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Was Maimonides an Epigone?

Was Maimonides an Epigone?

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STUDIA ROSENTHALIANA 40 (2007-2008), 9-26 doi: 10.2143/SR.40.0.2028834

Was an Epigone?

RESIANNE FONTAINE

AIMONIDES AN EPIGONE? At first the question seems ridiculous, M even outrageous. Of all the personalities in the history of , surely Maimonides is the epitome of an intellectual giant, himself giving rise to precisely the kind of activity generally considered epigonic? Indeed, until a few decades ago research in the field of tended to neglect thirteenth-century Jewish thinkers who were influenced by Maimonides or followed in his foot- steps because they were considered to be epigones, mere imitators whose work was unoriginal and second-rank. According to this view, the writ- ers who flourished in the period between Maimonides (1135/38-1204) and the next major Jewish (1288-1344) were believed to have made no independent contribution of note. However, if one of the purposes of studying epigones and the phe- nomenon of epigonism in this volume is to view the question from a dif- ferent angle and redefine the role and importance of epigones while also reassessing the relation of epigones to those whom they imitate, then clearly the status of the person at the other end of the equation, the orig- inator and precursor, also needs to be reexamined. For a more accurate and balanced evaluation of this relation, it is therefore necessary to exam- ine whether Maimonides himself was perhaps indebted to others. To that end, the present paper looks at the connection between Maimonides and (c. 1110-1180), who is commonly identified as Mai- monides’ immediate philosophical predecessor, and argues that to some extent he may indeed be considered an epigone of Ibn Daud. Maimonides himself would certainly not have approved of such an approach. As is well known he does not mention any medieval Jewish philosopher by name in his Guide of the Perplexed, nor does he suggest 0479-07_St.Rosenthaliana_40_02 23-12-2008 11:24 Pagina 10

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that he was influenced by any of them. Likewise, in his famous letter to , in which he refers to Isaac Israeli and Ibn Zaddiq only to dismiss them, he does not mention, let alone recommend Ibn Daud to his translator.1 This silence, however, need not imply that he was not familiar with Ibn Daud’s work. After all, silence with respect to sources is a characteristic of Maimonides’ Mishneh , while for the Guide it has also been established that he drew on sources without explicitly mentioning them.2 In fact we have reason to believe that Maimonides was not com- pletely silent regarding Ibn Daud. In a well-known passage in the Guide (I.71) in which he reviews the evolution of theological knowledge among Jews, Maimonides writes: As for the Andalusians among the people of our nation, all of them cling to the affirmations of the and incline to their opinions, insofar as these do not ruin the foundations of the Law. You will not find them in any way taking the paths of the Mutakallimun. In many things concerning the scanty matter of which the later ones among them had knowledge they have therefore approximately the same doctrine that we set forth in this Treatise.3 It is tempting to read this passage as a veiled allusion to Ibn Daud.4 It is certainly a fitting description of the philosopher: Abraham ibn Daud

1. I would like to thank Steven Harvey for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. On this letter and its impact see S. Harvey, ‘Did Maimonides’ Letter to Samuel Ibn Tibbon Determine Which Philosophers Would be Studied by Later Jewish Thinkers?’, JQR 83 (1992), p. 51-70. For Maimonides’ evaluation of Ibn Zaddiq, see S. Stroumsa, ‘He‘arah al yahaso sel ha-Rambam le-R. Yosef ibn Zaddiq’, in: M. Idel, Z. Harvey, E. Schweid (eds), Shlomo Pines Jubilee Volume II ( 1991), p. 33-38. 2. See e.g., S. Harvey, ‘A New Islamic Source of the Guide of the Perplexed’, Maimonidean Studies 2 (1991), p. 31-59 and A. Eran, ‘Al-Ghazali and Maimonides on the World to Come and Spir- itual Pleasure’, Jewish Studies Quarterly 8 (2001), p. 138-166. 3. S. Pines (transl.), Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed (Chicago and London 1963), p. 177. References are to this translation. In Pines’s view ‘This apparently refers to the passages of the and the Midrashim that, as Maimonides states in the beginning of this chapter, belong to the old esoteric tradition’, transl. p. 177 n. 15. W. Zeev Harvey rightly points out that the passage under consideration reveals that Maimonides was familiar with earlier Jewish philosophical thought, see W. Zeev Harvey, Maimonides’ plaats in de geschiedenis van de joodse filosofie (Amsterdam 2004), p. 7. 4. Cf. D. Rosin, Die Ethik des Maimonides (Breslau 1876), p. 22. 0479-07_St.Rosenthaliana_40_02 23-12-2008 11:24 Pagina 11

