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Connecting the Dots. Intelligence and Law Enforcement Since 9/11

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Connecting the Dots. Intelligence and Law Enforcement Since 9/11 CONNECTING THE DOTS. INTELLIGENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT SINCE 9/11 by Mary Margaret Stalcup A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Joint Doctor of Philosophy with University of California, San Francisco in Medical Anthropology in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Paul Rabinow, Chair Professor Dorothy Porter Professor Candace Slater Fall 2009 The dissertation of Mary Margaret Stalcup, titled Connecting the Dots. Intelligence and Law Enforcement since 9/11, is approved: Chair: ______________________________________________ Date _____________ ______________________________________________ Date _____________ ______________________________________________ Date _____________ University of California, Berkeley Connecting the Dots. Intelligence and Law Enforcement since 9/11 © 2009 by Mary Margaret Stalcup Abstract Connecting the Dots. Intelligence and Law Enforcement since 9/11 by Mary Margaret Stalcup Joint Doctor of Philosophy in Medical Anthropology with University of California, San Francisco University of California, Berkeley Professor Paul Rabinow, Chair This work examines how the conceptualization of knowledge as both problem and solution reconfigured intelligence and law enforcement after 9/11. The idea was that more information should be collected, and better analyzed. If the intelligence that resulted was shared, then terrorists could be identified, their acts predicted, and ultimately prevented. Law enforcement entered into this scenario in the United States, and internationally. “Policing terrorism” refers to the engagement of state and local law enforcement in intelligence, as well as approaching terrorism as a legal crime, in addition to or as opposed to an act of war. Two venues are explored: fusion centers in the United States and the international organization of police, Interpol. The configuration can be thought of schematically as operating through the set of law, discipline and security. Intelligence is predominantly a security approach. It modulates that within its purview, wielding the techniques and technologies that are here discussed. The dissertation is divided into two sections: Intelligence and Policing Terrorism. In the first, intelligence is taken up as a term, and its changes in referent and concept are examined. The Preface and Chapter One present a general introduction to the contemporary situation and intelligence, via Sherman Kent, as knowledge, organization and activities. Chapter Two traces the development of intelligence in the United States as a craft and profession. Chapter Three discusses some of the issues involving the intersection of intelligence and policy, and how those manifested in the aftermath of 9/11 and the lead up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The second section examines the turn to policing terrorism, beginning, in Chapter Four, with how Interpol has dealt with bioterrorism, and an examination of the shifting conceptualization of biological threats in international law. Moving from threats to their consequences, Chapter Five takes up the concept of an event in order to analyze the common comparison of Pearl Harbor and 9/11. Chapters Six and Seven turn to fieldwork done in the United States, with an examination of the suspicious activity reporting system and law enforcement’s inclusion in the Information Sharing Environment, focusing on fusion centers and data mining. 1 For Dennis Irwin 1951-2008 “All Ears, All The Time” i Connecting the Dots. Intelligence and Law Enforcement since 9/11 TABLE OF CONTENTS …………………………………………………………………..….…ii Acknowledgments……………………………………………………………………………..…iii List of Acronyms …………………………………………………………………………….…..iv PREFACE Knowledge as Problem and Solution …………………………………………….1 PART I. Intelligence 1. Introductions………………………..………………………………………………………….6 2. Science & Secrets…………………………………………………………………….. …....19 3. Politicizing Intelligence……………………………………………………………………...32 PART II. Policing Terrorism 4. Biothreats…………………….