. Navy judged that it was possible to move to the reconstruction stage according to situations in the afflicted areas, when reinforcement forces arrived, the duties were handed over to forces required for reconstruction such as Essex ARG, and USS Ronald Reagan and other vessels sailed to their next mission. This shows the importance of reviewing the organization of forces by their function according to the capabilities of each force. It is also essential for the JMSDF to utilize, in particular, the capabilities of JS Hyuga in the operation of JTF Maritime Component and to review the functions so that each unit can exploit its ability to the maximum extent. In doing so, not only efficient operating forces, but also various supplies and coordination for repair, are required. In addition, it is necessary to design a cycle in which forces may be poured in and changed continuously in order to meet the on-scene needs, and such timing have to correspond to the needs in the afflicted areas. It is indispensable for each component commander and the JTF Commander to be able to design a concept based on common doctrine and maintain a common operational picture by holding VTC and exchanging LNO in order to facilitate the effective operation cycle between the JTF Commander and the Maritime Component Commander. Although LNOs were dispatched to USS Ronald Reagan and the USS Essex to facilitate better coordination, the U.S. Navy’s real capabilities were not exercised to the maximum. As for cooperation with the U.S. Navy, the coordination process has been established through exercises in the past few years and communications on the scene were sufficient. However, there has not been
22 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) any opportunity to practice under normal circumstances with regard to the interaction between the JTF Commander and the Maritime Component Commander. In the end, the principal means of HA/DR is by land. The characteristics of ground, maritime and air forces and their operating environment are different. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct exercises based on the idea of “supported-supporting” such as that of the U.S. Forces, which clarifies the responsibility of which of the three forces provides assistance and which receives assistance in each operation phase in order for the characteristics of each force to be exploited to the maximum. d) Information superiority: Centered on on-site needs HA/DR no doubt had the same operation cycle as combat military operations. The “victims’ needs on the scene” equivalent to the “movement of the enemy” are core factors of the operational cycle. In the case of the U.S. Navy, information was always the center of the operation cycle. Firstly, water and emergency food were transported to the afflicted areas and every time they did so, they directly asked victims or conducted questionnaire surveys. Then, they reflected these needs in their next assistance action. This is equivalent to the analysis of information on the enemy. The JMSDF conducted the search and rescue of the missing immediately after the disaster, the provision of water, food and blankets and activities such as assistance for bathing. It is necessary, however, to conduct further deliberations in the future on whether they were truly appropriate activities. In particular, it is important to distribute appropriate information in order to alleviate the anxiety not only of victims but also of the entire nation and to avoid unnecessary confusion taking into account the tremendous lack of information in the afflicted areas immediately after the occurrence of disaster. It is necessary to consider the points for distributing, replenishing and rotating accumulated relief supplies. It is important to share information and coordinate activities in order to respond to needs in the afflicted areas swiftly and accurately. The cooperation between the JMSDF, JGSDF and JASDF and the U.S. Force is becoming more and more important depending
23 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) on characteristics of the area where they operate. We should not forget that “one-way” assistance may cause more confusion on the scene. Each SDF and the U.S. Forces need to coordinate in a way that they can achieve the goal of the entire force based on a synergistic effect in order to maximize their capabilities taking advantage of their characteristics. Based on the lessons of the past, the JMSDF should have been aware of the steps of the search and rescue stage in the initial actions, the subsequent life assistance stage, the reconstruction assistance stage and the withdrawal of units. Although it was difficult to define the standards for the decision on transitioning to the next step and express them as specific activities, information for making such decision always exists in the afflicted areas, so that it is necessary to see the afflicted areas with our own eyes.
(2) Operational level From the point of view of implementing the joint operation swiftly and effectively, it is necessary to establish a permanent Joint Headquarters and to make preparations during peacetime. The Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) held on June 21, 2011 highly praised “Operation Tomodachi,” saying that “the success of this large-scale joint response has validated years of bilateral training, exercises and planning.”42 As a matter of fact, the SDF and the U.S. Forces established the “Japan-U.S. Joint Coordination Offices” in three places; the Ministry of Defense, the U.S. Forces Japan Command (U.S. Yokota Air Base) and the JGSDF NEA (Sendai garrison), and they started consultations from March 14.43 On March 24, in order to reinforce the staff of the U.S. Force Japan, the Joint Support Force (JSF) 519 was formed under Adm. Patrick M. Walsh, Commander U.S. Pacific Command.44 The establishment of the Japan-U.S. Joint Coordination Offices and the formation of the JSF made
42 Secretary of State Clinton, Secretary of Defense Gates, Minister for Foreign Affairs Matsumoto, Minister of Defense Kitazawa, “Security Consultative Committee Document: Cooperation in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake,” June 21, 2011. 43 Kyodo News, March 20, 2011. 44 It was also formed at the time of the earthquake off the coast of Sumatra in 2004, and USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) was deployed swiftly to the afflicted area.
24 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) the two countries recognize that the SDF and the U.S. Forces can collaborate closely, and demonstrated the value of the Japan-U.S. alliance domestically and internationally. However, it took the Japan-U.S. Joint Coordination Offices two weeks before it could become accustomed to the Japan-U.S. cooperative mission at a full-blown level. A large-scale disaster generally causes a state of confusion due to conflicting information, and its impact on inside and outside of the country are beyond our imagination. It is necessary, therefore, to prepare not only for military activities under armed attack but also for non-military activities such as HA/DR during peacetime. Particularly, this disaster revealed the effectiveness of the military in HA/DR. As the cooperation within the SDF, with the U.S. Forces and the military services of other countries and the civil-military relationship with local governments and NGOs must be taken into consideration,45 prior planning, preparations and trainings are needed.
(3) Strategic level The response at the national level is indispensable. In the Great East Japan Earthquake, more than 130 countries including the U.S. offered such assistances as disaster relief teams, relief supplies and donations. When a large-scale disaster occurs, cooperation and support from a number of countries can be expected. The Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee held on June 21, 2011, emphasized the importance of multilateral cooperation, HA/DR, and of effective cooperation during such activities.46 While the response at the scene level has its own limitation, the relationship with the private sector such as NGOs would become more and more important depending on the situation. In addition, there are harmful
45 As of March 31, 159 countries and regions and 43 international organizations offered assistance, and the disaster relief teams and medical support teams from 23 countries and regions were in operation. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Emergency Support from Other Countries and Regions,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/saigai/index.html, accessed on February 6, 2012. 46 “Joint Announcement of the Security Consultative Committee, Toward the More Deepening and Expanding Japan-U.S. Alliance: On the Basis of the 50-year Partnership,” June 21, 2011.
25 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) rumors and anxiety that spread not only in the afflicted areas but also their neighboring areas, as well as the delay of response resulting in the shortage of supply and the expansion of anxiety among the general public due to the delay in the provision of information. Therefore, it is necessary for the national government to subjectively grasp the actual conditions of activities, to distribute accurate information and to define clear policies for the nation. The direction should be free from the existing framework. The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant has surfaced a number of issues that needs to be examined by a number of parties such as Tokyo Electric Power Company, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and the prime minister’s official residence, and calls for a more flexible way of thinking to handle unknown challenges. Admiral Keiji Akahoshi (Ret.), the former Chief of Staff, JMSDF, admits that the swift initial actions of the SDF in this operation was the fruit of practical trainings and says that “it is always impossible to exercise one’s capability more in actual circumstances than in trainings and to fully deal with emergency situations without trainings.”47 He also emphasizes the importance of what is called table top exercise at a national level in which mental training of parties concerned with crisis management within government-affiliated organizations are conducted in line with real situations. In addition, Michael Lind, the Whitehead Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation, pointed out the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina showed the limitations of a model of homeland disaster response in which the military is employed only after local and state authorities have failed.48 In HA/DR associated with large-scale disasters, it is necessary to make preparations for the rapid deployment of the army at a national level with local governments using various forms of coordination. Non-military activities such as HA/DR provide the SDF with a new place
47 Keiji Akahoshi, “Great East Japan Earthquake: Thought on the Deployment of the Self-Defense Force for Disaster Relief,” Japan Forum for Strategic Studies Journal, Vol.49, July 2011. 48 Michael Lind, “A Concert-Balance Strategy for a Multi-polar World,” Parameters, Autumn 2008, Vol. XXXVⅢ, No. 3, p.58.
26 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) for their active involvement, and the SDF must develop a strategy to back it up. That means the active involvement of the SDF in “Non Combatant Military Operation (NCMO)”49 that can be implemented in all periods, ranging from peacetime to emergency situations. The active involvement is a change of mentality, from the traditional stance “we cannot do” due to the various restrictions in Japan, to the stance of “what can we do now” by paying attention to activities possible even under those restrictions. On June 4, Defense Minister Kitazawa expressed his gratitude for assistance to the Great East Japan Earthquake from many countries in the Asia Security Summit (The Shangri-La Dialogue) and proposed to hold a meeting for discussion on the cooperation among defense authorities for unprecedented issues like nuclear incidents.50 This is a promising area where Japan is able to play a leading role. The necessity of multilateral cooperation is increasing as an urgent response is required.
Conclusion
Jean Baudrillard, famous French sociologist, examined the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake and summarized its characteristics, saying that “a catastrophe is actually a political and social catastrophe even if it is caused by the nature. That is to say, a natural disaster exposes and reveals cracks and fluctuations in the current political and social systems to everyone.”51 The Great East Japan Earthquake threw the entire country into chaos and it became dysfunctional. The deployment of each SDF, the coordination with the police, firefighters and NGOs, the removal of debris and the preparation of temporary housing were efforts made by the entire country. In this sense, the line between a disaster and war damage is very thin. In this operation, although both the Japan and the U.S. Forces rushed to
49 Richard Hunt and Robert Girrier, “RIMPAC Builds Partnerships That Last,” Proceedings, Vol. 137/10/1, 304, October 2011, pp.76-77. 50 Toshimi Kitazawa Minister of Defense, Japan Speech, The 10th IISS Asia Security Summit The Shangri-La Dialogue Second Plenary Session, June 4, 2011. 51 Asahi Shimbun, March 2, 1995.