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was born and educated in Andalusia; in his philosophical work Sefer ha- Emunah ha-Ramah (Book of Sublime Faith), originally written in , he certainly clings to the affirmations of the philosophers, that is, the Ara- bic philosophers al-Farabi (870-950) and Ibn Sina (980-1037); he does not in any way undermine the ‘foundations of the Law’ since his declared intention is to bring harmony between Torah and philosophy, neither did he follow in the footsteps of the Muslim sceptics, the Mutakallimun.5 Most importantly here, Ibn Daud’s Emunah, written around 1160, a few decades before the Guide, contains many doctrines that are similar or par- allel to those expounded in Maimonides’ work. Some of these similarities have been pointed out by D. Rosin, M. Arfa and more recently by Amira Eran and myself.6 The present article examines these similarities in an effort to determine whether Maimonides was indeed influenced by Ibn Daud even though he does not admit this. It should be noted, however, that to a large extent, many parallels between the two authors can be explained by the fact that both thinkers employed the same philosophical paradigm, namely the Muslim taught by the authoritative philosophers of their day, al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. Similarities such as proofs of ’s existence or accounts of the structure of the heavenly world need not detain us here, however numerous. Instead, our focus is on parallels and similarities in passages where Ibn Daud and Maimonides relate or apply philosophical theories to traditional Jewish views or inter- pret biblical passages in the light of these theories. Such parallels can be found in Ibn Daud’s discussions on , providence, , ethics, divine attributes and .

5. It is probably for this reason that he deemed Saadya’s Emunot we-De‘ot insufficient for his purposes, cf. S. Weil (ed.), Abraham Ibn Daud, ha-Emunah ha-Ramah (Frankfurt a. M. 1852), p. 2.34-38. All references to Emunah in this article are to this edition. 6. Rosen, op. cit. p. 22-24; M. Arfa, Abraham ibn Daud and the Beginnings of Medieval , unpublished PhD thesis (Columbia Univ. 1954), p. 2-3. 141-142; A. Eran, Me-emunah tammah le-emunah ramah (Tel Aviv 1998), see index, s.v. Maimonides; R. Fontaine, In Defence of Judaism: Structure and Sources of ha-Emunah ha-Ramah (Assen 1986), see index, s.v. Maimonides; cf. also Pines, op. cit., p. cxxxiii, n. 123. 0479-07_St.Rosenthaliana_40_02 23-12-2008 11:24 Pagina 12

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Parallels between Abraham ibn Daud and Maimonides

1. Prophecy: The most interesting parallel is the way in which both authors contrast the rational explanation of prophecy adopted from the Muslim philosophers to the biblical perception of prophecy. Ibn Daud describes the various stages of prophecy and the intellectual and moral preparations that a person has to undergo in order to attain prophecy.7 In all this he draws heavily on the theories of the philosophers. His con- clusion is that when a person’s soul is sufficiently prepared, prophecy emanates, ‘since there is no envy up there’.8 However, he then abruptly posits three conditions for the actual occurrence of prophecy, stating that the emanation can occur only in a certain period, a certain place and to a certain people, conditions that clearly cannot be influenced by the aspirant prophet’s own efforts but depend solely on God’s will.9 It is the same stark contrast that we find in Maimonides’ description of the various views on prophecy. Having proposed the second view, that of the philosophers who maintain that prophecy is a natural process at the culmination of which prophecy necessarily and automatically occurs, Maimonides claims that the biblical concept is identical with the - sophical opinion, except for one thing: God’s will can prevent prophecy occurring.10 Moreover, both authors not only emphasise, as might be expected, that the level of prophecy attained by Moses was beyond that of any other prophet, but also explain Moses’ uniqueness by pointing out that he received the revelation without the mediation of an .11 In addition, Maimonides probably borrowed from Ibn Daud when drawing up his list of prophetic levels.12

2. The problem of evil, and providence: Ibn Daud discusses the nature and origin of evil in a brief chapter in combination with other

7. Emunah, 70-74.9. 8. Emunah, 74.9-10. 9. Emunah, 74.12-40. 10. Moreh Nevukhim, II.32, transl. Pines p. 361. 11. Emunah, 88.28-31; Maimonides Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot De‘ot VII, Moreh Nevukhim, II.34, transl. Pines p. 367. 12. Cf. H. Kreisel, Prophecy: The History of an Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy (Dordrecht 2000), p. 280-281. 0479-07_St.Rosenthaliana_40_02 23-12-2008 11:24 Pagina 13

