University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 1-1-2005 Mao's American strategy and the Korean War/ Wanli, Hu University of Massachusetts Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1 Recommended Citation Hu, Wanli,, "Mao's American strategy and the Korean War/" (2005). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 864. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/864 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 312Qbb 02AA 7fifiM <1 MAO'S AMERICAN STRATEGY AND THE KOREAN WAR A Dissertation Presented by WANLI HU Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTORY OF PHILOSOPHY February 2005 History © Copyright by Wanli Hu All Rights Reserved MAO'S AMERICAN STRATEGY AND THE KOREAN WAR A Dissertation Presented by WANLI HU Approved as to style and content by: Stephen E. Pelz, Chair/ Steven M. Goldstein, Member ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to take this moment to express my great thanks to my advisor and committee chair, Stephen E. Pelz, for his thoughtful, patient guidance and support for many years. I also own a debt of gratitude to Steven M. Goldstein whose critical comments greatly increased the depth of my dissertation. Thanks are also attributed to the members of my committee, Carl Nightingale and Jonathan Lipman, for their useful instructions and suggestions. Jane M. Rausch, our graduate director, encouraged me to continue my "long march" to the end. I want to give my particular thanks to Xiaosi Yang at this occasion. Quite a number of discussions with him were a source of inspiration for new thought. edited the last I wish to express my appreciation to my colleague, John Watt. He draft of my dissertation before I submitted it to the committee. whose support and I will never forget all the friends and colleagues encouragement allowed me to achieve this accomplishment. iv ABSTRACT MAO'S AMERICAN STRATEGY AND THE KOREAN WAR FEBRUARY 2005 WANLI HU, B.A. SHAANXI TEACHERS UNIVERSITY, CHINA M.A. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST Ph.D. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST Directed by: Professor Stephen E. Pelz Even though the Korean War has been labeled by some as a forgotten war, scholars continue to seek the root of the Sino-U.S. confrontation and Mao's decision to Goldstein enter the war in Korea. Among the five interpretations I examined, Steven compares Mao's intervention to a Greek tragedy. In my opinion, this comes closest to been largely overlooked explaining this historical puzzle. However, this interpretation has by scholarship in the field. American strategy" to My dissertation relies on an understanding of "Mao's American strategy in comprehend Mao's motivation to enter the war. Mao developed his as the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) late 1944 and by mid-1945 it was established of the United States was based on its approach to the United States. The CCP's concept interests in China after World War II. analysis of Washington's long-term strategic influence on China through a pro- Washington's strategic objective was to insure its objective was to establish a coalition America government. The best means to reach this multi-party democratic system. Considering government, which would follow America's a coalition government time, the CCP leadership welcomed its obvious weakness at that in which the CCP and the Guomindang (GMD), could enjoy equal power. However, after analysis of GMD-CCP relations, Mao reached the conclusion that Jiang would not abandon autocracy no matter how hard Washington pressed him. Therefore, a GMD-CCP clash was inevitable. The United States took the position that it had no choice but to stand on the side of the GMD and to interfere with the Chinese revolution sooner or later. Truman's blockade of the Taiwan Straits, and the United Nations troops' crossing th the 38 parallel and marching toward the Yalu in 1950 triggered Mao's intervention. To meet an unavoidable clash, Mao decided to dispatch his army to Korea. In addition to explaining Mao's American strategy, I introduce an international factor: the clash between the National Independence Movement and the constraints of the Cold War. With Mao's American strategy as a chronological line and the international factor as a horizontal circumstance, this dissertation asserts that Mao's involvement in the Korean War can be seen as inevitable — a Greek tragedy. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iv ABSTRACT v CHAPTER I. A REVIEW OF THE SCHOLARSHIP ON MAO'S FOREIGN POLICY AND THE KOREAN WAR 1 Communist Expansion: the "Heroic Phase" of the Cold War 2 China's Defense of Her National Security 4 Misperception, Miscommunication and Miscalculation 16 Mao's Challenge toward the Domination of the United States 21 The Sino-U.S. Confrontation - A Greek Tragedy 30 II. THE HISTORICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF MAO'S WORLDVIEW.... 37 The Historical Sources of Mao's Worldview: Pre-Marxist Nationalism 37 The Impact of Marxism-Leninism on Mao's Anti-imperialist View 41 How Mao Made Marxism Chinese 43 The CCP and Mao's Foreign Policy toward the West, Particularly, the United States 58 Conclusion 72 75 III. MAO'S REACTIONS TO THE HURLEY MISSION, 1944 T01945 75 Mao's Mixed Attitudes to the Dixie Mission 82 The Interaction between Mao and Hurley: from Hope to Disappointment Service Competition to Win Roosevelt's Support among Hurley, Foreign 90 Officers and Mao 94 The Russian Card and the Yalta Conference 97 The Hostility between Hurley and Mao Three Fronts 103 Mao's Struggle to Maintain the Autonomy of the CCP on the 1 12 Resignation of Patrick Hurley Conclusion MEDIATION 117 IV. MAO'S RESPONSE TO THE MARSHALL 1 11 The Dilemma of the Marshall Mediation Moscow's Two-Sided Policy in Manchuria * Marshall's Mediation 21 Mao and his CCP Colleagues' Response to Competition for Manchuria vii Open Split between the CCP and Ma 130 Manipulate the CCP and the People for a Civil War 139 The Intermediate Zone and the Two Camps Theories 141 Conclusion 142 V. THE FAILURE OF ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 148 The Parallel of Acheson's Disengagement Policy and his Open Anti-CCP Stance 148 Mao Was Determined to Squeeze the United States out of China 155 Mao's American Strategy in the Liberation War 167 Mao Insisted on Establishing a Strategic Partnership with the USSR 169 Conclusion 175 VI. WHY MAO MADE THE DECISION TO ENTER THE KOREAN WAR 178 A Reluctant Response to Kim II Sung's Initiation of the Korean War 178 Difficult Decision 189 Conclusion 211 VII. CONCLUSION 216 The National Independence Movement vs. the Cold War 216 The Confrontation between the Two Different Concepts of National Security 219 Mao's American Strategy 221 BIBLIOGRAPHY 226 viii CHAPTER I A REVIEW OF THE SCHOLARSHIP ON MAO'S FOREIGN POLICY AND THE KOREAN WAR It has always been a perplexing as well as a controversial topic: why did China decide to enter the Korean War to challenge a seemingly insurmountable opponent? Bruce Cumings, the most prominent American historian of this conflict, having devoted well over a decade and some 1500 pages to studying its origins, could conclude as late as 1990 that "no one and everyone" was responsible: "Who started the Korean War? This question should not be asked." 1 John Lewis Gaddis also mentioned that "The reasons why are controversial, even today." However, it is the motivation of historians to study, understand and interpret a historical event no matter how complex it is. A thorough picture of the Korean War and different aspects and its origin may need to be drawn out with many people's efforts from question: in different times. Thus the author here is going to attempt to answer this Why did Mao Zedong decide to enter the Korean War to fight a seemingly undefeatable enemy? existing Generally speaking, there are five different answers to this question in the interpretation for its strong scholarship on the Korean War. This chapter will analyze each current scholarship on review of points and apparent problems. Based on the analysis of the subsequent chapters, to shed new recently declassified documents, the author aims, in armies into Korea. light on Mao's motives for dispatching his Princeton University Press, 1990), 1 1947-1950 (Princeton: Bruce Cummgs, The Roaring of the Cataract, ' 6 Clarendon Press, 1997). ? the Cold War History (Oxford: John Lewis Gaddis. We Now Know: Rethinking p.71. 1 1. Communist Expansion: the "Heroic Phase" of the Cold War The first well-known major interpretation of Mao's U.S. policy was developed in the 1950s, and was closely connected to the intense atmosphere of the Cold War. The outbreak of the Korean War, in President Harry Truman's eyes, occurred because "Communists have passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war." In Dean Acheson's words, "We are fighting 4 the second team, whereas the real enemy is the Soviet Union." Following this line almost all the scholarship, except for the books written by I. F. Stone and Melvin B. Voorhees, treated the war as a conspiracy between Moscow, Beijing and Pyongyang to 5 expand the sphere of the Communist world. In this view, Moscow was the commander of this expansion, while Beijing and Pyongyang were the running dogs.