27 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) the afflicted areas and responded at their full potential in the initial actions, the JTF Commander said that there was a problem in the coordination between Japan and the U.S. in the initial actions and that the capabilities of the U.S. Forces could not be fully utilized. That was because the means and points for coordination between Japan and the U.S. and the standards for judgment in order to respond to the change of needs at the scene had not been shared under normal circumstances. In order to take advantage of the capabilities of the U.S. Forces to the maximum extent in any Japan-U.S. joint operation, it is necessary to formulate a Japan-U.S. joint manual that includes the means and procedure for coordination, and conduct prior preparation and trainings under normal circumstances. This makes communications among the scene, the Maritime Component Commander and the JTF Commander smoother and it also allows us to efficiently respond even in a chaotic situation. In a chaotic situation caused by a large-scale disaster, the integral self-sustaining function the military has is extremely effective. However, the military cannot respond in an actual war without trainings. In order to raise the effectiveness to the maximum extent in a cooperative operation, such as Japan-U.S. cooperative operation or civil-military cooperative operation, the coordination among various organizations that have different structures would be more important, and organization, preparation and training towards it are required. In addition, the mutual relationship of trust through information sharing and trainings is essential. The idea pointed out by Samuel P. Huntington after the Cold War that “The mission of the Armed Forces is combat, to deter and defeat enemies of the U.S.. The military must be recruited, organized, trained and equipped for that purpose alone. Its capabilities can, and should be used for humanitarian and other civilian activities, but the military should not be organized or prepared or trained to perform such roles,”52 is not applicable any more. A military organization cannot exercise its capabilities to the maximum extent without organization, preparations and training based on
52 Samuel P. Huntington, “New Contingencies, OLD ROLES,” JFQ, Autumn 1993, pp.38-43.
28 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) both military and non-military activities. This gives a military a new role in the future. The lessons learned in the afflicted areas of the Great East Japan Earthquake were that to be effective in utilizing the capabilities of the U.S. Navy to the maximum extent in a large-scale disaster, regular preparations and training in normal circumstances, are necessary. Also, we can find a new aspect of the Japan-U.S. alliance in the role of Japan in non-military activities such as HA/DR. The JMSDF and the U.S. Navy succeeded in carrying out an unprecedented large-scale operation. Michael Green, Senior Advisor and Japan Chair, The Center for Strategic & International Studies, states that China and Russia must have been surprised at the interoperability between the SDF and the U.S. Forces.53 The response to the Great East Japan Earthquake demonstrated the solid ties of the Japan-U.S. alliance domestically and internationally. This alliance has contributed to the maintenance of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region for more than half the past century. This year commemorates the 60the anniversary of the conclusion of the former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. What should the Asia-Pacific region, where Japan and the U.S. have a common interest in peace and stability be like? It is necessary for the two countries to make efforts for realizing peace and stability and deepen the alliance based on the experiences and lessons of the Great East Japan Earthquake.
53 Asahi Shimbun, May 15, 2011.
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Disaster Relief Operations by the Imperial Japanese Navy and the US Navy in the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake : Focusing on the activities of the on-site commanders of the Imperial Japanese Navy and the US Navy
KURATANI Masashi
Foreword
The Great East Japan Earthquake that occurred on March 11, 2011 caused a series of tsunamis beyond our imagination and the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant, resulting in damage of an unprecedented scale. We have received numerous aid and support from other countries. In particular, the assistance provided by the US Navy in Japan is incomparable to that provided by other countries in terms of the response in its initial actions and scale. How have the Imperial Japanese Navy and the US Navy cooperated during past disasters in Japan? In this paper, I will examine the relief operations by the Imperial Japanese Navy in the Taisho Kanto Quake and subsequent damages that occurred about 90 years ago (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “1923 Great Kanto Earthquake”) and those of the US Asiatic Fleet whose base was in Qingdao, China, during the Qing Dynasty in the initial 2 weeks shortly after the occurrence of the earthquake.
1 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake
(1) Overview At about 10:00 a.m. on September 1st, 1923, there was a weak low-pressure system in the Kanto area and the area was experiencing strong wind and heavy rain. The rain stopped falling before long and the wind direction changed to the south. At 11:58 a.m., when people were preparing for lunch at home or in factories, a large earthquake hit the entire Kanto area. The
30 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) epicenter was north of Sagami Bay and the magnitude was 7.9. 1 The number of aftershocks felt in Tokyo Prefecture was 237 times by the afternoon on September 2nd and 721 by the end of September.2 Particularly, in densely populated areas like Tokyo, Yokohama, Yokosuka, etc., the public transportation and means of communication were interrupted due to the severity of the earthquake and at the same time, houses collapsed and fires broke out in many places. Millions of people were buried under collapsed houses and caught in fires, and had no idea where to go in order to escape from the fires. In addition, food and drinking water started to become scarce and the public security situation worsened over time due to robbery and acts of violence. As a result, the death toll rose to 91,344 and the number of missing persons totaled 13,275 in 7 prefectures (Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba, Saitama, Yamanashi, Shizuoka, Ibaraki (total population: about 10.72 million)).3
(2) Situation of damage a) Yokohama and Yokosuka One might think that Tokyo suffered the worst damage in the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake. However, as the epicenter was located on the north-west tip of the deepest part of the Sagami Bay trench, the damage caused by the earthquake was much more serious in Kanagawa Prefecture than in Tokyo Prefecture 4 as we can see in the morning edition of Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun on September 3rd. It states that “Yokohama was completely destroyed, the casualty toll has reached tens of thousands” and “Yokosuka was also completely destroyed. There are piles of dead and injured everywhere.” Almost all deaths in Tokyo Prefecture were the result of secondary damage caused by fires, while almost all deaths in Kanagawa Prefecture were the result of the earthquake and tsunamis. The
1 Technova Disaster Research Project, “Disasters in Modern Japan: Natural Disasters in the Meiji, Taisho and Showa Era,” Technova Inc, 1993, p.52. 2 Yokoyama Masaaki, Kanto-Daishinsai: Sonotoki Nishi-Sagami ha (Great Kanto Earthquake: What Happened in West Sagami?), Matsukazeshobou, 1996, p.8. 3 Tokyo Municipal Office, Tokyo Shinsai-Roku: Zenshu (Tokyo Disaster History: Part I), Tokyo Municipal Office ed., 1925, p.45. 4 Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, morning edition on September 3, 1923, pp.1-3.
31 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) worst-affected cities in Kanagawa Prefecture were Yokohama and Yokosuka. Kouzo Suzukida, commanding officer of the destroyer Hagi5 that arrived in the port of Yokohama at 11 a.m. on September 2nd, reported the situation in Yokohama to the Minister of the Navy on the situation as he himself saw it, reports from the Yokohama Harbor Office director, and officers dispatched to inspect the situation from the destroyer were also relayed back to the Minister of the Navy, Commander in Chief of Yokosuka Naval Station and Commander of Destroyer Flotilla 15.
“The severe earthquake destroyed the breakwaters and the Customs Office. Houses in the entire city were destroyed or submerged, and explosions were occurring in many places. The entire city has been turned into a sea of fire. The people had intended to head uptown, but they were obstructed by fires. We do not know how many people are dead or injured. Although some of them were fortunately able to get to the coast and were rescued by Japanese and foreign commercial ships in the port, there were insufficient ships. Heavy oil was burning and flowing on the sea surface. A number of people were killed by drowning and fire.”6
On the other hand, as the urban area of Yokosuka City was developed by clearing mountainous areas, the collapse of cliffs by the severe earthquake occurred in many places, burying roads and houses in the process. As a result, a number of men and livestock were killed or injured. 7 Kanagawa-ken Shinsai-shi (The Disaster History of Kanagawa Prefecture) explains that all 14,300 houses collapsed or were submerged. No house
5 Originally, Imperial Japanese warship entitles HIJMS (His Imperial Japanese Majesty’s Ship). However, omit entitles on this paper due to the complicatedness, and write only italics. 6 Navy Department ed., Koubun-Biko Hensai Saigai Fuzoku, Vol.4, stored in the National Institute for Defense Studies’ Library archive (0125). Although official documents do not include page numbers, they include reference numbers for microfilms. Therefore, the reference numbers were described in bracket. The same shall apply hereinafter. 7 Yokosuka City ed., Yokosuka-Shishi Shisei Shiko 80-nen (jou) (Yokosuka City History: 80 Years of Municipality (Vol.1)), Yokosuka City, 1988, p.402.
32 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) remained in its original condition. The entire city was destroyed and the death toll was 684 and the number of injured was 897.8 In the hilly urban area, massive landslides occurred which accompanied by unusual noise from the ground and clouds of dust rose in many places when the severe earthquake hit.9 Fires that occurred in the city were flamed by the strong winds and spread rapidly. 80,000 tons of heavy oil belonging to the Navy leaked from oil tanks in the Hakozaki area and into the Yokosuka port and caught fire. Military vessels in harbor were able to escape, but the leaked heavy oil continued to burn for 4 hours and heavy oil tanks continued to blow black smoke for 10 days.10 Yokosuka-shi Shinsai-Shi (the Yokosuka City Disaster History) describes the situation in the city immediately after the earthquake as follows.
Immediately after the earthquake, not only the central urban area but also all the areas in the city turned to dust. Houses in other areas collapsed or leaned. There is no house that still maintains its original condition. Moreover, strong aftershocks occurred several times per hour and shook half-destroyed houses. This caused tremendous fear on people and made it impossible to remain in the destroyed houses. Therefore, people evacuate not only to temples and shrines but also to hills, forests, school grounds, parade grounds and other safe places. Those places are filled with people. They are concerned about receiving immediate help and not able to think about the future. They are shocked and do not know what to do.11
Asakichi Yasukouchi, a governor of Kanagawa Prefecture then, reported the devastated state of the city to Shinpei Goto, Minister of Home Affairs then, as follows.
8 Kanagawa Prefecture ed., Kanagawa-ken Shinsai-Shi: Kanagawa-ken Shinsai-Shi Furoku-tsuki (Kanagawa Prefectural Disaster History: Kanagawa Prefectural Disaster History Supplement), Kanagawa Prefecture, p.513. 9 Ibid. 10 Kanagawa Prefectural Police Department ed., Taisho Daishin-Kasai-Shi (Taisho Quake Fire Record), Kanagawa Prefectural Police Department, 1925, p.513. 11 Kanagawa Prefecture ed., ibid., p.513.