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topics, such as free will and providence (Emunah II.6.2, p. 93-98). In these discussions we find a number of concepts that also appear in Mai- monides’ writings.13 Some of these parallels may be ascribed to their common use of Ibn Sina’s discussion of the issue, such as the theory that evil is a privation that relates to matter, or their response to the view that there is more evil than good on earth.14 However, in his emphasis that evil has no maker Maimonides comes close to Ibn Daud.15 It is true that Ibn Sina also states that essential evil has no cause, but his position here is not entirely clear, since at the same time he claims that this type of evil is the result of the action of external causes of evil.16 Moreover, Ibn Daud and Maimonides argue in similar fashion that man often fails to appre- hend the true nature of evil because he considers it from his own indi- vidual perspective rather from that of creation as a whole.17 As for providence, Maimonides shares with Ibn Daud the notion that there is a correlation between providence and perfection, since they teach that providence is granted commensurately with the grade of human perfection attained by man.18 Another parallel is their shared con- viction, expressed in their discussions of free will, that God may suspend or retract man’s free will as a punishment. In this vein they explain the biblical verses that refer to God’s hardening of Pharaoh’s heart. Since Pharaoh chose of his own free will to oppress Israel in Egypt, God pun- ished him by withholding the power of repentance, that is, by not afford- ing him the freedom to repent. Maimonides advances this interpretation not in the Guide, but in Shemonah Perakim VIII and Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Teshuvah. While their common source is probably rabbinic exe- gesis,19 it is conspicuous that Maimonides introduces his discussion by saying: ‘Weigh well what I say in this matter, reflect upon it, compare it with the words of others.’20 As Rosin has observed, Maimonides may in

13. Moreh Nevukhim, III.10-12. 14. Ibn Sina, Shifâ’, Ilâhiyyât IX.6, ed. M.Y. Musa and S.Y. Dunya (Cairo 1960), vol 2, p. 414-422. 15. Moreh Nevukhim, III.10, transl. Pines, p. 438-439; Emunah, 84.5-25. 16. See S. Inati, The Problem of Evil: Ibn Sina’s Theodicy (Binghamton NY 2000), p. 81-82. 17. Moreh Nevukhim, III.12, transl. Pines, p. 442; Emunah, 95.12-13. 18. Moreh Nevukhim, III.18, transl. Pines, p. 475; Emunah, 97.40-98.9. 19. See Shemot Rabba XIII:3 on Ex. 10:1. 20. Maimonides, Shemonah Perakim VIII, ed. and transl. J.I. Gorfinkle, The Eight Chapters of Maimonides on Ethics (Shemonah Perakim): A Psychological and Ethical Treatise (New York 1912), p. 48, transl. p. 94. 0479-07_St.Rosenthaliana_40_02 23-12-2008 11:24 Pagina 14

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fact be criticising Ibn Daud here for his interpretation of Isaiah 63:17, a verse that, according to Maimonides, does not bear on the issue of free will.21 Again it is tempting to see these words as referring to his older con- temporary, as Rosin does, although, as he notes himself, another candi- date may be .22

3. Ethics and perfection: Maimonides explains in Hilkhot De‘ot that it is forbidden to exercise moderation with regard to two virtues: suppres- sion of anger and meekness; Ibn Daud characterises these as ‘outstand- ing virtues’.23 In singling out these traits, both authors depart from the Aristotelian ethics that they present in their works. A crucial parallel between Ibn Daud and Maimonides concerns their views on human perfection and their perception of the relation between intellectual love and worship of God. Like Maimonides, Ibn Daud insists that love of God is achieved through knowledge, and both authors cite Deuteronomy 6:5 ‘And you shall love your God with all your heart, and with all your soul and with all your might’ to show that it is not possible to love what one does not know.24 They both argue that love leads to ‘avodah, since it encourages a person to direct every thought and action towards God and towards fulfilling His commandments. In other words, the relation between intellectual love, devotion and worship of God is the same for both authors. They both emphasise that uttering prayers while being occupied with worldly matters is not the proper way to serve God and that repetition and practice are required for attaining the right moral conduct and true service of God.25 Similarly, when discussing man’s highest perfection both philoso- phers offer the same interpretation of Jeremiah 9:22-23: ‘Thus says the Lord: Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, nor let the mighty man glory in his might, let not the rich man glory in his riches. But let him who glories glory in this, that he understands and knows me

21. Cf. Rosin, op. cit., p. 24. If the assumption that Maimonides had Ibn Daud in mind in this passage is correct, this would imply that he knew Emunah already when he was working on his commentary on the Mishnah (completed 1168). 22. Ibid. 23. Emunah, 101.17-25, Mishneh Torah Hilkhot De‘ot II.3. 24. Emunah, 45.37-38; 101.2-14; Moreh Nevukhim, III.51, transl. p. 621. 25. Emunah, 100. 26-40 and 101.7-10; Moreh Nevukhim, III.51, transl. p. 622-623. 0479-07_St.Rosenthaliana_40_02 23-12-2008 11:24 Pagina 15

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[haskel we-yado’a oti], that I am the Lord who exercises lovingkindness, justice, and righteousness, in the earth; for in these things I delight, says the Lord.’ The thrust of their interpretation is that man’s highest perfection is the knowledge of God’s attributes, and that this knowl- edge must lead to imitation of God’s actions, such as lovingkindness and justice.26 It is also worth noting that both authors present this argument at crucial places of their work. In Emunah it occurs towards the end of the introduction to Part II, an introduction that discusses the hierarchy of the sciences, connecting Part I (on physics) to Part II (on metaphysics). As for Maimonides, the discussion of the two verses forms the conclusion of his Guide.

