Critical Infrastructure and Cyber Security Across the World
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MAGAL SECURITY SYSTEMS Focused Solutions for the World’s Security Needs Kobi Vinokur, CFO March 2020 1 / SAFE HARBOR/ Statements concerning Magal Security’s business outlook or future economic performance, product introductions and plans and objectives related thereto, and statements concerning assumptions made or expectations as to any future events, conditions, performance or other matters, are "forward-looking statements'' as that term is defined under U.S. federal securities laws. Forward-looking statements are subject to various risks, uncertainties and other factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those stated in such statements. These risks, uncertainties and factors include, but are not limited to: the effect of global economic conditions in general and conditions affecting Magal Security’s industry and target markets in particular; shifts in supply and demand; market acceptance of new products and continuing products' demand; the impact of competitive products and pricing on Magal Security’s and its customers' products and markets; timely product and technology development/upgrades and the ability to manage changes in market conditions as needed; the integration of acquired companies, their products and operations into Magal Security’s business; and other factors detailed in Magal Security’s filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Magal Security assumes no obligation to update the information in this release. Estimated growth rates and other predictive statements represent Magal Security’s assumptions and expectations in light of currently available information. Estimated growth rates and other predictive statements, are based on industry trends, circumstances involving clients and other factors, and they involve risks, variables and uncertainties. -
Water Sector Cybersecurity Brief for States
WATER SECTOR CYBERSECURITY BRIEF FOR STATES Introduction Implementing cybersecurity best practices is critical for water and wastewater utilities. Cyber-attacks are a growing threat to critical infrastructure sectors, including water and wastewater systems. Many critical infrastructure facilities have experienced cybersecurity incidents that led to the disruption of a business process or critical operation. Cyber Threats to Water and Wastewater Systems Cyber-attacks on water or wastewater utility business enterprise or process control systems can cause significant harm, such as: • Upset treatment and conveyance processes by opening and closing valves, overriding alarms or disabling pumps or other equipment; • Deface the utility’s website or compromise the email system; • Steal customers’ personal data or credit card information from the utility’s billing system; and • Install malicious programs like ransomware, which can disable business enterprise or process control operations. These attacks can: compromise the ability of water and wastewater utilities to provide clean and safe water to customers, erode customer confidence, and result in financial and legal liabilities. Benefits of a Cybersecurity Program The good news is that cybersecurity best practices can be very effective in eliminating the vulnerabilities that cyber-attacks exploit. Implementing a basic cybersecurity program can: • Ensure the integrity of process control systems; • Protect sensitive utility and customer information; • Reduce legal liabilities if customer or employee personal information is stolen; and • Maintain customer confidence. Challenges for Utilities in Starting a Cybersecurity Program Many water and wastewater utilities, particularly small systems, lack the resources for information technology (IT) and security specialists to assist them with starting a cybersecurity program. Utility personnel may believe that cyber-attacks do not present a risk to their systems or feel that they lack the technical capability to improve their cybersecurity. -
Security Studies (SCST) 1
Security Studies (SCST) 1 SECURITY STUDIES (SCST) SCST 2363. Intro to Homeland Security. 3 Hours. This introductory course is designed to familiarize students with the field of security studies. Topics include Surveys, threats, and challenges from terrorist attacks, to pandemics to climate change. SCST 2364. Homeland Sec Research Methods. 3 Hours. Students gain knowledge about research design and methodology. Students develop the ability to analyze and critically evaluate data, ideas, arguments, and policy. Students also hone critical thinking skills and enhance their ability to be effective consumers of data. SCST 2365. Intro to Emergency Management. 3 Hours. Students study the evolution of emergency management in the United States from early community-based response practices to the current robust national system focused on risk analysis, communications, risk prevention and mitigation, and social and economic recovery. Students examine benchmark policies, regulations, and directives that form the basis of the emergency management field. Students engage in case study research and gain exposure to current and emerging trends in emergency management domestically and internationally. SCST 2366. Introduction to Cybersecurity. 3 Hours. Students examine the problem of cybersecurity from a homeland security perspective. Students explore the diversity of threats and security measures in cyberspace from a non-technical perspective and with a focus on laws, strategies, and policies. Security issues, from crime to espionage to cyberwar, will be considered on both the micro and macro-level. SCST 2368. Transportation Security. 3 Hours. Students examine a wide range of facets that comprise the field of transportation security. As part of this course students assess the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the transportation network as well as explore the agencies and governance issues impacting transportation security. -
