88-FHC-Shen Zhihua.Indd

Front. Hist. China 2007, 2(1): 88–108 DOI 10.1007/s11462-007-0005-9 RESEARCH ARTICLE

SHEN Zhihua

The Treaty of Peace with Japan and the Korean truce negotiations

Abstract The outbreak of the Korean War caused the U.S.A. to become determined in excluding the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from the Treaty of Peace with Japan, the signing of which is hoped to be hastened by winning the Korean War. Before the signing of the treaty, the U.S.A. intentionally delayed the Korean truce negotiations in order to prevent the PRC from attending the San Francisco Peace Conference. After the signing, the U.S.A. preferred an immediate cessation of hostilities in Korea, whereas the Soviet Union and the PRC, bogged down in the Far East by the terms of the treaty, were determined to take a hard-line stance, hoping that the U.S.A. would become tied down and drained on the Korean battlefield. Thus, there was a subtle relationship between the treaty and the negotiations in the context of the Cold War.

Keywords the Cold War, the Treaty of Peace with Japan, the Korean War

The Treaty of Peace with Japan and the Korean War constitute two of the most significant topics in Asian Cold War studies. The former, also known as the San Francisco Peace Treaty, not only demonstrated the victorious countries’ relationship with and change of policies toward Japan, but also marked the culmination of the Cold War structure in East Asia. It has always been on the agenda of scholarly inquiry, most of which approaches it from the perspective of the Allies (the U.S.A, the Great Britain, Japan, and others), usually focusing on their changing policies

Translated by Chen Dan from Shixue Jikan 史学集刊 (Collected Papers of History Studies) 2006, (1): 66–75

SHEN Zhihua ( ) Department of History, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062, China E-mail: [email protected] The Treaty of Peace with Japan and the Korean truce negotiations 89 and political considerations.1 Few have tackled it from the other side of the Iron Curtain, from the perspective of the socialist bloc, due primarily to the unavail- ability of historical materials. In the post-Cold War era, thanks to the opening of Russian archives and some Chinese archives, the Soviet and Chinese attitudes concerning the Treaty of Peace with Japan is now clearer, and relevant studies are beginning to appear.2 Meanwhile, research into the Korean War has also continued to develop in international Cold War studies. With increased access to historical documents and more and more in-depth research into such topics as the origin of the war, the international background, nuclear deterrence, and the processes of specific battles, scholars are now beginning to turn their attention to another topic, the truce negotiations.3 In fact, during the three years of the Korean War, two thirds of the

1 Comprehensive and in-depth research into this issue can be found in Michael Schaller’s The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia, Oxford University Press, Inc, 1985, and Yu Qun’s Meiguo duiri zhengce yanjiu (Changchun: Dongbei shifan daxue chubanshe. 1996). Other important monographs and articles are: Michael Yoshitsu, Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement (New York: Columbia University Press,1983); Howard Schonberger, “Peacemaking in Asia: the United States, Great Britain, and the Japanese Decision to Recognize Nationalist China, 1951–1952, Diplomatic History, 10: 1 (Winter 1986); Feng Zhaokui et al., Zhanhou riben Waijiao: 1945–1995 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1996); Zhang Shuya..“Dulesi yu duiri gouhe zhongde taiwan wenti (1950–1952),” in Zhonghua minguo zhuanti lunwenji,1996; Xu Youzheng. “Meiying zai xinzhongguo chanyu duiri gouhe wenti shangde zhengyi,” Shijie lishi (World history), 2004, No. 2; Cui Pi (unpub- lished) “Meiguo duiri dandui gouhe zhengce yu riben de jueze,” which is based on documents from the U.S. National Security Council. 2 It is natural that these studies were initiated by Russian scholars. B.N. Slavinskii. “San-Frant- susskaia konferentsiia 1951g. po mirnomu uregulirovaniiu s iaponiei i sovetskaia diplomatiia” (Treaty of Peace with Japan in San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951 and Soviet diplomacy) Problemy Dal’nego Vostoka (Far East Affairs), 1994, No. 1; S.L.Tikhvinskii, Rossiia-Iaponiia, Obrecheny na dobrososedstvo, Vospominaniia diplomata i zametki istorika (Predestined good-neighbourly Russo-Japanese relations: diplomacy revisited and a history). Moskva, 1996; S.L.Tikhvinskii, “Vmeshatel’stvo amerikanskoi diplomatii v protsess normalizatsii otnoshenii SSSR i KNR s iaponiei posle okonchaniia vtoroi mirovoi voiny” (The US diplomatic interven- tion in normalization of Russo-Japanese and Sino-Japanese relations in post-war era). This paper was submitted to the International Conference on The Cold War and Sino-Soviet Relations (Beijing, 1997). Other scholars have also availed themselves of the Russian archives, notably Vojtech Mastny. The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years. New York (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Zhang Shengfa. 2001. “Wushi niandai chuqi zhongsu gongtong dizhi duiri gouhe yu sulian juqian jiujingshan heyue”, Shijie lishi. No. 2. 3 As far as the armistice is concerned, three scholars submitted papers to the International Conference on Cold War in Asia (Hong Kong, 1996): Chen Jian, “China's Strategy to the End the Korean War;” K. Weathersby, “Stalin and a Negotiated Settlement in Korea, 1950–53”; F. Orlandi, “The Alliance: Beijing, Moscow, the Korean War and its End”. In its wake, other 90 SHEN Zhihua total time was spent on truce negotiations, a rare case in international war history.4 Consequently, academic concern has focused on one question: Why did the opposing sides hesitate to compromise and reach a peaceful settlement when they were all well aware that it was impossible for the war to go on? When dealing with the relationship between the Treaty of Peace with Japan and the Korean War, previous literature has pointed out that the outbreak of the Korean War caused the U.S.A. to change her policies concerning a treaty with Japan.5 However, the author has discovered that there is another relationship between the treaty and the war. After the change of the American policies concerning peace-making with Japan, the opposing sides in the Korean Conflict revised, in turn, their positions and strategies in the truce negotiations. In other words, the mode and the consequence of the signing of the Treaty of Peace with Japan were among the many factors that contributed to the lengthiness of the negotiations.