4. Attributes: Regarding similarities with respect to the problem of divine attributes, Ibn Daud’s interpretation of negative attributes is clearly significant. In an article on Maimonides’ treatment of negative attributes Wolfson observes that Maimonides brought a new element into the discussion of attributes, namely the logical aspect of the pred- icative names of God.27 Since if it is impossible for God to have real attributes, as the philosophers hold, all predicates become tautologies: to say that God has a particular quality is to say that God is God. Mai- monides therefore interprets attributes as either negations or actions. The same consideration is found in Ibn Daud’s discussion. He notes that the proposition ‘God is one’ amounts to saying ‘God is God’ and observes that the problem with attributes conceived as negations is that they do not convey any meaning.28 This leads him to interpret negations as attributes that express the incomparability of God to other beings, so that they do in fact convey a meaning. Ibn Daud was therefore also con- cerned with the semantic aspect of attributes. Thus Wolfson is not entirely correct in claiming that this element is new in Maimonides, although it is true that Maimonides dealt with the question in a more thorough and consistent manner.

26. Emunah, 46.30-36; Moreh Nevukhim, III.54 end, transl. p. 637-638. 27. H.A. Wolfson, ‘Maimonides on Negative Attributes’, in: I. Twersky and G.H. Williams (eds.), Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion, vol II (Cambridge, Mass 1977), p. 195. 28. Emunah, 51.9-13; 52.17-18, cf. Moreh Nevukhim, I.51, transl. p. 113. 0479-07_St.Rosenthaliana_40_02 23-12-2008 11:24 Pagina 16

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Moreover, it is possible to see Maimonides’ rejection of relative attributes as a response to Ibn Daud’s view. Ibn Daud’s exposition on this point is not entirely clear, but he seems to allow attributes of God that express a relation between God and created beings.29 Maimonides is as emphatic on this point as he is expansive: it is not permissible to ascribe these kinds of attributes to God although he admits that some may be more appropriate than others. His elaboration on this issue may be viewed as a correction of Ibn Daud’s view. Maimonides explains that at first it may seem to be permissible to ascribe these kinds of attributes to God, because they do not necessarily imply a multiplicity of divine essences. However, he continues, a more precise examination shows that this is not correct, since there can be no true comparison between God and anything that is not God.30 Here Maimonides may well have had Ibn Daud in mind, who argued that relative attributes do not imply the multiplicity of God, citing as an example that the same person may be the father of another and the friend of third and so on, while his essence is not affected by these various relations. Maimonides’ argument may also have been intended for (c. 1075-1141), who in his allows these kinds of attributes.31 However, it is more likely that he had Ibn Daud in mind, since in his refutation of this view Mai- monides uses the same example as Ibn Daud and in the next chapter, when discussing attributes that relate to action, he employs an analogy that is also found in Ibn Daud’s discussion of attributes, albeit in a less developed form. This is Maimonides’ example of the various actions relating to fire such as cooking, burning and melting, which he uses to show that different actions can derive from the same agent.32 A further indication that Maimonides may have been aware of Ibn Daud’s doctrine of divine attributes is that both refer to the Talmudic story of a person who went down (to serve as prayer leader) in R. Han- ina’s presence and said: “O God the great, mighty, terrible, majestic, powerful, awful, strong, fearless, sure and honoured” only to be roundly

29. Emunah, 54.22-35. 30. Moreh Nevukhim, I.52, transl. p. 117-118. 31. Kuzari, II.2. 32. Moreh Nevukhim, I.52, transl. p. 120; Emunah, 55.40-42. 0479-07_St.Rosenthaliana_40_02 23-12-2008 11:24 Pagina 17

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criticised by the Sage for his presumption.33 Note, however, that also presents this story.34

5. Angelology: It is Ibn Daud’s discussion of angels, found towards the end of his book (Emunah II.6.1) that bears the greatest similarity with Maimonides. This discussion, which is crucial to Ibn Daud’s over- all argument, is an attempt to demonstrate that angels are intermedi- aries between God and the sublunar world, and secondly that the names of God, that is elohim and the tetragrammaton, are in fact homonyms (shittufim) that are used both for angels and God. As Ibn Daud explains, he advances these theories in response to two problems: first, contradictions between religion and philosophy regarding biblical statements about God that seem to imply a change in God’s essence, and second, contradictions in Torah itself, for example between Exodus 33:20 (‘You cannot see my face; for no man shall see me and live’) and Numbers 12:8 and Exodus 33:11 (‘And the Lord spoke to Moses face to face’). His solution is to interpret these verses as references to different classes of angels, thereby eliminating the contradiction. Ibn Daud’s interpretation should be viewed primarily against the background of the vehement criticism by the Muslim theologian , according to whom Exodus 33 contains an inexcusable contradiction and anthro- pomorphism.35 Maimonides was less concerned with this particular challenge. Nonetheless the resemblance between this chapter in Emunah and vari- ous views advanced in the Guide is striking. Both treat divine names as shittufim, since elohim can also mean ‘judges’, for example,36 and both justify this approach by pointing out that Onkelos also interpreted rather than translated anthropomorphic terms in Torah.37 Particularly relevant here is Maimonides’ explicit rejection of the interpretation that elohim

