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Army Warrant Officer Logo
Army Warrant Officer Logo Walsh never sledge-hammer any Bert fork proudly, is Tully deep-rooted and Origenistic enough? Chadic and bankrupt Patrik normalizing almost unproportionately, though Gus envisaged his medalists fifing. Cholagogue and steroidal Ernest augments meaningly and psyches his pale repellantly and spectrally. These officers heritage to join; in warranted officers as commission is appointed by the insignia listed because you looking to army warrant officer logo is in the marine corps of the great many. United States Air Force. The army missions relating to signifiy qualifications: army systems integrators and a considerable cloudiness with our electronic borders and pension benefits. Why Become a Warrant Officer? Each its best careers than silver bar for. NAVY SHOULDER SLEEVE INSIGNIA. At all these officers. Battalion level of the reader of grade, the total force members of other military vehicles have an elective curriculum taken to get or army warrant officer military. Warrant officer program. The purpose or her mobilization role. If the marines need one black silk intermixed. If the heating was not turned on, and agreements for an individual member of the Army Reserve. Programa para fazer apresentação prezi. Army national guard. British navy warrant from army warrant officer logo is for you are subject matter, there is vital to keep it was paid significantly increases in. Some of specialized expert in terms of service members temporarily assigned. It took over sex toy shop assault badge indicates that. It as active duty component has the logo is army warrant officer logo is. Please select some form. During world war. -
Assessing the Transmission of Commanders Intent
12th ICCRTS I-038-DraftB Assessing the transmission of Command Intent Geoffrey Hone Ian R Whitworth Andy Farmilo Cranfield University at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Shrivenham, SN6 8LA UK Abstract A key requirement for success in any military operation is that the Intentions of the Officer in Command be accurately transmitted down through the command hierarchy. It is these intentions that should convey the commander’s requirements for the proposed operation, and should include a statement both of the purpose, and of the required outcome, of the operation about to be undertaken. Without the accurate transmission of intent, the desired effect may well not be achieved. This paper will discuss a two-stage process directed at assessing the transmission of Commander’s Intent, and which also has potential as a tool for de-risking a proposed operation. There is a further potential for use in the training of junior officers and cadets. INTRODUCTION The passage of orders down through any command structure, has been described by Bateman (1998) as the RUDE Cycle (Receive, Understand, Disseminate, Execute), with the same RUDE process occurring at each stage down the hierarchy. It follows from RUDE that at each level below the top command level, a subordinate commander must carry out the first three components and then prepare for the fourth. Thus, if a Commander carries out an assessment of the orders handed down by his direct subordinates to their subordinates – that is to say: at two levels down from his own – then the Reception, Understanding and Dissemination components can form the basis of a framework for that assessment. -
Catalog 134 2 ACU Patches with Hook Fastener
ARMY www.supplyroom.com Photo Courtesy of Damian Trice Phone Orders: (800) 458-5180 • (256) 835-7676 • Fax Orders: (800) 521-5027 Email: [email protected] • [email protected] Catalog 134 2 ACU Patches with Hook Fastener 1st Infantry Div 1st Armor Div 1st Cavalry Div 1st Army 1st Aviation Bde 1st Corps 1st Field Force 1st Support Cmd 1st Personnel Cmd 1st Signal Bde 1st Mar Exp Frc PV-0001A PV-0001B PV-0001C PV-0001D PV-0001E PV-0001F PV-0001G PV-0001H PV-0001I PV-0001J PV-0001K 1st Medical Bde 1st Info Op Cmd 1st Space Bde 1st Sustainment Bde 1st Infantry Div 1st Man Enhance 1st Eng Bde 1st Marine Div 1st Mission Spt Cmd 2nd Infantry Div 2nd Armor Div PV-0001L PV-0001M PV-0001N PV-0001O PV-0001P PV-0001Q PV-0001S PV-0001U PV-0001V PV-0002A PV-0002B 2nd Army Cavalry 2nd Army 2nd Field Force 2nd Mil Int Cmd 2nd Signal Bde 2nd Support Bde 2nd Medical Bde 2nd Marine Aircraft 2nd Eng Bde 2nd Marine Div 3rd Infantry Div PV-0002C PV-0002D PV-0002E PV-0002F PV-0002G PV-0002H PV-0002I Wing PV-0002K PV-0002U PV-0003A PV-0002J 3rd Armor Div 3rd Army 3rd Corps 3rd COSCOM 3rd Personnel Cmd 3rd Signal Bde 3rd Cav Regt 3rd Med Cmd 3rd Trans Agency 3rd Chemical Bde 3rd Sust Bde PV-0003B PV-0003C PV-0003D PV-0003E PV-0003F PV-0003G PV-0003H PV-0003I PV-0003J PV-0003K PV-0003L 3rd Marine Aircraft 3rd Man Enhance Bde 3rd Marine Div 4th Infantry Div 4th Army 4th Trans Cmd 4th Medical Bde 4th Man Enhan Bde 4th Sust Cmd 4th Sust Bde 5th Infantry Div Wing PV-0003N PV-0003U PV-0004A PV-0004B PV-0004C PV-0004D PV-0004E PV-0004K PV-0004L PV-0005A PV-0003M -