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Concepts and Continuum
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Concepts and Continuum Contents Introduction........................................................................................................ 3 Terms and concepts..................................................................................................................4 Protecting critical infrastructure is a continuum............................................ 5 Trusted collaboration and information sharing ground the CIP continuum......6 Key CIP capabilities ...................................................................................................................6 Sharing threat information leads to improved CIP.......................................................7 Establishing trustworthy policies and plans.................................................... 9 Prepare...........................................................................................................................................9 Review policies and existing programs.........................................................................9 Identify operational responsibilities...............................................................................9 Partner.........................................................................................................................................10 Coordinate.................................................................................................................................10 Plan...............................................................................................................................................12 -
Law Enforcement Intelligence: a Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies Second Edition
U. S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies Second Edition David L. Carter, Ph.D. School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies Second Edition David L. Carter, Ph.D. School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University This project was supported by Cooperative Agreement #2007-CK-WX-K015 by the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Points of view or opinions contained in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice or Michigan State University. References to specific agencies, companies, products, or services should not be considered an endorsement by the author or the U.S. Department of Justice. Rather, the references are illustrations to supplement discussion of the issues. Letter from the COPS Office January 2009 Dear Colleague: This second edition of Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement captures the vast changes that have occurred in the 4 years since the first edition of the guide was published in 2004 after the watershed events of September 11, 2001. At that time, there was no Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Information-Sharing Environment, or Fusion Centers. Since the advent of these new agencies to help fight the war on terror, emphasis has been placed on cooperation and on sharing information among local, state, tribal, and federal agencies. -
The First Americans the 1941 US Codebreaking Mission to Bletchley Park
United States Cryptologic History The First Americans The 1941 US Codebreaking Mission to Bletchley Park Special series | Volume 12 | 2016 Center for Cryptologic History David J. Sherman is Associate Director for Policy and Records at the National Security Agency. A graduate of Duke University, he holds a doctorate in Slavic Studies from Cornell University, where he taught for three years. He also is a graduate of the CAPSTONE General/Flag Officer Course at the National Defense University, the Intelligence Community Senior Leadership Program, and the Alexander S. Pushkin Institute of the Russian Language in Moscow. He has served as Associate Dean for Academic Programs at the National War College and while there taught courses on strategy, inter- national relations, and intelligence. Among his other government assignments include ones as NSA’s representative to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as Director for Intelligence Programs at the National Security Council, and on the staff of the National Economic Council. This publication presents a historical perspective for informational and educational purposes, is the result of independent research, and does not necessarily reflect a position of NSA/CSS or any other US government entity. This publication is distributed free by the National Security Agency. If you would like additional copies, please email [email protected] or write to: Center for Cryptologic History National Security Agency 9800 Savage Road, Suite 6886 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755 Cover: (Top) Navy Department building, with Washington Monument in center distance, 1918 or 1919; (bottom) Bletchley Park mansion, headquarters of UK codebreaking, 1939 UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY The First Americans The 1941 US Codebreaking Mission to Bletchley Park David Sherman National Security Agency Center for Cryptologic History 2016 Second Printing Contents Foreword ................................................................................ -