1 The turning of tide in the Korean War and disagreements between Soviet and US policies on making peace

On June 25, 1950, the Korean People’s Army crossed the 38th parallel, an action which not only resulted in a general change of American policies on Asia, but also paved the way for the American decision on making peace with Japan. On the second day after the outbreak of war, O. N. Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) pointed out to President H. Truman that Korea, Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan of China, the Philippines and Southeast Asia “are all part of the same problem,” and that because their positions were “interdependent,” there was “an

3 Continued study also touches upon this issue, such as Conrad C. Crane, “To Avert Impending Disaster: American Military Plans to Use Atomic Weapons During the Korean War.” The Journal of Strategic Studies, 2000, Vol. 23, No. 2; A.Volokhova.. “Peregovory o peremirii v Koree 1951–1953gg” (Korean truce negotiations from 1951–1953), Problemy Dal’nego Vostoka. 2000, No. 2; Chai Chengwen,“Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai lingdao chaoxian tingzhan tanpan de juece guiji” Dangdai Zhongguoshi yanjiu (Contemporary China History Studies), 2000, No. 6; Sheng Zhihua, “Yijiu wusan nian chaoxian tingzhan: zhongsu lingdaoren de zhengzhi kaolü”, Shijie shi (World History), 2001. No. 2; Niu Jun.. “Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng zhong de tingzhan tanpan juece yanjiu,” Shanghai xingzheng xueyuan xuebao (Journal of Shanghai Administration Institute), 2005, No. 1. 4 The Paris Peace Talks (1969–1973), which were held with a view to ending the Vietnam War, lasted less than four years, and the war itself nine years (1964–1973). By contrast, the Korean truce negotiations stand out as lengthy ones. 5 Cui Pi. 1993; Liu Weikai. “Jiang Zhongzheng yu zhongri heyue de qianding,” submitted to the Seminar on China in the 1950s (Shanghai, 2004); Feng Zhaokui, et al., 1996. The Treaty of Peace with Japan and the Korean truce negotiations 91 urgent need for a coordinated overall policy in the Far East.”6 As a result, the American sea, air, and land forces went to war just three days after the outbreak. Truman declared that Taiwan remained in an undefined status, and under this pretext, the Seventh Fleet invaded China’s Taiwan Straits. Meanwhile, the problem of Japan became paramount. The war made Japan’s status increase overnight and it appeared urgent to rearm Japan, due to the U.S.A.’s lack of armed forces in the Far East. On July 8, General MacArthur allowed the Japanese government to establish the National Police Reserve (NPR), a cadre of 75,000 men, and to add 8,000 men to the Japanese Coast Guard. Several days later, his special committee proposed that the NPR should promptly be changed into four infantry divisions equipped with U.S.-made weapons.7 On returning to the U.S.A. from Japan, J F Dulles, consultant to the State Department, urged the State Department to prepare a treaty with Japan. On July 19, Dulles stated that the outbreak of the Korean War made the treaty with Japan more important rather than less, and suggested careful thought be put into the treaty. The following day he reiterated the close relationship between an early peace and the rearmament of Japan.8 Thus, the American military leadership and diplomats saw eye-to-eye on this point. In the weeks that followed, the State Department and the Department of Defense carried out a series of discussions and came to an agreement on the prerequisites of the treaty, after which they submitted to the president, on September 7, a joint-memorandum detailing their proposals. As far as the procedure is concerned, the memorandum emphasized secret and preliminary negotiations with friendly nations in the Far Eastern Commission through diplomatic means, ignoring the Soviet Union. In terms of the content, it stressed that the U.S.A. was entitled to authorize the stationing and command of foreign troops on Japan, without denying Japan’s right to self defense and maintenance of necessary defense forces. The aide-mémoire was endorsed by Truman and peace was to be made as soon as the tide had turned in favor of the U.S.A on the Korean battlefield.9 On September 15, MacArthur’s successful landing at Inchon did turn the tide in the Korean War, and peace-making with Japan was on the agenda in Washington. After secret contacts and preparations, Dulles arranged a meeting with Ia.A. Malik, the representative of the Soviet Union to the United Nations. On the night

6 CCS 381. Formosa (11-8-48). sec.3,JCS Records,RG 218. in Schaller. The American Occupation of Japan. 283–284. 7 For details, see Yu Qun. Meiguo dui ri zhengce yanjiu, 126-127; Liu Tongshun and Gao Wenfan (eds.), Zhanghou shijie lishi changbian (6). Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1985, 385. Feng Zhaokui et al. 1996, 93. 8 Department of State, 1976a, 1243, 1247–1248. 9 Ibid., 1278–1282, 1293–1296, 1297–1304. 92 SHEN Zhihua of October 26, Dulles gave him the American memorandum entitled “Seven Principles of Peace with Japan.”10 “Dulles pointed out that it could be assumed that if the USSR were a party to the treaty, Japan would, by the treaty, cede South Sakhalin and the Kuriles to the Soviet Union.” Dulles said that it was their hope that “the treaty would be signed by all the nations represented on the Far Eastern Commission but that if any failed to participate” it was their “intention to proceed anyway providing the Japanese were willing to negotiate a separate peace.” The United States felt that Taiwan was “appropriate for the United Nations to con- sider.” In reply, Mr. Malik stated that the Soviet Union opposed the consideration of Taiwan by the United Nations because the status of Taiwan had been settled at Cairo and confirmed at Potsdam and that, therefore, the question of Taiwan was an internal problem of China.11 The situation in Korea at this time was delicate. Having been urged by both Stalin and Kim Il-sung, Mao Zedong was determined to dispatch armed forces to the battlefield without delay. On October 19, the People’s Volunteer Army (PVA) crossed the Yalu River in secret. Anxious to win, the Americans were so devoted to their northward advance that even after their initial engagement with Chinese troops, they still did not believe that the Chinese had really entered the war. Stalin rejoiced inwardly. Moscow did not reply immediately to the American proposal of making peace, rather it waited for the second turn of tide in the war and tried to enlist Beijing’s advice. It dramatically removed Stalin’s suspicion about the Communist Party of China (CPC) that troops dispatched by Mao, despite difficulties, went to Korea and the socialist bloc’s rescue. Sino-Soviet relations seemed extraordinarily close at the time. The archive affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, which was just opened to the public, preserves a great number of documents exchanged between China and the Soviet Union that deal with the treaty with Japan. The documentation attests to what M. C. Kapitsa (former secretary to the Soviet embassy in China) remarked in his memoirs: As allies, China and the USSR maintained close contact and cooperation in over issues of making peace with Japan at that time.12 When MacArthur declared in March 1950 that the major war criminals would be released before their sentence expired, the USSR informed China of her protest beforehand. On May 12, Zhou Enlai directed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to draft a declaration of support for the USSR, a declaration that appeared in newspapers two days after the Soviet Union issued