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In Yokosuka City, only 150 houses were saved from the damage among the total of 11,800 houses. However, those houses either collapsed or half-collapsed. About 4,000 houses were burnt to the ground by fires in four different places when the earthquake occurred. The number of dead bodies found by September 4th was about 450, and more and more dead bodies are being found. The situation is so devastating that I cannot explain it with words. In an instant all hell broke loose in the area. Moreover, the Naval Hospital, the Naval Engineering College, Naval Barracks, the Yokosuka post office and others were also burnt to the ground. It is not an exaggeration to say that the naval port in Yokosuka City was completely destroyed.12
Although soldiers began to congregate and participate in rescue activities about one hour after the earthquake due to the characteristics of the city, water was not available because fire hydrant in the entire city were destroyed. The fire-fighting activities had to depend on firebreaks.13 b) Tsunami The tsunami reached 6-meters high at the Miura Peninsula cape, which does not face Sagami Bay directly and 8-meters high at Suzaki.14 Though a tsunami warning was issued in the evening of September 1st, only a small tsunami arrived at urban Kamakura (77 houses submerged) and no tsunami was observed around the Miura Peninsula.15 On the other hand, a series of tsunamis hit Atami and Ito, which face Sagami Bay, after the earthquake. An approximately 13-meters high tsunami hit Atami twice and washed away about 150 houses on the coast. A number of the dead bodies of those who were washed away by the tsunamis were washed ashore on September 2nd, and it was a devastating scene. Ito was also hit by an
12 Yokosuka City Disaster History Publication Society, Yokosuka-shi Shinsai-Shi-tsuki Fukko-Shi (Yokosuka City Disaster History Supplement: Reconstruction History), Yokosuka Nichinichi Shimbun, 1983, p.1. 13 Kanagawa Prefecture ed., ibid., p.514. 14 Technova Disaster Research Project, ibid., p.52. 15 Yokosuka City History Editing Committee ed., Yokosuka-Shishi (Yokosuka City History), Yokosuka City, 1957, p.574.
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11-meters high tsunami and about 50 houses on the coast were washed away. Kamakura’s seashore was hit by a nearly 10-meters high tsunami, and about 100 people who were on the Yuigahama beach and about 50 people who were crossing the Enoshima bridge went missing.16 c) Railway The destruction of railway tracks caused by the great earthquake was also devastating. 24 trains met a mishap and some train cars were buried in tunnels or fell from cliffs into the ocean. The damage to the Tokaido line that runs alongside Sagami Bay near the epicenter was particularly tremendous, and a number of locomotives and passenger carriages were totally tipped over on their side. Railway tracks of the Tokaido line were cut in many places, and the section from Shinagawa to Gotenba was completely disconnected. In addition, as a railroad bridge between Chigasaki and Hiratsuka had collapsed, there was no hope for reopening the line. Therefore, the transportation of relief supplies into Tokyo and Yokohama, and the evacuation of the afflicted people from Kanto to Kansai had to depend solely on marine transportation. In order to assist the marine transportation, warships and ferries belonging to the Ministry of Railways were used for transporting the affected people to the Shimizu port from September 7th.
2 Initial action and damage of the Imperial Japanese Navy
I will now examine the initial actions taken by the Imperial Japanese Navy. Taisho-Daishin-Kasai-Shi (The Taisho Great Quake Fire Record) describes the initial actions of the Imperial Japanese Navy after the earthquake as follows.
As soon as the earthquake occurred, realizing the extent of the
16 Ministry of Home Affairs, Department of Social Affairs, Shashin to Chizu to Kiroku de Miru Kanto-Daishinsai-Shi: Kanagawa-Hen (History of the Great Kanto Earthquake Viewed with Photos and Maps: Kanagawa Version), Senshusha, 1988, p.468.
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damage, the Imperial Japanese Navy ordered all its organizations to respond immediately for the purpose of providing rescue. The mighty fleet was the first to transport food and other relief supplies.17
On the one hand, the following situations with regard to the initial action and damage sustained by land based forces of the Navy arose in Tokyo and Yokosuka. In the Tokyo area, at the time when the earthquake occurred, all telegraphic and telephone communications were completely lost and the same situation occurred with communications among the Navy Department, the Naval General Staff, the receiving stations and the Ministry of Communications and Transportation. As for the Navy, only the Naval Funabashi Transmitting Station miraculously kept operating its functions intact. This Transmitting Station was under the control of the Naval Tokyo Wireless Telegraph Station for transmitting telegrams issued by the central naval departments such as the Navy Department of Japan and the Naval General Staff. As wireless communications between Funabashi Transmitting Station and Tokyo were lost, the commanding officer (Lieutenant Omori) decided at his discretion to operate it as an independent communications station where both transmitting and receiving functions were available. Although Lieutenant Omori had not grasped the extent of the damage caused by the earthquake, he could see catastrophic fires in the directions of Tokyo and Yokohama in the distance, so he sent at his discretion the following telegraphic message to the entire Navy at 3:00 p.m. on September 1st.
A rainstorm has hit Tokyo today and strong earthquakes have occurred continuously since the afternoon. Catastrophic fires are fiercely burning in Yokohama.18
This was the first telegram message sent regarding the 1923 Great
17 Kanagawa Prefectural Police Department ed., ibid., pp.801-802. 18 Navy Department ed., Koubun-Biko Hensai-Saigai 4 (Official Document Remarks: Disaster 4), Vol. 156 (1445).
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Kanto Earthquake and it was transmitted to all the naval forces after the earthquake occurred. Then, after compiling the victims’ information and telegrams on the status of damage were transmitted in successively at his discretion.19 The contents of those five telegrams are as follows.20
Date & Number1 Time Content Group Funabashi 1) 011905 Communications between Tokyo and Funabashi have been lost from this afternoon due to the severe earthquake that hit Tokyo. I send this telegram just in case. Funabashi 2) 011910 Communications between the receiving and transmitting stations have been lost. We are investigating the situation. The damage in Yokosuka and Tokyo is devastating but we do not know about other areas. Funabashi 3) 012313 …According to what I have heard, fires broke out in about twenty places in Tokyo and are still burning fiercely. (Snip). Yokohama was also destroyed completely. Earthquakes occur from time to time. Although we have called the receiving station many times after the disaster, there is no response. Wireless communications have also been lost so I dispatched hands to investigate the situation. Funabashi 4) 020725 …Although the status of damage is unknown, according to evacuees, many houses had collapsed and fires broke out in many places after the first earthquake. 1. There are numerous dead bodies in the Fukagawa and Senjyu areas which were completely burnt to the ground. 2. Fires broke out in the Mitsukoshi department store and extended to Imperial Palace. The Metropolitan Police Department and the Teikoku Gekijyo (Imperial Garden theater) were completely burnt to the ground. 3. There is no response from the Navy Department. We assume that it has also been damaged.
19 The author put the number for an explanatory reason (the same shall apply hereinafter). 20 Navy Department ed., ibid., Vol. 156 (1479-1489).
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4. Fires are burning fiercely from Senjyu to Shinagawa, and explosion occurs in many places. The raging fire can be viewed from this station. 5. We are feared of earthquakes that have been occurring continuously up till now. 6. According to interception, Yokohama and Nagoya have almost been completely destroyed. 7. Railway bridges fell in many places and the transportation system has been stopped. Funabashi 5) 021100 Although we received a telegram to Tokyo, there is no hope of transmitting it to the recipient. Therefore, I am thinking better to send it by an official messenger from Shinagawa not from Yokosuka. By this morning, telegrams were carried by official messengers but their whereabouts are unknown.
Moreover, couriers carrying telegrams that the station had received were dispatched twice to the Navy Department in order to establish contact between the Navy Department and the Funabashi Transmitting Station. However, as those couriers did not return to the station, an experienced expert sailor was selected on September 2nd and was dispatched as courier for the third time by bicycle. This third courier returned from the Navy Department at 2:25 p.m. on the same day with important unsent telegram messages.21 The commanding officer of the Funabashi Transmitting Station made a decision at that time that these telegrams must be sent as soon as possible, because the damage to Tokyo was so devastating, based on their content. Therefore, those telegrams were transmitted continuously as emergency transmissions from 3:00 p.m. to about 7:00 p.m.22 Those three telegrams (Navy Department 1 to Navy Department 3) are described in the next chapter and they were the first information on the status of damage transmitted from the central command of the Navy to the entire Navy after
21 The first and second official messengers dispatched immediately after the disaster returned carrying important telegrams from the Ministry of the Navy same as September 2nd. 22 Ibid., 156 (1448).
38 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) the severe earthquake. At that time, the decision of Lieutenant Omori, the commanding officer of the Funabashi Transmitting Station, to transmit those telegrams is recorded as follows.
(Omitted) The first and second couriers have returned with a number of emergency transmissions to different addresses. I feel that I have an important mission of sending those emergency telegrams as soon as possible. (Snip) They were transmitted continuously from 3:00 p.m. to 7:07 p.m. (Snip).23
At the docks of the Yokosuka Naval Dockyard, Submarines number 10 and number 14 were under construction in dry dock. However, supports came off the submarines due to the earthquake and they were thrown into the stone floor from the slips and destroyed. The aircraft carrier Amagi24 was also destroyed.25 Within the port, Mikasa, a flagship of the Battle of Tsushima, was anchored, but a part of its bottom ran around on a reef. As a result, holes were made in the hull and water started to flow into the ship. In order to avoid capsizing, it was tugged to the coast of the Naval Engineering College outside the port and anchored on the rocky ground in shallow water.26 The Taisho Great Quake Fire Record describes the damage and initial action of the Yokosuka Naval Station as follows.
The building of the Headquarters of the Naval Station collapsed due to the earthquake and officials were unable to work there and had to evacuate. The headquarters was relocated to the front of the Naval Station building. The damage to the Yokosuka area was devastating.
