Zürcher Beiträge China and Eastern Europe, 1960S–1980S

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Zürcher Beiträge China and Eastern Europe, 1960S–1980S Research Collection Conference Proceedings China and Eastern Europe 1960s-1980s Proceedings of the International Symposium: Reviewing the History of Chinese-East European Relations from the 1960s to the 1980s, Beijing, 24-26 March 2004 Publication Date: 2004 Permanent Link: https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-004847336 Rights / License: In Copyright - Non-Commercial Use Permitted This page was generated automatically upon download from the ETH Zurich Research Collection. For more information please consult the Terms of use. ETH Library Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung Nr. 72 Xiaoyuan Liu and Vojtech Mastny (eds.) China and Eastern Europe, 1960s–1980s Proceedings of the International Symposium: Reviewing the History of Chinese–East European Relations from the 1960s to the 1980s Beijing, 24–26 March 2004 Hrsg.: Andreas Wenger Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik der ETH Zürich Inhaltsverzeichnis Preface 5 The Editors 7 Opening Session 19 Session One: Chinese–Eastern European Relations within the Context of the Sino–Soviet Split 29 Session Two: China, Eastern Europe, and the Vietnam War, 1964–1973 53 Session Three: The Effects of the Cultural Revolution on the Relations between China and Eastern Europe, 1966–1969 81 Session Four: Chinese–Eastern European Relations after Czechoslovakia and the Sino–Soviet Border Clashes, 1968–1972 101 Session Five The Impact of the Sino–American Rapprochement on Chinese–Eastern European Relations, 1968–1972 131 Session Six: The Mutual Effects of the Reforms in China and Eastern Europe, 1978–1989 147 Session Seven: The Road to Normalization in Chinese–Eastern European Relations, 1976–1989 173 Roundtable Discussion 195 Closing Session 221 3 Preface On 24–26 March 2004, the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP) held an international seminar on “Reviewing Relations between China and East European Countries from the 1960s to the 1980s” in Beijing. Of particular interest were topics such as the security implications of the US-Chinese rapprochement, China’s policies toward the Warsaw Pact and NATO, Soviet perceptions of China as an ally of the West, bilateral rela- tions between China and the member states of the Warsaw Pact other that the Soviet Union, and Sino-Albanian relations. The seminar brought together a selected group of Chinese and East European officials who were involved in the mutual relations as diplomats or party officials in the 1960–80s. The conference was organized by the Party History Research Center of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Parallel History Project, in cooperation with the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the George Washington University Cold War Group (GWCW), both in Washington, DC, and the Cold War Studies Centre at the London School of Economics. It was the first time the Chinese Party History Research Center organized an international conference with a foreign partner. The conference proceedings will allow interested scholars and an interested wider public to follow the fascinating roundtable discussion of former Chi- nese and East European diplomats and Western and Chinese scholars. The Center for Security Studies launched the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP) in late 1998, together with the National Security Archive at George Washington University and the CWIHP, both in Washington, D.C. The aim of the project is to provide new scholarly per- spectives on contemporary international history by collecting and analyzing formerly secret governmental documents from both NATO and Eastern and Central European archives. Coordinated by Vojtech Mastny, Senior Fellow of the National Security Archive, the Parallel History Project evolved into an international consortium of more than twenty partners, bringing together leading Cold War histori- ans, archivists, and government officials. PHP researchers have collected thousands of pages of material on security related issues from the Cold War period. They present their findings to the academic community at conferences 5 and through print and online publications. The PHP has organized several major international conferences on war planning and intra-bloc tensions. On its website (www.isn.ethz.ch/php), the PHP has published a large number of online documents on central issues such as mutual threat perceptions and alliance management, including a collection on “China, the Warsaw Pact, and Sino-Soviet Relations under Khrushchev and Mao” (October 2002). The Center for Security Studies is very pleased to publish the English version of these important proceedings in its series “Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung”. Its Chinese version is available in full-text on the PHP website. October 2004 Prof. Dr. Andreas Wenger Director of the Center for Security Studies (CSS) 6 The Editors Xiaoyan Liu ([email protected]) is Associate Professor of History at Iowa State University at Ames. A specialist in Chinese nationalism, ethnic con- flicts in Chinese Central Asia, Chinese- American relations, and East Asian international history, he is the author of Frontier Passages: Ethnopolitics and the Rise of Chinese Communism, 1921–1945 (Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 2004). Vojtech Mastny ([email protected]) is a Senior Fellow at the National Security Archive in Washington and PHP coordinator. A specialist in Euro- pean international history, he has been professor at Columbia University, University of Illinois, US Naval War College, Boston University, and the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. His