33. Talmud Bavli Masechet Berachot 33b, cf. Moreh Nevukhim, I.59, transl. p. 140; Emunah, 57.11-14. 34. M. Hyamson (ed.), Bahya ben Joseph ibn Paquda: Hovot ha-Levavot (Jerusalem 1962), vol. 1, p. 112 (Hebrew); p. 113 (English transl.). 35. Emunah, 81-93. 36. Emunah, 83.9-33; Moreh Nevukhim, II.6 transl. p. 261, and cf. also I.23, transl. p. 23. 37. Emunah, 89.14-19; Moreh Nevukhim, I.21 transl. p. 49 and I.28, transl. p. 60. 0479-07_St.Rosenthaliana_40_02 23-12-2008 11:24 Pagina 18

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can also denote ‘idols’, which may be a criticism of Ibn Daud, who advanced precisely this view, as Howard Kreisel observes.38 Shlomo Pines notes what he calls the ‘marked similarity’ between Abraham ibn Daud and Maimonides concerning the use of the word elo- him.39 However, there are other parallels too. One is the context of the discussion: in both texts the interpretation of Exodus 33:20 is linked to the issue of attributes, which raises the question whether Maimonides may have found the basis for his famous interpretation of Moses’ two requests in the work of his older contemporary. Another is Ibn Daud’s observation that the force that drives man to copulate and which implants parental love are also called angels (elohim) in the , namely the angels that are in charge of the perpetuation of the species.40 This brings to mind Maimonides’ statements that the formative force in sperm is an angel and that the force of orgasm is called an angel by the Rabbis.41 An important element in both Ibn Daud and Maimonides is the uncompromising rejection of the supposed corporeality of God. This relates to another significant parallel, namely their interpretation of the terms tselem and demut in Genesis 1:26. Ibn Daud explains how ‘foolish people of our religion’ are confused by this verse since they consider that the term ‘form’ denotes ‘body’ or ‘face’, implying that God made man cor- poreal after his own corporeality. However, the true meaning of the verse is that of all the created beings it is man who receives the intellectual form, by virtue of which he has some likeness to the angels. Moreover, tselem and demut are synonyms, meaning ‘likeness’ (hiqqui), as in I Samuel 6:5 (‘And you shall make images of your swellings’). Tselem may therefore refer to something incorporeal, that is, likeness or similarity (dimion).42 In Guide I.1 Maimonides begins his explanation of biblical expressions with a discussion of tselem and demut that is reminiscent of Ibn Daud’s. According to Maimonides, many suppose that ‘image’ (tselem) means

38. H. Kreisel, ‘Judah Halevi’s Influence on Maimonides: A Preliminary Appraisal’, Mai- monidean Studies 2 (1991), p. 110, n. 40. 39. Pines, op. cit., cxxxiii, n. 123. 40. Emunah, 86.35-38, Moreh Nevukhim, II.6, transl. p. 261. 41. Moreh Nevukhim, II.6, transl. p. 263-264. 42. Emunah, 91.22-92.6. 0479-07_St.Rosenthaliana_40_02 23-12-2008 11:24 Pagina 19

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shape (temunah) and configuration (to’ar), and this leads them into anthropomorphism. In fact the correct interpretation of ‘image’ is that it refers to the natural form, that is, to the property by ‘virtue of which a thing is constituted as a substance and becomes what it is’.43 With respect to man it refers to the particular form of man, that is, intellectual com- prehension. In this context he explains that ‘image’ refers to a notion, and that ‘likeness’ (demut) also refers to a likeness to a notion, not to a physi- cal likeness, citing I Samuel 6:5 as proof, like Ibn Daud.

6. General similarities: Thus far we have discussed parallels relating to specific views or interpretations, either in particular passages or entire chapters. Similarities can also be found in the more general features of the philosophical works of the two Jewish Aristotelians. A comparison of their respective introductions is instructive. Ibn Daud warns that his book is not intended for the simple believer who lacks a philosophical inclination, or for readers well versed in philosophy. Instead, his book is meant for those who have begun to study philosophy and are confused (navokh) by the apparent contradictions between philosophy and Torah.44 This, of course, is precisely the same audience Maimonides sought to address in the Moreh Nevukhim, according to his introduc- tion.45 Note that the use of the word navokh in Emunah, which immedi- ately calls to mind Maimonides’ title, should not tempt us to jump to conclusions, since we have no way of determining which word Ibn Daud used in the lost Arabic original of his work. It may well be that Solomon ben Lavi, who translated Emunah towards the end of the fourteenth cen- tury, decided to use the term precisely because of the title of Moreh Nevukhim. The word navokh does not occur in the parallel passage in the second, revised translation of Ibn Daud’s book, ha-Emunah ha-Nissa’ah by Samuel Motot.46 Apart from mevukhah, other terms denoting confu- sion, such as shibbush and bilbul also occur in both translations, for