10 S.L.Tikhvinskii, Rossiia-Iaponiia, 43; Renmin ribao, Nov., 26th, 1950. 11 Department of State, 1976a. 1332–1336; Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity, 108; Liu Tongshun and Yao Chunling, eds., Zhanhou shijie lishi changbian (7). (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1989), 76–77. 12 Kapitsa, 1996, 123–124. The Treaty of Peace with Japan and the Korean truce negotiations 93 her statement.13 In addition, on September 1, the Chinese notified Moscow of the negotiation between MacArthur and Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan. According to intelligence, they had agreed that Taiwan, regarded as a part of Japan, should be superintended by the commander of the Allied Powers before the conclusion of a treaty with Japan, that the American troops would be stationed on this island for a long time, and that the Seventh Fleet would be responsible for blockading the Taiwan Straits.14 It follows that the USSR consulted with China on the formal US proposal for a peace treaty with Japan. Immediately after the meeting between American and Soviet representatives, the Soviet Union notified China, by memorandum, of the Americans’ suggestion and sent the China her draft reply. On the Chinese transla- tion of the memorandum can be seen Zhou Enlai’s instruction: “Early this morn- ing, Roshchin sent this copy, which was presented to the Soviet Union by the US government. The Soviet Union has not replied yet. Please study it at once and give your opinions.” The Soviet aide-mémoire was tactfully mild, without any direct objection to the US suggestion; instead it raised six questions “to be answered.” Toward the end, it read, “The Soviet government hopes to know what means is to be utilized to make clear the opinion of the People’s Republic China on this issue.”15 China showed no disagreement to the Soviet reply.16 With this attitude, Malik went to meet Dulles on November 20. According to the Americans’ account, Malik began with exuberance, talking about the two countries’ friendship and understanding, devoid of the seriousness that had marked the first meeting. It seemed that the Soviets were trying to create amity. For instance, when Malik asked about Washington’s view on China’s participation in a treaty with Japan, “Dulles replied that the talks held so far had been diplomatic conversations and that, therefore, the United States had held discussions with the Nationalist Government as the government which this country recognizes.”17 Despite the USSR’s clear standpoint on this matter, Malik did not respond, and instead he shifted the topic. As a result, after the meeting, Dulles felt that the USSR could be ignored when dealing with China’s participation in the treaty with Japan.18 According to Kapitsa, Moscow deliberately remained noncommittal.19

13 The Archive afﬁ liated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, 105-00022-01, 1-8; Tian Huan, 1994, 13. 14 Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskii Federatsii (ed.), 49–50. 15 The Archive afﬁ liated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, 105-00019-01,1-10. 16 The published document was almost a duplicate of the draft. Cf. Renmin ribao Nov., 26th, 1950. 17 Department of State, 1976a, 1352–1354. 18 Ibid., 1352–1354. 19 Kapitsa, 1996, 124. 94 SHEN Zhihua

Obviously, this had something to do with an impending turn on the Korean battlefield. Stalin was trying to avoid untimely discussion with the U.S.A on the treaty with Japan—behind Malik’s smile, Moscow was waiting for exciting news from the front. By the December 3 meeting between Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung, China had achieved initial military gains, and Mao suggested to Kim: “The enemy may propose a ceasefire. However, in our opinion, only when the enemy agrees to and does actually withdraw from North Korea to south of the thirty-eighth parallel, can we negotiate a truce. We had better seize not only Pyongyang, but also Seoul. Our major task is to destroy the enemy forces by annihilating the puppet troops as the priority, which would accelerate the withdrawal of American forces.”20 Mao and Stalin were like-minded as far as this point was concerned. A. Gromyko, the vice foreign minister of the USSR, told the Chinese ambassador, Wang Jiaxiang on September 4 that the Chinese should make full use of the opportunity, “striking while the iron is hot,” and that they should cross the thirty-eighth parallel in pur- suit of the enemy.”21 The following day, Zhou Enlai issued a statement entitled “Guanyu duiri heyue wenti de shengming” (Statement Concerning the Treaty with Japan) in response to the above two memoranda. This was the first time that the PRC government expounded its view on making peace with Japan. The statement pointed out that Beijing “is obliged to participate in the preparation, drafting and signing of a treaty with Japan”; and that the Cairo Declaration and the Yalta Agreement had specified the nations that were sovereign over Taiwan, the Penghu Islands (the Pescadores), South Sakhalin, and the Kuriles, “without any need for further discussion.” In addition, it condemned the U.S.A. for openly arming Japan and for her attempt to colonize the latter.22 Most assuredly, these views were shared by the Soviet Union, though the USSR would not openly express them as such. Thus, China wanted to make use of the Korean War to help solve the problems of Taiwan and the treaty with Japan. The call for a ceasefire was overwhelming from the international community. Zhou Enlai told Roshchin that the UN and countries like India and Britain had been asking repeatedly under what circumstances China would stop military operations in Korea. Zhou said that the Chinese government would not be at a disadvantage, but rather would seize the initiative, and thus planned to put forward the following conditions: all foreign armed forces withdraw from Korea; American troops withdraw from the Taiwan Straits and Taiwan; Koreans’ problems be left to themselves; the representative of the PRC be allowed in the UN and Chiang Kai-shek’s representative be dismissed; and the