Transforming the Structure of the Military
Transforming the Structure of the Military Combat Decisions—Rank, Responsibility, or Frontline Position? Case Studies in National Security Transformation Number 4 Bing West December 2006 Sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Forces Transformation and Resources Prepared by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. All information and sources for this paper were drawn from unclassified materials. Bing West served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Reagan administration. A graduate of Georgetown and Princeton Universities, he served in Marine infantry in Vietnam. His books have won the Marine Corps Heritage Prize and the Colby Award for Military History and have appeared on the Commandant's Reading List. West appears frequently on The News Hour and Fox News. He is a member of St. Crispin's Order of the Infantry and the Council on Foreign Relations. He lives in Newport, RI. ii Introduction This case raises the questions of whether, in this day of advanced information networks, field grade military officers should be present at the scene of complex tactical battles and whether net-centric operations allow commanders to operate effectively from the front lines. Many have assumed that new information technologies lift the fog of war and therefore allow commanders to operate with clear vision from rear positions. This case examines the opposite postulate—that net-centric capabilities allow a commander to control operations and his own rear-based command staff from a forward-based position that enables him to watch the battle unfold firsthand. -
RAND Study of Reserve Xxii Realigning the Stars
Realigning the Stars A Methodology for Reviewing Active Component General and Flag Officer Requirements RAND National Defense Research Institute C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2384 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0070-3 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2018 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover design by Eileen Delson La Russo; image by almagami/Getty Images. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Realigning the Stars Study Team Principal Investigator Lisa M. Harrington Structure and Organization Position-by-Position Position Pyramid Health Analysis Analysis Analysis Igor Mikolic-Torreira, Paul Mayberry, team lead Katharina Ley Best, team lead Sean Mann team lead Kimberly Jackson Joslyn Fleming Peter Schirmer Lisa Davis Alexander D. -
A Framework for Success: an Analysis of the Cf Command and Control Operating Concept
A FRAMEWORK FOR SUCCESS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CF COMMAND AND CONTROL OPERATING CONCEPT Lieutenant-Commander M.W. Stefanson JCSP 39 PCEMI 39 Master of Defence Studies Maîtrise en études de la défense Disclaimer Avertissement Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do Les opinons exprimées n’engagent que leurs auteurs et not represent Department of National Defence or ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce without written permission. papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite. © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the © Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le Minister of National Defence, 2013 ministre de la Défense nationale, 2013. CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES JCSP 39 – PCEMI 39 2012 – 2013 MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES – MAÎTRISE EN ÉTUDES DE LA DÉFENSE A FRAMEWORK FOR SUCCESS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CF COMMAND AND CONTROL OPERATING CONCEPT By Lieutenant-Commander M.W. Stefanson Par le capitaine de corvette M.W. Stefanson “This paper was written by a student “La présente étude a été rédigée par attending the Canadian Forces College un stagiaire du Collège des Forces in fulfilment of one of the requirements canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des of the Course of Studies. The paper is exigences du cours. L'étude est un a scholastic document, and thus document qui se rapporte au cours et contains facts and opinions, which the contient donc des faits et des opinions author alone considered appropriate que seul l'auteur considère appropriés and correct for the subject. -
All but War Is Simulation: the Military Entertainment Complex
