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Command, Control, and the Common Defense ii~!iiii~ii!~ii~!!!ii!,,,~~¸,¸,,.......... ~,~ ~i~,~,~,i~i~, C ¸ i;i !ii!il¸ ,, i ~ii i~iii'XdX~ ~i ~~ 2~;};~@~!Ci~i~x~;,~ ............ i~'t~~ ~'~IU r~, ~i ;~2i,;~iii~;*~ ~ x,;~Ci~ i i ii i/}} ~x ~i,o~, ;@i~ii'i~flilS;i!ii ¸ Critical Acclaim for the Original Edition of Command, Control, and the Common Defense • Winner of the 1991 Edgar S. Furniss Book Award given by the Mershon Center at Ohio State University, as an outstanding contribution to national security studies • Lead volume on the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff's professional military reading list (JCS Pub. l) "A definitive work from both a historical and practical viewpoint... A 'must read'." --Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., U.S. Navy Ret.; former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff "An exceptionally rich exploration of the historical as well as current dimensions of the [interservice] problem." --Russell F. Weigley, author of The American Way of War, in the Journal of American History "Those with responsibility for the organization and direction of United States defense.., ignore this book at their cost." --Martin Edmonds, American Political Science Review "[Allard] provides an unparalleled basis for assessing where we are and where we must go if we are to solve the joint and combined command and control challenges facing the U.S. military as it [makes a transition] to the twenty-first century." ----General Edward C. Meyer, U.S. Army Ret., former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Armed Forces Journal "Anyone who wants to be more than a dilettante in command and control must understand what Lt. Col. Allard describes and documents in this marvelous volume." --Admiral W.J. Holland, Jr., U.S. Navy Ret., Signal Magazine "A roman h clef in a usually dry, technocratic field... Allard has forged a powerful tool for effective use by modern military forces in the information age." --Robert Hunter, Center for Strategic and International Studies Command, Control, and the Common Defense Command, Control, and the Common Defense Kenneth Allard Revised Edition "[HE CENTER FOR ADVANCEO Directorate of Advanced Concepts, Technologies, and Information Strategies Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY • President: Lieutenant General Ervin J. Rokke, USAF • Vice President: Ambassador William G. Walker INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES • Director: Dr. Hans A. Binnendijk DIRECTORATE OF ADVANCED CONCEPTS, TECHNOLOGIES, AND INFORMATION STRATEGIES (ACTIS) • Director: Dr. David S. Alberts Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author. They do not necessarily represent the views of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Government agency. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited. Copyright © 1996 by C. Kenneth Allard, except for chapter 9 (pages 273 through 303), which is copyright © 1995 by Westview Press and is reprinted by permission of Westview Press. Reproduction in whole or part requires written permission of the author, except for official use by the U.S. Government. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Allard, C. Kenneth (Carl Kenneth), 1947- Command, control, and the common defense / Kenneth Allard. -- Rev. ed p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. United States--Armed Forces--Organization. 2. Command and control systems--United States. 3. United States--Armed Forces-- Equipment. 4. Information technology--United States. I. Title. UA23.A593 1996 355.3'3041--dc20 96-44766 CIP First printing, June 1990 (Yale University Press) Revised Edition, October 1996 For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP Washington, DC 20402-9328 Phone: (202) 512-1800 ISBN 0-16-053377-1 This book is respectfully dedicated to the memory of Congressman Bill Nichols of Alabama--Soldier, statesman, patriot The Romans said, "If you would have peace, you must be prepared for war." And while we pray for peace, we can never forget that organization, no less than a bayonet or an aircrait carrier, is a weapon of war. We owe it to our soldiers, our sailors, our airmen, and our marines to ensure that this weapon is lean enough, flexible enough, and tough enough to help them win if, God forbid, that ever becomes necessary. From the opening statement by Congressman Nichols House Armed Services Committee Hearings on the Reorganization of the Department of Defense February 19, 1986 Contents Preface to the Revised Edition /x Acknowledgments xi Abbreviations xv 1 Paradigms and Perspectives 1 2 The Roots of Service Autonomy, 1776-1850 21 3 Paradigms on Land and Sea, 1861-1921 47 4 The Quest for Unity of Command 89 5 Setting the Scene: Formative Influences on Modem Command and Control 125 Tactical Command and Control of American Armed Forces: Problems of Modernization 151 Building Joint Approaches: Of JINTACCS and JTIDS 193 Historical Linkages and Future Implications 247 Epilogue: Desert Storm and Information