20 Feng Xianzhi and Jin Chongji, 2003, 135. 21 Shen Zhihua, 2003, 635–636. 22 Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1961, 354–357. The Treaty of Peace with Japan and the Korean truce negotiations 95 foreign ministers of the four powers convene to prepare a treaty with Japan. Zhou hoped for immediate comment on these from Moscow. In the reply on the same day, Moscow showed her consent to the conditions and confirmed that “only under such circumstances can the military operations stop.” On the other hand, the Soviet government asked China to “put her cards on the table” after Seoul was emancipated.23 It can be safely assumed that Stalin would seriously discuss with his American counterpart the treaty with Japan only when the initiative on the Korean battlefield rested with the Russians. Consequently, Moscow only sent a copy of the American State Department’s reply of December 27 to Beijing, without any other response.24 The PVA launched the second campaign in November and December 1950, routing the Americans so decisively that at the Pentagon and the White House even a full-blown general withdrawal was under discussion.25 Later, the PVA crossed the thirty-eighth parallel, capturing Seoul. Meanwhile, the call for the end of the war became stronger in the UN, and the proposals there were in favor of China. Had China (with the approval of the USSR) accepted the UN motion of January 13, 1951 and begun truce negotiations, she would not only have been in control of a favorable situation in the Korean War, but also would have had drastic influence on handling the issue of a treaty with Japan. However, neither China nor the USSR grasped this golden opportunity. Shortly after China’s January 17 refusal of the UN motion, the American counteroffensive drove the Chinese army back north of the thirty-eighth parallel.26 The tide on the battlefield turned once again, and the peacemaking with Japan went against China and the Soviet Union.

2 The U.S.A. stalls on truce negotiations to make peace with Japan

This new advantage in the war enabled the U.S.A. to adopt a hard-line stance with regard to the peacemaking. The March 12 memorandum from the British ambassador to the American State Department read to the effect that according to the Yalta Agreement, Japan should cede South Sakhalin and the Kuriles to the USSR. Washington responded that the American government held that it either should be a bilateral topic for the Japanese and Soviet governments to define the border of the Kuriles, or the border should be arbitrated by the International Court.27 In a

23 Shen Zhihua, 2003, 639, 641. 24 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC Archive, 105-00086-02, 13–20. 25 Acheson, 1978, 333; Department of State, 1976b, 1324–1328. 26 For details, see: Shen Zhihua. 2003, 342–368. 27 Koshkin, 2000, 58. 96 SHEN Zhihua

March 30 note delivered to the Soviet ambassador, the U.S.A. once again reiterated the trusteeship of some of Japan’s islands and the recognition of Japan’s right of self-defense; moreover, it emphasized that countries that were not signatories to the treaty would not be given any rights and interests de jure. With regard to the provisions concerning territory, the note also adopted a different attitude: it called on Japan only to renounce claims on Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, leaving open the question of sovereignty over them, quite opposite to the provisions in the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation that they should be returned to China. The prerequisite that once the USSR had signed and ratified the treaty28 the provision of returning south Sakhalin and the Kuriles to the USSR from the Yalta Agreement be put into effect, betrayed U.S.A.’s seeming adherence to the agreement. Some scholars maintain that it demonstrated the American efforts to enlist the USSR in the negotiation of peace with Japan, on the ground that it accorded with the long-term interests of western countries.29 However, this argument does not hold. Even before the note was delivered, Dulles remarked in the State Depart- ment’s discussion on March 21 that “If the USSR refuses to accept a treaty, we will be prepared to reconsider whether reference to Sakhalin and the Kuriles should be totally eliminated from the treaty.” Dulles made it even clearer when he talked with Wellington Koo, Chiang Kai-shek’s ambassador to the U.S.A. He told Koo that the provisions concerning the Kuriles and south Sakhalin were “borrowed from Yalta Agreement in terms of diction, [because the U.S.A.] knows that the USSR will not participate in negotiating a peace with Japan and does not want to change the Agreement which would be a pretext for the USSR not to take part in the negotiation.”30 It follows that the U.S.A. knew that the USSR would not give in. Indeed, the USSR would not sign the treaty with Japan in such a context. Once the momentum in the Korean War had returned to the Americans, Stalin adopted the position of obstructing the peacemaking plan. Moscow turned to the CPC and the Communist Party of Japan (CPJ). First, Stalin insisted that the CPJ boycott the American policies of occupying and stationing troops in Japan and resort to revolutionary violence. Kyuichi Tokuda, Sanzo Nozaka, and other leaders of the CPJ, who had been exiled in China, were summoned to Moscow in April 1951.31 There they were converted to Moscow’s view. Looking back on the past, they acknowledged that “It is simply to wrong to believe that the liberation and democratic reforms of Japan could be achieved through peaceful means,” and they proceeded to frame a new

28 State Department, 1977, 908; B.N.Slavinskii, 1994, 84. 29 Slavinskii, 1994, 89. 30 Department of State, 1977, 942–943; Cui Pi, 1993, 199. 31 For details of the suppression of CPJ and of the labour movement in Japan, see Yu Qun, Meiguo duiri zhengce yanjiu, 123–125. The Treaty of Peace with Japan and the Korean truce negotiations 97 revolutionary platform.32 At a conference, the politburo of the Soviet Communist Party (Bolshevik) (SCP(B)) made a decision to support the new CPJ plan finan- cially, and asked the National Intelligence Council to donate 100,000 US dollars on to CPJ.33 Meanwhile, the USSR and China began to discuss how best to boycott the US peacemaking plan. Stalin sent a telegram to Mao on May 6, clarifying the USSR’s standpoint concerning the peacemaking. Stalin denounced U.S.A.’s monopoliza- tion of the task of preparing a draft treaty, demanded that the draft treaty be resolute on China’s sovereignty over Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, objected to placing the Ryukyu Islands and other Japanese islands under American trusteeship, and proposed that the scale of Japanese armed forces be limited. Further, the Soviet government suggested a convention of foreign ministers from the four countries, and the drafting of a treaty that would stipulate that Japan not form an alliance to counter any of those countries with which she had fought; that within one year of the signing of the treaty, all occupying forces should withdraw from the Japanese territory; that no country should have troops and military bases in Japan. Mao Zedong replied with agreement the same day.34 The Foreign Ministry of the USSR handed “The Opinion of USSR on the American Draft Treaty with Japan” to the US ambassador in the USSR on May 7. On May 22, Zhou Enlai presented a formal note to Roshchin, demonstrating China’s full support for the Soviet suggestions.35 On May 24, the Soviet Union published the full text of strongly worded document.36 On June 10, the Soviet government presented another note to the U.S.A., denouncing the US draft treaty as a means of resuming Japanese militarism, and reiterating the convention of a peace conference in July or August to include representatives from all the countries that had fought Japan.37 Finally, on June 25, the Foreign Affairs Department of North Korea also presented a note to the USSR, stating that both in terms of treaty procedures and content, North Korea was in total agreement with the Soviets.38

