Command and Authority in the IDF: the Winograd Challenge

Command and Authority in the IDF: The Winograd Challenge

Gabriel Siboni

Whoever casts a discerning eye over the Winograd Commission interim report will uncover a mineﬁeld of puzzling questions. It would be enough to point to the conclusions of the Commission regarding decision making processes, which in most cases reﬂect a simplistic approach to the human and psychological processes embedded in a decision.1 Elsewhere in the report the Commission implicitly asserts its own position regarding the decisions that led Israel to the Second Lebanon War.2 However on one matter the Commission exceeds all boundaries – when it delivers its far- reaching pronouncement on the concept of the authority of command in the IDF. On this issue the Commission wrote: It is important to stress that the supreme loyalty of professionals must be to their profession and to their duties, not to their superiors or the organization they serve. To be sure, a commitment to superiors and commanders and to the organization in which a person works is an important component of the professional ethos. A measure of trust and faithfulness between people working together is essential to the proper functioning of any team or organization. It is always prefer- able to begin by alerting and deliberating within the organization by using accepted practices. However, when in the opinion of professionals the person in charge or the organization is acting in a manner liable to cause actual damage, they must warn others and not shy away from a confrontation with their superiors. In the event of serious damage that harbors dangerous consequences, it is the obligation of professionals to warn the higher echelons of authority.3

Gabrial Siboni, research associate at INSS

40 One must not minimize the importance of or the headquarters – instead of the person at internal discussion and dialogue within the the helm – at the center. This is by no means IDF, yet here the ruling of the Commission a question of semantics; it is a manifestation raises a significant challenge to future IDF of an ongoing process of the shedding of the commanders. This article seeks to examine personal responsibility of commanders in fa- the far-reaching implications of the Commis- vor of the fuzzy notion of organizational re- sion’s statements regarding authority of com- sponsibility or the headquarters’ responsibil- mand within the IDF. It will argue that the ity. Consequently, debates in the IDF and in Commission’s approach is extremely prob- the public discourse include statements such lematic, and if implemented, is liable to harm as, “The position of the army is…” or “The significantly the ability of the IDF to function air force’s position is…” and so forth. Yet the as an effective military organization. hierarchal structure of military command is One of the most basic foundations of by nature and in essence a personal hierar- Chief of Staff the military is the concept of command and chy that flows from the fundamental princi- Lt. Gen. Gabi chain of command. Obedience based on a ple of decentralized authority, from the chief Ashkenazi hierarchy of command is the cornerstone of of staff as commander of the army to subor- any military organization. As to the IDF, “an dinate commanders. As such, it decidedly ominous pattern has been evident for years: does not recognize the concept of authority command procedures in the IDF have be- and responsibility of organizations or head- come more and more like work procedures in quarters. Authority is personal and by na- bureaucratic civilian organizations, and less ture is sufficient to carry out a given task. In like those necessary in a military hierarchy the same vein responsibility is also personal. 4 environment.” Military culture demands Therefore the position of the head of the or- the existence of an official as the source of ganization or unit and his decisions instantly authority at any given time. It should al- determine the position of the command unit ways be remembered that the tasks imposed that assists him and are taken as strict, bind- on the IDF (and on any military organiza- ing orders. It follows that the position of the tion) are imposed on commanders who are IDF in government discussions will always allotted resources to complete them. These be the position of the chief of staff, and so on commanders are personally responsible and down the line of command. accountable for the tasks. At the top of this The Commission comments on the culture hierarchy is the chief of staff, commander of discourse in the IDF during the war, high- of the IDF, who is given the authority to call lighting “the chief of staff’s directive during In the world of all of the army’s resources into action. Each the forum of senior officers, stipulating that commander is naturally assisted by a head- military personnel must avoid voicing ‘per- military terms, quarters to exercise his authority; however, sonal’ opinions in places where the position obligation to the headquarters itself has no command au- of the military is called for.”5 It seems that the the commander thority. chief of staff understood fully what the Com- is not a Over the years we have been witness to a mission did not, i.e., the absolute separation professional continued blurring of the personal authority between: (1) the need to conduct discussions of the commander, brought about by com- as part of the army’s decision making pro- ethos: it is a mon discourse that places the organization cesses and (2) the obligation to ultimately legal duty.

