Foucault's Darwinian Genealogy
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Aristotle's Essentialism Revisited
University of Missouri, St. Louis IRL @ UMSL Theses Graduate Works 4-15-2013 Accommodating Species Evolution: Aristotle’s Essentialism Revisited Yin Zhang University of Missouri-St. Louis, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://irl.umsl.edu/thesis Recommended Citation Zhang, Yin, "Accommodating Species Evolution: Aristotle’s Essentialism Revisited" (2013). Theses. 192. http://irl.umsl.edu/thesis/192 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Works at IRL @ UMSL. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses by an authorized administrator of IRL @ UMSL. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Accommodating Species Evolution: Aristotle’s Essentialism Revisited by Yin Zhang B.A., Philosophy, Peking University, 2010 A Thesis Submitted to The Graduate School at the University of Missouri – St. Louis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts in Philosophy May 2013 Advisory Committee Jon D. McGinnis, Ph.D. Chairperson Andrew G. Black, Ph.D. Berit O. Brogaard, Ph.D. Zhang, Yin, UMSL, 2013, p. i PREFACE In the fall of 2008 when I was a junior at Peking University, I attended a lecture series directed by Dr. Melville Y. Stewart on science and religion. Guest lecturers Dr. Alvin Plantinga, Dr. William L. Craig and Dr. Bruce Reichenbach have influenced my thinking on the relation between evolution and faith. In the fall of 2010 when I became a one-year visiting student at Calvin College in Michigan, I took a seminar directed by Dr. Kelly J. Clark on evolution and ethics. Having thought about evolution/faith and evolution/ethics, I signed up for Dr. -
The Fourth Perspective: Evolution and Organismal Agency
The Fourth Perspective: Evolution and Organismal Agency Johannes Jaeger Complexity Science Hub (CSH), Vienna, Josefstädter Straße 39, 1080 Vienna Abstract This chapter examines the deep connections between biological organization, agency, and evolution by natural selection. Using Griesemer’s account of the re- producer, I argue that the basic unit of evolution is not a genetic replicator, but a complex hierarchical life cycle. Understanding the self-maintaining and self-pro- liferating properties of evolvable reproducers requires an organizational account of ontogenesis and reproduction. This leads us to an extended and disambiguated set of minimal conditions for evolution by natural selection—including revised or new principles of heredity, variation, and ontogenesis. More importantly, the con- tinuous maintenance of biological organization within and across generations im- plies that all evolvable systems are agents, or contain agents among their parts. This means that we ought to take agency seriously—to better understand the con- cept and its role in explaining biological phenomena—if we aim to obtain an or- ganismic theory of evolution in the original spirit of Darwin’s struggle for exis- tence. This kind of understanding must rely on an agential perspective on evolu- tion, complementing and succeeding existing structural, functional, and processual approaches. I sketch a tentative outline of such an agential perspective, and present a survey of methodological and conceptual challenges that will have to be overcome if we are to properly implement it. 1. Introduction There are two fundamentally different ways to interpret Darwinian evolutionary theory. Charles Darwin’s original framework grounds the process of evolution on 2 the individual’s struggle for existence (Darwin, 1859). -
Evolutionary Epistemology in James' Pragmatism J
35 THE ORIGIN OF AN INQUIRY: EVOLUTIONARY EPISTEMOLOGY IN JAMES' PRAGMATISM J. Ellis Perry IV University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth "Much struck." That was Darwin's way of saying that something he observed fascinated him, arrested his attention, surprised or puzzled him. The words "much struck" riddle the pages of bothhis Voyage ofthe Beagle and his The Origin of Species, and their appearance should alert the reader that Darwin was saying something important. Most of the time, the reader caninfer that something Darwin had observed was at variance with what he had expected, and that his fai th in some alleged law or general principle hadbeen shaken, and this happened repeat edly throughout his five year sojourn on the H.M.S. Beagle. The "irritation" of his doubting the theretofore necessary truths of natu ral history was Darwin's stimulus to inquiry, to creative and thor oughly original abductions. "The influence of Darwinupon philosophy resides inhis ha ving conquered the phenomena of life for the principle of transi tion, and thereby freed the new logic for application to mind and morals and life" (Dewey p. 1). While it would be an odd fellow who would disagree with the claim of Dewey and others that the American pragmatist philosophers were to no small extent influenced by the Darwinian corpus,! few have been willing to make the case for Darwin's influence on the pragmatic philosophy of William James. Philip Wiener, in his well known work, reports that Thanks to Professor Perry's remarks in his definitive work on James, "the influence of Darwin was both early and profound, and its effects crop up in unex pected quarters." Perry is a senior at the University of Massachusetts at Dartmoltth. -
