PEKING UNIVERSITY

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

IN QUEST OF MUSHROOM CLOUDS:

PERSPECTIVES OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON STRATEGY

FROM THE CHINESE SIDE

BY

JING ZHANG

GRADUATE HISTORY WORKSHOP

27 NOVEMBER 2009 1

The declassification of Chinese foreign relations archives by the People‘s Republic of

China‘s (PRC) Ministry of Foreign Affairs during 2004–8, which number more than 80,000 volumes from 1949 to 1965, sheds light on many hitherto unclear problems, the most interesting one to me being Chinese foreign policy before and after the Chinese detonation of a nuclear device on 16 October 1964.1 Since my dissertation is about U.S.–China rapprochement during Nixon presidency, 1969–72, this workshop paper is a stepping-stone in the process of designing my dissertation. Yet, it is closely tied to a general—and important— problem I want to explore and I hope resolve, and which I will talk about first.

In the light of these newly available Chinese materials, my research interest or curiosity is enlightened by outstanding works by scholars like Evelyn Goh, Jeremi Suri, John Lewis

Gaddis, Akira Iriye, Chen Jian, as well as Chinese scholars like Zhihua Shen, Dayong Niu, and Jun Niu. The different approaches used by these scholars, from orthodox realpolitik, to constructivism, to the new international history, coached me to be alert of some pitfalls in studying Cold War history and meanwhile to dig some holes.

One possible pitfall concerns ideology itself. Compared to the traditional, revisionist and post-revisionist scholars, it is evident that the new Cold War historians emphasize the role of ideology in policymaking during the Cold War era. Yet sometimes their overemphasizing of ideology makes for a misreading of historical materials. In addition, especially when explaining Chinese foreign policy after 1949, I feel that clearly distinguishing and defining ideology, and the basic needs or goals of the nation-state according to its stage of development are important.

1. All the Chinese materials for this paper were collected from the declassified archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the published writings and Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, the governmental biographies of Mao and Zhou that used documents still classified to the public, the memoirs of Chinese officials, and official newspapers like Ren Min Ri Bao. 2

The holes that I want to dig will reveal that Beijing‘s rapprochement with Washington since the late 1960s was well suited to the Chinese leadership‘s long pursuit of basic nation- state goals, which they had failed to realize in the unequal relationship between the PRC and the USSR. The Chinese goals were: security, including both economic and military aspects; the acknowledgement of Chinese ideology, institution, and government by the international society; and the PRC‘s equality, dignity, and status in the world order. U.S.–China rapprochement was not a cause and effect process, but rather a historical process in which personal, national, material, and psychological factors applied, and forces such as domestic politics, struggles within the Communist bloc, and strength in the international world interacted during the two decades before 1969. How, for example, did China‘s physical development affect its leaders‘ psychological condition, and thus their policy towards the

U.S., to be specific, U.S.–China rapprochement? So, this is my general thinking, in light of which, with the rich and newly declassified materials from the Chinese side, I intend to focus only on the military security aspect, specifically, the nuclear detonation in 1964.

In the thirty odd years since China exploded its first atomic bomb, on 16 October 1964, some of the mysteries shrouding the history of the Chinese nuclear weapons program have been cleared away. Scholarly research has shed light on the Soviet Union‘s nuclear policy,2

Soviet aid to the Chinese nuclear industry,3 the development of Chinese nuclear weapons, and

2. Yuri Sminov and Vladislav Zubok, ―Nuclear Weapon after Stalin‘s Death: Moscow Enters the H-Bomb Age,‖ Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 4, Fall 1994, pp. 14–18; David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994); Mark Kramer, ―Documenting the Early Soviet Nuclear Program,‖ Cold War International History Project Bulletin, 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 266–71; John Lewis Gaddi, ed., Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 3. Viktor M. Gobarev, ―Soviet Policy Toward China: Developing Nuclear Weapons 1949–1969,‖ in The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 12:4 (December 1999), pp. 1–53. Dai Chao-Wu, ―Zhongguo Hewuqi de Fazhan Yu Zhong Su guanxi de Polie (1954-1962)‖ (The Development of China‘s Nuclear Weapons and the Rupture of Sino-Soviet Relations (1954—1962)), in Contemporary China History Studies, 3 (2001), pp. 76–85; Vol.5, 2001, pp. 62–72. Shen Zhihua, ―Sulian dui Zhongguo de Hewuqi Yanzhi de Yuanzhu yu Xianzhi‖ (Soviet