23 Ibid. 24 Although the original plan was to construct a 41,200-ton battleship, it was cancelled due to the effect of disarmament; the vessel was decided to be modified as aircraft carrier in 1923. The construction was restarted, but it did not complete so that the vessel was mothballed. 25 Kanagawa Prefecture ed., Kanagawa-ken-Shi Shiryo-Hen 11: Kindai-Gendai 1 (Kanagawa Prefectural History Material 11: Modern Period and Today (1)), Kanagawa Prefecture, 1975, p.86. 26 Kotaro, Tanaka and Tatsuzo, Takayama, Nihon Shinsai-Shi (Japanese Disaster History), Ariakeshobou, 1993, pp.58-.59.
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Various naval organizations and a number of houses in the city collapsed or were submerged. Moreover, as fires broke out in many places after the earthquake, the assigned fleet forces received orders to organize fire-fighting teams immediately and participate in fire-fighting activities for various official buildings and in the urban area. Wired and wireless communications and the public transportation system had been heavily damaged and the status of other areas was unknown at that time. We could see black smoke in the sky in the direction of Tokyo and Yokohama. We couldn’t imagine the extent of the damage.27
The specific damage to major facilities under the control of Yokosuka Naval Station is as described in the following table.28 As the Headquarters of Naval Station was located in Yokosuka, there were many fortified zones and a lot of the information was kept secret. Therefore, the status of damage had not been made known publicly.
Status of damage of major facilities related to the Yokosuka Naval Station Name of Number of Building facility casualties HQ of Naval 1 person was (Brick) office building was severely Station crushed to death, damaged and brick buildings were several minor and completely destroyed and all wood serious injuries buildings were sloped or partially destroyed. About half of them have a chance to be reconstructed. It is impossible to continue working. Naval Station 1 death, several Most parts of the building collapsed or Library minor and serious were damaged. The building is out of injuries service. Wireless 1 minor injury One toilet room was completely Transmitting destroyed. One sending and Station transmitting machine room was partially destroyed. The electric motor room and electric detector room leaned and their ceiling was damaged.
27 Kanagawa Prefectural Police ed., ibid., p.802. 28 Navy Department ed., Koubun-Bikou Hensai-Saigai Fuzoku, Vol.4, summary of Yoko-Chinsai-Nippo No.1.
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Eighteen oil condensers for transmitters (1910 model) are out of service. Meteorological Observatory room: There are big cracks Weather in the sidewall and the ceiling was Station seriously damaged. Office room: The ceiling was seriously damaged. Wind meter stand: Sloping due to ground subsidence. Machinery and apparatus: Primordial mercurial barometer and accessories of camera were completely destroyed. Naval 40 instant deaths, Brick and wood buildings outside the Dockyard 44 serious office building collapsed or were injuries, seriously damaged except for a few 12 minor injuries buildings. Steel-reinforced concrete buildings suffered less damaged. Naval 3 serious injuries, Two buildings collapsed. The office Gunnery about 10 minor building and barracks were damaged School injuries but may be used after repair. Torpedo The office building, barracks and School auditorium were seriously damaged but may be used after repair. Naval 2 deaths, Completely burnt outside the canning Engineering a few minor factory (steel structure). College injuries Naval 1 death, Partially burnt, the office building and Barracks 1 minor injury barracks were severely damaged. The engine factory (steel structure) was partially destroyed. Naval 1 death, Completely burnt. Hospital 1 serious injury Naval Flying Most aircrafts were damaged. The office Corps building, barracks and hangers were severely damaged but it is possible to repair them. Warships in Submarines and Amagi (under Docks construction) were overturned. Hakozaki There are cracks, heavy oil leak and heavy oil more than 80% of the stock has tanks vanished in smoke.
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3 Rescue operations and security patrol by the Imperial Japanese Navy
(1) Overview The Imperial Japanese Navy started full-blown rescue operations mainly from the sea within a few days of the occurrence of the earthquake. The Taisho Quake Fire Record describes this situation as follows.
It did not pass long before relief supplies were accumulated in Tokyo and top of the Yokohama bay head. This significantly contributed to the stabilization of public and maintained order. A few months have passed after that, during which the officer and men have all suffered but were dedicated to various efforts with their full strength. This gives all of us hope.29
The order for mobilization was issued to almost all major available warships from among the warships belonging to the Combined Fleet and the three Naval Stations (Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo) except those dispatched to other countries at that time. The number of major naval ships totaled 150 (about 30,000 hands) including 45 warships and 63 destroyers.30 Those naval ships participated in such duties as the transportation of food, relief goods and evacuees, guard duties, investigation and surveying of afflicted areas, and the total number of transported evacuees totaled 59,000.31 The recovery operations were completed by November 6th, about 2 months after the occurrence of the earthquake.32
(2) Response of each force The Navy Department established the Naval Disaster Relief Committee in
29 Kanagawa Prefectural Police ed., ibid., pp.801-802. 30 Goro, Kezuka, Kanto Daishinsai to Miura Hanto (Great Kanto Earthquake and Miura Peninsula), Goro Kzuka, p.70. 31 Ibid. 32 Yokosuka City ed., ibid., p.409.
42 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) the Ministry on September 3rd in order to implement relief measures in collaboration with the Extraordinary Disaster Relief Secretariat of the Cabinet. Among unsent telegrams carried by officials who returned to Funabashi Transmitting Station after 3:00 p.m. on September 2nd33, the following are the telegrams related to the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake transmitted to the naval forces through the Funabashi Transmitting Station from the Vice-Minister of Navy.
Telegrams related to the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake transmitted through the Funabashi Transmitting Station Number: From: To: Navy Vice-Minister of Navy Commander in Chief of the Department 1) Combined Fleet At noon on September 1st, a severe earthquake hit the Tokyo area. Although we do not know the degree of damage, many people were injured or killed. Huge fires have occurred in many places and burnt the majority of the city. Fires are still spreading. Communications have been lost inside and outside the city and martial law has been issued. This telegram is to order you to stop the cruise of your Fleet and take measures for assigning them to the three ports (Yokosuka, Osaka, Kure) for such duties as rescue and transportation. I will send you another telegram with more detail. This is an order from the Ministry.
Number: From: To: Navy Vice-Minister of Navy Commander in Chief of each Department 2) Naval Station , Commander in Chief of each Major Naval Port All vessels that are schedule to leave for overseas are ordered to cancel their schedule and to take measures for participating in such duties as rescue and transportation in the Tokyo area.
Number: From: To: Navy Vice-Minister of Navy Commander in Chief of the Department 3) Yokosuka Naval Station It is hard to explain the devastating situation of the afflicted people in Yokohama. The situation is worsening and it seems that the police do not exist. Therefore, I issue an order to take measures for immediately sending a
33 Ibid., Hensai-Saigai 2, Vol.154 (1100, 1107, 1114).
43 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) heavily-armed force under the direction of you, Naval Engineering College and a captain of each force to Yokohama and to take care of the maintenance of security. The Army is planning to dispatch about 70 mounted soldiers tonight and 150 police officers of the Metropolitan Police tomorrow morning by a communication vessel. The authority of direction of the Army and the Navy is acknowledged and we shall comply with the order of precedence.
The status of damage caused by this great earthquake written in those telegrams has been summarized by only time, but their text makes us feel the sense of despair. In particular, Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet was ordered to cancel the future cruise (Navy Department 1)) and Commander in Chief of each Naval Station and each key port’s commander were ordered to cancel the action of vessels that were scheduled to leave for overseas (Navy Department 2)) by the Vice-Minister of Navy. This indicated that the Navy Department was ready to commence the relief operations with all naval forces and regarded this situation as an emergency. Moreover, a ground security force was formed and ordered to be dispatched in order to maintain the security of the city of Yokohama. It was also encouraged to have army soldiers familiarize themselves with the order of precedence with regard to the authority of direction (Navy Department 3)). In those days, it seemed that there was no specific agreement on the direction in cases where the Army and the Navy cooperated in a disaster field in those days. Although the Combined Fleet (Commander in chief of Combined Fleet, Vice Admiral Isamu Takeshita) was implementing routine inspection in the Lichangshan harbor in the seas around Lushun on September 1st, he received all five emergency transmissions (Funabashi 1)-(Funabashi 5) )transmitted after 3:00 p.m. on the same day by the commanding officer of the Funabashi Transmitting Station. This helped the Fleet to know the situation about the great earthquake in the Tokyo and Yokohama area and to understand the necessity of swiftly returning to Japan. At 2:00 p.m. on September 2nd, the Commander in Chief of Combined Fleet issued an emergency order to prepare for getting underway to all assigned forces. Each Fleet weighed anchor for Japan successively from about 4:00 p.m. Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet who received the first telegram
44 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) transmitted by the Navy Department (Navy Department 1)) at 4:45 p.m. on September 2nd on the way back to Japan rewired with regard to the intentions of Fleet’s actions as follows.34
From: To: Commander in Chief of the Vice-Minister of Navy, Commander Combined Fleet in Chief of each Naval Station The Fleet leaves on September 2nd and is deployed as follows. Yokosuka: “Nagato”, “Kongo”, “Wakamiya”, Third Squadron, Second Torpedo Flotilla Division Osaka: “Mutsu”, “Hiei”, “Kirishima”, Fifth Squadron Kure: “Ise”, “Hyuga”, First Torpedo Flotilla Division Other vessels are ordered to wait in Sasebo for the time being. “Mutsu”, “Hiei” and “Kirishima” will be sent to Yokosuka as soon as they arrive at Osaka. “Nagato” is expected to arrive in the morning of September 5th.
The flagship Nagato went directly to Tokyo area and arrived off the coast of Shinagawa at 4:20 p.m. on September 5th and Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet received the instruction on disaster relief duties from the Minister of Navy at 7:00 p.m. on the same day.35 At this point, the Combined Fleet and officially received their assignments and it started to give their assigned forces those assignments. The organization of the Combined Fleet in those days was as follows.
Organization of the Combined Fleet during the period of the Great Kanto Earthquake
First Fleet First Squadron (Nagato, Mutsu, Hyuga, Ise (reorganized to Third Squadron from September 3rd) Third Squadron (Kuma, Tama, Ooi) First Torpedo Flotilla Division (Tatsuta, 25th to 28th Destroyer Divisions)
34 Shinpachiro, Goto, Kanto-Daishinsai ni Okeru Kaigun no Katsudo (jou) (The Imperial Japanese Navy’s Operations for the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake), Heijutsu-Dokokai, 1983. 35 Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, morning edition on September 8, 1923, p.3.