Two Uses of Genealogy: Michel Foucault and Bernard Williams 90 1
the practices which we might use genealogy to inquire into. Of course, 1 these two thinkers each used genealogy in very different senses insofar as I Chapter 5 Nietzsche's genealogy was an attempt to undermine and subvert certain! modern moral practices whereas Williams' was an attempt to vindicate i Two uses of genealogy: Michel Foucault and and strengthen certain modern moral notions concerning the value ofl Bernard Williams practices of truthfulness. Although the minimal conclusion that Foucault's genealogy differs I Colin Koopman from Nietzsche's and Williams' genealogy may not be all that surprising" what is nonetheless revealing is an exploration of the specific terms oni which these varying conceptions of genealogy can be differentiated. Such! an exploration particularly helps us recognize the complex relationship I The notion CMn1lWn to all the work that I have done . .. is that of problematization. between genealogy and critique. It is my claim that Foucault's project dif-i -Michel Foucault, 1984, 'The Concern/or Truth' fers from more normatively ambitious uses of genealogy and that muchI i light is shed on the way in which Foucault used genealogy as a critical appa ratus by explicating this difference. Foucault used genealogy to develop a i Michel Foucault's final description of his genealogical and archaeological form of critique that did not rely on the traditional normative ambitions inquiries in terms of the concept of 'problematization' is, most commen which have motivated so much of modern philosophy. Foucault, perhaps -
Synthesis of Phylogeny and Taxonomy Into a Comprehensive Tree of Life
Synthesis of phylogeny and taxonomy into a comprehensive tree of life Cody E. Hinchliffa,1, Stephen A. Smitha,1,2, James F. Allmanb, J. Gordon Burleighc, Ruchi Chaudharyc, Lyndon M. Coghilld, Keith A. Crandalle, Jiabin Dengc, Bryan T. Drewf, Romina Gazisg, Karl Gudeh, David S. Hibbettg, Laura A. Katzi, H. Dail Laughinghouse IVi, Emily Jane McTavishj, Peter E. Midfordd, Christopher L. Owenc, Richard H. Reed, Jonathan A. Reesk, Douglas E. Soltisc,l, Tiffani Williamsm, and Karen A. Cranstonk,2 aEcology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109; bInterrobang Corporation, Wake Forest, NC 27587; cDepartment of Biology, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611; dField Museum of Natural History, Chicago, IL 60605; eComputational Biology Institute, George Washington University, Ashburn, VA 20147; fDepartment of Biology, University of Nebraska-Kearney, Kearney, NE 68849; gDepartment of Biology, Clark University, Worcester, MA 01610; hSchool of Journalism, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824; iBiological Science, Clark Science Center, Smith College, Northampton, MA 01063; jDepartment of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS 66045; kNational Evolutionary Synthesis Center, Duke University, Durham, NC 27705; lFlorida Museum of Natural History, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611; and mComputer Science and Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843 Edited by David M. Hillis, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, and approved July 28, 2015 (received for review December 3, 2014) Reconstructing the phylogenetic relationships that unite all line- published phylogenies are available only as journal figures, rather ages (the tree of life) is a grand challenge. The paucity of homologous than in electronic formats that can be integrated into databases and character data across disparately related lineages currently renders synthesis methods (7–9). -
Philosophical Genealogy: a User's Guide
Philosophical Genealogy: A User's Guide MPhil Stud Victor Braga Weber University College London 2019 1 I, Victor Braga Weber, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis. Victor Braga Weber, August 28, 2019 2 Abstract In what way might our past effect our current philosophical outlook? More particularly, is there any philosophical value in investigating the contexts from which our philosophical outlooks originate? Analytic philosophy has historically responded antagonistically to the suggestion that looking to our past for answers is valuable. Yet some philosophers argue that the search for the origins of our philosophical outlook can be a source of great (meta-)philosophical insight. One such strand are the so-called genealogists. The purpose of this thesis is to understand what the promise of philosophical genealogy is, and whether it can be fulfilled. A challenge for my project is that the term ‘genealogy’ has been used to describe very different kinds of things (Section I). As such, I propose to develop a taxonomy of conceptions of genealogy (Section II), identify what the distinctive features of its members are (Section III), and what kind of insight they can give us (Section IV). In the final section (Section V), I return to the question of whether there is any non-trivial claim we can make about what features are shared by the disparate conceptions I identify. I argue that there is, but not at the level of a common philosophical method. -
Our Knowledge of the External World As a Field for Scientific Method In
Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy By Bertrand Russell 1 PREFACE The following lectures[1] are an attempt to show, by means of examples, the nature, capacity, and limitations of the logical-analytic method in philosophy. This method, of which the first complete example is to be found in the writings of Frege, has gradually, in the course of actual research, increasingly forced itself upon me as something perfectly definite, capable of embodiment in maxims, and adequate, in all branches of philosophy, to yield whatever objective scientific knowledge it is possible to obtain. Most of the methods hitherto practised have professed to lead to more ambitious results than any that logical analysis can claim to reach, but unfortunately these results have always been such as many competent philosophers considered inadmissible. Regarded merely as hypotheses and as aids to imagination, the great systems of the past serve a very useful purpose, and are abundantly worthy of study. But something different is required if philosophy is to become a science, and to aim at results independent of the tastes and temperament of the philosopher who advocates them. In what follows, I have endeavoured to show, however imperfectly, the way by which I believe that this desideratum is to be found. [1] Delivered as Lowell Lectures in Boston, in March and April 1914. The central problem by which I have sought to illustrate method is the problem of the relation between the crude data of sense and the space, 2 time, and matter of mathematical physics. -
Ten Misunderstandings About Evolution a Very Brief Guide for the Curious and the Confused by Dr
Ten Misunderstandings About Evolution A Very Brief Guide for the Curious and the Confused By Dr. Mike Webster, Dept. of Neurobiology and Behavior, Cornell Lab of Ornithology, Cornell University ([email protected]); February 2010 The current debate over evolution and “intelligent design” (ID) is being driven by a relatively small group of individuals who object to the theory of evolution for religious reasons. The debate is fueled, though, by misunderstandings on the part of the American public about what evolutionary biology is and what it says. These misunderstandings are exploited by proponents of ID, intentionally or not, and are often echoed in the media. In this booklet I briefly outline and explain 10 of the most common (and serious) misunderstandings. It is impossible to treat each point thoroughly in this limited space; I encourage you to read further on these topics and also by visiting the websites given on the resource sheet. In addition, I am happy to send a somewhat expanded version of this booklet to anybody who is interested – just send me an email to ask for one! What are the misunderstandings? 1. Evolution is progressive improvement of species Evolution, particularly human evolution, is often pictured in textbooks as a string of organisms marching in single file from “simple” organisms (usually a single celled organism or a monkey) on one side of the page and advancing to “complex” organisms on the opposite side of the page (almost invariably a human being). We have all seen this enduring image and likely have some version of it burned into our brains. -
Darwin's “Tree of Life”
Icons of Evolution? Why Much of What Jonathan Wells Writes about Evolution is Wrong Alan D. Gishlick, National Center for Science Education DARWIN’S “TREE OF LIFE” mon descent. Finally, he demands that text- books treat universal common ancestry as PHYLOGENETIC TREES unproven and refrain from illustrating that n biology, a phylogenetic tree, or phyloge- “theory” with misleading phylogenies. ny, is used to show the genealogic relation- Therefore, according to Wells, textbooks Iships of living things. A phylogeny is not should state that there is no evidence for com- so much evidence for evolution as much as it mon descent and that the most recent research is a codification of data about evolutionary his- refutes the concept entirely. Wells is complete- tory. According to biological evolution, organ- ly wrong on all counts, and his argument is isms share common ancestors; a phylogeny entirely based on misdirection and confusion. shows how organisms are related. The tree of He mixes up these various topics in order to life shows the path evolution took to get to the confuse the reader into thinking that when current diversity of life. It also shows that we combined, they show an endemic failure of can ascertain the genealogy of disparate living evolutionary theory. In effect, Wells plays the organisms. This is evidence for evolution only equivalent of an intellectual shell game, put- in that we can construct such trees at all. If ting so many topics into play that the “ball” of evolution had not happened or common ances- evolution gets lost. try were false, we would not be able to discov- THE CAMBRIAN EXPLOSION er hierarchical branching genealogies for ells claims that the Cambrian organisms (although textbooks do not general- Explosion “presents a serious chal- ly explain this well). -
Evolutionism and Holism: Two Different Paradigms for the Phenomenon of Biological Evolution