3

Chinese nuclear strategy.4 In addition to this body of excellent scholarship, a number of interesting memoirs relating to the Chinese nuclear project have been published in the last few years, adding to our knowledge of this dimension of the PRC‘s military and technological history.5 The same degree of attention, however, has eluded questions regarding the connection between the making of the bomb and developments in Chinese foreign policy. The issues of the Chinese leadership‘s perception of the strategic role of nuclear weapons,6 and the interaction between Chinese nuclear strategy and foreign policymaking after China‘s first nuclear detonation have yet to be investigated in depth.7

Aid to and Constraining of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Research and Production), in Zhong Su Guanxi Shigang, 1917-1991 (The History of Sino-Soviet Relations, 1917-1991), ed. Shen Zhihua (Beijing: XinHua Press, 2007), pp. 177-206. 4. John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988). 5. Li Jue, Lei Rongtian, Li Yi, and Li Yingxiang, chief eds., Dangdai Zhongguo de Hegongye (The Nuclear Industry of Contemporary China) (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1987). Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen Huiyilu (Memoirs of Nie Rongzhen, 3 Volumes) (Beijing: The PLA Press, 1982). Nie Rongzhen Zhuanji (Biography of Nie Rongzhen) (Beijing: Contemporary China Press, 1994). Zhou Junlun ed., Nie Rongzhen Nianpu (The Chronicle of Nie Rongzhen) (Beijing: People Press, 1990). 6. Strictly speaking, the nuclear weapon concludes three parts that are atomic warhead, delivery means, and commanding system. Commonly, atomic warhead can be substituted with nuclear setting and nuclear weapon. In 1950s and 1960s, the nuclear weapon can also be called as the top weapon or nuclear technology of national defense. 7. The materials that John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai draw heavily upon include Memoirs of Nie Rongzhen and open sources like Renmin Ribao (People‘s Daily), Xinhua Yuekan (New China Monthly), and Hong Qi (Red Flag), all of which were all published before 1988. In terms of the China decision to build the atomic bomb, the authors point out that the events in Korea, Indochina, and the Taiwan Strait, constituted the proximate cause of the Chinese decision to build a national strategic force. These events galvanized the leadership to act in the winter of 1954-1955 and lent special urgency to strategic weapons development in the decade thereafter. They also think that during 1963 and 1964, Chinese nuclear strategy was intended to complement China‘s international struggle, that is, they think that the atomic test was a manifestation of China‘s prevailing international line. See China Builds the Bomb, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988, p.35, pp.195-196. With regard to Mao Zedong‘s strategic thinking and his perception of nuclear weapons, see Shu Guang Zhang, ―China‘s Strategic Culture and the Cold War Confrontations‖, in Reviewing The Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory, ed. Odd Arne Westad, London, Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000, pp.258-277; Shu Guang Zhang, ―Between ‗Paper‘ and ‗Real Tigers‘: Mao‘s View of Nuclear Weapons‖, in Cold War Statesman Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomac since 1945, ed. John Lewis Gaddis, Philip H. Gordon, Ernest R. May, and Jonathan Rosenberg (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 194–215. 4

On 16 October 1964, China successfully exploded its first atomic bomb. Scholars have done extensive researches on Soviet Union‘s assistance to the Chinese nuclear industry and the process of China developing its nuclear weapons. In analyzing Chinese nuclear strategy, they emphasize the security aspect, especially the influence of the Korean War, Taiwan Strait

Crisis, and the Vietnam War. Through examining the published collections of more than one decade, and the newly declassified documents from the Archives of Chinese Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, this paper argues first, that there were altered as well as unchanged aspects of the Chinese leadership‘s perceptions toward nuclear weapons; second, Chinese nuclear strategy was an ―active defense,‖ which is not difficult to understand, although the reasons, in addition to the security concerns, were more complicated; third, from the comparison between foreign policy after the nuclear detonation and foreign and domestic policy in the past thirty years, I will make some important reflections on the meaning of nuclear weapons to the PRC‘s sixty years of development.