The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (Oxford University Press, 1996) was the winner of the American Historical Association’s 1997 George L. Beer Prize. The proceedings of the seminar, conducted in English and in Chinese, were recorded on tapes and interpreted simultaneously. In addition, a Chinese stenographic record was taken. Xiaoyuan Liu transcribed the English parts from the tapes and translated as well as transcribed the remaining parts of the proceedings from the stenographic record. Vojtech Mastny edited the transcribed text. The Chinese stenographic record of the proceedings is available on the PHP website, www.isn.ethz.ch/php. 7 Beijing Seminar on China and Eastern Europe in the 1960–80s The PHP held its second major international conference on March 24–26, 2004, in Beijing, under the title “Reviewing Relations between China and East European Countries from the 1960s to the 1980s” (see Program). Orga- nized jointly with the Party History Research Center of the Central Commit- tee of the Chinese Communist Party, the seminar brought together former Chinese and East European diplomats for a roundtable discussion with Western and Chinese scholars. The London School of Economics Cold War Studies Centre, Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wil- son International Center for Scholars (CWIHP) and the George Washington University Cold War Group (GWCW) were the cooperating institutions. In the early stages of the preparation, the Modern History Research Center and Archives and the School of International Relations, both at Peking University, had also been involved. The seminar was the first time the Chinese Party History Research Center organized an international conference with a foreign partner. One of the participating Chinese diplomats commented that “When I first heard of the proposed seminar I could not believe my ears.” The goal was to engage in a structured and focused open discussion aimed at identifying, analyz- ing, and interpreting the main issues of the relations between China and the Soviet Union’s Warsaw Pact allies during their most turbulent period, as remembered by veteran diplomats from both sides. The seminar achieved that goal beyond expectations. The discussion, arranged chronologically, was moderated by Professor Odd Arne Westad, of the London School of Economics, and Zhang Baijia, Senior Research Fellow at the Party History Research Center and director of its Third Research Department (responsible for research on the period since 1978). The Chinese side was represented by seven former ambassadors, the East Euro- pean side by three former ambassadors and three other high-ranking diplomats (see List of Participants). The countries involved were Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania. No suitable participant could be located in former Czechoslovakia. 9 In advance of the seminar, the National Security Archive had prepared a CD with a selection of declassified US documents on the American-Chinese rapprochement in the 1970s.1 A further selection of documents, obtained by the PHP from former East German, Czechoslovak, and Romanian archives, had been posted on the PHP website, www.isn.ethz.ch/php;2 a few had been translated with support from the CWIHP, with more translations to be added later. Numerous additional documents had been made available by the GWCW at its landmark November 2003 conference in Budapest, of which the Beijing seminar has been described as a “most perfect follow-up.” Although no new Chinese archival documents had become available for the years covered by the seminar its coincidence with the unprecedented release by the Chinese foreign ministry of about 30% of its records up to 1955 augured well for the future. The proceedings of the seminar were recorded in both Chinese and Eng- lish. Both versions are published on the PHP website.
Recommended publications
  • Cuban Missile Crisis JCC: USSR
    asdf PMUNC 2015 Cuban Missile Crisis JCC: USSR Chair: Jacob Sackett-Sanders JCC PMUNC 2015 Contents Chair Letter…………………………………………………………………...3 Introduction……………….………………………………………………….4 Topics of Concern………………………...………………….………………6 The Space Race…...……………………………....………………….....6 The Third World...…………………………………………......………7 The Eastern Bloc………………………………………………………9 The Chinese Communists…………………………………………….10 De-Stalinization and Domestic Reform………………………………11 Committee Members….……………………………………………………..13 2 JCC PMUNC 2015 Chair’s Letter Dear Delegates, It is my great pleasure to give you an early welcome to PMUNC 2015. My name is Jacob, and I’ll be your chair, helping to guide you as you take on the role of the Soviet political elites circa 1961. Originally from Wilmington, Delaware, at Princeton I study Slavic Languages and Literature. The Eastern Bloc, as well as Yugoslavia, have long been interests of mine. Our history classes and national consciousness often paints them as communist enemies, but in their own ways, they too helped to shape the modern world that we know today. While ultimately failed states, they had successes throughout their history, contributing their own shares to world science and culture, and that’s something I’ve always tried to appreciate. Things are rarely as black and white as the paper and ink of our textbooks. During the conference, you will take on the role of members of the fictional Soviet Advisory Committee on Centralization and Global Communism, a new semi-secret body intended to advise the Politburo and other major state organs. You will be given unmatched power but also faced with a variety of unique challenges, such as unrest in the satellite states, an economy over-reliant on heavy industry, and a geopolitical sphere of influence being challenged by both the USA and an emerging Communist China.