Critical Infrastructure: Security Preparedness and Maturity Sponsored by Unisys Independently Conducted by Ponemon Institute LLC Publication Date: July 2014
Critical Infrastructure: Security Preparedness and Maturity Sponsored by Unisys Independently conducted by Ponemon Institute LLC Publication Date: July 2014 31 Part 1. Introduction Ponemon Institute is pleased to present the results of the “Critical Infrastructure: Security Preparedness and Maturity” study, sponsored by Unisys. The purpose of this research is to learn how utility, oil and gas, alternate energy and manufacturing organizations are addressing cyber security threats. These industries have become a high profile target for security exploits. Moreover, it has been reported that if their industrial controls systems (ICS) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems were attacked the damage could be enormous. For example, an unnamed natural gas company hired an IT firm to test its corporate information system. POWER Magazine reported, “The consulting organization carelessly ventured into a part of the network that was directly connected the SCADA system. The penetration test locked up the SCADA system and the utility was not able to send gas through its pipelines for four hours. The outcome was the loss of service to its customer base for those four hours.”1 As the findings reveal, organizations are not as prepared as they should be to deal with the sophistication and frequency of a cyber threat or the negligence of an employee or third party. In fact, the majority of participants in this study do not believe their companies’ IT security programs are “mature.” For purposes of this research, a mature stage is defined as having most IT security program activities deployed. Most companies have defined what their security initiatives are but deployment and execution are still in the early or middle stages. -
Acronyms Abbreviations &Terms
Acronyms Abbreviations &Terms A Capability Assurance Job Aid FEMA P-524 / July 2009 FEMA Acronyms Abbreviations and Terms Produced by the National Preparedness Directorate, National Integration Center, Incident Management Systems Integration Division Please direct requests for additional copies to: FEMA Publications (800) 480-2520 Or download the document from the Web: www.fema.gov/plan/prepare/faat.shtm U.S. Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency Management Agency The FEMA Acronyms, Abbreviations & Terms (FAAT) List is not designed to be an authoritative source, merely a handy reference and a living document subject to periodic updating. Inclusion recognizes terminology existence, not legitimacy. Entries known to be obsolete (see new “Obsolete or Replaced” section near end of this document) are included because they may still appear in extant publications and correspondence. Your comments and recommendations are welcome. Please electronically forward your input or direct your questions to: [email protected] Please direct requests for additional copies to: FEMA Publications (800) 480-2520 Or download the document from the Web: www.fema.gov/plan/prepare/faat.shtm 2SR Second Stage Review ABEL Agent Based Economic Laboratory 4Wd Four Wheel Drive ABF Automatic Broadcast Feed A 1) Activity of Isotope ABHS Alcohol Based Hand Sanitizer 2) Ampere ABI Automated Broker Interface 3) Atomic Mass ABIH American Board of Industrial Hygiene A&E Architectural and Engineering ABIS see IDENT A&FM Aviation and Fire Management ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile -
Protecting the Water Sector's Critical
Protecting the Water Sector’s Critical Infrastructure Information Analysis of State Laws Ideal crop marks create jobs 51/shutterstock.com jobs create Dedicated to the World’s Most Important Resource ® Gorodenkoff/shutterstock.com Acknowledgements The research for this report was supported by policy interns in AWWA’s Government Affairs Office in Washington, DC, including Gabriela Rossner and Erin Ress and managed by Kevin Morley, AWWA Federal Relations Manager. Disclaimer This report includes excerpts of statutory text addressing the protections provided to information that may be included in a risk and resilience assessment and/or emergency response plan prepared by a community water system in compliance with §2013 of Americas Water Infrastructure Act of 2018. This report is provided for reference purposes only and does not represent an official legal opinion. Legal counsel should be consulted when exercising these information protections. © Copyright 2020 American Water Works Association | 3 SUMMARY: merica’s Water Infrastructure Act (AWIA) of 2018 requires community water systems that serve 3,300 or more persons to 1) conduct a risk and resilience Aassessment (RRA) and 2) prepare or revise an emergency response plan (ERP). In recognition of the security sensitive information developed by state and local entities, many states have taken steps to exempt this information from public release. Thirty- four states currently have disclosure exemption laws that specifically address the type of information a utility would be required to develop and prepare in compliance with AWIA. The remaining states have some protections that may, or may not, apply to critical infrastructure information. This report is a review and summary of the protections available for the information developed by a water utility per AWIA at the state level. -