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First Submarine Division (Chikuma, 4th and 6th Submarine Divisions, Mansyu) Special vessels (Tokiwa, 12th Destroyer Division)
Second Fleet Fourth Squadron (Kongo, Hiei, Kirishima) Fifth Squadron (Natori, Kinu, Nagara, Yura) Second Torpedo Flotilla Division (Kitakami, 1st to 4th Destroyer Divisions) Second Submarine Division(Yahagi, 14th and 16th submarine divisions) Special vessels (Karasaki, Wakamiya) Training Squadron (Iwate, Asama, Yakumo)
Major telegrams from the first telegram related to the disaster to messages that explain the termination of the relief operations, etc. and the recovery (to the 20th telegram) are as follows.
Combined Fleet 1st special order (Combined Fleet Order)36 From: To: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet Fleet Forces (1) I am in charge of the relief operations of the fleet forces off the coasts of Shinagawa and Yokohama. (2) The Combined Fleet Command Office is established in the Navy Department for implementing the relief operations.
Combined Fleet 2nd special order (Combined Fleet Order)37 From: To: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet Yubari (1) Yubari is under the order to move immediately to Yokohama to consult with the Yokohama prison warden and the Army commander and hand about 600 prisoners there over to the Nagoya prison warden. (2) When that assignment completes, you must carry food from Nagoya and return to Shibaura.
36 Ibid., Hensai-Saigai 7, Vol.159 (0122). 37 Ibid., 159 (0149).
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The 1st special telegram indicates that Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet himself directed the assigned warships off the coasts of Shinagawa and Yokohama near Tokyo and that the Combined Fleet Command had been moved from the flagship Nagato to the Navy Department (1st special telegram). The reason is thought to be that the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet kept in close contact with the central command of the Ministry. There were Kosuge, Sugamo, Ichigaya and Toyotama prisons in Tokyo, Yokohama, Urawa, Chiba and Kofu prisons and Odawara juvenile prison in the afflicted areas and a number of prisoners were in jail. When the earthquake occurred, many prison buildings collapsed and it became possible for prisoners to break out of prison. The Yokohama prison was particularly damaged and its cells and other facilities were burnt or collapsed. Therefore, all prisoners (about 1,000) except injured prisoners were released under the condition that they would return to the prison within the 24-hour statutory period. 295 prisoners among those who returned to the prison were transferred to the Nagoya prison under strict supervision by the cruiser Yubari and the destroyer Aoi (2nd special telegram).38 The 3rd special telegram transmitted on September 6th states that the forces that belong to the Combined Fleet shall implement the assignments related to the earthquake and clerical works of the command shall be carried out in the Navy Department for the time being. In addition, the 4th special telegram states that a ground security group consisting of warships hands was formed for the maintenance of security and dispatched for guarding military facilities.
38 It was ordered to transfer about 600 prisoners. However, there is a report that only 295 were actually transferred and 200 prisoners did not go aboard and involved in the recovery of prison facilities. There is discrepancy of numbers so that it is unclear whether they were transferred afterward.
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Combined Fleet 3rd special order (Combined Fleet Order)39 From: To: The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet all (1) Omitted (2) I am in charge of the fleet forces and implement the following assignments upon consultations with Commander in Chief of the Yokosuka Naval Station, the Kanto martial law administrator and the local government officials concerned and under close coordination with the Naval Disaster Relief Committee. a) Investigation on the status of coastal areas affected by the earthquake, rescue efforts and maritime transportation b) Assistance for maritime transportation of materials and personnel for rescue efforts c) General port duties at Shibaura and Yokohama d) Maintenance of security of the Naval offices in Tokyo e) Communications and liaison with each Breau and Department in the Navy (3) Actions or assignments of each Fleet are as follows. a) “Mutsu”, “Hiei”, “Kirishima”, “Karasaki” and the 12th Destroyer Flotilla shall move to off the coast of Shinagawa. b) “Ise” and “Hyuga” shall carry relief supplies from Osaka or Kobe or and then move to off the coast of Shinagawa. c) Third Fleet shall discharge relief supplies off the coast of Shinagawa and then move to Yokohama for the assignment of maintaining security. d) First Submarine Division shall carry relief supplies via Osaka, Kobe or Yokkaichi and then move to Yokosuka. e) First Torpedo Flotilla Division, Fifth squadron and Second Submarine Division (without “Karasaki”) shall complete the preparation for mobilization and involve in education and trainings in Hiroshima Bay. f) Admiral Commanding the Second Fleet shall take control of the discharge of relief supplies and personnel off the coast of Shinagawa, assistance of maritime transportation and general port duties at Shibaura. Vessels that stay off the coast of Shinagawa shall seek the direction of Admiral Commanding the Second Fleet with regard to said matters and carry relief supplies, etc., and vessels that move to off the coast of Shinagawa shall report this scheduled arrival time to Commander in Chief of Second Fleet. g) Second Torpedo Flotilla Division shall take care of investigations on the status of damage caused by the earthquake at coastal areas of the Miura peninsula, the west coast of the Boso peninsula, the Izu peninsula and the Izu islands and those who have completed the assignment or those who do not have a particular need of staying in said areas shall move to Yokosuka. Commander in Chief shall design out an action plan and report it. (4) Omitted (5) Administration of Combined Fleet shall be enforced in the Navy Department for the time being.
39 Ibid., 159 (0299-0302).
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Combined Fleet 4th special order (Combined Fleet Order) (September 6, 1923)40 From: To: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet all “Nagato” and “Kongo” shall dispatch ground groups as follows and assign them to take care of the protection of the Technology Institute and communications lines related to the Navy in Tokyo. Personnel A naval landing party shall be dispatched from “Nagato” and “Kongo” (4 enlisted men and 56 seamen) everyday Clothing and duties (omitted)
As mentioned above, the Tokaido line had been disconnected between Shinagawa and Gotenba after the earthquake. Therefore, the maritime transportation depended on the Shimizu port that was used as an intermediate port of vessels that sailed between Kanto and Kansai in those days, and traveled mainly between Tokyo and Shimizu (6th special telegram). Under the situation where there was no clear prospect of when the Tokaido line would be recovered, major ports in Sagami Bay near the epicenter were unserviceable due to the damage caused by tsunamis, etc. In addition, the Shimizu port is located the west of Kanto and in frequent use. It is thought, therefore, that it was the most accessible port. The Navy provided public transportation between Shibaura-Shimizu port, Shibaura-Yokosuka, Yokosuka (via Yokohama)-Shibaura. Anyone who applied to the Navy Department could go aboard and there was a plan of increasing transportation vessels gradually if there was any shortage in transportation capacity.41
6th special order of the Combined Fleet (Combined Fleet order)
40 Ibid., 159 (0303). 41 Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, morning edition on September 8, 1923, p.3.
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(September 7, 1923)42 From: To: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet all Admiral Commanding the Training Squadron shall implement the assignment of maritime transportation as follows. 1. Schedule (omitted) 2. Action At 1:00 p.m., leave off the coast of Shinagawa for Shimizu. After passengers from Tokyo have been discharged, passengers from Shimizu shall aboard and return to the coast of Shinagawa. 3. (Omitted) 4. Relief supplies shall be carried when you return from Shimizu to off the coast of Shinagawa.
8th special order of the Combined Fleet (Combined Fleet order) (September 7, 1923)43 From: To: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet all 1. A naval pier command shall be established in Shibaura and the commanding officer of Nagato shall be assigned as its commander. The commander shall take control of the discharge and carriage of supplies at the Shibaura pier and neighboring areas, supervision of works, arrangement of passengers and other works particularly ordered (hereinafter omitted).
The shore command was established near the naval dock in Shibaura early on September 7th, and the commanding officer of Nagato was assigned as a naval dock commander and he took control of transporting and carrying supplies (8th special order).
14th special order of the Combined Fleet (Combined Fleet order) (September 12, 1923)44 From: To: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet all Izumo shall leave Shinagawa at 1:00 p.m. on September 18th and arrive at Yokosuka at 3:00 p.m. on September 19th return to Sasebo after stopping off Kobe when its assignment of transporting evacuees completed (hereinafter
42 Ibid., 159 (0306). 43 Ibid., Hensai-Saigai 6, Vol.158 (1697). 44 Ibid., Hensai-Saigai 7, Vol.159 (0325).
50 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) omitted).
Telegrams were sent out that ordered vessels to return to their original ports from September 12th just 10 days have passed from the disaster (14th special order). It was ordered that vessels that had implemented relief and support activities to gradually return to their original missions and endeavor to have resupplied and take rest. Moreover, it was permitted for people who were born in the afflicted areas to take a leave of absence within 3 days, and a leave of absence of up to 5 days if it involved a family hardship. There were a number of naval ship hands who had lost their immediate family members but participated in the relief operations particularly in Yokosuka without regards to their own concerns. The shore command of the Combined Fleet established at the Navy Department was dismantled on September 21st (20th special order).
20th special order of the Combined Fleet (Combined Fleet order) (September 17, 1923)45 From: To: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet all 1. You shall return to your original command after September 22nd. 2. (Omitted) 3. Each vessel shall move to Yokohama as ordered by the fleet commander depending on the status of works and be resupplied and take rest. 4. Victims of the earthquake and persons who are from the afflicted areas (including those who have their family members or relatives in those areas) shall be permitted to take a leave of absence to take care of family responsibilities within the period not exceeding 5 days and 3 days, respectively. 5. Combined Fleet Command Office at the Navy Department shall be dismantled by September 21st. 6. (Omitted) 7. (Omitted)
Concerning aerial reconnaissance, according to the reports related to the disaster by the Kasumigaura Naval Flying Corps, two ground training aircrafts and one sea reconnaissance seaplane scouted the status of damage
45 Ibid., 159 (03).
51 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) in Tokyo, Yokohama and Yokosuka areas at 8:00 am on September 2nd, and its results were reported to the police authorities, and the government authorities. Such important information was a source to newspapers and was the only source for the general public to receive information about the disaster and to prevent panic. It also served for subsequent recovery measures. From September 5th, the Navy engaged in regular communication flights between Kasumigaura (Kasumigaura Naval Flying Corps)-Tokyo (Yoyogi Airport)-Yokosuka (Yokosuka Naval Flying Corps (Oppama)), reconnaissance and mutual communication. Moreover, according to the Naval Relief Committee report, a routine flight between Yokosuka and near the Shibaura naval pier using water aircraft that belong to the Yokosuka Naval Flying Corps was established from September 7th and they engaged in the transportation of documents. The following table explains the assignments entrusted to the vessel forces under the control of the Yokosuka Naval Station in the initial stages after the disaster occurred (September 2nd-September 7th, 1923). The Taisho Great Quake Fire Record describes the status of activities of organizations related to the Yokosuka Naval Station as follows.