    [Show full text]
  • Foreign Visitors and the Post-Stalin Soviet State
    University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 2016 Porous Empire: Foreign Visitors And The oP st- Stalin Soviet State Alex Hazanov Hazanov University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Hazanov, Alex Hazanov, "Porous Empire: Foreign Visitors And The osP t-Stalin Soviet State" (2016). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 2330. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2330 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2330 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Porous Empire: Foreign Visitors And The oP st-Stalin Soviet State Abstract “Porous Empire” is a study of the relationship between Soviet institutions, Soviet society and the millions of foreigners who visited the USSR between the mid-1950s and the mid-1980s. “Porous Empire” traces how Soviet economic, propaganda, and state security institutions, all shaped during the isolationist Stalin period, struggled to accommodate their practices to millions of visitors with material expectations and assumed legal rights radically unlike those of Soviet citizens. While much recent Soviet historiography focuses on the ways in which the post-Stalin opening to the outside world led to the erosion of official Soviet ideology, I argue that ideological attitudes inherited from the Stalin era structured institutional responses to a growing foreign presence in Soviet life. Therefore, while Soviet institutions had to accommodate their economic practices to the growing numbers of tourists and other visitors inside the Soviet borders and were forced to concede the existence of contact zones between foreigners and Soviet citizens that loosened some of the absolute sovereignty claims of the Soviet party-statem, they remained loyal to visions of Soviet economic independence, committed to fighting the cultural Cold War, and profoundly suspicious of the outside world.
    [Show full text]
  • Mao and the 1956 Soviet Military
    ! ! !"#$"%&'()#$*+,$-"& .(#/&0122& & & & & 3%4&'()#$*+,$-"5&& & & & SHEN ZHIHUA & MAO AND THE 1956 SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN HUNGARY & & & & !"#$#%&''()*+,'#-./0)#%1) 2./)3456)7+%$&"#&%)8/9:'+;#:%)&%0);./)<:9#/;)=':>)?:+%;"#/-1)8/&>;#:%-)&%0) 8/*/">+--#:%-)) @0#;/0),()AB%:-)CD)8&#%/"E)F&;&'#%)<:G'&#) 2./)H%-;#;+;/)I:");./)7#-;:"():I);./)3456)7+%$&"#&%)8/9:'+;#:%E)7#-;:"#>&')J">.#9/-):I) ;./)7+%$&"#&%)<;&;/)</>+"#;(E)=+0&*/-;E)KLLM)) & 003Shenjo:Elrendezés 1 2007.11.11. 12:24 Oldal 24 SHEN ZHIHUA MAO AND THE 1956 SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN HUNGARY Sino-Soviet relations entered a honeymoon period when Khrushchev came to power. Friendship and cooperation were unimpaired despite worries on the part of Mao Zedong about some of Khrushchev’s actions at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In fact, Khrushchev’s bold criticism of Stalin suited Mao Zedong because it relieved some pressure on him. Generally speaking, the guiding principles of the 20th Congress of the CPSU were identical with those of the 8th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP),1 to whose views 24 Moscow attached great importance at the time. Pravda went so far as to translate into Russian and reprint a CCP article entitled “On the historical experience of proletarian dictatorship”, which was also issued as a pamphlet in Russian in 200 000 copies, for study by the whole party.2 When another CCP article, “More on the historical experience of proletarian dictatorship”, was published, Soviet radio used its star announcer
    [Show full text]
  • H-Diplo Essay 267- Shen Zhihua on Learning the Scholar's Craft
    H-Diplo H-Diplo Essay 267- Shen Zhihua on Learning the Scholar’s Craft: Reflections of Historians and International Relations Scholars Discussion published by George Fujii on Tuesday, September 15, 2020 H-Diplo Essay 267 Essay Series on Learning the Scholar’s Craft: Reflections of Historians and International Relations Scholars 15 September 2020 The Journey of Scholarship https://hdiplo.org/to/E267 Series Editor: Diane Labrosse | Production Editor: George Fujii Commissioning Editors: Sergey Radchenko and Yafeng Xia Translated for H-Diplo by Yafeng Xia Essay by Shen Zhihua, East China Normal University I turned seventy on April 20, 2020. There is an old saying in China: “A man seldom lives to be seventy years old.” You can’t help but sigh helplessly. It is not uncommon that old age clouds your memory. Perhaps, too, it is still too early to pass the final judgment on me. But when looking back, many things come vividly to my mind. And I frequently reflect on the road I took to become a scholar. Without exaggeration, I was successful in my youth. I am the same age as New China. My parents went to Yan’an in 1936-38, studied at the Anti-Japanese University[1] and joined the Eighth Route Army. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, they were both assigned to work at the Ministry of Public Security. I grew up within the compound of the Ministry of Public Security, which was diagonally opposite of Tiananmen Square at the time. As a descendant of revolution, I was very comfortable from an early age.