32 Haruki Wada. “Stalin and the Japanese Communist Party, 1945–1953,” submitted to the Conference on “Cold War in Asia” (Hong Kong, 1996). For the meeting between Stalin and CPJ leadership, see N.Adyrkhaev. 1990. Vstrecha Stalina s iaponskimi kommunistami: Glazami ochevidcha (The meeting between Stalin and the Japanese leadership: a witness’s recollection). Problemy Dal’nego Vostoka. No. 2, 140–144. 33 TsKhSD (Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation), f.89, op.50, d.3, l.1. 34 Shen Zhihua, 2003, pp. 755–757; Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, 1988, 274. 35 Guoji tiaoyueji (1950–1952), 358, 360–361; The Archive afﬁ liated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, 105-00019-03, 86–87. 36 Renming ribao of May, 25th. The English version is found in XG0187, MF2527245-0990, Main Library, University of Hong Kong, 1951. 37 See also: Renmin Chubanshe, 1951, 95, 100, 107; B.N.Slavinskii, 1994, 87. 38 AVPRF, f.0102, op.7, 25, d.2, l.26–31. 98 SHEN Zhihua

While Washington was anxious to negotiate peace talks and the Soviet Union stonewalled, the Korean War reached a deadlock due to the Chinese troops’ stout resistance. At last, both parties demonstrated a willingness to hold peace talks.39 Upon his return to the State Department, as a consultant, G. Kennan discussed the possibility of a truce negotiation with Malik, who appeared ready to negotiate. What caught Kennan’s attention was that Malik made no mention of international affairs in the Far East such as Taiwan and the treaty of peace with Japan. Kennan believed that Malik evinced the Soviet desire for a ceasefire even without the solution of those other problems.40 Kennan was right. The USSR did wish for a ceasefire before a treaty, which might be favorable to her and China. However, the U.S.A. adopted a diametrically opposed strategy: seeking a peace treaty with Japan first, and then a ceasefire. The military advantage entitled the U.S.A. to diplomatic initiative. In the Spring and Summer of 1951, the U.S.A. not only forced the Japanese government to promise that it would not conclude a treaty with China, but also forced the British government to adhere to the principle that “neither Chinese government is to take part in the multilateral peace conference,” so that the British–American dispute over China’s right to sign a treaty was brought to an end.41 On July 3, the U.S.A. and U.K. co-drafted the Treaty of Peace with Japan. Thus, while she was urging a peace conference for Japan, the U.S.A. was at the same time stalling on truce negotiations in Korea. Obviously, if a ceasefire was to be agreed upon and a last- ing peace ensued, China and the USSR would be acclaimed as “peace heroes.” Then the U.S.A. would not be able to deny Beijing’s participation in the Treaty of Peace with Japan, nor persuade her allies to rearm Japan and to continue stationing troops there.42 Consequently, shortly after the truce negotiation began in Kaesong on July 10, the American representatives repeatedly obstructed them. Although China and North Korea compromised to such an extent that they accepted the US proposal for negotiating procedures and fixing the military demarcation line, the U.S.A. still constantly resorted to incidents to stall. For example, the UN attack on August 18, the attack on Chinese and North Korean troops on August 19, and the aerial bombardment of the Chinese and North Korean representatives in Laifeng- zhuang.43 As a result, on the 23rd, the negotiations in Kaesong had to be brought

39 For Russian documents, see Shen Zhihua, 2003, 777–786, 804–811, 835–840. 40 Tao Wenzhao, 2003, 629–630. 41 For details, see: Zhanhou lishi changbian (7), 78–81; Xu Youzheng. Yingmei zai xinzhongguo canyu duiri gouhe wenti shangde zhengyi, 32–35; Yu Qun, Meiguo duiri zhengce yanjiu, 162–171. 42 Even the American newspapers got this point. See: I. F. Stone, Chaoxian zhanzheng de neimu. (The Hidden History of the Korean War). trans. Nan Zuomin et al. (Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 1989), 286. 43 Cf. also Shen Zhihua, 2003, 941–1007; Chai Chengwen, Zhao Yongtian, Banmendian tanpan. (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1992), 144–155. The Treaty of Peace with Japan and the Korean truce negotiations 99 to a halt, exactly as the U.S.A. wanted. Thus, when the U.S.A. presented the final draft treaty to the USSR as an ultimatum, Moscow was confronted with a dilemma. On July 6, the American government delivered the (co-draft) memorandum to the USSR, which stated uncompromisingly that the revised draft was already formed in terms that the would-be signatory allies could accept, and that it would be handed out to all the nations who fought Japan on July 20. What fueled Moscow’s anger most, regarding the treaty, was the drastic revision concerning territory: while the draft of March 30 provided that Japan should cede South Sakhalin and the adjacent islands to the Soviet Union and hand over the Kuriles, the draft of July 3 only ruled that Japan should renounce the right and claim to these islands, without mentioning which nation was sovereign over them. Before the Soviet Union replied, the American and British ambassadors paid a visit to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, presenting the joint note from the U.S.A. and U.K., the invitation to the San Francisco Peace Conference on September 4, 1951, and the formal text of the draft treaty as well as other relevant documents. The note pointed out that the conference was based on the US and UK co-draft, and asked if the Soviet government would accept the invitation. Although it welcomed suggestions to the draft treaty, the note claimed that the final text would be promulgated on August 13, despite possible protests. A.G. Kirk, the US ambassador, emphasized in an oral statement that the conference was not held to work out a treaty, but to sign the draft promulgated on August 13.44 Stalin was indeed on the horns of a dilemma: it meant compromise to participate in the conference, but it would leave the USSR in diplomatic isolation not to do so. Baffled by this problem, the Soviet government was at a loss as to what to do. On July 21, Gromyko suggested to Stalin that the USSR should attend the conference, but a note from August 1 explained the reasons why she could not. After much consideration, the SCP (B) made a decision on August 10. Just as the Soviet Union had done at the Paris Conference when discussing the Marshall Plan, she would attend the San Francisco Conference, criticizing and attempting to revise the US–UK draft, particularly stressing China’s right to attend the conference and trying to get the revisions passed. If this failed, she would not sign the treaty. The USSR informed China of this position on August 12, explaining that she could hardly refuse to be present at the conference, but that she would propose at the conference that Chinese representatives should be invited.45 Before long, the USSR notified China of the suggestions about Japan’s reparations and the armaments limitation thereof.46 China showed understanding of the Soviet decision. On