Hands were dispatched to Yokosuka and neighboring municipalities immediately after the earthquake and they engaged in the maintenance of security and rescue of the afflicted people in cooperation with local police officers. On the night of September 2nd, some vessels were dispatched swiftly to and made some hands land Isogo. Their crews patrolled some parts of the city and gave the afflicted people a great sense of security. Martial law was issued on September 3rd. As soon as the public noticed that Yokosuka and the Miura district have become subject to the authority of Commander in Chief of the Yokosuka Naval Station on September 5th, the command was established in the Headquarters of Naval Station and the martial law district was divided into four areas. They had to protected the afflicted people with their full strength by engaging in various operations such as the rescue of residents under jurisdiction, recovery of communication equipment,
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opening of closed roads, cleaning up of burnt city areas and restration of the water supply and electricity and significantly contribute to promoting the reconstruction project.46 Assignments of forces under command of the Yokosuka Naval Station Participating vessel Assignments Battleship Asahi Temporary shelter Naval Gunnery school Same as above Battleship Mikasa Temporary shelter for prisoners Battleship Satsuma Temporary shelter for naval engineering school trainees Battleship Aki Temporary shelter for Naval air force officers Battleship Haruna For operation room of the injured Cruiser Isuzu, Destroyer Security patrol of Yokohama Hatsushimo Destroyer Shigure For returning of the Imperial family to Tokyo Special vessel Fuji Communications between Tokyo and Yokosuka (via off the coast of Shinagawa) and maritime transportation of the Army soldiers between Tokyo and Yokohama Submarine Tender Jingei Transportation of evacuees from Yokosuka to Shimizu and of food from Shimizu Fifth destroyer division Transportation of interior officers who were on a business trip to Osaka between Shimizu and Tokyo Destroyers / torpedo boats Sea patrol of the Miura peninsula Military band members Security Ground Forces and other duties Yokosuka Air Force Reconnaissance of the status of the (aircrafts on the Carrier earthquake and taking aerial photography Hosho) along the coast of the southernmost part of Musashi, Sagami, Izu and Boso peninsulas Kasumigaura Air Force Reconnaissance of the status of the earthquake and taking aerial photography of the coasts of Awa, Kazusa and Shimousa. Special vessel Takasaki Transportation of injured and family members who wish to move (Yokosuka-Kure) Destroyer Tanikaze Transportation of family members who wish to move (Yokosuka-Kure) Cruiser Hirado Same as above (3) Arbitrary decision and execution by on-site commanders with regard to
46 Kanagawa Prefectural Police Department, “Taisho Quake Fire History,” p.802.
53 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) ports used by foreign vessels When four or five days had passed after the disaster, foreign rescue vessels started to enter Tokyo Bay frequently. Rear Admiral Seizo Kobayashi, Admiral Commanding the Third Squadron, First Fleet, Combined Fleet (hereinafter referred to as RADM Kobayashi) had made liaison officers take care of the coordination with foreign vessels that entered the port, in particular the US Asiatic Fleet. In those days, the ports where foreign vessels had been permitted to enter were confined to Hakodate, Niigata, Yokohama, Kobe and Nagasaki for national security reasons. The Japanese government did not want foreign vessels to use Shibaura and Shinagawa in Tokyo. In addition, because the entire Shonan area south of Yokohama was regarded as a fortified zone, it did not want foreign countries to know the status of damage to the facilities related to the Yokosuka Naval Station. The Imperial Japanese Navy particularly feared that the navigation of foreign vessels in Tokyo Bay, Sagami Bay, etc. would help foreign countries come to know the status of damage caused by the earthquake and that national defense secrets may be leaked. As explained above, there were many fortresses near Tokyo Bay so that it was necessary to obtain prior permission from the senior command when a foreign vessel entered the above said port. However, there was a commander there who permitted foreign vessels to enter the port without permission. A telegram transmitted from the commanding officer of Battleship Yamashiro to the Vice-Minister of Navy on September 6th says the following.
The three USN destroyers solicited permission for entering the port in order to rescue US citizens in Hakone, Kamakura and Hayama. I provided them permission at my discretion. I would like to ask for your approval.47
This telegram indicates that the commanding officer permitted the entrance to a port other than the Yokohama port at his discretion and asked
47 Ibid., Hensai-Saigai 9, Vol.161 (0245).
54 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) for retrospective approval. In addition, although Admiral Commading the Third Squadron had maintained the security of the Yokohama port, he permitted US vessels to enter a closed seaport at his discretion as a senior commander. Therefore, he was criticized by the Minister of Navy for a bungled handing of his responsibility as “it was not too late to ask me once, because said area is a fortified zone.”48 It was thought to be an inevitable response, because a passive attitude of waiting for instructions by going through formal procedures in such an emergency situation would interfere with rescue operations that require a sense of urgency and swiftness taking into accounts the communications capability of vessels in those days. Problems had already arisen when a foreign vessel entered the Tokyo port on September 13th. Therefore, Foreign Minister Gonbei Yamamoto sent a document that said that “even if warships enter Tokyo port, water routes have been changed after the earthquake off the coasts of Tokyo and Shinagawa and there are a number of small and big Japanese ships in port. Therefore, it is difficult to ensure safety of navigation. In addition, even if vessels anchored temporarily in the Tokyo port, the Shibaura discharge place has been destroyed and it is extremely difficult to land using the provisional pier. Based on these reasons, I would like to ask you to enter the Yokohama port unless there special permission granted later on. In the Yokohama port, there are some piers available so that it is more plausible to land relief supplies sent for Tokyo area from there”49 to ambassadors of countries that dispatch vessels scheduled to enter the Tokyo port for participating in the relief operations in the afflicted areas. He asked for the use of the Yokohama port for reasons of security and for its facilities. This tells us that the Japanese government and the Minister of Navy were in a difficult situation where they had to consider the conservation of military secrets such as a number of fortresses and military factories in Tokyo Bay and the goodwill of foreign countries.
48 Ibid., 161 (0297). 49 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan ed., Nihon Gaiko Bunsho Taisho 12-nen Dai-1-satsu (Taisho-ki Dai-37-satsu) (Japanese Diplomatic Document, 1923 Vol.1 (Taisho Period Vol.37)), p.569.
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4 Relief operations by the US Navy
(1) Actions of the Asiatic Fleet and response of the Japanese government On September 2nd, the US Department of the Navy ordered Admiral Anderson, Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet (hereinafter referred to as Admiral Anderson), who had stayed in Qinghuang Island, China, to dispatch vessels to Japan for the relief operations related to the great earthquake that had occurred in Japan.50 Admiral Anderson arranged for one destroyer to enter Nagasaki on September 4th as a communication vessel and assigned it to establish a wireless communications system in order to secure coastal and Pacific communications networks. One destroyer for the relief operations was dispatched to Kobe where US citizens from Yokohama had already been evacuated to on September 5th.51 Moreover, the commander ordered six destroyers carry a large quantity of relief supplies from the US Army warehouse in Tianjin, China, to head to Japan.52 He was on board the flagship “USS Huron” and procured food supplies in Zhifu, China, and entered the Yokohama port.53 At the same time, Philippine Governor Leonard Wood who was in Manila had received the order for mobilization to Japan from the US Department of the Army on the afternoon of September 2nd. George Read, Commander of the stationary troops in the Philippines, had 3000 beds, 150 tons of medical supplies, 750 tons of food and a medical support force consisting mainly from the Army (18 doctors and 60 nurses) aboard on September 5th. He himself came aboard the ship and left for Yokohama.54 Though the purpose of dispatching US Naval warships was to
50 Ibid., 161 (0232). 51 Ibid., 161 (0235). 52 Ibid., 161 (0307). 53 USS Huron implemented a gun-salute for the Imperial Japanese Navy ships when it entered the Yokohama port. However, Japanese destroyers reported to the higher command that it is not possible for Japanese destroyers to implement a gun-salute, because evacuees were aboard for a security reason. Admiral Commanding the Third Squadron also requested the notification that a gun-salute is impossible to implement to the US Embassy through the Ministry of the Navy. (Ibid., 161 (0248)). 54 Ibid., 161 (0297).
56 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) participate in the relief operations for Japan, they also transferred US citizens in Tokyo to Yokohama and western Japan and American victims who lived in the Shonan area. Imperial Japanese Navy’s destroyers accompanied US warships that participated in those operations for surveillance. I have already mentioned that a number of foreign vessels started to enter and leave closed ports in support of the relief operations where foreign vessels had been prohibited to leave or enter. As a result of consultations between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Navy Department on September 9th, however, the decisions were made with regard to the future entry of US vessels to closed ports that 1) a rescue center shall be established in Yokohama, 2) US vessels shall engage in the transportation of evacuees between Yokohama and Shimizu, 3) the cargo vessel USS Meigs and the torpedo tender USS Black Hawk shall sail from Shibaura and back to Yokohama when they are to completes the discharge of on-board supplies, 4) the cargo vessel USS Merrit and the coal ship USS Pecos shall sail to Yokohama and discharge on-board supplies and 5) liaison officers shall be dispatched from Combined Fleet to the US Command and other directions.55 On September 11th, the Japanese government decided in its cabinet meeting the guidelines for relief operations of each country as follows. 1) Japan is willing to accept food (excluding rice) and other necessary supplies, 2) Japan appreciates the kind proposal to dispatch personnel for the relief operations but declines said proposal. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall take appropriate measures for persons who have already arrived in Japan or who are on the way to Japan. Japan shall decline the provision of transportation vessels, and 3) when any vessel enters a port to provide food and other relief supplies, government officials in charge shall be dispatched to said vessel for inspection before its crews are permitted to land and cargos are discharged.56 Admiral Anderson continued to participate in the relief operations for Japan till September 21st and then returned to Shanghai. However, private
55 Ibid., 161 (0254-0255). 56 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan ed., ibid., pp.560-561.
57 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) notes of Frederick Moore, then advisor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at that time, described that “the US Navy vigorously engaged in intelligence operations in order not to fall behind other countries (Snip). This is an act that would destroy the friendship of the two countries.”57 and gave his country a warning. This shows that operatives whose assignment was to collect information were on board US vessels and had engaged in intelligence gathering operations during their stay in Japan.