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 41 den of discipline within the Israel Defense Forces, to obey all commands and instructions given by authorized commanders, and dedi- cate all of my strength and even sacrifice my life in order to defend the homeland and free- dom of Israel.” The idea that a professional duty exists above the duty to obey is groundless and indicates a total lack of understanding of the foundations of a mili- Members of the reach a decision and present it to the political tary organization. Shall the division com- Winograd Commission echelon, assuming full responsibility for that mander who receives an order now check decision as commander of the armed forces. whether the order measures up to his own The chief of staff may present a number of al- professional standard? Shall the staff officer ternatives (though it his duty to recommend given an order now examine it in light of his one of them) or on rare occasions present personal professional analysis? positions opposed to his own; however, this The Commission report continues by en- is always within the framework of his deci- couraging IDF commanders and officers to sion and preferences as the IDF’s exclusive insist on their positions within the organi- authority. zation. However, the Commission proceeds What does the Commission actually say to make an astonishing pronouncement: if in this context? In the paragraph quoted the opinions of officers are not accepted, it above, the Commission contends that the is their duty to protest to the higher echelons loyalty of members of the military echelon (”they must warn others and not shy away is to their profession and military duties, from a confrontation with their superiors”). and they accept their obligation to the com- Just that! In other words it is the duty of the mander as part of their professional ethos. commander to turn to higher bodies and Herein lies the Commission’s first mistake. protest. Now that same division, brigade, or In the world of military terms, obligation to battalion commander; that same staff com- the commander is not a professional ethos: mander is allowed to understand that his it is a legal duty! The duty to obey (legal) professional reasoning goes beyond his le- commands of the command echelon applies gal duty to obey and that the door is always to all army personnel and units. In the IDF, open to appealing to higher echelons. This each soldier pledges to “unconditionally and norm of behavior,6 if realized, will place the without limitation take upon myself the bur- IDF in an intolerable situation.

42 The foundations of command in the IDF from it would likely cause total chaos in the were established on the sound and univer- command apparatus. sal foundations of war. The principle of Here the Commission has failed severely. It command hierarchy is based on thousands would have been fitting for the Winograd of years of war and in the final analysis, Commission to work towards setting a norm on the cost/benefit ratio of the principle’s demanding commanders to take full respon- application. True, it cannot be denied that sibility for their actions, to resign, and be there have been cases where commanders ready to pay the price if they are incapable led their soldiers to crushing failures. The of fulfilling orders given them, or of acting ultimate shield against faulty decisions by according to decisions in total opposition to commanders and military leaders has not their professional views. It was the Commis- yet been invented, this despite the magical sion’s obligation to invalidate the claim of notion there are processes that if realized “I opposed it in real time…but they didn’t would improve the quality of decisions. It is accept my opinion.” The norm must be that important, however, to distinguish between the moment a commander decides not to be discussions aimed at improving the knowl- released of his duties, he becomes a full part- edge and learning of decision makers, and ner in the action, as if it was he who initiated deliberations where professional figures it. The potency of the report’s words and the present their alternatives for action. This is weight ascribed to the report’s content by a broad issue and lies beyond the scope of the public and the military are liable to bring this article. about a collapse of the norms of command The state has given IDF commanders that are so essential to the IDF. As such, it is and the chief of staff an enormous amount the Winograd Commission that is liable to of authority. The process of supervising the be the body that removes the keystone from implementation of authority must be car- the delicate structure of the army’s author- ried out in accordance with the command ity and responsibility of command. It would hierarchy. The authority to alter decisions of be fitting if the contention of the Commis- a given commander is always in the hands sion contained in its draft report would be of his superior commander. The responsibil- removed from the final report so as to pre- ity – in fact the duty – of a commander is to vent a deepening of the crisis of command supervise his subordinates; if his supervision in the IDF. is not sufficient, he must replace them with other subordinates. This is the art of military Notes command. Conversely, it is the duty of sub- 1 The Winograd Commission, interim report, ordinates to implement the orders given to page 133 (Chapter 7, “Conclusions,” article 120) in which Commission members state: “It them and carry out the tasks assigned to is our impression that in those days the prime them. In the event these tasks are contrary minister came to decision making meetings af- to the solders’ professional conscience, it is ter the decisions had essentially been shaped their duty to request to be released of their and formulated” (all references are to the He- duties and be willing to pay the price, and brew transcript). Does the Commission expect only then protest to the higher echelons. This that the prime minister would arrive at such critical government discussions without a def- principle is fundamental, and any deviation inite position?

Volume 10, No. 2, August 2007 43 2 For example, on page 118 (Chapter 7, “Conclu- whatsoever in a determination of this sort. sions,” article 25) the Commission states: “We 3 Page 107 (Chapter 6, paragraph C, article 22). expect public leaders and the senior profes- The professional echelon referred to is the mil- sional military echelon to have also examined itary echelon, and the organization referred to whether a harsh response would indeed serve is the IDF. the entire range of interests of the state and the 4 Gabriel Siboni, “Command in the IDF,” Strate- public they serve. Such an examination would gic Assessment 9, no. 4 (2007): 72. have likely shown that based on existing 5 The Winograd Commission, interim report, knowledge and the evaluation of plausible sce- page 128 (Chapter 7, “Conclusions”, article narios, the dangers of an immediate harsh re- 83). sponse would outweigh the advantages.” The 6 Note, however, that this norm of behavior is risk analysis that was performed in hindsight illegal. Military-Justice Law, article 123, stipu- reﬂects the Commission’s assessment regard- lates the penalties for not fulﬁlling the orders ing the strategic reality that was achieved ver- of a commander: “Any soldier who does not sus the price paid for its achievement. There are carry out an order given by a superior is sub- different assessments of Israel’s overall strate- ject to imprisonment of two years; if this of- gic situation after the war; however, these can- fence is committed while the transgressor’s not be measured, and therefore the members unit is in combat, he/she shall be liable to im- of the Commission have no relative advantage prisonment of ten years.”