“From Mockeries of the Paper Tiger to the Quest for Nuclear Clouds”

By analyzing Mao‘s sentence, ―The atomic bomb is nothing without the struggle of the people,‖ and his critiques on conferring primacy to the role of arms in settling conflicts, which he dubbed ―Weapon-ism‖ in 1945 after the two U.S. atomic bombs fell on Japan, I explain that Mao‘s contempt towards the atomic bomb and emphasis on his People‘s War arose from his voluntaristic philosophy that human individuals could play what he called ―a conscious dynamic role‖ in shaping the course of history, and hence should not be dismissed as mere posturing. He believed that ―Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is the people, not things, that are decisive. The contest of strength is not only a contest of military and economic powers, but also a contest of human power and 5

human will. Military and economic power is necessarily wielded by people.‖ 8 The people,

Mao believed, were the true source of decisive might in war.9 ―To decide the outcome, subjective efforts must be added, namely, the directing and waging of the war, man's conscious dynamic role in war.‖10 This is the basis for comprehending Mao‘s famous ―paper tiger.‖ slogan. On 6 August 1948, Mao said to American journalist Anna Louise Strong,

―The atomic bomb is a paper tiger used by the American reactionaries in scaring people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn‘t. Of course, the atomic bomb is a weapon of mass slaughter, but the outcome of a war is decided by people, not by one or two new types of weapons. In appearance, reactionaries are terrifying, but in reality they are not so powerful. From a long- term point of view, it is not the reactionaries but the people who are really powerful.‖

After the American bombing of Hiroshima, dark clouds of civil war were hanging over the CCP. In the face of a lopsided balance of power between military power of the CCP and

Guomindang (GMD), many CCP cadres voiced fear for the prospects of their party, especially in light of the awesome power of the atomic bomb. They expressed pessimism over the outcome of struggle with the GMD11 and even doubts about Mao‘s assertion that

―the American imperialism is a paper tiger.‖ In order to push back against this widespread gloom within the party, Mao mobilized the entire party leadership to engage in an exercise of what he called ―strategically taking the enemy lightly,‖ which in practice involved critiquing

―Weapon-ism‖ and stressing the importance of relying on the people in political study sessions. Mao‘s critique of ―Weapon-ism,‖ emphasis on the role of human will, and doctrine

8. Mao Zedong, ―On Protracted War,‖ 26 May to 3 June 1938, (毛泽东：《论持久战》，1938年5月26日至6月3日), MZJW II, p.297. 9. Ibid, p.340. 10. Ibid, p.306. 11. Luo Ronghuan, ―General Report on Political Work,‖ 24 January 1948 (罗荣桓：《政治工作综合报告》1948年1月24日)，LRJW, p. 394. 6

of People‘s War influenced the CCP leadership‘s perception of nuclear weapons. If the nuclear weapon was a ―paper tiger‖ then why should China bother to build one? That is to ask, what was Chinese nuclear strategy?

In the leaderships‘ perspective, building nuclear weapons was not merely a military issue but also a political matter of challenging the imperialists‘ nuclear deterrence. This perception was based upon the dialectic relationship between man and weapon, as Mao said.

It was also the premise for exploring the Chinese nuclear strategy of ―active defense,‖ which was formed in the revolution period. ―Active defense‖ was a defense of attacking. As Zhou

Enlai said cryptically, ―Defense is the best attack, and attack is the best defense.‖ ―If you are well prepared for the attack, they will not [attack you]; if you are not prepared, they will bully you.‖

Thus, I would like to emphasize two points: First, even though China built the bomb,

Mao‘s belief in the People‘s War and his strategic attitude of contempt towards the nuclear weapon did not change too much. He believed that once America launched a war towards

China, then the Chinese ―millet plus rifles‖ approach would ultimately defeat the American

―airplanes plus atomic bombs‖ strategy, because ―all people in the world will support us.‖

―The U.S. nuclear blackmail is not able to scare Chinese people.‖ Still, as he recalled his feelings of watching the newsreel of a Soviet nuclear test in 1950 in his first trip to Moscow, he admitted that, ―the trip to the Soviet Union greatly widened my view! It seemed that the atomic bomb could ally many people. The U.S. has it and so does the USSR. We can also make some!‖ This remark shows a subtle update of his view. He had now decided that although it was proper to hold the enemy in contempt strategically, one should take him seriously on a tactical level: ―That is to say, on an aggregate level, we should show contempt for the enemy; however, when it comes to individual concrete issues, we should give them 7

much careful thought.‖12 From mockeries of the paper tiger to the quest for nuclear clouds,

Mao‘s contempt for the nuclear weapon did not waver in strategic terms, although it changed on the tactical level.