(2) Diplomatic confusion between Japan and the US Although the US Navy cargo vessel USS Merrit entered the Yokohama port to establish a field hospital, there were misunderstandings on the transportation and discharge of materials between Japan and the US. Thus, Admiral Commanding the Third Squadron appealed to Keisuke Okada, the Vice-Minister of Navy on September 11th as follows.
The decision was made between the Japanese government and the US government through diplomatic channels to establish a rescue center in Yokohama as the main assignment of the US Asiatic Fleet. Therefore, the US cargo vessel USS “Merrit” was expected to arrive at Yokohama on September 16th with all materials and personnel necessary for constructing a field hospital. However, Kanagawa Prefecture and the city of Yokohama were not happy with this decision and claimed that there was no such need. The place for construction has not been selected due to this reason. Their way of thinking was very different to our own and complicated situations could arise if we leave this matter uncontrolled. I would like to request for your urgent consideration of this matter upon consultations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and ask you to order the city of Yokohama to construct a field hospital or take materials to Tokyo. In this way, we can avoid rejecting materials and personnel provided by the US with great hardship and costs, because the
57 NHK news crew ed., When the history changed 5, KTC Chuoh Publishing, 2001, p.184.
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procedures have been settled through diplomatic channels.58
On the following day, September 12th, a telegram was transmitted from Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet to Admiral Commanding the Third Squadron in response to the said request. The telegram said that 1) an agreement has been made with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Home Ministry that a rescue center will be constructed in Yokohama. There is no doubt that a direction to that effect will be given to the prefectural office59 and that 2) the vice minister already consulted with the mayor with regard to the decision that a rescue center would be constructed near the Yamashita Bridge in Yokohama.60 However, another telegram was transmitted from Admiral Commanding the Third Squadron to the Vice-Minister of Navy on September 15th as follows.
USS “Merrit” entered the Yokohama port at 11:00 a.m. on September 15th. The harbor office director visited her at 11:30 a.m. and insisted that there was a notice from the Minister of Home Affairs that all discharge of cargo from said vessel shall be suspended. He also expressed his opinions on the cargo of said vessel was for a field hospital. However, he had heard of the telegram on the decision that it should be established in Yokohama. An order to discharge the cargo has already been planned upon consultation with the Commander in Chief of the US Asiatic Fleet. If the discharge of cargo was suspended, it is a concern that sentiments between the two parties would worsen. I would like to request your immediate consideration to the fact that said decision has already been in action.61
In response to this telegram, the Vice-Minister of Navy wired the
58 Ibid., 161 (0276-0277). 59 Ibid., 161 (0287). 60 Ibid., 161 (0289). 61 Ibid., 161 (0317).
59 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) following telegram.
The matter of the discharge of cargos from USS “Merrit” and of the establishment of a rescue center will be discussed in the cabinet meeting today. Ministries concerned have the intention to execute the decision. The response of the harbor office director at your place is thought to be an error. I would like to ask you to immediately prepare for executing said decision upon consultation with the parties concerned.62
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Navy Department consulted the matter concerning the place for constructing a rescue center and a decision had been made on September 9th. Then, this was approved by the cabinet on September 12th. However, as this information did not reach the persons in charge in the field, the decision had not been implemented thoroughly. This is thought to have had caused a discrepancy between the Navy Department and field forces and created confusion.63
(3) News report in the US In other countries, a telegram on the status of Japan transmitted from the military attaché of the Japanese Embassy in the US to the Naval Undersecretary and the deputy director of the military command on September 10th says that “there was a report that the Yokosuka port was completely destroyed and that a number of Japanese warships went down.64” Also, there was information in the US that there were people who secretly intended to promote that the contribution of large amount of cash to Japan would help the recovery of the Japanese Navy.65 Chicago Tribune’s correspondent Matheson who lived in Japan transmitted the content of the report from Consul Yoshida in Chicago to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on
62 Ibid., 161 (0319). 63 There is a telegram concerning the review of discharging cargos of the transportation vessel USS Merrit that “it was found out that the request of the harbor office director was a complete error.” (Ibid., 161 (0327)) 64 Ibid., 161 (0246). 65 Ibid., 161 (0247).
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September as follow. 1) When the US Navy swiftly arrived at Yokohama in order to participate in the relief operations, the Japanese Navy committed an act that seemed to be in an obstructive behavior, 2) When a Japanese destroyer collected a imperial family member’s dead body in Kamakura, it did not allow a number of foreigners to come aboard and a notice that prohibited the entrance of foreign vessels to said area was sent and 3) it was prohibited for Commander of the US Fleet to dispatch their fleets to Tokyo and neighboring areas. 66 In response to this report, Foreign Minister Hikokichi Ijyuin wired a telegram to Consul Yoshida in Chicago on September 22nd. The telegram said “the report of Mr. Matheson included a number of falsehood (Snip). It is in fact incorrect that the Japanese government authorities committed any acts that obstructed the support of the US Navy in Yokohama (Snip). The report on the prohibition of dispatching US vessels to Tokyo and neighboring areas means that nonmilitary vessels were prohibited to enter or leave said areas for a smooth discharge of relief supplies and goods at Shibaura at that time. This was an inevitable measure taken during a chaotic situation, but there was no intention to discriminate against US vessels. In particular, there is no truth to the report that US destroyers are prohibited to enter or leave Tokyo Bay.”67 He also gave an instruction to disclose information where necessary. Notwithstanding such measures, the evening paper on September 27th reported with the headline that “the Japanese humiliated the US Navy and Japanese government authorities made an excuse.” Its content was as follows. “US vessels were treated as if they were a nuisance. Many Japanese and Japanese government petty officials thought that they entered Tokyo Bay to take advantage of chaotic situation in Japan without knowing that the Japanese government had given them approval for entering these vital places. Therefore, one government official went aboard a destroyer that had anchored in Tokyo Bay and requested its departure. In addition, two destroyers were ordered to follow the US destroyer and search lights were irradiated. Furthermore, it was requested that round trips be cancelled
66 Ibid., 161 (0350). 67 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan ed., ibid., p.592.
61 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) between vessels anchoring in Yokohama and the US Embassy in Tokyo Japan due to congestion in the Yokohama port.”68 It is an extremely serious diplomatic problem that information different from the truth is reported overseas, and this could lead to a diplomatic crisis. This case shed light on the immature response by the Japanese government and the Japanese people in those days towards foreign media showed the immaturity of Japanese diplomacy. At first, foreign media reported that misunderstandings arose between Japan and the US due to busy schedules and poor negotiation skills of Japanese government officials. However, this problem was solved as time passed. This set a precedent that misunderstandings, false reports and harmful rumors are likely to develop when a government receives the support of foreign forces, and we also continually need to pay sufficient attention to this matter even in modern times.
5 Confidence-building and friendship between on-site commanders of the Japanese and US Navies
Although RADM Kobayashi of Third Squadron received a warning from the Minister of Navy because he gave permission at his discretion, he greatly demonstrated the spirit of confidence-building between the two navies of Japan and US by taking charge of the US vessels sailing in the area. A telegram transmitted to the captain of the 1st class cruiser Asama scheduled to enter the Shimizu port on September 12th reveals such spirit.
The two US destroyers carrying 600 evacuees from Yokohama are scheduled to arrive at the Shimizu port around 12:00 p.m. on September 12th. I request your sufficient support for the discharge of those evacuees and other matters. I request that you consult with local officers in advance before those vessels enter the port today.69
68 Ibid., 161 (0336). 69 Ibid., 161 (0291).
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It is exceedingly unusual to transmit a telegram that requests prior coordination for vessels scheduled to enter the Shimizu port since the port was not under the direct control of Combined Fleet despite the port falling under its jurisdiction. This indicates special consideration given to US vessels engaging in the relief operations. A telegram transmitted from RADM Kobayashi to Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet on September 19th said “the US vessel (Meigs) carries some materials for a field hospital under construction. In order to receive that material, the US Navy tugboat was permitted to sail into Shibaura. I am wiring you this telegram just in case you have not heard anything”.70
The above telegram displays arbitrary decision making and execution on part of the field commander, who at same-time expected US vessels to implement relief operations smoothly while taking precedence the rules. The observation made by Admiral Anderson later when he left Yokohama explains and supports these points clearly. A telegram transmitted from Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet to Admiral Commanding Third Squadron on September 18th, when the completion for the US Asiatic Fleet was getting closer, contained the following:
When Lieutenant General Read from the US Army visited us on September 17th, I expressed are sincere gratitude for the support provided by the US in the name of the IJN. He replied that it is an obligation for a neighboring country like the Philippines to provide our friends who are suffering during such a disaster with our full support. My visit to Japan is no exception.71
Such content reveals to us that the relief operations of the US forces were evidence of a strong friendship.
70 Ibid., 161 (0339). 71 Ibid., 161 (0407-0408).
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Moreover, a telegram transmitted from Third Squadron commander to the Vice-Minister of Navy on September 21st describes a ceremony of an exchange of a naval gun salute was implemented between the US Navy and the Japanese Navy.
USS “Huron” left for Shanghai at 2:00 p.m. on September 21st with eight destroyers. When they left the port, they did a naval gun salute to the national flag so we replied in kind with a gun-salute.72
Liaison Officer Lieutenant Soji who was stationed in Third Squadron recorded it as information in Yokohama area as follows on September 21st.
The US Admiral offered to exchange a naval gun salute to the national flag when they left the port, because he wished to express his special friendship and make vessels of other countries understand how deep the relationship between Japan and the US was. Admiral Commanding the Third Squadron accepted this offer so that they could exchange a naval gun salute. Both of them were satisfied73.
Admiral Commanding the Third Squadron reported the departure of the US Asiatic Fleet from Yokohama to the Vice-Minister of Navy on September 21st as follows.