44 Slavinskii, 1994, 89–91. 45 Ibid., 91–93, 95. 46 The Archive afﬁ liated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, 105-00086-02, 6–7. 100 SHEN Zhihua

August 15, Zhou Enlai issued a statement to the effect that the preparation, drafting, and signing of a treaty with Japan, whatever the content, would be illegal, and null and void without the participation of the PRC. On the same day, he met K M Panikkar, the Indian ambassador to China, telling the latter that it was up to India whether or not to attend the conference, but that India could attend the conference without changing her opinions, as was the Soviet Union.47

3 The San Francisco Peace Treaty and the PRC and USSR’s hard-line position in the truce negotiations

The proceedings of the San Francisco Conference were simple. As planned, Gromyko, the Soviet representative, first delivered a speech to give suggestions regarding the treaty, maintaining that the treaty should not be discussed without China’s participation. This proposal was turned down. Then, the Soviet representative made suggestions concerning the revision of the draft treaty, which was likewise turned down. Under such circumstances, the representatives from the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia refused to sign the treaty.48 In what appears as foreknowledge regarding the results of the conference, Beijing prepared in advance a statement denouncing the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Before the conference was over, Zhou Enlai issued the statement, indicating that China would not recognize the conference.49 While the treaty was being signed, the Foreign Ministry of the PRC sent the statement to the Soviet embassy.50 Five hours after the Treaty was concluded, D Acheson, the US Secretary of State, and Yoshida Shigero, the Japanese Prime Minister, signed the Japanese– American Security Pact in San Francisco. On December 24, the latter sent a letter to Chiang Kai-shek, under Dulles’s pressure, suggesting the conclusion of a peace treaty. The two parties struck a bargain seven hours before the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect on April 28, 1952, signing the Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan.51 Thus far, the Americans had achieved their collective defense system in East Asia. What remained to be done was the

47 Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949–1976), Vol. I. (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1997), 171; Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1961, 362–364, 366–367. India and Burma refused to attend the conference in the end, due to disagreement to the text of the treaty. See S.L.Tikhvinskii, Vmeshatel’stvo amerikanskoi diplomatii, 9. 48 For details, see Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1961, 368–386; B.N.Slavinskii, 1994, 98; S.L.Tikhvinskii, Vmeshatel’stvo amerikanskoi diplomatii, 9. 49 Zhonggong zhongyang yanjiushi, 1997, 178. 50 Kapitsa, 1996, 130. 51 For detaills, see Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1961, 393–394; Zhanhou lishi changbian (7), 105–110. The Treaty of Peace with Japan and the Korean truce negotiations 101 truce on the Korean battlefield. Left in limbo in Far Eastern diplomacy, the USSR and China took a hard-line position in the truce negotiation in Panmunjom. Having failed to sign the peace treaty, Soviet policies concerning Japan were endangered, as was her post-war diplomatic status in the country. The first problems that beset the Soviet Union were the disbandment of both the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan. Even before the Treaty came into effect, the Soviet Foreign Ministry had foreseen these possible problems, but there was no way out and it had to wait. On February 21, 1952, Gromyko reported to Stalin that when the Treaty was ratified by the various countries, the U.S.A. would proclaim the disbandment of the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan. The Soviet representative in Japan suggested that “We take the initiative to declare the end of occupation in Japan and the disbandment of all agencies related to occupation, and to require the withdrawal from Japan of all occupying troops as soon as possible and the return of all sovereignty to the Japanese people.” However, the Foreign Ministry held that it was improper to issue such a statement, “because it is hard to explain to the public that the USSR, who did not recognize the Peace Treaty with Japan, now suggests that the Allied Council and the Far Eastern Commission, both of which were established under the Allies’ decision in December 1945, should be disbanded.” Consequently, the USSR was to issue a condemnation only after the U.S.A took action. Gromyko also pointed out that due to “the impossibility of establishing normal Russo-Japanese relations, [the USSR should] try to reach an agreement with the Japanese government, an agreement which would allow the Soviet representative body to continue to stay in Japan as a trade delegation.” He also advised that China be notified of this beforehand to reaffirm that the Soviet Union would not recognize the Treaty.52 But even on the issue of the trade delegation, out of strategic concern, the Foreign Ministry felt that the USSR should not be proactive but should wait for Japan to take the initiative.53 The Allied Council for Japan convened for the last time on April 23, 1952, declaring the end of its mission. The American representative to the Far Eastern Commission also sent a letter to the secretary general, proposing the dissolution of the Commission after the Treaty entered into effect. The USSR issued a statement, denouncing the U.S.A., for lack of a better option.54 On the same day, the Japanese representative issued a statement, claiming that “They are discussing how to deal with the loss of Soviet ambassador’s privileges owing to