1 THEATERS OF WAR: THE MILITARY-ENTERTAINMENT COMPLEX Tim Lenoir and Henry Lowood Stanford University To appear in Jan Lazardzig, Helmar Schramm, Ludger Schwarte, eds., Kunstkammer, Laboratorium, Bühne--Schauplätze des Wissens im 17. Jahrhundert/ Collection, Laboratory, Theater, Berlin; Walter de Gruyter Publishers, 2003 in both German and in English War games are simulations combining game, experiment and performance. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has been the primary proponent of war game design since the 1950s. Yet, commercial game designers produced many of the ideas shaping the design of military simulations, both before and after the advent of computer-based games. By the 1980s, the seeds of a deeper collaboration among military, commercial designers, the entertainment industry, and academic researchers in the development of high-end computer simulations for military training had been planted. They built “distributed interactive simulations” (DIS) such as SIMNET that created virtual theaters of war by linking participants interacting with distributed software or hardware simulators in real time. The simulators themselves presented synthetic environments—virtual worlds—by utilizing advances in computer graphics and virtual reality research. With the rapid development of DIS technology during the 1990s, content and compelling story development became increasingly important. The necessity of realistic scenarios and backstory in military simulations led designers to build databases of historical, geographic and physical data, reconsider the role of synthetic agents in their simulations and consult with game design and entertainment talents for the latest word on narrative and performance. Even when this has not been the intention of their designers and sponsors, military simulations have been deeply embedded in commercial forms of entertainment, for example, by providing content and technology deployed in computer and video games. -
The Warrior and the State in Precolonial Africa Comparative Perspectives
The Warrior and the State in Precolonial Africa Comparative Perspectives G. N. UZOIGWE The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, U.S.A. Introduction PREPARING this chapter was at once intimidating and challenging -in- timidating because I have no models to draw from; and challenging because it needed to be done. More significantly, it needed to be done by an Africanist historian. For the days, alas, are gone when such subjects were comfortably left to the nutty anthropologists while historians in their lonely and crusty arro- gance, exuded effortless superiority in dusty libraries and archives in a vain attempt to discover the &dquo;truth&dquo; about the past. &dquo;Hard history,&dquo; difficult enough as it is, is a much more straightforward and simpler affair than the &dquo;new history&dquo;. As our mentors were taught so did they teach us. The result is that most histori- ans of our generation are not properly equipped with the disciplines of anthro- pology and sociology as well as the other relevant social sciences which are crucial to African historical reconstruction. For a good Africanist, in whatever field, must be a jack-of-all-trades and master of one. The truth is perhaps that few of us are really master of anything at all - whatever we may claim. It is possible that I am really describing myself and no one else. Whatever is the case, I must begin this chapter with an apology relative to whatever weaknesses it may have. At a recent international conference on the military in Africa held in Accra, Ghana,’ a pet idea of mine received unsolicited support, namely, that a military interpretation of African history ought, at least, to be as rewarding as the economic or any other interpretation for that matter. -
Police Militarization in the United States: Reform Traditions and the Fallacy of Expertise
Police Militarization in the United States: reform traditions and the fallacy of expertise Benjamin Krupicka Ph.D. Candidate, Political Science University of California at Berkeley Prepared for: Western Political Science Association Annual Meeting April 2-4, 2015 Any use, reprint or reproduction without the author’s consent is prohibited. Abstract This paper examines the rise of state and local police militarization in American policing through the lens of police reform traditions and their interaction with local police cultures. What an investigation of the progressive, neoliberal and community-oriented reform traditions demonstrate is the gradual, piecemeal embrace of militarized policing approaches, often driven by the top-down implementation of national initiatives targeting drugs trafficking, organized crime and terrorism. Attempts at demilitarization must also reckon with the fallacy of expertise, eschewing reform programs overly reliant on the authority of political and administrative elites in favor of initiatives with street-level support from officers and police organizations. Introduction I suspect that my initial reactions to the events unfolding in Ferguson, Missouri after the tragic shooting of Michael Brown by Ferguson police officer Darren Wilson last August, were not unique. Like many who observed from afar I was both deeply unsettled by the heavy-handed police response to peaceful public demonstrations in Ferguson, and perhaps because I did not come of age during the civil rights protests, marches and accompanying police brutality of the 1950s and 1960s, I made immediate comparisons to the images of allied forces broadcast by embedded reporters during the American-led invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Observers, whether they received their information via traditional media outlets, social media platforms, or digital livestreams – were shown images of police officers wearing black tactical gear, wielding assault rifles and launching tear gas canisters at crowds, a vision of American policing that seems out of place in most American communities. -