43. Moreh Nevukhim, I.1, transl. p. 22. 44. Emunah, 4.6-15. 45. Moreh Nevukhim, I, introduction, p. 10. 46. This translation was made after that of Ben Lavi. On the relation between the two trans- lations, see A. Eran, ‘The Hebrew Translations of Abraham ibn Daud’s The Exalted Faith’ (Hebrew), Tarbiz 65 (1996), p. 79-107. In the passage discussed here, Motot translates: ‘mi she-nitgalgel el ha- iyyun ve-qats mi-peshat ha-qabbalah’. 0479-07_St.Rosenthaliana_40_02 23-12-2008 11:24 Pagina 20

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example in the section on homonyms. Noting the confusion and doubt regarding their interpretation, he asserts that God did not want us to be in a state of confusion (mevukhah) and blindness (‘ivvaron) in these mat- ters.47 Regardless of the exact wording of the introduction, it is clear that Maimonides and Ibn Daud were motivated by the same considerations. Both authors wished to clear up and dispel the confusion caused by the apparent contradiction of certain biblical verses and philosophical ideas, which explains why such a large proportion of both their books is devoted to a rational explanation of biblical verses. It is true that Mai- monides’ method of contradiction is absent in Ibn Daud. However, the concept of a two-tiered text, one for the multitude and one for the schol- arly elite, is also present in the Emunah. At the start of his treatise, Ibn Daud states that ‘many verses are phrased in accordance with what is suit- able for the multitude, not in accordance with their true meaning’.48 Sig- nificantly, he presents the biblical verses that he provides after each dis- cussion of a philosophical issue as remazim, pointers to philosophical truths. Moreover, in his discussion of attributes he states that he refrains from writing a complete explanation of God’s knowledge lest it fall into the hands of those with insufficient intelligence to understand it and who may be misguided.49 Ibn Daud therefore also distinguishes between the multitude (he-hamon) and the philosophical elite. Since both philoso- phers were involved in the same transcultural endeavour it is clear that Maimonides and Ibn Daud adopted this distinction from their Muslim predecessors and that Maimonides had no need of Ibn Daud here. Nonetheless it is important to note that Ibn Daud was the first Jewish philosopher to employ it in a systematic philosophical exposition. An additional parallel between the two works is their form. Both authors use the same literary device: while Maimonides wrote his treatise for a valued pupil, Ibn Daud states that he wrote Emunah at the request of a friend who wished to learn about free will, a question for which, as he explains, Scripture does not provide an unambiguous answer. Another important general resemblance concerns the reservations of both Ibn Daud and Maimonides regarding the limits of the intellect.

47. Emunah, 83.5-10; cf. also 90.33 and 91.22. 48. Emunah, 2.1-2; cf. also 47.2-6 and 91.24. 49. Emunah, 56.3-8. 0479-07_St.Rosenthaliana_40_02 23-12-2008 11:24 Pagina 21

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Interestingly, the idea that the intellect cannot comprehend everything is postulated by both philosophers in the same context: namely, in their discussions of the structure of the heavenly world, or, as Ibn Daud calls it ‘the order of causes’. To quote Ibn Daud: ‘What they [i.e., the Muslim philosophers] maintain about the cause of existence of the nine spheres and their movers are statements for which we have not found demon- strative proof.’50 Moreover, he continues, the same applies to philoso- phers’ theories about ‘the order of causes’. He concludes by observing that they construct this system in order to avoid the false assumption that the many can emanate from the one, but in doing so they enter another false assumption.51 This critical approach to philosophical teachings is reminiscent of the preamble to Maimonides’ introduction to the philosophical theories on the motions of the spheres. While conceding that ’s theories are less dubious than those proposed by other philosophers, he warns that ‘the opinions held by Aristotle regarding the causes of the motions of the spheres […] are simple assertions for which no demonstration has been made.’52 Maimonides repeats this in a later chapter in a well-known passage, stating that Aristotle’s explanation of the sphere of the moon and that which is above it and about the order of intellects cannot be demonstrated and consequently amounts to pure conjecture.53 Interestingly, according to Maimonides, Aristotle was aware of the weakness of his arguments.54 In this regard Maimonides quotes a passage from De Caelo in which Aristotle states that his investigation of the spheres should not be ascribed either to temerity or boldness on his part, but rather to his desire to understand. Ibn Daud, by contrast, continues his critique by claiming that the philosophers overreached themselves and tried to understand things that are impossible for man to under- stand due to man’s inherent nature.55 Perhaps Maimonides’ observations

50. Emunah, 67.22-24. 51. Emunah, 67.24-36. 52. Moreh Nevukhim, II.3, transl. p. 254. 53. Moreh Nevukhim, II.22, transl. p. 319-320. 54. Moreh Nevukhim, II.19, transl. p. 307, cf. I.31 (transl. p. [65]) where Maimonides states that the philosophers acknowledge that man’s intellect is also limited. 55. Emunah, 67.6-68.1. At Emunah, 67.43-68.1 Ibn Daud describes the philosopher who thinks he can know everything as someone ‘who cannot lift one pound but tries to lift 1000 kikar or 0479-07_St.Rosenthaliana_40_02 23-12-2008 11:24 Pagina 22

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about Aristotle testify to his awareness that other authors, such as Ibn Daud, had a different and perhaps more negative appreciation of the efforts of the philosophers.