    [Show full text]
  • New China and Its Qiaowu: the Political Economy of Overseas Chinese Policy in the People’S Republic of China, 1949–1959
    1 The London School of Economics and Political Science New China and its Qiaowu: The Political Economy of Overseas Chinese policy in the People’s Republic of China, 1949–1959 Jin Li Lim A thesis submitted to the Department of International History of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, September 2016. 2 Declaration: I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 98,700 words. 3 Abstract: This thesis examines qiaowu [Overseas Chinese affairs] policies during the PRC’s first decade, and it argues that the CCP-controlled party-state’s approach to the governance of the huaqiao [Overseas Chinese] and their affairs was fundamentally a political economy. This was at base, a function of perceived huaqiao economic utility, especially for what their remittances offered to China’s foreign reserves, and hence the party-state’s qiaowu approach was a political practice to secure that economic utility.
    [Show full text]
  • Title of Thesis: ABSTRACT CLASSIFYING BIAS
    ABSTRACT Title of Thesis: CLASSIFYING BIAS IN LARGE MULTILINGUAL CORPORA VIA CROWDSOURCING AND TOPIC MODELING Team BIASES: Brianna Caljean, Katherine Calvert, Ashley Chang, Elliot Frank, Rosana Garay Jáuregui, Geoffrey Palo, Ryan Rinker, Gareth Weakly, Nicolette Wolfrey, William Zhang Thesis Directed By: Dr. David Zajic, Ph.D. Our project extends previous algorithmic approaches to finding bias in large text corpora. We used multilingual topic modeling to examine language-specific bias in the English, Spanish, and Russian versions of Wikipedia. In particular, we placed Spanish articles discussing the Cold War on a Russian-English viewpoint spectrum based on similarity in topic distribution. We then crowdsourced human annotations of Spanish Wikipedia articles for comparison to the topic model. Our hypothesis was that human annotators and topic modeling algorithms would provide correlated results for bias. However, that was not the case. Our annotators indicated that humans were more perceptive of sentiment in article text than topic distribution, which suggests that our classifier provides a different perspective on a text’s bias. CLASSIFYING BIAS IN LARGE MULTILINGUAL CORPORA VIA CROWDSOURCING AND TOPIC MODELING by Team BIASES: Brianna Caljean, Katherine Calvert, Ashley Chang, Elliot Frank, Rosana Garay Jáuregui, Geoffrey Palo, Ryan Rinker, Gareth Weakly, Nicolette Wolfrey, William Zhang Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Gemstone Honors Program, University of Maryland, 2018 Advisory Committee: Dr. David Zajic, Chair Dr. Brian Butler Dr. Marine Carpuat Dr. Melanie Kill Dr. Philip Resnik Mr. Ed Summers © Copyright by Team BIASES: Brianna Caljean, Katherine Calvert, Ashley Chang, Elliot Frank, Rosana Garay Jáuregui, Geoffrey Palo, Ryan Rinker, Gareth Weakly, Nicolette Wolfrey, William Zhang 2018 Acknowledgements We would like to express our sincerest gratitude to our mentor, Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • 2 the Reform of the Warsaw Pact
    Research Collection Working Paper Learning from the enemy NATO as a model for the Warsaw Pact Author(s): Mastny, Vojtech Publication Date: 2001 Permanent Link: https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-004148840 Rights / License: In Copyright - Non-Commercial Use Permitted This page was generated automatically upon download from the ETH Zurich Research Collection. For more information please consult the Terms of use. ETH Library Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung Nr.58 Vojtech Mastny Learning from the Enemy NATO as a Model for the Warsaw Pact Hrsg.: Kurt R. Spillmann und Andreas Wenger Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktanalyse der ETH Zürich CONTENTS Preface 5 Introduction 7 1 The Creation of the Warsaw Pact (1955-65) 9 2The Reform of the Warsaw Pact (1966-69) 19 3 The Demise of the Warsaw Pact (1969-91) 33 Conclusions 43 Abbreviations 45 Bibliography 47 coordinator of the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw PREFACE Pact (PHP), closely connected with the Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research (CSS) at the ETH Zürich. The CSS launched the PHP in 1999 together with the National Security Archive and the Cold War International History Project in Washington, DC, and the Institute of Military History, in Vienna. In 1955, the Warsaw Pact was created as a mirror image of NATO that could be negotiated away if favorable international conditions allowed Even though the Cold War is over, most military documents from this the Soviet Union to benefit from a simultaneous dissolution of both period are still being withheld for alleged or real security reasons.