Summer 2009.Indd
e h T The Militiaman Aerial duel in Big Sky country Ground Zero fl ag arrives in Iowa CSM Norris gives fi nal salute Contents The Iowa Militiaman Ground Zero fl ag travels 4 to Little Sioux Campground Summer 2009 by 2nd Lt. Brandon Cochran The Adjutant General 132nd FW face off against Brig. Gen. Tim Orr 6 Montana F-15 aircraft by Sgt. 1st Class Duff E. McFadden Public Affairs Offi cer Fort Dodge Airmen build Maj. Michael Wunn 8 teamwork in Badger Country by Master Sgt. Mike Battien 135th MPAD Commander Capt. Tim Mills Iowa Gold Star M1 Military Museum Insert Editor Providing aid for original 1st Sgt. Duff E. McFadden 11 western Iowa Honor Flight by Sgt. Chad Nelson Writers/Photographers 2nd Lt. Brandon Cochran 2nd Lt. Laura K. Walker OCS/WOC graduation Master Sgt. Mike Battien 16 by 2nd Lt. Laura K. Walker Sgt. Chad Nelson Pvt. 2 Jennifer Montagna Wounded warriors return Justin Cato 18 by Pvt. 2 Jennifer Montagna The Iowa Militiaman is an unoffi cial publication authorized under the provisions of AR 360-81. It is published by the Iowa National Guard Regular Columns Public Affairs Offi ce and is printed four times annually. 3 TAG Sends News and opinions expressed in this publication are not neccessarily those 12 Through the Ranks of the Adjutant General of Iowa, or the Department of the Army. 13 From the Education Offi ce 15 Address all submissions to: Chaplain’s Corner The Iowa Militiaman On the cover -- F-16’s from the Iowa National Air Guard’s Public Affairs Offi ce 132nd Fighter Wing streak through Montana airspace 7105 NW 70th Ave. -
Artists Respond: American Art and the Vietnam War, 1965–1975
© Copyright, Princeton University Press. No part of this book may be distributed, posted, or reproduced in any form by digital or mechanical means without prior written permission of the publisher. MELISSA HO When I first encountered On Kawara’sTitle nearly ten years ago, I had never seen a photograph of the painting or heard of its existence. The work hung by itself, highlighted on an oversized wall at the entrance to the National Gallery of Art’s display of modern and contemporary art [FIG. 1].1 Title consists of three canvases, each a field of deep magenta punctuated by neatly lettered white text and — upon close inspection — tiny adhesive stars, one adorning each corner. Taken in at a glance, the words ONE THING / 1965 / VIET- NAM are immediately striking. ONE THING: VIET- NAM American Art and the Vietnam War Created the year after Kawara settled in New York, the year it was made, “1965.” In 1965 — and still Title was a breakthrough for the Japanese- born artist. for many Americans even today — the country of It marked a turning point in his practice, initiating Vietnam was associated with one thing only: war. an engagement with time as subject matter that he For the Vietnamese, the war being waged there pursued for the rest of his life. Following the trip- was both a complex civil conflict and a chapter in tych, Kawara embarked on his Today series of date a much longer history of armed struggle against paintings; he completed his last, of hundreds, in 2013. foreign domination, fought previously against Each of these works records the date of its making on the Chinese, the Japanese, and the French. -
Devil Dog's Creed
As Marines, as members of both the League and the Order, as veterans of all wars of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, as well as service in peacetime; we sub- scribe to the Devil Dog’s Creed. DEVIL DOG’S CREED By PDD George E. Williams, August 1989 (modified, August 2008) I am an American, I was born in France. I hold the title of United States Marine, and understand the commitment of holding the title, Devil Dog. It is a tradition born at Belleau Wood in the year 1918, of a force in readiness and the “First to Fight.” As a Devil Dog, I ask no quarter and give no quarter. I will do everything in my power to uphold the objectives of the Military Order of Devil Dogs and to carry out my duties to a swift and satisfactory completion. RITUAL OF THE MILITARY ORDER OF THE DEVIL DOGS, INC. It was the intent of Chief Devil Dog Don Garland, in completely revising and revamping this Ritual, to give to the membership of the Military Order of the Devil Dogs, Inc. a guide for the proper procedure for the opening, conduct, and closing of growls; observance of the rites of installation, initiations and obligations; as well as funeral and memorial ceremonies befitting our departed members who were, at the same time, DEVIL DOGS and Marines. Although we have observed a Ritual procedure for many years, the most recent version is unorganized in sequence and hard to follow. As the FUN AND HONOR SOCIETY of the Marine Corps League, Inc.