Second, pursuance of the nuclear weapon also featured in the Chinese leaders‘ ambitious nationalist calculus. As the Western powers dramatically expanded their economic and military presence in Asia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Western concepts and ideas—above all Eurocentric views of international relations fed by social

Darwinist notions of racial competition and power politics—percolated through intellectual circles in China and increasingly took root in the hearts of many. The notion that ―those who lag behind get beaten (落后就要挨打)‖ became a widely shared article of faith on the ways of international politics.13 After a century of war and social and political convulsions, the economic and military weakness of China that was apparent to all at the dawn of the PRC greatly concerned its new leaders. Even though the notion that, ―those who lag behind get beaten,‖ derived from a Eurocentric fixation with making comparisons with the West, Mao‘s preoccupation with being bullied originated in his revolutionary nationalism.14 After the baptism of a bloody war in Korea, military backwardness and especially the fact that China did not possess an atomic bomb was a source of interminable anguish and anxiety for Mao.

12. Mao Zedong, ―All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers,‖ 18 November 1957 (毛泽东：《一切反动派都是纸老虎》1957年11月18日), MZJW VI, pp. 371–72. 13. Xiang Lanxin, Tradition and Foreign Relations: An Assessment of the Ideological Background of US- China Relations, (相蓝欣：《传统与对外关系——兼评中美关系的意识形态背景》) (Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2007), pp. 18–25. 14. On 25 April 1956, Mao delivered a speech on the relationship between economic construction and national defense at the Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee, in which he employed the notion that―those who lag behind get beaten‖ to demonstrate the urgency of developing the atomic bomb. He said: ―In today‘s world, if we do not want to be bullied and wish to survive, then we cannot do without it.‖ See Mao Zedong, ―On the Relationship Between Economic Construction and National Defense‖, April 25, 1956 (《经济建设和国防建设的关系》1956年4月25日), MZJW VI, pp. 365–66. Examples of conversations with foreign leaders in which Mao expressed similar sentiments will be discussed in the part III. 8

At the same National Defense Committee meeting mentioned above, he noted how ―China is a huge country, but its industry is not as good as those of Holland [and] Belgium, [and] its automotive industry is not as good as Denmark‘s.……At present we can make neither tanks nor automobiles nor large caliber cannons nor tractors. We had better tuck our tail away

[between our legs].‖15 A backward country would be looked down upon by others (看不起).

Breaking away from the images of old China, ―impecunious, dirty, dingy, backward, and barbaric,‖ was always a driving force for the Chinese leadership to catch up with advanced countries. The first thing was to reduce the gap on technology, in which the A-bomb, the H- bomb, and the launch vehicle were vanguards.

At the CCP‘s Eighth Party Congress in September 1956, turning China from a backward agrarian country into an advanced socialist industrial country was confirmed as the fundamental goal of the national economic policy. It was also envisioned that after about three five-year plans China would have created an industrial system capable of producing advanced weaponry, including atomic bombs, missiles, and long-range aircraft.16 Thus, from this point forward, the construction of atomic bombs and missiles became an integral part of the commanding national policy.

The success of Chinese nuclear detonation exalted Chinese leadership‘s confidence of

―catching up with and surpassing the advanced world levels,‖ and developing China into ―a powerful modernized socialist country.‖ After the detonation, for the first time Zhou Enlai put forward the goal of ―Four Modernizations‖ in his annual Government Work Report of

15. Mao Zedong, ―Talk Given at the First Session of the Conference of the National Defense Committee,‖,ibid., pp. 359–60. 16. Zhou Enlai, ibid, p .232. 15 October 1957, China and Soviet Union signed the New Defense Technology Accord, under which the Soviet Union would assist China to build a synthesized nuclear industry and atomic bombs. See Shen Zhihua, The Aid to and Control of China’s Nuclear Weapon Research and Production by the USSR (―苏联 对中国的核武器研制的援助与限制‖), in The History of Sino-Soviet Relations (1917- 1991)（中苏关系史纲 (1917-1991), ed. Shen Zhihua (Beijing: XinHua Press, 2007), p. 193. 9