Age Warfare 273 Notes 305 Bibliography 335 Index 347 About the Author 361 Preface to the Revised Edition Two things in life are really gratifying for an author: finishing a project and finding out, usually much later, that these words and ideas may actually have been of some use to the reader. This is especially true if these people are students in either our military or civilian educational institutions. The study of information age conflict has captured growing attention in the media and academe over the last several years; so I am deeply grateful that this book is being made available to students entering this rapidly changing field. One of the challenges facing the writer is keeping up with those developments. While Command, Control, and the Common Defense provides a historical perspective on a contemporary problem, it was written in the late 1980s; since then, the end of the Cold War and the American experience in the Gulf War have provided some fundamentally new perspectives of their own. Re-written history has its own pitfalls; a better solution was to leave the original content intact and to add as an epilogue a chapter which originally appeared in a 1995 anthology on the Gulf War. Both works have, of course, been edited for consistency. Thanks are due to the editors of both Yale University Press, original publishers of Command, Control, and the Common Defense, and Westview Press, publishers of Turning Point: The Gulf War and U.S. Military Strategy, for their kindness in granting permission for this revised edition to be published; in particular, John Covell of Yale Press and Michael Mazarr of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the editor of Turning Point. Dr. David S. Alberts, Director of Advanced Concepts, Technologies, and Information Strategies at National Defense University, provided not only the support that made this publication possible but also much encouragement and many helpful suggestions. Advice and production assistance by the following people are gratefully acknowledged: Rhonda Storey-Gross, Rosemaria B. Bell, Richard L. Layton, and Rear Admiral (ret.) Gary F. Wheatley. My appreciation for the people recognized in the acknowledgments to the original volume remains undiminished. Finally, there is reason to ponder in the light of more contemporary developments one of the major points in that original work: that the tight integration demanded by emerging command and control technologies otten runs afoul of existing command structures and theories of warfare. As I completed the revisions to this edition while serving on special x • Preface to the Revised Edition assignment with the NATO Implementation Force in Bosnia, there were daily reminders of the truth of that statement. I hope that this book will be especially useful to students--and particularly to those who will one day be charged with adapting these old circumstances to new strategic realities. CKA 1st Armored Division, Bosnia June 1996 Acknowledgments There is no way that a seven-year research effort can be completed without the help of many people, far too many than can be mentioned here. This book would not be complete, however, if I failed to thank those people whose contributions were essential. Professors Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and Professor Anthony G. Oettinger of the Harvard University Program on Information Resources Policy supervised the dissertation that eventually resulted in this book: both merit my heartfelt thanks for their professionalism, their sound guidance, and, most of all, their patience over a very long haul. Both the Harvard Program on Information Resources Policy and the Security Studies Program at Fletcher, then headed by Professor Uri Ra'anan, provided generous financial support, which is gratefully acknowledged. The privilege of completing a combined degree program at two such distinguished institutions as the Kennedy School of Govern- ment at Harvard and the Fletcher School at Tuits would not have been possible for a serving Army officer without the sponsorship of a third distinguished institution: the United States Military Academy at West Point. It was a great honor to serve for three years as an assistant professor in the USMA Department of Social Sciences under Col. Lee D. OIvey: my debt to him and to all my colleagues in "The Department" is profound. The generous support of the Military Education Foundation is also acknowl- edged with appreciation. Brig. Gen. Roy K. Flint, dean of the Academic Board, deserves special thanks for his encouragement and the support provided by the USMA Science Research Laboratory during a 1985 fellowship at the National War College, Washington, D.C. Col. Roy Stafford, dean of the faculty at the National War College, extended every personal and professional courtesy during that fellowship; his generosity and encouragement helped to make the dissertation a reality. Gen. Robert T. Herres, United States Air Force, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Lt.
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