In sum, resemblances can be found between the two philosophers in spe- cific doctrines, interpretations of biblical verses, framework, motivation and more generally, the system of thought as well as limits to the capac- ity of reason. Moreover, in some instances Maimonides may have been reacting to positions held by Ibn Daud. It is therefore hard to believe that Maimonides was not familiar with his older contemporary’s work. In which case it is quite possible that Maimonides’ reference to ‘one of the later Andalusians’ is indeed directed at Ibn Daud. No other Andalu- sian pre-Maimonidean Jewish philosopher displays as many parallels to Maimonides’ thought as his immediate predecessor. In my view, the spe- cific parallels singularly and collectively indicate that Maimonides knew and used Ibn Daud’s book. The alternative would be to ascribe all paral- lels to common sources: Islamic philosophers, Jewish predecessors and . This would be problematic, especially given the obvi- ous similarities between Ibn Daud’s chapter on angels and Maimonides’ discussion in the Guide. That a number of parallels with this chapter are found at the start of the Guide, together with a major parallel at the end of the Guide is especially significant. However, it is hard to determine the true extent of Ibn Daud’s influence. Moreover, he too had his predecessors, and some of the sim- ilarities noted here can also be found in the works of earlier Jewish philosophers.56 In particular he appears to have been influenced by Halevi, whom he mentions as little as Maimonides mentions Ibn Daud. Indeed, it is Halevi’s position that philosophy leads to indifference to

more’. Perhaps this statement is echoed in Moreh Nevukhim, I.31 where Maimonides observes that ‘the fact that man is able to carry 200 weights does not mean that he is able to carry ten’ (transl. Pines, p. 65). Another passage where Ibn Daud expresses his reservations concerning human knowl- edge is Emunah, 87.6-13. Here the context is divine knowledge, cf. Moreh Nevukhim, III.20, transl. p. 482. 56. As for Maimonides’ acquaintance with other earlier Jewish philosophers, cf I. Twersky’s claim that ‘Bahya ibn Pakuda […] and Abraham ibn Ezra exerted considerable influence on Mai- monides’ in his review of Pines’s translation of the Guide, Speculum 41/3 (1967), p. 558, and especially Kreisel, op. cit. (1991), p. 95-121. 0479-07_St.Rosenthaliana_40_02 23-12-2008 11:24 Pagina 23

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the commandments that led Ibn Daud to use philosophy in defence of free will. For him the philosophical proof of free will is the basis and paves the way to love of God and to acceptance of the commandments. In other words, Halevi and Ibn Daud present two different (although not diametrically opposed) paradigms for the usefulness of philosophy in understanding religion. As for Halevi, Kreisel has suggested that his views may offer a ‘subtle contribution to Maimonides’ thought on a number of questions’.57 We may even go a step further and suggest that the two alternatives presented by Halevi and Ibn Daud provided Mai- monides with a basis on which to build his system. As for Ibn Daud, perhaps Emunah provided Maimonides with a model from which to draw inspiration and on which to improve. He may have disapproved of Ibn Daud’s extensive use of Ibn Sina, whom Maimonides valued con- siderably less than al-Farabi. In short, Maimonides may have devised his Moreh Nevukhim in part as a correction of Ibn Daud’s Emunah, the first attempt to integrate the teachings of the Muslim Aristotelians into a Jewish philosophic .

Maimonides as Epigone

What are the implications of all this for Maimonides’ position as a role model and his place in the history of epigonism? Crucially, to what extent did Maimonides, the Jewish philosopher par excellence, who pre- sented his work as a , break new ground? Clearly, it is not his system of thought as such that accounts for his tremendous impact on those who followed him, since as far as the system itself is concerned, it was Abraham ibn Daud who pioneered new answers to the Muslim philosophers. Maimonides elaborated on an existing model and followed the trend rather than set it. Since he has no claim to originality in that respect, this clearly places him in the category of epigone. However, originality is a problematic criterion since it involves applying modern ideas about innovative speculation to medieval authors whose understanding of originality may have been quite different.58 A

57. Kreisel, op. cit., p. 105. Kreisel notes that the question requires more research. 58. Cf. S. Harvey, Falaquera’s Epistle of the Debate: An Introduction to Jewish Philosophy (Cam- bridge, Mass 1987), p. xiv, n. 15. 0479-07_St.Rosenthaliana_40_02 23-12-2008 11:24 Pagina 24