52 Shen Zhihua, Li Danhui. “Geluomike gei sidalin de baogao,” In Zhongsu guanxi: eguo dang’an yuanwen fuyinjian huibian, 2004. Vol. 9, 2118–2127. 53 Sheng Zhihua, Li Danhui. “Liangong(bu) zhongyang jueyi,” In Sulian lishi: eguo dangan yuanwen fuyinjian huibian. (The book will be referred to as Sulian lishi wenjian for short henthforth), 2004. Vol. 27, 131–132. 54 Calvocoressi, 1989, p. 485; Renmin ribao, April, 3rd, 1952. 102 SHEN Zhihua the dissolution of the Allied Council for Japan.” The US headquarters in Japan notified the USSR representative body of the deprivation of its right to use radio stations when the treaty came into effect. As a result, the Soviet Foreign Ministry decided that they should stop using the stations, “to avoid possible provocation of the Japanese authorities.” In fact, the Soviet Foreign Ministry and Military Ministry had already ordered the destruction of confidential files and ciphers in case of accidents.55 Later, the Soviets discovered that “The Japanese authorities had not taken steps to expel the Soviet representatives in Tokyo,” and that the political and industrial circles in Japan hoped “to deal with the Russo-Japanese relations properly.” On the one hand, the Japanese government suggested that it would wait for a Soviet proposal on dealing with the Russo-Japanese relationship; whereas, it probed the Soviet intention informally with its industrial circle. Anxious to grasp this opportunity, the Soviet Foreign Ministry proposed that Kislenko, the Soviet representative, should not hurry home but should keep touch with the Japanese government.56 The SCP (B) passed a resolution concerning this issue on May 20.57 However, the Soviet plan was once again frustrated. Perhaps under pressure from the U.S.A., the Japanese government informed the Soviet representatives formally on May 30 that because the Treaty was in effect, the representatives had become illegitimate. Frustrated and embarrassed, Kislenko and the majority of the attaché had to leave Tokyo, despite their protests.58 Japan’s armaments production for the American troops caused even more con- sternation in Moscow. When the Treaty went into effect, the allied headquarters was to return to Japan 850 factories, which had originally been planned to be used as reparations. Among the plants were 314 fighter factories, 131 ordnance factories, and 25 armaments research institutes. During the Korean War, Japan played the role of “ordnance factory” in the Far East for the U.S.A., providing a great number of armaments, valued at over 110,000,000 US dollars.59 This worried Stalin greatly; however, the USSR could do nothing about it. The Soviet Foreign Ministry reported on March 20 that the allied headquarters allowed the Japanese government to produce ammunition, weapons, warships, and planes. Kislenko believed this should be protested against. However, the Foreign Ministry held that it was improper to protest for the following reasons: first, the Soviet Union had stated that Japan was entitled to a limited number of land, sea, and air forces and to produce a certain number of weapons; second, the protest, which would be leveled at the Americans, might not have the desired results, as they might in turn

55 “Weixinsiji gei sidalin de baogao”, In Sulian lishi wenjian, Vol. 27. 137–139. 56 For details, see: “Weixinsiji gei sidalin de baogao”, In Sulian lishi wenjian, Vol. 27. 143–145. 57 “Liangong(bu) zhongyang jueyi”. In Sulian lishi wenjian, Vol. 27. 146. 58 Calvocoressi, 1989, 486–487. 59 Feng Zhaokui et al., 1996, 100. The Treaty of Peace with Japan and the Korean truce negotiations 103 criticize the Soviet Union for attempting to prohibit the armed forces in Japan.60 Two days later, the SCP (B) ratified the instructions for Kislenko, in accordance with the Foreign Ministry’s opinion.61 By now, the USSR had lost all its influence on Far East affairs except its veto in the UN. Malik exercised the right of veto when the UN Security Council voted on September 8 on Japan’s application for member state status (ten “yes” and one “no”).62 As for the Taiwan issue, all that the PRC and the USSR could do was to extend the time that the Soviet troops were allowed to stay in Lüshun Harbor.63 Left totally passive in diplomacy, China and the USSR were resolved to launch a counterattack in the Korean War. Stalin hoped that the truce negotiations could be prolonged and the deadlock maintained, so that the U.S.A. would be tied down and drained in the Far East. After the San Francisco Peace Conference, the U.S.A. engaged in the promotion of truce negotiations in Korea. The American ambassador Kirk arranged a meeting with Vyshinskii, the Soviet Foreign Minister, on October 5, 1951, emphasizing that “The issue of Korea is the most acute and most dangerous international problem, one which demands an immediate solution.” Further, Kirk said that the “Korean truce negotiations could have a huge impact” on relieving international tension and improving Russo-American relations.64 The truce negotiations were resumed in Panmunjom on October 25. The agreement on the military demarcation line was reached quickly, so Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung optimistically instructed their delegations to “try to conclude a truce within the year.”65 Shortly after this, however, the Chinese position changed. On December 28, Mao instructed Li Kelong, the vice Foreign Minister of the PRC who headed the delegation, that prolonging the negotiation was not something to be feared and that if they were patient, the enemy could be brought to his wits’ end.66 Zhou Enlai reiterated this strategy of patience in his telegram to Li Kelong and Qiao Guanhua several days later.67 On January 14 and 15, 1952, Mao instructed Li to “adhere to the established strategy without wavering” and to “take the initiative to counter the enemy proactively.”68 Opinions split at the third meeting; the American JCS was