R. Fondi, International Journal of Ecodynamics. Vol. 1, No. 3 (2006) 284–297 EVOLUTIONISM AND HOLISM: TWO DIFFERENT PARADIGMS FOR THE PHENOMENON OF BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION R. FONDI Department of Earth Sciences, University of Siena, Italy. ABSTRACT The evolutionistic paradigm – the assumption that biological evolution consists in a mere process of ‘descendance with modification from common ancestors’, canonically represented by means of the phylogenetic tree model – can be seen as strictly connected to the classical or deterministic vision of the world, which dominated the 18th and 19th centuries. Research findings in palaeontology, however, have never fully supported the above- mentioned model. Besides, during the 20th century, the conceptual transformations produced by restricted and general relativity, quantum mechanics, cosmology, information theory, research into consciousness, chaos– complexity theory, evolutionary thermodynamics and biosemiotics have radically changed the scientific picture of reality. It is therefore necessary to adopt a more suitable and up-to-date paradigm, according to which nature is not seen anymore as a mere assembly of independent things, subject to the Lamarckian-Darwinian dialectics of ‘chance and necessity’, but as: (1) an extremely complex system with all its parts dynamically coordinated; (2) the evolution of which does not obey the logic of a deterministic linear continuity but that of an indeterministic global discontinuity; and (3) in which the mind or psychic dimension, particularly evident in semiotic aspects of the biological world, is an essential and indissoluble part. On the basis of its characteristics, the new paradigm can be generically named holistic, organicistic or systemic. Keywords: biological evolution, biostratigraphy, evolutionism, holism, palaeontology, systema naturae, taxa. -
Michel Foucault, Philosopher? a Note on Genealogy and Archaeology1 Rudi Visker
PARRHESIA NUMBER 5 • 2008 • 9-18 MICHEL FOUCAULT, PHILOSOPHER? A NOTE ON GENEALOGY AND ARCHAEOLOGY1 Rudi Visker My title formulates a question that is mainly addressed to myself. Less elliptically formulated, it would read as follows: please explain why you, a professor in philosophy, have published over the years so many pages in which you kept referring to the work of someone who has authored a series of historical works on topics which, at first sight, have hardly any bearing on the discipline which your institution pays you to do research in. Whence this attraction to studies on madness, crime or sexuality? Wasn’t one book enough to make you realize that however enticing a reading such works may be, they bring little, if anything, for philosophy as such? I imagine my inquisitor wouldn’t rest if I were to point out to him that he seems badly informed and apparently unaware of the fact that Foucault by now has come to be accepted as an obvious part of the philosophical canon for the past century. Should I manage to convince him to take up a few of the books presenting his thought to philosophers, he would no doubt retort that what he had been reading mainly consisted of summaries of the aforementioned histories, and for the rest of exactly the kind of arguments that gave rise to his suspicion: accusations of nihilism, relativism, self-contradiction, critique without standards… And worse, if I were honest, I would have to agree that for all the fascination that it exerted on us philosophers, Foucault’s work also put us before a deep, and by now familiar embarrassment. -
PRAGMATISM AS a PHILOSOPHY of ACTION (Paper Presented at the First Nordic Pragmatism Conference, Helsinki, Finland, June 2008)
1 PRAGMATISM AS A PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION (Paper presented at the First Nordic Pragmatism Conference, Helsinki, Finland, June 2008) Erkki Kilpinen University of Helsinki When I gave the doctrine of pragmatism the name it bears, – and a doctrine of vital significance it is, – I derived the name by which I christened it from pragma, – behaviour – in order that it should be understood that the doctrine is that the only real significance of a general term lies in the general behaviour which it implies. Charles S. Peirce, May 1912 cited by Eisele (1987:95).1 Introduction: Action ahead of knowledge on pragmatism’s philosophical agenda Although the very founder of the pragmatic movement is adamant that this philosophy is inherently related to action – or behaviour as Peirce laconically says here – philosophers have been curiously reluctant to recognize this. Of course one finds in the literature comments about how pragmatists often talk about action, and some commentators feel that they talk about it too often, at the expense of traditional philosophical problems. To see this is not yet, however, to see the essential pragmatist point; in what sense they talk about action. Their usage of this term and the underlying idea differ from what is customary in other philosophical approaches. Pragmatism namely approaches all theoretical and philosophical problems as problems that in final analysis are related to action. In mainstream philosophy, both in its positivist-analytic and phenomenological versions, action is a contingent empirical phenomenon demanding an explanation. In pragmatism, action is a universal phenomenon which in itself begs no explanation but rather makes the starting point for explanations.