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brief examination of Ibn Daud’s perception of his own efforts in relation to those of earlier thinkers shows that unlike the author of the Guide, he does not pretend that his Emunah is a creatio ex nihilo. Nevertheless, Ibn Daud displays a sense of self-awareness and newness by denying the rel- evance of both Saadya’s Emunot and Ibn Gabirol’s Meqor Hayyim to his discussion, and stating that it was the absence of a suitable work on the subject that prompted him to write his book.59 While his motive may in part be a topos to establish the work’s legitimacy, it is interesting that he emphasises that he has presented new ideas elsewhere too. For example in a passage in which he provides a new interpretation of Deuteronomy 14:11 based on a grammatical analysis, claiming that this verse had never been correctly interpreted before,60 while in his discussion of Exodus 33:12 he states that his contemporaries failed to explain this verse accord- ing to the teachings of ‘the men of speculation’ (iyyun).61 His general explanation of the names of God is especially illuminating in this respect: he justifies his unprecedented procedure by asserting that it is the only way to solve the contradiction in the relevant biblical verses and that up to his own day no satisfactory explanation of this chapter had been presented.62 Both Ibn Daud and Maimonides considered their work to be inno- vative. But what makes it new or original? Ibn Daud appears to answer this when he defends his novel explanation of certain biblical verses. This passage is important in that it shows how Ibn Daud understood origi- nality and newness: he did not devise a new approach simply to be orig- inal, but to provide an answer to the challenge that contemporary phi- losophy posed to tradition. Ibn Daud felt that he had to meet this need – the same need that Maimonides sensed a few decades later. Essentially, their response to contemporary challenges stems from their commitment to tradition, hence their originality should be under- stood within the framework of tradition. It is bound up with their con- cern for a correct understanding and explication of tradition. Their orig- inality lies in the creativity with which they presented new philosophical

59. Emunah, introduction, 2.35-3.6. 60. Emunah, 85.35. 61. Emunah, 83.1-4. 62. Emunah, 89.4-13. 0479-07_St.Rosenthaliana_40_02 23-12-2008 11:24 Pagina 25

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interpretations of biblical terms and passages that solved imminent prob- lems. Yet this originality also embraces a sense of continuity, since it forms part of the ongoing and timeless process of defence and actualisa- tion of Torah in response to changing perspectives and circumstances. Thus originality does not necessarily entail a break with tradition. In the time and place in which these philosophers worked, their new, philo- sophical approach involved change rather than revolution. However, for later generations and in other regions Maimonides’ Moreh Nevukhim was indeed revolutionary, so that Maimonides ceases to be an epigone. While the Great Eagle certainly had epigonic qualities, other features conventionally attributed to epigones, such as mediocrity of thought and simplification clearly do not apply. On the contrary, not only did Maimonides eclipse his older contemporary with his mastery of halakhah and his charismatic personality; the Guide’s elaboration of the system presented in the Emunah is also far more sophisticated and pro- found. In a way, Maimonides’ position with regard to Ibn Daud and other pre-Maimonidean thinkers is similar to that of Saadya with regard to his predecessors Muqammas and Isaac Israeli with respect to the intro- duction of Kalam and into Jewish thought. As Sarah Stroumsa notes: ‘The role of pioneer belongs to these predecessors [i.e. Muqammas and Isaac Israeli – RF] who legitimise these influences and show the way for their integration into Judaism. It was then, Saadya who, creatively and systematically, shaped, smoothed the rough ends, and consolidated the foundations laid by his predecessors, and presented the outcome as ‘Jewish philosophy’, with an authority that his predeces- sors lacked.’63 Similarly, Maimonides built on his predecessors in a way that proved to be authoritative. Maimonides’ Guide is the culmination of a trend and at the same time it marks the beginning of a new trend, namely the story of the thir- teenth-century and later epigones of Jewish philosophy who were inspired by Maimonides’ study and disseminated his work. These epigones built on the foundations laid by their hero. Yet the great rabbi himself had not worked in a cultural vacuum. He was not an isolated

63. S. Stroumsa, ‘Saadya and ’, in: D.H. Frank and O. Leaman (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Jewish Philosophy (Cambridge 2003), p. 79. 0479-07_St.Rosenthaliana_40_02 23-12-2008 11:24 Pagina 26

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phenomenon. Just as epigones may occasionally innovate as well as prop- agate, those they follow may also respond creatively to existing trends, as well as invent. A teacher also learns. The contrast between precursor and epigone is therefore less stark than might be assumed, and the relation between the two should not be viewed as a strict divide. To the question whether Maimonides was an epigone, the answer must therefore be that while he, more than any other medieval thinker, inspired and gave rise to generations of epigones, even this most authoritative and creative figure may in some respects be viewed as an epigone.

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