60 “Weixinsiji gei sidalin de baogao”, In Sulian lishi wenjian, Vol. 27. 133–134. 61 “Liangong(bu) zhongyang jueyi”. In Sulian lishi wenjian, Vol. 27. 146. 62 Calvocoressi, 1989, 487. 63 When he met Zhou Enlai in September 1952, Stalin pointed out that the Soviet Union would extend the time because “American ﬂ eets are stationed in Taiwan and the USA makes use of Taiwan.” He also emphasized that the existence of a Japanese-Chiang Treaty implies “the impossibility of a treaty between the PRC and Japan.” Shen Zhihua, 2003, 1222, 1227–1232. 64 Ibid., 1058–1061. 65 Chai Chengwen, Zhao Yongtian, 1992, 181. 66 Zhonggong zhongyang yanjiushi, 1997, 207. 67 Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun junshi kexueyuan, 1997, 265–266. 68 Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, 1989, 49, 54–55. 104 SHEN Zhihua willing to compromise on China’s rebuilding of an airfield and proposed a higher- level meeting between China and Korea.69 The Chinese standpoint, however, became even more uncompromising. Zhou Enlai sent a telegram to Li on February 24, saying that “We should never compromise on the issues concerning limits on the rebuilding of the airfield, voluntary repatriation and Soviet participation in a Chinese supervisory agency. If the opposing side does not budge, we prefer deadlock.”70 In only two months time, the Chinese position changed from being anxious to reach an agreement to being extremely patient with no results. Perhaps she was aware of reinforcements due to strategic shifting of infantry battalions and impending Soviet weapons reinforcements, or perhaps it was simply out of strategic concern. The answer remains open until more can be learned from the Chinese documents. What is clear is that China was encouraged and supported behind the scenes by Moscow, which had otherwise been left passive in Far East diplomacy. V. H. Razuvaev, then the Soviet ambassador to Korea, reported the Chinese attitude and strategy to Moscow in detail.71 With much gratitude, Stalin told Mao that “Your firm stand has led to positive results, which may drive the enemy to further compromise.”72 On April 28, when the Treaty of Peace with Japan came into effect, a “secret” conference was held by the negotiators. The Americans proposed that they would abandon the effort to impose limitations on the rebuilding of the North Korean airfield, provided that their proposal for voluntary repatriation of POWs was accepted and provided that the Soviet Union is not nominated as a neutral nation. When the U.S.A. made such a substantial compromise, China and Korea withdrew their nomination of the Soviet Union. On May 2, China and Korea put forward a package proposal: on the condition that the repatriation of all POWs is accepted and that the Americans not intervene in the Korean airfield rebuilding, they would nominate only Poland, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, and Sweden as the neutral nations. Thus the two discrepancies, which had prolonged the third round of negotiations, were resolved. In addition, an agreement had already been reached concerning political meetings in the fifth round. Only the issue of POWs from the fourth round remained to be solved.73 However, the negotiations came to a cul-de-sac on this very issue, which was supposed to be the easiest to agree on. Antagonism between the U.S.A. and China unfolded gradually, after the fourth round began on December 11, 1951. The negotiation reached stalemate several

69 JCS 91600, From JCS to Ridgway, 10 Jan. 1952, selected records relating to the Korean War, Harry S. Truman Library. 70 Zhonggong zhongyang yanjiushi, 1997, 220. 71 AVPRF, f.0102, op.8, p.35, d.10, l.158.A.Volokhova, Peregovory o peremirii v Koree, 104. 72 Shen Zhihua, 2003, 1151. 73 Junshi kexueyuan junshi lishi yanjiubu, 2000, 227–230; Chai Chengwen, Zhao Yongtian, 1992, 203. The Treaty of Peace with Japan and the Korean truce negotiations 105 times before it was finally adjourned. An array of reasons is usually held responsible, ranging from ideological conflicts and cultural differences to psychological warfare strategies and attempts to influence international opinion. Obviously, China and the Soviet Union held firm on the negotiation in order to regain an active position in Far East affairs. Resorting to her military supremacy, the U.S.A. tried to force China and North Korea to compromise by bombardment and nuclear blackmail. In the face of this pressure, Kim Il-sung was inclined to accept the American provisions. In his opinion, the number of POWs repatriated through negotiation would be far less than the casualties from the bombardment. Consequently, he instructed Nam Il, the Korean representative at the negotiations, to suggest that they compromise in Li Kelong’s name and tell Mao that they were “unwilling to continue the war.”74 Trying to persuade Kim, Mao told him that it was unfavorable to China and Korea, both politically and militarily, to accept the aggressive and deceitful American suggestions in the face of bombardment. The war would indeed deal the North Koreans and the PVA blows, but it would also tie the U.S.A. down and drain her. The long-term results were worth the short-term suffering; continuing the war guaranteed Soviet construction, the development of communist revolutions throughout the world, and “the deferment of the outbreak of a new world war.”75 Mao Zedong’s words echoed Stalin’s views. Having lost the “war” of the Treaty, the USSR now could only combat the U.S.A. by encouraging and supporting the Chinese. Speaking with Zhou Enlai on August 20, Stalin promised to give China comprehensive economic and military aid. On the issue of POWs, he also agreed with the Chinese who insisted on the repatriation of all POWs. Further, he stood by Mao’s opinion that the continuation of the war was in their favor because it disturbed US preparation for the Third World War. He advocated a hard-line policy towards the U.S.A., stating that “The Chinese must be aware that if the United States of America does not lose the war, China will never regain Taiwan.”76 Talking with Kim Il-sung and Peng Dehuai on September 4, Stalin reiterated his opposition to the American provisions concerning POWs and suggested that there be no new proposals.77 Meanwhile, the JCS and M. Clark, the new commander of the UN troops, exchanged telegrams frequently, discussing a variety of plans to solve the POW problem.78 Whatever efforts the Americans made, all would be futile,

74 AVPRF, f.0102, op.8, 35, d.10, l.157–158. A.Volokhova, Peregovory o peremirii v Koree, 104; Shen Zhihua, 2003, 1152–1153. 75 Shen Zhihua, 2003, 1187–1189. 76 Ibid., 1200–1204. 77 Ibid., 1216. 78 C 51562, From Clark to JCS, 8 July 1952; CX 55003, From Clark to JCS, 11 Sep. 1952, Selected Records Relating to the Korean War, Harry S. Truman Library; Meiguo duihua zhengce wenjianji, Vol. I. 831–835. 106 SHEN Zhihua provided that they held firm on voluntary repatriation.79 Clark, the Pentagon, and the White House could no longer tolerate China’s hard-line policy and decided to take a resolute step, so that the firm stance and dignity of the UN and the U.S.A. might be maintained.80 The UN delegation announced on October 8, that the truce negotiations in Panmunjom would adjourn indefinitely.81 The outbreak of the Korean War drove the U.S.A. to adopt a new policy of negotiating a peace with Japan without the participation of the PRC. She hoped that results on the battlefield would enable favorable peace with Japan. Although the U.S.A felt the need to end the Korean War, and despite China’s various conces- sions, the U.S.A. tried to drag out the truce negotiations until the treaty with Japan was signed, thus preventing Chinese representatives from attending the San Francisco Conference. After the conference, the U.S.A. desired an immediate cessation of hostilities in Korea, whereas the Soviet Union and China, having just been left out of Far Eastern diplomacy, became uncompromising, hoping that the U.S.A. would expend all its energy on the Korean battlefield. This was the subtle relationship between the Treaty of Peace with Japan and Korean truce negotiations in the context of the Cold War.

References

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