1964. He asked rhetorically, ―Haven‘t we detonated an atomic bomb? Haven‘t we cast away the name of ‗sick man of East Asia‘? Why cannot the Eastern proletariats obtain the achievement that the western bourgeoisies have got?‖ His questions stressed that solving the fundamental problem of no longer ―crawling behind others‖ was to develop top technologies and to realize his Four Modernizations. In addition to pursuing the progress of technology, the successful nuclear test also encouraged leaders‘ pride, confidence, and the belief that

―history is righteous,‖ as Foreign Minster Chen Yi out it in a poem and private letter to his brother.

It was the common wish of Chinese leaders in the 1950s and 1960s to secure international recognition through nuclear weapons. In a meeting of the Central Military

Commission on 21 June 1958, Mao said ―we will build a few atomic bombs and H-bombs,‖ because even though they were ―things of [only] this big, if you do not have them, people will say what you words do not count [说话不算数].‖17 Although the immediate catalysts that galvanized the Chinese leadership to strengthen the country‘s national defense were the events in Korea, Indochina, and Taiwan Strait,18 it was a more fundamental quest that was driving them to develop nuclear weapons: as a newly established nation-state, China desired diplomatic recognition, respect by the international society, and a status equal to those of other nations in the world.19 Nuclear weapons would allow China to obtain these and also prestige as a major power.

17. Mao Zedong, ―To Build A Bit Of Atomic Bombs‖, June 21, 1958 (毛泽东：《要搞一点原子弹氢弹》1958年6月21日), MZJW VI, p. 374. 18. John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, p. 35. 19. As Shu Guang Zhang pointed, from the moment Mao proclaimed that ‗the Chinese people have stood up‘, he was determined to restore China to its rightful place as an important member of the society of states, and aspired to redress the balance in the international system. Beijing has been preoccupied with how it can restore international respect for new China. Shu Guang Zhang, ―China‘s Strategic Culture and the Cold War Confrontations,‖ p. 266, p. 273. 10

Chinese Nuclear Strategy

In regard to the thesis I will present in my dissertation, the first point I would like to make is that in the view of China‘s military and political leaders, building nuclear weapons was not merely a military issue but also a political move to resist nuclear intimidation by the imperialists. In 1963, Nie Rongzhen told industrial and military leaders that, ―We should use it as a political weapon to break the enemy‘s nuclear monopoly and counter his blackmails, and to strengthen our spirit and dismay his [长自己的志气，灭敌人的威风]. As for the military function [of nuclear weapons], our government has announced to the world that we are a socialist country and we will not be the first to use atomic bombs at anytime and under any circumstances, no matter how many of them we have. We do not rely on the atomic bomb as a solution to the problem of war, nor do we rely on it as a solution to the problems of battles and fighting.‖20 This emphasis on the political rather than military significance of nuclear weapons arose from a dialectical understanding of the relationship between man and weapon, an idea on which the Chinese leadership had insisted all along. As Zhou Enlai stated, ―Our strategic thinking should be built on the basis of solidarity with and the development of socialist forces and the people‘s power; only then shall we be able to overcome imperialism rather than beg for peace and ask the enemy in supplication to lay down his arms.‖21 Grasping the leadership‘s emphasis on the political rather than military significance of nuclear weapons is a sine qua non of analyzing China‘s nuclear strategy in relation to two factors: the strategy of ―active defense,‖ which took form during the civil war period, and the Chinese leadership‘s perception of their own country as a socialist state with

20. Ye Jianying, ―Further Improve the Quality of Military Training,‖ ibid., pp. 613–14. 21. Zhou Enlai, ―People‘s Army and People‘s War,‖ 7 October 1962 (周恩来：《人民军队与人民战争》1962年10月7日), ZEJW IV, pp. 438–39. 11

abundant resources and a large population, ingredients of power that compared favorably with those of the rival imperialist camp.