Before they left, I visited the admiral of the US Asiatic Fleet to express my appreciation for their support and to pray for his future health and prosperity. The admiral changed his attitude and appreciated the favorable treatment given by the Imperial Government, particularly the Navy Department after he succeeded as Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet. He also expressed his gratitude, because it was not hard to complete his mission due to frank negotiations with the naval authority after he arrived at Japan for the relief operations of this earthquake. He
72 Ibid., 161 (0349). 73 Ibid., 161 (0354).
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praised the people’s spirit toward reconstruction in spite of an unprecedented disaster in the history (Snip). All US citizens want the friendship between Japan and the US and wish for the prosperity of Japan. The US Navy particularly has a good impression of the Japanese Navy. US citizens worked hard to rescue the Japanese people unexpectedly in response to your country’s disaster and the US Navy expressed sincerity in using its limited capability. Such actions back up the above-mentioned discussion in detail.74
In addition to the above-mentioned observation, I have already mentioned that a salute-exchange with respect to the national flag and the command flag was implemented.75 He adds that actions of the Asiatic Fleet were extremely effective, the commitment of Admiral Anderson was sincere and friendly and there is no doubt that Admiral Anderson left the port of Yokohama with a good impression.76 His attitude until he departed was excellent. As this report describes, the relationship of trust between the Japanese Navy and the US Navy deepened greatly at that time. The attitude of the US Navy Asiatic Fleet was an example for the actions of foreign forces that came to provide support. Although it was at the discretion of Japanese on-site commanders, the partnership between the two countries’ navies exercised to full extent and the coordination was implemented on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, the relief operations by US vessels were implemented extremely smoothly on the scene at the discretion of Admiral Commanding the Third Squadron.
Conclusion
The Imperial Japanese Navy executed its assignments with the determination to cancel the inspection of naval maneuvers and overseas deployment during the relief operations and its contribution was
74 Ibid., 161 (0401). 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid., 161 (0402).
65 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) significantly throughout the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake. The morning edition of Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun of September 20th describes it as follows with the headline that “the Navy is worthy of receiving credit in this disaster.”
It was the first time that the Navy devoted its energy to transporting food, relief supplies, building materials and evacuees for relief operations. In particular, it was the first time for the Imperial Japanese Navy to permit citizens to come freely aboard vessels. When the transportation system of food was paralyzed, the Navy provided people transportation with all their might. The afflicted people could receive not only food but also various daily supplies. It is not an exaggeration to say that the person or organization who made the most valuable contribution to the relief operations was the Navy.77
The Imperial Japanese Navy rapidly launched the Naval Earthquake Relief Committee in the Navy Department and transported the affected people who lost their homes to different places, provided relief supplies and food mainly to Shinagawa and Yokohama and maintained the peace and harmony by dispatching ground troops and by engaging them in peacekeeping operations. The Navy could dedicate its resources, because they had secured their communications system at an early stage in the disaster and they could operate effectively, particularly maritime transportation capability on the seas that were hardly affected by the earthquake. Moreover, the Navy had good fortune since the epicenter of the Great Kanto Earthquake was near Sagami Bay and Tokyo Bay, which became the strategic point of the relief operations, was not affected by the tsunamis. Therefore, the use of ports for maritime transportation was possible as usual. As a result, the Navy which had been a target of the reduction in budget because of the arms reduction treaty after the Washington Conference and budget austerity measures made the public feel
77 Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, evening edition on September 20, 1923, p.1.
66 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) its presence through additional assignments and activities after the earthquake, that is, the relief operations. The values of armed forces (Navy) were greatly recognized. During this time, Combined Fleet that belonged to the afflicted areas and the Yokosuka Naval Station engaged in the relief operations with the same determination as if in wartime and showed a high cope capability in this situation. In the relief activities that continued for about two weeks after the great earthquake occurred, the Imperial Japanese Navy demonstrated their real potential to the people and made the public understand the purpose of the existence of the armies to protect peace and maintain security. In particular, the action of the Funabashi Transmitting Station chief who transmitted the urgency of the situation to the naval forces and organizations through wireless transmission immediately after the disaster was a result of the awareness of his duty as a commander and showed an ability to judge appropriately the situation. This demonstrated the high quality of Japanese naval officers during those days. Although most of the Yokosuka urban areas collapsed or was burnt down, compared to the civil unrest and chaotic situations in Tokyo and Yokohama, Yokosuka was extremely quiet. As it was a naval city, there was no disturbing behavior such as riots that occurred in other disaster-struck cities. The relief and security measures that were implemented swiftly calmed down the people and public order recovered quickly. This is attributable to the factors that there were a limited number of populated areas remaining and the number of houses and population were small in the southern and western areas, but the presence of the Army and the Navy was also important. The relief operations by the US Navy were extraordinary compared to other countries’ navies, in terms of the quantity of supplies and swiftness of response. Although the Japanese government had difficulty in how to respond, the Navy played a role as a mediator between the two countries. The United States had become a major military power in the world after World War II and it is extraordinary not only in the material sense but also in the field of intelligence gathering. The US appealed such qualities to the
67 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected) entire world through those relief operations and exploited the presence of the Navy to a great extent. The Navy has, in particular, received a high evaluation. Both the Imperial Japanese Navy and the US Navy demonstrated their capabilities to the fullest extent and the people were proud of them. Under an emergency, the people tend to depend on such powers. This is applicable to modern times as well. In the 1923 Kanto Great Earthquake, the Army demonstrated its security maintenance capability, technological capability, mobilization capability and fairness by rescuing the afflicted people without discrimination. Particularly, in the Taisho era when democratic consciousness was emerging in Japan, a strong impression that the Army was to reliable was shown to the people. At an early stage after the disaster, the coordination between the Japanese government and the US Asiatic Fleet was so poor that field commanders of the Imperial Japanese Navy intervened and acted as mediators. As we could see in the observations of the US Navy on-site commanders, the relief operations were implemented extremely smoothly at on-site commander’s level. This proves that there is only one sea and they sufficiently demonstrated the spirit of Navy to Navy. I suppose that the spirit or DNA, peculiar to the Japanese to accept foreign cultures and customs without protest and integrate them into the Japanese culture from ancient times blossomed by the visit of Perry and affinity toward the US had been created. Such affinity had no doubt been carried into the Taisho era. The 1923 Kanto Great Earthquake further deepened the affinity towards the US, in particular, by the Imperial Japanese Navy. Although there were sad periods such as the enactment of the Japanese Exclusion Act in the year following to the great earthquake and the Pacific War, I have no doubt that from that time there existed a ground for building a sense of trust and friendship between the two Navies.
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Contributors
YAMAMOTO Toshihiro Vice President, JMSDF Staff College National Defense Academy (1978) Naval Staff College, US Naval War College Command and Staff College, JMSDF Staff College Regular Course, Joint Staff College. Commanding Officer, Air ASW Squadron 124 / Deputy Director of Plans and Programs Division, MSO / Commanding Officer, Air Development Squadron 51/ Commander, Fleet Air Wing 22 / Commander, Fleet Air Wing 21 Chairman of Strategic Study Group
SHIMODAIRA Takuya Head of Maritime Operations Education Office, JMSDF Staff College National Defense Academy (1987) MA in Area Studies, University of Tsukuba Command and Staff College, JMSDF Staff College Advance College, Joint Staff College Executive Course, APCSS, Honolulu Commanding Officer, JS Ishikari (DE 226) / Operations Staff, Commander Fleet Escort Force / Chief, International Policy Planning Section, Joint Staff / Chief Staff Officer, Commander Escort Flotilla 1
KURATANI Masashi Instructor, Leadership & Military History Education Office, JMSDF Staff College National Defense Academy (1979) School of Engineering and Sciences, National Defense Academy Command and Staff College, JMSDF Staff College MA in Literature, Bukkyo University Executive Officer, JS Yudachi (DD 103) / Instructor, Leadership Division, 1st Maritime Service School / Instructor, Operations Division, 1st Maritime Service School
69 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 1 Number 2 English Version (Selected)
From the Editors
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Staff College Review is the editorial works of the staff and students’ papers from the viewpoint of security issues concerning the course of action of Japan as a maritime nation, and seeking maritime defense strategies and policies suited for today. The purpose of this publication is to provide an opportunity for free and open-minded opinion exchange to the experts of security studies all over the world. The views and opinions expressed in JMSDF Staff College Review are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force or Japan Ministry of Defense. To cite any passages from the review, it is requested that the author and JMSDF Staff College Review be credited. Citing them without clearly indicating the original source is strictly prohibited.
JMSDF Staff College Review Editional Board CHAIRMAN Vice Adm. FUKUMOTO Izuru; President VICE CHAIRMAN Rear Adm. YAMAMOTO Toshihiro; Vice President MEMBERS Capt. KUNO Keiichi; Director of Research Department Capt. TAKAHASHI Takamichi; Director of Education Department Capt. SHIMODAIRA Takuya; Head of Maritime Operations Education Office Capt. SUGIMOTO Yoichi; Head of Strategies & Operations Studies Group Capt. YAMAMOTO Katsuya; Senior Researcher Cdr. ISHIHARA Takahiro; Instructor, Security & Strategies Education Office Cdr. YAGI Naoto, PhD; Instructor, Security & Strategies Education Office Cdr. KURATANI Masashi; Instructor, Leadership & Military History Education Office
JMSDF Staff College Review Editional Staff Capt. TAKAHASHI Hidemasa; Chief of International Planning Section Cdr. TOGO Hiroshige; Staff Officer, International Planning Section Cdr. KUMAGAI Takakazu; Staff Officer, International Planning Section LtCdr. SEKI Hiroyuki; Staff Officer, International Planning Section LtCdr. IGARASHI Naomi; Staff Officer, International Planning Section LtCdr. KUMASHIRO Takeshi; Staff Officer, International Planning Section
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Staff College Review Volume1 Number2 English Version (Selected) Published on 31st May, 2012 by JMSDF Staff College 2-2-1, Nakameguro, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 153-8933 Japan Phone: +81-3-3719-7451 (Office of Strategic Study Group) Website: http://www.msc.go.jp/mschp/SSG/eng_SSG.html Printed at JMSDF Print Supply Unit
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