    [Show full text]
  • Mike's Essay Template
    PEKING UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY IN QUEST OF MUSHROOM CLOUDS: PERSPECTIVES OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON STRATEGY FROM THE CHINESE SIDE BY JING ZHANG GRADUATE HISTORY WORKSHOP 27 NOVEMBER 2009 1 The declassification of Chinese foreign relations archives by the People‘s Republic of China‘s (PRC) Ministry of Foreign Affairs during 2004–8, which number more than 80,000 volumes from 1949 to 1965, sheds light on many hitherto unclear problems, the most interesting one to me being Chinese foreign policy before and after the Chinese detonation of a nuclear device on 16 October 1964.1 Since my dissertation is about U.S.–China rapprochement during Nixon presidency, 1969–72, this workshop paper is a stepping-stone in the process of designing my dissertation. Yet, it is closely tied to a general—and important— problem I want to explore and I hope resolve, and which I will talk about first. In the light of these newly available Chinese materials, my research interest or curiosity is enlightened by outstanding works by scholars like Evelyn Goh, Jeremi Suri, John Lewis Gaddis, Akira Iriye, Chen Jian, as well as Chinese scholars like Zhihua Shen, Dayong Niu, and Jun Niu. The different approaches used by these scholars, from orthodox realpolitik, to constructivism, to the new international history, coached me to be alert of some pitfalls in studying Cold War history and meanwhile to dig some holes. One possible pitfall concerns ideology itself. Compared to the traditional, revisionist and post-revisionist scholars, it is evident that the new Cold War historians emphasize the role of ideology in policymaking during the Cold War era.
    [Show full text]
  • Heretics of China. the Psychology of Mao and Deng
    HERETICS OF CHINA HERETICS OF CHINA THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MAO AND DENG NABIL ALSABAH URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-opus4-445061 DOI: https://doi.org/10.20378/irbo-44506 Copyright © 2019 by Nabil Alsabah Cover design by Katrin Krause Cover illustration by Daiquiri/Shutterstock.com All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the author, except for the use of brief quotations in a book review. ISBN: 978-1-69157-995-2 Created with Vellum During his years in power, Mao Zedong initiated three policies which could be described as radical departures from Soviet and Chinese Communist practice: the Hundred Flowers of 1956-1957, the Great Leap Forward 1958-1960, and the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1976. Each was a disaster: the first for the intellectuals, the second for the people, the third for the Party, all three for the country. — RODERICK MACFARQUHAR, THE SECRET SPEECHES OF CHAIRMAN MAO In many ways, [Deng Xiaoping’s] reputation is underestimated: while Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev oversaw the peaceful end of Soviet communist rule and the dismembering of the Soviet empire, he had wanted to keep the Soviet Union in place and reform it. Instead it fell apart; communism lost power—and Russia endured a decade of instability […]. Perhaps the most influential political titan of the late 20th century, Deng succeeded in guiding China towards his vision where his fellow communist leaders failed. — SIMON SEBAG MONTEFIORE, TITANS OF HISTORY CONTENTS Introduction ix 1.