……………………………………………………………....46 5. Events and Failure…………………………………………………………………………..73 6. Collecting the Dots…………………………………………………………………………..86 7. Connecting the Dots……………………………………………………………………….111 BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………......... …..137 ii Acknowledgements It is a pleasure to acknowledge the intellectual exchanges, quotidian support and friendships that helped me in the process of researching and writing this dissertation. At home, my parents, Alex and Janice Stalcup, and my brothers, especially Luke Stalcup, welcomed my anthropology cohort into their house many times, and supported me with meals, transportation and encouragement. They also actively worked on developing and implementing this project; it would not have been possible without them. At the fusion center, I will leave people unnamed, but they know who they are and have my gratitude for trusting me to do this research, accepting me with an open mind and without restrictions on what I would produce, engaging in many hours of conversation, and taking me to the DEA gym. In France, my thanks to the people at Interpol who assisted me, and to the people who made a difference in my life in Lyon: members of Grupo Capoeira de Angola Cabula, Sophie Chiha, Xavier Dagany, Violaine L’hotellerie, Sophie Pailhes, Brian Rudkin and his family, and Scott Spence. In Berkeley and San Francisco, I would especially like to thank the participants of the labinar; members of the Anthropology of the Contemporary Research Collaboratory; the staff at Espresso Roma, the UC Berkeley RSF, Interlibrary Services, in particular Shannon Monroe, and the anthropology department, in particular Ned Garrett; Professors Lawrence Cohen and Nancy Scheper-Hughes, who first gave me a chance; Professors Bill Hanks, Rosemary Joyce, Stefania Pandolfo, and Sharon Kaufman for courses and departmental support; members of my cohort, notably Monica Eppinger for her explanations of law, Carlo Caduff, and Nicholas Langlitz; Misha MacLaird for copyediting and company while writing; Ryan Sayre, for his critique of several chapter drafts; Roger Brent, for his sustained interest; the members of my committee, Professors Dorothy Porter and Candace Slater, and my advisor Paul Rabinow, for both allowing and demanding intellectual honesty, and for his unwavering care. iii List of Acronyms ACLU: American Civil Liberties Union BW: Biological weapons BWC: Biological Weapons Convention (Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological [Biological] and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction) CATIC: California Anti-Terrorism Information Center CDC: Center for Disease Control CHHP: Center for Health Hazards Preparedness CHP: California Highway Patrol CIA: Central Intelligence Agency CJIS: Criminal Justice Information System COI: (Office of) Coordinator of Information CTR: Cash Transaction Report DA: District Attorney DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration DHS: Department of Homeland Security DMV: Department of Motor Vehicles DOD: Department of Defense DOJ: Department of Justice EPIC: El Paso Intelligence Center FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI–NCIC: Federal Bureau of Investigation National Crime Information Center FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency FI: Field Information FISA: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act HE: High explosives HIDTA: High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area HIFCA: High-Intensity Financial Crimes Area IC: Intelligence Communities IDW: Investigative Data Warehouse ILP: Intelligence-led policing Interpol: International Criminal Police Organization IRTPA: Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act iv IRS: Internal Revenue Service ISE-SAR: (National) Information Sharing Environment Suspicious Activity Reporting (Initiative) JIS: Jamiyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh JTTF: Joint Terrorism Task Force MDR-TB: Multiple-drug-resistant tuberculosis NIE: National Intelligence Estimate NLETS: National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System NSSM: National Security Study Memorandum OSP: Office of Special Plans (Pentagon) OSS: Office of Strategic Services OUSDP: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy POP: Problem-Oriented Policing POST: Police Officer Standards and Training PSAC: President’s Science Advisory Committee RTTAC: Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Center SAR: Suspicious Activity Report TLO: Terrorism liaison officer VERTIC: Verification Research, Training and Information Centre WMD: Weapon(s) of Mass Destruction WMDC: Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission WSIN: Western States Information Network XDR-TB: Extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis v PREFACE Knowledge as Problem and Solution “Connecting the dots” as a metaphor for intelligence analysis became popular with the 9/11 Commission Report. What is the message in that child’s drawing game? Information is so many scattered, random dots. If joined together they will suddenly present an image of reality. From dots to picture corresponds to the transformation of information into intelligence. Analysis is equated with child’s play, but not unproblematically. This is a limited and stifling game. The dots are simply lying there on the page. There is one, correct way to connect them. Ignored are the practical and ethical challenges that collection really presents, and the potential for mutability of the pictures. Intelligence, an epistemologically unique and ultimately shadowy kind of knowledge, is equated with neatly linked pieces of data. The parallel
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