Cybersecurity Recommendations for Critical Infrastructure Using Video
For more information, please visit cisa.gov/telework CYBERSECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE USING VIDEO CONFERENCING This videoconferencing product is for executives charged with securing critical infrastructure networks, and for critical infrastructure employees to help them think through related cybersecurity and physical issues. RAPID INCREASE IN ADOPTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF VIDEO CONFERENCING American companies and government agencies are increasingly adopting workplace flexibilities such as telework. Advances in information technology, such as the increased availability of video conferencing software and video conferencing capabilities incorporated into other products like collaboration software, facilitate telework. Users are likely to need video conferencing and other collaboration solutions to stay connected as they telework. It is critical that cybersecurity requirements and risk exposure for products be counterbalanced appropriately against remote access product benefits such as convenience, usability, speed, and stability. The following advisory guidance is intended to support the incorporation of cybersecurity considerations when adopting or expanding the use of video conferencing software and related collaboration tools. The guidance also includes suggestions for individuals using these tools to host and attend meetings—information that is particularly critical as organizations increasingly broadcast sensitive discussions over these platforms. As the authority for securing telework, the Cybersecurity and -
Gao-14-459, Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection
United States Government Accountability Office Report to the Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate June 2014 MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION DHS Needs to Better Address Port Cybersecurity GAO-14-459 June 2014 MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION DHS Needs to Better Address Port Cybersecurity Highlights of GAO-14-459, a report to the Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found U.S. maritime ports handle more than Actions taken by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and two of its $1.3 trillion in cargo annually. The component agencies, the U.S. Coast Guard and Federal Emergency operations of these ports are Management Agency (FEMA), as well as other federal agencies, to address supported by information and cybersecurity in the maritime port environment have been limited. communication systems, which are • susceptible to cyber-related threats. While the Coast Guard initiated a number of activities and coordinating Failures in these systems could strategies to improve physical security in specific ports, it has not conducted degrade or interrupt operations at a risk assessment that fully addresses cyber-related threats, vulnerabilities, ports, including the flow of commerce. and consequences. Coast Guard officials stated that they intend to conduct Federal agencies—in particular DHS— such an assessment in the future, but did not provide details to show how it and industry stakeholders have would address cybersecurity. Until the Coast Guard completes a thorough specific roles in protecting maritime assessment of cyber risks in the maritime environment, the ability of facilities and ports from physical and stakeholders to appropriately plan and allocate resources to protect ports cyber threats. -
US-India Homeland Security Cooperation
U.S.-India Homeland Security Cooperation Building a Lasting Partnership via Transportation Sector Security PROJECT AUTHORS A Report of the CSIS Homeland Security DIRECTOR Brianna Fitch and Counterterrorism Program Rick “Ozzie” Nelson Melissa Hersh Rick “Ozzie” Nelson Ally Pregulman JUNE 2013 Rob Wise U.S.- India Homeland Security Cooperation Building a Lasting Partnership via Transportation Sector Security PROJECT DIRECTOR Rick “Ozzie” Nelson AUTHORS Brianna Fitch Melissa Hersh Rick “Ozzie” Nelson Ally Pregulman Rob Wise CONTRIBUTORS Grace Jones Ashley Nichols Lauren Powell Matt Shahian Abigail Temoshchuk A Report of the CSIS Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program June 2013 ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK About CSIS— 50th Anniversary Year For 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has developed solutions to the world’s greatest policy challenges. As we celebrate this milestone, CSIS scholars are developing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a nonprofi t or ga ni za tion headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full-time staff and large network of affi liated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS was dedicated to fi nding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has become one of the world’s preeminent international institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and economic integration.