    [Show full text]
  • The Impact of the People's Republic of China on The
    “They Wanted to Cut Off My Head”: The Impact of the People’s Republic of China on the Personality Cult of Kim Il Sung, 1956-1969 Zachary Charles Mulrenin Honolulu, Hawaii Bachelor of Arts, University of Nebraska at Omaha, 2018 A Thesis presented to the Graduate Faculty of the University of Virginia in Candidacy for the Degree of Master of Arts Department of East Asian Languages, Literatures, and Cultures University of Virginia December, 2020 1 Introduction The 1960s were a turbulent decade for North Korea, as it was pulled in both directions during the height of the Sino-Soviet split, contended with a new authoritarian Park Chung-hee regime in the South, and Mao’s Cultural Revolution to the North strained the Sino-North Korean relationship. Amidst these challenges, Kim Il Sung’s personality cult underwent some major changes, taking on the extreme form that is recognizable today. Some of these changes include the introduction of the Monolithic Ideological System, promotion of Juche as the state ideology, and the near-deification of Kim Il Sung himself. Most works overwhelmingly focus on Stalinist influence on North Korean society, including the Kim personality cult. While Stalinism undoubtedly had an enormous influence on North Korea, it was not necessarily the sole influence. This thesis examines how Sino-North Korean relations also influenced the development of Kim Il Sung’s personality cult and culminated in its sudden intensification in the mid-1960s. Kim Il Sung felt a palpable threat from China during the mid-1960s when Sino- North Korean relations were at their lowest point, and there was a historical precedent for Kim to have felt threatened by China.
    [Show full text]
  • Czechoslovak Reply to Warsaw Meeting's Criticisms. Mr. Dubcek's Assurances of Continuation of Democratic Reforms
    Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives), Volume 14, August, 1968 Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovak, Page 22888 © 1931-2006 Keesing's Worldwide, LLC - All Rights Reserved. Czechoslovak Reply to Warsaw Meeting's Criticisms. Mr. Dubcek's Assurances of Continuation of Democratic Reforms. - Soviet Demand for Meeting of Czechoslovak and Soviet Politburos. - Continuation of Soviet “Nerve War” against Czechoslovakia. A reasoned, point-by-point reply to the criticisms of the Communist Parties represented at Warsaw was made on July 18 by the presidium of the central committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. On the same day Mr. Dubcek, the First Secretary of the party, gave an assurance in a radio and television broadcast that there would be no retreat from the democratic reforms begun since January. Declaring that “we want our socialism deeply anchored in the minds of the people,” Mr. Dubcek said that after many years “an atmosphere has been created in this country in which everyone can publicly, without fear, express his opinion openly and with dignity.” While emphasizing that Czechoslovakia remained loyal to the Warsaw Pact and that there was no danger of the Czechoslovak Communist Party losing its leading position in the country, Mr. Dubcek stressed that “we shall finish the democratic process we have begun” and “shall not permit any return to the pre-January situation.” In its reply to the “ Warsaw letter,” the Czechoslovak Communist Party denied that any serious threat had arisen to its position or authority; reiterated Czechoslovakia's loyalty to the Warsaw Pact and to the socialist community; pointed out inter alia that the Communist Party, the Government, and the National Front had rejected the “2,000 Words” document; declared that the overwhelming majority of the Czechoslovak people favoured the abolition of censorship and supported free expression of opinion; and said that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was trying to give a different leadership than that of the “discredited bureaucratic-police methods” of the past.
    [Show full text]
  • History, Grand Strategy and NATO Enlargement 145 History, Grand Strategy And
    History, Grand Strategy and NATO Enlargement 145 History, Grand Strategy and NATO Enlargement ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ John Lewis Gaddis Some principles of strategy are so basic that when stated they sound like platitudes: treat former enemies magnanimously; do not take on unnecessary new ones; keep the big picture in view; balance ends and means; avoid emotion and isolation in making decisions; be willing to acknowledge error. All fairly straightforward, one might think. Who could object to them? And yet – consider the Clinton administration’s single most important foreign-policy initiative: the decision to expand NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. NATO enlargement, I believe, manages to violate every one of the strategic principles just mentioned. Perhaps that is why historians – normally so contentious – are in uncharacteristic agreement: with remarkably few exceptions, they see NATO enlargement as ill-conceived, ill-timed, and above all ill-suited to the realities of the post-Cold War world. Indeed I can recall no other moment in my own experience as a practising historian at which there was less support, within the community of historians, for an announced policy position. A significant gap has thus opened between those who make grand strategy and those who reflect upon it: on this issue at least, official and accumulated wisdom are pointing in very different directions. This article focuses on how this has happened, which leads us back to a list of basic principles for grand strategy. First, consider the magnanimous treatment of defeated adversaries. There are three great points of reference here – 1815–18, 1918–19 and 1945–48 – and historians are in general accord as to the lessons to be drawn from each.
    [Show full text]