There are a number of goals that any newly born nation-state would pursue: casting off the image of being poor and backward, catching up with the advanced countries, implementing modernization, ensuring national security, and acquiring equal status and respect in the international society. In the case of China, there was the additional factor in historical memory of ―lagging behind and getting beaten [落后就要挨打].‖ The Chinese leaders‘ conception of international relations was further influenced by their self image as a peace-loving socialist country, and their perception that capitalist countries were imperialist and aggressive. From this perspective, China was driven not only by physical security concerns to build the nuclear bomb. Other arguably deeper and longer-standing motivations, such as the revolutionary ideals of the Chinese leaders, a desire for international recognition and prestige, and a yearning for modernization, all played a role in the Chinese decision to embark on their quest for the mushroom clouds.

Nuclear Weapons and Chinese Foreign Policy in the Late 1960s

After the detonation, foreign responses were reported to the Chinese Ministry of

Foreign Affairs. Chinese diplomatic outposts around the world submitted many reports on local reactions to the Chinese Foreign Ministry after the first Chinese nuclear detonation.

Some of these foreign voices were outright hostile, others said the bomb test was not unexpected and deprecated it as a ―primitive device,‖ while yet others were positively effusive.22 Amid this cacophony of gibes, criticisms, and adulation, however, I discern a common set of concerns, the most important being the impact that Chinese possession of

22. ―British response to Our Nuclear Detonation (telegrams from the Chinese charge d'affaires in Britain)‖(《英国对我爆炸原子弹的反映（我驻英国代办处报回有关电）》), File No.: 110-01697-05, Dates: 1964.10.17- 1964.12.15, 22 pp., p.1. ACMFA. 12

nuclear weapons would have on world affairs and China‘s international status, especially in regard to admission to the United Nation.

How did Chinese leaders react to these international responses? Available sources suggest that they had hardly any impact on their perception of the international situation and of Chinese national security requirements. From the materials I have studied, it seemed there was no any easy change in the leadership‘s perceptions towards national security situations.

Even though Foreign Minister Chen Yi said in a press conference that the making of Chinese foreign policy would not change because of the nuclear weapon, the leadership‘s attitudes on resuming China‘s seat in UN, on disarmament, and on the prohibition of nuclear weapons were becoming even tougher.

Impact of Nuclear Weapons on the Sixty-year History of the PRC

On 3 August 1965 in his conversation with Mao, the French minister of culture André

Malraux asked, ―If China wants to be a power of Chinese style, what do you need?‖ Mao‘s answer was very short and clear: ―Time, at least several decades. We also need friends.‖

Fourteen years later in 1978, after the initial nuclear detonation, two events changed modern

Chinese history, the first being the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Communist Party of China

Central Committee, in which the ―reform and open-up‖ policy was declared, and the second being the publication of the Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the

People's Republic of China, which was the basic foundation of the establishment of diplomatic relationship between the two countries. During the past thirty years, nuclear weapons have guaranteed China not only national security but also the confidence and mentality as a responsible country in the world. With the consolidation of national defense ability and the rise of international status, China‘s leaders changed their attitudes toward the international world, from overthrowing the established international order to actively 13

participating in international and multinational cooperation, especially on advancing the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

Zhang Baijia, a famous historian of CCP history, pointed out that China changed itself and influenced the world. I think this would be a better way to understand the nationalism and perseverance of the Chinese leadership, and their changing attitudes toward the international order. In 1988, Deng talked about the political and historical meaning of

Chinese nuclear weapons: ―If China neither had the atomic bombs and H-bombs in the 1960s nor launched the artificial satellite, China would neither be called an influential country nor have the international status as nowadays. The atomic bombs and H-bombs reflect one nation‘s ability and are symbols of a nation‘s prosperity.‖

Developing from a ―revolutionary country‖ to a responsible power that actively advocates nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and disarmament, the leadership has not merely been pursuing national security bur moreover modernization, national renaissance and honor, diplomatic independence, and recognition and respect by the international world.

CCP leaders built the nuclear bomb not only to protect China‘s physical security but also to advance their ideals, sentiments, and national self-esteem. These psychological and emotional needs, which were shaped by the comparison between China as a peace loving socialist country and Westerners as imperialist invaders, were more consistent motivations behind the quest for nuclear mushroom clouds.

In formulating these arguments, I am not defending China‘s development of nuclear weapons or justifying the nuclear problems in Iran and North Korea. I just want to emphasize that we have to understand the nationalist pursuance of these so-called ―axes of evils‖ or ―axes of upheaval‖ from the perspectives of history, culture, mentality, and from analyzing the basic needs of a nation-state in domestic and world arenas.